SUDAN AND ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

INTRODUCTION

In this essay my aim would be mainly to try to clarify why and in which way Israel supported an African-

muslin country, such as Sudan. My article is also an attempt to define the complicate and instable relations

that occurred inside the African country that let foreign countries to support a particular faction rather the

another, such as Israel’s support to the Anya-Nya movement, the Southern Sudanese rebel movement.

First of all I will focus on the first Sudanese Civil War (1955-1972), making a short introduction about

the ethnic , cultural and political causes of the war, in order to sketch and understand the main events

happened during the war. Then I will try to analyze the ideology, the political and economical reasons of

Israeli foreign policy in the Horn of Africa and in the Sub-Saharan Africa, and finally I will develop Israeli

foreign Policy toward Sudan, in particular during the first civil war. It is also my intention to give some hints

about how, since the first Sudanese Civil War, some alliances were already quite clear and developed after,

during the second civil war (1983-2005), and resists also after the proclamation of independence of the

South Sudan (9 July 2011).

CHAPTER I: HOW ETHNICY, CULTURE AND POLICY IN SUDAN INFLUENCED THE FIRST CIVILE WAR (1955-1972)

When medieval Arab travelers arrived in Sudan called it “Bilad al-Sudan”, literally meaning the land of

the blacks1, but a lot of differences between the Southern region and the northern one have always existed.

The Southern region is inhabited by numerous African ethnic groups corresponding to three major linguistic

groups: Sudanic, Western Nilotes, and Eastern Nilotes2, where Sudanic people are divided into the Moru-

Madi and the Azande. The Moru-Madi were the first inhabitants of Southern Sudan, while Azande occupy a

vast area in the heart of Africa, including the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of

Congo. Nilotes are distributed over a large area of northeast Africa and Southern Sudan; it is possible to

divide them into Western and Eastern Nilotes. The first ones can be distinguished into Dinka-Nuer and the

Lwo-speaking, they are the largest ethnic group in Sudan, Dinka lead a nomadic life style, while Nuer are

1 S.S.POGGIO, The First Sudanese Civil War. Africans, Arabs, and Israelis in the Southern Sudan,1955-1972, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p.9.

2 E.O’BALLANCE, Sudan, Civil War, and Terrorism, 1956-1999, London, Macmillan, 2000.1

pastoralist and occupy both banks of the White Nile.3 Easter Nilotes are related and claim a common

ancestors, for this reason can be gathered in a unique group called Kuku.

What it is important to notice in this fragmentation inside the Southern region is that the boundaries

which separate it from its neighbors are artificial, since they are the product of Egyptian-English colonial

administration. Thus, some ethnic groups such Azande have settlement in Congo and others like Nuer

occupy part of Western Ethiopia.

Really different is the ethnic and cultural situation in the North Sudan, where the arrival of the Arabs in

the sixteenth century changed completely the preexisting structure, forcing Nuba people to retreat to the

Nuba mountains4, and imposing in the territory the Arab culture, language and religion. The process of

Arabization and Islamization carried on in the Centuries produced identity problems in the Sudanese men

closed between being “African” and being “Arab”. To worsen the situation, the Arabs, especially those of

the Gulf Countries, used to see Northern Sudanese not as “Arabs”, but as “abid”, slave in Arabic5. African

Arabs were seen at the periphery of the Arab identity.

Despite this sense of inferiority felt by northern Sudanese, during the decades they have managed to

create alliances and diplomatic relations with countries in Nord Africa, in the Middle East and in Sub-

Saharan Africa. Besides, they were able to exercise economic and political power over the whole Sudan,

with the result that the Sudanese economy, private and public institutions, and foreign affairs were

dominated by people from the North, while the vast majority of the black African Sudanese have been

marginalized. This situation created the seeds for a conflict between North and South Sudan.

