Summa Theologica - Thomas Aquinas

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F. INNOCENTIUS APAP. O.P., S.T.M.

Censor. Theol.

Emprimstnr.

EDUS. CANONICUS SURMONT.

VicARius Generalis.

WkSTMONASTIKII

APPROBATIO ORDINIS.

itihil Obshit.

F. RAPHAEL MOSS. O.P.. S.T.L.

F. LEO. MOORE, O.P., S.T.L.

Itttpximnivct.

F. BEDA JARRETT, O.P., S.T.L., A.M.

PriorProvinciaus Angli*.

Dit 7 /aHuarii, 19*1.



THE

SUMMA THEOLOGICAOF

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

PART I.

QQ. XXVII.—XLIX.

(2)

LITERALLY TRANSLATED BY

FATHERS OF THE ENGLISH DOMINICANPROVINCE

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LONDON

BURNS OATES & VVASHBOURNE LTDPITBLISHERS TO THE HOLY SEE



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LETTER FROM THE MASTER-GENERAL OF.

THE FRIAR PREACHERS.

COLLEGIO ANGELICO,

Roma, May 21st, 1911.

To the English Translators of the ' Summa Theologica ' of

St. Thomas.

Very Rev. and dear Fathers,

In translating into English the Summa Theologica of

St. Thomas, you undertake a work which will bring profit

to the Church and honour to the Dominican Order, and

which, I hope, will be acceptable even to the laity ; for

what was said of the great doctor by his contemporaries is

true for all time—that everybody can gather fruit from his

writings, which are within the grasp of all. As a matter of

fact, St. Thomas appeals to the light of reason, not in order

to weaken the ground of faith, which is the Divine Reason,

infinitely surpassing the reason of man, but, on the con-

trary, in order to increase the merit of faith by making us

adhere more firmly to His revelation. For we see thereby

how reasonable is our submission, how salutary it is to the

mind, how profitable for our guidance, how joyful to the

heart.

May your work contribute to this end Thus it will be

a sermon, preached through the press, by reason of its

diffusion and duration more fruitful than that preached by

word of mouth.

I bless you in our Holy Father, St. Dominic, and ask

the help of your prayers for the Order and for myself.

Fr. Hyacinth M. Cormier, O.P.,

Master-General.

Vll





CONTENTS

TREATISE ON THE TRINITYQUESTION PAGE

XXVII. THE PROCESSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS - - - 3XXVIII. THE DIVINE RELATIONS - - - - -14XXIX. THE DIVINE PERSONS - . . - - 25

XXX. THE PLURALITY OF PERSONS IN GOD - - 3^

XXXI. WHAT BELONGS TO THE UNITY AND PLURALITY IN GOD - 49

XXXII. THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVINE PERSONS - - - 60

XXXIII. OF THE PERSON OF THE FATHER - - - -72XXXIV. OF THE PERSON OF THE SON - - - - 83

XXXV. OF THE IMAGE - - - - - - 93

XXXVI. OF THE PERSON OF THE HOLY GHOST - - 97XXXVII. OF THE NAME OF THE HOLY GHOST—LOVE - - - 113

XXXVIII. OF THE NAME OF THE HOLY GHOST AS GIFT - - - 121

XXXIX. OF THE PERSONS IN RELATION TO THE ESSENCE - - I26

XL. OF THE PERSONS AS COMPARED TO THE RELATIONS OR PRO-

PERTIES ...--- 152

XLI. OF THE PERSONS IN REFERENCE TO THE NOTIONAL ACTS - 163

XLH. OF EQUALITY AND LIKENESS AMONG THE DIVINE PERSONS - I79

XLIII. THE MISSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS . - - 194

TREATISE ON THE CREATION

XLIV. THE PROCESSION OF CREATURES FROM GOD, AND OF THE

FIRST CAUSE OF ALL THINGS - - - 213

XLV. THE MODE OF EMANATION OF THINGS FROM' THE FIRST

PRINCIPLE .-.--- 222

XLVI. OF THE BEGINNING OF THE DURATION OF THE CREATURES - 242

XLVII. THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN GENERAL - - - 255

XLVni. THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN PARTICULAR - - 263

XLIX. THE CAUSE OF EVIL------ 277

tx





TREATISE ON THE TRINITY





THE SUMMA THEOLOGIGA

FIRST PART.

TREATISE ON THE TRINITY.

QUESTION XXVII.

THE PROCESSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS.

{In Five Articles.)

Having considered what belongs to the unity of the divine

essence, it remains to treat of what belongs to the Trinity

of the persons in God. And because the divine Persons are

distinguished from each other according to the relations

of origin, the order of doctrine leads us to consider firstly,

the question of origin or procession ; secondly, the relations

of origin ;thirdly, the persons.

Concerning procession there are five points of in-

quiry :

(i) Whether there is procession in God? (2) Whether

any procession in God can be called generation ?

(3) Whether there can be any other procession in God

besides generation ? (4) Whether that other procession

can be called generation ? (5) Whether there are more

than two processions in God ?

First Article,

whether there is procession in god?

We proceed thus to the First Article —Objection i. It would seem that there cannot be any

procession in God. For procession signifies outward move-

ment. But in God there is nothing mobile, nor anything

extraneous. Therefore neither is there procession in Godt



Q. 27. Art. i. THE *' SUMMA THEOLOGICA '-^

4

Obj. 2. Further, everything which proceeds differs from

that whence it proceeds. But in God there is no diversity

but supreme simpHcity. Therefore in God there is noprocession.

Obj. 3. Further, to proceed from another seems to be

against the nature of the first principle. But God is the

first principle, as shown above (Q. II., A. 3). Therefore

in God there is no procession.

On the contrary, Our Lord says. From God I proceeded

(Jo. viii. 42).

/ answer that, Divine Scripture uses, in relation to God,

names which signify procession. This procession has been

differently understood. Some have understood it in the

sense of an effect proceeding from its cause; so Arius took

it, saying that the Son proceeds from the Father as His

primary creature, and that the Holy Ghost proceeds fromthe Father and the Son as the creature of both. In this

sense neither the Son nor the Holy Ghost would be true

God : and this is contrary to what is said of the Son,

That . . . we may be in His true Son. This is the true

God (i John v. 20). Of the Holy Ghost it is also said.

Know you not that your members are the temple of the

Holy Ghost? (i Cor. vi. 19.) Now, to have a temple is

God's prerogative. Others take this procession to mean the

cause proceeding to the effect, as moving it, or impressing

its own likeness on it ; in which sense it was understood by

.Sabellius, who said that God the Father is called Son in

assuming flesh from the Virgin, and that the Father also is

calledHoly Ghost

in sanctifying the rational creature, and

moving it to life. The words of the Lord contradict such

a meaning, when He speaks of Himself, The Son cannot of

Himself do anything (John v. 19); while many other

passages show the same, whereby we know that the Father

is not the Son. Careful examination shows that both of

these opinions take procession as meaning an outward act;

hence neither of them affirms procession as existing in GodHimself; whereas, since procession always supposes action,

and as there is an outward procession corresponding to

the act tending to external matter, so there must be an





Q. 27. Art. 2. THE *^ SUMMA THEOLOGICA 6

A. 2.), the divine lWofcI is of necessity perfectly one with

the source whence He proceeds, without any kind of

diversity.

Reply OBj. 3. To proceed from a principle, so as to be

something outside and distinct from that principle, is irre-

concilable with the idea of a first principle ; whereas an

intimate and uniform procession by way of an intelligible

act is included in the idea of a first principle. For when we

call the builder the principle of the house, in the idea of

such a principle is included that of his art ; and it would be

included in the idea of the first principle were the builder

the first principle of the house. God, Who is the first

principle of all things, may be compared to things created

as the architect is to things designed.

Second Article.

whether any procession in god can be called

generation ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—Objection i. It would seem that no procession in God

can be called generation. For generation is change from

non-existence to existence, and is opposed to corruption;

while matter is the subject of both. Nothing of all this

belongs to God. Therefore generation cannot exist in God.

Obj. 2. Further, procession exists in God, according to

an intelligible mode, as above explained (A. i). But such

a process is not called generation in us;

therefore neither is

it to be so called in God.

Obj. 3. Further, anything that is generated derives

existence from its generator. Therefore such existence is a

derived existence. But no derived existence can be a self-

subsistence. Therefore, since the divine existence is self-

subsisting (Q. HI., A. 4), it follows that no generated exist-

ence can be the divine existence. Therefore there is no

generation in God.

On the contrary, It is said (Ps. ii. 7) : This day have I

begotten Thee.



7 THE DIVINE PERSONS Q. 27. Art. 2

/ ansiver that, The procession of the Word in God is

called generation. In proof whereof we must observe that

generation has a twofold meaning : one common to every-

thing subject to generation and corruption ;in which sense

generation is nothing but change from non-existence to

existence. In another sense it is proper and belongs to

living things; in which sense it signifies the origin of a

living being from a conjoined living principle ; and this is

properly called birth. Not everything of that kind, how-ever, is called begotten ; but, strictly speaking, only what

proceeds by way of similitude. Hence a hair has not the

aspect of generation and of'sonship, but only that has

which proceeds by way of a similitude. Nor will any like-

ness suffice; for a worm which is generated from animals

has not the aspect of generation and sonship, although it

has a generic similitude; for this kind of generation re-

quires that there should be a procession by way of simili-

tude in the same specific nature ; as a man proceeds from

a man, and a horse from a horse. So in living things,

which proceed from potential to actual life, such as men

and animals, generation includes both these kinds of

generation. Butif there is a being whose life does not

proceed from potiintiality to act, procession (if found in

such a being) excludes entirely the first kind of generation

whereas it may have that kind of generation which belongs

to living things. So in this manner the procession of the

Word in God is generation ; for He proceeds by way of

intelligible action, which is a vital operation :—from a con-

joined principle (as above described) :

—by way of simili-

tude, inasmuch as the concept of the intellect is a likeness

of the object conceived :—and exists in the same nature,

because in God the act of understanding and His existence

are the same, as shown above (Q. XIV., A. 4). Hence

the procession of the Word in God is called generation

and the Word Himself proceeding is called the Son.

Reply Obj. i. This objection is based on the idea of

generation in the first sense, importing the issuing forth

from potentiality to act ; in which sense it is not found in

God.1.

'2



Q. 27. Art. 2 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA 8

Reply Obj. 2. The act of human understanding in our-

selves is not the substance itself of the intellect ;hence the

word which proceeds within us by intelligible operationis

not of the same nature as the source whence it proceeds;so

the idea of generation cannot be properly and fully applied

to it. But the divine act of intelligence is the very sub-

stance itself of the one who understands (Q. XIV., A. 4).

The Word proceeding therefore proceeds as subsisting in

the same nature; and so is properly called begotten, and

Son. Hence Scripture employs terms which denote genera-

tion of living things in order to signify the procession of

the divine Wisdom, namely, conception and birth ;as is

declared in the person of the divine Wisdom, The depths

were not as yet, and I was already conceived; before the

hills, I was brought forth (Prov. viii. 24). In our way of

understanding we use the word' conception ' in order to

signify that in the word of our intellect is found the like-

ness of the thing understood, although there be no identity

of nature.

Reply Obj. 3. Not everything derived from another has

existence in another subject; otherwise we could not say

that the whole substance of created being comes from

God, since there is no subject that could receive the whole

substance. So, then, what is generated in God receives its

existence from the generator, not as though that existence

were received into matter or into a subject (which would

conflict with the divine self-subsistence); but when we

speak of His existence as received, we mean that He Who

proceedsreceives divine existence from another; not, how-

ever, as if He were other from the divine nature. For

in the perfection itself of the divine existence are contained

both the Word intelligibly proceeding and the principle

of the Word, with whatever belongs to His perfection

(Q. IV.. A. 2).



5>,THE DIVINK persons g. 27. Art. i

Third Article.

whether any other procession exists in god besides

that of the word ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article —Objection i. It would seem that no other procession

exists in God besides the generation of the Word. Be-

cause, for whatever reason we admit another procession, we

should be led to admit yet another, and so on to infinitude

which cannot be. Therefore we must stop at the first, and

hold that there exists only one procession in God.

Obj. 2. Further, every nature possesses but one mode of

self-communication ; because operations derive unity and

diversity from their terms. But procession in God is only

by way of communication of the divine nature. Therefore,

as there is onlyone

divine nature(Q. XL, A. 4),

it follows

that only one procession exists in God.

Obj. 3. Further, if any other procession but the intelli-

gible procession of the Word existed in God, it could only

be the procession of love, which is by the operation of the

will. But such a procession is identified with the intelli-

gible procession of the intellect, inasmuch as the will in

God is the same as His intellect (Q. XIX., A. i). There-

fore in God there is no other procession but the procession

of the Word.

On the contrary, The Holy Ghost proceeds from the

Fatlier (Jo. xv. 26); and He is distinct from the Son,

according to the words, / will ask My Father, and He ivill

give you another Paraclete(Jo.

xiv. 16). Therefore in

Godanother procession exists besides the procession of the

Word.

I answer that, There are two processions in God ; the

procession of the Word, and another.

In evidence whereof we must observe that procession

exists in God, only according to an action which does not

tend to anything external, but remains in the agent itself.

Such action in an intellectual nature is that of the intellect,

and of the will. The procession of the Word is by way of

an intelligible operation. The operation of the will within



Q. 27. Art. 4 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA '^10

ourselves involves also another procession, that of love,

whereby the object loved is in the lover ; as, by the concep-

tion of the word, the object spoken of or understood is in

the intelligent agent. Hence, besides the procession of the

Word in God, there exists in Him another procession

called the procession of love.

Reply Obj. i. There is no need to go on to infinitude in

the divine processions ; for the procession which is accom-

plished within the agent in an intellectual nature terminates

in the procession of the will.

Reply Obj. 2. All that exists in God, is God (Q. HI.,

AA. 3, 4); whereas the same does not apply to others.

Therefore the divine nature is communicated by every

procession which is not outward, and this does not apply

to other natures.

Reply Obj. 3. Though will and intellect are not diverse

in God, nevertheless the nature of will and intellect re-

quires the processions belonging to each of them to exist

in a certain order. For the procession of love occurs in

due order as regards the procession of the Word; since

nothing can be loved by the will unless it is conceived in

the intellect. So as there exists a certain order of the

Word to the principle whence He proceeds, although in

God the substance of the intellect and its concept are the

same ; so, although in God the will and the intellect are the

same, still, inasmuch as love requires by its very nature

that it proceed only from the concept of the intellect,

there is a distinction of order between the procession of

love and the procession of the Word in God.

Fourth Article.

whether the procession of love in god is generation ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—Objection i. It would seem that the procession of love in

God is generation. For what proceeds by way of likeness

of nature among living things is said to be generated and

born. But what proceeds in God by way of love proceeds

in the likene>;s of nature; otherwise it would be extraneous



It THE DIVINE PERSONS . Q. 27. Art. 4

to the divine nature, and would be an external procession.

Therefore what proceeds in God by way of love, proceeds

as generated and born.

Obj. 2. Further, as similitude is of the nature of the

word, so does it belong to love. Hence it is said, that

every beast loves its like (Ecclus. xiii. 19). Therefore if

the Word is begotten and born by way of likeness, it seems

becoming that love should proceed by way of generation.

Obj. 3. Further, what is not in any species is not in the

genus. So if there is a procession of love in God, there

ought to be some special name besides this common name

of procession. But no other name is applicable but

generation. Therefore the procession of love in God is

generation.

On the contrary, Were this true, it would follow that the

Holy Ghost Who proceeds as love, would proceed as

begotten ; which is against the statement of Athanasius :

The Holy Ghost is from the Father and the Son, not made,

nor begotten, but proceeding.

I answer that, The procession of lo\e in God ought not

to be called generation. In evidence whereof we must

consider that the intellect and the will differ in this respect,

that the intellect is made actual by the object understood

residing according to its own likeness in the intellect;

whereas the will is made actual, not by any similitude of

the object willed witliin it, but by its having a certain

inclination to the thing willed. Thus the procession of

the intellect is by way of similitude, and is called genera-

tion, because every generator begets its own like; whereasthe procession of the will is not by way of similitude, but

is rather by way of impulse and movement towards an

object.

So what proceeds in God by way of love, does not pro-

ceed as begotten, or as son, but proceeds rather as spirit

which name expresses a certain vital movement and

impulse, accordingly as anyone is described as moved or

impelled by love to perform an action.

Reply Obj. i. AJl that exists in God is one with the

divine na.ture. Hence the proper notion of this or that





13 THE DIVINE PERSONS Q. 27. Art. s

cession of the word, but there are many : for in us from

one word proceeds another ; and also from one love pro-

ceeds another. Therefore in God there are more than twoprocessions.

On the contrary, In God there are not more than two

who proceed—the Son and the Holy Ghost. Therefore

there are in Him but two processions.

/ answer that, The divine processions can be derived

only from the actions which remain within the agent. In

a nature which is intellectual, and in the divine nature

these actions are two, the acts of intelligence and of will.

The act of sensation, which also appears to be an operation

within the agent, takes place outside the intellectual nature,

nor can it be reckoned as wholly removed from the sphere

of external actions ; for the act of sensation is perfected by

the action of the sensible object upon sense. It follows

that no other procession is possible in God but the pro-

cession of the Word, and of Love.

Reply Obj. i. Power is the principle whereby one thing

acts on another. Hence it is that external action points to

power. Thus the divine power does not imply the pro-

cession of a divine person ; but is indicated by the proces-

sion therefrom of creatures.

Reply Obj. 2. As Boethius says {De Hebdo7n.), good-

ness belongs to the essence and not to the operation, un-

less considered as the object of the will.

Thus, as the divine processions must be denominated

from certain actions ; no other processions can be under-

stood in God according to goodness and the like attributes

except those of the Word and of love, according as God

understands and loves His own essence, trutli, and good-

ness.

Reply Obj. 3. As above explained (OQ. XIV., A. 5,

and XIX., A. 5), God understands all things by one

simple act ; and by one act also He wills all things. Hence

there cannot exist in Him a procession of Word from

Word, nor of Love from Love : for there is in Him only

one perfect Word, and one perfect Love ; thereby being

manifested His perfect fecundity.



QUESTION XXVIII.

THE DIVINE RELATIONS.{In Four Articles.)

The divine relations are next to be considered, in four

points of inquiry : (i) Wliether there are real relations in

God? (2) Whether those relations are the divine essence

itself, or are extrinsic to it ? (3) Whether in God there can

be several relations distinct from each other? (4) Thenumber of these relations.

First Article.

whether there are real relations in god?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—Objection i. It would seem that there are no real rela-

tions in God. For Boethius says (De Trin. iv.), All

possible predicaments used as regards the Godhead refer

to the substance ; for nothing can be predicated relatively.

But whatever really exists in God can be predicated of

Him. Therefore no real relation exists in God.

Obj. 2. Further, Boethius says (ibid.) that, Relation in

the Tritiity of the Father to the Son, and of both to the

Holy Ghost, is the relation of the same to the same. But a

relation of this kind is only a logical one; for every real

relation requires and implies in reality two terms. There-

fore the divine relations are not real relations, but are

formed only by the mind.

Obj. 3. Further, the relation of paternity is the relation

of a principle. But to say that God is the principle of

creatures does not import any real relation, but only a

logical one. Therefore paternity in God is not a real

'4



15 THE DIVINE RELATIONS Q. 28. Art. i

relation ; while the same applies for the same reason to the

other relations in God.

Obj. 4. Further, the divine generation proceeds by wayof an intelligible word. But the relations following upon

the operation of the intellect are logical relations. There-

fore paternity and filiation in God, consequent upon

generation, are only logical relations.

On the contrary, The Father is denominated only from

paternity; and the Son only from filiation. Therefore, if

no real paternity or filiation existed in God, it would

follow that God is not really Father or Son, but only in our

manner of understanding; and this is the Sabellian heresy.

I answer that, relations exist in God really ; in proof

whereof we may consider that in relations alone is found

something which is only in the apprehension and not in

reality. This is not found in any other genus; forasmuch

as other genera, as quantity and quality, in their strict and

proper meaning, signify something inherent in a subject.

But relation in its own proper meaning signifies only what

refers to another. Such regard to another exists some-

times in the nature of things, as in those things which by

their own very nature are ordered to each other, and have

a mutual inclination ; and such relations are necessarily

real relations ; as in a heavy body is found an inclination

and order to the centre ; and hence there exists in the

heavy body a certain respect in regard to the centre and

the same applies to other things. Sometimes, however,

this regard to another, signified by relation, is to be found

only in the apprehension of reason comparing one thing to

another, and this is a logical relation only ; as, for instance,

when reason compares man to animal as the species to the

genus. But when something proceeds from a principle of

the same nature, then both the one proceeding and the

source of procession, agree in the same order; and then

they have real relations to each other. Therefore as the

divine processions are in the identity of the same nature,

as above explained (Q. XXVII., A A. 2, 4), these relations.

according to the divine processions, are necessarily real

relations.



Q. 28. Art. i THE *' SUMMA THEOLOGICA x6

w Reply Obj. i. Relationship is not predicated of God

according to its proper and formal meaning, that is to say,

in so far as its proper meaning denotes comparison to that

in which relation is inherent, but only as denoting regard

to another. Nevertheless Boethius did not wish to ex-

clude relation in God ; but he wished to show that it was

not to be predicated of Him as regards the mode of in-

herence in Himself in the strict meaning of relation ; but

rather by way of relation to another.

Reply Obj. 2. The relation signified by the term the

same is a logical relation only, if in regard to absolutely

ihe same thing; because such a relation can exist only in a

certain order observed by reason as regards the order of

mything to itself, according to some two aspects thereof.

The case is otherwise, however, when things are called the

•;ame, not numerically, but generically or specifically.

hus Boethius likens the divine relations to a relation of

identity, not in every respect, but only as regards the fact

(hat the substance is not diversified by these relations, as

neither is it by relation of identity.

Reply Obj. 3. As the creature proceeds from God in

diversity of nature, God is outside the order of the whole

creation, nor does any relation to the creature arise from

His nature; for He does not produce the creature by neces-

sity of His nature, but by His intellect and will, as is above

explained (QQ. XIV., AA. 3, 4, and XIX., A. 8). There-

fore there is no real relation in God to the creature ; where-

as in creatures there is a real relation to God; because

creatures are contained under the divine order, and their

very nature entails dependence on God. On the other

hand, the divine processions are in one and the same

nature. Hence no parallel exists.

Reply Obj. 4. Relations which result from the mental

operation alone in the objects understood are logical rela-

tions only, inasmuch as reason observes them as existing

between two objects perceived by the mind. Those rela-

tions, however, which follow the operation of the intellect,

and which exist between the word intellectually proceeding

and the source whence it proceeds, are not logical relations





Q. 38. Art. z THI; SUMMA TH.liOLOGICA '-^

18

erred on this point, but revoked his error later at the

council of Rheims. For he said that the divine relations

are assistant, or externally artixed.

To perceive the error here expressed, we must consider

that in each of the nine genera of accidents there are two

points for remark. One is the nature belonging to each

one of them considered as an accident; which commonly

applies to each of them as inherent in a subject, for the

essence of an accident is to inhere. The other point ofremark is the proper nature of each one of these genera.

In the genera, apart from that of relation, as in quantity

and quality, even the true idea of the genus itself is derived

from a respect to the subject ; for quantity is called the

measure of substance, and quality is the disposition of

substance. But the true idea of relation is not taken from

its respect to that in which it is, but from its respect to

something outside. So if we consider even in creatures,

relations formally as such, in that aspect they are said to

be assistant, and not intrinsically affixed, for, in this way,

they signify a respect which affects the thing related and

tends from that thing to something else; whereas, if rela-

tion is considered as an accident, it inheres in a subject,

and has an accidental existence in it. Gilbert de la Porrê

considered relation in the former mode only.

Now whatever has an accidental existence in creatures,

when considered as transferred to God, has a substantial

existence; for there is no accident in God; since all in Him

is His essence. So, in so far as relation has an accidental

existence in creatures, relation really existing in God has the

existence of the divine essence in no way distinct there-

from. But in so far as relation implies respect to some-

thing else, no respect to the essence is signified, but rather

to its opposite term.

Thus it is manifest that relation really existing in God

is really the same as His essence; and only differs in its

mode of intelligibility; as in relation is meant that regard

to its opposite which is not expressed in the name of

essence. Thus it is clear that in God relation and essence

do not differ from each other, but are one and the same.



lij THE DIVINE RELATIONS Q. 28. Art. 2

Reply Obj. i. These words of Augustine do not imply

that paternity or any other relation which is in God is not

in its very being the same as the divine essence; but that it

is not predicated under the mode of substance, as existing

in Him to Whom it is applied; but as a relation. So there

are said to be two predicaments only in God, since other

predicaments import habitude to that of which they are

spoken, both in their generic and in tlieir specific nature;

but nothing that exists in

Godcan have any relation to

that wherein it exists, or of whom it is spoken, except the

relation of identity; and this by reason of God's supreme

simplicity.

Reply Obj. 2. As the relation which exists in creatures

involves not only a regard to another, but also sometinng

absolute, so the same applies to God, yet not in the same

way. What is contained in the creature above and beyondwhat is contained in the meaning of relation, is sometliing

else besides that relation ; whereas in God there is no dis-

tinction, but both are one and the same; and this is not

perfectly expressed by the word relation, as if it were

comprehended in the ordinary meaning of that term. For

it was above explained (Q. XIII., A. 2), in treating of the

divine names, that more is contained in the perfection of

the divine essence than can be signified by any name.

Hence it does not follow that there exists in God anything

besides relation in reality ; but only in the various names

imposed by us.

Reply Obj. 3. If the divine perfection contained only

what is signified by relative names, it would follow that it

is imperfect, being thus related to something else; as in

the same way, if nothing more were contained in it than

what is signified by the word wisdom, it would not in that

case be a subsistence. But as the perfection of the divine

essence is greater than can be included in any name, it

does not follow, if a relative term or any other name

applied to God signify something imperfect, that the

divine essence is in any way imperfect; for the divine

essence comprehends within itself the perfection of every

genus (Q. IV., A. a).



Q. 28. ARt. 3 THE '* SUiMMA THEOLOGlCA *^20

Third Article.

whether the uel..tions in god are really distinguished

from each other?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—Objection i. It would seem that the divine relations are

not really distinguished from each other. For things

which are identified with the same, are identified with each

other. But every relation in God is really the same as the

divine essence. Therefore the relations are not really

distinguished from each other.

Obj. 2. Further, as paternity and filiation are by name

distinguished from the divine essence, so likewise are

goodness and power. But this kind of distinction does

not make any real distinction of the divine goodness and

power. Therefore neither does it make any real distinc-

tion of paternity and filiation.

Obj, 3. Further, in God there is no real distinction but'

that of origin. But one relation does not seem to arise

from another. Therefore the relations are not really dis-

tinguished from each other.

On the contrary, Boethius says {De Trin.) that in GodtJie substance contains the unity; and relation multiplies

the trinity. Therefore, if the relations were not really

distinguished from each other, there would be no real

trinity in God, but only an ideal trinity, which is the error

of Sabellius.

/ answer that, The attributing of anything to another

involves the attribution likewise of whatever is contained

in it. So when man is attributed to anyone, a rational

nature is likewise attributed to him. The idea of relation,

however, necessarily means regard of one to another,

according as one is relatively opposed to another. So as

in God there is a real relation (A. i) there must also be a

real opposition. The very nature of relative opposition

includes distinction. Hence, there must be real distinc-

tion in God, not, indeed, according to that which is

absolute—namely, essence, wherein there is supreme unity

and simplicity—but according to that which is relative.



21 THE DIVINE RELATIONS Q. 28. Art. 4

Reply Obj. i. According to the Philosopher (Phys. iii.),

this argument holds, that whatever things are identified

with the same thing are identified with each other, if the

identity be real and logical ; as, for instance, a tunic and

a garment; but not if they differ logically. Hence in Lhe

same place he says that although action is the same as

motion, and likewise passion ; still it does not follow that

action and passion are the same ; because action implies

reference as of somethingfrom

which there is motion in

the thing moved ; whereas passion implies reference as of

something which is from another. Likewise, although

paternity, just as filiation, is really the same as the divine

essence: nevertheless these two in their own proper idea

and definitions import opposite respects. Hence they are

distinguished from each other.

Reply Obj. 2. Power and goodness do not import any

opposition in their respective natures; and hence there is

no parallel argument.

Reply Obj. 3. Ahhougli relations, properly sp;\nking, do

not arise or proceed from each other, nevertheless they are

considered as opposed according to the procession of one

from another.

Fourth Article.

whether in god there are only four real relations

—paternity, filiation, spiration, and procession?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—Objection i. It would seem that in God there are not

only four real relations—paternity, filiation, spiration, and

procession. For it must be observed that in God there

exist the relations of the intelligent agent to the object

understood; and of the one willing to the object willed;

which are real relations not comprised under those above

specified. Therefore there are not only four real relations in

Go'd.

Obj. 2. Further, real relations in God are understood as

coming from the intelligible procession of the Word. But

intelligible relations are infinitely multiplied, as Avicenna



Q. 28. Art. 4 THE '• SUMMA THEOLOGICA '^22

says. Therefore in God thjere exists an infinite series of

real relations.

Obj. 3. Further, ideas in God are eternal

(Q.XV.,

A. i); and are only distinguished from each other by

reason of their regard to things, as above stated. There-

fore in God there are many more eternal relations.

Obj. 4. Further, equality, and likeness, and identity are

relations : and they are in God from eternity. Therefore

several more relations are eternal in God than the above

named.Obj. 5. Further, it may also contrariwise be said that

there are fewer relations in God than those above named.

For, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii. text 24), It

is the same way from Athens to Thebes, as from Thebes

to Athens. By the same way of reasoning there is the

same relation from the Father to the Son, that of paternity,

and from the Son to the Father, that of filiation ; and thus

there are not four relations in God.

/ answer that, According to the Philosopher {Metaph. v.),

every relation is based either on quantity, as double and

half; or on action and passion, as the doer and the deed,

the father and the son, the master and the servant, and the

like. Now as there is no quantity in God, for He is great

without quantity, as Augustine says (De Trin. i. i) it

follows that a real relation in God can be based only on

action. Such relations are not based on the actions of God

according to any extrinsic procession, forasmuch as the

relations of God to creatures are not real in Him (Q. XHI.,

A. 7). Hence, it follows that real relations in God can be

understood only in regard to those actions according to

which there are internal, and not external, processions in

God. These processions are two only, as above ex-

pounded (Q. XXVn., A. 5), one derived from the action

of the intellect, the procession of the Word; and the

other from the action of the will, the procession of love.

In respect of each of these processions two opposite rela-

tions arise; one of which is the relation of the person pro-

ceeding from the principle ; the other is the relation of the

principle Himself. The procession of the Word is called



23 THE DIVINE RELATIONS Q. 28. Art. 4

generation in the proper sense of the term, whereby it is

applied to living things. Now the relation of the principle

of generation in perfect living beings is called paternity;

and the relation of the one proceeding from the principle

is called filiation. But the procession of Love has no

proper name of its own (Q. XXVII., A. 4); and so neither

have the ensuing relations a proper name of their own.

The relation of the principle of this procession is called

spiration ; and the relation of the person proceeding is

called procession:

although these two names belong to

the processions or origins themselves, and not to the

relations.

Reply Obj. i. In those things in which there is a differ-

ence between the intellect and its object, and the will and

its object, there can be a real relation, both of science to

its object, and of the wilier to the object willed. In God,

however, the intellect and its object are one and the same

because by understanding Himself, God understands all

other things; and the same applies to His will and the

object that He wills. Hence it follows that in God these

kinds of relations are not real ; as neither is the relation of a

thing to itself. Nevertheless, the relation to the word is a

real relation ;

because the word is understood as proceed-ing by an intelligible action ; and not as a thing under-

stood. For when we understand a stone; that which the

intellect conceives from the thing understood, is called the

word.

Reply Obj. 2. Intelligible relations in ourselves are in-

finitely multiplied, because a man understands a stone by

one act, and by another act understands that he under-

stands the stone, and again by another, understands that

he understands this ; thus the acts of understanding are

infinitely multiplied, and consequently also the relations

understood. This does not apply to God, inasmuch as Heunderstands all things by one act alone.

Reply Obj. 3. Ideal relations exist as understood byGod. Hence it does not follow from their plurality that

there are many relations in God ; but that God knows

these many relations.




Reply Obj. 4. Equality and similitude in God are not

real relations; but are only logical relations (Q. XLII.,

A. 3, ad 4).

Reply Obj. 5. The way from one term to another and

conversely is the same; nevertheless the mutual relations

are not the same. Hence, we cannot conclude that the

relation of the father to the son is the same as that of the

son to the father ; but we could conclude this of something

absolute, if there were such between them.



QUESTION XXIX.

THE DIVINE PERSONS.{In Four Articles.)

Having premised what have appeared necessary notions

concerning the processions and the relations, we must

now approach the subject of the persons.

First, we shall consider the persons absolutely, and then

comparatively as regards each other. We must considerthe persons absolutely first in common; and then singly.

The general consideration of the persons seemingly in-

volves four points: (i) The signification of this word

person; (2) the number of the persons; (3) what is in-

volved in the number of the persons, or is opposed thereto

as diversity, and similitude, and the like; (4) what belongs

to our knowledge of the persons.

Four subjects of inquiry are comprised in the first point

(i) The definition of person. (2) The comparison of

person to essence, subsistence, and hypostasis. (3)

Whether the name of person is becoming to God ?

(4) What does it signify in Him?

First Article.

THE definition OF * PERSON.*

We proceed thus to the First Article:—Objection i. It would seem that the definition of person

given by Boethius (De Duab. Nat.) is insufficient—that is,

a person is an individual substance of a rational nature.

For nothing singular can be subject to definition. But

person signifies something singular. Therefore person is

improperly defined.

as





27 THE DIVINE PERSONS Q. 29. Art. i

act of themselves ; for actions belonj^- to singulars. There-

fore also the individuals of the rational nature have a

special

name even among other substances;

andthis

nameis person.

Thus the term individual substance is placed in the

definition of person, as signifying the singular in the

genus of substance ; and the term rational nature is added,

as signifying the singular in rational substances.

Reply Obj. i. Although this or that singular may not be

definable, yet what belongs to the general idea of singu-

larity can be defined ; and so the Philosopher* gives a

definition of first substance; and in this way Boethius

defines person.

Reply Obj. 2. In the opinion of some, the term substance

in the definition of person stands for first substance, which

is the hypostasis ; nor is the term individual superfluously

added, forasmuch as by the name of hypostasis or first

substance the idea of universality and of part is excluded.

For we do not say that man in general is an hypostasis,

nor that the hand is since it is only a part. But where

individual is added, the idea of assumptibility is excluded

from person ; for the human nature in Christ is not a

person, since it is assumed by a greater—that is, by the

Word of God. It is, however, better to say that substance

is here taken in a general sense, as divided into first and

second, and when individual is added, it is restricted to

first substance.

Reply Obj. 3. Substantial differences being unknown to

us, or at least unnamed by us, it is sometimes necessary to

use accidental differences in the place of substantial ; as,

for example, we may say that fire is a simple, hot, and

dry body : for proper accidents are the effects of sub-

stantial forms, and make them known. Likewise, terms

expressive of intention can be used in defining realities if

used to signify things which are unnamed. And so the

term individual is plnred in the dcllnition of person to

signify tiie mode of subsistence which belongs to particu-

lar substances.

* De Prccdic, cap. De substantia.



Q. 29. Art. 2 THE SUMM A THEOLOGICA 28

Reply Ohj, 4. According to the Philosopher (Metaph.

V. 5), the word nature was first used to signify the genera-

tion of livingthings, which is called nativity. And be-

cause this kind of generation comes from an intrinsic

principle, this term is extended to signify the intrinsic

principle of any kind of movement. In this sense he defines

nature (Phys. ii. 3). And since this kind of principle is either

formal or material, both matter and form are commonly

called nature. And as the essence of anything is com-

pleted by the form ; so the essence of anything, signified

by the definition, is commonly called nature. And here

nature is taken in that sense. Hence Boethius says (ihid.)

that, nature is the specific difference giving its form to each

thing, for the specific difference completes the definition,

and is derived from the special form of a thing. So in

the definition of person, which means the singular in a

determined genus, it is more correct to use the term nature

than essence, because the latter is taken from being, which

is most common.

Reply Ohj. 5. The soul is a part of the human species;

and so, although it may exist in a separate state, yet since

it ever retains its nature of unibility, it cannot be called

an individual substance, which is the hypostasis or first

substance, as neither can the hand nor any other part of

man ; thus neither the definition nor the name of person

belongs to it.

Second Article.

whether* person

' is the same as hypostasis, subsis-

tence, and essence ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article —Objection i. It would seem that person is the same as

hypostasis, subsistence, and essence. For Boethius says

(be Duab. Nat.) that the Greeks called the individual sub-

stance of the rational nature by the name hypostasis.

But this with us signifies person. Therefore person is

altogether the same as hypostasis.

Ohj. 2. Further, as we say there are three persons in




God, so we say there are three subsistences in God ; which

impHes that person and subsistence have the same mean-

ing. Therefore person andsubsistence

meanthe same.

Obj. 3. Further, Boethius says {Com. Freed.) that ovcrlai

which means essence, signifies a being composed of matter

and form. Now, that which is composed of matter and

form is the individual substance called hypostasis and

person. Therefore all the aforesaid names seem to have

the same meaning.

Obj. 4. On the contrary, Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.)

that genera and species only subsist ; whereas individuals

are not only subsistent, but also substand. But sub-

sistences are so called from subsisting, as substance or

hypostasis is so called from substanding. Therefore,

since genera and species are not hypostases or persons,

these are not the same as subsistences.

Obj. 5. Further, Boethius says (Com. Freed.) that matter

is called hypostasis, and form is called ovaicocri.'i—that

is, subsistence. But neither form nor matter can be called

person. Therefore person differs from the others.

/ answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph.

v.), substance is twofold. In one sense it means the

quiddity of a thing, signified by its definition, and thus wesay that the definition means the substance of a thing; in

which sense substance is called by the Greeks ovaia, which

we may call essence. In another sense substance means a

subject or suppositum, which subsists in the genus of

substance. To this, taken in a general sense, can be

applied a name expressive of an intention ; and thus it is

called the suppositum. It is also called by three names

signifying a reality—that is, a thing of nature, subsistence,

and hypostasis, according to a threefold consideration of

the substance thus named. For, as it exists in itself and

not in another, it is called subsistence ; as we .say that those

things subsist which exist in themselves, and not in

another. As it underlies some common nature, it is called

a thing of nature; as, for instance, this particular man is

a human natural thing. As it underlies the accidents, it is

called hypostasis, or substance. What these three names



Q. 29. Art. 2 IHE SUMMA THHOLOGlCA 30

signify in common to the whole genus of substances,

this name person signifies in the genus of rational

substances.

Reply Obj. I. Among the Greeks, the term hypostasis,

taken in the strict interpretation of the word, signifies any

individual of the genus substance; but in the usual way of

speaking, it means the individual of the rational nature, by

reason of the excellence of that nature.

Reply Obj. 2. As we say three persons plurally in God,

and three S2ibsistences, so the Greeks say three hypostases.

But because the word substance, which, properly speak-

ing, corresponds in meaning to hypostasis, is used among

us in an equivocal sense, since it sometimes means essence,

and sometimes means hypostasis, in order to aroid any

occasion of error, it was thought preferable to use subsist-

ence for hypostasis, rather than substa7ice.

Reply Obj. 3. Strictly speaking, the essence is what is

expressed by the definition. Now, the definition comprises

the principles of the S{)ccies, but not the individual prin-

ciples. Hence in things composed of matter and form, the

essence signifies not only the form, nor only the matter,

but what is composed of matter and the common form, as

the principles of the species. But what is composed of

this matter and this form has the nature of hypostasis and

person. For soul, flesh, and bone belong to the nature

of man ; whereas this soul, this flesh, and this bone belong

to the nature of this man. Therefore hypostasis and person

add the individual principles to the idea of essence; Ror

are these identified with the essence in things composed of

matter and form, as we said above when treating of divine

simplicity (Q. III., A. 3).

Reply Obj. 4. Boethius says that genera and species sub-

sist, inasmuch as it belongs to some individual things to

subsist, from the fact that they belong to genera and

species comprised in the predicament of substance, but

not because the species and genera themselves subsist;except in the opinion of Plato, who asserted that the species

of tilings subsisted separately from singular things. To

substand. however, belongs to the same individual things



31 THE DIVliNE PERSONS Q. 29. Art.3

in relation to the accidents, which are outside tlie essence

of genera and species.

Reply Obj.5. The

individual composed of matter and

form substands in relation to accident from the very nature

of matter. Hence Boethius says {De Trin.) : A simple

lorrn cannot, be a subject. Its self-subsistence is derived

from the nature of its form, which does not supervene to

the things subsisting, but gives actual existence to the

matter, and makes it subsist as an individual. On this

account, therefore, he ascribes hypostasis to matter, and

iv<Tt,(i)<n<;, or subsistence, to the form, because the matter

is the principle of substanding, and the form is the prin-

ciple of subsisting.

Third Article.

whether the word ' person ' should be said of god ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article —Objection i. It would seem that the name person should

not be said of God. For Dionysius says {Div. Nom. i.) :

No one should ever dare to say or think anything of the

supersubstantial and hidden Divitiity, beyond ivhat has

been divinely expressed to us by the sacred oracles. But

the name person is not expressed to us in the Old or NewTestament. Therefore person is not to be applied to God.

Obj. 2. Further, Boethius says {De Duab. Nat.) : The

d'ord person seems to be taken jrom those persons ivlio

represented men in comedies and tragedies. For person

comes from sounding through (personando), since a greater

volume of sound is produced through the cavity in the

mask. These ' persons ' or masks the Greeks called

TTpoato-jra, as they were placed on the face and covered

the features before the eyes. This, however, can apph

to God only in a metaphorical sense. Therefore the word

person is only applied to God metaphorically.

Ohj. 3. Further, every person is a hypostasis. Butthe word hypostasis does not apply to God, since, as

Boethius says (ibid.), it signifies what is the subject of

accidents, which do not exist in God. Jerome also says



Q. 29. Art. 3 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA -32

{Ep. ad Damas.) that, in this word hypostasis, poison lurks

in honey. Therefore the word person should not be said

of God.Obj. 4. Further, if a definition is denied of anything, the

thing defined is also denied of it. But the definition of

person, as given above, does not apply to God. Both be-

cause reason implies a discursive knowledge, which does

not apply to God, as we proved above (Q. XIV., A. 12);

and thus God cannot be said to have a rational nature.

And also because God cannot be called an individual

substance, since the principle of individuation is matter

while God is immaterial : nor is He the subject of

accidents, so as to be called a substance. Therefore the

word person ought not to be attributed to God.

On the contrary. In the Creed of Athanasius we say :

Oneis the

person ofthe

Father, another of the Son,another of the Holy Ghost.

I answer that. Person signifies what is most perfect in all

nature—that is, a subsistent individual of a rational nature.

Hence, since everything that is perfect must be attributed

to God, forasmuch as His essence contains every perfec-

tion, this name person is fittingly applied to God; not,

however, as it is applied to creatures, but in a more ex-

cellent way; as other names also, which, while giving

them to creatures, we attribute to God ; as we showed above

when treating of the names of God (Q. XIII., A. 2).*

Reply Obj. i. Although the word person is not found

applied to God in Scripture, either in the Old or New

Testament, nevertheless what the word signifies is found

to be affirmed of God in many places of Scripture; as that

He is the supreme self-subsisting being, and the most

perfectly intelligent being. If we could speak of God only

in the very terms themselves of Scripture, it would follow

that no one could speak about God in any but the original

language of the Old or New Testament. The urgency of

confuting heretics made it necessary to find new words to

express the ancient faith about God. Nor is such a kind

of novelty to be shunned ; since it is by no means profane,

for it does not lead us astray from the sense of Scripture.



33 THE DIVINE PERSONS Q. 29. Art.^

The Apostle warns us to avoid profane novelties of words

(i Tim. vi. 20).

Reply Obj. 2. Although this name person maynot

belong to God as regards the origin of the term, neverthe-

less it excellently belongs to God in its objective meaning.

Eor as famous men were represented in comedies and

tragedies, the name person was given to signify those who

held high dignity. Hence, those who held high rank in

the Church came to be called persons. Thence by some

the definition of person is given as hypostasis distinct by

reason of dignity. And because subsistence in a rational

nature is of high dignity, therefore every individual of

the rational nature ,is called a person. Now the dignity of

the divine nature excels every other dignity ; and thus the

name person pre-eminently belongs to God.

Reply Obj. 3. The word hypostasis does not applyto

God as regards its source of origin, since He does not

underlie accidents; but it applies to Him in its objective

sense, for it is imposed to signify the subsistence. Jerome

said that poison lurks in this word, forasmuch as before

it was fully understood by the Latins, the heretics used

this term to deceive the simple, to make people profess

many essences as they profess several hypostases, inas-

much as the word substance, which corresponds to hypos-

tasis in Greek, is commonly taken amongst us to mean

essence.

Reply Obj. 4. It may be said that God has a rational

nature, if reason be taken to mean, not discursive thought,

but in a general sense, an intelligent nature But Godcannot be called an individual in the sense that His in-

dividuality comes from matter; but only in the sense which

implies incommunicability. Substance can be applied to

God in the sense of signifying self-subsistence. There

are some, however, who say that the definition of Boethius,

quoted above (A. i), is not a definition of person in the

sense we use when speaking of persons in God. There-

fore Richard of St. Victor amends this definition by adding

that Person in God is the iucommunicable existence of the

divine nature.



0. 29. Art. 4 THE SUMMA THIiOLOGlCA 34

Fourth Article,

whether this word * person ' signifies relation?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—Objection i. It would seem that this word person, as

applied to God, does not signify relation, but substance.

For Augustine says (De Trin. vii. 6) : When xve speak of

the person of the Father, ive mean nothing else but the

substance of the Father, for person is said in regard to

Himself, and not in regard to the Son.Obj. 2. Further, the interrogation What? refers to the

essence. But, as Augustine says ; When we say there are

three who bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word,

and the Holy Ghost, and it is asked, Three what? the

answer is, Three persons. Therefore person signifies

essence.

Obj. 3. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. iv.), the

meaning of a word is its definition. But the definition of

person is this : The individual substance of the rational

nature, as above stated. Therefore person signifies

substance.

Obj. 4. Further, person in men and angels does not

signify relation, but something absolute. Therefore, if in

God it signified relation, it would bear an equivocal mean-

ing in God, in man, and in angels.

On the contrary, Boethius says {De Trin.) that every

word that refers to the persons signifies relation. But no

word belongs to person more strictly than the very word

person itself. Therefore this word person signifies relation.

/ answer that, A difficulty arises concerning the meaning

of this word person in God, from the fact that it is pre-

dicated plurally of the Three in contrast to the nature of

the names belonging to the essence ; nor does it in itself

refer to another, as do the words which express relation.

Hence some have thought that this word person of

itself expresses absolutely the divine essence; as this nameGod and this word Wise; but that to meet heretical attack,

it was ordained by conciliar decree that it was to be taken

in a relative sense, and especially in the plural, or with the





Q. 29 Art. 4 THE *' SUMMA TttEOLOGICA 36

Now distinction in God is only by relation of origin,

as stated above (Q. XXVIII., AA. 2, 3), while relation

in God is not as an accident in a subject, but is the divine

essence itself; and so it is subsistent, for the divine essence

subsists. Therefore, as the Godhead is God, so the divine

paternity is God the Father, Who is a divine person.

Therefore a divine person signifies a relation as subsisting.

And this is to signify relation by way of substance, and

such a relation is a hypostasis subsisting in the divine

nature, although in truth that which subsists in the divine

nature is the divine nature itself. Thus it is true to say

that the name person signifies relation directly, and the

essence indirectly ; not, however, the relation as such, but

as expressed by way of a hypostasis. So likewise it

signifies directly the essence, and indirectly the relation,

inasmuch as the essence is the same as the hypostasis :

while in God the hypostasis is expressed as distinct by the

relation : and thus relation, as such, enters into the notion

of the person indirectly. Thus we can say that this signi-

fication of the word person was not clearly perceived before

it was attacked by heretics. Hence, this word person was

used just as any other absolute term. But afterwards it

was applied to express relation, as it lent itself to that

signification, so that this word person means relation not

only by use and custom, according to the first opinion, but

also by force of its own proper signification.

Reply Obj. 1. This word person is said in respect to

itself, not to another ; forasmuch as it signifies relation not

as such, but by way of a substance

—which is a hypostasis.

In that sense Augustine says that it signifies the essence,

inasmuch as in God essence is the same as the hypostasis,

because in God what He is, and whereby He is are the

same.

Reply Obj. 2. The term what refers sometimes to the

nature expressed by the definition, as when we ask; What

.s man ? and we answer; A mortal rational animal. Some-times it refers to the supposituvi, as when we ask. What

swims in the sea? and answer, A fish. So to those who

ask. Three what ? we answer, Three persons.




Replj Obj. 3. In God the individual i.e., distinct and

incommunicable substance—includes the idea of relation, as

above explained.

Reply Obj. 4. The different sense of the less common

term does not produce equivocation in the more common.

Although a horse and an ass have their own proper defini-

tions, nevertheless they agree univocally in animal, be-

cause the common definition of animal applies to both.

So it does not follow that, although relation is contained

in the signification of divine person, but not in that of anangelic or of a human person, the word person is used

in an equivocal sense. Though neither is it applied

univocally, since nothing can be said univocally of God

and creatures (Q. XIII., A. 5).

454715



QUESTION XXX.

THE PLURALITY OF PERSONS IN GOD.

{In Four Articles.)

We are now led to consider the plurality of the persons;

about which there are four points of inquiry : (i) Whether

there are several persons in God? (2) How many are

they? (3) What the numeral terms signify in God?

(4) The community of the term person.

First Article,

whether there are several persons in god?

We proceed thus to the First Article —Objection i. It would seem that there are not several

persons in God. For person is the individual substance of

a rational nature. If then there are several persons in

God, there must be several substances ; which appears to

be heretical.

Obj. 2. Further, Plurality of absolute properties does

not make a distinction of persons, either in God, or in

ourselves. Much less therefore is this effected by a

plurality of relations. But in God there is no plurality but of

relations (Q. XXVIII., A. 3). Therefore there cannot be

several persons in God.

Obj. 3. Further, Boethius says of God (De Trin. i.), that

this is truly one which has no number. But plurality

implies number. Therefore there are not several persons

in God.

Obj. 4. Further, where number is, there is whol6 andpart. Thus, if in God there exist a number of persons,

there must be whole and part in God; which is inconsis-

tent with the divine simplicitv.

38



39 PLURALITY OF PERSONS Q. 30. Art. i

On the contrary, Athanasius says : One is the person of

the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Ghost.

Therefore the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghostare several persons.

/ answer that. It follows from what precedes that there

are several persons in God. For it was shown above

(Q, XXIX., A. 4) that this word person signifies in God

a relation as subsisting in the divine nature. It was also

established (Q. XXVI II., A. i) that there are several real

relations in God ; and hence it follows that there are also

several realities subsistent in the divine nature; which

means that there are several persons in God.

Reply Ohj. i. The definition of person includes sub-

stance, not as meaning the essence, but the suppositum

which is made clear by the addition of the term individual.

To signify the substance thus understood, the Greeks usethe name hypostasis. So, as we say Three persons, they say

Three hypostases. We are not, however, accustomed to

say Three substances, lest we be understood to mean three

essences or natures, by reason of the equivocal significa-

tion of the term.

Reply Ohj. 2. The absolute properties in God, such as

goodness and wisdom, are not mutually opposed; and

hence, neither are they really distinguished from each

other. Therefore, although they subsist, nevertheless

they are not several subsistent realities—that is, several

persons. But the absolute properties in creatures do not

subsist, although they are really distinguished from each

other, as whiteness and sweetness; on the other hand, the

relative properties in God subsist, and are really dis-

tinguished from each other (Q. XXVIII. , A. 3). Hence

the plurality of such properties suffices for the plurality of

persons in God.

Reply Ohj. 3. The supreme unity and simplicity of Godexclude every kind of plurality of absolute things, but not

plurality of relations. Because relations are predicated

relatively, and thus the relations do not import composi-

tion in that of which they are predicated, as Boethius

teaches in the same book.

1.2 4





41 PLURALITY OF PERSONS Q 30. Art. 2

intellect, but also in an infinite number of ways. There-

fore there are an infinite number of persons in God.

Obj. 4. Further, it is from the infinite goodness of the

Pâther that He communicates Himself infinitely in the

production of a divine person. But also in the Holy

Ghost is infinite goodness. Therefore the Holy Ghost

produces a divine person ; and that person another ; and

so to infmity.

Obj. 5. Further, everything within a determinate number

is measured, for number is a measure. But the divine

persons are immense, as we say in the Creed of

Athanasius : The Father is immense, the Son is immense,

the Holy Ghost is immense. Therefore the persons are

not contained within the number three.

On the contrary, It is said : There are three who bear

witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the HolyGhost (i John v. 7). To those who ask, Three what? we

answer, with Augustine {De Trin. vii. 4), Three persons.

Therefore there are but three persons in God.

/ answer that, As was explained above, there can be

only three persons in God. For it was shown above that

the several persons are the several subsisting relations

really distinct from each other. But a real distinction

between the divine relations can come only from relative

opposition. Therefore two opposite relations must needs

refer to two persons : and if any relations are not opposite,

they must needs belong to the same person. Since then

paternity and filiation are opposite relations, they belong

necessarily to two persons. Therefore the subsistingpaternity is the person of the Father; and the subsisting

filiation is the person of the Son. The other two relations

are not opposed to either of these, but they are opposed to

each other; therefore these two cannot belong to one

person : hence either one of them must belong to both of

the aforesaid persons; or one must belong to one person,

and the other to the other. Now, procession cannot belong

to the Father and the Son, or to either of them ; for thus

it would follow that the procession of the intellect, which

in God is generation, wherefrom paternity and filiation



Q. 30. Art. 2 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA ** 42

are derived, would issue from the procession of love,

whence spiration and procession are derived, if the person

generating and the person generated proceeded from the

person spirating; and this is against what was laid downabove (Q. XXVIl., AA. 3, 4). We must consequently

admit that spiration belongs to the person of the Father,

and to the person of the Son, forasmuch as it has no

relative opposition either to paternity or to filiation ; and

consequently that procession belongs to the other person

whois called

the person of the Holy Ghost, who proceedsby way of love, as above explained. Therefore only three

persons exist in God, the Father, the Son, and the Holy

Ghost.

Reply Obj. i. Although there are four relations in God,

one of them, spiration, is not separated from the person

of the Father and of the Son, but belongs to both ; thus,

although it is a relation, it is not called a property, because

it does not belong to only one person ; nor is it a personal

relation i.e.-, constituting a person. The three relations

—paternity, filiation, and procession—are called personal

properties, constituting as it were the persons ; for paternity

is the person of the Father, filiation is the person of the

Son, procession is the person of the Holy Ghost pro-

ceeding.

Reply Obj. 2. That which proceeds by way of intelli-

gence, as word, proceeds according to similitude, as also

that which proceeds by way of nature; thus, as above ex-

plained (Q. XXVn., A. 3), the procession of the divine

Word is the very same as generation by way of nature.

But love, as such, does not proceed as the similitude of that

whence it proceeds ; although in God love is co-essential

as being divine ; and therefore the procession of love is not

called generation in God.

Reply Obj. 3. As man is more perfect than other animals,

he has more intrinsic operations than other animals, be-

cause his perfection is something composite. Hence the

angels, who are more perfect and more simple, have fewer

intrinsic operations than man, for they have no imagina-

tion, or feeling, or the like. In God there exists only one



43 PLURALITY OF PERSONS Q. 30. Art. 3

real operation—that is, His essence. How there are in

Him two processions was above explained (Q. XXVH.,

AA. I, 4).

Reply Obj. 4. This argument would prove if the Holy

Ghost possessed another goodness apart from the good-

ness of the Father; for then if the Father produced a

divine person by His goodness, the Holy Ghost also would

do so. But the Father and the Holy Ghost have one and

the same goodness. Nor is there any distinction between

them except by the personal relations. So goodness be-

longs to the Holy Ghost, as derived from another ; and

it belongs to the Father, as the principle of its communica-

tion to another. The opposition of relation does not allow

the relation of the Holy Ghost to be joined with the rela-

tion of principle of another divine person ; because He

Himself proceeds from the other persons who are in God.Reply Obj. 5. A determinate number, if taken as a

simple number, existing in the mind only, is measured by

one. But when we speak of a number of things as applied

to the persons in God, the notion of measure has no place,

because the magnitude of the three persons is the same

(Q. XLH., AA. I, 4), and the same is not measured by

the same.

Third Article,

whether the numeral terms denote anything real in

GOD?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

•

Objection i. It would seem that the numeral terms

denote something real in God. For the divine unity is

the divine essence. But every number is unity re-

peated. Therefore every numeral term in God signifies

the essence; and therefore it denotes something real in

God.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever is said of God and of creatures,

belongs to God in a more eminent manner than to

creatures. But the numeral terms denote something real

in creatures; therefore much more so in God






But we say that numeral terms predicated of God are

not derived from number, a species of quantity, for in

that sense they could bear only a metaphorical sense in

God, like other corporeal properties, such as length,

breadth, and the like ; but that they are taken from multi-

tude in a transcendent sense. Now multitude so under-

stood has relation to the many of which it is predicated, as

one convertible with being is related to being ; which kind

of oneness does not add anything to being, except a nega-

tion of division, as we saw when treating of the divine

unity (Q. XL, A. i); for one signifies undivided being.

So, of whatever we say ' one,' we imply its undivided

reality : thus, for instance, one applied to man signifies

the undivided nature or substance of a man. In the same

way, when we speak of many things, multitude in this

latter sense points to those things as being each undividedin itself.

But number, if taken as a species of quantity, denotes an

accident added to being; as also does one which is the

principle of that number. Therefore the numeral terms in

God signify the things of which they are said, and beyond

this they add negation only, as stated (loc. cit.); in which

respect the Master was right (loc. cit.). So when we say,

the essence is one, the term one signifies the essence un-

divided; and when we say the person is one, it signifies

the person undivided ; and when we say the persons are

many, we signify those persons, and their individual un-

dividedness ; for it is of the very nature of multitude that

it should be composed of units.Reply Obj. i. One, as it is a transcendental, is wider

and more general than substance and relation. And so

likewise is multitude; hence in God it may mean both sub-

stance and relation, according to the context. Still, the

very signification of such names adds a negation of

division, beyond substance and relation ; as was explained

above.

Reply Obj. 2. Multitude, which denotes something real

in creatures, is a species of quantity, and cannot be used

when speaking of God : unlike transcendental multitude,



Q. 30. Art. 4 THE SUMMA THEOLOGlCA **

46

which adds only indivision to those of which it is predi-

cated. Such a kind of muUitude is appHcable to God.

Reply Obj. 3. One does not exclude multitude, butdivision, which logically precedes one or multitude. Multi-

tude does not remove unity, but division from each of the

individuals which compose the multitude. This was ex-

plained when we treated of the divine unity (Q. XI., A. 2).

It must be observed, nevertheless, that the opposite

arguments do not sufficiently prove the point advanced.

Although the idea of solitude is excluded by plurality, and

the plurality of gods by unity, it does not follow that these

terms express this signification alone. For blackness is

excluded by whiteness; nevertheless, the term whiteness

does not signify the mere exclusion of blackness.

Fourth Article.

whether this term ' person ' can be common to the

three persons ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—Objectio7i I. It would seem that this term person cannot

be common to the three persons. For nothing is common to

the three persons but the essence. But this term person

does not signify the essence directly. Therefore it is not

common to all three.

Obj. 2. Further, the common is the opposite to the in-

communicable. But the very meaning of person is that it

is incommunicable; as appears from the definition given

byRichard of St. Victor

(Q.XXIX., A.

3,ad 4). There-

fore this term person is not common to all the three

persons.

Obj. 3. Further, if the name person is common to the

three, it is common either really, or logically. But it is

not so really ; otherwise the three persons would be one

person ; nor again is it so logically ; otherwise person would

be a universal. But in God there is neither universal nor

particular ; neither genus nor species, as we proved above

(Q. III., A. 5). Therefore this term person is not

common to the three.




On the contrary, Augustine says {De Trin. vii. 4) that

when we ask, Three what? we say, Three persons, because

what a person is. is common to them.

/ answer that. The very mode of expression itself shows

that this term person is common to the three when we say

three persons ; for when we say three men we show that man

is common to the three. Now it is clear that this is not

community of a real thing, as if one essence were common

to the three;

otherwise there would be only one person ofthe three, as also one essence.

What is meant by such a community has been variously

determined by those who have examined the subject.

Some have called it a community of exclusion, forasmuch

as the definition of person contains the word incom-

municable. Others thought it to be a community of in-

tention, as the definition of person contains the wordindividual; as we say that to be a species is common to

horse and ox. Both of these explanations, however, are

excluded by the fact that person is not a name of exclusion

nor of intention, but the name of a reality. We must

therefore resolve that even in human affairs this name

person is common by a community of idea, not as genus or

species, but as a vague individual thing. The names of

genera and species, as man or animal, are given to signify

the common natures themselves, but not the intentions of

those common natures, signified by the terms genus or

species. The vague individual thing, as some man, signifies

the common nature with the determinate mode of existence

of singular things—that is, something self-subsisting, as

distinct from others. But the name of a designated

singular thing signifies that which distinguishes the

determinate thing; as the name Socrates signifies this

flesh and this bone. But there is this difference—that the

term some man signifies the nature, or the individual on

the part of its nature, with the mode of existence of

singular things; while this name person is not given to

signify the individual on the part of the nature, but the

subsistent reality in that nature. Now this is common in

idea to the divine persons, that each of them subsists




distinctly from the others in the divine nature. Thus this

name person is common in idea to the three divine persons..

Reply Obj. i. This argument is founded on a real com-munity.

Reply Obj. 2. Although person is incommunicable, yet

the mode itself of incommunicable existence can be

common to many.

Reply Obj. 3. Although this community is logical and

not real, yet it does not follow that in God there is uni-

versal or particular, or genus, or species ; both because

neither in human affairs is the community of person the

same as community of genus or species; and because the

divine persons have one being; whereas genus and species

and every other universal are predicated of many which

differ in being.



OF WHAT BELONGS TO THE UNITY OR PLURALITY

IN GOD.

(7n Four Articles.)

We now consider what belongs to the unity or plurality in

God; which gives rise to four points of inquiry : (i) Con-

cerning the word Trinity. (2) Whether we can say that

the Son is other than the Father? (3) Whether an ex-

clusive term, which seems to exclude otherness, can be

joined to an essential name in God ? (4) .Whether it can

be joined to a personal term ?

First Article,

whether there is trinity in god ?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—Objection i. It would seem there is not trinity in God.

For every name in God signifies substance or relation.

But this name Trinity does not signify the substance;

otherwise it would be predicated of each one of the

persons: nor does it signify relation; for it does not ex-

press a name that refers to another. Therefore the wordTrinity is not to be applied to God.

Obj. 2. Further, this word trinity is a collective term,

since it signifies multitude. But such a word does not

apply to God; as the unity of a collective name is the least

of unities, whereas in God there exists the greatest possible

unity. Therefore this word trinity does not apply to

God.

Obj. 3. Further, every trine is threefold. But in God

there is not triplicity ; since triplicity is a kind of in-

equality. Therefore neither is there trinity in God.

49



Q. 31. Art. 1 THE '' SUMMA THEOLOGICA 50

Obj. 4. Further, all that exists in God exists in the unity

of the divine essence; because God is His own essence.

Therefore, if Trinity exists in God, it exists in the unity of

the divine essence; and thus in God there would be three

essential unities; which is heresy.

Obj. 5. Further, in all that is said of God, the concrete is

predicated of the abstract ; for Deity is God and paternity

is the Father. But the Trinity cannot be called trine;

otherwise there would be nine realities in God; which, of

cou-rse, is erroneous. Therefore the word trinity is not to

be applied to God.

On the contrary, Athanasius says: Unity in Trinity;

and Trinity in Unity is to be revered.

I answer that, The name Trinity in God signifies the

determinate number of persons. And so the plurality of

persons in God requires that we should use the word

trinity ; because what is indeterminately signified by

plurality, is signified by trinity in a determinate manner.

Reply Obj. i. In its etymological sense, this word

Trinity seems to signify the one essence of the three

persons, according as trinity may mean trine-unity. But

in the strict meaning of the term it rather signifies the

number of persons of one essence; and on this account wecannot say that the Father is the Trinity, as He is not

three persons. Yet it does not mean the relations them-

selves of the Persons, but rather the number of persons

related to each other ; and hence it is that the word in itself

does not express regard to another.

Reply Obj. 2. Two things are implied in a collective

term, plurality of the supposita, and a unity of some kind

of order. For people is a multitude of men comprehended

imder a certain order. In the first sense, this word trinity

is like other collective words ; but in the second sense it

differs from them, because in the divine Trinity not only

is there unitv of order, but also with this there is unity of

essence.Reply Obj. 3. Trinity is taken in an absolute sense; for

it signifies the threefold number of persons. Triplicity

signifies a proportion of inequality ; for it is a species of



51 JPLURALITY IK GOD Q. 31. Art. 2

unequal proportion, according to Boethius {Arithm. i. 23).

Therefore in God there is not triplicity, but Trinity.

Reply Obj. 4. In the divine Trinity is to be understood

both number and the persons numbered. So when we say,

Trinity in Unity, we do not place number in the unity of

the essence, as if we meant three times one; but we place

the Persons numbered in the unity of nature; as the

supposita of a nature are said to exist in that nature. On

the other hand, we say Unity in Trinity; meaning that

the nature is in its supposita.

Reply Obj. 5. When we say, Trifiity is trine, by reason^

of the number implied, we signify the multiplication of

that number by itself; since the word trine imports a dis-

tinction in the supposita of which it is spoken. Therefore

it cannot be said that the Trinity is trine; otherwise it

follows that, if the Trinity be trine, there would be three

supposita of the Trinity; as when we say, God is trine, it

follov/s that there are three supposita of the Godhead.

Second Article,

whether the son is other than the father ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—Objection i. It would seem that the Son is not other

than the Father. For other is a relative term implying

diversity of substance. If, then, the Son is other than the

Father, He must be different from the Father; which is

contrary to what Augustine says (De Trin. vii.), that

when we speak of three persons, ive do not mean to imply

diversity.

Obj. 2. Further, whosoever are other from one another,,

differ in some way from one another. Therefore, if the

Son is other than the Father, it follows that He differs

from the Father ; which is against what Ambrose says

(De Fide i.), that the Father and the Son are one in God-

head; nor is there any difference in substance betweenthem, nor any diversity.

Obj. 3. Further, the term alien is taken from alius

(other). But the Son is not alien from the Father, for




Hilary says (De Trin. vii) that in the divine persons there

is nothing diverse, nothing alien, nothing separable.

Therefore the Son is not other than the Father.

Obj. 4. Further, the terms other person and other thing

(alius et aliud) have the same meaning, differing only in

gender. So if the Son is another person from the Father,

it follows that the Son is a thing apart from the Father.

On the contrary, Augustine* says : There is one essence

of the Father and Son and Holy Ghost, in which the Father

is not one thing, the Son another, and the Holy Ghostanother; although the Father is one person, the Son

another, and the Holy Ghost another.

I answer that. Since, as Jerome remarks,-fa heresy arises

from words wrongly used, when we speak of the Trinity

we must proceed with care and with befitting modesty

because, as Augustine says (De Trin. i. 3), nowhere is

error more harmful, the quest more toilsome, the finding

more fruitful. Now, in treating of the Trinity, we must

beware of two opposite errors, and proceed cautiously

between them—namely, the error of Arius, who placed a

Trinity of substance with the Trinity of persons ; and the

error of Sabellius, who placed unity of person with the

unity of essence.

Thus, to avoid the error of Arius we must shun the use

of the terms diversity and difference in God, lest we take

away the unity of essence : we may, however, use the term

distinction on account of the relative opposition. Hence,

whenever we find terms of diversity or difference of Persons

used in an authentic work, these terms of diversity or

difference are taken to mean distinction. But lest the

simplicity and singleness of the divine essence be taken

away, the terms separation and division, which belong to

the parts of a whole, are to be avoided : and lest equality

be taken away, we avoid the use of the term disparity : and

lest we remove similitude, we avoid the terms alien and dis-

crepant. For Ambrose says (De Fide i.) that in the Father

and the Son there is no discrepancy, but one Godhead:

* Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrutn i.

t In substance, Ep. Ivii.



53 PLURALITY IN GOD Q. 31. Art. a

and according to Hilary, as quoted above, in God there is

nothing alien, nothing separable.

To avoid the heresy of Sabellius, we must shun the

term singularity, lest we take away the communicability ot

the divine essence. Hence Hilary says (De Trin. vii.) :

It is sacrilege to assert that the Father and the Son are

separate in Godhead. We must avoid the adjective only

(unici) lest we take away the number of persons. Hence

Hilary says in t]ie same book : We exclude from God the

idea of singularity or uniqueness. Nevertheless, we can

say the only Son, for in God there is no plurality of Sons.

Yet, we do not say the only God, for Deity is common to

several. We avoid the word confused, lest we take away

from the Persons the order of their nature. Hence

Ambrose says (loc. cit.): What is one is not confused;

and there is no multiplicity where there is no difference.

The word solitary is also to be avoided, lest we take away

the society of the three persons; for, as Hilary says (De

Trin. iv.). We confess neither a solitary nor a diverse God.

This word other (alius), however, in the masculine sense,

means only a distinction of suppositum; and hence we can

properly say that the Son is other than the Father, be-

cause He is another suppositum of the divine nature, as Heis another person and another hypostasis.

Reply Obj. i. Other, being like the name of a particular

thing, refers to the suppositum ; and so, there is sufficient

reason for using it, where there is a distinct substance in

the sense of hypostasis or person. But diversity requires

a distinct substance in the sense of essence. Thus we can-

not say that the Son is diverse from the Father, although

He is another.

Reply Obj. 2. Difference implies distinction of form.

There is one form only in God, as appears from the text.

Who, when He was in the form of God (Phil. ii. 6). There-

fore the term difference does not properly apply to God, as

appears from the authority quoted. Yet, Damascene (DeFide Orthod. i. 5) employs the term difference in the divine

persons, as meaning that the relative property is signified

by way of form. Hence he says that the hypostases do




not differ from each other in substance, but according to

determinate properties. But difference is taken for dis-

tinction, as above stated.Reply Ohj. 3. The term alien means what is extraneous

and dissimilar ; which is not expressed by the term other

(alius) ; and therefore we say that the Son is other than the

Father, but not that He is anything alien.

Reply Ohj. 4. The neuter gender is formless ; whereas

the masculine is formed and distinct ;• and so is the

feminine. So the common essence is properly and aptly

expressed by the neuter gender, but by the masculine and

feminine is expressed the determined subject in the

common nature. Hence also in human affairs, if we ask.

Who is this man ? we answer, Socrates, which is the name

of the suppositum; whereas, if we ask, What is he? we

reply,

Arational

andmortal animal.

So, becausein

Goddistinction is by the persons, and not by the essence, we

say that the Father is other than the Son, but not some-

thing else ; while conversely we say that they are one thing,

but not one person.

Third Article.

whether the exclusive word ' alone ' should be

added to the essential term in god ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article —Objection i. It would seem that the exclusive word alone

(solus) is not to be added to an essential term in God. For,

according to the Philosopher (Elench. ii. 3), He is alone

who is not with another. But God is with the angels and

the souls of the saints. Therefore we cannot say that

God is alone.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever is joined to the essential term

in God can be predicated of every person per se, and of

all the persons together ; for, as we can properly say that

God is wise, we can say the Father is a wise God;

and the

Trinity is a wise God. But Augustine says (De Trin.

vi. 9) : We must consider the opinion that the Father is not

true God alone. Therefore God cannot be said to be alone.



55 PLURALITY IN GOD Q. 31- Art. 3

Obj. 3. Further, if this expression alone is joined to an

essential term, it would be so joined as regards either the

personal predicate or the essential predicate. Butit can-

not be the former, as it is false to say, God alone is Father,

since man also is a father ; nor, again, can it be applied as

regards the latter, for, if this saying were true, God alone

creates, it would follow that the Father alone creates, as

whatever is said of God can be said of the Father ; and it

would be false, as the Son also creates. Therefore this

expression alone cannot be joined to an essential term in

God.

On the contrary, It is said. To the King of ages, im-

mortal, invisible, the only God (i Tim. i. 17).

/ answer thai, This term alone can be taken as a cate-

gorematical term, or as a syncategorematical term. A

categorematical termis

one which ascribes absolutelyits

meaning to a given suppositum ; as, for instance, white to

man, as when we say a white man. If the term alone is

taken in this sense, it cannot in any way be joined to any

term in God ; for it would mean solitude in the term to

which it is joined ; and it would follow that God was

solitary, against what is above stated (A. 2). A syncate-

gorematical term imports the order of the predicate to the

subject; as this expression every one or no one; and like-

wise the term alone, as excluding every other suppositum

from the predicate. Thus, when we say, Socrates alone

writes, we do not mean that Socrates is solitary, but that

he has no companion in writing, though many others mav

be with him. In this

waynothing

prevents the term alonebeing joined to any essential term in God, as excluding

the predicate from all things but God ; as if we said, Godalone is eternal, because nothing but God is eternal.

Reply Obj. i. Although the angels and the souls of the

saints are always with God, nevertheless, if plurality of

persons did not exist in God, He would be alone or solitarv.

For solitude is not removed by association with anything

that is extraneous in nature; thus anyone is said to be

alone in a garden, though many plants and animals are with

him in the garden. Likewise, God would be alone or

1.2 5




solitary, though angels and men were with Him, suppos-

ing that several persons were not within Him. There-

fore the society of angels and of souls does not take away

absolute solitude from God; much less does it remove

respective solitude, in reference to a predicate.

Reply Obj. 2. This expression alone, properly speaking,

does not affect the predicate, which is taken formally, for

it refers to the suppositum, as excluding any other

suppositum from the one which it qualifies. But the

adverb only, being exclusive, can be applied either to

subject or predicate. For we can say, Only Socrates^

that is, no one else runs: and Socrates runs only—that is, he does nothing else. Hence it is not properly

said that the Father is God alone, or the Trinity is God

alone, unless some implied meaning be assumed in the

predicate, as, for instance. The Trinity is God Who alone

is God. In that sense it can be true to say that the Father

is that God who alone is God, if the relative be referred to

the predicate, and not to the suppositum. So, when

Augustine says that the Father is not God alone, but that

the Trinity is God alone, he speaks expositively, as he

might explain the words, ' To the King of ages, invisible,

the only God,' as applying not to the Father, but to the

Trinity alone.

Reply Obj. 3. In both ways can the term alone be joined

to an essential term. For this proposition, God alone is

Father, can mean two things, because the word Father

can signify the person of the Father; and then it is true;

for no man is that person : or it can signify the relation

only ; and thus it is false, because the relation of paternity

is found also in others, though not in a univocal sense.

Likewise it is true to say God alone creates ; nor, does it

follow, therefore the Father alone creates, because, as

logicians say, an exclusive diction so fixes the term to

which it is joined that what is said exclusively of that term

cannot be said exclusively of an individual contained in

that term : for instance, from the premiss, Man alone is a

mortal rational animal, we cannot conclude, therefore

Socrates alone is such.



57 PLURALITY IN GOD Q. 31. Art. 4

Fourth Article.

whether an exclusive diction can be joined to the

personal term ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—Objection i. It would seem that an exclusive diction can

be joined to the personal term, even though the predicate

is common. For our Lord speaking to the Father, said:

That U\ey may know Thee, the only true God (Jo. xvii. 3).

Therefore the Father alone is true God.

Ohj. 2. Further, He said: No one knows the Son hut

the Father (Matt. xi. 27); which means that the Father

alone knows the Son. But to know the Son is common (to

the persons). Therefore the same conclusion follows.

Ohj. 3. Further, an exclusive diction does not excludewhat enters into the concept of the term to which it is

joined. Hence it does not exclude the part, nor the uni-

versal ; for it does not follow that if we say Socrates alone

is zvhite, that therefore his hand is not white, or that man

is not white. But one person is in the concept of another

as the Father is in the concept of the Son ; and conversely.

Therefore, when we say, The Father alone is God, we do

not exclude the Son, nor the Holy Ghost; so that such a

mode of speaking is true.

Obj. 4. Further, the Church sings:: Thou alone art Most

High, O Jesus Christ.

On the contrary, This proposition The Father alone is

God includes two assertions—namely, that the Father is

(lod, and that no other besides the Father is God. But

this second proposition is false, for the Son is another

from the Father, and He is God. Therefore this is false.

The Father alone is God ; and the same of the like sayings.

/ answer that, When we say. The Father alone is God,

such a proposition can be taken in several senses. If

alone means solitude in the Father, it is false in a categore-

matical sense; but if taken in a syncategorematical sense it

can again be understood in several ways. For if it ex-

clude (all others) from the form of the subject, it is true,




the sense being the Father alone is God—that is, He tvho

with no other is the Father, is God. In this way Augustine

expounds when he says (DeTrin. vi.

6):

Wesay the

Father alone, not because He is separate from the Son, or

from the Holy Ghost, but because they are not the Father

together with Him, This, however, is not the usual way

of speaking, unless we understand another implication,

as though we said He who alone is called the Father is

God. But in the strict sense the exclusion aflfects the

predicate. And thus the proposition is false if it excludes

another in the masculine sense ; but true if it excludes it

in the neuter sense ; because the Son is another person

than the Father, but not another thing ; and the same

applies to the Holy Ghost. But because this diction

alone, properly speaking, refers to the subject, it tends to

exclude another Person rather than other things. Hence

such a way of speaking is not to be taken too literally, but

it should be piously expounded, whenever we find it in an

authentic work.

Reply Obj. 1. When we say. Thee the only true God, we

do not understand it as referring to the person of the

Father, but to the whole Trinity, as Augustine expounds

(De Trin. vi. 9). Or, if understood of the person of the

Father, the other persons are not excluded by reason of

the unity of essence ; in so far as the word only excludes

another thing, as above explained.

The same Reply can be given to Obj. 2. For an essential

term applied to the Father does not exclude the Son or the

Holy Ghost, by reason of the unity of essence. Hence

we must understand that in the text quoted the term no

one {nemo) is not the same as no man, which the word it-

self would seem to signify* (for the person of the Father

could not be excepted), but is taken according to the usual

way of speaking in a distributive sense, to mean any

rational nature.

Reply Obj. 3. The exclusive diction does not excludewhat enters into the concept of the term to which it is

adjoined, if they do not differ in suppositum, as part and

* Ntmo = non-homo, i.e. no man.



59 PLURALITY IN GOD Q. 31. Art. 4

universaL But the Son differs in suppositum from the

Father ; and so there is no parity.

Reply Obj. 4. We do not say absolutely that the Sonalone is Most High ; but that He alone is Most High with

the Holy Ghost, in the glory of God the Father.



QUESTION XXXII.

THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVINE PERSONS.

{In FourArticles.)

We proceed to inquire concerning the knowledge of the

divine persons; and this involves four points of inquiry :

(i) Whether the divine persons can be known by natural

reason ? (2) Whether notions are to be attributed to the

divine persons? (3) The number of the notions? (4)

Whether we may lawfully have various contraryopinions

of these notions ?

First Article.

whether the trinity of the divine persons can be

knovitn by natural reason ?

We proceed thus to the First Article —Objection i. It would seem that the trinity of the divine

persons can be known by natural reason. For philoso-

phers came to the knowledge of God not otherwise than by

natural reason. Now we find that they said many things

about the trinity of persons, for Aristotle says (De Ccelo

et Mundo i. 2) : Through this nuviber—namely, three we

bring ourselves to acknowledge the greatness of one God,

surpassing all things created. And Augustine says {Conf.

vii. 9) : / have read in their works, not in so many words,

but enforced by many and various reasons, that in the

beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God,

and the Word was God, and so on ; in which passage the

distinction of personsis

laid down. Weread, moreover,

in a gloss on Rom. i. and Exod. viii. that the magicians of

Pharaoh failed in the third sign—that is, as regards know-

ledge of a third person i.e., of the Holy Ghost—and thus

60



6i [THE DIVINE PERSONS Q. 32. Art. i

it is clear that they knew at least two persons. Likewise

Trismegistus says : The monad begot a monad, and re-

flected upon itself its own heat. By which words the

generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy

Ghost seem to be indicated. Therefore knowledge of the

divine persons can be obtained by natural reason.

Obj. 2. Further, Richard of St. Victor says {De Trin.

i. 4) : / believe without doubt that probable and even

necessary arguments can be found for any explanation of

the truth. So even to prove the Trinity some have brought

forward a reason from the infinite goodness of God, who

communicates Himself infinitely in the procession of the

divine persons; while some are moved by the considera-

tion that no good thing can be joyfully possessed without

partnership. Augustine proceeds (De Trin. ix. 4; x. (Ii,

12) to prove the trinity of persons by the procession of the

word and of love in our own mind ; and we have followed

him in this (Q. XXVII., A. i, 3). Therefore the trinity

of persons can be known by natural reason.

Obj. 3. Further, it seems to be superfluous to teach what

cannot be known by natural reason. But it ought not to

be said that the divine tradition of the Trinity is super-

fluous. Therefore the trinity of persons can be known by

natural reason.

On the contrary, Hilary says {De Trin. i.), Let not manthink to reach the sacred mystery of generation by his own

mind. And Ambrose says {De Fide ii. 5), It is impossible

lo know the secret of generation. The mind fails, the voice

is silent. But the trinity of the divinepersons is

distinguished by origin of generation and procession

((). XXX., A. 2). Since, therefore, man cannot know, and

with his understanding grasp that for which no necessary

reason can be given, it follows that the trinity of persons

cannot be known by reason.

J answer that, It is impossible to attain to the know-

ledge of the Trinity by natural reason. For, as above

explained (Q. XII., AA. 4, 12), man cannot obtain the

knowledge of God by natural reason except from creatures.

Now creatures lead us to the knowledge of God, as effects






some of the essential attributes appropriated to the persons,

as power to the Father, wisdom to the Son, goodness to

the Holy Ghost ; as will later on appear. So, when Aris-

totle said, By this number, etc., we must not take it as if

he affirmed a threefold number in God, but that he wished

to say that the ancients used the threefold number in theij

sacrifices and prayers on account of some perfection resid-

ing in the number three. In the Platonic books also we

find, In the beginning was the word, not as meaning the

Person begotten in God, but as meaning the ideal type

whereby God made all things, and which is appropriated

to the Son. And although they knew these were appro-

priated to the three persons, yet they are said to have failed

in the third sign—that is, in the knowledge of the third

person, because they deviated from the goodness appro-

priated to the Holy Ghost, in that knowing God they did

not glorify Him as God (Rom. i.) ; or, because the Platonists

asserted the existence of one Primal Being whom they also

declared to be the father of the universe, they consequently

maintained the existence of another substance beneath

him, which they called mind or the paternal intellect, con-

taining the idea of all things, as Macrobius relates {Som.

Scip. iv.). They did not, however, assert the existence of

a third separate substance which might correspond to

the Holy Ghost. So also we do not assert that the Father

and the Son differ in substance, which was the error of

Origen and Arius, who in this followed the Platonists.

When Trismegistus says, Monad begot monad, etc., this

does not refer to the generation of the Son, or to the

procession of the Holy Ghost, but to the production of the

world. For one God produced one world by reason of His

love for Himself.

Reply Obj. 2. Reason may be employed in two ways to

establish a point : firstly, for the purpose of furnishing

sufficient proof of some principle, as in natural science,

where sufficient proof can be brought to show that the

movement of the heavens is always of uniform velocity.

Reason is employed in another way, not as furnishing a

sufficient proof of a principle, but as confirming an already



Q. 32. Art. i THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA •*64

established principle, by showing the congruity of its Re-

sults, as in astrology the theory of eccentrics and epicycles

is considered as established, because therebythe sensible

appearances of the heavenly movements can be explained

not, however, as if this proof were sufficient, forasmuch as

some other theory might explain them. In the first way

we can prove that God is one ; and the like. In the second

way, reasons avail to prove the Trinity ; as, when assumed

to be true, such reasons confirm it. We must not, how-

ever, think that the trinity of persons is adequately proved

by such reasons. This becomes evident when we consider

each point ; for the infinite goodness of God is manifested

also in creation, because to produce from nothing is an act

of infinite power. For if God communicates Himself by

His infinite goodness, it is not necessary that an infinite

effect should proceed fromGod

: but that according to its

own mode and capacity it should receive the divine good-

ness. Likewise, when it is said that joyous possession of

good requires partnership, this holds in the case of one not

having perfect goodness : hence it needs to share some

other's good, in order to have the goodness of complete

happiness. Nor is the image in our mind an adequate

proof in the case of God, forasmuch as the intellect is not

in God and ourselves univocaliy. Hence, Augustine says

{Tract, xxvii. in Joan.) that by faith we arrive at know-

ledge, and not conversely.

Reply Obj. 3. There are two reasons why the knowledge

of the divine persons was necessary for us. It was neces-

sary for the right idea of creation. The fact of saying that

God made all things by His Word excludes the error of

those who say that God produced things by necessity.

When we say that in Him there is a procession of love, we

show that God produced creatures not because He needed

them, nor because of any other extrinsic reason, but on

account of the love of His own goodness. So Moses,

when he had said. In the beginning God created heavenand earth, subjoined, God said, Let there be light, to

manifest the divine Word; and then said, God saw the

light that it was good, to show the proof of the divine love.




The same is also found in the other works of creation. In

another way, and chiefly, that we may think rightly con-

cerning the salvation of the human race, accomplished bythe Incarnate Son, and by the gift of the Holy Ghost.

Second Article,

whether there are notions in god?

We proceed thus to the Second Article —Objection i. It would seem that in God there are no

notions. For Dionysius says {Div. Nom. i.) : We must

not dare to say anything of God but what is taught to us

by the Holy Scripture. But Holy Scripture does not say

anything concerning notions. Therefore there are none in

God.

Obj. 2. Further, all that exists in God concerns the unity

of the essence or the trinity of the persons. But the

notions do not concern the unity of the essence, nor the

Trinity of the persons; for neither can what belongs to the

essence be predicated of the notions : for instance, we do

not say that paternity is wise or creates ; nor can what

belongs to the persons be so predicated ; for example, we

do not say that paternity begets, nor that filiation is be-

gotten. Therefore there do not exist notions in God.

Obj. 3. Further, we do not require to presuppose any

abstract notions as principles of knowing things which are

devoid of composition : for they are known of themselves.

But the divine persons are supremely simple. Therefore

we are not to suppose any notions in God.On the contrary, Damascene says {De Fide Orthod.

iii. 5): We recognize difference of hypostases (i.e., of

persons), in the three properties ; i.e., in the paternal, the

filial, and the processional. Therefore we must admit

properties and notions in God.

/ answer that, Prepositivus, considering the simplicity

of the persons, said that in God there were no properties

or notions, and wherever they were mentioned, he pro-

pounded the abstract for the concrete. For as we are

accustomed to say, / beseech your kindness—i.e., you who




are kind—so when we speak of paternity in God, we mean

God the Father.

But, as was shown above (Q. III., A. 3, ad i), the use of

concrete and abstract names in God is not in any way re-

pugnant to the divine simplicity ; forasmuch as we always

name a thing as we understand it. Now, our intellect

cannot attain to the absolute simplicity of the divine

essence, considered in itself, and therefore, our human

intellect apprehends and names divine things, according

to its own mode, that is in so far as they are found in

sensible objects, whence its knowledge is derived. In

these things we use abstract terms to signify simple forms;

and to signify subsistent things we use concrete terms.

Hence also we signify divine things, as above stated, by

abstract names, to express their simplicity ; whereas, 10

express their subsistence and completeness, we use concrete

names.

But not only must essential names be signified in the

abstract and in the concrete, as when we say Deity and

(jod; or wisdom and wise; but the same applies to the

personal names, so that we may say paternity and Father.