One consideration should be done on the fact that, when Sudan gained its independence from Egypt

on January 1, 1956, were the educated and highly politicized elite in Khartoum who inherited the political

and economical power from Egypt and Great Britain. Instead of creating a unique African-Arab civilization

and reorganizing the richness of African, Arab and European civilization, they decided to keep all the

powers in their hands and to exclude the majority of African black people. The neglected South attempted

to rise its voice, in particular about the new matter of creating a federal government, but northern leaders

baked away from commitments to create it, because that would mean giving the south substantial

autonomy.6

What let the civil war started was when, on 18 August 1955, some members of the British-administered

Sudan Defense Force Equatorial Corps mutinied in Torit, one of the most important city in the Southern

Sudan. The cause of the mutiny was a trial of a southern member of the national assembly and a false 3 For further information about Nilotes see the anthropologist E.E. EVANS-PRITCHARD, The Nuer: A description

of the models of livelihood and political institution of a nilotic people, New York, Oxford University Press, 1940.4 S. MUSA RAHHAL, The right to be Nuba: The story of a Sudanese People’s struggle for survival, Lawrenceville,

N.J., Red Sea, 2001, pp.6-8. 5 S.S. POGGIO, Ibid.,. p.18.6 E. O'BALLANCE, “The Secret War in the Sudan: 1955–1972”, Hamden, Connecticut, Archon Books, 1977, p. 41.

2

telegram urging northern administrators in the South to oppress Southerners. The most of the mutinies

were suppressed, while survivors came to the towns and began an uncoordinated insurgency in rural areas.

What happened in Torit was not just a simple mutiny, but as professor Poggio stated “[…] was a

rebellion by Southern patriots against all forms of injustice imposed on the South by the Nord. It was the

first attempt by African people in Southern Sudan to express their political aspirations, their strong belief in

African nationalism, and above all, their assertion of Africanism over Arabism.”(POGGIO,2008:194)

The rebels in rural areas were poorly armed and bad organized, this kind of guerrilla, was a little threat

to the ex-colonial power and to the newly formed Sudanese government. Nevertheless, the insurgents

gradually developed into a secessionist movement composed of mutineers and southern students. These

groups formed, what was called, the Anya-Nya guerrilla army, which arose determined to seek

independence for the South. Starting from Equatoria, the region where the mutiny take place, between

1963 and 1969 Anya-Nya spread throughout the other two southern provinces: Upper Nile and Bahr al

Ghazal.7

The instable government was not able to take advantage of rebels’ internal ethnic divisions and

weaknesses, since the first independent government of Sudan, led by Prime Minister Ismail al-Azhari, was

quickly replaced by a coalition of various conservative forces, which was overthrown in the coup d'état in

1958. Popular dissatisfactions for the military government provoked protests that led to a creation of an

instable government in 1964, which bought another military coup in 1969.8

At this point, what is important to underline in my analyzes , is how this struggle between the southern

independent movement and the Khartoum government became internationalized. The First Sudanese Civil

War was seen in the framework of the Cold War tension between East and West and in the contest

between Israel and the Arab power. In fact, by 1969 the rebels had developed foreign contacts to obtain

weapons and supplies. Israel, for example, trained Anya Nya recruits and shipped weapons via Ethiopia and

Uganda to the rebels. Anya Nya also purchased arms from Congolese rebels and collected money for them

in the south and from among southern Sudanese exile communities in the Middle East, Western Europe,

and North America. The rebels also captured arms, equipment, and supplies from government troops.9

Government operations against the rebels declined after the 1969 coup. However, when negotiations

failed to result in a settlement, Khartoum increased troop strength in the south to about 12,000 in 1969,

and intensified military activity throughout the region. In that period the Soviet Union revealed to be the

biggest supplier of weapons for the Sudanese government. USSR has always regarded the Red Sea region as

strategically important for consolidating its influence in the Middle East and in Indian Ocean. For this

7 E. O'BALLANCE, Ibid., 1977, p.628 For more detailed information about the history of Sudan see M. H. FADLALLA, Short History of Sudan,

iUniverse, 2004.9 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/sudan-civil-war1.htm

3

reason, in the late 1960s it increased also its help arising to $100 million the arms agreement with Sudan.

In this way it granted aid that would allow the government to continue to prosecute the war. During this

period, in fact, Sudan obtained some Soviet-manufactured weapons from Egypt, most of which went to the

Sudanese air force. By the end of 1969, however, the Soviet Union had shipped unknown quantities of

85mm antiaircraft guns, sixteen MiG-21s, and five Antonov-24 transport aircraft.10

In 1971 Joseph Lagu, who had become the leader of the southern forces, proclaimed the creation of the

Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM). Anya-Nya leaders became united behind him, and nearly all

exiled southern politicians supported the SSLM. This was the first time in the history of the civil war that the

separatist movement had a unified command structure able to accomplish the aim of secession and the

formation of an independent state in South Sudan.

The Sudanese government believed it could stop the fighting and stabilize the region by granting

regional self-governments. By October 1971, Khartoum had established contact with the SSLM. After

consultations, a conference between SSLM and Sudanese government delegations was held in Addis Ababa,

Ethiopia, in February 1972. Initially, the southerners demanded a federal state with a separate southern

government and an army that would come under the federal president's command only in response to an

external threat to Sudan. Eventually, however, the two sides, with the help of Ethiopia's Emperor Haile

Selassie, reached an agreement.11 What deserves notice is that Ethiopia’s emperor was not the only actor

who promoted a peaceful agreement. The mediation of the leaders of the World Council of Churches

(WWC) and the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC), which had proved material and financial

resources to the Southern Sudanese refugees in the neighboring countries, together with the Church World

Service (CWS) of New York, became instrumental in facilitating peace talks between the Khartoum

administration and the SSLM. In exchange for ending their armed uprising, southerners were granted a

single southern administrative region with defined powers. For example, the cabinet named by the regional

president would be responsible for all aspects of regional government except such areas as defense,

foreign affairs, currency and finance, economic and social planning, which were dominion of the central

authority.12

Unfortunately, the Addis Ababa Agreement revealed to be only a temporary respite. Infringements by

the north, due to the weakness of the agreement, led to increase civil disorders in the south. They started

in the mid-1970s and brought to the 1983 army mutiny with the result of the Second Sudanese Civil War.

The main reasons of the weakness of the Addis Ababa agreement are underlined by the professor Poggio as

“failures in clarifying the position of the North in terms of central authority” (POGGIO,2008:191). He

continues with examples: “[…]For instance, although the South possessed mineral resources, the North, as

10 S.S. POGGIO, Ibid., p.167.11 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/sudan-civil-war1.htm12 Ibid.

4

central authority, controlled these resources. The North also neglected to provide financially for the

regional government, […]. The agreement moreover failed to clarify the financial needs of the regional

government, and the South depended primarily on the national treasury in Khartoum.”

(POGGIO,2008:191).

CHAPTER II: ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD EAST AND SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

At this point it is essential to analyze the history and the ideology of Israel to understand why it decided

to intervene and support a lot of East African and Sub-Saharan African state, and in which way it shaped

and influenced their policies.

It was on 14 May 1948 when David Ben-Gurion, the Executive Head of the World Zionist Organization

and president of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, declared "the establishment of a Jewish state in Eretz

Israel, to be known as the State of Israel," an independent state upon the termination of the British

Mandate for Palestine, 15 May 1948.13

Since its proclamation, the main objective of Israeli foreign policy was to mobilize all the resources of

diplomacy for its protection and preservation. From 1948 to 1950, Israel adopted a policy of non-alignment

and as such, it tried to have contact with the independent states of Asia, the geographic region to which it

belongs. Unfortunately Israel was not able to establish diplomatic relations with many Asian countries.

Besides, Arab/Muslim states of Asia refused any diplomatic contact with it.

Consequentially, one of the plausible reason why he sought the support of the African states was Israeli

disappointment with the Afro-Asian Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia from 18 to 24, 1955. It

provoked a shock to Israel because it showed the growing hostility on the part of non-aligned world.14

Twenty-nine countries participated, among them fourteen were Arab and Muslims, also Palestinian leaders

were there. Israel was not invited to attend because Arab/Muslims pressure. Moreover, a resolution hostile

to Israel was adopted, supporting the Palestinian. As a consequence, in spring of 1957, when Gahna gained

its independence, Ben-Gurion asked him to establish an Israeli Legation there, affirming that it had to stop

the encirclement by a hostile Arab world and build bridges to the emerging nations on the black continent.