Two chief motives for this can be cited. The first arises

from the obstinacy of heretics. For since we confess the

Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost to be one God and

three persons, to those who ask : Whereby are They one

God? and whereby are they three persons? as we answer

that they are one in essence or deity ; so there must also

be some abstract terms whereby we may answer that the

persons are distinguished; and these are the properties or

notions signified by an abstract term, as paternity and

filiation. Therefore the divine essence is signified as

What; and the person as Who; and the property as

Whereby.

The second motive is because one person in God is

related to two Persons—namely, the person of the Father

to the person of the Son and to the person of the Holy

Ghost. This is not, however, by one relation; otherwise

it would follow that the Son also and the Holy Ghost

would be related to the Father by one and the same rela-




tion. Thus, since relation alone multiplies the Trinity, it

would follow that the Son and the Holy Ghost would not

be two persons. Nor can it be said with Prepositivus that

as God is related in one way to creatures, while creatures

are related to Him in divers ways, so the Father is related

by one relation to the Son and to the Holy Ghost ; whereas

these two persons are related to the Father by two rela-

tions. For, since the very specific idea of a relation is that

it refers to another, it must be said that two relations arenot specifically different if but one opposite relation cor-

responds to them. For the relation of lord and father

must diflfer according to the difference of filiation and

servitude. Now, all creatures are related to God as His

creatures by one specific relation. But the Son and the

Holy Ghost are not related to the Father by one and the

same kind of relation. Hence there is no parity.

Further, in God there is no need to admit any real re-

lation to the creature (Q. XXVIII., AA. i, 3) ; while there

is no reason against our admitting in God, many logical

relations. But in the Father there must be a real relation

to the Son and to the Holy Ghost. Hence, corresponding

to the two relations of the Son and of the Holy Ghost,whereby they are related to the Father, we must under-

stand two relations in the Father, whereby He is related to

the Son and to the Holy Ghost. Hence, since there is

only one Person of the Father, it is necessary that the

relations should be separately signified in the abstract;

and these are what we mean by properties and notions.

Reply Obj. i. Although the notions are not mentioned

in Holy Scripture, yet the persons are mentioned, com-

prising the idea of notions, as the abstract is contained in

the concrete.

Reply Obj. 2. In God the notions have their significance

not after the manner of realities, but by way of certain

ideas whereby the persons are known;

although in

God these notions or relations are real, as stated above

(Q. XXVIII., A. i). Therefore whatever has order to

any essential or personal act, cannot be applied to the

notions; forasmuch as this is against their mode of signifi-






,Obj. 4. On the contrary, It seems that there are more;

because, as the Father is from no one, and therefrom is

derived the notion of innascibility ; so from the HolyGhost no other person proceeds. And in this respect

there ought to be a sixth notion.

Obj. 5. Further, as the Father and the Son are the

common origin of the Holy Ghost, so it is common to the

Son and the Holy Ghost to proceed from the Father.

Therefore, as one notion is common to the Father and the

Son, so there ought to be one notion common to the Son

and to the Holy Ghost.

/ answer that, A notion is the proper idea whereby we

know a divine Person. Now the divine persons are multi-

plied by reason of their origin : and origin includes the

idea of someone from whom another comes, and of some-

one that comes from another, and by these two modes a

person can be known. Therefore the Person of the Father

cannot be known by the fact that He is from another ; but

by the fact that He is from no one ; and thus the notion

that belongs to Him is called innascibility. As the source

of another, He can be known in two ways, because as the

Son is from Him, the Father is known by the notion of

paternity; and as the Holy Ghost is from Him, He is

known by the notion of common spiration. The Son

can be known as begotten by another, and thus He is

known by filiation; and also by another person pro-

ceeding from Him, the Holy Ghost, and thus He is

known in the same way as the Father is known, by common

spiration. The Holy Ghost can be known by the fact that

He is from another, or from others ; thus He is known

by procession; but not by the fact that another is from

Him, as no divine person proceeds from Him.

Therefore there are Five notions in God : innascibility,

paternity, filiation, common spiration, and procession. Of

these only four are relations, for innascibility is not a

relation, except by reduction, as will appear later (Q.

XXXIII., A. 4, ad 3). Four only are properties. For

common spiration is not a property ; because it belongs to

two persons. Three are personal notions i.e., constitut-



Q. 32. Art. 4 THE SUMMA THKOLOGICA 70

ing persons, paternity, filiation, and procession. Common

spiration and innascibility are called notions of Persons,

but not personal notions, as we shall explain further on

(Q. XL., A. I, ad i).

Reply Obj. i. Besides the four relations, another notion

must be admitted, as above explained.

Reply Obj. 2. The divine essence is signified as a reality

and likewise the persons are signified as realities ; whereas

the notions are signified as ideas notifying the persons.

Therefore, although God is one by unity of essence, and

trine by trinity of persons, nevertheless He is not quinary

by the five notions.

Reply Obj, 3. Since the real plurality in God is founded

only on relative opposition, the several properties of one

Person, as they are not relatively opposed to each other, do

not really differ. Nor again are they predicated of each

other, because they are different ideas of the persons ; as

we do not say that the attribute of power is the attribute

of knowledge, although we do say that knowledge is power.

Reply Obj. 4. Since Person implies dignity, as stated

above (Q. XIX., A. 3), we cannot derive a notion of the

Holy Spirit from the fact that no person is from Him.

For this does not belong to His dignity, as it belongs to

the authority of the Father that He is from no one.

Reply Obj. 5. The Son and the Holy Ghost do not agree

in one special mode of existence derived from the Father

as the Father and the Son agree in one special mode of

producing the Holy Ghost. But the principle on which a

notion is based must be something special ; thus no parity

of reasoning exists.

Fourth Article.

whether it is lawful to have various contrary

opinions of notions?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article —Objection i. It would seem that it is not lawful to have

various contrary opinions of the notions : For Augustine

says {De Trin. i. 3) : No error is more dangerous than any




ay regards the Trinity: to whicli mystery the notions

assuredly belong. But contrary opinions must be in some

way erroneous.Therefore it is not right to have contrary

opinions of the notions.

Obj. 2. Further, the persons are known by the notions.

But no contrary opinion concerning the persons is to be

tolerated. Therefore neither can there be about the

notions.

On the contrary, The notions are not articles of faith.

Therefore different opinions of the notions are permissible.

/ ansiver that. Anything is of faith in two ways; directly,

where any truth comes to us principally as divinely taught,

as the trinity and unity of God, the Incarnation of the

Son, and the like; and concerning these truths a false

opinion of itself involves heresy, especially if it be held

obstinately.

Athing is of faith, indirectly, if the denial

of it involves as a consequence something against faith ;

as for instance if anyone said that Samuel was not the son

of Elcana, for it follows that the divine Scripture would be

false. Concerning such things anyone may have a false

opinion without danger of heresy, before the matter has

been considered or settled as involving consequences

against faith, and particularly if no obstinacy be shown ;

whereas when it is manifest, and especially if the Church

has decided that consequences follow against faith, then

the error cannot be free from heresy. For this reason

manv things are now considered as heretical which were

formerly not so considered, as their consequences are now

more manifest.

So we must decide that anyone may entertain contrary

opinions about the notions, if he does not mean to uphold

anvthing at variance with faith. If, however, anyone

siiould entertain a false opinion of the notions, knowing

or thinking that consequences against the faith would

follow, he would lapse into heresy.

By what has been said all the objections may be solved-.



QUESTION XXXIII.

OF THE PERSON OF THE FATHER.

(In Four Articles.)

,We now consider the persons singly ; and first, the Person

of the Father, concerning Whom there are four points of

inquiry: (i) Whether the Father is the Principle?

(2) Whether the person of the Father is properly signified

by this name Father? (3) Whether Father in God is said

personally before it is said essentially? (4) Whether it

belongs to the Father alone to be unbegotten ?

First Article.

whether it belongs to the father to be the

principle?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—Objection i. It would seem that the Father cannot be

called the principle of the Son, or of the Holy Ghost. For

principle and cause are the same, according to the phil-

osopher {Metaph. iv.). But we do not say that the Father

is the cause of the Son. Therefore we must not say that

He is the principle of the Son.Obj. 2. Further, a principle is so called in relation to

the thing principled. So if the Father is the principle of

the Son, it follows that the Son is a person principled, and

is therefore created ; which appears false.

Obj. 3. Further, the word principle is taken from priority.

But in God there is no before and after, as Athanasius

says. Therefore in speaking of God we ought not to use

the term principle.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv. 20), The

Father is the PHnciple of the whole Deity.

72



73 PERSON OF THE FATHER Q. 33. Art. t

I answer that, The word principle signifies only that

.vhence another proceeds : Since anything whence some-

thing proceeds in any way we call a principle ; and con-

versely. As the Father then is the one whence another

proceeds, it follows that the Father is a principle.

Reply Obj. i. The Greeks use the words cause and

principle indifferently, when speaking of God; whereas

the Latin Doctors do not use the word cause, but only

principle. The reason is because principle is a wider term

than cause; as cause is more common than element. For

the first term of a thing, as also the first part, is called the

principle, but not the cause. Now the wider a term is, the

more suitable it is to use as regards God (Q. XHI., A. 11),

because, the more special terms are, the more they deter-

mine the mode adapted to the creature. Hence this term

cause seems to mean diversity of substance, and depend-ence of one from another; which is not implied in the word

principle. For in all kinds of causes there is always to be

found between the cause and the effect a distance of per-

fection or of power : whereas we use the term principle

even in things which have no such difference, but have

only a certain order to each other; as when we say that a

point is the principle of a line; or also when we say that

the first part of a line is the principle of a line.

Reply Obj. 2. It is the custom with the Greeks to say

that the Son and the Holy Ghost are principled. This is

not, however, the custom with our Doctors ; because,

although we attribute to the Father something of authority

by reason of His being the principle, still we do not

attribute any kind of subjection or inferiority to the Son,

or to the Holy Ghost, to avoid any occasion of error. In

this way, Hilary says {De Trin. ix.) : By authority of the

Giver, the Father is the greater ; nevertheless the Son is not

less to Whom oneness of nature is given.

Reply Obj. 3. Although this word principle, as regards

its derivation, seems to be taken from priority, still it does

not signify priority, but origin. For what a term signifies,

and the reason why it was imposed, are not the same thing,

as stated above (Q. XHI., A. 8).



Q. 33. Art. i THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA 74

Second Article.

whether this name ' father ' is properly the

name of a divine person?

'(We proceed thus to the Second Article —Objection i. It would seem that this name Father is not

properly the name of a divine person. For the name

Father signifies relation. Moreover person is an individual

substance. Therefore this name Father is not properly a

name signifying a Person.

Obj. 2. Further, a begetter is more common than father;

for every father begets; but it is not so conversely. But

a more common term is more properly applied to God, as

stated above (Q. XIII., A. 11). Therefore the more proper

name of the divine person is begetter and genitor than

Father.

Obj. 3. Further, a metaphorical term cannot be the

proper name of anyone. But the word is by us metaphori-

cally called begotten, or offspring; and consequentiv, he

of whom is the word, is metaphorically called father.

Therefore the principle of the Word in God is not properly

called Father.

Obj. 4. Further, everything which is said properly of

God, is said of God first before creatures. But generation

appears to appl}' to creatures before God ; because genera-

tion seems to be truer when the one who proceeds is distinct

from the one whence it proceeds, not only by relation but

also by essence. Therefore the name Father taken from

generation does not seem to be the proper name of any

divine person.

On the contrary, It is said (Ps. Ixxxviii. 27) : He shall

cry out to me : Thou art my Father.

I answer that, The proper name of any person signifies

that whereby the person is distinguished from all other

persons. For as body and soul belong to the nature of

man, so to the concept of this particular man belong thisparticular soul and this particular body ; and by these is

this particular man distinguished from all other men.

Now it is paternity which distinguishes the person of the



75 PERSON OF THE FATHER Q. 33. Art.2

Father from all the other persons. Hence this name

Father, whereby paternity is signified, is the proper name

of the person of the Father.

Reply Ohj. i. Among- us relation is not a subsisting

person. So this name father among us does not signify a

person, but the relation of a person. In God, however, it

is not so, as some wrongly thought ; for in God the relation

signified by the name Father is a subsisting person.

Hence, as aboveexplained (O. XXIX., A.

4),this name

person in God signifies a relation subsisting in the divine

nature.

Reply Obj. 2. According to the Philosopher (Dc

Anima, ii., text 49), a thing is denominated chiefly by its

perfection, and by its end. Now generation signifies some-

thing in process of being made, whereas paternity signifies

the complement of generation ; and therefore the nameFather is more expressive as regards the divine person

than genitor or begetter.

Reply Obj. 3. In human nature the word is not a sub-

sistence, and hence is not properly called begotten or son.

But the divine Word is something subsistent in the divine

nature; and hence He is properly and not metaphorically

railed Son, and His principle is called Father.

Reply Obj. 4. The terms generation and paternity, like

the other terms properly applied to God, are said of God

before creatures as regards the thing signified, but not

as regards the mode of signification. Hence also the

Apostle says, / bend my knee to the Father of my Lord

Jesus Christ, from ivhotn all paternity in heaven and onearth is named (Eph. iii. 14). This is explained thus. It

is manifest that generation receives its species from the

term wliich is the form of the thing generated; and the

nearer it is to the form of the generator, the truer and more

perfect is the generation ; as univocal generation is more

perfect than non-univocal, for it belongs to the essence of

a generator to generate what is like itself in form. Hence

the very fact that in the divine generation the form of the

Begetter and Begotten is numerically the same, whereas in

creatures it is not numerically, but only specifically, the



Q. 33. Art. 3 THE SUMMA llIliOLOGICA

76

same, shows that generation, and consjequently paternity,

is applied to God before creatures. Hence the very fact

that in God a distinction exists of the Begotten from theBegetter as regards relation only, belongs to the truth of

the divine generation and paternity.

Third Article.

whether this name ' father ' is applied to god,

firstly as a personal name?

iWe proceed thus to the Third Article —Objection i. It would seem that this name Father is not

applied to God, firstly as a personal name. For in the

intellect the common precedes the particular. But this

name Father as a personal name, belongs to the person of

the Father; and taken in an essential sense it is

commonto the whole Trinity ; for we say Our Father to the whole

Trinity. Therefore Father comes first as an essential name

before its personal sense.

Ohj. 2. Further, in things of which the concept is the

same there is no priority of predication. But [paternity and

filiation seem to be of the same nature, according as a

divine person is Father of the Son, and the whole Trinity

is our Father, or the creature's ; since, according to Basil

(Horn. XV., De Fide), to receive is common to the creature

and to the Son. Therefore Father in God is not taken as

an essential name before it is taken personally.

Obj. 3. Further, it is not possible to compare things

which have not a common concept. But the Son is com-

pared to the creature by reason of filiation or generation,

accor'iing to Col. i. 15 : Who is the image of the invisible

God, the first-born of every creature. Therefore paternity

taken in a personal sense is not prior to, but has the same

concept as, paternity taken essentially.

On the contrary, The eternal comes before the temporal.

But God is the Father of the Son from eternity; wliile Heis Father of the creature in time. Therefore paternity in

God is taken in a personal sense as regards the Son, before

it is so taken as regards the creature.



77 PERSON OF THE FATHER Q. 33. Art. 3

/ answer that, A name is applied to that wherein is per-

fectly contained its whole signification, before it is applied

to that which only partially contains it;

for the latter bearsthe name by reason of a kind of similitude to that which

answers perfectly to the signification of the name ; since all

imperfect things are taken from perfect things. Hence

this name lion is applied first to the animal containing the

whole nature of a lion, and which is properly so called,

before it is applied to a man who shows something of a

lion's nature, as courage, or strength, or the like; and of

whom it is said by way of similitude.,

Now it is manifest from the foregoing (QQ. XXVH.A. 2; XXVni., A. 4), that the perfect iaea of paternitj'

and filiation is to be found in God the Father, and in God

the Son, because one is the nature and glory of the Father

and the Son. Butin

the creature,filiation is found in

relation to God, not in a perfect manner, since the Creator

and the creature have not the same nature; but by way of

a certain likeness, which is the more perfect the nearer we

approach to the true idea of filiation. For God is called

the Father of some creatures by reason only of a trace, for

instance of irrational creatures, according to Job xxxviii.

28 : Who is the father of the rain? or who begot the drops

of dew? Of some, namely, the rational creature (He is the

Father), by reason of the likeness of His image, according

to Deut. xxxii. 6: Is He not thy Father, who possessed,

and made, and created thee? And of others He is the

Father by similitude of grace, and these are also called

adoptive sons, as ordained to the heritage of eternal glory

by the gift of grace which they have received, according

to Rom. viii. 16, 17 : The Spirit Himself gives testimony

to our spirit that we are the sons of God; and if sons, heirs

also. Lastly, He is the Father of others by similitude

of glory, forasmuch as they have obtained possession of

the heritage of glory, according to Rom. v. 2 : We glory

in the hope of the glory of the sons of God. Therefore it

is plain that paternity is applied to God first, as importing

regard of one Person to another Person, before it imports

the regard of God to creatures.




Reply Obj. i. Common terms taken absolutely, in the

order of our intelligence, come before proper terms;

because they are included in the understanding of properterms ; but not conversely. For in the concept of the

person of the Father, God is understood; but not con-

versely. But common terms which import relation to the

creature come after proper terms which import personal

relations ; because the person proceeding in God proceeds

as the principle of the production of creatures. For as the

word conceived in the mind of the artist is first understood

to proceed from the artist before the thing designed, which

is produced in likeness to the word conceived in the artist's

mind ; so the Son proceeds from the Father before the

creature, to which the name of filiation is applied as it

participates in the likeness of the Son, as is clear from the

words of Rom. viii. 29:

Whom He foreknew and pre-destined to be made conformable to the image of His Son.

Reply Obj. 2. To receive is said to be common to the

creature and to the Son not in a univocal sense, but accord-

ing to a certain remote similitude whereby He is called the

First Born of creatures. Hence the authority quoted sub-

joins : That He rnay be the First Born among many

brethren, after saying that some were conformed to the

image of the Son of God. But the Son of God possesses

a position of singularity above others, in having by nature

what He receives, as Basil also declares (ibid.) ; hence He

is called the only begotten (John i. 18) : The only begotten

Who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared

unto us.

From this appears the Reply to Obj. 3.

Fourth Article.

whether it is proper to the father to be

unbegotten.

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—Objection i. It would seem that it is not proper to the

Father to be unbegotten. For every property supposes

something in that of which it is the property. But un-



79 PERSON OF THE FATHER Q. 33. Art. 4

begotten supposes nothino- in the Father; it only removes

something. Therefore it does not signify a property of

the Father.

Obj. 2. Further, Unbegotten is taken either in a priva-

tive, or in a negative, sense. If in a negative sense, then

whatever is not begotten can be called unbegotten. But

the Holy Ghost is not begotten ; neither is the divine

essence. Therefore to be unbegotten belongs also to the

essence; thus it is not proper to the Father. But if it be

taken in a privative sense, as every privation signifies im-

perfection in the thing which is the subject of privation, it

follows that the Person of the Father is imperfect ; which

cannot be.

Obj. 3. Further, in God, unbegotten does not signify

relation, for it is not used relatively. Therefore it signifies

substance; therefore unbegotten and begotten differ in

substance. But the Son, Who is begotten, does not differ

from the Father in substance. Therefore the Father ought

not to be called unbegotten.

Obj. 4. Further, property means what belongs to one

alone. Since, then, there are more than one in God pro-

ceeding from another, there is nothing to prevent several

not receiving their being from anotlier. Therefore the

Father is not alone unbegotten.

Obj. 5. Further, as the Father is the principle of the

person begotten, so is He of the person proceeding. So if

by reason of His opposition ,to the person begotten, it is

proper to the Father to be unbegotten, it follows that it is

proper to Him also to be unproceeding.On the contrary, Hilary says {De Trin. iv.) : One is

from one—that is, the Begotten is from the Unbegotten—namely, by the property in each one respectively of in-

nascibility and origin.

I answer that, As in creatures there exist a first and a

secondary principle, so also in the divine Persons, in

Whom there is no before or after, is formed the principle

not from a principle, Who is the Father; and the principle

from a principle, Who is the Son.

Now in things created a first principle is known in two



Q. 33. Art. 4 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA '*

80

ways ; in one way as the first principle, by reason of its

having a relation to what proceeds from itself ; in another

way, inasmuch asit

is a first principle byreason of its not

being from another. Thus therefore the Father is known

both by paternity and by common spiration, as regards the

persons proceeding from HimSelf. But as the principle,

not from a principle He is known by the fact that He is not

from another; and this belongs to the property of in-

nascibility, signified by this word unhegoiten.

Reply Obj. i. Some there are who say that innascibility,

signified by the word unhegoiten, as a property of the

Father, is not a negative term only, but either that it means

both these things together—namely, that the Father is

from no one, and that He is the principle of others; or that

it imports universal authority, or also His plenitude as

the source of all. This, however, does not seem true,

because thus innascibility would not be a property distinct

from paternity and spiration ; but would include them as

the proper is included in the common. For source and

authority signify in God nothing but the princip (e of

origin. We must therefore say with Augustine {De

Trin. v. 7) that unhegoiten imports the negation of

passive generation. For he says that unhegoiten has the

same meaning as ' not a son.' Nor does it follow that

unhegoiten is not the proper notion of the Father; for

primary and simple things are notified by negations ; as,

for instance, a point is defined as what has no part.

Reply Ohj. 2. Unhegoiten is taken sometimes in a nega-

tive sense only, and in that sense Jerome says that the

Holy Ghost is unhegoiten—that is, He is not begotten.

Otherwise unhegoiten may be taken in a kind of privative

sense, but not as implying any imperfection. For priva-

tion can be taken in many ways; in one way when a thing

has not what naturally belongs to another, even though it

is not of its own nature to have it; as, for instance, if a

stone be called a dead thing, as wanting life, whichnaturally belongs to some other things. In another sense,

privation is so called when something has not what

naturally belongs to some members of its genus ; as for



8i PERSON OF THE FATHER Q. 33. Art. 4

instance when a mole is called blind. In a ibird sense

privation means the absence of what something ought to

have; in which sense, privation imports an imperfection.

In this sense, unbegotten is not attributed to the Father as

a privation, but it may be so attributed in the second sense,

meaning that a certain person of the divine nature is not

begotten, while some person of the same nature is be-

gotten. In this sense the term unbegotten can be applied

also to the Holy Ghost. Hence to consider it as a term

proper to the Father alone, it must be further understood

that the name unbegotten belongs to a divine person as the

principle of another person ; so that it be understood to

imply negation in the genus of principle taken personally

in God. Or that there be understood in the term unbe-

gotten that He is not in anyway derived from another ; and

not only that He is not from another by way only of genera-tion. In this sense the term unbegotten does not belong

at all to the Holy Ghost, Who is from another by proces-

sion, as a subsisting person; nor does it belong to the

divine essence, of which it may be said that it is in the Son

or in the Holy Ghost from another—namely, from the

Father.

Reply Obj. 3. According to Damascene {De Fide

Orthod. ii. 9), unbegotten in one sense signifies the same

as uncreated; and thus it applies to the substance, for

thereby does the created substance differ from the un-

created. In another sense it signifies what is not be-

gotten, and in this sense it is a relative term;just as nega-

tion is reduced to the genus of affirmation, as not man is

reduced to the genus of substance, and not white to the

genus of quality. Hence, since begotten implies relation

in God, unbegotten belongs also to relation. Thus it does

not follow that the Father unbegotten is substantially dis-

tinguished from the Son begotten; but only by relation:

that is, as the relation of Son is denied of the Father.

Reply Obj. 4. In every genus there must be something

first; so in the divine nature there must be some one

principle wiiich is not from another, and which we call

unbegotten. To admit two innascibles is to suppose the



Q. 33. Art. 4 THE SUMMA THEQLOGiCA ** 82

existence of two Gods, and two divine natures. Hence

Hilary says {De Synod.) : As there is one God, so there

cannot be two innascibles . And this especially because,

did two innascibles exist, one would not be from the other,

and they would not be distinguished by relative opposi-

tion : therefore they would be distinguished from each

other by diversity of nature.

Reply Obj. 5. The property of the Father, whereby He

is not from another, is more clearly signified by the

removal of the nativity of the Son, than by the removal of

the procession of the Holy Ghost ; both because the pro-

cession of the Holy Ghost has no special name, as stated

above (Q. XXVH., A. 4, ad 3), and because also in the

order of nature it presupposes the generation of the Son.

Hence, it being denied of the Father that He is begotten,

although He is the principle of generation, it follows, as a

consequence, that He does not proceed by the procession

of the Holy Ghost, because the Holy Ghost is not the

principle of generation, but proceeds from the person

begotten.



QUESTION XXXIV.

OF THE PERSON OF THE SON.

{In Three Articles.)

We next consider the person of the Son. Three names are

attributed to the Son—namely, So7i, Word, and Image.

The idea of Son is gathered from the idea of Father.

Hence it remains for us to consider Word and Image.

Côncerning Word there are three points of inquiry :

(i) Whether Word is an essential term in God, or a

personal term ? (2) Whether it is the proper name of the

vSon ? (3) Whether in the name of Word is expressed

relation to creatures?

First Article,

whether word in god is a personal name?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—Objection i. It would seem that Word in God is not a

personal name. For personal names are applied to Godin a proper sense, as Father and Son, But Word is

applied to God metaphorically, as Origen says on (Jo. i. i),

In the beginning was the Word. Therefore Word is not a

personal name in God.

Obj. 2. Further, according to Augustine {De Trin.

ix. 10), The Word is knowledge with love ; and according

to Anselm (Monol. Ix.), To speak is to the Supreme Spirit

nothing but to see by thought. But knowledge andthought, and sight, are essential terms in God. Therefore

Word is not a personal term in God.

Obj. 3. Further, it is essential to word to be spoken.But, according to Anselm {ibid, lix.), as the Father is

intelligent, the Son intelligent, and the Holy Ghost in-

telligent, so the Father speaks, the Son speaks, and the

83




Holy Ghost speaks ; and likewise, each one of them is

spoken. Therefore, the name Word is used as an essential

term in God, and not in a personal sense.Obj. 4. Further, no divine person is made. But the

Word of God is something made. For it is said. Fire,

hail, snow, ice, the storms wJiich do His Word (Ps. cxlviii.

8). Therefore the Word is not a personal name in God.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vii. 11) : As

the Son is related to the Father, so also is the Word to Him

Whose Word He is. But Son is a personal name, since

it is said relatively. Therefore so also is Word.

I answer that, The name of Word in God, if taken in its

proper sense, is a personal name, and in no way an essential

name.

To see how this is true, we must know that our own

word taken in its proper sense has a threefold meaningwhile in a fourth sense it is taken improperly or figura-

tively. The clearest and most common sense is when it is

said of the word spoken by the voice; and this proceeds

from an interior source as regards two things found in the

exterior word—that is, the vocal sound itself, and the

signification of the sound. For, according to the Philoso-

pher {Peri Herm. i.) vocal sound signifies the concept of

the intellect. Again the vocal sound proceeds from the

signification or the imagination, as stated in De Aninia, ii.,

text 90. The vocal sound, which has no signification, can-

not be called a word : wherefore the exterior vocal sound

is called a word from the fact that it signifies the interior

concept of the mind. Therefore it follows that, first andchiefly, the interior concept of the mind is called a word;

secondarily, the vocal sound itself, signifying the interior

concept, is so called ; and thirdly, the imagination of the

vocal sound is called a word. Damascene mentions these

three kinds of words {De Fide Orthod. i. 17), saying that

word is called the natural movement of the intellect, where-

by it is moved, and understands, and thinks, as light and

splendour ; which is the first kind. Again, he says, the

word is what is not pronounced by a vocal word, but is

uttered in the heart ; which is the third kind. Again also,



85 PERSON OF THE SON Q. 34. Art. i

the word is the angel—that is, the messenger of intelli-

gence ; which is the second kind. Word is also used in a

fourth way figuratively for that which is signified or effected

by a word ; thus we are wont to say, this is the word I have

said, or which the king has commanded, alluding to some

deed signified by the word either by way of assertion or of

command.

Now word is taken strictly in God, as signifying the con-

cept of the intellect. Hence Augustine says (De Trin.

XV. 10) : Whoever can understand the word, not only

before it is sounded, hut also before thought has clothed it

with imaginary sound, can already see some likeness of

that Word of Whom it is said: In the beginning was the

Word. The concept itself of the heart has of its own naturp

to proceed from something other than itself—namely, from

the knowledge of the one conceiving. Hence Word,according as we use the term strictly of God, signifies

something proceeding from another ; which belongs to the

nature of personal terms in God, inasmuch as the divine

persons are distinguished by origin (Q. XXVH., AA. 3,

4, 5). Hence the term Word, according as we use the

term strictly of God, is to be taken as said not essentially,

but personally.

Reply Obj. i. The Arians, who sprang from Origen, de-

clared that the Son differed in substance from the Father.

Hence, they endeavoured to maintain that when the Son

of God is called the Word, this is not to be understood in a

strict sense ; lest the idea of the Word proceeding should

compel them to confess that the Son of God is of the samesubstance as the Father. For the interior word proceeds in

such a manner from the one who pronounces it, as to re-

main within him. But supposing Word to be said meta-

phorically of God, we must still admit Word in its strict

sense. For if a thing be called a word metaphorically,

this can only be by reason of some manifestation; either it

makes something manifest as a word, or it is manifested by

a word. If manifested by a word, there must exist a word

whereby it is manifested; If it is called a word because it

exteriorly manifests, what it exteriorly manifests cannot be



y. 34. Art. I THE SUiMMA THEOLOGICA 86

called word except in as far as it signifies the interior con-

cept of the mind, which anyone may also manifest by

exterior signs. Therefore, although Word may be some-times said of God metaphorically, nevertheless we must

also admit Word in the proper sense, and which is said

personally.

Reply Obj. 2. Nothing belonging to the intellect can be

applied to God personally, except word alone ; for word

alone signifies that which emanates from another. For

what the intellect forms in its conception is the word.

Now, the intellect itself, according as it is made actual by

the intelligible species, is considered absolutely; likewise the

act of understanding which is to the actual intellect what

existence is to actual being; since the act of understanding

does not signify an act going out from the intelligent agent,

butan

actremaining

in the agent. Thereforewhen we

say that word is knowledge, the term knowledge does not

mean the act of a knowing intellect, or any one of its habits,

but stands for what the intellect conceives by knowing.

Hence also Augustine says {De Trin. vii. i) that the Word

is begotten wisdom ; for it is nothing but the concept of the

Wise One ; and in the same way It can be called begotten

knowledge. Thus can also be explained how to speak is in

God to see by thought, forasmuch as the Word is conceived

by the gaze of the divine thought. Still the term thought

does not properly apply to the Word of God. For

Augustine says (Do Trin. xv. 16) : Therejore do we speak

of the Word of God, and not of the Thought of God, lest

we believe that in God there is something unstable, now

assuming the form of Word, now putting off that form and

remaining latent and as it were formless. For thought con-

sists properly in the search after truth, and this has no place

in God. But when the intellect attains to the form of truth,

it does not think, but perfectly contemplates the truth.

Hence Anselm (loc. cit.) takes thought in an improper

sense for contemplation.

Reply Obj. 3. As, properly speaking. Word in God is

said personally, and not essentially, so likewise is to speak.

Hence, as the Word is not common to the Father, Son,



87 PERSON OF THE SON Q. 34. Art. i

and Holy Ghost, 50 it is not true that the Father, Son, and

Holy Ghost are one speaker. So Augustine says (De

Trin. vii. i) ;

He who speaks in that co-eternal Word is

understood as not alone in God, but as being with that

very Word, ivithout which, forsooth, He would not be

speaking. On the other hand, to be spoken belongs to

each Person, for not only is the word spoken, but also tlie

thing understood or signified by the word. Therefore in

this manner to one person alone in God does it belong to be

spoken in the same way as a word is spoken ; whereas in

the way whereby a thing is spoken as being understood in

the word, it belongs to each Person to be spoken. For the

Father, by understanding Himself, the Son, and the Holy

Ghost, and all other things comprised in this knowledge,

conceives the Word; so that thus the whole Trinity is

spoken in the Word;

and likewise also all creatures:

as

the intellect of a man by the word he conceives in the act of

understanding a stone, speaks a stone, Anselm took the

term speak improperly for the act of understanding; where-

as they really differ from each other; for to understand

means only the habitude of the intelligent agent to the

thing understood, in which habitude no trace of origin is

conveyed, but only a certain information of our intellect;

forasmuch as our intellect is made actual by the form of

the thing understood. In God, however, it means com-

plete identity, because in God the intellect and the thing

understood are altogether the same, as was proved above

(Q. XIV., AA. 4, 5). Whereas to speak means chiefly the

habitude to the word conceived;

for to speak is nothing butto utter a word. But by means of the word it imports a

habitude to the thing understood which in the word uttered

is manifested to the one who understands. Thus, only the

Person who utters the Word is speaker in God, althougii

each Person understands and is understood, and conse-

quently is spoken by the Word.

Reply Obj. 4. The term word is there taken figuratively,

as the thing signified or effected by word is called word.

For thus creatures are said to do the word of God, as exe-

cuting any effect, whereto they are ordained from the word

I. 2 7



g. 34- Art. 2 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA 88

conceived of the divine wisdom ; as anyone is said to do the

word of the king when he does the work to which he is

appointed by the king's word.

Second Article.

WHETHER ' WORD ' IS THE SON's PROPER NAME?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—Objection i. It would seem that Word is not the proper

name of the Son. For the Son is a subsisting person in

God. But word does not signify a subsisting thing, as

appears in ourselves. Therefore word cannot be the

proper name of the person of the Son.

Obj. 2. Further, the word proceeds from the speaker by

being uttered. Therefore if the Son is properly the word,

He proceeds from the Father by way only of utterance

which is the heresy of Valentine ; as appears from Augus-

tine {De Hceres. xi.).

Obj. 3. Further, every proper name of a person signifies

some property of that person. Therefore, if the Word is

the Son's proper name, it signifies some property of His;and thus there will be several more properties in God than

those above mentioned.

Obj. 4. Furthvr, Whoever understands conceives a word

in the act of understanding. But the Son understands.

Therefore some word belongs to the Son : and conse-

quently to be Word is not proper to the Son.

Obj. 5. Further, it is said of the Son (Heb. i. 3) : Bearing

all things by the word of His power; whence Basil infers

(Cont. Eunom. v. 11) that the Holy Ghost is the Son's

Word. Therefore to be Word is not proper to the Son.

On the contrary, Augustine says {De Trin. vi. 11): By

Word we understand the Son alone.

I answer that, Word, said of God in its proper sense, is

used personally, and is the proper name of the person of

the Son. For it signifies an emanation of the intellect:

and the person Who proceeds in God, by way of emanation



89 PERSON OF THE SON Q. 34. Art. 3

of the intellect, is called the Son ; and this procession is

called generation, as we have shown above (Q. XXVII.,

A. 2). Hence it follows that the Son alone is properly

called Word in God.

Reply Obj. i. To be and to understand are not the same

in us. Hence that which in us has intellectual being, does

not belong to our nature. But in God to be and to under-

stand are one and the same : hence the Word of God is not

an accident in Him, or an effect of His; but belongs to Hisvery nature. And therefore it must needs be something

subsistent; for whatever is in the nature of God subsists;

and so Damascene says (De Fide Orthod. i. 18) that the

Word of God is substantial and has a hypostatic being;

but other words (as our own) are activities of the soul.

Reply Obj. 2. The error of Valentine was condemned,

not as the Arians pretended, because he asserted that the

Son was born by being uttered, as Hilary relates {De

Trin. vi.) ; but on account of the different mode of utterance

proposed by its author, as appears from Augustine (De

Hceres., loc. cit.).

Reply Obj. 3. In the term Word the same property is

comprised as in the name Son. Hence Augustine says(De Trin. vii. 11) : Word and Son express the same. For

the Son's nativity, which is His personal property, is

signified by different names, which are attributed to the

Son to express His perfection in various ways. To show

that He is of the same nature as the Father, He is called

the Son ; to show that He is co-eternal, He is called the

Splendour; to show that He is altogether like, He is called

the Image; to show that He is begotten immaterially. He

is called the Word. All these truths cannot be expressed

by only one name.

Reply Obj. 4. To be intelligent belongs to the Son, in

the same way as it belongs to Him to be God, since to

understand is said of God essentially, as stated above,

(Q. XIV., AA. 2, 4). Now the Son is God begotten, and

not God begetting; and hence He is intelligent, not as

producing a Word, but as the Word proceeding; foras-

much as in God the Word proceeding does not differ really



0. 34. Art. 3 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA 90

from the divine intellect, but is distinguished from the

principle of the Word only by relation.

Reply Obj. 5. When it is said of the Son, Bearing all

things by the -word of His power: word is taken figur-

atively for the effect of the Word. Hence a gloss says that

uwrd is here taken to mean command; inasmuch as by the

effect of the power of the Word, things are kept in being,

as also by the effect of the power of the Word things are

brought into being. Basil speaks widelyand

figuratively

in applying Word to the Holy Ghost ; in the sense perhaps

that everything that makes a person known may be called

his word, and so in that way the Holy Ghost may be called

the Son's Word, because He manifests the Son.

Third Article.

whether the n.ame ' word ' imports relation to

creatures ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—Objection i. It would seem that the name Word does not

import relation to creatures. For every name that con-

notes some effect in creatures, is said of God essentially.

But Word is not said essentially, but personally. There-

fore Word does not import relation to creatures.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever imports relation to creatures is

said of God in time ; as Lord and Creator. But Word is

said of God from eternity. Therefore it does not import

relation to the creature.

Obj. 3. Further, Word imports relation to the source

whence it proceeds. Therefore if it imports relation to the

creature, it follows that the Word proceeds from the

creature.

Obj. 4. Further, Ideas (in God) are many according to

their various relations to creatures. Therefore if Word

imports relation to creatures, it follows that in God there is

not one Word only, but many.

Obj. 5. Further, if Word imports relation to the creature,

this can only be because creatures are known by God. But



91 PERSON OF THE SON Q. 34. Art. 3

God does not know beinj^s only ; He knows also non-

beings. Therefore in the Word are implied relations to

non-beings ; which appears to be false.

On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. Ixxxiii., qu. 63),

that the name Word signifies not only relation to the

Father, but also relation to those beings which are made

through the Word, by His operative poiver.

I answer that. Word implies relation to creatures. For

God by knowing Himself, knows every creature. Now theword conceived in the mind is representative of everything

that is actually understood. Hence there are in ourselves

different words for. the different things which we under-

stand. But because God by one act understands Himself

and all things, His one only Word is expressive not only

of the Father, but of all creatures.

And as the knowledge of God is only cognitive as

regards God, whereas as regards creatures, it is both cog-

nitive and operative, so the Word of God is only expres-

sive of what is in God the Father, but is both expressive

and operative of creatures ; and therefore it is said

(Ps. xxxii. 9) ; He spake, and they were made ; because in

the Word is implied the operative idea of what God makes.Reply Obj. i. The nature is also included indirectly in

the name of the person ; for person is an individual sub-

stance of a rational nature. Therefore the name of a divine

person, as regards the personal relation, does not imply

relation to the creature, but it is implied in what belongs

to the nature. Yet there is nothing to prevent its implying

relation to creatures, so far as the essence is included in its

meaning : for as it properly belongs to the Son to be the

Son, so it properly belongs to Him to be God begotten,

or the Creator begotten ; and in this way the name Wordimports relation to creatures.

Reply Obj. 2. Since the relations result from actions,

some names import the relation of God to creatures, whichrelation follows on the action of God which passes into some

exterior effect, as to create and to govern ; and the like are

applied to God in time. But others import a relation which

follows from an action which does not pass into an exterior




effect, but abides in the agent—as to know and to will :

such are not applied to God in time ; and this kind of rela-

tion to creatures is implied in the name of the Word. Noris it true that all names which import the relation of God

to creatures are applied to Him in time; but only those

names are applied in time which import relation following

on the action of God passing into exterior effect.

Reply Obj. 3. Creatures are known to God not by a

knowledge derived from the creatures themselves, but by

His own essence. Hence it is not necessary that the Wordshould proceed from creatures, although the Word is

expressive of creatures.

Reply Obj. 4. The name of Idea is imposed chiefly to

signify relation to creatures ; and therefore it is applied

in a plural sense to God ; and it is not said personally. But

the name of Word is imposed chiefly to signify relation

to the speaker, and consequently, relation to creatures,

inasmuch as God, by understanding Himself, understands

every creature; and so there is only one Word in God, and

that a personal one.

Reply Obj. 5. God's knowledge of non-beings and God's

Word about non-beings are the same ; because the Wordof God contains no less than does the knowledge of God,

as Augustine says {De Trin. xv. 14). Nevertheless the

Word is expressive and operative of beings, but is expres-

sive and manifestive of non-beings.






chiefly in the figure. For we see that the species of

different animals are of different figures ; but not of different

colours. Hence if the colour of anything is depicted on a

wall, this is not called an image unless the figure is likewise

depicted. Further, neither the similitude of species nor of

figure is enough for an image, which requires also the idea

of origin; because, as Augustine says (QQ. Ixxxiii., qu.

74) : One egg is not the image of another, because it is not

derived from it. Therefore for a true image it is required

that one proceeds from another like to it in species, or at

least in specific sign. Now whatever imports procession or

origin in God, belongs to the persons. Hence the name

Image is a personal name.

Reply Obj. i. Image, properly speaking, means what-

ever proceeds forth in likeness to another. That to the

likeness of which anything proceeds, is properly speaking

called the exemplar, and is improperly called the image.

Nevertheless Augustine (Fulgentius) uses the name of

Image in this sense when he says that the divine nature of

the Holy Trinity is the Image to whom man was made.

Reply Obj. 2. Species, as mentioned by Hilary in the

definition of image, means the form derived from one thing

to another. In this sense image is said to be the species

of anything, as that which is assimilated to anything is

called its form, inasmuch as it has a like form.

Reply Obj. 3. Imitation in God does not signify po.s-

teriority, but only assimilation.

Second Article.

whether the name of image is proper to the son?

We proceed thus to the Second Article —Objection i. It would seem that the name of Image is not

proper to the Son ;because, as Damascene says (De Fide

Orthod. i. 18), The Holy Ghost is the Image of the Son.

Therefore Image does not belong to the Son alone.

Obj. 2. Further, Similitude in expression belongs to the

nature of an image, as Augustine says (QQ. Ixxxiii,

qu. 74). But this belongs to the Holy Ghost, Who pro-





Q. 3s. Art. 2 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA 96

Therefore we must explain the matter otherwise by say-

ing that, as the Holy Ghost, although by His procession

He receives the nature of the Father, as the Son also

receives it, nevertheless is not said to be born; so,

although He receives the likeness of the Father, He is not

called the Image; because the Son proceeds as word, and

it is essential to word to be of like species with that whence

it proceeds ; whereas this does not essentially belong to

love, although it may belong to that love which is the Holy

Ghost, inasmuch as He is the divine love.

Reply Obj. i. Damascene and the other Greek Doctors

commonly employ the term image as meaning a perfect

similitude.

Reply Obj, 2. Although the Holy Ghost is like to the

Father and the Son, still it does not follow that He is the

Image, as above explained.Reply Obj. 3. The image of a thing may be found in

something in two ways. In one way it is found in some-

thing of the same specific nature; as the image of the king

is found in his son. In another way it is found in some-

thing of a different nature, as the king's image on the coin.

In the first sense the Son is the Image of the Father; in the

second sense man is called the image of God ; and there-

fore in order to express the imperfect character of the divine

image in man, man is not simply called the image, but to

the image, whereby is expressed a certain movement of

tendency to perfection. But it cannot be said that the

Son of God is to the image, because He is the perfect

Image of the Father.



QUESTION XXXVI.

OF THE PERSON OF THE HOLY GHOST.

(In Four Articles.)

We now proceed to treat of what belongs to the person of

the Holy Ghost, Who is called not only the Holy Ghost,

but also the Love and Gift of God. Concerning the name

Holy Ghost, there are four points of treatment : (i)

Whether this Name, Holy Ghost, is the proper name of

one divine Person ? (2) Whether that divine person Whois called the Holy Ghost, proceeds from the Father and

the Son ? (3) Whether He proceeds from the Father

through the Son ? (4) Whether the Father and the Son

are one principle of the Holy Ghost ?

First Article.

whether this name, ' holy ghost,' is the proper

name of oxne divine person ?

We proceed thus to the First Article —Objection i. It would seem that this name, ' Holv

Ghost,' is not the proper name of one divine person. For

no name which is common to the three persons is the

proper name of any one person. But this name of ' Holy

Ghost '*is common to the three persons; for Hilary {De

* It should be borne in mind that the word ' ghost ' is the old

English equivalent for the Latin spiritus, whether in the sense of

breath or blast, or in the sense of spirit as an immati-rial substance.

Thus we read in the former sense (Hampole, Psalter x. 7), The Cost

ofStorms (spiritus procellarmn),

andin the latter

Trubled gost issacrifice of God (Prose Psalter, a.d. 1325), and Oure wrestlynge is . . .

against the spiritual luicked gostes of the ayre (More, Comfortagainst Tribulation ) ; and in our modern expression of giving up

the ghost. As applied to God, and not specially to the third HolyPerson, we have an example from Maunder, Jhesu Criste was the

worde and the goste of Good. (See Oxford Dictionary.)

97




Trin. viii.) shows that the Spirit of God sometimes means

the Father, as in the words of Isaias (Ixi. i) : The Spirit of

the Lord is upon me; and sometimes the Son, as when the

Son says : In the Spirit of God I cast out devils (Matt. xii.

28), showing that He cast out devils by His own natural

power ; and that sometimes it means the Holy Ghost, as in

the words of Joel (ii. 28) : I will pour out of My Spirit over

all flesh. Therefore this name Holy Ghost is not the

proper name of a divine person.Obj. 2. Further, the names of the divine persons are

relative terms, as Boethius says {De Trin.). But this

name Holy Ghost is not a relative term. Therefore this

name is not the proper name of a divine Person.

Obj. 3. Further, because the Son is the name of a divine

Person He cannot be called the Son of this one or of that.

But the spirit is spoken of as of this or that man, as appears

in the words. The Lord said to Moses, I will take of thy

spirit and will give to them (Num. xi. 17), and also, The

Spirit of Ellas rested upon Eliseus (4 Kings ii. 15). There-

fore Holy Ghost does not seem to be the proper name of a

divine Person.

On the contrary, It is said (i Jo. v. 7):

There are threewho bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the

Holy Ghost. As Augustine says {De Trin. vii. 4) : Whenwe ask, Three what? we say. Three persons. Therefore the

Holy Ghost is the name of a divine person.

I answer that. While there are two processions in God,

one of these, the procession of love, has no proper name of

its own, as stated above (Q. XXVH., A. 4, ad 3). Hencethe relations also which follow from this procession are

without a name (Q. XXVHI., A. 4) : for which reason the

Person proceeding in that manner has not a proper name.

But as some names are accommodated by the usual mode

of speaking to signify the aforesaid relations, as when we

use the names of procession and spiration, which in the

strict sense more fittingly signify the notional acts than

the relations; so to signify the divine Person, Who pro-

ceeds by way of love, this name Holy Ghost is by the use

of scriptural speech accommodated to Him. The appro-






no creature does it belong to be a principle as regards a

divine person ; but rather the reverse. Therefore we can

say our Father, and our Spirit; but we cannot say our Son.

Second Article,

whether the holy ghost proceeds from the son?

We proceed thus to the Second Article —Objection i. It would seem that the Holy Ghost does not

proceed from the Son. For as Dionysius says (Div,

Nom. i.) : We must not dare to say anything concerning

the substantial Divinity except what has been divinely ex-

pressed to us by the sacred oracles. But in the Sacred

Scripture we are not told that the Holy Ghost proceeds

from the Son ; but only that He proceeds from the Father,

as appears from Jo. xv. 26 : The Spirit of truth, Whoproceeds from the Father. Therefore the Holy Ghost does

not proceed from the Son.

Obj. 2. Further, In the creed of the council of Con-

stantinople (Can. vii.) we read : We believe in the Holy

Ghost, the Lord and Lifegiver, Who proceeds fro7n the

Father; with the Father and the Son to be adored and

glorified. Therefore it should not be added in our Creed

that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son ; and those

who added such a thing appear to be worthy of anathema.

Obj. 3. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orthod. i.) :

We say that the Holy Ghost is from the Father, and we

name Him the Spirit of the Father ; but we do not say that

the Holy Ghost is from the Son, yet we name Him the

Spirit of the Son. Therefore the Holy Ghost does not

proceed from the Son.

Obj. 4. Further, Nothing proceeds from that wherein it

rests. But the Holy Ghost rests in the Son ; for it is said

in the legend of St. Andrew : Peace be to you and to all

who believe in the one God the Father, and in His only

Son our Lord Jesus Christ, and in the one Holy Ghost

proceeding from the Father, and abiding in the Son.

Therefore the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son.



loi PERSON OF THE HOLY GHOST Q. 36. Art. 2

Obj. 5. Further, the Son proceeds as the Word. But our

breath (spiritus) does not seem to proceed in ourselves

from our word. Therefore the Holy Ghost does not pro-

ceed from the Son.

Obj. 6. Further, the Holy Ghost proceeds perfectly from

the Father. Therefore it is superfluous to say that He

proceeds from the Son.

Obj. 7. Further, the actual and the possible do not differ

in things perpetual {Phys. iii., text 32), and much less so

in .God. But it is possible for theHoly Ghost

to be

distinguished from the Son, even if He did not proceed

from Him. For Anselm says {De Process. Spir. Sancti ii.) :

The Son and the Holy Ghost have their Being from the

Father; but each in a different way; one by Birth, the

other by Procession, so that they are thus distinct from

one another. And further on he says : For even if for no

other reason were the Son and the Holy Spirit distinct,

this alone would suffice. Therefore the Holy Spirit is

distinct from the Son, without proceeding from Him.

On the contrary, Athanasius says : The Holy Ghost is

from the Father and the Son; not made, nor created, nor

begotten, but proceeding.

I answer that. It

must besaid that

the Holy Ghostis

from the Son. For if He were not from Him, He could in

no wise be personally distinguished from Him ; as appears

from what has been said above {QQ. XXVni., A. 3;

XXX., A. 2). For it cannot be said that the divine Persons

are distinguished from each other in any absolute sense:

for it would follow that there would not be one essence of

the three persons : since everything that is spoken of Godin an absolute sense, belongs to the unity of essence.

Therefore it must be said that the divine persons are dis-

tinguished from each other only by the relations. Now the

relations cannot distinguish the persons except forasmuch

as they are opposite relations ; which appears from the fact

that the Father has two relations, by one of whichHe

is

related to the Son, and by the other to the Holy Ghost;

but these are not opposite relations, and therefore they do

not make two persons, but belong only to the one person



Q. 36. Art. 2 THt SUMMA THEOLOGICA ** 102

of the Father. If therefore in the Son and the Holy Ghost

there were two relations only, whereby each of them were

related to the Father, these relations would not be oppositeto each other, as neither would be the two relations where-

by the Father is related to them. Hence, as the person of

the Father is one, it would follow that the person of the

Son and of the Holy Ghost would be one, having two

relations opposed to the two relations of the Father. But

this is heretical since it destroys the Faith in the Trinity.

Therefore the Son and the Holy Ghost must be related to

each other by opposite relations. Now there cannot be in

God any relations opposed to each other, except relations

of origin, as proved above (Q. XXVHI., A. 4). And

opposite relations of origin are to be understood as of a

principle, and of what is from the principle. Therefore we

must conclude that it is necessary to say that either theSon is from the Holy Ghost; which no one says; or that

the Holy Ghost is from the Son, as we confess.

Furthermore, the order of the procession of each one

agrees with this conclusion. For it was said above {QQ.XXVII., AA. 2, 4; XXVIII., A. 4), that the Son proceeds

by way of the intellect as Word, and the Holy Ghost by

way of the will as Love. Now love must proceed from a

word. For we do not love anything unless we apprehend

it bv a mental conception. Hence also in this way it is

manifest that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son.

We derive a knowledge of the same truth from the very

order of nature itself. For we nowhere find that several

tilings proceed from one without order except in those

which differ only by their matter; as for instance one

smith produces many knives distinct from each other

materially, with no order to each other; whereas in things

in which there is not only a material distinction we always

find that some order exists in the multitude produced.

Hence also in the order of creatures produced, the beauty

of the divine wisdom is displayed. So if from the one

Person of the Father, two persons proceed, the Son and the

Holv Ghost, there must be some order between them. Nor

can any other be assigned except ilie order of their nature,






Ghost, the Father and the Son are not opposed to each

other, but only as regards the fact that one is the Father,

and the other is the Son.Reply Obj. 2. In every council of the Church a symbol

of faith has been drawn up to meet some prevalent error

condemned in the council at that time. Hence subsequent

councils are not to be described as making a new symbol

of faith; but what was implicitly contained in the first

symbol was explained by some addition directed against

rising heresies. Hence in the decision of the council of

Chalcedon it is declared that those who were congregated

together in the council of Constantinople, handed down the

doctrine about the Holy Ghost, not implying that there was

anything wanting in the doctrine of their predecessors who

had gathered together at Nicsea, but explaining what those

fathers had understood of the matter. Therefore, because

at the time of the ancient councils the error of those who

said that the Holy Ghost did not proceed from the Son had

not arisen, it was not necessary to make any explicit de-

claration on that point; whereas, later on, when certain

errors rose up, in another council* assembled in the west,

the matter was explicitly defined by the authority of the

Roman Pontiff, by whose authority also the ancient

councils were summoned and confirmed. Nevertheless the

truth was contained implicitly in the belief that the Holy

Ghost proceeds from the Father.

Reply Obj. 3. The Nestorians were the first to introduce

the error that the Holy Ghost did not proceed from the

Son, as appears in a Nestorian creed condemned in the

council of Ephesus. This error was embraced bv Theodoric

the Nestorian, and several others after him, among whomwas also Damascene. Hence, in that point his opinion is

not to be held. Although, too, it has been asserted by

some that while Damascene did not confess that the Holy

Ghost was from the Son, neither do those words of his

express a denial thereof.

Reply Obj. 4. When the Holy Ghost is said to rest or

abide in the Son, it does not mean that He does not

* Council of Rome, under Pope Damasus.



I05 PERSON OF THE HOLY GHOST Q. 36. art. 3

proceed from Him ; for the Son also is said to abide in the

Father, although He proceeds from the Father. Also the

Holy Ghostis

said torest in the

Sonas the love of the

lover abides in the beloved ; or in reference to the human

nature of Christ, by reason of what is written : On whom

thou shall see the Spirit descending and remaining upon

Him, He it is who baptizes (Jo. i. 33).

Reply Obj. 5. The Word in God is not taken after thfe

similitude of the vocal word, whence the breath (spiritus)

does not proceed ; for it would then be only metaphorical

but after the similitude of the mental word, whence pro-

ceeds love.

Reply Obj. 6. For the reason that the Holy Ghost pro-

ceeds from the Father perfectly, not only is it not super-

fluous to say He proceeds from the Son, but rather it is

absolutely necessary. Forasmuch as one power belongs tothe Father and the Son ; and because whatever is from the

Father, must be from the Son unless it be opposed to the

property of filiation ; for the Son is not from Himself,

although He is from the Father.

Reply Obj. 7. The Holy Ghost is distinguished person-

ally from the Son, inasmuch as the origin of the one is dis-

tinguished from the origin of the other; but the difference

itself of origin comes from the fact that the Son is only

from the Father, whereas the Holy Ghost is from the Father

and the Son; for otherwise the processions would not be

distinguished from each other, as explained above, and in

Q. XXVII.

Third Article.

whether the holy ghost proceeds from the father

through the son ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—Objection i. It would seem that the Holy Ghost does not

proceed from the Father through the Son. For whatever

proceeds from one tlirough another, does not proceed

immediately. Therefore, if the Holy Ghost proceeds from

the Father tlirough the Son, He does not proceed immedi-

ately from the Fatiier; which seems to be unfitting.



^. 30. Art. 3 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA lob

Obj. 2. Further, if the Holy Ghost proceeds from the

Father through the Son, He does not proceed from the

Son, except on account of the Father. But whatever causes

a thing to he such is yet more so. Therefore He proceeds

more from the Father than from the Son.

Obj. 3. Further, the Son has His being by generation.

Therefore if the Holy Ghost is from the Father through the

vSon, it follows that the Son is first generated and after-

wards the Holy Ghost proceeds ; and thus the procession

of the Holy Ghost is not eternal, which is heretical.

Obj. 4. Further, when anyone acts through another, the

same may be said conversely. For as we say that the

king acts through the bailiff, so it can be said conversely

that the bailiff acts through the king. But we can never

say that the Son spirates the Holy Ghost through the

Father. Therefore it can never be said that the Fatherspirates the Holy Ghost through the Son.

On the contrary, Hilary says {De Trin. xii.) : Keep me,

I pray, in this expression of my faith, that I may ever

possess the Father—namely. Thyself: that I may adore

Thy Son together with Thee: and that I may deserve Thy

Holy Spirit, Who is through Thy Only Begotten.

I answer that, Whenever one is said to act through

another, this preposition through points out, in what is

covered by it, some cause or principle of that act. But

since action is a mean between the agent and the thing

done, sometimes that which is covered by the preposition

through is the cause of the action, as proceeding from the

agent ;

andin that

caseit is

the cause of why the agent acts,whether it be a final cause or a formal cause, whether it be

effective or motive. It is a final cause when we say, for

instance, that the artisan works through love of gain. It is

a formal cause when we say that he works through his art.

It is a motive cause when we say that he works through

the command of another. Sometimes, however, that which

is covered by this preposition through is the cause of the

action regarded as terminated in the thing done; as, for

instance, when we say, the artisan acts through the mallet,

for this does not mean that the mallet is the cause why the





•Q. 36. Art. 4 THE •' SUMMA THEOLOGICA 108

with the begetter (and hence the Father does not exist

before begetting the Son), so the procession of the Holy

Ghost is coeternal with His principle. Hence, the Son was

not begotten before the Holy Ghost proceeded; but each

of the operations is eternal.

Reply Obj. 4. When anyone is said to work through

anything, the converse proposition is not always true. For

we do not say that the mallet works through the carpenter;

whereas we can say that the bailiff acts through the king,

because it is the bailiff's place to act, since he is master of

his own act, but it is not the mallet's place to act, but only

to be made to act, and hence it is used only as an instru-

ment. The bailiff is, however, said to act through the

king, although this preposition through denotes a medium,

for the more a supposilum is prior in action, so much the

more is its power immediate as regards the effect, inas-

much as the power of the first cause joins the second cause

to its effect. Hence also first principles are said to be

immediate in the demonstrative sciences. Therefore, so

far as the bailiff is a medium according to the order of the

subject's acting, the king is said to work through the bailiff;

but according to the order of powers, the bailiff is said to

act through the king, forasmuch as the power of the king

gives the bailiff's action its effect. Now there is no order

of power between Father and Son, but only order of

supposita; and hence we say that the Father spirates

through the Son ; and not conversely.

Fourth Article.

whether the father and the son are one principle

of the holy ghost?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—Objection i . It would seem that the Father and the Son are

not one principle of the Holy Ghost. For the Holy Ghost

does not proceed from the Father and the Son as they are

one; not as they are one in nature, for the Holy Ghost

would in that way proceed from Himself, as He is one in

nature with Them ; nor again inasmuch as they are united



I09 PERSON OF THE HOLY GHOST Q. 36. Art. 4

in any one property, for it is clear that one property can-

not belong to two subjects. Therefore the Holy Ghost

proceeds from the Father and the Son as distinct from one

another. Therefore the Father and the Son are not one

principle of the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 2. Further, in this proposition the Father and the

Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost, we do not

designate personal unity, because in that case the Father

and the Son would be one person ; nor again do we desig-

nate the unity of property, because if one property werethe reason of the Father and the Son being one principle

of the Holy Ghost, similarly, on account of His two

properties, the Father would be two principles of the Son

and of the Holy Ghost, which cannot be admitted. There-

fore the Father and the Son are not one principle of the

Holy Ghost.

Obj. 3. Further, the Son is not one with the Father more

than is the Holy Ghost. But the Holy Ghost and the

Father are not one principle as regards any other divine

person. Therefore neither are the Father and the Son.

Obj. 4. Further, if the Father and the Son are one prin-

ciple of the Holy Ghost, this one is either the Father or it is

not the Father. But we cannot assert either of these posi-

tions because if the one is the Father, it follows that the

Son is the Father; and if the one is not the Father, it

follows that the Father is not the Father. Therefore we

cannot say that the Fûher and the Son are one principle of

the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 5. Further, if the Father and the Son are one prin-

ciple of the Holy Ghost, it seems necessary to say, con-

versely, that the one principle of the Holy Ghost is the

Father and the Son. But this seems to be false; for this

word principle stands either for the person of the Father,

or for the person of the Son ; and in either sense it is false.

Therefore this proposition also is false, that the Father

and the Son are one principle of the Holv Gliost.Obj. 6. Further, unity in substance makes identity. So

if the Father and the Son are the one principle of the Holv

Ghost, it follows that they are the same principle; which





Ill PERSON OF THE HOLY GHOST Q. 36. Art. 4

one principle of the Holy Ghost by reason of the unity of

the property that is signified in this word principle.

Reply Obj. i. If we consider the spirative power, the

Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as theyare one in the spirative power, which in a certain way

signifies the nature with the property, as we shall see later

(ad 7). Nor is there any reason against one property

being in two supposita that possess one common nature.

But if we consider the supposita of the spiration, then we

may say that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father

and the Son, as distinct; for He proceeds from them as the

unitive love of both.

Reply Obj. 2. In the proposition the Father and the Son

are one principle of the Holy Ghost, one property is desig-

nated which is the form signified by the term. It does not

thence follow that by reason of the several properties l ie

Father can be called several principles, for this would

imply in Him a plurality of subjects.

Reply Obj. 3. It is not by reason of relative properties

that we speak of similitude or dissimilitude in God, but by

reason of the essence. Hence, as the Father is not more

like to Himself than He is to the Son ; so likewise neither

is the Son more like to the Father than is the Holy Ghost.

Reply Obj. 4. These two propositions, The Father andthe Son are one principle which is the Father, or, one

principle which is not the Father, are not mutually con-

tradictory ; and hence it is not necessary to assert one or

other of them. For when we say the Father and the Son

are one principle, this word principle has not determinate

supposition ; but rather it stands indeterminately for two

persons together. Hence there is a fallacy of figure of

speech as the argument concludes from the indeterminate

to the determinate.

Reply Obj. 5. This proposition is also true :—The one

principle of the Holy Ghost is the Father and the Son;

because the word principle does not stand for one person

only, but indistinctly for the two persons as above ex-

plained.

Reply Obi. 6. There is no reason against saying that the




Father and the Son are the same principle, because the

word principle stands confusedly and indistinctly for

the two Persons together.Reply Obj. 7. Some say that although the Fattier and

the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost, there are

two spirators, by reason of the distinction of supposita, as

also there are two spirating, because acts refer to subjects.

Yet this does not hold good as to the name Creator; be-

cause the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the

Son as from two distinct persons, as above explained

whereas the creature proceeds from the three persons not as

distinct persons, but as united in essence. It seems, how-

ever, better to say that because spirating is an adjective,

and spirator a substantive, we can say that the Father and

the Son are two spirating, by reason of the plurality of the

supposita, but not two spirators by reason of the one spira-

tion. For adjectival words derive their number from the

supposita, but substantives from themselves, according to

the form signified. As to what Hilary says, that the Holy

Ghost is from the Father and the Son as His authors, this

is to be explained in the sense that the substantive here

stands for the adjective.



QUESTION XXXVII.

OF THE NAME OF THE HOLY GHOST—LOVE.

{In Two Articles.)

We now inquire concerning the name Love, on which arise

two points for consideration : (i) Whether it is the proper

name of the Holy Ghost? (2) Whether the Father and

the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost ?

First Article.

^whether ' love ' is the proper name of the

holy ghost?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—Objection i. It would seem that Love is not the proper

name of the Holy Ghost. For Augustine says {De Trin.

XV. 17) : As the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are called

Wisdom, and are not three Wisdoms, hut one; I know not

why the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost should not be called

Charity, and all together one Charity. But no name which

is predicated in the singular of each person and of all

together, is a proper name of a person. Therefore this

name, Love, is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 2. Further, the Holy Ghost is a subsisting person,

but love is not used to signify a subsisting person, but

rather an action passing from the lover to the beloved.

Therefore Love is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 3. Further, Love is the bond between lovers, for as

Dionysius says {Div. Nom. iv.) :

Love is a unitive force.

But a bond is a medium between what it joins together,

not something proceeding from them. Therefore, since

the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son, as

113




was shown above (Q. XXXVI., A- 2), it seems that He

is not the Love or bond of the Father and the Son.

Obj. 4. Further, Love belongs to every lover. But the

Holy Ghost is a lover : therefore He has love. So if the

Holy Ghost is Love, He must be love of love, and spirit

from spirit; which is not admissible.

On the contrary, Gregory says {Horn. xxx. in Pente-

cost.) : The Holy Ghost Himself is Love.

I answerthat,

Thename Love in

Godcan be taken essen-

tially and personally. If taken personally it is the proper

name of the Holy Ghost ; as Word is the proper name of

the Son.

To see this, we must know that since, as shown above

(Q. XXVII. , AA. 2, 3, 4, 5), there are two processions in

God, one by way of the intellect, which is the procession

of the Word, and another by way of the will, which is the

procession of Love ; forasmuch as the former is the more

known to us, we have been able to apply more suitable

names to express our various considerations as regards that

procession, but not as regards the procession of the will.

Hence, we are obliged to employ circumlocution as re-

gards the person Who proceeds, and the relations follow-

ing from this procession which are called procession and

spiration, as stated above (Q. XXVII., A. 4, ad 3), and yet

express the origin rather th^n the relation, in the strict sense

of the term. Nevertheless we must consider them in

respect of each procession simply. For as when a thing

is understood by anyone, there results in the one who

understands a conception of the object understood, whichconception we call word; so when anyone loves an object,

a certain impression results, so to speak, of the thing loved

in the affection of the lover ; by reason of which the object

loved is said to be in the lover; as also the thing under-

stood is in the one who understands ; so that when anyone

understands and loves himself he is in himself, not only

by real identity, but also as the object understood is in the

one who understands, and the thing loved is in the lover.

As regards the intellect, however, words have been found

to describe the mutual relation of the one who understands



115 NAME OF HOLY GHOST—LOVE Q. 37. Art. 1

to the object understood, as appears in the word to under-

stand; and other words are used to express the procession

of the intelle.ctual conception—namely, to speak, and word.

Hence in God, to understand is applied only to the essence

because it does not import relation to the Word that pro-

ceeds ; whereas Word is said personally, because it signifies

what proceeds ; and the term to speak is a notional term as

importing the relation of the principle of the Word to the

Word Himself. On the other hand, on the part of the

will, with the exception of the words dilection and love,which express the relation of the lover to the object loved,

there are no other terms in use, which express the relation

of the impression or affection of the object loved, produced

in the lover by the fact that he loves—to the principle of

that impression, or vice versa. And tiierefore, on account

of the poverty of our vocabulary, we express these rela-

tions by the words love and dilection: just as if we were

to call the Word intelligence conceived, or wisdom be-

gotten.

It follows that so far as love means only the relation of

the lover to the object loved, love and to love are said of the;

essence, as understanding and to understand; but, on the'

other hand, so far as these words are used to express the-relation to its principle, of what proceeds by way of love,,

and vice versa, so that by love is understood the love pro-

ceeding, and by to love is understood the spiration of the

love proceeding, in that sense love is the name of the-

person, and to love is a notional term, as to speak and tO'

beget.

Reply Obj. 1. Augustine is there speaking of charity as-

it means the divine essence, as was said above (here and

Q. XXIV., A. 2 ad 4),

Reply Obj. 2. Although to understand, and to will, and'

to love signify actions passing on to their objects, neverthe-

less they are actions that remain in the agents, as stated

above(Q.

XIV., A.4),

yet in such a way that in theagent

itself they import a certain relation to their object. Hence,,

love also in ourselves is something that abides in the lover,

and the word of the heart is something abiding in the



Q. 37. Art. 2 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA ir6

speaker;yet with a relation to the thing expressed by word,

or loved. But in God, in whom there is nothing accidental,

there is more than this ; because both Word and Love are

subsistent. Therefore, when we say that the Holy Ghost

is the Love of the Father for the Son, or for something

else ; we do not mean anything that passes into another,

but only the relation of love to the beloved ; as also in the

Word is imported the relation of the Word to the thing

expressed by the Word.

Reply Obj. 3. The Holy Ghost is said to be the bond of

the Father and Son, inasmuch as He is Love; because,

since the F'ather loves Himself and the Son with one Love^

and conversely, there is expressed in the Holy Ghost, as

Love, the relation of the Father to the Son, and conversely,

as that of the lover to the beloved. But from the fact that

the Father and the Son mutually love one another, it

necessarily follows that this mutual Love, the Holy Ghost,

proceeds from both. As regards origin, therefore, the

Holy Ghost is not the medium, but the third person in the

Trinity ; whereas as regards the aforesaid relation He is

the bond between the two persons, as proceeding from

both.

Reply Obj. 4. As it does not belong to the Son, though

He understands, to produce a word, for it belongs to Him

to understand as the word proceeding; so in like manner,

although the Holy Gliost loves, taking Love as an essential

term, still it does not belong to Him to spirate love, which

is to take love as a notional term ; because He loves essen-

tially as love proceeding; but not as the one whence love

proceeds.

Second Article.

whether the father and the son love each other

by the holy ghost?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—Objection i. It would seem that the Father and the Son

do not love each other by the Holy Ghost. For Augustine

{De Trin. vii. i) proves that the Father is not wise by the

Wisdom begotten. But as the Son is Wisdom begotten.



117 NAME OF HOLY GHOST—LOVE Q. 37. Art. 2

so the Holy Ghost is the Love proceeding, as explained

above (Q. XXVH., A. 3). Therefore the Father and the

Son love each other by the Holy Ghost, this word love is to

is, by the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 2. Further, in the proposition. The Father and the

Son love each other by the Holy Ghost, this word love is to

be taken either essentially or notionally. But it cannot be

true if taken essentially, because in the same way we might

say that the Father understands by the Son; nor, again, if

it is

takennotionally, for then, in like

manner,it

might besaid that the Father and the Son spirate by the Holy Ghost,

or that- the Father generates by the Son. Therefore in no

way is this proposition true : The Father and the Son love

each other by the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 3. Further, by the same love the Father loves the

Son, and Himself, and us. But the Father does not love

Himself by the Holy Ghost ; for no notional act is reflected

back on the principle of the act ; since it cannot be said that

the Father begets Himself, or that He spirates Himself.

Therefore, neither can it be said that He loves Himself by

the Holy Ghost, if to love is taken in a notional sense.

Again, the love wherewith He loves us is not the Holy

Ghost;

because it imports a relation to creatures, and thisbelongs to the essence. Therefore this also is false : The

Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost.

On the contrary, Augustine says {De Trin. vi. 5) : The

Holy Ghost is He whereby the Begotten is loved by the one

begetting and loves His Begetter.

I answer that, A difficulty about this question is objected

to the effect that when we say, the Father loves the Son by

the Holy Ghost, since the ablative is construed as denoting

a cause, it seems to mean that the Holy Ghost is the prin-

ciple of love to the Father and the Son ; which cannot be

admitted.

In view of this difficulty some have held that it is false,

that the Father and the Son love each other by the HolyGhost; and they add that it was retracted by Augustine

when he retracted its equivalent to the effect that the Father

19 wise by the Wisdom begotten. Others say that the




proposition is inaccurate and ought to be expounded, as

that the Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost—that is,

by His essential Love, whichis

appropriatedto

the HolyGhost. Others further say that this ablative should be

construed as importing a sign, so that it means, the Holy

Ghost is the sign that the Father loves the Son; inasmuch

as the Holy Ghost proceeds from them both, as Love.

Others, again, say that this ablative must be construed as

importing the relation of formal cause, because the Holy

Ghost is the love whereby the Father and the Son formally

love each other. Others, again, say that it should be con-

strued as importing the relation of a formal effect; and

these approach nearer to the truth.

To make the matter clear, we must consider that since a

thing is commonly denominated from its forms, as white

fromwhiteness,

and man from humanity;

everythingwhence anything is denominated, in this particular respect

stands to that thing in the relation of form. So when I

say, this man is clothed with a garment, the ablative is to be

construed as having relation to the formal cause, although

the garment is not the form. Now it may happen that a

thing may be denominated from that which proceeds from

it, not only as an agent is from its action, but also as from

the term itself of the action—that is, the effect, when the

effect itself is included in the idea of the action. For we

say that fire warms by heating, although heating is not the

heat which is the form of the fire, but is an action pro-

ceeding from the fire; and we say that a tree flowers with

the flower, although the flower is not the tree's form, but

is the effect proceeding from the form. In this way, there-

fore, we must say that since in God to love is taken in two

wavs, essentially and notionally, when it is taken essen-

tially, it means that the Father and the Son love each other

not by the Holy Ghost, but by their essence. Hence

Augustine says {De Trin. xv. 7) : Who dares to say that the

Father loves neither Himself, nor the Son, nor the HolyGhost, except by the Holy Ghost? The opinions first

quoted are to be taken in this sense. But when the term

Love is taken in a notional sense it means nothing else





Q. 37. Ari. 2 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA 120

every creature by His begotten Word, inasmuch as the

Word begotten adequately represents the Father and every

creature; so He loves Himself and every creature by the

Holy Ghost, inasmuch as the Holy Ghost proceeds as the

love of the primal goodness whereby the Father loves Him-

self and every creature. Thus it is evident that relation

to the creature is implied both in the Word and in the

proceeding Love, as it were in a secondary way, inasmuch

as the divine truth and goodness are a principle of under-

standing and loving all creatures.



QUESTION XXXVIII.

OF THE NAME OF THE HOLY GHOST, AS GIFT.

{In Two Articles.)

There now follows the consideration of the Gift ; concern-

ing which there are two points of inquiry : (i) Whether

Gift can be a personal name? (2) Whether it is the proper

name of the Holy Ghost?

First Article,

whether ' gift ' is a personal name ?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—Objection i. It would seem that Gift is not a personal

name. For every personal name imports a distinction in

God. But the name of Gift does not import a distinction

in God; for Augustine says {De Trin. xv. 19): that the

Holy Ghost is so given as God's Gift, that He also gives

Himself as God. Therefore Gift is not a personal name.

Obj. 2. Further, no personal name belongs to the divine

essence. But the divine essence is the Gift which the

Father gives to the Son, as Hilary says (De Trin. ix.).

Therefore Gift is not a personal name.

Obj. 3. Further, according to Damascene (De Fide

Orthod. iv. 19) there is no subjection nor service in the

divine persons. But gift implies a subjection both as re-

gards him to whom it is given, and as regards him by

whom it is given. Therefore Gift is not a personal name.

Obj. 4. Further,Gift

imports relation tothe

creature,and

it thus seems to be said of God in time. But personal

names are said of God from eternity ; as Father, and Son.

Therefore Gift is not a personal name.





123 NAME OF HOLY GHOST, AS GIFT Q. 38. Art. 2

sense, a thing is another's as a possession, or as a slave;

and in that sense gift is essentially distinct from the giver;

and the gift of God so taken is a created thing. In a third

sense this is this one's through its origin only ; and in this

sense the Son is the Father's ; and the Holy Ghost belongs

to both. Therefore, so far as gift in this way signifies the

possession of the giver, it is personally distinguished from

the giver, and is a personal name.

Reply Obj. 2. The divine essence is the Father's gift in

the first sense, as being the Father's by wayof identity.

Reply Obj. 3. Gift as a personal name in God does not

imply subjection, but only origin, as regards the giver;

but as regards the one to whom it is given, it implies a free

use, or enjoyment, as above explained.

Reply Obj. 4. Gift is not so called from being actually

given, but from its aptitude to be given. Hence the divine

person is called Gift from eternity, although He is given in

time. Nor does it follow that it is an essential name be-

cause it imports relation to the creature; but that it in-

cludes something essential in its meaning; as the essence

is included in the idea of person, as stated above (Q.

XXXIV., A. 3).

Second Article.

whether ' gift ' is the proper name of the

holy ghost?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—Objection i. It would seem that Gift is not the proper

name of the Holy Ghost. For the name Gift comes from

being given. But, as Isaias says, A Son is given to us

(ix. 6). Therefore to be Gift belongs to the Son, as well as

to the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 2. Further, every proper name of a person signifies

a property. But this word Gift does not signify a property

of the Holy Ghost. Therefore Gift is

not a proper name ofthe Holy Ghost.

Obj. 3. Further, the Holy Ghost can be called the spirit

of a man, whereas He cannot be called the gift of any man,





125 NAME OF HOLY GHOST, AS GIFT Q. 38. Art. 2

Reply Obj. 3. Before a gift is given, it belongs only to

the giver; but when it is given, it is his to whom it is

given. Therefore, because Gift does not import the actual

giving, it cannot be called a gift of man, but the Gift of

God giving. When, however, it has been given, then it

is the spirit of man, or a gift bestowed on man.



QUESTION XXXIX.

OF THE PERSONS IN RELATION TO THE ESSENCE.

{In Eight Articles.)

Those things considered which belong to the divine

persons absolutely, we next treat of what concerns the

person in reference to the essence, to the properties, and to

the notional acts ;

and of the comparison of these with eachother.

As regards the first of these, there are eight points of

inquiry : (i) Whether the essence in God is the same as the

person ? (2) Whether we should say that the three persons

are of one essence ? (3) Whether essential names should

be predicated of the persons in- the plural, or in the

singular? (4) Whether notional adjectives, or verbs, or

participles, can be predicated of the essential names taken

in a concrete sense? (5) Whether the same can be pre-

dicated of essential names taken in the abstract? (6)

Whether the names of the persons can be predicated of

concrete essential names? (7) Whether essential attributes

can be appropriated to the persons? (8) Which attributesshould be appropriated to each person ?

First Article,

whether in god the essence is the same as the

PERSON ?

We proceed thus to the First Article —Objection i. It would seem that in God the essence is not

the same as person. For whenever essence is the same as

person or suppositiim, there can be only one suppositum

126






opposite relation, it has a real distinction by virtue of that

opposition. Thus there are one essence and three persons.

Reply Obj. i. There cannot be a distinction ofsuppositum in creatures by means of relations, but only by

essential principles ; because in creatures relations are not

subsistent. But in God relations are subsistent, and so by

reason of the opposition between them they distinguish the

supposita; and yet the essence is not distinguished, because

the relations themselves are not distinguished from each

other so far as they are identified with the essence.

Ohj, 2. As essence and person in God differ in our way

of thinking, it follows that something can be denied of the

one and affirmed of the other ; and therefore, when we

suppose the one, we need not suppose the other. .

Ohj. 3. Divine things are named by us after the way of

created things, as above explained (Q. XIII., AA. i, 3).

And since created natures are individualized by matter

which is the subject of the specific nature, it follows that

individuals are called subjects, supposita, or hypostases.

So the divine persons are named supposita or hypostases,

but not as if there really existed any real supposition or

subjection.

Second Article.

whether it must be said that the three persons are

of one essence?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection i. It would seem not right to say that the three

persons are of one essence. For Hilary says {De Synod.)

that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are indeed three bv

substance, but one in harmony. But the substance of God

is His essence. Therefore the three persons are not of one

essence.

Obj. 2. Further, nothing is to be aflfirmed of God except

what can be confirmed by the authority of Holy Writ, as

appears from Dionysius {Div. Nom. [.). Now Holy Writ

never says that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are of one

essence : Therefore this should not be asserted.



129 PERS. IN REFER. TO ESSENCE Q. 39- Art. 2

Obj. 3. Further, the divine nature is the same as the

divine essence. It suffices therefore to say that the three

persons are of one nature.

Obj. 4. Further, it is not usual to say that the person is

of the essence; but rather that the essence is of the person.

Therefore is does not seem fitting to say that the three

persons are of one essence.

Obj. 5. Further, Augustine says {De Trin. vii. 6) that

wc do not say that the three persons are from one essence

(ex una essentia), lest we should seem to indicate a distinc-

tion between the essence and the persons in God. But

prepositions which imply transition, denote the oblique

case. Therefore it is equally wrong to say that the three

persons are of one essence {unius essentice).

Obj. 6. Further, nothing should be said of God which

can be occasion of error. Now,to say that the three

persons are of one essence or substance, furnishes occasion

of error. For, as Hilary says {De Synod.) : One substance

predicated of the Father and the Son signifies either one

subsistent, with two denominations; or one substance

divided into two imperfect substances ; or a third prior

substance taken and assumed by the other two. There-

fore it must not be said that the three persons are of one

substance.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Maxim, iii.)

that the word ofioovaiov ^ which the Council of Niceea

adopted against the Arians, means that the three persons

are of one essence.

/ answer that, As above explained (Q. XIII., AA. i, 2),

divine things are named by our intellect, not as they really

are in themselves, for in that way it knows them not ; but

in a way that belongs to things created. And as in the

objects of the senses, whence the intellect derives its know-

ledge, the nature of the species is made individual by the

matter, and thus the nature is as the form, and the in-

dividual is the suppositum of the form ; so also in God the

essence is taken as the form of the three persons, accord-

ing to our mode of signification. Now in creatures we say

that everv form belongs to that whereof it is the form ; as




the health and beauty of a man belongs to the man. But

we do not say of that which has a form, that it belongs to

the form, unless some adjective qualifies the form;

aswhen we say : That woman is of a handsome figure, or :

This man is of perfect virtue. In like manner, as in God

the persons are multiplied, and the essence is not multi-

plied, we speak of one essence of the three persons, and

three persons of the one essence, provided that these

genitives be understood as designating the form.

Reply Obj. i. Substance is here taken for the hypostasis,

and not for the essence.

Reply Obj. 2. Although we may not find it declared in

Holy Writ in so many words that the three persons are of

one essence, nevertheless we find it so stated as regards the

meaning ; for instance, / and the Father are one (Jo. x.

30), and / a7n in the Father, and the Father in Me {ibid.

38) ; and there are many other texts of the same import.

Reply Obj. 3. Because nature designates the principle of

action, while essence comes from being (essendo), things

may be said to be of one nature which agree in some action,

as all things which give heat ; but only those things can be

said to be of one essence which have one being. So the

divine unity is better described by saying that the three per-

sons are of one essence, than by saying they are of one nature.

Reply Obj. 4. Form, in the absolute sense, is wont to be

designated as belonging to that of which it is the form, as

we say the virtue of Peter. On the other hand, the thing

having form is not wont to be designated as belonging to

the form except when we wish to qualify or designate theform. In which case two genitives are required, one signi-

fying the form, and the other signifying the determination

of the form, as, for instance, when we say, Peter is of great

virtue {magncB virtutis), or else one genitive must have the

force of two, as, for instance, he is a 7nan of blood—that is,

he is a man who sheds much blood {multi sanguinis). So,

because the divine essence signifies a form as regards the

person, it may properly be said that the essence is of the

person ; but we cannot say the converse, unless we add

some term to designate the essence ; as, for instance, the



131 PERS. IN REFER. TO ESSENCE Q. 39. Art. 3

Father is a person of the divine essence; or, the three

persons are of one essence.

Reply Obj. 5. The preposition from or out of does not

designate the habitude of a formal cause, but rather the

habitude of an efficient or material cause; which causes

are in all cases distinguished from those things of which

they are the causes. For nothing can be its own matter,

nor its own active principle. Yet a thing may be its own

form, as appears in all immaterial things. So, when we

say, three persons of one essence, taking essence as having

the habitude of form, we do not mean that essence is

different from person, which we should mean if we said,

three persons froyn the same essence.

Reply Obj. 6. As Hilary says {De Synod.) : It would be

prejudicial to holy things, if we had to do aivay ivith them,

just because some do not think them lioly. So if sotne mis-

understand ofMoovcnov , what is that to me, if I understand it

rightly? . . . The 07ieness of nature does not result from

division, or from union or from community of possession,

but from one nature being proper to both Father and Son.

Third Article.

whether essential names should be predicated in

the singular of the three persons ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—Objection i. It would seem that essential names, as the

name God, should not be predicated in the singular of the

three persons, but in the plural. For as

mansignifies one

that has humanity, so God signifies one that has Godhead.

But the three persons are three who have Godhead. There-

fore the three 'persons are three Gods.

Obj. 2. Further, Gen. i. i, where it is said. In the be-

ginning God created heaven and earth, the Hebrew original

has Elohim, which may be rendered Gods or Judges: and

this word is used on account of the plurality of persons.

Therefore the three persons are several Gods, and not one

God.

Obj. 3. F'urther, this word thing, when it is said




absolutely, seems to belong to substance. But it is predi-

cated of the three persons in the plural. For Augustine

says(De Doctr. Christ, i. 5):

The things that are the objects

of our future glory are the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.

Therefore other essential names can be predicated in the

plural of the three persons.

Obj. 4. Further, as this word God signifies a being who

has Deity, so also this word person signifies a being sub-

sisting in an intellectual nature. But we say there are

three persons. So for the same reason we can say there

are three Gods.

On the contrary, It is said (Deut. vi. 4) : Hear, O Israel,

the Lord thy God is one God.

I answer that, Some essential names signify the essence

after the manner of substantives ; while others signify it

after the manner of adjectives. Those which signify it as

substantives are predicated of the three persons in the

singular only, and not in the plural. Those which signify

the essence as adjectives are predicated of the three persons

in the plural. The reason of this is that substantives

signify something by way of substance, while adjectives

signify something, by way of accident, which adheres to a

subject. Now just as substance has existence of itself, so

also it has of itself unity or multitude ; wherefore the

singularity or plurality of a substantive name depends upon

the form signified by the name. But as accidents have

their existence in a subject, so they have unity or plurality

from their subject ; and therefore the singularity and

plurality of adjectives depends upon their supposita. In

creatures, one form does not exist in several supposita

except by unity of order, as the form of an ordered multi-

tude. So if the names signifying such a form are substan-

tives, they are predicated of many in the singular, but

otherwise if they are adjectives. For we say that many

men are a college, or an army, or a people ; but we say

that many men are collegians. Now in God the divine

essence is signified by way of a form, as above explained

(A. 2), which, indeed, is simple and supremely one, as

shown above {QQ. III., A. 7; XI,, A. 4) So, names




which signify the divine essence in a substantive manner

are predicated of the three persons in the singular, and not

in the plural. This, then, is the reason why we say that

Socrates, Plato, and Cicero are three men; whereas we do

not say the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are three Gods,

but one God; forasmuch as in the three supposita of human

nature there are three humanities, whereas in the three

divine Persons there is but one divine essence. On the

other hand, the names which signify essence in an adjec-

tival manner are predicated of the three persons plurally,

by reason of the plurality of supposita. For we say there

are three existent or three wise beings, or three eternal, un-

created, and immense beings, if these terms are understood

in an adjectival sense. But if taken in a substantive

sense, we say one uncreated, immense, eternal being, as

Athanasius declares.Reply Obj. i. Though the name God signifies a being

having Godhead, nevertheless the mode of signification

is different. For the name God is used substantively;

whereas having Godhead is used adjectively. Conse-

quently, although there are three having Godhead, it does

not follow that there are three Gods.

Reply Obj. 2. Various languages have diverse modes of

expression. So as by reason of the plurality of supposita

the Greeks said three hypostases, so also in Hebrew Elohim

is in the plural. We, however, do not apply the plural

either to God or to substance, lest plurality be referred to

the substance.

Reply Obj. 3. This word thing is one of the transcen-dentals. Whence, so far as it is referred to relation, it

is predicated of God in the plural ; whereas, so far as it is

referred to the substance, it is predicated in the singular.

So Augustine says, in the passage quoted, that the same

Trinity is a thing supreme.