Israel adopted the policy of establishing friendly relations, greater identification and international

alignment with as many emerging Sub-Saharan African nations as possible. We can divide Israel’s relation

13 http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Declaration+of+Establishment+of+State+of+Israel.htm

14 A. ODED, Africa in Israeli Foreign Policy-Expectation and Disenchantment: Historical and Diplomatic Aspects , Israel Studies, vol.15, n.3, Special Issue: The making of Israeli Foreign Policy / Guest Editors: Gabriel Shaffer and Nathan Adrian, Fall 2010, pp.122-124

5

with Africa into three main periods: The “Golden Years”, in the 1960s, when the majority of independent

states in Africa had diplomatic relations with Israel; the 1970s, after the Yom Kippur War of 1973, when

almost all African countries cut their relations with it; and in the 1980s and 1990s, with the return of Israel

to Africa.15

During the 1960s Israel established diplomatic relations with thirty-three American countries. 16 As I

already stated, the main political motivation was to preserve the condition of survival of the Jewish people

bringing international respectability to Israel. Consequentially, the achievement of a positive image in Africa

become a major goal for its foreign policy, where the idea of respectability was not also a political goal, but

also include an economic, social and moral character of the Jewish state.17

Besides political aims there were also pragmatics motives that led Israel entry to Africa, such as

economic and commercial interests. First of all, we have to underline the strategic position of the Horn of

Africa: Ethiopia and Eritrea are geographically close to Israel and the Red Sea had a peculiar importance in

order to assure maritime passage to Southern Africa, while the ports of Kenya and Tanzania were important

for Israeli cargo on their way to the Far East and the Southern Africa. Furthermore Africa, in general, is rich

in row materials. Israeli idea was to import them directly and sell there its industrial products. We have to

mention also the Islamic factor as strategic. As it is reported by the Israeli scholar Arye Oded, one-third of

the African population is Muslim, therefore the economic and social cooperation with them might keep

calm the Arab-Israeli conflict. (ODED,2010:125).

Essential to understand Israeli foreign policy is ideology, what is called “sense of messianic mission”

(CAROL,2012:37). The professor Carol continue stating: “ […]Throughout the century of dispersion, Jews

have maintained an extraordinary bond with the Bible, a belief in the concept of the Chosen People and a

vision of a unique role in the messianic era to unfold.” (CAROL,2012:38). As the prophet Isaiah 49:6, stated

in the Old Testament: “ I will also give thee [Israel], for the light to the nation, that My salvation may be

unto the end of the earth.”18 The messianic mission is also tied to emotional and humanitarian causes:

Israel also felt a sense of identification and partnership of fate with Africans. Since the Jewish people were

long victims of racial discrimination, felt affinity for the Africans.

Concretely, Israel was willing to contribute in the nation-building and development to the newly

independent countries in Africa through assistance programs, establishing special institutions for the

training of young local people. Golda Meir herself, Israeli Prime Minister in 1969, invested much time and

energy in the Israeli-Africa relations: she visited Ghana in 1958 and she carried on strong ties with Kenya.

15 Ibid., p.122.16 Ibid., p.122. 17 S.CAROL, From Jerusalem to the Lion of Judah and beyond: Israel’s Foreign Policy in East Africa, iUniverse,

2012, p.29.18 The Holy Scripture, Tel Aviv, Israel, Sinai Publishing, 1967, p.997.

6

She used to highlight how the motives for Israel entrance to Africa were a mixture of political and

humanitarian reasons: as for the political, in the 1950s, Israel felt isolated by the Arab pressure from the

world, as for the humanitarian, international cooperation programs and technical aid were carried on

successfully.19

Israeli activity was not limited to humanitarian and political affairs, but also to technical: technical

cooperation, especially training personnel for agriculture, irrigation, development of arid zone was one of

the primary aim in Israeli foreign policy. In particular, a special unit was created called MASHAV (Hebrew

acronym for the Center for International Cooperation), which in the 1960s became a large division that

collaborate with international organization, among them the U.N. agencies. Another important training

institute was the Afro-Asian Institute for Labor and Cooperative Studies. In the training centers, between

the years 1958 and 1971, thousands of Africans and students from the Third World were trained. MASHAV

sent 4,341 Israeli experts abroad; among them 2,763 worked in Africa, the majority in agricultural

projects.20 What is important to underline is that Israel’s technical cooperation had positive reactions in

Africa and influence positively the idea of Israel’s presence in the Third World, especially during the 1960s.

The MASHAV technical cooperation also had an impact on the reestablishment of diplomatic relations

between Israel and Africa in the 1980s and 1990s. (ODED,2010:131).

The “Golden Years” came to an end with the Six-Day War of 1967 fought by Israel and the

neighboring states of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. As it is reported by the professor Carol it was a “watershed

of Israeli-African relations” (CAROL,2012:381). Israel revealed to have a strong military power in the Middle

East, besides, it occupied the Egyptian territory, which acquisition was by force. This fact was seen as a

threat for other neighboring African states. As a result, the new emerging idea about Israeli occupation of

the area won, was to see the Jewish state as an imperial western country supported mainly by US.

In the early 1970s the African countries began to frozen the relationship with Israel, in a process

that peaked in 1973 with the Yom Kippur war. Such a deterioration of relations was also to attribute to the

fact that Arab countries influenced the African ones in order to take advantages from them. As professor

Oded remember to us “[…] Nine member countries of the Arab League belong to the OAU (ed. Organization

of African Unity) to which Israel had no access. In fact, ever since the OAU was founded, in 1963, its Arab

delegates had persevered in their efforts to include the Arab-Israeli conflict on the agenda of the OAU. The

Arab countries were successful in exploiting the fact that about one-third of Africa’s population is Muslim.”

(ODED,2010:133).

Arabs’ strategy was to promote their cause by increasing Islamic activities against Israel. When

Muammar Qadhafi assumed power in Libya in 1969, he followed Abd ál-Nasir’s aim to remove Israel from

19 A. ODED, Ibid., p.12620 MASHAV, Annual Reports, 1958–1971

7

Africa. He also threatened jihad against Ethiopia and Chad because they were still supporting Israel, while

to others, such as Uganda, Niger and Gabon he offered financial reward, since they severed their relations

with Israel.

The process of frozen the ties with Israel started with Guinea, in 1967, followed with Uganda in

1972, where the president Amin, close friend of Israel decided to severe its relations mainly because Israel

refused to furnish his country with an exaggerate amount of money and weapons. As a consequence, the

president went to Qadhafi; the Libyan chief agreed to assist him financially and militarily only on condition

that he expelled all the Israelis from Uganda.21 Precisely, since 1973, Libya and other Arab countries

intensified their financial, political and diplomatic efforts in Africa in order to prevent Israel from coming

back there.

The most remarkable thing to put attention on, was how Israel continued, in that period, to have

informal and practical relations with these African countries. In fact, for examples, a lot of African scholars

attended international conferences in Israel, while in Nigeria and in Kenya Israelis continued their business

in their companies.

The return to Africa was gradual and started in the early 1980s. The main reasons for the

rapprochement recognized by the professor Oded, were, first of all, the peace between Israel and Egypt,

which started with Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, completed in 1982. Furthermore, the Oslo Accord in 1993,

between Israel and Palestine and the peace treaty with Jordan in 1994, not only helped the process of

restoration the relations between Africa and Israel, but also helped the image of Israel. Important was also

the fact that since the 1990s many African countries stated to fear the radical Islamism supported by Libya,

Iran and Sudan, and, as a consequence, they saw Israeli support as a way to reduce the menace. Last, but

not least, were the outcomes of the Soviet Union disintegration: pro-Soviet countries such as Angola,

Mozambique and Ethiopia, established or renewed diplomatic relations with Israel. (ODED,2010:137).

After the analysis of the trend of bilateral relation between Africa and Israel we have to point out

how Israeli foreign policy has become, during the years, more selective, realistic and pragmatic, based on

mutual interests and adaptable to the ever-changing international climate (CAROL,2012:387). The

enthusiasm and the ideological motivation have been replaced by pragmatic considerations and economic

and strategic outputs.

In fact, technical cooperation, currently, is still strong and updated, since Israeli companies are

engaged in communication, computerization and infrastructure projects.

21 For further information about Israel and Uganda relation see A.ODED, Uganda and Israel – The history of a complex relationship, Jerusalem, Hebrew, 2002.

8

Nowadays Israel has only nine embassies in African key countries: Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, South

Africa, Nigeria, Senegal, Cote d’Ivoire, Angola, and Cameroon.22

CHAPTER III: ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD SUDAN

After giving general ideas about the trend of Israeli foreign policy in Africa from his proclamation till

nowadays, I want to focus now on diplomatic, economic and military relation toward Sudan. What the

professor of Middle Eastern history at United States Air Force Academy , Jacob Abadi affirmed how Israel-

Sudanese relations were unique for their secrecy and inconsistency, mainly because of the result of