Reply Obj. 4. The form signified by the word person is

not essence or nature, but personality. So, as there are

three personalities—that is, three personal properties in

the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost— it is predicated of the

three, not in the singular, but in the plural.



g. 39. Art. 4 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA 134

Fourth Article.

whether the concrete essential names can stand

for the person?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—Objection i. It would seem that the concrete, essential

names cannot stand for the person, so that we can truly say

God begot God. For, as the logicians say, a singular term

signifies what it stands for. But this name God seems to

be a singular term, for it cannot be predicated in the plural,

as above explained (A. 3). Therefore, since it signifies

the essence, it stands for essence, and not for person.

Obj. 2. Further, a term in the subject is not modified by

a term in the predicate, as to its signification; but only as

to the sense signified in the predicate. But when I say,

God creates, this name God stands for the essence. So

when we say God begot, this term God cannot by reason of

the notional predicate, stand for person.

Obj. 3. Further, if this be true, God begot, because the

Father generates ; for the same reason this is true, God does

not beget, because the Son does not beget. Therefore

there is God who begets, and there is God who does not

beget ; and thus it follows that there are two Gods.

Obj. 4. Further, if God begot God, He begot either God,

that is Himself, or another God. But He did not beget

God, that is Himself; for, as Augustine says {De Trin.

i. i), nothing begets itself. Neither did He beget another

God;

as there is only one God. Therefore it is false to say,

God begot God.

Obj. 5. Further, if God begot God, He begot either God

who is the Father, or God who is not the Father. If God

who is the Father, then God the Father was begotten. If

.God who is not the Father, then there is a God who is not

God the Father : which is false. Therefore it cannot be

said that God begot God.

On the contrary, In the Creed it is said, God of God.

I answer that, Some have said that this name God and

the like, properly according to their nature, stand for the




essence, but by reason of some notional adjunct are made

to stand for the Person. This opinion apparently arose

from considering the divine simplicity, which requires that

in God, He who possesses and ivhat is possessed be the

same. So He who possesses Godhead, which is signified

by the name God, is the same as Godhead. But when we

consider the proper way of expressing ourselves, the mode

of signification must be considered no less than the thing

signified. Hence as this word God signifies the divine

essence as in Him Who possesses it, just as the name man

signifies humanity in a subject, others more truly have said

that this word God, from its mode of signification, can, in

its proper sense, stand for person, as does the word mafi.

So this word God sometimes stands for the essence, as

when we say God creates ; because this predicate is attrib-

uted to the subject by reason of the form signified—that is.

Godhead. But sometimes it stands for the person, either

for only one, as when we say God begets, or for two, as

when we say, God spirates ; or for three, as when it is said :

To the King of ages, immortal, invisible, the only God,

etc. (i Tim. i. 17).

Reply Obj. i. xVlthough this name God agrees with

singular terms as regards the form signified not being

multiplied; nevertheless it agrees also with general terms

so far as the form signified is to be found in several

supposita. So it need not always stand for the essence it

signifies.

Reply Obj. 2. This holds good against those who say

that the word God does not naturally stand for person.

Reply O'jj. 3. The word God stands for the person in a

different way from that in which this word man does; for

since the form signified by this word mati—that is, humanity

—is really divided among its different subjects, it stands of

itself for the person, even if there is no adjunct determining-

it to the person—that is, to a distinct subject. The unitv

of community of the human nature, however, is not a

reality, but is only in the consideration of the mind. Hence

this term man does not stand for the common nature, un-

less this is required by some adjunct, as when we say,

I. 2 10




man is a species; whereas the form signified by the name

God— that is, the divine essence— is really one and

common. So of itself it stands for the common nature, but

by some adjunct it may be restricted so as to stand for the

person. So, when we say, God generates, by reason of the

notional act this name God stands for the person of the

Father. But when we say, God does not generate, there

is no adjunct to determine this name to the person of the

Son, and hence the phrase means that generation is re-

pugnant to the divine nature. If, however, something be

added belonging to the person of the Son, this proposition,

for instance, God begotten does not beget, is true. Con-

sequently, it does not follow that there exists a God

generator, and a God not generator; unless there be an

adjunct pertaining to the persons; as, for instance, if we

were to say, the Father is God the generator, and the Son

is God the non-generator : and so it does not follow that

there are many Gods ; for the Father and the Son are one

God, as was said above (A. 3).

Reply Obj. 4. This is false, the Father begot God, that

is Himself, because the word Himself, as a reciprocal term,

refers to the same suppositum. Nor is this contrary towhat Augustine says {Ep. Ixvi., ad Maxim.) that God the

Father begot another self {alterum se), forasmuch as the

word se is either in the ablative case, and then it means

He begot another from Himself, or it indicates a single

relation, and thus points to identity of nature. This is,

however, either a figurative or an emphatic way of speak-

ing, so that it would really mean. He begot another most

like to Himself. Likewise also it is false to say. He begot

another God, because although the Son is another than the

Father, as above explained (Q. XXXI., A. 2), nevertheless

it cannot be said that He is another God; forasmuch as this

adjective another would be understood to apply to the sub-

stantive God;

andthus the meaning would be that there is a

distinction of Godhead. Yet this proposition He begot

another God is tolerated by some, provided that another

be taken as a substantive, and the word God be construed

in apposition with it. This, however, is an inexact way of



137 PERS. IN REFER. TO ESSENCE Q. 39. Art. s

speaking, and to be avoided, for fear of giving occasion to

error.

Reply Ohj. 5. To say, God begot God Who is God the

Father, is wrong, because since the word Father is con-

strued in apposition to God, the word God is restricted to

the person of the Father; so that it would mean, He begot

God, Who is Himself the Father; and then the Father

would be spoken of as begotten, which is false. Where-

forethe negative of this proposition is true,

Hebegot

GodWho is not God the Father. If, however, we understand

these words not to be in apposition, and require something

to be added, then, on the contrary, the affirmative proposi-

tion is true, and the negative is false; so that the meaning

would be, He begot God Who is God Who is the Father.

Such a rendering, however, appears to be forced, so that

it is better to say simply that the affirmative proposition is

false, and the negative is true. Yet Prepositivus said that

both the negative and affirmative are false, because this

relative Who in the affirmative proposition can be referred

to the supposituni ; whereas in the negative it denotes both

the thing signified and the suppositum. Whence, in the

affirmative the sense is that to be God the Father is be-fitting to the person of the Son ; and in the negative the

sense is that to be God the Father, is to be removed from

the Son's divinity as well as from His personality. This,

however, appears to be irrational ; since, according to the

Philosopher {Peri Herm, ii.), what is open to affirmation,

is open also to negation.

Fifth Article.

whether abstract essential names can stand for

the person ?

Weproceed thus to the

FifthArticle:—

Objection i. It would seem that abstract essential names

can stand for the person, so that this proposition is true,

Essence begets essence. For Augustine says {De Trin.

vii., i. 2) : The Father and the Son are one Wisdom,






it, from its mode of signification it can of its own nature

stand for person. Thus the things which properly belong

to the persons, can be predicated of this word God, as, for

instance, we can say God is begotten or is Begetter, as

above explained (A. 4). The word essence, however, in

its mode of signification, cannot stand for Person, because

it signifies the essence as an abstract form. Consequently,

what properly belongs to the persons whereby they are

distinguished from eachother, cannot

beattributed to the

essence. For that would imply distinction in the divine

essence, in the same way as there exists distinction in the

supposila.

Reply Obj. i. To express unity of essence and of person,

the holy Doctors have sometimes expressed themselves

with greater emphasis than the strict propriety of terms

allows. Whence instead of enlarging upon such expres-

sions we should rather explain them : thus, for instance,

abstract names should be explained by concrete names, or

even by personal names ; as when we find essence from

essence; or wisdom from wisdom; vve should take the sense

to be, the Son who is essence and wisdom, is from the

Father who is essence and wisdom. Nevertheless, as re-

gards these abstract names a certain order should be

observed, forasmuch as what belongs to action is more

nearly allied to the persons because actions belong to

supposita. So nature from nature, and wisdom from

ivisdom are less inexact than essence from essence.

Reply Obj. 2. In creatures the one generated has not the

same nature numerically as the generator, but another

nature, numerically distinct, which commences to exist in

it anew by generation, and ceases to exist by corruption,

and so it is generated and corrupted accidentally; whereas

God begotten has the same nature numerically as the

begetter. So the divine nature in the Son is not begotten

either directly or accidentally.Reply Obj. 3. Although God and the divine essence are

really the same, nevertheless, on account of their different

mode of signification, we must speak in a different way

about each of them.




Reply Obj. 4. The divine essence is predicated of the

Father by mode of identity by reason of the divine sim-

plicity;yet it does not follow that it can stand for the

Father, its mode of signification being different. This

objection would hold good as regards things which are

predicated of another as the universal of a particular.

Reply Obj. 5. The difference between substantive and

adjectival names consists in this, that the former carry

their subject with them, whereas the latter do not, but addthe thing signified to the substantive. Whence logicians

are wont to say that the substantive is considered in the

light of siippositum, whereas the adjective indicates some-

thing added to the suppositum. Therefore substantive

personal terms can be predicated of the essence, because

they are really the same ; nor does it follow that a personal

property makes a distinct essence ; but it belongs to the

suppositum implied in the substantive. But notional and

personal adjectives cannot be predicated of the essence

unless we add some substantive. We cannot say that

the essence is begetting ; yet we can say that the essence

is a thing begetting, or that it is God begetting, if thing

and God stand for person, but not if they stand for

essence. Consequently, there exists no contradiction in

saying that essence is a thing begetting, and a thing not

begetting ; because in the first case thing stands for person,

and in the second it stands for the essence.

Reply Obj. 6. So far as Godhead is one in several

supposita, it agrees in a certain degree with the form of a

collective term. So when we say, the Father is the prin-

ciple of the whole Godhead, the term Godhead can be taken

for all the persons together, inasmuch as it is the principle

in all the divine persons. Nor does it follow that He is

His own principle; as one of the people may be called the

ruler of the people without being ruler of himself. We

may also say that Heis

theprinciple of the whole

God-head; not as generating or spirating it, but as communicat-

ing it by generation and spiration



141 PERS. IN REFER. TO ESSENCE Q. 39 Art. 6

Sixth Article.

whether the persons can be predicated of the

essential terms ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—Objection i. It would seem that the persons cannot be

predicated of the concrete essential names ; so that we can

say for instance, God is three persons; or, God is the

Trinity. For it is false to say, man is every man, because

it cannot be verified as regards any particular subject.

For neither Socrates, nor Plato, nor anyone else is every

man. In the same way this proposition, God is the Trinity,

cannot be verified of any one of the supposita of the divine

nature. For the Father is not the Trinity ; nor is the Son;

nor is the Holy Ghost. So to say, God is the Trinity, is

false.

Obj. 2. Further, the lower is not predicated of the higher

except by accidental predication ; as when I say, animal is

man; for it is accidental to animal to be man. But this

name God as regards the three persons is as a general

term to inferior terms, as Damascene says {De Fide

Orthod. iii. 4), Therefore it seems that the names of the

persons cannot be predicated of this name God, except in

an accidental sense.

On the contrary, Augustine says, in his sermon on

Faith,* We believe that one God is one divinely named

Trinity.

I answer that. As above explained (A. 5), although adjec-

tival terms, whether personal or notional, cannot be predi-

cated of the essence, nevertheless substantive terms can be

so predicated, owing to the real identity of essence and

person. The divine essence is not only really the same as

one person, but it is really the same as the three persons.

Whence, one person, and two, and three, can be predicated

of the essence as if we were to say, The essence is the

Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost. And because

this word God can of itself stand for the essence, as above

* Serm. ii., in ccuna Domini.




explained (A. 4, ad 3), hence, as it is true to say, The

essence is the three persons; so likewise it is true to say,

God is the three persons.

Reply Obj. i. As above explained this term man can of

itself stand for person, whereas an adjunct is required for

it to stand for the universal human nature. So it is false

to say, Man is every man; because it cannot be verified of

any particular human subject. On the contrary, this word

God can of itself be taken for the divine essence. So,

although to say of any of the supposita of the divine nature,

God is the Trinity, is untrue, nevertheless it is true of the

divine essence. This was denied by Porretanus because

he did not take note of this distinction.

Reply Obj. 2. When we say, God, or the divine essence

is the Father the predication is one of identity, and not of

the lower in regard to a higher species : because in God

there is no universal and singular. Hence, as this proposi-

tion. The Father is God is of itself true, so this proposi-

tion God is the Father is true of itself, and by no means

accidentally.

Seventh Article.

whether the essential names should be appropriated

to the persons ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—Objection i. It would seem that the essential names

should not be appropriated to the persons. For whatever

might verge on error in faith should be avoided in the

treatment of divine things; for, as Jerome says, careless

words involve risk of heresy.* But to appropriate to any

one person the names which are common to the three

persons, may verge on error in faith ; for it may be

supposed either that such belong only to the person to

whom they are appropriated, or that they belong to Himin a fuller degree than to the others. Therefore the

essential attributes should not be appropriated to the

persons.

* In substance Ep. Ivii.




Obj. 2. Further, the essential attributes expressed in the

abstract signify by mode of form. But one person is not

as a form to another; since a form is not distinguished in

subject from that of which it is the form. Therefore

the essential attributes, especially when expressed in the

abstract, are not to be appropriated to the persons.

Obj. 3. Further, property is prior to the appropriated,

for property is included in the idea of the appropriated.

But the essential attributes, in our way of understanding,are prior to the persons ; as what is common is prior to

what is proper. Therefore the essential attributes are not

to be appropriated to the persons.

On the contrary, The apostle says : Christ the power of

God and the wisdom of God (i Cor. i. 24).

/ answer that, For the manifestation of our faith it is

fitting that the essential attributes should be appropriated

to the persons. For although the trinity of persons can-

not be proved by demonstration, as was above expounded

(Q. XXXII., A. i), nevertheless it is fitting that it be

declared by things which are more known to us. Now

the essential attributes of God are more clear to us from

the standpoint of reason than the personal properties;

be-

cause we can derive certain knowledge of the essential

attributes from creatures which are sources of knowledge

to us, such as we cannot obtain regarding the personal

properties, as was above explained (ibid.). As, therefore,

we make use of the likeness of the trace or image found in

creatures for the manifestation of the divine persons, so

also in the same manner do we make use of the essential

attributes. And such a manifestation of the divine persons

by the use of the essential attributes is called appropriation.

The divine person can be manifested in a twofold manner

by the essential attributes; in one way by similitude, and

thus the things which belong to the intellect are appro-

priated to the Son, Who proceeds by way of intellect,

as Word. In another way by dissimilitude ; as power is

appropriated to the Father, as Augustine says, because

fathers by reason of old age are sometimes feeble ; lest any-

thing of the kind be imagined of God.




Reply Obj. i. The essential attributes are not appro-

priated to the persons as if they exclusively belonged to

them ; but in order to make the persons manifest by way of

similitude, or dissimilitude, as above explained. So, no

error in faith can arise, but rather manifestation of the

truth.

Reply Ohj. 2. If the essential attributes were appro-

priated to the persons as exclusively belonging to each of

them, then it would follow that one person would be as

a form as regards another ; which Augustine altogether

repudiates (De Trin. vi. 2), showing that the Father is wise,

not by the wisdom begotten by Him, as though only the

Son were Wisdom ; so that the Father and the Son together

only can be called wise, but not the Father without the

Son. But the Son is called the Wisdom of the Father,

because He is Wisdom from the Father Who is Wisdom.

For each of them is of Himself Wisdom ; and both together

are one Wisdom. Whence the Father is not wise by the

wisdom begotten by Him, but by the wisdom which is His

own essence.

Reply Obj. 3. Although the essential attribute is in its

proper concept prior to person, according to our way of

understanding; nevertheless, so far as it is appropriated,

there is nothing to prevent the personal property from

being prior to that which is appropriated. Thus colour is

posterior to body considered as body, but is naturally prior

to white body, considered as white.

Eighth Article.

whether the essential attributes are appropriated

to the persons in a fitting manner by the holy

DOCTORS ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article —Objection i. It would seem that the essential attributes

are appropriated to the persons unfittingly by the holy

doctors. For Hilary says (De Trin. ii.) : Eternity is in the

Father, the species is in the Image; and use is in the Gift.

In which words he designates three names proper to the




persons : the name of the Father, the name Image proper

to the Son (Q. XXXV., A. 2), and the name Bounty or

Gift, which is proper to the Holy Ghost (Q. XXXVIII.»

A. 2). He also designates three appropriated terms. For

he appropriates eternity to the Father, species to the Son,

and use to the Holy Ghost. This he does apparently with-

out reason. For eternity imports duration of existence;

species, the principle of existence; and use belongs to the

operation. But essence and operation are not found to beappropriated to any person. Therefore the above terms are

not fittingly appropriated to the persons.

Ohj. 2. Further, Augustine says {De Doctr. Christ, i. 5) :

Unity is in the Father, equality in the Son, and in the

Holy Ghost is the concord of equality and unity. This

does not, however, seem fitting; because one person does

not receive formal denomination from what is appropriated

to another. For the Father is not wise by the wisdom be-

gotten, as above explained (Q. XXXVH., A. 2, ad i). But,

as he subjoins. All these three are one by the Father ; all are

equal hy the Son, and all united by the Holy Ghost. The

above, therefore, are not fittingly appropriated to the

Persons.

Obj. 3. Further, according to Augustine, to the Father

is attributed power, to the Son wisdom, to the Holy Ghost

goodness. Nor does this seem fitting; for strength is part

of power, whereas strength is found to be appropriated to

the Son, according to the text, Christ the strength* of God

(i Cor. i. 24). So it is likewise appropriated to the Holy

Ghost, according to the words, strength-f came out from

Him and healed all (Luke vi. 19). Therefore power should

not be appropriated to the Father.

Obj. 4. Likewise Augustine says {De Trin. vi. 10) : What

the Apostle says, From Hiw., and by Him, and in Him,

is not to be taken in a confused sense. And (Contra

Maxim, ii.) from Him refers to the Father, byHim to the Son, in Him to the Holy Ghost. This,

however, seems to be incorrectly said ; for the words in

* Douay, power.

t Douay, virtue.




Him seem to imply the relation of final cause, which is first

among the causes. Therefore this relation of cause should

be appropriated to the Father, Who is the principle fromno principle.

Obj. 5. Likewise, Truth is appropriated to the Son,

according to John xiv. 6, / am the Way, the Truth, and the

Life ; and likewise the book of life, according to Ps. xxxix. 9,

In the beginning of the book it is written of Me, where a

gloss observes, that is, with the Father Who is My head,

also this word Who is; because on the text of Isaias, Be-

hold I go to the Gentiles (Ixv. i), a gloss adds. The Son

speaks Who said to Moses, I am Who am. These appear

to belong to the Son, and are not appropriated. For truth,

according to Augustine {De Vera Relig. 36), is the supreme

similitude of the principle without any dissimilitude. So

it seems that it properly belongs to the Son, Who has a

principle. Also the book of life seems to be proper to the

Son, as signifying a thing from another ; for every book is

written by someone. This also, Who is, appears to be

proper to the Son ; because if when it was said to Moses,

/ am Who am, the Trinity spoke, then Moses could have

said. He Who is the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost sent me

to you; so also he could have said further. He Who is the

Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost sent me to you,

pointing out a certain person. This, however, is false;

because no person is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. There-

fore it cannot be common to the Trinity, but is proper to

the Son.

I answer that. Our intellect, which is led to the know-

ledge of God from creatures, must consider God according

to the mode derived from creatures. In considering any

creature four points present themselves to us in due order

Firstly, the thing itself taken absolutely is considered as

a being. Secondly, it is considered as one. Thirdly, its

intrinsic power of operation and causality is considered

The fourth point of consideration embraces its relation to

its effects. Hence this fourfold consideration comes to our

mind in reference to God.

According to the first point of consideration, whereby




we consider God absolutely in His being, the appropria-

tion mentioned by Hilary applies, according to which

eternity is appropriated to the Father, species to the Son,use to the Holy Ghost. For eternity as meaning a being

without a principle, has a likeness to the property of the

Father, Who is a principle without a principle. Species or

beauty has a likeness to the property of the Son. For

beauty includes three conditions, integrity or perfection,

since those things which are impaired are by the very fact

ugly; due proportion or harmony; and lastly, brightness,

or clarity, whence things are called beautiful which have a

bright colour.

The first of these has a likeness to the property of the

Son, inasmuch as He as Son has in Himself truly and

perfectly the nature of the Father. To insinuate this,

Augustine says in his explanation {De Trin. vi. 10):

Where—that is, in the Son—there is supreme and primal life, etc.

The second agrees with the Son's property, inasmuch as

He is the express Image of the Father. Hence we see that

an image is said to be beautiful, if it perfectly represents

even an ugly thing. This is indicated by Augustine when

he says (ibid.), Where there exists wondrous proportion and

primal equality, etc.

The third agrees with the property of the Son, as the

Word, which is the light and splendour of the intellect, as

Damascene says (De Fide Orthod. iii. 3). Augustine

alludes to the same when he says (ibid.) : As the perfect

Word, not wanting in anything, and, so to speak, the art

of the omnipotent God, etc.

Use has a likeness to the property of the Holy Ghost

provided that use be taken in a wide sense, as includ-

ing also the sense of to enjoy; according as to use is

to employ something at the beck of the will, and

to enjoy means to use joyfully, as Augustine says (De

Trin. x. 11). So use, whereby the Father and the

Son enjoy each other, agrees with the property of

the Holy Ghost, as Love. This is what Augustine says

(De Trin. vi. 10) : That love, that delectation, that felicity

or beatitude, is called use by him (Hilary), But the use



Q. 39- Art. 8 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA 148

by which we enjoy God, is likened to the property of the

Holy Ghost as the Gift ; and Augustine points to this when

he says (ibid.) :

In the Trinity, the Holy Ghost, the sweet-ness of the Begetter and the Begotten, pours out upon us

mere creatures His immense bounty and wealth. Thus

it is clear how eternity, species, and use are attributed or

appropriated to the persons, but not essence or operation;

because, being common, there is nothing in their concept

to liken them to the properties of the Persons.

The second consideration of God regards Him as one.

In that view Augustine {De Doctr. Christ, i. 5) appro-

priates unity to the Father, equality to the Son, concord or

union to the Holy Ghost. It is manifest that these three

imply unity, but in different ways. For unity is said

absolutely, as it does not presuppose anything else ; and

for this reason it is appropriated to the Father, to Whomany other person is not presupposed, since He is the

principle without a principle. Equality implies unity as

regards another ; for that is equal which has the same

quantity as another. So equality is appropriated to the

Son, Who is the principle from a principle. Union

implies the unity of two ; and is therefore appropriated to

the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He proceeds from two. And

from this we can understand what Augustine means when

he says {loc. cit.) that The Three are one, by reason of the

Father; They are equal by reason of the Son; and are

united by reason of the Holy Ghost. For it is clear that

we trace a thing back to that in which we find it first : just

as in this lower world we attribute life to the vegetativesoul, because therein we find the first trace of life. Now,

unity is perceived at once in the person of the Father, even

if by an impossible hypothesis, the other persons were

removed. So the other persons derive their unity from the

Father. But if the other persons be removed, we do not

find equality in the Father, but we find it as soon as we

•suppose the Son. So, all are equal by reason of the Son,

not as if the Son were the principle of equality in the

Father, but that, without the Son equal to the Father, the

Father could not be called equal ; because His equality is






way as power. The preposition by (per) sometimes desig-

nates an intermediate cause ; thus we may say that a smith

works by a hammer. Hence the word by is not alwaysappropriated to the Son, but belongs to the Son properly

and strictly, according to the text. All things were

made by Him (Jo. i. 3); not that the Son is an instru-

ment, but as the principle from a principle. Sometimes

it designates the habitude of a form by which an agent

works ; thus we say that an artificer works by his art.

Hence, as wisdom and art are appropriated to the Son,

so also is the expression by Whom. The preposition in

strictly denotes the habitude of one containing. Now,

God contains things in two ways : in one way by their

similitudes ; thus things are said to be in God, as existing

in His knowledge. In this sense the expression in Him

should be appropriated to the Son. In another sense thingsare contained in God forasmuch as He in His goodness

preserves and governs them, by guiding them to a fitting

end; and in this sense the expression in Him is appro-

priated to the Holy Ghost, as likewise is goodness. Nor

need the habitude of the final cause (though the first of

causes) be appropriated to the Father, Who is the prin-

ciple without a principle; because the divine persons, of

Whom the Father is the principle, do not proceed from Him

as towards an end, since each of Them is the last end ; but

They proceed by a natural procession, which seems more

to belong to the nature of a natural power.

Regarding the other points of inquiry, we can say that

since truth belongs to the intellect, as stated above (Q.

XVI., A. i), it is appropriated to the Son, without, how-

ever, being a property of His. For truth can be con-

sidered as existing in the thought or in the thing itself.

Hence, as intellect and thing in their essential meaning, are

referred to the essence, and not to the persons, so the same

is to be said of truth. The definition quoted from Augus-

tine belongs to truth as appropriated to the Son. The

book of life directly means knowledge; but indirectly it

means life. For, as above explained (Q. XXIV., A, i), it

is God's knowledge regarding those who are to possess




eternal life. Consequently, it is appropriated to the Son;

although life is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, as imply-

ing a certain kind of interior movement, agreeing in that

sense with the property of the Holy Ghost as Love. To

be written by another is not of the essence of a book con-

sidered as such ; but this belongs to it only as a work pro-

duced. So this does not imply origin ; nor is it personal,

but an appropriation to a person. The expression Whois is appropriated to the person of the Son, not by reason

of itself, but by reason of an adjunct, inasmuch as, in

God's word to Moses, was prefigured the delivery of the

human race accomplished by the Son. Yet, forasmuch as

the word Who is taken in a relative sense, it may some-

times relate to the person of the Son ; and in that sense it

would be taken personally ; as, for instance, were we to

say, The Son is the begotten Who is, forasmuch as

God begotten is personal. But taken indefinitely, it is an

essential term. And although the pronoun this (iste) seems

grammatically to point to a particular person, nevertheless

everything that we can point to can be grammatically

treated as a person, although in its own nature it is not a

person ; as we may say, this stone, and this ass. So, speak-

ing in a grammatical sense, so far as the word God signifies

and stands for the divine essence, the latter may be desig-

nated by the pronoun this, according to Exod. xv. 2 :

This is my God, and I will glorify Him.

I. 2 II





153 PERS. IN REF. TO RELATIONS Q. 40. Art. 1

Obj. 3. Further, when several things are identical, what

is predicated of one is predicated of the others. But all

that is predicated of a Person is not predicated of Hisproperty. For we say that the Father begets; but not that

the paternity is begetting. Therefore property is not the

same as person in God.

On the contrary, in God what is and whereby it is are

the same, according to Boethius {De Hebdom.). But the

Father is Father by paternity. Therefore He is the same

as paternity. In the same way, the other properties are the

same as the persons.

/ answer that, Different opinions have been held on this

point. Some have said that the properties are not the

persons, nor in the persons ; and these have thought thus

owing to the mode of signification of the relations, which

do not indeed signify existence in something, but ratherexistence towards something. Whence, they styled the

relations assistant, as above explained (Q. XXVIII., A. 2).

But since relation, considered as really existing in God, is

the divine essence Itself, and the essence is the same as

person, as appears from what was said above (Q. XXXIX.,

A. i), relation must necessarily be the same as person.

Others, therefore, considering this identity, said that the

properties were indeed the persons ; but not in the persons;

for, they said, there are no properties in God except in our

way of speaking, as stated above (Q. XXXII., A. 2). Wemust, however, say that there are properties in God ; as we

have shown (ibid.). These are designated by abstract

terms, being forms, as it were, of the persons. So, since

the nature of a form requires it to be in that of which it is

the form, we must say that tlie properties are in the persons,

and yet that they are the persons ; as we say that tiie

essence is in God, and yet is God.

Reply Obj. I. Person and property are really the same,

but differ in concept. Consequently, it does not follow

that if one is multiplied, the other must also be multiplied.

We must, however, consider that in God, by reason of the

divine simplicity, a twofold real identity exists as regards

what in creatures ar- distinct. For, since the divine



Q. 40. Art. i THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA '*154

simplicity excludes the composition of matter and form,

it follows that in God the abstract is the same as the con-

crete, as Godhead and God. And as the divine simplicity

excludes the composition of subject and accident, it follows

that whatever is attributed to God, is His essence Itself;

and so, wisdom and power are the same in God, because

they are both in the divine essence. According to this

twofold identity, property in God is the same as person.

For personal properties are the same as the persons

because the abstract and the concrete are the same in

God; since they are the subsisting persons themselves, as

paternity is the Father Himself, and filiation is the Son,

and procession is the Holy Ghost. But the non-personal

properties are the same as the persons according to the

other reason of identity, whereby whatever is attributed to

God is His own essence. Thus, common spiration is the

same as the person of the Father, and the person of the

Son ; not that it is one self-subsisting person ; but that as

there is one essence in the two persons, so also there is one

property in the two persons, as above explained (Q. XXX.,

A. 2).

Reply Ohj. 2. The properties are said to be in the essence,

only by mode of identity ; but in the persons they exist

by mode of identity, not merely in reality, but also in the

mode of signification ; as the form exists in its subject. Thus

the properties determine and distinguish the persons, but

not the essence.

Reply Ohj. 3. Notional participles and verbs signify the

notional acts : and acts belong to a suppositum. Now,properties are not designated as supposita, but as forms of

supposita. And so their mode of signiiication is against

notional participles and verbs being predicated of the

properties.



155 PKRS. IN REF. TO RELATIONS Q. 40. Art. 2

Second Article.

whether the persons are distinguished by the

relations ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article —Objection i. It would seem that the persons are not

distinguished by the relations. For simple things are

distinct by themselves. But the persons are supremely

simple. Therefore they are distinguished by themselves,

and not by the relation.

Obj. 2. Further, a form is distinguished only in relation

to its genus. For white is distinguished from black only

by quality. But hypostasis signifies an individual in the

genus of substance. Therefore the hypostases cannot be

distinguished by relations.

Obj. 3. Further, what is absolute comes before what is

relative. But the distinction of the divine persons is the

primary distinction. Therefore the divine persons are not

distinguished by the relations.

Obj. 4. Further, whatever presupposes distinction cannot

be the first principle of distinction. But relation pre-

supposes distinction, which comes into its definition ; for a

relation is essentially what is towards another. Therefore

the first distinctive principle in God cannot be relation.

On the contrary, Boethius says {De Trin.) : Relation

alone multiplies the Trinity of the divine persons.

I answer that, In whatever multitude of things is to be

found something common to all, it is necessary to seek out

the principle of distinction. So, as the three persons agree

in the unity of essence, we must seek to know the principle

of distinction whereby they are several. Now, there are

two principles of difference between the divine persons, and

these are origin and relation. Although these do not really

differ, yet they differ in the mode of signification ; for

origin is signified by way of act, as generation ; and rela-

tion by way of the form, as paternity.

Some, then, considering that relation follows upon act,

have said that the divine hypostases are distinguished by




origin, so that we may say that the Father is distinguished

from the Son, inasmuch as the former begets and the latter

is begotten. Further, that the relations, or the properties,

make known the distinctions of the hypostases or persons

as resulting therefrom ; as also in creatures the properties

manifest the distinctions of individuals, which distinctions

are caused by the material principles.

This opinion, however, cannot stand—for two reasons.

Firstly, because, in order that two things be understood as

distinct, their distinction must be understood as resulting

from something intrinsic to both ; thus in things created it

results from their matter or their form. Now origin of a

thing does not designate anything intrinsic, but means

the way from something, or to something ; as generation

signifies the way to the thing generated, and as proceeding

from the generator. Hence it is not possible that what is

generated and the generator should be distinguished by

generation alone; but in the generator and in the thing

generated we must presuppose whatever makes them to be

distinguished from each other. In a divine person there i*

nothing to presuppose but essence, and relation or pro-

perty. Whence, since the persons agree in essence, it only

remains to be said that the persons are distinguished from

each other by the relations. Secondly : because the dis-

tinction of the divine persons is not to be so understood

as if what is common to them all is divided, because the

common essence remains undivided; but the distinguish-

ing principles themselves must constitute the things which

are distinct. Now the relations or the properties dis-

tinguish or constitute the hypostases or persons, inasmuch

as they are themselves the subsisting persons; as paternity

is the Father, and filiation is the Son, because in God the

abstract and the concrete do not differ. But it is against

the nature of origin that it should constitute hypostasis

or person. For origin taken in an active sense signifies

proceeding from a subsisting person, so that it presupposes

the latter; while in a passive sense origin, as nativity,

signifies the way to a subsisting person, and as not yet

constituting the person.



157 PERS. IiN REF. TO RELATIONS Q. 40. Art. 3

It is therefore better to say that the persons or hypostases

are distinguished rather by relations than by origin. For,

although in both ways they are distinguished,nevertheless

in our mode of understanding they are distinguished chiefly

and firstly by relations ; whence this name Father signifies

not only a property, but also the hypostasis; whereas

this term Begetter or Begetting signifies property only;

forasmuch as this name Father signifies the relation which

is distinctive and constitutive of the hypostasis; and this

term Begetter or Begotten signifies the origin which is not

distinctive and constitutive of the hypostasis.

Reply Obj. i. The persons are the subsisting relations

themselves. Hence it is not against the simplicity of the

divine persons for them to be distinguished by the relations.

Reply Obj. 2. The divine persons are not distinguished

as regards being, in which they subsist, nor in anythingabsolute, but only as regards something relative. Hence

relation suffices for their distinction.

Reply Obj. 3. The more prior a distinction is, the nearer

it approaches to unity ; and so it must be the least possible

distinction. So the distinction of the persons must be by

that which distinguishes the least possible; and this is by

relation.

Reply Obj. 4. Relation presupposes the distinction of the

subjects, when it is an accident ; but when the relation is

subsistent, it does not presuppose, but brings about dis-

tinction. For when it is said that relation is by nature to

be towards anotlier, the word another signifies the correla-

tive which is not prior, but simultaneous in the order of

nature.

Third Article.

whether the hypostases remain if the relations are

mentally abstracted from the persons ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—Objection i. It would seem that the hypostases remain if

the properties or relations are mentally abstracted from the

persons. For that to which something is added, may be




understood when the addition is taken away ; as man is

something added to animal which can be understood if

rational be taken away. But person is something added to

hypostasis ; for person is a hypostasis distinguished by a

property of dignity. Therefore, if a personal property be

taken away from a person, the hypostasis remains.

Obj. 2. Further, that the Father is Father, and that He is

someone, are not due to the same reason. For as He is

the Father by paternity, supposing He is some one by

paternity it would follow that the Son, in Whom there is

not paternity, would not be someone. So when paternity

is mentally abstracted from the Father, He still remains

someone— that is, a hypostasis. Therefore, if property

be removed from person, the hypostasis remains.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says {De Trin. v. 6) : Un-

begotten is not the same as Father; for if the Father hadnot begotten the Son, nothing would prevent Him being

called unbegotten. But if He had not begotten the Son,

there would be no paternity in Him. Therefore, if

paternity be removed, there still remains the hypostasis of

the Father as unbegotten.

On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv.) : The Son

has nothing else than birth. But He is Son by birth.

Therefore, if filiation be removed, the Son's hypostasis no

more remains ; and the same holds as regards the other

persons.

/ answer that. Abstraction by the intellect is twofold,

when the universal is abstracted from the particular, as

animal abstracted from man ; and when the form is ab-

stracted from the matter, as the form of a circle is abstracted

by the intellect from any sensible matter. The difference

between these two abstractions consists in the fact that in

the abstraction of the universal from the particular, that

from which the abstraction is made does not remain ; for

when the difference of rationality is removed from man,

the man no longer remains in the intellect, but animal

alone remains. But in the abstraction of the form from the

matter, both the form and the matter remain in the in-

tellect; as, for instance, if we abstract the form of a circle



159 PERS. IN REF. TO RELATIONS Q. 40. Art. 3

from brass, there remains in our intellect separately the

understanding both of a circle, and of brass. Now,

although there is no universal nor particular in God, norform and matter, in reality ; nevertheless, as regards the

mode of signification there is a certain likeness of these

things in God ; and thus Damascene says {De Fide Orthod.

iii. 6) that substance is common and hypostasis is par-

ticular. So, if we speak of the abstraction of the universal

from the particular, the common universal essence remains

in the intellect if the properties are removed ; but not the

hypostasis of the Father, which is, as it were, a particular.

But, as regards the abstraction of the form from the

matter, if the non-personal properties are removed, then

the idea of the hypostases and persons remains : as, for

instance, if the fact of the Father's being unbegotten or

spirating be mentally abstracted from the Father, theFather's hypostasis or person remains.

If, however, the personal property be mentally ab-

stracted, the idea of the hypostasis no longer remains.

For the personal properties are not to be understood as

added to the divine hypostases, as a form is added to a

pre-existing subject : but they carry with them their own

supposita, inasmuch as they are themselves subsisting

persons; thus paternity is the Father Himself. For hypo-

stasis signifies something distinct in God, since hypostasis

means an individual substance. So, as relation dis-

tinguishes and constitutes the hypostases, as above ex-

plained (A. 3), it follows that if the personal relations are

mentally abstracted, the hypostases no longer remain.Some, however, think, as above noted, that the divine

hypostases are not distinguished by the relations, but only

by origin; so that the Father is a hypostasis as not from

another, and the Son is a hypostasis as from another by

generation. And that the consequent relations which are

to be regarded as properties of dignity, constitute the

notion of person, and are thus called personal properties.

Hence, if these relations are mentally abstracted, the

hypostasis, but not the persons, remain.

But this is impossible, for two reasons : first, because the




relations distinguish and constitute the hypostases, as

shown above (A. 2); secondly, because every hypostasis of

a rational nature is a person, as appears from the definition

of Boethius (De Duab. Natur.) that, person is the in-

dividual substance of a rational nature. Hence, to have

hypostasis and not person, it would be necessary to abstract

the rationality from the nature, but not the property from

the person.

Reply Obj. i. Person does not add to hypostasis a dis-

tinj;;uishing property absolutely, but a distinguishing

property of dignity, all of which must be taken as the

difference. Now, this distinguishing property is one of

dignity precisely because it is understood as subsisting in

a rational nature. Hence, if the distinguishing property

be removed from the person, the hypostasis no longer re-

mains; whereas it would remain were the rationality of the

nature removed ; for both person and hypostasis are in-

dividual substances. Consequently, in God the distin-

guishing relation belongs essentially to both.

Reply Obj. 2. By paternity the Father is not only Father,

but is a person, and is someone, or a hypostasis. It does

not follow, however, that the Son is not someone or a

hypostasis;just as it does not follow that He is not a

person.

Reply Obj. 3. Augustine does not mean to say that the

hypostasis of the Father would remain as unbegolten, if

His paternity were removed, as if innascibility constituted

and distinguished the hypostasis of the Father; for this

would be impossible, since being unbegotten says nothingpositive and is only a negation, as he himself says. But he

speaks in a general sense, forasmuch as not every un-

begotten being is the Father. So, if paternity be removed,

the hypostasis of the Father does not remain in God, as

distinguished from the other persons, but only as distin-

guished from creatures; as the Jews understand it.



i6i PERS. IN REF. TO RELATIONS Q. 40. Art. 4

Fourth Article.

whether the properties presuppose the

notional acts ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—Objection i. It would seem that the notional acts are

understood before the properties. For the Master of the

Sentences says (i Sent. D. xxvii.) that, the Father always

is, because He is ever begetting the Son. So it seems that

generation precedes paternity in the order of intelligence.

Obj. 2. Further, in the order of intelligence every rela-

tion presupposes that on which it is founded; as equality

presupposes quantity. But paternity is a relation founded

on the action of generation. Therefore paternity pre-

supposes generation.Obj. 3. Further, Active generation is to paternity as

nativity is to filiation. But filiation presupposes nativity;

for the Son is so called because He is born. Therefore

paternity also presupposes generation.

On the contrary, Generation is the operation of the

person of the Father. But paternity constitutes the person

of the Father. Therefore, in the order of intelligence,

paternity is prior to generation.

/ answer that, According to the opinion that the

properties do not distinguish and constitute the hypostases

in God, but only manifest them as already distinct and

constituted, we must absolutely say that the relations in our

mode of understanding follow upon the notional acts, sothat we can say, without qualifying the phrase, that

because He begets, He is the Father. A distinction, how-

ever, is needed if we suppose that the relations distinguish

and constitute the divine hypostases. For origin has in

God an active and passive signification—active, as genera-

tion is attributed to the Father, and spiration, taken for

the notional act, is attributed to the Father and the Son;

passive, as nativity is attributed to the Son, and procession

to the Holy Ghost. For, in the order of intelligence,

origin, in the passive sense, simply precedes the personal




properties of the person proceeding ; because origin, as

passively understood, signifies the way to a person

constituted by the property. Likewise, origin signified

actively is prior in the order of intelligence to the non-

personal relation of the person originating ; as the notional

act of spiration precedes, in the order of intelligence, the

unnamed relative property common to the Father and the

Son. The personal property of the Father can be con-

sidered in a twofold sense : firstly, as a relation ; and thus

again in the order of intelligence it presupposes the notional

act, for relation, as such, is founded upon an act : secondly,

according as it constitutes the person ; and thus the notional

act presupposes the relation, as an action presupposes a

person acting.

Reply Obj. i. When the Master says that because He

begets, He is Father, the term Father is taken as meaningrelation only, but not as signifying the subsisting person

;

for then it would be necessary to say conversely that

because He is Father He begets.

Reply Obj. 2. This objection avails of paternity as a

relation, but not as constituting a person.

Reply Obj. 3. Nativity is the way to the person of the

Son ; and so, in the order of intelligence, it precedes filia-

tion, even as constituting the person of the Son. But

active generation signifies a proceeding from the person of

the Father ; wherefore it presupposes the personal property

of the Father.



QUESTION XLI.

OF THE PERSONS IN REFERENCE TO THENOTIONAL ACTS.

(In Six Articles.)

We now consider the persons in reference to the notional

acts, concerning which six points of inquiry arise: (i)

Whether the notional acts are to be attributed to the

persons? (2) Whether these acts are necessary, or volun-

tary ? (3) Whether as regards these acts, a person proceeds

from nothing or from something? (4) Whether in God

there exists a power as regards the notional acts ?

(5) What this power means ? (6) Whether several persons

can be the term of one notional act ?

F iRST Article.

WHETHER THE NOTIONAL ACTS .ARE TO BE ATTRIBUTED TO

THE PERSONS ?

We proceed thus to the First Article —Objection 1. It would seem that the notional acts are not

to be attributed to the persons. For Boethius says {DeTrin.) : Whatever is predicated of God, of whatever genus

it be, becomes the divine substance, except what pertains

to the relation. But action is one of the ten genera. There-

fore, any action attributed to God belongs to His essence,

and not to a notion.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says {De Trin. v. 4, 5) that,

everything which is said of God, is said of Hint as regards

either His substance, or relation. But whatever belongs to

the substance is signified by the essential attributes; and

whatever belongs to the relations, by the names of the per-

163



Q. 41. Akt. I THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA i6.^

sons, or by the names of the properties. Therefore, in

addition to these, notional acts are not to be attributed to

the persons.

Ohj. 3. Further, the nature of action is of itself to cause

passion. But we do not place passions in God. There-

fore neither are notional acts to be placed in God.

On the contrary, Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad

Petrum ii.) says : It is a property of the Father to beget the

Son. But to beget is an act. Therefore notional acts are

to be placed in God.

/ answer that, In the divine persons distinction is

founded on origin. But origin can be properly designated

only by certain acts. Wherefore, to signify the order of

origin in the divine persons, we must attribute notional

acts to the persons.

Reply Ohj. i. Every origin is designated by an act. In

God there is a twofold order of origin : one, forasmuch as

the creature proceeds from Him, and this is common to the

three persons; and so those actions which are attributed

to God to designate the proceeding of creatures from Him,

belong to His essence. Another order of origin in God

regards the procession of person from person ; wherefore

the acts which designate the order of this origin are called

notional ; because the notions of the persons are the mutual

relations of the persons, as is clear from what was above

explained (Q. XXXII., A. 2).