Sudanese political instability.23

Since Sudan gained its independence, in 1956, bilateral contacts were established with Israel, but

the instable nature of the Sudanese state, caused mainly by inter-tribal conflicts, made them discontinuous

and the most of the times secrete. Till 1958 military coup, Khartoum had pro-Western orientation, but with

the general Abbud, Sudanese foreign policy changed for supporting the Egyptian president Nasser and

severing contact with Israel.24 After another coup in 1969, Nimeiri came to power. Just to have a brief view

of the presidential history of Sudan, Nimeiri in the 1980s imposed an Islamic regime ruled by Sharia, such

radical choice threatened Israel and other African neighboring countries. Another military coup in 1985

brought Sadiq al-Mahdi to the government, which remained to the power until 1989 coup, when the actual

Omar al-Bashir take the control of the state. With the influence Hassan al-Turabi, an Islamic politician, they

adopted extremely hostile attitude toward Israel.25

What I want to demonstrate is how Israel, despite the anti-Israeli policy adopted during the history

of the independent Sudan, could establish episode of bilateral cooperation. As stated by the professor

Abadi: “ […] The bilateral contact were a result of pragmatic consideration on both sides.” (ABADI,1999:20).

Examples could be in the fact that, since its independence, Sudan was looking for securing itself from

foreign attacks. On the other side Israel wanted to establish a huge arsenal on Sudanese territory, in order

22 Data are update to 2010 and refers to A. ODED, Africa in Israeli Foreign Policy-Expectation and Disenchantment: Historical and Diplomatic Aspects , Israel Studies, vol.15, n.3, Special Issue: The making of Israeli Foreign Policy / Guest Editors: Gabriel Shaffer and Nathan Adrian, Fall 2010 .

23 J.ABADI, Israel and Sudan: the saga of enigmatic Relationship, Middle Eastern Studies, London, Vol.35, July 1999, No.3 p.19.

24 J.LEFEBVRE, Middle East Conflicts and Middle-Level Power Intervention in the Horn of Africa, Middle East Journal, Vol.50, No.3, Summer 1996, p.390

25 For more detailed information about the history of Sudan see M. H. FADLALLA, Short History of Sudan, iUniverse, 2004

9

to support African and middle Eastern countries which asked help to it, but also in order to have them as

allies. (ABADI,1999:21).

Evidences of bilateral cooperation where mainly on economic sphere. In fact Sudan was still under

Egyptian domination and used to export its agricultural products and cattle to Israel, until 1950, when the

Egyptian government decided to force the Italian vessel Dimavo, on the way to Israel, to stop and open its

cargo of cotton-seed in Port Sudan. London, concerned about good relationships between Sudan and Israel,

affirmed that Egypt had no legal right to ban Sudanese trade with Israel, as it was subject of internal Sudan

legislation.26 Anyway the most important thing, at that time, was not to deteriorate relations between

Egypt and Israel, therefore they treat the matter as an isolate incident. Since Sudan and Israel economic

cooperation was in any case restricted, Egypt would recompense the Sudanese losses.27

Another episode of bilateral cooperation, in this case in political field, was at the eve of Sudanese

independence. The Umma Party was looking for possible allies to support an Independent Sudan, and since

Egypt was their common enemy, Israel could be the potential figure that could help Sudan. Israel, in fact

with its influence in the western world, especially in United States and Great Britain, could intercede on

Sudan for financial, economic and political independence and stability.

Anyway, the most remarkable and influential aid was given by Israel to support, not Sudanese

government, but the Anya-Nya separatist movement during the first Sudanese Civil War. They were

predominately Christian blacks, fighting against northern Arab/Muslims, and, as it is reported by the

professor Abadi, this Israeli action had the strategic aim to support dissident minorities in Arab countries,

such as supporting Kurds in Iraq and Druze in Syria. (ABADI, 1999:22).

It’s interesting to notice how, this military relations has begun. In June 1967 , Lagu, one of the most

important figure in the separatist southern movement, after the Six-Say War, wrote to Israeli prime

minister to congratulate him on the victory of Israeli forces over the Arab. Lagu was also fighting the Arabs

in Southern Sudan and if Israel supported the Anya-Nya forces, he would defeat the Sudanese army,

making difficult for Sudan to sent troops to Support Egypt in Sinai. Israel accepted, and from then till the

Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972, he consistently sent military assistance and training to Southern Sudan.28

Anyway, by the time Lagu contacted Israel, Israelis had already diplomatic relations with Kenya, Uganda,

Ethiopia and Congo. Among them, Emperor Selassie of Ethiopia let Israel to use its airspace for military

trainings and for the training of Anya-Nya soldiers. Indeed, Selassie was sympathetic to Southern Sudan, as

26 G. R. WARBURG, The Sudan and Israel: an Episode in Bilateral Relations” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.28, No.2, April 1992, pp. 385-387

27 Remember that the trade in that period was all in one direction from Sudan to Israel. The figures show the decrease in trades as follows: in 1949 - £540,000, in 1950- £726,000, in 1951 - £697,000, in 1952- £343,000 and in 1953 - £8,000. For further details about this episode see WARBURG, The Sudan and Israel: an Episode in Bilateral Relations Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.28, No.2, April 1992, pp.385-96.