Reply Ohj. 2. The notional acts differ from the relations

of the persons only in their mode of signification; and in

reality are altogether the same. Whence the Master saysthat generation and nativity in other words are paternity

and filiation (i Sent. D. xxvi.). To see this, we must con-

sider that the origin of one thing from another is firstly

inferred from movement : for that anything be changed

. from its disposition by movement evidently arises from

some cause. Hence action, in its primary sense, means origin

of movement ; for, as movement derived from another into

a mobile object, is called passion, so the origin of move-

ment itself as beginning from another and terminating in

what is moved, is called action. Hence, if we take away



i65 PERS. IN Rlit. lO NOTION. ACTS Q. 41. Art. 2

movement, action implies nothing more than order of

origin, in so far as action proceeds from some cause or

principle to what is from that principle. Consequently,

since in God no movement exists, the personal action of

the one producing a person is only the habitude of the

principle to the person who is from the principle; which

habitudes are the relations, or the notions. Nevertheless

we cannot speak of divine and intelligible things except

after the manner of sensible things, whence we derive our

knowledge, and wherein actions and passions, so far as

these imply movement, differ from the relations which

result from action and passion, and therefore it was neces-

sary to signify the habitudes of the persons separately after

the manner of act, and separately after the manner of

relations. Thus it is evident that they are really the same,

differing only in their mode of signification.

Reply Obj. 3. Action, so far as it means origin of move-

ment, naturally involves passion; but action in that sense

is not attributed to God. Whence, passions are attributed

to Him only from a grammatical standpoint, and in accord-

ance with our manner of speaking; as we attribute to beget

to the Father, and to the Son to be begotten.

Second Article,

whether the notional acts are voluntary?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—Objection i. It would seem that the notional acts are

voluntary. For Hilary says {De Synod.) : Not by natural

necessity was the Father led to beget the Son.

Obj. 2. Further, the Apostle says, He transferred us to

the kingdom of the Son of His love (Col. i. 13). But love

belongs to the will. Therefore the Son was begotten of the

Father by will.

Obj. 3. Further, nothing is

morevoluntary than love.

But the Holy Ghost proceeds as Love from the Father and

the Son. Therefore He proceeds voluntarily.

Obj. 4. Further, the Son proceeds by mode of the in-

tellect, as the Word. But every word proceeds bv the will




from a speaker. Therefore the Son proceeds from the

Father by will, and not by nature.

Obj. 5. Further, what is not voluntary is necessary.

Therefore if the Father begot the Son, not by the will, it

seems to follow that He begot Him by necessity; and this

is against what Augustine says (Ad Orosium qu. vii.).

On the contrary, Augustine says, in the same book, that,

the Father begot the Son neither by will, nor by necessity.

I answer that, When anything is said to be, or to be

made by the will, this can be understood in two senses. In

one sense, the ablative designates only concomitance, as I

can say that I am a man by my will—that is, I will to be a

man ; and in this way it can be said that the Father begot

the Son by will ; as also He is God by will, because He

wills to be God, and wills to beget the Son. In the other

sense, the ablative imports the habitude of a principle, as

it is said that the workman works by his will, as the will is

the principle of his work ; and thus in that sense it must be

said that God the Father begot the Son, not by His will;

but that He produced the creature by His will. Whence

in the book De Synod., it is said :

If anyone say that the

Son was made by the Will of God, as a creatine is said to

be made, let him be anathema. The reason of this is that

will and nature differ in their manner of causation, in such

a way that nature is determined to one, while the will is not

determined to one ; and this because the effect is assimilated

to the form of the agent, whereby the latter acts. Now it

is manifest that of one thing there is only one natural form

whereby it exists ;

and hence such as it is itself, such also is

its work. But the form whereby the will acts is not only

one, but many, according to the number of ideas under-

stood. Hence the quality of the will's action does not

depend on the quality of the agent, but on the agent's will

and understanding. So the will is the principle of those

things which may be this way or that way ; whereas of

those things which can be only in one way, the principle is

nature. What, however, can exist in different ways is far

from the divine nature, whereas it belongs to the nature

of a created being; because God is of Himself necessary



i67 PERS. IN REF. TO NOTION. ACTS Q. 41. Art. 2

being, whereas a creature is made from nothing. Thus,

the Arians, wishing to prove the Son to be a creature, said

that the Father begot the Son by will, taking will in the

sense of principle. But we, on the contrary, must assert

that the Father begot the Son, not by will, but by nature.

Wherefore Hilary says (De Synod.) : The will of God gave

to all creatures their substance: but perfect birth gave the

Son a nature derived from a substance impassible and un-

born. All things created are such as God willed them to

be; but the Son, born of God, subsists in the perfect like-

ness of God.

Reply Obj. i. This saying is directed against those who

did not admit even the concomitance of the Father's will

in the generation of the Son, for they said that the Father

begot the Son in such a manner by nature that the will to

beget was wanting; just as we ourselves suffer many things

against our will from natural necessity—as, for instance,

death, old age, and like ills. This appears from what

precedes and from what follows as regards the words

quoted, for thus we read : Not against His will, nor as it

were, forced, nor as if He were led by natural necessity did

the Father beget the Son.

Reply Obj. 2. The Apostle calls Christ the Son of the

love of God, inasmuch as He is superabundantly loved by

God ; not, however, as if love were the principle of the

Son's generation.

Reply Obj. 3. The will, as a natural faculty, wills some-

thing naturally, as man's will naturally tends to happiness;

and likewise God naturally wills and loves Himself; where-

as in regard to things other than Himself, the will of Godis, in a way, undetermined in itself, as above explained

(Q. XIX., A. 3). Now, the Holy Ghost proceeds as Love,

inasmuch as God loves Himself, and hence He proceeds

naturally, although He proceeds by mode of the will.

Reply Obj. 4. Even as regards the intellectual concep-

tions of the mind, a return is made to those first principles

which are naturally understood. But God naturally under-

stands Himself, and thus the conception of the divine Wordis natural.

I. 2 12



Q. 41. Art. 3 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA i68

Reply Obj. 5. A thing is said to be necessary of itself,

and by reason of another. Taken in the latter sense, it has

a twofold meaning : firstly, as an efficient and compelling

cause, and thus necessary means what is violent; secondly,

it means a final cause, when a thing is said to be necessary

as the means to an end, so far as without it the end could

not be attained, or, at least, so well attained. In neither

of these ways is the divine generation necessary ; because

God is not the means to an end, nor is He subject to com-

pulsion. But a thing is said to be necessary of itself which

cannot but be : in this sense it is necessary for God to

be; and in the same sense it is necessary that the Father

beget the Son.

Third Article,whether the notional acts proceed from something ?

We proceed thtis to the Third Article:—Objection i. It would seem that the notional acts do not

proceed from anything. For if the Father begets the Son

from something, this will be either from Himself or from

something else. If from something else, since that whencea thing is generated exists in what is generated, it follows

that something dififerent from the Father exists in the Son,

and this contradicts what is laid down by Hilary (De Trin.

vii.) that. In them nothing diverse or different exists. If

the Father begets the Son from Himself, since again that

whence a thing is generated, if it be something permanent,

receives as predicate the thing generated therefrom—just

as we say. The man is white, since the man remains, when

from not white he is made white— it follows that either the

Father does not remain after the Son is begotten, or that

the Father is the Son, which is false. Therefore the Father

does not beget the Son from something, but from nothing.

Obj. 2. Further, thatwhence anything

is

generatedis

theprinciple regarding what is generated. So if the Father

generate the Son from His own essence or nature, it follows

that the essence or nature of the F ather is the principle of

the Son. But it is not a material principle, because in God



i6g PERS. IN REF. TO NOTION. ACTS Q. 41. Art. a

nothing material exists; and therefore it is, as it were, an

active principle, as the begetter is the principle of the one

begotten. Thus it follows that the essence generates,

which was disproved above (Q. XXXIX., A. 5).

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii. 6) that the

three persons are not from the same essence ; because the

essence is not another thing from person. But the person

of the Son is not another thing from the Father's essence.

Therefore the Son is not from the Father's essence.Obj. 4. Further, every creature is from nothing. But in

Scripture the Son is called a creature; for it is said (Ecclus.

xxiv. 5), in the person of the Wisdom begotten, / came out

of the mouth of the Most High, the first-born before all

creatures: and further on (verse 14) it is said as uttered by

the same Wisdom, From the beginning, and before the

world was I created. Therefore the Son was not begotten

from something, but from nothing. Likewise we can

object concerning the Holy Ghost, by reason of what is

said (Zach. xii. i) : Thus saith the Lord Who stretcheth

forth the heavens, and layeth the foundations of the earth,

and formeth the spirit of man within him; and (Amos iv.

13) according to another version :* / Who form the earth,

and create the spirit.

On the contrary, Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad

Petrum i. i) says : God the Father, of His nature, without

beginning, begot the Son equal to Himself.

I answer that, The Son was not begotten from nothing,

but from the Father's substance. For it was explained

above (Q. XXVII., A. 2; Q. XXXIII., AA. 2, 3) that

paternity, filiation and nativity really and truly exist in

God. Now, this is the difference between true genera-

tion, whereby one proceeds from another as a son, and

making, that the maker makes something out of external

matter, as a carpenter makes a bench out of wood, whereas

a man begets a son from himself. Now, as a created work-man makes a thing out of matter, so God makes things out

of nothing, as will be shown later on (Q. XLV., A. i),

not as if this nothing were a part of the substance of the

* The Scptuagint.




thing made, but because the whole substance of a thing is

produced by Him without anything else whatever pre-

supposed. So, were the Son to proceed from the Father as

out of nothing, then the Son would be to the Father what

the thing made is to the maker, whereto, as is evident, the

name of filiation would not apply except by a kind of simili-

tude. Thus, if the Son of God proceeds from the Father

out of nothing, He could not be properly and truly called

the Son, whereas the contrary is stated (i Jo. v. 20) : That•we may be in His true Son Jesus Christ. Therefore the

true Son of God is not from nothing ; nor is He made, but

begotten.

That certain creatures made by God out of nothing are

called sons of God is to be taken in a metaphorical sense,

according to a certain likeness of assimilation to Him Whois the true Son. Whence, as He is the only true and

natural Son of God, He is called the only begotten,

according to Jo. i. 18, The only begotten Son, Who

is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared

Him; and so far as others are entitled sons of adop-

tion by their similitude to Him, He is called the first

begotten, according to Rom. viii. 29: Whoyn He fore-

knew He also predestinated to be made conformable to the

image of His Son, that He might be the first born of many

brethren. Therefore the Son of God is begotten of the

substance of the Father, but not in the same way as man

is born of man ; for a part of the human substance in

generation passes into the substance of the one begotten,

whereas the divine nature cannot be parted ; whence it

necessarily follows that the Father in begetting the Son

does not transmit any part of His nature, but communi-

cates His whole nature to Him, the distinction only of

origin remaining, as explained above (Q. XL., A. 2).

Reply Obj. i. When we say that the Son was born of the

Father, the preposition of designates a consubstantial

generating principle, but not a material principle. For

that, which is produced from matter, is made by a change

of form in thatwhence it is produced. But the divine essence

is unchangeable, and is not susceptive of another form.



171 PERS. IN REF. TO NOTION. ACTS Q. 41. Art. 3

Reply Obj. 2. When we say the Son is begotten of the

essence of the Father, as the Master of the Sentences ex-

plains (i Sent. D. v.), this denotes the habitude of a kind of

active principle, and as he expounds, the Son is begotten of

the essence of the Father—that is, of the Father Who is

essence ; and so Augustine says (De Trin. xv. 13) : When I

say of the Father Who is essence, it is the same as if I said

more explicitly, of the essence of the Father.

This, however, is not enough to explain the real meaningof the words. For we can say that the creature is from

God Who is essence ; but not that it is from the essence of

God. So we may explain them otherwise, by observing

that the preposition of (de) always denotes consubstanti-

ality. We do not say that a house is of (de) the builder,

since he is not the consubstantial cause. We can say,

however, that something is of another, if this is its con-

substantial principle, no matter in what way it is so,

whether it be an active principle, as the son is said to be

of the father, or a material principle, as a knife is of iron;

or a formal principle, but in those things only in which the

forms are subsisting, and not accidental to another, for we

can say that an angel is of an intellectual nature. In this

way, then, we say that the Son is begotten of the essence

of the Father, inasmuch as the essence of the Father, com-

municated by generation, subsists in the Son.

Reply Obj. 3. When we say that the Son is begotten of

the essence of the Father, a term is added which saves the

distinction. But when we say that the three persons are

of the divine essence, there is nothing expressed to warrant

the distinction signified by the preposition, so there is no

parity of argument.

Reply Obj. 4. When we say Wisdo^n was created, this

may be understood not of Wisdom which is the Son of

God, but of created wisdom given by God to creatures :

for it is said, He created her (namely, Wisdom) in the HolyGhost, and He poured her out over all His works (Ecclus.

i. 9, 10). Nor is it inconsistent for Scripture in one text to

speak of the Wisdom begotten and wisdom created, for

wisdom created is a kind of participation of the uncreated




Wisdom. The saying may also be referred to the created

nature assumed by the Son, so that the sense be, From the

beginnitig and before the ivorld was I made—that is, I

was foreseen as united to the creature. Or the mention of

wisdom as both created and begotten insinuates into our

minds the mode of the divine generation ; for in genera-

tion what is generated receives the nature of the generator,

and this pertains to perfection ; whereas in creation the

Creator is not changed, but the creature does not receivethe Creator's nature. Thus the Son is called both created

and begotten, in order that from the idea of creation the

immutability of the Father may be understood, and from

generation the unity of nature in the Father and the Son.

In this way Hilary expounds the sense of this text of

Scripture (De Synod.). The other passages quoted do not

refer to the Holy Ghost, but to the created spirit, some-

times called wind, sometimes air, sometimes the breath of

man, sometimes also the soul, or any other invisible sub-

stance.

Fourth Article.

whether in god there is a power in respect of the

notional acts ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—Objection i. It would seem that in God there is no power

in respect of the notional acts. For every kind of power is

either active, or passive; neither of which can be here ap-

plied, there being in God nothing which we call passive

power, as above explained (Q. XXV., A. i) ; nor can active

power belong to one person as regards another, since the

divine persons were not made, as stated above (A. 3).

Therefore in God there is no power in respect of the

notional acts.

Obj.2.

Further,the object of

poweris what is possible.

But the divine persons are not regarded as possible, but

as necessary. Therefore, as regards the notional acts,

whereby the divine persons proceed, there cannot be power

in God.



173 PERS. IN REF. TO NOTION. ACTS Q.4i- Art. 4

Obj. 3. Further, the Son proceeds as the word, which

is the concept of the intellect; and the Holy Ghost pro-

ceeds as love, which belongs to the will. But in Godpower exists as regards effects, and not as regards intellect

and will, as stated above (Q. XXV., A. i). Therefore, in

God power does not exist in reference to the notional acts.

On the contrary, Augustine says (ContTa Maxim, iii. i) :

// God the Father could not beget a co-equal Son, where is

the omnipotence of God the Father? Power therefore

exists in God regarding the notional acts.

/ answer that, As the notional acts exist in God, so must

there be also a power in God regarding these acts ; since

power only means the principle of act. So, as we under-

stand the F'ather to be principle of generation ; and the

Father and the Son to be the principle of spiration, we

must attribute the power of generating to the Father, andthe power of spiration to the Father and the Son ; for the

power of generation means that whereby the generator

generates. Now every generator generates by something.

Therefore in every generator we must suppose the power of

generating, and in the spirator the power of spirating.

Reply Obj. i. As a person, according to the notional

acts, does not proceed as if made ; so the power in God

as regards the notional acts has no reference to a person

as if made, but only as regards the person as proceeding.

Reply Obj. 2. Possible, as opposed to what is necessary,

is a consequence of a passive power, which does not exist

in God. Hence, in God there is no such thing as possi-

bility in this sense, but only in the sense of possible as

contained in what is necessary; and in this latter sense it

can be said that as it is possible for God to be, so also is it

possible that the Son should be generated.

Reply Obj. 3. Power signifies a principle : and a prin-

ciple implies distinction from that of which it is the

principle. Now we must observe a double distinction in

things said of God : one is a real distinction, the other is

a distinction of reason only. By a real distinction, Godby His essence is distinct from those things of which Heis the principle by creation : just as one person is distinct







Q. 41. Art. 6 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA '* 176

power of begetting signifies the divine nature directly, but

the relation indirectly.

Reply Obj. i. Power does not signify the relation itself

of a principle, for thus it would be in the genus of relation;

but it signifies that which is a principle; not, indeed, in the

sense in which we call the agent a principle, but in the

sense of being that by which the agent acts. Now

the agent is distinct from that which it makes, and the

generator from that which it generates:

but that by whichthe generator generates is common to generated and

generator, and so much more perfectly, as the generation

is more perfect. Since, therefore, the divine generation is

most perfect, that by which the Begetter begets, is common

to Begotten and Begetter by a community of identity, and

not only of species, as in things created. Therefore, from

the fact that we say that the divine essence is the principle

by which the Begetter begets, it does not follow that the

divine essence is distinct (from the Begotten) : which would

follow if we were to say that the divine essence begets.

Reply Obj. 2. As in God, the power of begetting is the

same as the act of begetting, so the divine essence is

the same in reality as the act of begetting or paternity;although there is a distinction of reason.

Reply Obj. 3. When I speak of the power of begetting,

power is signified directly, generation indirectly : just as if

I were to say, the essence of the Father. Wherefore in

respect of the essence, which is signified, the power of

begetting is common to the three persons : but in respect

of the notion that is connoted, it is proper to the person of

the Father.

•

Sixth Article.

whether several persons can be the term of one

notional act ?

Objection i. It would seem that a notional act can be

directed to several Persons, so that there may be several

Persons begotten or spirated in God. For whoever has the

power of begetting can beget. But .the Son has the power



177 PERS. IN REF. TO NOTION. ACTS Q. 41- Art. 6

of begetting. Therefore He can beget. But He can not

beget Himself : therefore He can beget another son.

Therefore there can be several Sons in God.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says {Contra Maxim, iii. 12) :

The Son did not beget a Creator: not that He could not,

but that it behoved Him not.

Obj. 3. Further, God the Father has greater power to

beget than has a created father. But a man can beget

several sons. Therefore God can also :

the more so that

the power of the Father is not diminished after begetting

the Son.

On the contrary, In God that which is possible, and that

which is do not differ. If, therefore, in God it were

possible for there to be several Sons, there would be several

Sons. And thus there would be more than three Persons

in God; which is heretical.

/ answer that, As Athanasius says, in God there is only

one Father, one Son, one Holy Ghost. For this four

reasons may be given.

The first reason is in regard to the relations by which

alone are the Persons distinct. P'or since the divine

Persons are the relations themselves as subsistent, there

would not be several Fathers, or several Sons in God, un-

less there were more than one paternity, or more than one

filiation. And this, indeed, would not be possible except

owing to a material distinction : since forms of one species

are not multiplied except in respect of matter, which is

not in God. Wherefore there can be but one subsistent

filiation in God : just as there could be but one subsistent

whiteness.

The second reason is taken from the manner of the pro-

cessions. For God understands and wills all things by one

simple act. Wherefore there can be but one person pro-

ceeding after the manner of word, which person is the

Son;

and but one person proceeding after the manner of

love, which person is the Holy Ghost.

The third reason is taken from the manner in which the

persons proceed. For the persons proceed naturally, as

we have said (A. 2), and nature is determined to one.




The fourth reason is taken from the perfection of the

divine persons. For this reason is the Son perfect, thatthe entire divine filiation is contained in Him, and that

there is but one Son. The argument is similar in regard

to the other persons.

Reply Ohj. i. We can grant, without distinction, that

the Son has the same power as the Father ; but we cannot

grant that the Son has the power generandi (of begetting)

thus taking generandi as the gerund of the active verb,

so that the sense would be that the Son has the power to

beget. Just as, although Father and Son have the same

being, it does not follow that the Son is the Father, by

reason of the notional term added. But if the word

generandi (of being begotten) is taken as the gerundive

of the passive verb, the power generandi is in the Sonthat is, the power of being begotten. The same is to be

said if it be taken as the gerundive of an impersonal verb,

so that the sense be the poiver of generation—that is, a

power by which it is generated by some person.

Reply Ohj. 2. Augustine does not mean to say by those

words that the Son could beget a Son ; but that if He did

not, it was not because He could not, as we shall see later

on (Q. XLH., A. 6 ad 3).

Reply Ohj. 3. Divine perfection and the total absence of

matter in God require that there cannot be several Sons

in God, as we have explained. Wherefore that there are

not several Sons is not due to any lack of begetting power

in the Father,






things to be alike, not to be equal. Therefore, we may

speak of likeness in the divine persons, but not of equality.

Obj. 3. Further, things wherein there is to be found

equality, are equal to one another, for equality is

reciprocal. But the divine persons cannot be said to be

equal to one another. For as Augustine says {De Trin.

vi. 10) : If an image answers perfectly to that whereof it is

the image, it may be said to be equal to it; but that which

it represents cannotbe

said to be equal to the image.But

the Son is the image of the Father ; and so the Father

is not equal to the Son. Therefore equality is not to be

found among the divine persons. \

Obj. 4. Further, equality is a relation. But no relation

is common to the three persons ; for the persons are distinct

by reason of the relations. Therefore equality is not be-

coming to the divine persons.

On the contrary, Athanasius says that the three persons

are co-eternal and co-equal to one another.

I answer that. We must needs admit equality among

the divine persons. For, according to the Philosopher

(Metaph. x., text. 15, 16, 17), equality signifies the negation

of greater or less.

Now wecannot admit anything greater

or less in the divine persons; for as Boethius says (De

Trin. i.) : They must needs admit a difference—namely,

of Godhead who speak of either increase or decrease, as

the Arians do, who sunder the Trinity by distinguishing

degrees as of numbers, thus involving a plurality. Now

the reason of this is that unequal things cannot have the

same quantity. But quantity, in God, is nothing else than

His essence. Wherefore it follows, that if there were any

inequality in the divine persons, they would not have the

same essence ; and thus the three persons would not be one

God; which is impossible. We must therefore admit

equality among the divine persons.

ReplyObj. i. Quantity is twofold. There is quantity

of bulk or dimensive quantity, which is to be found only in

corporeal things, and has, therefore, no place in God.

There is also quantity of virtue, which is measured accord-

ing to the perfection of some nature or form : to this sort of



i8i EQUALITY AND LIKENESS Q. 42. Art. 1

quantity we allude when we speak of something as being

more, or less, hot ; forasmuch as it is more, or less, perfect

in heat. Now this virtual quantity is measured firstly by

its source—that is, by the perfection of that form or nature :

such is the greatness of spiritual things, just as we speak

of great heat on account of its intensity and perfection.

And so Augustine says (De Trin. vi. 18) that in things

which are great, but not in bulk, to be greater is to be better,

for themore

perfectathing is, the better it is. Secondly,

virtual quantity is measured by the effects of the form.

Now the first effect of form is being, for everything has

being by reason of its form. The second effect is opera-

tion, for every agent acts through its form. Consequently

virtual quantity is measured both in regard to being and in

regard to action : in regard to being, forasmuch as things

of a more perfect nature are of longer duration ; and in

regard to action, forasmuch as things of a more perfect

nature are more powerful to act. And so as Augustine

(Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i.) says : We understand

equality to be in the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, inas-

much as no one of them either precedes in eternity, or excels

in greatness, or surpasses in power.

Reply Obj. 2. Where we have equality in respect of

virtual quantity, equality includes likeness and something

besides, because it excludes excess. For whatever things

have a common form, may be said to be alike, even if they

do not participate in that form equally, just as the air may

be said to be like fire in heat ; but they cannot be said to be

equal, if one participates in the form more perfectly than

another. And because not only is the same nature in both

Father and Son, but also is it in both in perfect equality,

therefore we say not only that the Son is like to the Father,

in order to exclude the error of Eunomius, but also that He

is equal to the Father to exclude the error of Arius.

Reply Obj. 3. Equality and likeness in

Godmay be

designated in two ways—namely, by nouns and by verbs.

When designated by nouns, equality in the divine persons

is mutual, and so is likeness; for the Son is equal and like

to the Father, and conversely. This is because the divine




essence is not more the Father's than the Son's. Where-

fore, just as the Son has the greatness of the Father, and is

therefore equal to the Father, so the Father has the great-

ness of the Son, and is therefore equal to the Son. But in

reference to creatures, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix.) :

Equality and likeness are not viutual. For effects are said

to be like their causes, inasmuch as they have the form of

their causes : but not conversely, for the form is principally

in the cause, and secondarily in the effect.

But verbs signify equality with movement. And although

movement is not in God, there is something that receives.

Since, therefore, the Son receives from the Father, this,

namely, that He is equal to the Father, and not conversely,

for this reason we say that the Son is equalled to the

Father, but not conversely.

Reply Obj. 4. In the divine persons there is nothing for

us to consider but the essence which they have in common

and the relations in which they are distinct. Now equality

implies both—namely, distinction of persons, for nothing

can be said to be equal to itself ; and unity of essence, since

for this reason are the persons equal to one another, that

they are of the same greatness and essence. Now it is

clear that the relation of a thing to itself is not a real rela-

tion. Nor, again, is one relation referred to another by a

further relation : for when we say that paternity is opposed

to filiation, opposition is not a relation mediating between

paternity and filiation. For in both these cases relation

would be multiplied indefinitely. Therefore equality and

likeness in the divine persons is not a real relation distinct

from the personal relations : but in its concept it includes

both the relations which distinguish the persons, and the

unity of essence. For this reason the Master says (i Sent,

D. xxxi.) that in these it is only the terms that are relative.






Obj. 3. Further, everything which is corrupted ceases

to be. Hence everything generated begins to be ; for the

end of generation is existence. But the Son is generated

by the Father. Therefore He begins to exist, and is not

co-eternal with the Father.

Obj. 4. Further, if the Son be begotten by the Father,

either He is always being begotten, or there is some

moment in which He is begotten. If He is always being

begotten, since, during the process of generation, a thing

must be imperfect, as appears in successive things, which

are always in process of becoming, as time and motion, it

follows that the Son must be always imperfect, which can-

not be admitted. Thus there is a moment to be assigned

for the begetting of the Son, and before that moment the

Son did not exist.

On the contrary, Athanasius declares that all the three

persons are co-eternal with each other.

I answer that, We must say that the Son is co-eternal

with the Father. In proof of which we must consider that

for a thing which proceeds from a principle to be posterior

to its principle may be due to two reasons : one on the part

of the agent, and the other on the part of the action. Onthe part of the agent this happens differently as regards

free agents and natural agents. In free agents, on account

of the choice of time ; for as a free agent can choose the

form it gives to the effect, as stated above (Q. XLI., A. 2),

so it can choose the time in which to produce its effect.

In natural agents, however, the same happens from the

agent not having its perfection of natural power from the

very first, but obtaining it after a certain time; as, for

instance, a man is not able to generate from the very first.

Considered on the part of action, anything derived from a

principle cannot exist simultaneously with its principle

when the action is successive. So, given that an agent,

as soon as it exists, begins to act thus, the effect would notexist in the same instant, but in the instant of the action's

termination. Now it is manifest, according to what has

been said (Q. XLI., A. 2), that the Father does not beget

the Son by will, but by nature; and also that the Father's



i85 EQUALITY AND LIKFNESS O. 42. Art. 2

nature was perfect from eternity ; and again that the action

whereby the Father produces the Son is not successive,

because thus the Son would be successively generated, andthis generation would be material, and accompanied with

movement; which is quite impossible. Therefore we con-

clude that the Son existed whensoever the Father existed;

and thus the Son is co-eternal with the Father, and like-

wise the Holv Ghost is co-eternal with both.

Reply Obj. I. As Augustine says (De Verbis Domini,

Serm. 38), no mode of the procession of any creature

perfectly represents the divine generation. Hence we need

to gather a likeness of it from many of these modes, so

that what is wanting in one may be somewhat supplied

from another; and thus it is declared in the council of

Ephesus : Let Splendour tell thee that the co-eternal Son

existed ahvays ivith the Father; let the Word announcethe impassibility of His Birth ; let the name Son insinuate

His consubstanliality . Yet, above them all the procession

of the word from the intellect represents it more exactly;

the intellectual word not being posterior to its source ex-

cept in an intellect passing from potentiality to act; and

this cannot be said of God.

Reply Obj. 2. Eternity excludes the principle of dura-

tion, but not the principle of origin.

Reply Obj. 3. Every corruption is a change; and so all

that corrupts begins not to exist and ceases to be. The

divine generation, however, is not changed, as stated above

(O. XXVII., A. 2). Hence the Son is ever being begotten,

and the Father is always begetting.

Reply Obj. 4. In time there is something indivisible

namely, the instant ; and there is something else which

endures—namely, time. But in eternity the indivisible

now stands ever still, as we have said above (Q. X., A. 2

ad I, A. 4 ad 2). But the generation of the Son is not in

the now of time, or in time, but in eternity. And so to

express the presentiality and permanence of eternity, wecan say that He is ever being born, as Origen said {Horn,

in Jo. i.). But as Gregory* and Augustinef said, it is

* Moral xxix. 2i. t Super Ps. ii. 7.




better to say ever horn, so that ever may denote the per-

manence of eternity, and horn the perfection of the only

Begotten. Thus, therefore, neither is the Son imperfect,

nor was there a time when He was not, as Arius said.

Third Article.

whether in the divine persons there exists an order

of nature?

We proceed thus to the Third Article —Objection i. It would seem that among the divine persons

there does not exist an order of nature. For whatever

exists in God is the essence, or a person, or a notion. But

the order of nature does not signify the essence, nor any of

the persons, or notions. Therefore there is no order of

nature in God.

Obj. 2. Further, wherever order of nature exists, there

one comes before another, at least, according to nature

and intellect. But in the divine persons there exists

neither priority nor posteriority, c^s declared by Athanasius.

'I'herefore, in the divine persons there is no order of nature.

Ohj. 3. Further, wherever ordei exists, distinction alsoexists. But there is no distinction in the divine nature.

Therefore it is not subject to order ; and order of nature

does not exist in it.

Ohj. 4. Further, tlie divine nature is the divine essence.

But there is no order of essence in God. Therefore neither

is there of nature.

On the contrary. Where plurality exists without order,

confusion exists. But in the divine persons there is no

confusion, as Athanasius says. Therefore in God order

exists.

/ answer that, Order always has reference to some

principle. Wherefore since there are many kinds of prin-

ciple

—namely, according to site, as a point ; according to

intellect, as the principle of demonstration ; and according

to each individual cause—so are there manv kinds of order.

Now principle, according to origin, without priority, exists

in God as we have stated (O. XXXI II., A. i) : so there



i87 EQUALITY AND LIKENESS Q. 42 Art. 4

must likewise be order according to origin, without priority;

and this is called the order of nature: in the words of

Augustine {Contra Maxim, iv.) : Not ivhereby one is prior

to another, but ivhcreby one is from another.

Reply Obj. 1. The order of nature signifies the notion of

origin in general, not a special kind of origin.

Reply Obj. 2. In things created, even when what is

derived from a principle is coeval in duration with its

principle, the principle still comes first in the order of

nature and reason, if formally considered as principle. If,

however, we consider the relations of cause and effect, or of

the principle and the thing proceeding therefrom, it is clear

that the things so related are simultaneous in the order of

nature and reason, inasmuch as the one enters the definition

of the other. But in God the relations themselves are the

persons subsisting in one nature. So, neither on the part

of the nature, nor on the part of the relations, can one

person be prior to another, not even in the order of nature

and reason.

Reply Obj. 3. The order of nature means not the order-

ing of nature itself, but the existence of order in the divine

Persons according to natural origin.

Reply Obj. 4. Nature in a certain way implies the idea

of a principle, but essence does not; and so the order of

origin is more correctly called the order of nature than the

order of essence.

Fourth Article.

whether the son is equal to the father in

greatness ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—Objection 1. It would seem that the Son is not equal to

the Father in greatness. For He Himself said (Jo. xiv.

28): The Father is greater than I; and the Apostle says(i Cor, XV. 28) : The Son Himself shall be subject to Himthat put all things under Him.

Obj. 2. Further, Paternity is part of the Father's dignity.

But paternity does not belong to the Son. Therefore the



Q. 42. Art. 4 THE SUMMA TMh:OLOGlCA 188

Son does not possess all the Father's dignity; and so He is

riot e-qual in greatness to the Father.

Ohj. 3. Further, wherever there exist a whole and a pari,

many parts are more than one only, or than fewer parts

as three men are more than two, or than one. But in God

a universal whole exists, and a part ; for under relation or

notion, several notions are included. Therefore, since in

the Father there are three notions, while in the Son there

are only two, the Son is evidently not equal to the Father.On the contrary, It is said (Phil. ii. 6). : He thought it

not robbery to be equal zvith God.

I answer that, The Son is necessarily equal to the Father

in greatness. For the greatness of God is nothing but the

perfection of His nature. Now it belongs to the very

nature of paternity and filiation that the Son by generation

should attain to the possession of the perfection of the

nature which is in the Father, in the same way as it is in

the Father Himself. But since in men generation is a

certain kind of transmutation of one proceeding from poten-

tiality to act, it follows that a man is not equal at first to the

father who begets him, but attains to equality by due

growth, unless owing to a defect in the principle of genera-tion it should happen otherwise. From what precedes

(Q. XXVH., A. 2; Q. XXXHI., AA. 2, 3), it is evident

that in God there exist real true paternity and filiation.

Nor can we say that the power of generation in the Father

was defective, or that the Son of God arrived at perfection

in a successive manner and by change. Therefore we must

say that the Son was eternally equal to the Father in great-

ness. Hence, Hilary says {De Synod., Can. 27) : Remove

bodily weakness, remove the beginning of conception, re-

move pain and all human shortcomings, then every son, by

reason of his natural nativity, is the father's equal, because

he has a like nature.

Reply Obj. 1. These words are to be understood ofChrist's human nature, wherein He is less than the Father,

and subject to Him ; but in His divine nature He is equal

to the Father. This is expressed by Athanasius, Equal

to the Father in His Godhead; less than the Father in





g. 42. Art. 5 THE *• SUMMA THEOLOGICA 190

Fifth Article,

whether the son is in the father, and conversely?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—Objection i. It would seem that the Son and the Father

are not in each other. For the Philosopher {Phys. iv.,

text 23) gives eight modes of one thing existing in another,

according to none of which is the Son in the Father, or

conversely ; as is patent to anyone who examines each mode.

Therefore the Son and the Father are not in each other.

Obj. 2. Further, nothing that has come out from another

is within it. But the Son from eternity came out from

the Father, according to Micheas v. 2 : His going forth is

from the beginning, from the days of eternity. Thereforethe Son is not in the Father.

Obj. 3. Further, one of two opposites cannot be in the

other. But the Son and the Father are relatively opposed.

Therefore one cannot be in the other.

On the contrary, It is said (Jo. xiv. 10) : / am in the

Father, and the Father is in Me.

I answer that, There are three points of consideration

as regards the Father and the Son; the essence, the rela-

tion, and the origin ; and according to each the Son and the

Father are in each other. The Father is in the Son by His

essence, forasmuch as the Father is His own essence, and

communicates His essence to the Son not by any change on

Hispart.

Henceit

follows that asthe

Father's essence is

in the Son, the Father Himself is in the Son ; likewise,

since the Son is His own essence, it follows that He Him-

self is in the Father in Whom is His essence. This is ex-

pressed by Hilary {De Trin. v.), The unchangeable God;

so to speak, folloivs His own nature in begetting an un-

changeable subsisting God. So we understand the nature

of God to subsist in Him, for He is God in God. It is also

manifest that as regards the relations, each of two relative

opposites is in the concept of the other. Regarding origin

also, it is clear that the procession of the intelligible word

is not outside the intellect, inasmuch as it remains in the



igi EQUALITY AND LIKENESS Q. 42. Art. 6

iitterer of the word. What also is uttered by the word is

therein contained. And the same applies to the Holy

Ghost.

Reply Obj. i. What is contained in creatures does not

sufficiently represent what exists in God ; so according to

none of the modes enumerated by the Philosopher, are the

Son and the Father in each other. The mode the most

nearly approaching to the reality is to be found in that

whereby something exists in its originating principle, ex-

cept that the unity of essence between the principle and that

which proceeds therefrom is wanting in things created.

Reply Obj. 2. The Son's going forth from the Father is

by mode of the interior procession whereby the word

emerges from the heart and remains therein. Hence this

going forth in God is only by the distinction of the rela-

tions, not by any kind of essential separation.

Reply Obj. 3. The Father and the Son are relatively

opposed, but not essentially: while, as above explained,

one relative opposite is in the other.

Sixth Article,

whether the son is equal to the father in

POWER ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—Objection i. It would seem that the Son is not equal to

the Father in power. For it is said (Jo. v. 19) : The Son

cannot do anything of Himself but what He seeth the

Father doing. But the Father can act of Himself. There-

fore the Father's power is greater than the Son's.

Obj. 2. Further, greater is the power of him who com-

mands and teaches than of him who obeys and hears. But

the Father commands the Son according to Jo. xiv. 31 :

.4s the Father gave Me commandment, so do I. The

Father also teaches the Son:

The Father loveth the Son,and showeth Him all things that Himself doth (]o. v. 20).

Also, the Son hears : As I hear, so I judge (Jo. v. 30).

Therefore, the Father has greater power than the Son.

Obj. 3. Further, it belongs to the Father's omnipotence



Q. 42. Art. 6 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA ) 192

to be able to beget a Son equal to Himself. For Augustine

says {Contra Maxim, iii. 7), Were He unable to beget one

equal to Himself, where would be the omnipotence of God

the Father? But the Son cannot beget a Son, as proved

above (Q. XLL, A. 6). Therefore the Son cannot do all

that belongs to the Father's omnipotence ; and hence He

is not equal to Him in power.

On the contrary, It is said (Jo. v. 19) : Whatsoever things

the Father doth, these the Son also doth in like manner.I answer that, The Son is necessarily equal to the Father

in power. Power of action is a consequence of perfection

of nature. In creatures, for instance, we see that the more

perfect the nature, the greater power is there for action.

Now it was shown above (A. 4) that the very notion of the

divine paternity and filiation requires that the Son should

be the Father's equal in greatness—that is, in perfection of

nature. Hence it follows that the Son is equal to the

Father in power ; and the same applies to the Holy Ghost

in relation to both. .

Reply Obj. i. The words, the Son cannot of Himself

do anything, do not withdraw from the Son any power

possessed by the Father, since it is immediately added,Whatsoever things the Father doth, the Son doth in like

manner: but their meaning is to show that the Son derives

His power from the Father, of Whom He receives His

nature. Hence, Hilary says (De Trin. ix.), The unity of

the divine nature implies that the Son so acts of Himself

(per se), that He docs not act by Himself (a se).

Reply Obj. 2. The Father's showing and the Son's hear-

ing are to be taken in the sense that the Father communi-

cates knowledge to the Son, as He communicates His

essence. Tlie command of the Father can be explained in

the same sense, as giving Him from eternity knowledge

and will to act, by begetting Him. Or, better still, this

may be referred to Christ in His human nature.Reply Obj. 3. As the same essence is paternity in the

Father, and filiation in the Son : so by the same power the

Father begets, and the Son is begotten. Hence it is clear

that the Son can do whatever the Father can do; yet it



193 EQUALITY AND LIKENESS Q. 42. Art. 6

does not follow that the Son can beget; for to argue thus

would imply transition from substance to relation, for

generation signifies a divine relation. So the Son has the

same omnipotence as the Father, but with another relation;

the Father possessing power as giving signified when we

say that He is able to beget; while the Son possesses the

power as receiving, signified by saying that He can be

beg'otten.



QUESTION XLIII.

THE MISSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS.

(In Eight Articles.)

We next consider the mission of the divine persons, con-

cerning which there are eight points of inquiry : (i) Whethei

it is suitable for a divine person to be sent? (2) Whether

mission is eternal, or only temporal ? (3) In what sense a

divine person is invisibly sent? (4) Whether it is fitting

that each person be sent ? (5) Whether both the Son and

the Holy Ghost are invisibly sent? (6) To whom the

invisible mission is directed? (7) Of the visible mission.

(8) Whether any person sends Himself visibly or invisibly ?

First Article,

whether a divine person can be properly sent ?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—Objection i. It would seem that a divine person cannot

be properly sent. For one who is sent is less than the

sender. But one divine person is not less than another.

Therefore one person is not sent by another.

Obj. 2. Further, what is sent is separated from the

sender; hence Jerome says, commenting on Ezechiel xvi.

53 : What is jointed and tied in one body cannot be sent.

But in the divine persons there is nothing that is separable,

as Hilary says (De Trin. vii.). Therefore one person is not

sent by another.Obj. 3. Further, whoever is sent, departs from one place

and comes anew into another. But this does not apply to a

divine person, Who is everywhere. Therefore it is not

suitable for a divine person to be sent.

194



1Q5 MISSION OF DIMNE PERSONS Q. 43. Art. i

On the contrary, It is said (Jo. viii. 16) : / am not alone,

but I and the Father that sent Me.

I answer that, the notion of mission includes two things :

the habitude of the one sent to the sender; and that of the

one sent to the end whereto he is sent. Anyone being seni

impHes a certain kind of prgcession of the one sent from the

sender : either according to command, as the master sends

the servant; or according to counsel, as an adviser may be

said to send the king to battle; or according to origin, as atree sends forth its flower. The habitude to the term to

which he is sent is also shown, so that in some way he

begins to be present there : either because in no way was he

present before in the place whereto he is sent, or because he

begins to be there in some way in which he was not there

hitherto. Thus the mission of a divine person is a fitting

thing, as meaning in one way the procession of origin from

the sender, and as meaning a new way of existing in

another ; thus the Son is said to be sent by the Father into

the world, inasmuch as He began to exist visibly in the

world by taking our nature ; whereas He ivas previously

in the world (Jo. i. i).

Reply Obj. i. Mission implies inferiority in the one sent,

when it means procession from the sender as principle, by

command or counsel ; forasmuch as the one commanding is

the greater, and the counsellor is the wiser. In God, how-

ever, it means only procession of origin, which is accord-

ing to equality, as explained above (Q. XLII., AA. 4, 6).

Reply Obj. 2. What is so sent as to begin to exist where

previously it did not exist, is locally moved by being sent;

lience it is necessarily separated locally from the sender.

This, however, has no place in the mission of a divine

person ; for the divine person sent neither begins to exist

where he did not previously exist, nor ceases to exist where

He was. Hence such a mission takes place without a

separation, having only distinction of origin.

Reply Obj. 3. This objection rests on the idea of mission

according to local motion, which is not in God.




Second Article,

whether mission is eternal, or only temporal?

We proceed thus to the Second Article —Objection i. It would seem that mission can be eternal.

For Gregory says {Horn. xxvi. in Ev.), The Son is sent as

He is begotten. But the Son's generation is eternal.

Therefore missionis

eternal.Obj. 2. Further, a thing is changed if it becomes some-

thing temporally. But a divine person is not changed.

Therefore the mission of a divine person is not temporal,

but eternal.

Obj. 3. Further, mission implies procession. But the

procession of the divine persons is eternal. Therefore

mission is also eternal.

On the contrary, It is said (Gal. iv. 4) : When the fulness

of the time was come, God sent His Son.

1 answer that, A certain difference is to be observed in

all the words that express the origin of the divine persons.

For some express only relation to the principle, as proces-

sion and going forth. Others expressthe

termof

proces-sion together with the relation to the principle. Of these

some express the eternal term, as generation and spiration;

for generation is the procession of the divine person into

the divine nature, and passive spiration is the procession of

the subsisting love. Others express the temporal term

with the relation to the principle, as mission and giving.

For a thing is sent that it may be in something else, and is

given that it may be possessed ; but tliat a divine person be

possessed by any creature, or exist in it in a new mode, is

temporal.

Hence mission and giving have only a temporal significa-

tion in God ; but generation and spiration are exclusively

eternal ;

whereasprocession

and giving,in

God, have bothan eternal and a temporal signification : for the Son may

proceed eternally as God; but temporally, by becoming

man, according to His visible mission, or likewise by

dwelling in man according to his invisible mission.



IQ7 -. MISSION OF DIVINE PERSONS g. 43- art. 3

Reply Obj. i. Gregory speaks of the temporal generation

of the Son, not from the Father, but from His mother; or it

may be taken to mean that He could be sent because

eternally begotten.

Reply Obj. 2. That a divine person may newly exist in

anyone, or be possessed by anyone in time, does not come

from change of the divine person, but from change in the

creature; as God Himself is called Lord temporally by

change of the creature.

Reply Obj. 3. Mission signifies not only procession from

the principle, but also determines the temporal term ol the

procession. Hence mission is only temporal. Or we rnay

say that it includes the eternal procession, with the addition

of a temporal effect. For the relation of a divine person to

His principle must be eternal. Iênce the procession may

be called a twin procession, eternal and temporal, not that

there is a double relation to the principle, but a double term,

temporal and eternal.

Third Article.

whether the invisible mission of the divine person isonly according to the gift of sanctifying grace ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—Objection i. It would seem that the invisible mission of

the divine person is not only according to the gift of

sanctifying grace. For the sending of a divine person

means that He is given. Hence if the divine person is sent

only according to the gift of sanctifying grace, the divine

person Himself will not be given, but only His gifts; and

this is the error of those who say that the Holy Ghost is

not given, but that His gifts are given.

Obj. 2. Further, this preposition, according to, denotes

the habitude of some cause. But the divine person is the

cause why the gift of sanctifying grace is possessed, andnot conversely, according to Rom. v. 5, the charity of Godis poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is

given to us. Therefore it is improperly said that the divine

person is sent according to the gift of sanctifving grace.




Obj. 3. Further, Augfustine says {De Trin. iv. 20) that

the Son, when temporally perceived by the mind,is

sent.But the Son is known not only by sanctifying grace, but

also by gratyitous grace, as by faith and knowledge. There-

fore the divine person is not sent only according to the

gift of sanctifying grace.

Obj. 4. Further, Rabanus says that the Holy Ghost was

given to the apostles for the working of miracles. This,

however, is not a gift of sanctifying grace, but a gratuitous

grace. Therefore the divine person is not given only

according to the gift of sanctifying grace.

On the contrary, Augustine says {De Trin. iii. 4) that the

Holy Ghost proceeds temporally for the creature's sanctifi-

cation. But mission is a temporal procession. Since then

the creature's sanctification is by sanctifying grace, it

follows that the mission of the divine person is only by

sanctifying grace.

/ answer that, The divine person is fittingly sent in the

sense that He exists newly in anyone ; and He is given as

possessed by anyone ; and neither of these is otherwise than

by sanctifying grace.

For God is in all things by His essence, power, and

presence, according to His one common mode, as the cause

existing in the effects which participate in His goodness.

Above and beyond this common mode, however, there is

one special mode belonging to the rational nature wherein

God is said to be present as the object known is in the

knower, and the beloved in the lover. And since therational creature by its operation of knowledge and love

attains to God Himself, according to this special mode

God is said not only to exist in the rational creature, but

also to dwell therein as in His own temple. So no other

effect can be put down as the reason why the divine person

is in the rational creature in a new mode, except sanctify-

ing grace. Hence, the divine person is sent, and proceeds

temporally only according to sanctifying grace.

Again, we are said to possess only what we can freely use

or enjoy : and to have the power of enjoying the divine

person can only be according to sanctifying grace. And



199 MISSION OF DIVINE PERSONS Q. 43 Art. 4

yet the Holy Gliost is possessed by man, and dwells within

him, in the very gift itself of sanctifying grace. Hence the

Holy Ghost Himself is given and sent.

Reply Obj. i. By the gift of sanctifying grace the rational

creature is perfected so that it can freely use not only the

created gift itself, but enjoy also the divine person Him-

self; and so the invisible mission takes place according to

the gift of sanctifying grace ; and yet the divine person

Himself is given.

Reply Obj.2.

Sanctifying gracedisposes the soul to

possess the divine person ; and this is signified wlien it is

said that the Holy Ghost is given according to the gift of

grace. Nevertheless the gift itself of grace is from the Holy

Ghost; which is meant by the words, the charity of God is

poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost.

Reply Obj. 3. Although the Son can be known by us

according to other effects, yet neither does He dwell in us,

nor is He possessed by us according to those effects.

Reply Obj. 4. The working of miracles manifests sancti-

fying grace as also does the gift of prophecy and anv

other gratuitous graces. Hence gratuitous grace is called

the manifestation of the Spirit (i Cor. xii. 7). So the Holv

Ghost is said tobe

given to theapostles

forthe working of

miracles, because sanctifying grace was given to them with

the outward sign. Were the sign only of sanctifving grace

given to them without the grace itself, it would not be

simply said that the Holy Ghost was given, except with

some qualifying term; just as we read of certain ones

receiving the gift of the spirit of prophecy, or of miracles,

as having from the Holy Ghost the power of prophesving

or of working miracles.

Fourth Article,

whethiir the fatiilr can be fittingly sent?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—Objection i. It would seem that it is fitting also that the

Father should be sent. For being sent means that the

divine person is given. But the Father gives Himself since

T. 2 14



g. 43- Art. 4 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA 200

He can only be possessed by His giving Himself. There-

fore it can be said that the Father sends Himself.

Obj. 2. Further, the divine person is sent according to

the indwelling of grace. But by grace the whole Trinity

dwells in us according to Jo. xiv. 23 : We will come to

him and make Our abode with him. Therefore each one of

the divine persons is sent.

Obj. 3. Further, whatever belongs to one person, belongs

to them all, except the notions and persons. But mission

does not signify any person ; nor even a notion, since there

are only five notions, as stated above (Q. XXXH., A. 3).

Therefore every divine person can be sent.

On the contrary, Augustine says {De Trin. ii. 3), The

Father alone is never described as being sent.

I answer that, The very idea of mission means procession

from another, and in God it means procession according to

origin, as above expounded. Hence, as the Father is not

from another, in no way is it fitting for Him to be sent ; but

this can only belong to the Son and to the Holy Ghost, to

Whom it belongs to be from another.

Reply Obj. i. In the sense of giving as a free bestowal of

something, the Father gives Himself, as freely bestowing

Himself to be enjoyed by the creature. But as implying

the authority of the giver as regards what is given, to be

given only applies in God to the Person Who is from

another ; and the same as regards being sent.

Reply Obj. 2. Although the effect of grace is also from

the Father, Who dwells in us by grace, just as the Son and

the Holv Ghost, still He is not described as being sent, for

He is not from another. Thus Augustine says {De Trin.

iv. 20) that The Father, when known by anyone in time, is

not said to be sent; for there is no one whence He is, or

from whom He proceeds.

Reply Obj. 3. Mission, meaning procession from the

sender, includes the signification of a notion, not of a special

notion, but in general; thus to be from another is common

to two of the notions.



20I MISSION OF DIVINE PERSONS Q. 43- A . 5

FiFtH Article.

WHETHER IT IS FITTING FOR THE SON TO BE SENT

INVISIBLY?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—Objection i. It would seem that it is not fitting for the

Son to be sent invisibly. For invisible mission of the

divine personis

accordingto the gift of grace. But all

gifts of grace belong to the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Cor.

xii. 1 1 : One and the same Spirit worketh all things. There-

fore only the Holy Ghost is sent invisibly.

Obj. 2. Further, the mission of the divine person is

according to sanctifying grace. But the gifts belonging to

the perfection of the intellect are not gifts of sanctifying

grace, since they can be held without the gift of charity,

according to i Cor. xiii. 2 : If I should have prophecy,

and should know all mysteries, and all knowledge, and if

I should have all faith so that I could move mountains,

and have not charity, I am nothing. Therefore, since the

vSon proceeds as the word of the intellect, it seems unfitting

for

Himto be sent invisibly.

Obj. 3. Further, the mission of the divine person is a

procession, as expounded above (AA. 1,4). But the pro-

cession of the Son and of the Holy Ghost differ from each

other. Therefore they are distinct missions, if both are

sent ; and then one of them would be superfluous, since one

would suffice for the creature's sanctification.

On the contrary. It is said of divine Wisdom (Wisd. ix.

10) : Send her from heaven to Thy Saints, and from the

seat of Thy greatness.

I answer that. The whole Trinity dwells in the mind by

sanctifying grace, according to Jo. xiv. 23 : We will come to

him, and will make Our abode with him. But that a divine

person be sent to

anyone byinvisible

grace signifies boththat this person dwells in a new way within him and that

He has His origin from another. Hence, since both to the

Son and to the Holy Ghost it belongs to dwell in the soul

by grace, and to be from another, it therefore belongs to



Q. 43. Art. 5 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA '* 202

both of them to be invisibly sent. As to the Father, though

He dwells in us by grace, still it does not belong to Him to

be from another, and consequently He is not sent.

Reply Obj. i. Although all the gifts, considered as such,

are attributed to the Holy Ghost, forasmuch as He is by His

nature the first Gift, since He is Love, as stated above

(Q. XXXVHL, A. i), some gifts nevertheless, by reason

of their own particular nature, are appropriated in a certain

way to the Son, those, namely, which belong to the in-

tellect, and in respect of which we speak of the mission of

the Son. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. iv. 20) that The

Son is sent to anyone invisibly, whenever He is known and

perceived by anyone.

Reply Obj. 2. The soul is made like to God by grace.

Hence for a divine person to be sent to anyone by grace,

there must needs be a likening of the soul to the divine

person Who is sent, by some gift of grace. Because the

Holy Ghost is Love, the soul is assimilated to tfie Holy

Ghost by the gift of charity : hence the mission of the Holy

Ghost is according to the mode of charity. Whereas the

Son is the Word, not any sort of word, but one Who

breathes forth Love. Hence Augustine says (De Trin.ix. 10) : The Word we speak of is knowledge with love. Thus

the Son is sent not in accordance with every and any kind

of intellectual perfection, but according to the intellectual

illumination, which breaks forth into the affeciion of love,

as is said (Jo. vi. 45) : Everyone that hath heard from the

Father and hath learned, cortieth to Me, and (Ps. xxxviii.

4) : In viy meditation a fire shall flame forth . Thus Augus-

tine plainly says {De Trin. iv. 20) : The Son is sent, when-

ever He is known and perceived by anyone. Now percep-

tion implies a certain experimental knowledge ; and this is

properly called wisdom (sapientia), as it were a sweet know-

ledge {sapida scientia), according to Ecclus. vi. 23: The

wisdom of doctrine is according to her name.Reply Obj. 3. Since mission implies the origin of the

person Who is sent, and His indwelling by grace, as above

explained (A. i), if we speak of mission according to origin,

in this sense the Son's mission is distinguished from the



203 MISSION OF DIVINE PERSONS Q. 43- A . 6

mission of the Holy Ghost, as generation is distinguished

from procession. If we consider mission as regards the

effect of grace, in this sense the two missions are united in

the root which is grace, but are distinguished in the effects

of grace, which consist in the illumination of the intellect

and the kindling of the affection. Thus it is manifest that

one mission cannot be without the other, because neither

takes place without sanctifying grace, nor is one person

separated from the other.

Sixth Article.

whether the invisible mission is to all whoparticipate grace ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—Objection i. It would seem that the invisible mission is

not to all who participate grace. For the Fathers of the

Old Testament had their share of grace. Yet to them was

made no invisible mission ; for it is said (Jo. vii. 39) : The

Spirit was not yet given, because Jesus was not yet glorified.

Therefore the invisible mission is not to all partakers in

grace.

Obj. 2. Further, progress in virtue is only by grace. But

the invisible mission is not according to progress in virtue;

because progress in virtue is continuous, since charity ever

increases or decreases; and thus the mission would be con-

tinuous. Therefore the invisible mission is not to all who

share in grace.

Obj. 3. Further, Christ and the blessed have fulness of

grace. But mission is not to them, for mission implies

distance, whereas Christ, as man, and all the blessed are

perfectly united to God. Therefore the invisible mission is

not to all sharers in grace.

Obj. 4. Further, the Sacraments of the New Law contain

grace, and it is not said that the invisible mission is sent to

them. Therefore the invisible mission is not to all that

have grace.

On the contrary, According to Augustine {De Trin. iii.

4; XV. 27), the invisible mission is for the creature's sancti-





205 MISSION OF DIVINE PERSONS Q. 43. Art..;

to a greater number of objects. To Christ the invisible

mission was sent at the first moment of His conception ;

but not afterwards, since from the beginning of His con-

ception He was filled with all wisdom and grace.

_ Reply Obj. 4. Grace resides instrumentally in the sacra-

ments of the New Law, as the form of a thing designed

resides in the instruments of the art designing, according to

a process flowing from the agent to the passive object.

But mission is only spoken of as directed to its term.Hence the mission of the divine person is not sent to the

sacraments, but to those who receive grace through the

sacraments.

Seventh Article.

w^hether it is fitting for the holy ghost to be

sent visibly ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article —Objection i. It would seem that the Holy Ghost is not

fittingly sent in a visible manner. For the Son as visibly,

sent to the world is said to be less than the Father. But the

i Toly Ghost is never said to be less than the Father. There-

f(jre the Holy Ghost is not fittingly sent in a visible manner.

Obj. 2. Further, the visible mission takes place by way of

union to a visible creature, as the Son's mission according

to the flesh. But the Holy Ghost did not assume any

visible creature; and henceit

cannot be said that He existsotherwise in some creatures than in others, unless perhaps

as in a sign, as He is also present in the sacraments, and

in all the figures of the law. Thus the Holy Ghost is either

not sent visibly at all, or His visible mission takes place in

all these things.

Obj. 3. Further, every visible creature is an effect show-

ing forth the whole Trinity. Therefore the Holy Ghost is

not sent by reason of those visible creatures more than any

other person.

Obj. 4. Further, the Son was visibly sent by reason of

the noblest kind of creature—namely, the human nature.





207 MISSION OF DIVINE PERSONS Q. 43- Art. 7

Son of God; and so, by reason of the nature assumed, the

Son is called less than the Father. But the Holy Ghost did

not assume the visible creature, in which He appeared, into

the unity of His person; so that what is said of it cannot

be predicated of Him. Hence He cannot be called less

than the Father by reason of any visible creature.

Reply Obj. 2. The visible mission of the Holy Ghost does

not apply to the imaginary vision which is that of

prophecy; because, as Augustine says {De Trin. ii. 6):

The prophetic vision is not displayed to corporeal eyes by

corporeal shapes, but is shown in the spirit by the spiritual

images of bodies. But whoever saw the dove and the fire,

saw them by their eyes. Nor, again, has the Holy Ghost

the same relation to these images that the Son has to the

rock, because it is said, ' The rock was Christ ' (i Cor. x.

4), For that rock was already created, and after the mannerof an action was named Christ, ]Vhofn it typified; whereas

the dove and the fire suddenly appeared to signify only

what was happening. They seem, however, to be like to

the flame of the burning bush seen by Moses and to the

column which the people followed in the desert, and to the

lightning and thunder issuing forth when the law was given

on the mountain. For the purpose of the bodily appear-

ances of those things was that they might signify, and then

pass away. Thus the visible mission is neither displayed

by prophetic vision, which belongs to the imagination, and

not to the body, nor by the sacramental signs of the Old

and New Testament, wherein certain pre-existing things are

employed to signify something. But the Holy Ghost is

said to be sent visibly, inasmuch as He showed Himself

in certain creatures as in signs especially made for that

purpose.

Reply Obj. 3. Although the whole Trinity makes those

creatures, still they are made in order to show forth in some

special way this or that person. For as the Father,Son,

and Holy Ghost are signified i^y diverse names, so also can

They each one be signified by different things; although

neither separation nor diversity exists amongst Them.

Reply Obj. 4. It was necessary for the Son to be dechued



g. 43. Art. 7 THE SUMMA THEOLOGlCA '• 208

as the author of sanctification, as explained above. Tlius

the visible mission of the Son was necessarily made accord-

ing to the rational nature to which it belongs to act, andwhich is capable of sanctification ; whereas any other

creature could be the sign of sanctification. Nor was such

a visible creature, formed for such a purpose, necessarily

assumed by the Holy Ghost into the unity of His person,

since it was not assumed or used for the purpose of action,

but only for the purpose of a sign ; and so likewise it was

not required to last beyond what its use required.

Reply Obj. 5. Those visible creatures were formed by the

ministry of the angels, not to signify the person of an angel,

but to signify the Person of the Holy Ghost. Thus, as

the Holy Ghost resided in those visible creatures as the one

signified in the sign, on that account the Holy Ghost is said

to be sent visibly, and not an angel.Reply Obj. 6. It is not necessary that the invisible

mission should always be made manifest by some visible

external sign ; but, as is said (i Cor. xii. 7) the manifesta-

tion of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit—that is,

of the Church. This utility consists in the confirmation

and propagation of the faith by such visible signs. This

has been done chiefly by Christ and by the apostles, accord-

ing to Heb. ii. 3, which having begun to be declared by the

Lord, was confirmed unto us by them that heard.

Thus in a special sense, a mission of the Holv Ghost was

directed to Christ, to the apostles, and to some of the early

saints on whom the Church was in a way founded ; in such

a manner, however, that the visible mission made to Christshould show forth the invisible mission made to Him, not

at that particular time, but at the first moment of His con-

ception. The visible mission was directed to Christ at the

time of His baptism by the figure of a dove, a fruitful

animal, to show forth in Christ the authority of the giver of

grace by spiritual regeneration ; hence the Father's voice

spoke. This is My beloved Son (Matt. iii. 17), that others

might be regenerated to the likeness of the only Begotten.

The Transfiguration showed it forth in the appearance of

a bright cloud, to show the exuberance of doctrine; and



2og MISSION OF DIVINE PERSONS Q. 43. Art. «

hence it was said, Hear ye Him (Matt. xvii. 5). To the

apostles the mission was directed in the form of breathing

to show forth the power of their ministry in the dispensa-

tion of the sacraments ; and hence it was said, Whose sins

you shall forgive, they are forgiven (Jo. xx. 23) : and again

under the sign of fiery tongues, to show forth the office of

teaching; whence it is said that, they began to speak ivith

divers tongues (Acts ii. 4). The visible mission of the Holy

Ghost was fittingly not sent to the fathers of the Old Testa-

ment, because the visible mission of the Son was to be

accomplished before that of the Holy Ghost ; since the Holy

Ghost manifests the Son, as the Son manifests the Father.

Visible apparitions of the divine persons were, however,

given to the Fathers of the Old Testament, which, indeed,

cannot be called visible missions; because, according to

Augustine (De Trin. ii. 17), they were not sent to designatethe indwelling of the divine person by grace, but for the

manifestation of somethin - else.

Eighth Article.

.whether a divine person is sent only by the

person whence he proceeds eternally ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article —Objection i. It would seem that a divine person is sent

only by the one whence He proceeds eternally. For as

Augustine says {De Trin. iv.), The Father is sent by no one

because He is from no one. Therefore if a divine person

is sent by another, He must be from that other.

Obj. 2. Further, the sender has authority over the one

sent. But there can be no authority as regards a divine

person except from origin. Therefore the divine person

sent must proceed from the one sending.

Obj. 3. Further, if a divine person can be sent by one

whence He does not proceed, then the Holy Ghost may be

given by a man, although He proceeds not from him

which is contrary to what Augustine says {De Trin. xv.).

Therefore the divine person is sent onlv bv the one whence

He proceeds




On the contrary, The Son is sent by the Holy Ghost,

according to Isa. xlviii. 16, Now the Lord God hath sent Me

and His Spirit. But the Son is not from the Holy Ghost.Therefore a divine person is sent by one from Whom He

does not proceed.

/ answer that, There are different opinions on this point.

Some say that the divine person is sent only by the one

whence He proceeds eternally ; and so, when it is said that

the Son of God is sent by the Holy Ghost, this is to be

explained as regards His human nature, by reason of which

He was sent to preach by the Holy Ghost. Augustine,

however, says {De Trin. ii. 5) that the Son is sent by Him-

self, and by the Holy Ghost ; and the Holy Ghost is sent by

Himself, and by the Son ; so that to be sent in God does not

apply to each person, but only to the person proceeding

from another, whereas to send belongs to each person.There is some truth in both of these opinions ; because

when a person is described as being sent, the person Him-

self existing from another is designated, with the visible or

invisible effect, applicable to the mission of the divine

person. Thus if the sender be designated as the principle

of the person sent, in this sense not each person sends, but

that person only Who is the principle of that person who is

sent; and thus the Son is sent only by the Father; and the

Holy Ghost by the Father and the Son. If, however, the

person sending is understood as the principle of the effect

implied in the mission, in that sense the whole Trinity

sends the person sent. This reason does not prove that a

man can send the Holy Ghost, forasmuch as man cannotcause the effect of grace.

The answers to the objections appear from the above.



TREATISE ON THE CREATION





QUESTION XLIV.

THE PROCESSION OF CREATURES FROM GOD, AND OP

THE FIRST CAUSE OF ALL THINGS.

(In Four Articles.)

After treating of the procession of the divine persons, we

must consider the procession of creatures from God. This

consideration will be threefold : (i) of the production of

creatures; (2) of the distinction between them; (3) of their

preservation and government. Concerning the first point

there are three things to be considered:

(i) the first causeof beings; (2) the mode of procession of creatures from the

first cause; (3) the principle of the duration of things.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry :

(i) Whether God is the efficient cause of all beings? (2)

Whether primary matter is created by God, or is an in-

dependent co-ordinate principle with Him? (3) Whether

God is the exemplar cause of beings, or whether there are

other exemplar causes ? (4) Whether He is the final cause

of things?

First Article.

whether it is necessary that every being be

created by god ?

We proceed thus to the First Article —Objection i. It would seem that it is not necessary that

every being be created by God. For there is nothing to

prevent a thing from being without that which does not

belong to its essence, as a man can be found without white-

ness. But the relation of the thing caused to its cause doesnot appear to be essential to beings, for some beings can

be understood without it; therefore they can exist without

213



Q. 44. Akt. I THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA 214

it; and therefore it is possible that some beings should not

be created by God.

Obj. 2. Further, a thing requires an efficient cause in

order to exist. Therefore whatever cannot but exist does

not require an efficient cause. But no necessary thing can

not exist, because whatever necessarily exists cannot but

exist. Therefore as there are many necessary things in

existence, it appears that not all beings are from God.

Obj. 3. Further, whatever things have a cause, can be

demonstrated b)^ that cause. But in mathematics demon-

stration is not made by the efficient cause, as appears from

the Philosopher {Metaph. iii., text. 3); therefore not all

beings are from God as from their efficient cause.

On the contrary, It is said (Rom. xi. 36) : Of Hh>if and

by Him, and in Him are all things.

I answer that, It must be said that every being in anyway existing is from God. For whatever is found in any-

thing by participation, must be caused in it by that to which

it belongs essentially, as iron becomes ignited by fire. Now

it has been shown above (O. III., A. 4) when treating of the

divine simplicity that God is the essentially self-subsisting

Being; and also it was shown (Q. XI., AA. 3, 4) that sub-

sisting being must be one; as, if whiteness were self-

subsisting, it would be one, since whiteness is multiplied

bv its recipients. Therefore all beings apart from God are

not their own being, but are beings by participation.

Therefore it must be that all things which are diversified

by the diverse participation of being, so as to be more or

less perfect, are caused by one First Being, Who possesses

being most perfectly.

Hence Plato said {Parmen. xxvi.) that unity must come

before multitude; and Aristotle said {Metaph. ii., text. 4)

that whatever is greatest in being and greatest in truth, is

the cause of every being and of every truth;just as what-

ever is the greatest in heat is the cause of all heat.

Reply Obj. i. Though the relation to its cause is not part

of the definition of a thing caused, still it follows, as a con-

sequence, on what belongs to its essence ; because from the

fact that a thing has being by participation, it follows that



215 PROCESSION OF CREATURES Q. 44- Art. 2

it is caused. Hence such a being cannot be without being

caused, just as man cannot be without having the faculty of

laughing. But, since to be caused does not enter into the

essence of being as such, therefore is it possible for us to

find a being uncaused.

Reply Obj. 2. This objection has led some to say that

what is necessary has no cause {Phys. viii., text. 46). But

this is manifestly false in demonstrative sciences, where

necessary principles are the causes of necessary conclu-

sions. And therefore Aristotle says {Metaph. v., text. 6),

that there are some necessary things which have a cause of

their necessity. But the reason why an efficient cause is

required is not merely because the effect is not necessar)',

but because the effect might not be if the cause were not.

For this conditional proposition is true, whether the ante-

cedent and consequent be possible or impossible

Reply Obj. 3. The science of mathematics treats its

object as though it were something abstracted mentally,

whereas it is not abstract in reality. Now, it is becoming

that everything should have an efficient cause in propor-

tion to its being. And so, although the object of mathe-

matics has an efficient cause, still, its relation to that cause

is not the reason why it is brought under the consideration

of the mathematician, who therefore does not demonstrate

that object from its efficient cause.

Second Article,

whether primary matter is created by god?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—Objection i. It would seem that primary matter is not

created by God. For whatever is made is composed of a

subject and of something else (Phys. i., text. 62). But

primary matter has no subject. Therefore primary matter

cannot have been made by God.

Obj. 2. Further, action and passion are opposite members

of a division. But as the first active principle is God, so

the first passive principle is matter. Therefore God and1. 15




primary matter are two principles divided against each

other, neither of which is from the other.

Obj. 3. Further, every agent produces its like, and thus,

since every agent acts in proportion to its actuality, it

follows that everything made is in some degree actual. But

primary matter is only in potentiality, formally considered

in itself. Therefore it is against the nature of primary

matter to be a thing made.

On thecontrary,

Augustine says (Conf.xii.

7), Twothings hast Thou made, O Lord; one nigh unto Thyself—viz., angels the other nigh unto nothing—viz., primary

matter.

I answer that, The ancient philosophers gradually, and

as it were step by step, advanced to the knowledge of truth.

At first being of grosser mind, they failed to realize that

any beings existed except sensible hodies. And those

among them who admitted movement, did not consider it

except as regards certain accidents, for instance, in relation

to rarefaction and condensation, by union and separation.

And supposing as they did that corporeal substance itself

was uncreated, they assigned certain causes for these acci-

dental changes,as

for instance, affinity,discord, intellect,

or something of that kind. An advance was made when

they understood that there was a distinction between the

substantial form and matter, which latter thev imagined to

be uncreated, and when they perceived transmutation to

take place in bodies in regard to essential forms. Such

transmutations they attributed to certain universal causes,

such as the oblique circle,* according to Aristotle (De

Gener. ii.), or ideas, according to Plato. But we must take

into consideration that matter is contracted by its form to a

determinate species, as a substance, belonging to a certain

species, is contracted by a supervening accident to a deter-

minate mode of being; for instance, man by whiteness.

Each of these opinions, therefore,considered being under

some particular aspect, either as this or as such; and so

they assigned particular efficient causes to things. Then

others there were who arose to the consideration of being,

* The zodiac.



217 PROCESSION OF CREATURES Q. 44 Art. 3

as being, and who assigned a cause to things, not as these,

or as such, but as beings.

Therefore whatever is the cause of things considered as

beings, must be the cause of things, not only according as

they are such by accidental forms, nor according as they are

these by substantial forms, but also according to all that

belongs to their being at all in any way. And thus it is

necessary to say that also primary matter is created by the

universal cause of things.

Reply Obj. i. The Philosopher (Phys. i., text. 62),is

speaking of becoming in particular—that is, from form to

form, either accidental or substantial. But here we are

speaking of things according to their emanation from the

universal principle of being ; from which emanation matter

itself is not excluded, although it is excluded from the

former mode of being made.

Reply Obj. 2. Passion is an effect of action. Hence it is

reasonable that the first passive principle should be the

effect of the first active principle, since every imperfect

thing is caused by one perfect. For the first principle must

be most perfect, as Aristotle says (Metaph. xii., text. 40).

Reply Obj. 3. The reason adduced does not show that

matter is not created, but that it is not created without form;

for though everything created is actual, still it is not pure

act. Hence it is necessary that even what is potential in it

should be created, if all that belongs to its being is created.

Third Article,

whether the exemplar cause is anything besideGOD?

We proceed thus to the Third Article —Objection i. It would seem that the exemplar cause is

something beside God. For the effect is like its exemplar

cause. But creatures are far from being like God. There-

fore God is not their exemplar cause.Obj. 2. Further, whatever is by participation is reduced

to something self-existing, as a thing ignited is reduced

to fire, as stated above (A. i). But whatever exists in



g. 44. ARt. J THE SUMMA THEOLOGiCA ** 218

sensible things exists only by participation of some species.

This appears from the fact that in all sensible things is

found not only what belongs to the species, but also in-

dividuating principles added to the principles of the species.

Therefore it is necessary to admit self-existing species, as,

for instance, a per se man, and a per se horse, and the like,

which are called the exemplars. Therefore exemplar causes

exist beside God.

Obj, 3. Further,sciences

anddefinitions are concerned

with species themselves, but not as these are in particular

things, because there is no science or definition of particular

things. Therefore there are some beings, which are beings

or species not existing in singular things, and these are

called exemplars. Therefore the same conclusion follows

as above.

Obj. 4. Further, this likewise appears from Dionysius,

who says (Div. Nom. v.) that self-subsisting being is before

self-subsisting life, and before self-subsisting wisdom.

On the contrary, The exemplar is the same as the idea.

But ideas, according to Augustine {QQ. LXXXIII., qii. 46),

are the master forms, which are contained in the divine in-

telligence.Therefore

the exemplars of things are not out-

side God.

/ answer that, God is the first exemplar cause of all

things. In proof whereof we must consider that if for the

production of anything an exemplar is necessary, it is in

order that the effect may receive a determinate form. For

an artificer produces a determinate form in matter by reason

of the exemplar before him, whether it is the exemplar

beheld externally, or the exemplar interiorly conceived in

the mind. Now it is manifest that things made by nature

receive determinate forms. This determination of forms

must be reduced to the divine wisdom as its first principle,

for divine wisdom devised the order of the universe, which

order consists in the variety of things. And therefore we

must say that in the divine wisdom are the types of all

things, which types we have called ideas i.e., exemplar

forms existing in the divine mind (Q. XV., A. i). And

these ideas, though multiplied by their relations to things.






the end. But God needs nothing. Therefore it does not

become Him to act for an end.

Obj. 2. Further, the end of generation, and the form of

the thing generated, and the agent cannot be identical

(Phys. ii., text 70), because the end of generation is the

form of the thing generated. But God is the first agent

producing all things. Therefore He is not the final cause

of all things.

Obj. 3. Further, all things desire their end. But all

things do not desire God, for all do not even know Him.

Therefore God is not the end of all things.

Obj. 4. Further, the final cause is the first of causes. If,

therefore, God is the efficient cause and the final cause, it

follows that before and after exist in Him; which is im-

possible.

On the contrary, It is said (Prov. xvi. 4) :

The Lord has

made all things for Himself.

I answer that, Every agent acts for an end : otherwise

one thing would not follow more than another from the

action of the agent, unless it were by chance. Now the

^'nd of the agent and of the patient considered as such is the

same, but in a different way respectively. For the impres-

sion which the agent intends to produce, and which the

patient intends to receive, are one and the same. Some

things, however, are both agent and patient at the same

time : these are imperfect agents, and to these it belongs

to intend, even while acting, the acquisition of something.

But it does not belong to the First Agent, Who is agent

only, to act for the acquisition of some end;

He intends

only to communicate His perfection, which is His good-

ness ; while every creature intends to acquire its own per-

fection, which is the likeness of the divine perfection and

goodness. Therefore the divine goodness is the end of all

things.

Reply Obj. i. To act from need belongs only to an

imperfect agent, which by its nature is both agent and

patient. But this does not belong to God, and therefore

He alone is the most perfectly liberal giver, because He does

not act for His own profit, but only for His own goodness.



221 PROCESSION OF CREATURES Q. 44. Art. 4

Reply Obj. 2. The form of the thing generated is not the

end of generation, except inasmuch as it is the likeness of

the form of the generator, which intends to communicate

its own likeness; otherwise the form of the thing generated

would be more noble than the generator, since the end is

more noble than the means to the end.

Reply Obj. 3. All things desire God as their end, when

they desire some good thing, whether this desire be intel-

lectual or sensible, or natural, i.e., without knowledge;

because nothing is good and desirable except forasmuch as

it participates in the likeness to God.

Reply Obj. 4. Since God is the efficient, the exemplar

and the final cause of all things, and since primary matter

is from Him, it follows that the first principle of all things

is one in reality. But this does not prevent us from

mentally considering many things in Him, some of which

come into our mind before others.



QUESTION XLV.

THE MODE OF EMANATION OF THINGS FROM THEFIRST PRINCIPLE.

(In Eight Articles.)

The next question concerns the mode of the emanation of

things from the First Principle, and this is called creation,

and includes eight points of inquiry : (i) What is creation ?

(2) Whether God can create anything? (3) Whether

creation is anything in the very nature of things ? (4) To

what things it belongs to be created? (5) Whether it

belongs to God alone to create? (6) Whether creation is

common to the whole Trinity, or proper to any one Person ?

(7) Whether any trace of the Trinity is to be found in

created things? (8) Whether the work of creation is

mingled with the works of nature and of the will ?

First Article,

whether to create is to make something from

NOTHING ?

We proceed thus to the First Article —Objection i. It would seem that to create is not to make

anything from nothing. For Augustine says (Contra Adv.

Leg. et Proph. i.) : To make concerns what did not exist at

all; but to create is to make something by bringing forth

something from what was already.

Obj. 2. Further, the nobility of action and of motion is

considered from their terms. Action is therefore nobler

from good to good, and from being to being, than from

nothing to something. But creation appears to be the most

noble action, and first among all actions. Therefore it is






wherefrom in generation, is more imperfect than the

contrary, which is the term wherefrom in alteration.

Similarly creation is more perfect and more excellent thangeneration and alteration, because the term whereto is the

whole substance of the thing ; whereas what is understood

as the term wherefrom is simply not-being.

Reply Obj. 3. When anvthing is said to be made from

nothing, this preposition from (ex) does not signify the

material cause, but only order; as when we say, from

morning comes midday—i.e., after morning is midday.

But we must understand that this preposition from {ex) can

comprise the negation implied when I say the word

nothing, or can be included in it. If taken in the first

sense, then we affirm the order by stating the relation

between what is now and its previous non-existence. But

if the negation includes the preposition, then the order is

denied, and the sense is, It is made from nothing—i.e., it

is not made from anything—as if we were to say. He speaks

of nothing, because he does not speak of anything. And

this is verified in both ways, when it is said, that anything

is made from nothing. But in the first way this preposi-

tion from (ex) implies order, as has been said in this reply.

In the second sense, it imports the material cause, which is

denied.

Second Article.

whether god can create anything?

We proceed thus to the Second Article —Objection i. It would seem that God cannot create any-

thing, because, according to the Philosopher {Phys. i.,

text 34), the ancient philosophers considered it as a

commonly received axiom that nothing is made from

nothing. But the power of God does not extend to the

contraries of first principles ; as, for instance, that God

could make the whole to be less than its part, or that affir-

mation and negation are both true at the same time. There-

fore God cannot make anything from nothing, or create.

Obj. 2. Further, if to create is to make something from



225 EMANATION OF THINGS Q. 45. Art. 3

nothing, to be created is to be made. But to be made is

to be changed. Therefore creation is change. But every

change occurs in some subject, as appears by the definitionof movement : for movement is the act of what is in poten-

tiality. Therefore it is impossible for anything to be made

out of nothing by God.

Obj. 3. Further, what has been made must have at some

time been becoming. But it cannot be said that what is

created, at the same time, is becoming and has been made,

because in permanent things what is becoming, is not, and

what has been made, already is : and so it would follow

that something would be, and not be, at the same time.

Therefore when anything is made, its becoming precedes its

having been made. But this is impossible, unless there is a

subject in which the becoming is sustained. Therefore it

is impossible that anything should be made from nothing.Obj. 4. Further, infinite distance cannot be crossed. But

infinite distance exists between being and nothing. There-

fore it does not happen that something is made from

nothing.

On the contrary, It is said (Gen. i. i) : In the beginning

God created heaven and earth.

I answer that, Not only is it not impossible that anything

should be created by God, but it is necessary to say that all

things were created by God, as appears from what has been

said (Q. XLIV., A. i). For when anyone makes one thing

from another, this latter thing from which he makes is

presupposed to his action, and is not produced by his

action ; thus the craftsman works from natural things, as

wood or brass, which are caused not by the action of art,

but by the action of nature. So also nature itself causes

natural things as regards their form, but presupposes

matter. If therefore God did only act from something pre-

supposed, it would follow that the thing presupposed would

not be caused by Him. Now it han been shown above

(Q. XLIV., AA. I, 2), that nothing can be, unless it is

from God, Who is the universal cause of all being. Hence

it is necessary to say that God brings things into being

from nothing.





227 EMANATION OF THINGS Q. 45 Art. 3

when we speak of its being made, we mean that it is from

another, and was not previously. Hence since creation is

without movement, a thing is being created and is already

created at the same time.

Reply Obj. 4. This objection proceeds from a false imag-

ination, as if there were an infinite medium between nothing

and being; which is plainly false. This false imagination

comes from creation being taken to signify a change

existing between two terms.

Third Article,

whether creation is anything in the creature?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—Objection i. It would seem that creation is not anything

in the creature. For as creation taken in a passive sense is

attributed to the creature, so creation taken in an active

sense is attributed to the Creator. But creation taken

actively is not anything in the Creator, because otherwise

it would follow that in

Godthere would be something

temporal. Therefore creation taken passively is not any-

thing in the creature.

Obj. 2. Further, there is no medium between the Creator

and the creature. But creation is signified as the medium

between them both : since it is not the Creator, as it is

not eternal ; nor is it the creature, because in that case it

would be necessary for the same reason to suppose another

creation to create it, and so on to infinity. Therefore

creation is not anything in the creature.

Obj. 3. Further, if creation is anything beside the

created substance, it must be an accident belonging to it.

But every accident is in a subject. Therefore a thing

createdwould be

the subject of creation,and

so tiie

samething would be the subject and also the term of creation.

This is impossible, because the subject is before the acci-

dent, and preserves the accident; while the term is after

the action and passion whose term it is, and as soon as it




exists, action and passion cease. Therefore creation itself

is not any thing.

On the contrary, It is greater for a thing to be made

according to its entire substance, than to be made accord-

ing to its substantial or accidental form. But generation

taken simply, or relatively, whereby anything is made

according to the substantial or the accidental form, is some-

thing in the thing generated. Therefore much more is

creation, whereby a thing is made according to its whole

substance, something in the thing created.

I answer that, Creation places something in the thing

created according to relation only ; because what is created,

is not made by movement, or by change. For what is

made by movement or by change is made from something

pre-existing. And this happens, indeed, in the particular

productions of some beings, but cannot happen in the pro-

duction of all being by the universal cause of all beings,

which is God. Hence God by creation produces things

without movement. Now when movement is removed from

action and passion, only relation remains, as was said

above (A. 2 ad 2). Hence creation in the creature is only

a certain relation to the Creator as to the principle of its

being; even as in passion, which implies movement, is

implied a relation to the principle of motion.

Reply Obj. i. Creation signified actively means the

divine action, which is God's essence, with a relation to the

creature. But in God relation to the creature is not a real

relation, but only a relation of reason ; whereas the relation

of the creature to God is a real relation, as was said above

(Q. Xni., A. 7) in treating of the divine names.

^ Reply Obj. 2. Because creation is signified as a change,

as was said above (A. 2, ad 2), and change is a kind of

medium between the mover and the moved, therefore also

creation is signified as a medium between the Creator and

the creature. Nevertheless passive creation is in the

creature, and is a creature. Nor is there need of a further

creation in its creation ; because relations, of their entire

nature being referred to something, are not referred by

any other relations, but by themselves ; as was also shown




above (Q. XLII., A. i, ad 4), in treating of the equality

of the Persons.

Reply Obj. 3. The creature is the term of creation as

signifying a change, but is the subject of creation, taken as

a real relation, and is prior to it in being, as the subject is

to the accident. Nevertheless creation has a certain aspect

of priority on the part of the object to which it is directed,

which is the beginning of the creature. Nor is it necessary

that aslong

as the creature is it should be created ; because

creation imports a relation of the creature to the Creator,

with a certain newness or beginning.

Fourth Article.

whether to be created belongs to composite andsubsisting things ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—Objection i. It would seem that to be created does not

belong to composite and subsisting things. For in the

book, De Causis (prop, iv.), it is said. The first of creatures

is being.But

thebeing

ofathing

createdis

not subsist-ing. Therefore creation properly speaking does not belong

to subsisting and composite things.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever is created is from nothing.

But composite things are not from nothing, but are the

result of their own component parts. Therefore composite

things are not created.

Obj. 3. Further, what is presupposed in the second

emanation is properly produced by the first ; as natural

generation produces the natural thing, which is presupposed

in the operation of art. But the thing supposed in natural

generation is matter. Therefore matter, and not the com-

posite, is, properly speaking, that which is created.

Onthe contrary, It is

said (Gen.i. i) :

In the beginningGod created heaven and earth. But heaven and earth are

subsisting composite things. Therefore creation belongs

to them.'*'

I answer that, To be created is, in a manner, to bt* made,




as was shown above (Q. XLIV., A. 2, ad 2 and 3). Now,

to be made is directed to the being of a thing. Hence to be

made and to be created properly belong to whatever beingbelongs ; which, indeed, belongs properly to subsisting

things, whether they are simple things, as in the case

of separate substances, or composite, as in the case of

material substances. For being belongs to that which

has being— that is, to what subsists in its own being.

But forms and accidents and the like are called beings,

not as if they themselves were, but because something is by

them ; as whiteness is called a being, forasmuch as its

subject is white by it. Hence, according to the Philoso-

pher {Metaph. vii., text. 2) accident is more properly said

to be of a being than a being. Therefore, as accidents and

forms and the like non-subsisting things are to be said to

co-exist rather than to exist, so they ought to be called

rather concreated than created things; whereas, properly

speaking, created things are subsisting beings.

Reply Obj. i. In the proposition the first of created

things is being, the word being does not refer to the subject

of creation, but to the proper concept of the object of

creation. For a created thing is called created because it

is a being, not because it is this being, since creation is the

emanation of all being from the Universal Being, as was

said above (A. i). We use a similar way of speaking when

we say that the first visible thing is coloiir, although, strictly

speaking, the thing coloured is what is seen.

Reply Obj. 2. Creation does not mean the building up of

a composite thing from pre-existing principles; but it

means that the composite is created so that it is brought

into being at the same time with all its principles.

9Reply Obj. 3. This reason does not prove that matter

alone is created, but that matter does not exist except by

creation ; for creation is the production of the whole being,

and not onlv of matter.



231 EMANATION OF THINGS Q. 45. Art..

Fifth Article,

whether it belongs to god alone to create?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—Objection i. It would seem that it does not belong to God

alone to create, because, according to the Philosoplier (De

Anima ii., text. 34), what is perfect can malce its own like-

ness. But immaterial creatures are more perfect thanmaterial creatures, which nevertheless can make their own

likeness, for fire generates fire, and man begets man.

Therefore an immaterial substance can make a substance

like to itself. But immaterial substance can be made only by

creation, since it has no matter from which to be made.

Therefore a creature can create.

Obj. 2. Further, the greater the resistance is on the part

of the thing made, so much the greater power is required

in the maker. But a contrary resists more than nothing.

Therefore it requires more power to make (something) from

its contrary, which nevertheless a creature can do, than

to make a thing from nothing. Much more therefore can a

creature do this.

Obj. 3. Further, the power of the maker is considered

according to the measure of what is made. But created

being is finite, as we proved above when treating of the

infinity of God (Q. VII., AA. 2, 3, 4). Therefore only a

finite power is needed to produce a creature by creation.

But to have a finite power is not contrary to the nature of a

creature. Therefore it is not impossible for a creature to

create.

On the contrary, Augustine says {De Trin. iii. 8) that

neither good nor bad angels can create anything. Muchless therefore can any other creatures.

/ ansiver that, It sufficiently appears at the first glance,

according to what precedes (A. i), that to create can be theaction of God alone. For the more universal effects must

be reduced to the more universal and prior causes. Nowamong all effects the most universal is being itself : and

hence it must be the proper effect of the first and mostI. -' Ivi



Q. 45. Art. s THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA 232

universal cause, and that is God. Hence also it is said

(De Causis, prop, iii.) that neither intelligence nor the soul

gives us being, except inasmuch as it works by divine

operation. Now to produce being absolutely, not as this

or that being, belongs to creation. Hence it is manifest

that creation is the proper act of God alone.