28 S.S. POGGIO, The First Sudanese Civil War. Africans, Arabs, and Israelis in the Southern Sudan,1955-1972, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p.139

10

Khartoum government was supporting Eritrean guerrilla fighting for the independence from Ethiopia.29

Between 1963 and 1972 also the President of Kenya was sympathetic to the southern Sudanese cause, as

he permitted Israeli planes to refuel in Nairobi after dropping arms at Anya-Nya bases.30

Stepping back to the worsening of the diplomatic relationship between the Khartoum government

and Israel, we have to remember when before the Six Day war, Sudan sent a contingent of forces to Egypt.

In fact, despite the differences between the two countries, Sudan wanted to express solidarity to Nasser

and the other Arab countries. As a result, Khartoum severed its diplomatic relations with Israel and the

western countries. In December 1969 it signed the Tripoli Charter in which it declared to align its foreign

policy with Egypt and Libya. Therefore, in the 1970s, Sudan’s foreign policy supported Muammar Gaddafi’s

plan to mobilize all Arab states against Israel. During the Yom Kippur War, in 1973, Sudan tried to sent

soldiers to the Egyptian front. Consequentially, such forms of Arab solidarity did not pass unnoticed to

Israel, which, in response continued, and even increased its support to the Southern rebels. Back to 1971,

Khartoum attitude was more hostile than ever, since Israel was openly blamed by the Sudanese

government for helping rebels groups. Furthermore, also Sudan’s Communist Party, which was ideologically

anti-Israel, was even prone to have relations with Egypt and Libya in order to defeat Zionism. (ABADI,

1999:25).

The tension in the Israeli-Sudanese relations were reshaped with the Addis Ababa Agreement in

1972, which terminated Israeli involvement in Southern Sudan, for that moment. As a result, the

agreement improved temporarily Sudan’s relationships.

An episode of political and economic cooperation, which deserve to be mentioned, was when,

during the Seventies, Israelis wanted to turn Sudan into a huge arsenal containing arms to be used for

special projects, such as helping the son of the deposed Shah of Iran, to return to his country and removed

Khomeini’s regime. The political aim of such operation was the containment of the Islamic factor which was

spreading worldwide. On the other side, Sudan was paid generously by Israel for its sustain.31

What is also important in my analysis is to understand how the president Nimeiri (1969-1985) was

able to rule the country between a strong favoritism towards Palestine and the necessity to keep contact

with Israel. In fact, as soon as he come to power in 1969, Nimeiri's regime committed itself to the Arab

cause and to the struggle against Israel. Nevertheless, he did not want to ruin his image in Washington's

eyes, so he had to reduce his sympathy with the radicals in the Palestinian camp. Actually, it was only in the

29 Ibid., p. 15930 Ibid., p. 16131 More details about this operation are reported in J.ABADI, Israel and Sudan: the saga of enigmatic

Relationship, Middle Eastern Studies, London, Vol.35, No.3, July 1999, p.26

11

1980s when Nimeiri decided to moderate his behavior towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: he began

talking about negotiations and agreements as a way to solve Palestinian dilemma. (ABADI, 1999:29).

However, ties with the Islamic world were still strong and they led Khartoum in 1988 to recognize

the State of Palestine, on one side, and to give asylum to Palestine extremist, on the other. Furthermore,

according to United States reports cited in Abadi essay, Sudan accepted the sum of $30 million from Iran to

construct training camps for Muslim terrorists. (ABADI, 1999:30).

As a result, Israel started to be involved again in supporting the rebels in the South regions during

the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005). John Garang, leader of Sudan’s People’s Liberation Army

(SPLA), obtained shipments of weapons from Israel through Kenya. Therefore, as stated by Carol, the other

History professor in his book, the South Sudanese could not forget the assistance from Israel during the two

civil wars. As the Jewish State set the path to the nowadays independent south Sudan, Southern Sudanese

are grateful and still have economic, diplomatic and social ties with it. (CAROL,2012:376).

Stepping back to the history of Sudan, in 1993, it is important to remark how it was transformed

into an Islamic authoritarian single-party state with Bashir at the Government, and Turabi as influent

Islamic politician. As reported by Abadi in an Arabic television interview in 1994, the Islamic leader Bashir,

denounced publicly Israel for supplying arms to Garang and added that Israel had used it has a tool in the

imperialist campaign led by United States against Sudan. Besides, Israel was using Uganda, Ethiopia and

Eritrea in order to interfere in Sudanese affairs, using them as a base of operation against its country.

(ABADI,1999:32). To worsen even more the relation with Israel, Bashir expressed reservation to the Israeli-

Palestinian agreement, while Turabi was even more critical, expressing disappointment for Palestinian

surrender to the West. Turabi argued also that it was largely due to the existence of the Zionism lobby that

United States become hostile to Islam. However, in another interview always reported by Abadi, he denied

to provide asylum to the radical Hizballah, and he also denied any connection with Hamas.

(ABADI,1999:35)

Although all of these hostile declarations, episodes of bilateral cooperation continued, in particular

in security matters. The purpose was to involve Israel in a mediating role with US and to pressure the

Jewish state to limit its aid to Garang’s rebels in order to use it to improve Sudan’s economy.

As we have seen pragmatism was the key point in the bilateral relation between Sudan and Israel.

What we can understand from the analysis of the resources, is that Sudan as Islamic country, would

continue to denounce Israel foreign policy, but episode of secret or practical co-operation are likely to

reappear in the future.

CONCLUSION

12

With my essay I tried to give the main ideas about the dynamics of the Israel foreign policy and

about the history of the independent Sudan. I focused mainly on the first Sudanese Civil War (1955-1972),

making an effort to understand the causes and why the presence of international actors, such as Israel.

I also followed the current interpretation of the bilateral relations between Israel and Sudan, that

gives more relevance to the pragmatic aspect, rather than the ideological and the humanitarian one, which

was the first approach used by Israel in its diplomatic relations toward Africa.

Finally I also had the intention, with my work, to clarify the saga of these bilateral ties, which still

deserves more attentions and further studies, since the dynamics and complexity of the situation, are

constantly influenced by international changes.

BIBLIOGRAFY

13

A. ODED, Africa in Israeli Foreign Policy-Expectation and Disenchantment: Historical and Diplomatic Aspects,

Israel Studies, vol.15, n.3, Special Issue: The making of Israeli Foreign Policy / Guest Editors: Gabriel Shaffer

and Nathan Adrian, Fall 2010, pp.121-142.

E.E. EVANS-PRITCHARD, The Nuer: A description of the models of livelihood and political institution of a

nilotic people, New York, Oxford University Press, 1940.

E. O’BALLANC, Sudan, Civil War, and Terrorism, 1956-1999, London, Macmillan, 2000.

Holy Scripture, Tel Aviv, Israel, Sinai Publishing, 1967, p.997.

G. R. WARBURG, The Sudan and Israel: an Episode in Bilateral Relations” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.28,

No.2, April 1992, pp. 385-396.

J.ABADI, Israel and Sudan: the saga of enigmatic Relationship, Middle Eastern Studies, London, Vol.35, July

1999, No.3 p.19-41.

J.LEFEBVRE, Middle East Conflicts and Middle-Level Power Intervention in the Horn of Africa, Middle East

Journal, Vol.50, No.3, Summer 1996, p.387-404.

MASHAV, Annual Reports, 1958–1971.

M. H. FADLALLA, Short History of Sudan, iUniverse, 2004.

S. CAROL, From Jerusalem to the Lion of Judah and beyond: Israel’s Foreign Policy in East Africa, iUniverse,

2012.

S. MUSA RAHHAL, The right to be Nuba: The story of a Sudanese People’s struggle for survival,

Lawrenceville, N.J., Red Sea, 2001.

S. S. POGGIO, The First Sudanese Civil War. Africans, Arabs, and Israelis in the Southern Sudan,1955-1972,

New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

SITOGRAFIA

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/sudan-civil-war1.htm

http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/

Declaration+of+Establishment+of+State+of+Israel.htm

14