It happens, however, that something participates the

proper action of another, not by its own power, but in-

strumentally, inasmuch as it acts by the power of another

as air can heat and ignite by the power of fire. And so

some have supposed that although creation is the proper

act of the universal cause, still some inferior cause acting

by the power of the first cause, can create. And thus

Avicenna asserted that the first separate substance created

by God created another after itself, and the substance of

the world and its soul ; and that the substance of the worldcreates the matter of the inferior bodies. And in the same

manner the Master says (Sent, iv., D. 5) that God can

communicate to a creature the power of creating, so

that the latter can create ministerially, not by its own

power.

But such a thing cannot be, because the secondary in-

strumental cause does not participate the action of the

superior cause, except inasmuch as by something proper

to itself it acts dispositively to the effect of the principal

agent. If therefore it effects nothing, according to what

is proper to itself, it is used to no purpose ; nor would there

be any need of certain instruments for certain actions.

Thus we see that a saw, in cutting wood, which it doesby the property of its own form, produces the form of a

bench, which is the proper effect of the principal agent.

Now the proper effect of God creating is what is pre-

supposed to all other effects, and that is absolute being.

Hence nothing else can act dispositively and instrumentally

to this effect, since creation is not from anything pre-

supposed, which can be disposed by the action of the

instrumental agent. So therefore it is impossible for any

creature to create, either by its own power, or instrumen-

tally—that is, ministerially.



233 EMANATION OF THINGS Q. 45. Art. s

And above all it is absurd to suppose that a body can

create, for no body acts except by touching or moving

and thus it requires in its action some pre-existing thing,which can be touched or moved, which is contrary to the

very idea of creation.

Reply Obj. i. A perfect thing participating any nature,

makes a likeness to itself, not by absolutely producing

that nature, but by applying it to something else. For an

individual man cannot be the cause of human nature abso-

lutel}^, because he would then be the cause of himself ; but

he is the cause of human nature being in the man be-

gotten ; and thus he presupposes in his action a determinate

matter whereby he is an individual man. But as an in-

dividual man participates human nature, so every created

being participates, so to speak, the nature of being ; for

God alone is His own being, as we have said above (Q.VII., AA. I, 2). Therefore no created being can produce

a being absolutely, except forasmuch as it causes being in

this: and so it is necessary to presuppose that whereby a

thing is this thing, before the action whereby it makes its

own likeness. But in an immaterial substance it is not pos-

sible to presuppose anything whereby it is this thing ; be-

cause it is what it is by its form, whereby it has being,

since it is a subsisting form. Therefore an immaterial

substance cannot produce another immaterial substance

like to itself as regards its being, but only as regards some

added perfection ; as we may say that a superior angel

illuminates an inferior, as Dionysius says {CoeL Hier.

iv., X.). In this way even in heaven there is paternity,

as the Apostle says (Eph. iii. 15) : From whom all paternity

in heaven and on earth is named. From which it evidently

appears that no created being can cause anything, unless

something is presupposed; which is against the very idea

of creation.

Reply Obj. 2. A thing is made from its contrary in-

directly (Phys. i., text. 43), but directly from the subject

which is in potentiality. And so the contrary resists the

agent, inasmuch as it impedes the potentiality from the act

which the agent intends to induce, as fire intends to reduce



Q. 45- Art. 6 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA 234

the matter of water to an act like to itself, but is impeded

by the form and contrary dispositions, whereby the poten-

tiality (of the water) is restrained from being reduced toact ; and the more the potentiality is restrained, the more

power is required in the agent to reduce the matter to act.

Hence a much greater power is required in the agent when

no potentiality pre-exists. Thus therefore it appears that

it is an act of much greater power to make a thing from

nothing, than from its contrary.

Reply Obj. 3. The power of the maker is reckoned not

only from the substance of the thing made, but also from

the mode of its being made; for a greater heat heats not

only more, but quicker. Therefore although to create a

finite effect does not show an infinite power, yet to create

it from nothing does show an infinite power : which

appears from what has been said (ad 2). For if a greaterpower is required in the agent in proportion to the distance

of the potentiality from the act, it follows that the power

of that which produces something from no presupposed

potentiality is infinite, because there is no proportion

between no potentiality and the potentiality presupposed

by the power of a natural agent, as there is no proportion

between not being and being. And because no creature

has simply an infinite power, any more than it has an

infinite being, as was proved above (Q. VH., A. 2), it

follows that no creature can create.

Sixth Article,

whether to create is proper to any person ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—Objection i. It would seem that to create is proper to

some Person. For what comes first is the cause of what is

after; and what is perfect is the cause of what is imperfect.

Hut the procession of the divine Person is prior to the

procession of the creature : and is more perfect, because the

divine Person proceeds in perfect similitude of its principle;

whereas the creature proceeds in imperfect similitude.




Therefore the processionfc of the divine Persons are the

cause of the processions of things, and so to create belongs

to a Person

.

Obj. 2. Further, the divine Persons are distinguished

from each other only by their processions and relations.

Therefore whatever difference is attributed to the divine

Persons belongs to them according to the processions and

relations of the Persons. But the causation of creatures

is diversely attributed to the divine Persons; for in the

Creed, to the Father is attributed that He is the Creator of

all things visible and invisible; to the Son is attributed

that by Him all things were made; and to the Holy Ghost

is attributed that He is Lord and Life-giver. Therefore

the causation of creatures belongs to the Persons according

to processions and relations.

Obj. 3. Further, if it be said that the causation of the

creature flows from some essential attribute appropriated

to some one Person, this does not appear to be sufficient;

because every divine efifect is caused by every essential

attribute— viz., by power, goodness, and wisdom— and

thus does not belong to one more than to another. There-

fore any determinate modeof

causation oughtnot to

beattributed to one Person more than to another, unless

they are distinguished in creating according to relations

and processions.

On the contrary, Dionysius says {Div. Nom. ii.) that all

things caused are the common work of the whole Godhead.

7 ansiver that, To create is, properly speaking, to cause

or produce the being of things. And as every agent pro-

duces its like, the principle of action can be considered

from the effect of the action ; for it must be fire that gener-

ates fire. And therefore to create belongs to God accord-

ing to His being, that is, His essence, which is common to

the three Persons. Hence to create is not proper to any

one Person, but is common to the whole Trinity.Nevertheless the divine Persons, according to the nature

of their procession, have a causality respecting the creation

of things. For as was said above (Q. XIV., A. 8; Q.XIX., A. 4), when treating of the knowledge and will of




God, God is the cause of things by His intellect and will,

just as the craftsman is cause of the things made by his

craft. Now the craftsman works through the word con-ceived in his mind, and through the love of his will re-

garding some object. Hence also God the Father made

the creature through His Word, which is His Son ; and

til rough His Love, which is the Holy Ghost. And so the

processions of the Persons are the type of the produc-

tions of creatures inasmuch as they include the essential

attributes, knowledge, and will.

Reply Obj. i. The processions of the divine Persons are

the cause of creation, as above explained.

Reply Obj. 2. As the divine nature, although common to

the three Persons, still belongs to them in a kind of order,

inasmuch as the Son receives the divine nature from the

I'âther, and the Holy Ghost from both:

so also likewise

the power of creation, whilst common to the three Persons,

belongs to them in a kind of order. For the Son receives

it from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both. Hence

to be the Creator is attributed to the Father as to Him Whodoes not receive the power of creation from another. And

of the Son it is said (Jo. i. 3), Through Him all things

were made, inasmuch as He has the same power, but from

another ; for this preposition through usually denotes a

mediate cause, or a principle from a principle. But to the

Holy Ghost, Who has the same power from both, is

attributed that by His sway He governs, and quickens

what is created by the Father through the Son. Again,

the reason for this particular appropriation may be takenfrom the common notion of the appropriation of the

essential attributes. For, as above stated (Q. XXXIX.,

A. 8, ad 3), to the Father is appropriated power which is

chiefly shown in creation, and therefore it is attributed to

Him to be the Creator. To the Son is appropriated

wisdom, through which the intellectual agent acts: and

therefore it is said : Through Whom all things were made.

And to the Holy Ghost is appropriated goodness, to whicli

belong both government, which brings things to their

proper end, and the giving of life —for life consists in a







239 EMANATION OF THINGS Q. 45- Art. 8

whereby it is distinguished; whereby it agrees. For a

thing exists by its substance, is distinct by its form, and

agrees by its order. Other similar expressions may be

easily reduced to the above.

Reply Obj. i. The representation of the trace is to be

referred to the appropriations : in which manner we are

able to arrive at a knowledge of the trinity of the divine

persons from creatures, as we have said (Q. XXXII.,

A. 1).

Reply Obj. 2. A creature properly speaking is a thing

self-subsisting ; and in such are the three above-mentioned

things to be found. Nor is it necessary that these three

things should be found in all that exists in the creature;

but only to a subsisting being is the trace ascribed in

regard to those three things.

Reply Obj. 3. The processions of the persons are also in

some way the cause and type of creation ; as appears from

the above (A. 6).

Eighth Article.

whether creation is mingled with works of

nature and art?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:—Objection i. It would seem that creation is mingled in

works of nature and art. For in every operation of nature

and art some form is produced. But it is not produced

from anything, since matter has no part in it. Therefore

it is produced from nothing; and thus in every operation

of nature and art there is creation.

Obj. 2. Further, the effect is not more powerful than its

cause. But in natural things the only agent is the acci-

dental form, which is an active or a passive form. There-

fore the substantial form is not produced by the operationof nature; and therefore it must be produced by creation.

Obj. 3. Further, in nature like begets like. But some

things are found generated in nature by a thing unlike to

them; as is evident in animals generated through putre-



y. 45. Art. 8 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA 240

faction. Therefore the form of these is not from nature,

but by creation ; and the same reason applies to other

things.

Obj. 4. Further, what is not created, is not a creature.

If therefore in nature's productions there were not creation,

it would follow that nature's productions are not creatures;

which is heretical.

On the contrary, Augustine {Super Gen. v. 6, 14, 15)

distinguishes the work of propagation, which is a work of

nature, from the work of creation.

/ answer that, The doubt on this subject arises from the

forms which, some said, do not come into existence by the

action of nature, but previously exist in matter ; for they

asserted that forms are latent. This arose from ignorance

concerning matter, and from not knowing how to dis-

tinguish between potentiality and act. For because formspre-exist in matter, in potentiality, they asserted that they

pre-existed simply. Others, however, said that the forms

were given or caused by a separate agent by way of crea-

tion;and accordingly, that to each operation of nature is

joined creation. But this opinion arose from ignorance

concerning form. For they failed to consider that the form

of the natural body is not subsisting, but is that by which

a thing is. And therefore, since to be made and to be

created belong properly to a subsisting thing alone, as

shown above (A. 4), it does not belong to forms to be

made or to be created, but to be concreated. What, in-

deed, is properly made by the natural agent is the com-

posite, which is made from matter.

Hence in the works of nature creation does not enter, but

is presupposed to the work of nature.

Reply Obj. i. Forms begin to be actual when the com-

posite things are made, not as though they were made

directly, but only indirectly.

Reply Obj. 2. The active qualities in nature act by virtue

of substantial forms : and therefore the natural agent not

only produces its like according to quality, but according

to species.

Reply Obj. 3. For the generation of imperfect animals, a



241 EMANATION OF THINGS Q. 45. Art. i

universal agent suffices, and this is to be found in the

celestial power to which they are assimilated, not in species,

but according to a kind of analogy. Nor is it necessary to

say that their forms are created by a separate agent. How-

ever for the generation of perfect animals the universal

agent does not suffice, but a proper agent is required, in

the shape of a univocal generator.

Reply Obj. 4. The operation of nature takes place only

on the presupposition of created principles ; and thus the

products of nature are called creatures.



QUESTION XLVl.

OF THE BEGINNING OF THE DURATION OF

CREATURES.{In Three Articles.)

Next must be considered the beginning of the duration of

creatures, about which there are three points for treatment

(i) Whether creatures always existed? (2) Whether that

they began to exist is an article of Faith ? (3) How God is

said to have created heaven and earth in the beginning?

First Article,

whether the universe of creatures always

EXISTED ?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—Ohjeclion i. It would seem that the universe of creatures,

called the world, had no beginning, but existed from

eternity. For everything which begins to exist, is a

possible being before it exists : otherwise it would be im-

possible for it to exist. If therefore the world began to

exist, it was a possible being before it began to exist. But

possible beingis

matter, whichis

in potentiality to exist-ence, which results from a form, and to non-existence, which

results from privation of form. If therefore the world

began to exist, matter must have existed before the world.

But matter cannot exist without form : while the matter of

the world with its form is the world. Therefore the world

existed before it began to exist : which is impossible.

Obj. 2. Further, nothing which has power to be always,

sometimes is and sometimes is not ; because so far as the

power of a thing extends so long it exists. But every

incorruptible thing has power to be always ; for its power

242





Q. 46. Art. i THE '• SUMMA THEOLOGICA 244

because time is the measure of movement. Therefore it

remains that before every new movement, there was a

previous movement ; and so the same conclusion follows

as before.

Obj. 7. Further, whatever is always in its beginning, and

always in its end, cannot cease and cannot begin ; because

what begins is not in its end, and what ceases is not in its

beginning. But time always is in its beginning and end,

because there is no time except now which is the end of the

past and the beginningof the future. Therefore time can-

not begin or end, and consequently neither can movement,

the measure of which is time.

Obj. 8. Further, God is before the world either in the

order of nature only, or also by duration. If in the order

of nature only, therefore, since God is eternal, the world

also is eternal. But if God is prior by duration ; since what

is prior and posterior in duration constitutes time, it follows

that time existed before the world, which is impossible.

Obj. 9. Further, if there is a sufficient cause, there is an

effect ; for a cause to which there is no effect is an imperfect

cause, requiring something else to make the effect follow.

But God is the sufficient cause of the world ; being the final

cause, by reason of His goodness, the exemplar cause byreason of His wisdom, and the efficient cause, by reason

of His power as appears from the above (Q. XLIV., AA. 2,

3, 4). Since therefore God is eternal, tlie world also is

eternal.

Obj. 10. Further, eternal action postulates an eternal

effect. But the action of God is His substance, which is

eternal. Therefore the world is eternal.

On the contrary, It is said (Jo. xvii. 5), Glorify Me, OFather, with Thyself with the glory which I had before the

world was ; and (Prov. viii. 22), The Lord possessed Me in

the beginning of His ways, before He made anything from

the beginning.

I answer that, Nothing except God can beeternal.

Andthis statement is far from impossible to uphold : for it has

been shown above (Q. XIX., A. 4) that the will of God is

the cause of things. Therefore things are necessary, accord-



245 BEGINNING OF CREATURES Q. 46. Art. i

ing as it is necessary for God to will them, since the

necessity of the effect depends on the necessity of the cause

(Metaph. v., text. 6). Now it was shown above (Q. XIX.,A. 3), that, absolutely speaking, it is not necessary that

God should will anything except Himself. It is not there-

fore necessary for God to will that the world should always

exist ; but the world exists forasmuch as God wills it to

exist, since the being of the world depends on the will of

God, as on its cause. It is not therefore necessary for the

world to be always ; and hence it cannot be proved by

demonstration.

Nor are Aristotle's reasons {Phys. viii.) simply, but

relatively, demonstrative—viz., in order to contradict the

reasons of some of the ancients who asserted that the world

began to exist in some quite impossible manner. This

appears in three ways. Firstly, because, both in Phys. viii.

and in De Coelo i., text. loi, he premises some opinions, as

those of Anaxagoras, Empedocles and Plato, and brings

forward reasons to refute them. Secondly, because wherever

he speaks of this subject, he quotes the testimony of the

ancients, which is not the way of a demonstrator, but of

one persuading of what is probable. Thirdly, because he

expressly says {Topic, i. 9), that there are dialectical

problems, about which we have nothing to say from reason,

as, whether the world is eternal.

Reply Obj. i. Before the world existed it was possible

for the world to be, not, indeed, according to a passive

power which is matter, but according to the active power

of God; and also, according as a thing is called absolutely

possible, not in relation to any power, but from the sole

habitude of the terms which are not repugnant to each

other ; in which sense possible is opposed to impossible, as

appears from the Philosopher {Metaph. v., text. 17).

Reply Obj. 2. Whatever has power always to be, from

the fact of having that power, cannot sometimes be and

sometimes not be ; but before it received that power, it did

not exist.

Hence this reason, which is given by Aristotle {De

Coelo i., text. 120), does not prove simply that incorruptible



Q. 46. Art. . THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA ^ 246

things never begaFi to exist; but that they did not begin

by the natural mode whereby tilings generated and

corruptible begin.

Reply Obj. 3. Aristotle (Phys. i., text. 82) proves that

matter is unbegotten from the fact that it has not a subject

from which to derive its existence ; and {De Coelo el

Mundo [., text. 20) he proves that heaven is ungenerated,

forasmuch as it has no contrary from which to be gener-

ated. Hence it appears that no conclusion follows either

way, except that matterand heaven did

not beginby

generation, as some said, especially about heaven. But

we say that matter and heaven were produced into being

by creation, as appears above (Q. XLIV., A. i ad 2).

Reply Obj. 4. The notion of a vacuum is not only mwhich is nothing, but also implies a space capable of hold-

ing a body and in which there is not a body, as appears

from Aristotle (Phys. iv., text. 60). Whereas we hold that

there was no place or space before the world was.

Reply Obj. 5. The first mover was always in the same

state : but the first movable thing was not always so,

because it began to be whereas hitherto it was not. This,

however, was not through change, but by creation, which

is not change, as saidabove (Q. XLV., A.

2

ad 2). Henceit is evident that this reason, which Aristotle gives (Phys.

viii.), is valid against those who admitted the existence of

eternal movable things, but not eternal movement, as

appears from the opinions of Anaxagoras and Empedocles.

But we hold that from the moment that movable things

began to exist movement also existed.

Reply Obj. 6. The first agent is a voluntary agent. Andalthough He had the eternal will to produce some effect, vet

He did not produce an eternal effect. Nor is it necessary

for some change to be presupposed, not even on account of

imaginary time. For we must take into consideration the

difference between a particular agent, that presupposes

something and produces something else,

andthe universal

agent, who produces the whole. The particular agent pro-

duces the form, and presupposes the matter; and hence it is

necessary that it introduce the form in due proportion into



247 BEGINNING OF CREATURES Q. 46. Art. i

a suitable matter. Hence it is correct to say that it intro-

duces the form into such matter, and not into another,

on account of the different kinds of matter. But it is not

correct to say so of God Who produces form and matter

together : whereas it is correct to say of Ilim that He pro-

duces matter fitting to the form and to the end. Now, a

particular agent presupposes time just as it presupposes

matter. Hence it is correctly described as acting in time

after and not in time before, according to an imaginary

succession of time after time. But the universal agent

who produces the thing and time also, is not correctly

described as acting now, and not before, according to an

imaginary succession of time succeeding time, as if time

were presupposed to His action ; but He must be considered

as giving time to His effect as much as and when He willed,

and according to what was fitting to demonstrate Hispower. For the world leads more evidently to the know-

ledge of the divine creating power, if it was not always,

than if it had always been ; since everything which was not

always manifestly has a cause; whereas this is not so mani-

fest of what always was.

Reply Obj. 7. As is stated (Phys. iv., text, gg), before

and after belong to time, according as they are in move-

ment. Hence beginning and end in time must be

taken in the same way as in movement. Now, granted

the eternity of movement, it is necessary that any given

moment in movement be a beginning and an end of move-

ment; which need not be if movement has a beginning.

The same applies to the noiv of time. Thus it appears that

the idea of the instant now, as being always the beginning

and end of time, presupposes the eternity of time and move-

ment. Hence Aristotle brings forward this reason (Phys.

viii., text. 10) against those who asserted the eternity of

time, but denied the eternity of movement.

Reply Obj. 8. God is prior to the world by priority of

duration. But the word prior signifies priority not of

time, but of eternity.—Or we may say that it signifies

the eternity of imaginary time, and not of time really exist-

ing ; thus, when we say that above heaven there is nothing,

I. 2 17




the word above signifies only an imaginary place, according

as it is possible to imagine other dimensions beyond those

of the heavenly body.

Reply Obj. 9. As the effect follows from the cause that

acts by nature, according to the mode of its form, so like-

wise it follows from the voluntary agent, according to the

form preconceived and determined by the agent, as appears

from what was said above (Q. XIX., A. 4; Q. XLI.,

A. 2). Therefore, although God was from eternity the

sufficient cause of the world,

weshould not say that the

world was produced by Him, except as preordained by His

will—that is, that it should have being after not being, in

order more manifestly to declare its author.

Reply Obj. 10. Ciiven the action, the effect follows

according to the requirement of the form, which is the

principle of action. But in agents acting by will, what

is conceived and preordained is to be taken as the form,

which is the principle of action. Therefore from the eternal

action of God an eternal effect did not follow ; but such

an effect as God willed, an effect, to wit, which has being

after not being.

Second Article,

whether it is an article of faith that the

world began ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—Objection i. It would seem that it is not an article of

faith but a demonstrable conclusion that the world began.

For everything that is made has a beginning of its dura-

tion. But it can be proved demonstratively that God is

the effective cause of the world ; indeed this is asserted by

the more approved philosophers. Therefore it can be

demonstratively proved that the world began.

Obj. 2. Further, if it is necessary to say that the world

was made by God, it must therefore have been made from

nothing, or from something. But it was not made from

something; otherwise the matter of the world would have



249 BEGINNING OF CREATURES Q. 46. Akt. a

preceded the world; against which are the arguments of

Aristotle {De Ccelo i.), who held that heaven was un-

generated. Therefore it. must be said that the world wasmade from nothing; and thus it has being after not being.

Therefore it must have begun.

Obj. 3. Further, everytiiing which works by intellect,

works from some principle, as appears in all kinds of

craftsmen. But God acts by intellect ; therefore His work

has a principle. The world, therefore, which is His effect,

did not always exist.

Obj. 4. Further, it appears manifestly that certain arts

have developed, and certain countries have begun to be

inhabited at some fixed time. But this would not be the

case if the world had been always. Therefore it is mani-

fest that the world did not always exist.

Obj. 5. Further, it is certain that nothing can be equal

to God. But if the world had always been, it would be

equal to God in duration. Therefore it is certain tliat the

world did not always exist.

Obj. 6. Further, if the world always was, the conse-

quence is that infinite days preceded this present day.

But it is impossible to pass through an infinite medium.

Therefore we should never have arrived at this present

day ; which is manifestly false.

Obj. 7. Further, if the world was eternal, generation also

was eternal. Therefore one man was begotten of another

in an infinite series. But the father is the efficient cause or

the son {Phys. ii., text. 29). Therefore in efficient causes

there could be an infinite series, which is disproved

(Metaph. ii., text. 5).

Obj. 8. Further, if the world and generation always were,

there have been an infinite number of men. But man's soul

is immortal : therefore an infinite number of human souls

would actually now exist, which is impossible. Therefore

it can be known with certainty that the world began,andnot only is it known by faith.

On the contrary, The articles of faith cannot be proved

demonstratively, because faith is of things that appear not

(Heb. xi. i). But that God is the Creator of the world:



(J 46. Art. 2 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA ^50

hence that the world began, is an article of faith ; for we

say, / believe in one God, etc. And again, Gregory sa}'S

(Horn. i. in Esech.), that Moses prophesied of the past,

saying, In the beginning God created heaven and earth :

in which words the newness of the world is stated. There-

fore the newness of the world is known only by revelation;

and therefore it cannot be proved demonstratively.

/ answer that, By faith alone do we hold, and by no

demonstration can it be proved, that the world did not

always exist, as was said above of the mystery of the

Trinity (Q. XXXII., A. i). The reason of this is that the

newness of the world cannot be demonstrated on the part of

the world itself. For the principle of demonstration is the

essence of a thing. Now everything according to its species

is abstracted from here and now; whence it is said that

universals are everywhere and always. Hence it cannot

be demonstrated that man, or heaven, or a stone were not

always. Likewise neither can it be demonstrated on the

part of the efficient cause, whicli acts by will. For the v.ill

of God cannot be investigated by reason, except as regards

tliose things which God must will of necessity ; and wh.it

He wills about creatures is not among these, as was said

above (Q. XIX., A. 3). But the divine will can be mani-fested by revelation, on whicii faith rests. Hence that the

world began to exist is an object of faith, but not of demon-

stration or science. And it is useful to consider this, lest

anyone, presuming to demonstrate what is of faith, should

bring forward reasons that are not cogent, so as to give

occasion to unbelievers to laugh, thinking that on such

grounds we believe things that are of faith.

Reply Obj. i. As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi. 4),

the opinion of philosophers who asserted the eternity of the

world was twofold. For some said that the substance of

the world was not from God, which is an intolerable error;

and therefore it is refuted by proofs that are cogent. Some,

however, said that the world was eternal, although made byGod. For they hold that the world has a beginning, not of

time, but of creation, so that in a certain hardly intelligible

way it was always made. And they try to explain their



251 BEGINNING OF CREATURES Q. 46. Akt. 2

meaning thus (De Civ. Dei x. 31) : for as, if the foot were

always in the dust from eternity, there would always be a

footprint which without doubt was caused by hint whotrod

on it, so also the world ahvays was, because its Maker

always existed. To understand this we must consider that

the efficient cause, which acts by motion, of necessity pre-

cedes its effect in time ; because tlie effect is only in the end

of the action, and every agent must be the principle of

action. But if the action is instantaneous and not suc-

cessive, it is not necessary for the maker to be prior to the

thing made in duration, as appears in the case of illumina-

tion. Hence they say that it does not follow necessarily

if God is the active cause of the world, that He should be

prior to the world in duration ; because creation, by whicii

i le produced the world, is not a successive change, as was

said above (Q. XLV., A. 2).

Reply Obj. 2. Those who would say that the world was

eternal, would say that the world was made by God from

nothing, not that it was made after nothing, according to

what we understand by the word creation, but that it was

not made from anything; and so also some of them do

not reject the word creation, as appears from Avicenna

{Mctaph. ix., text. 4).

Reply Obj. 3, This is the argument of Anaxagoras (as

quoted in Phys. viii., text. 15). But it does not lead to a

necessary conclusion, except as to that intellect which

deliberates in order to find out what should be done, which

is like movement. Such is the human intellect, but not the

divine intellect (Q. XIV., AA. 7, 12).

Reply Obj. 4. Those who hold the eternitv of the world

hold that some region ^\•as changed an infinite number of

times, from being uninhabitable to being inhabitable and

vice versa, and likewise they hold that the arts, by reason

of various corruptions and accidents, were subject to an

infinite variety of advance and decay. Hence Aristotle says

(Meteor, i.), that it is absurd from sucli particular changes

to hold tile opinion of the newness of the whole world.

Reply Obj. 5. Even supposing that the world always

was, it would not be equal to God in eternitv. as Boethiu«



Q. 4(,. akv. 2 THE •• SUMMA THtX)LOGlCA 252

says {De Consol. v. 6); because the divine Being is all

being simultaneously without succession ; but with the

world it is otherwise.

Reply Obj. 6. Passage is always understood as being

from term to term. Whatever by-gone day we choose,

from it to the present day there is a finite number of days

whicli can be passed through. The objection is founded

on the idea that, given two extremes, there is an infinite

number of mean terms.

Reply Obj. 7. In efficient causes it is impossible to pro-

ceed to infinity per se—thus, there cannot be an infinite

number of causes that are per se required for a certain

effect ; for instance, that a stone be moved by a stick,

the stick by the hand, and so on to infinity. But it is not

impossible to proceed to infinity accidentally as regards

efficient causes ; for instance, if all the causes thus in-

finitely multiplied should have the order of only one cause,

their multiplication being accidental; as an artificer acts

by means of many hammers accidentally, because one after

the other may be broken. It is accidental, therefore, that

one particular hammer acts after the action of another;

and likewise it is accidental to this particular man as gener-

ator to be generated by another man ; for he generates as

a man, and not as the son of another man. For all men

generating hold one grade in efficient causes—viz., the

grade of a particular generator. Hence it is not impossible

for a man to be generated by man to infinity ; but such a

thing would be impossible if the generation of this man

depended upon this man, and on an elementary body, and

on the sun, and so on to infinity.

Reply Obj. 8. Those who hold the eternity of the world

evade this reason in many ways. For some do not tliink

it impossible for there to be an actual infinity of souls, as

appears from the Metaphysics of Algazel, who says that

such a thing is an accidental infinity. But this was dis-

proved above(Q.

VH., A. 4). Some say that the soul is

corrupted with the body. And some say that of all souls

only one will remain. Rut others, as Augustine says,*

* Serm. XIV., De Temp., 4, 5; De Hcpres., haeres. 46; De Civ.

Dei xii. 13.







QUESTION XLVII.

OF THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN GENERAL.


After considering tiie production of creatures, we come to

the consideration of the distinction of things. This con-

sideration will be threefold—first, of the distinction of

things in general ; secondly, of the distinction of good and

evil ; tWrdly of the distinction of the spiritual and corporeal

creature.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry : (i)

The multitude or distinction of things. (2) Their in-

equality. (3) The unity of the world.

First Article.

WHETHER the MULTITUDE AND DISTINCTION OF THINGS

COME FROM GOD ?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—Objection 1. It would seem that the multitude and dis-

tinction of things does not come from God. For one

naturally always makes one. But God is supremely one,

as appears from what precedes (Q. XI., A. 4). Therefore

He produces but one effect.

Obj. 2. Further, the representation is assimilated to its

exemplar. But God is the exemplar cause of His effect,

as was said above (Q. XLIV., A. 3). Therefore, as Godis one. His effect is one only, and not diverse.

Obj. 3. Further, the means are proportional to the end.

But the end of the creation is one—viz., the divine good-

ness, as was shown above (Q. XLIV.. A. 4). Therefore

the effect of God is but one.

25s



Q. 47. Art. i THE SUMMA THHOLOGICA 256.,*

On the contrary, It is said (Gen. i. 4, 7) that God divided

the light from the darkness, and divided waters from

waters. Therefore the distinction and muhitude of things

is from God.

/ ans7ver that, The distinction of things has been ascribed

to many causes. For some attributed the distinction to

matter, either by itself or with the agent. Democritus, for

instance, and all the ancient natural philosophers, who

admitted no cause but matter, attributed it to matter alone;

and in their opinion the distinction of things comes fromchance according to the movement of matter. Anaxagoras,

however, attributed the distinction and multitude of things

to matter and to the agent together; and he said that the

intellect distinguishes things by extracting what is mixed

up in matter.

But this cannot stand, for two reasons. First, because,

as was shown above (Q. XLIV., A. 2), even matter itself

was created by God. Hence we must reduce whatever

distinction comes from matter to a higher cause. Secondl}',

because matter is for the sake of the form, and not the form

for the matter, and the distinction of things comes from

tlieir proper forms. Therefore the distinction of things is

not on accoimt of the matter;

Init rather, on the contrary,created matter is formless, in order that it may be accommo-

dated to different forms.

Others have attributed the distinction of things to

secondary agents, as did Avicenna, who said that God by

understanding Himself, produced the first intelligence; in

which, forasmuch as it was not its own being, there is

necessarily composition of potentiality and act, as will

appear later (Q. L., A. 3). And so the first intelligence,

inasmuch as it understood the first cause, produced the

second intelligence ; and in so far as it understood itself as

in potentiality it produced the heavenly body, which causes

movement, and inasmuch as it understood itself as having

actuality it produced the soul of theheavens.

But this opinion cannot stand, for two reasons. First,

because it was shown above (Q. XIvV., A. 5) that to create

belongs to God alone, and hence what can he caused onlv



257 DISTINCTION IN GEN1':RAL Q. 47. Art. »

by creation is produced by God alone—viz., all those things

which are not subject to generation and corruption.

Secondly, because, according to this opinion, the univer-sality of things would not proceed from the intention of

the first agent, but from the concurrence of many active

causes; and such an effect we can describe only as being-

produced by chance. Therefore, the perfection of the uni-

verse, which consists of the diversity of things, would thus

be a thing of chance, wliich is impossible.

Hence we must say that the distinction and multitude

of things come from the intention of the first agent,

who is God. For He brought things into being in order

tiiat His goodness might be communicated to creatures,

and be represented by them ; and because His goodness

could not be adequately represented by one creature alone,

He produced many and diverse creatures, that what waswanting to one in the representation of the divine good-

ness might be supplied by another. For goodness, which

in God is simple and uniform, in creatures is manifold and

divided; and hence the whole universe together partici-

pates the divine goodness more perfectly, and represents

il better than any single creature whatever.

And because the divine wisdom is the cause of the dis-

tinction of things, therefore Moses said that things are

made distinct by the word of God, which is the concept of

His wisdom ; and this is what we read in Genesis (i. 3, 4) :

God said: Be light made. . . . And He divided the light

from the darkness.

Reply Obj,I.

The natural agent acts by the form whichmakes it what it is, and which is only one in one thing;

and therefore its effect is one onlv. But the voluntary

agent, such as God is, as was shown above (Q. XIX., A.

4), acts by an intellectual form. Since, therefore, it is not

against God's unity and simplicity to understand manythings, as was shown above (Q. XV., A. 2), it follows that,

although He is one, He can make many things.

Reply Obj. 2. This reason would apply to the repre-

sentation which reflects the exemplar perfectly, and which

is multiplied by rrason of matter only ; hence the uncreated



Q. 47. Art. 2 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA ** 258

image, which is perfect, is only one. But no creature

represents the first exemplar perfectly, which is the divine

essence ; and, therefore, it can be represented by many

things. Still, according as ideas are called exemplars, the

plurality of ideas corresponds in the divine mind to the

plurality of things.

Reply Obj. 3. In speculative things the medium of

demonstration, which demonstrates the conclusion per-

fectly, is one only; whereas probable means of proof are

many. Likewise when operation is concerned, if the meansbe equal, so to speak, to the end, one only is sufficient.

But the creature is not such a means to its end, which is

God; and hence the multiplication of creatures is necessary.

Si:( ftND Article.

WHETHER THE INEQUALITY OF THINGS IS FROM GOD?We proceed thus to the Second Article —Objection i. It would seem that the inequality of things

is not from God. For it belongs to the best to produce the

best. But among things that are best, one is not greater

than another. Therefore, it belongs to God, Who is the

Best, to make all things equal.

Obj. 2. Further, equality is the effect of unity (Metaph.

v., text. 20). But God is one. Therefore, He has made all

things equal.

Obj. 3. Further, it is the part of justice to give unequal

to unequal tilings. But God is just in all His works.

Since, therefore, no inequality of things is presupposed to

the operation whereby He gives being to things, it seemsthat He has made all things equal.

On the contrary, It is said (Ecclus. xxxiii. 7) : Why does

one day excel another, and one light another, and one year

another year, one sun another sun? (Vulg. when all come

of the sun). By the knowledge of the Lord they were

distinguished.

I answer that, When Origen wished to refute those who

said that the distinction of things arose from the contrar\-

principles of good and evil, he said that in the beginning



259 DISTINCTION IN GENERAL Q. 47. Art. 2

all things were created equal by God. For he asserted

that God first created only the rational creatures, and all

equal ; and that inequality arose in them from free-will,

some being turned to God more and some less, and others

turned more and others less away from God. And so those

rational creatures which were turned to God by free-will,

were promoted to the order of angels according to the

diversity of merits. And those who were turned away

from God were bound down to bodies according to the

diversity of their sin ; and he said this was the cause of

tlie creation and diversity of bodies. But according to

this opinion, it would follow that the universality of bodily

creatures would not be the effect of the goodness of God

as communicated to creatures, but it would be for the sake

of the punishment of sin, which is contrary to what is said :

God saw all the tilings that He had made, and they 'were

very good (Gen. i. 31). And, as Augustine says (De Civ.

Dei ii. 22) '• What can be more foolish than to say that the

divine Architect provided this one sun for the one world,

not to be an ornament to its beauty, nor for the benefit of

corporeal things, Out that it happened through the sin of

one soul; so that, if a hundred souls had sinned, there

would be a Jiundred suns in the world?

Therefore it must be said that as the wisdom of God is

the cause of the distinction of things, so the same wisdom

is the cause of their inequality. This may be explained

as follows. A twofold distinction is found in things; one

is a formal distinction as regards things differing specific-

ally;

the other is a material distinction as regards thingsdiffering numerically only. And us the matter is on account

of the form, material distinction exists for the sake of the

formal distinction. Ilencewe see that in incorruptible things

there is only one individual of each species, forasmuch as

the species is sufficiently preserved in the one; whereas in

things generated and corruptible there are manv in-

dividuals of one species for the preservation of the species.

Whence it appears that formal distinction is of greater

consequence than material. Now, formal distinction

always requires inequality, because, as the Philosopher




says {Metaph. viii. 10), the forms of things are like numbers

in which species vary by addition or subtraction of unity.

Hence in natural things species seem to be arranged in

degrees; as the mixed things are more perfect than the

elements, and plants than minerals, and animals than

plants, and men than other animals; and in each of these

one species is more perfect than others. Therefore, as the

divine wisdom is the cause of the distinction of things for

the sake of the perfection of the universe, so is it the cause

of inequality. For the universe would not be perfect if

only one grade of goodness were found in things.

Reply Oh), i. It is the part of the best agent to produce

an eOect which is best in its entirety ; but this does not

mean that He makes every part of the whole the best

absolutely, but in proportion to the whole ; in the case of

an animal, for instance, its goodness would be taken away

if every part of it had the dignity of an eye. Thus, there-

lOre, God also made the universe to be best as a whole,

according to the mode of a creature; whereas He did not

make each single creature best, but one better than another.

And therefore we find it said of each creature, God saw the

light that it ivas good (Gen. i. 4); and in like manner of

each one of the rest.•

But of all together it is said, Godsaw all the things that He had. made, and they were very

good (Gen. i. 31).

Reply Obj. 2. The first effect of unity is equality; and

then comes multiplicity; and therefore from the Father,

to Whom, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ, i. 5),

is appropriated unity, the Son proceeds, to Whom is

appropriated equality, and then from Him the creature

proceeds, to which belongs inequality ; but nevertheless

even creatures share in a certain equality—namely, of

proportion.

Reply Obj. 3. This is the argument that persuaded

Origen : but it holds only as regards the distribution of

rewards, the inequality of which is due to unequal merits.

But in the constitution of things there is no inequality of

parts through any preceding inequality, either of merits

or of the disposition of the matter; but inequality comes



26i DISTINCTION IN GENERAL Q. 47. Art. 3

from the perfection of the whole. This appears also in

works done by art; for the roof of a house differs from the

foundation, not because it is made of other material;

butin order that the house may be made perfect of different

parts, tile artificer seeks different material ; indeed, he

would make such material if he could.

Third Article,

whether there is only one world?

]Ve proceed thus to the Third Article:—Objection 1. It would seem that there is not only one

world, but many. Because, as Augustine says (QU.

LXXXIIL, qu. 46), it is unfitting to say that God has

created things without a reason. But for the same reason

iliat He created one, He could create many, since His

power is not limited to the creation of one world ; but rather

it is infinite, as was shown above (Q. XXV., A. 2). There-

fore God has produced many worlds.

Obj. 2. Further, nature does what is best, and much more

does God. But it is better for there to be many worlds

than one,

because many good things are better than a few.Therefore many worlds have been made by God.

Obj. 3. F urther, everything w^hich has a form in matter

can be multiplied in number, the species remaining the

same, because multiplication in number comes from matter.

But the world has a form in matter. Thus as when I say

man I mean the form, and when I say this man, I mean the

form in matter ; so when we say world, the form is signified,

and when we say tliis ivorld, the form in matter is signified.

Therefore there is nothing to prevent the existence of many

worlds.

On the contrary, It is said (Jo. i. 10) : The world was

made by Him, where the world is named as one, as if only

one existed./ answer that. The very order of things created by God

shows the unity of the world. For this world is called one

by the unity of order, whereby some things are ordered to

others. But whatever things come from God, have rela-




tion of order to each other, and to God Himself, as shown

above (Q. XL, A. 3; Q. XXL, A. i). Hence it must be

that all things should belong to one world. Therefore

those only can assert that many worlds exist who do not

acknowledge any ordaining wisdom, but rather believe in

chance, as Democritus, who said that this world, besides

an infinite number of other worlds, was made from a casual

concourse of atoms.

Reply Obj. i. This reason proves that the world is one

because all things must be arranged in one order, and to

one end. Therefore from the unity of order in things Aris-

totle infers {Metaph. xii., text. 52) the unity of God govern-

ing all ; and Plato (Tim.), from the unity of the exemplar,

proves the unity of the world, as the thing designed.

Reply Obj. 2. No agent intends material plurality as the

end; forasmuch as material multitude has no certain limit,

but of itself tends to infinity, and the infinite is opposed

to the notion of end. Now when it is said that many

worlds are better than one, this has reference to material

order. But the best in this sense is not the intention of

the divine agent; forasmuch as for the same reason it

might be said that if He had made two worlds, it would be

better if He had made three;

and so on to infinity.Reply Obj. 3. The world is composed of the whole of its

matter. For it is not possible for there to be another earth

than this one, since every earth would naturally be carried

to this central one, wherever it was. The same applies to

the other bodies which are part of the world.



QUESTION XLVIII.

THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN PARTICULAR.{In Six Articles.)

We must now consider the distinction of things in par-

ticular; and firstly the distinction of good and evil; and

then the distinction of the spiritual and corporeal creatures.

Concerning the first, we inquire into evil and its cause.

Concerning evil, six points are to be considered:

([) Whether evil is a nature? (2) Whether evil is found

in things? (3) Whether good is the subject of evil?

(4) Whether evil totally corrupts good ? (5) The division

of evil into pain and fault. (6) Whether pain, or fault, has

more the nature of evil ?

First Article,

whether evil is a nature?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—Objection i. It would seem that evil is a nature. For

every genus is a nature. But evil is a genus; for the

Philosopher says (PrcBclic. x.) that

good andevil

are notin a genus, but are genera of other things. Therefore evil

is a nature.

Obj. 2. Further, every difference which constitutes a

species is a nature. But evil is a difference constituting a

species of morality ; for a bad habit differs in species from

a good habit, as liberality from illiberality. Therefore evil

signifies a nature.

Obj. 3. Further, each extreme of two contraries is a

nature. But evil and good are not opposed as privation

and habit, but as contraries, as the Philosopher showsI- 2

263 18




(Prcedic, x.) by the fact that between good and evil there

is a medium, and from evil there can be a return to good.

Therefore evil signifies a nature.

Obj. 4. Further, what is not, acts not. But evil acts, for

it corrupts good. Therefore evil is a being and a nature.

Obj. 5. Further, nothing belongs to the perfection of the

universe except what is a being and a nature. But evil

belongs to the perfection of the universe of things; for

Augustine says (Enchir. 10, 11) that the admirable beauty

of the universe is made up of all things. In which even

^vhat is called evil, well ordered and in its place, is the

eminent commendation of %vhat is good. Therefore evil is

a nature.

On the contrary, Dionysius says {Div. Nom. iv.), Evil is

neither a being nor a good.

I answer that. One opposite is known through the other,

as darkness is known through light. Hence also what evil

is must be known from the nature of good. Now, we

have said above that good is everything appetible ; and

thus, since every nature desires its own being and its

own perfection, it must be said also that the being and

the perfection of any nature is good. Hence it cannot be

that evil signifies being, or any form or nature. Therefore

it must be that by the name of evil is signified the absence

of good. And this is what is meant by saying that evil

is neither a being nor a good. For since being, as such,

is good, the absence of one implies the absence of the

ather.

Reply Obj. i. Aristotle speaks there according to the

opinion of the Pythagoreans, who thought that evil was a

kind of nature; and therefore they asserted the existence

of the genus of good and evil. For Aristotle, especially in

his logical works, brings forward examples that in his time

were probable in the opinion of some pliilosophers. Or, it

may be said that, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv.,

text. 6), the first kind of contrariety is habit and privation,

as being verified in all contraries; since one contrary is

always imperfect in relation to another, as black in relation

to white, and bitter in relation to sweet. And in this way



265 OF EVIL Q. 48. Art. i

good and evil are said to be genera not simply, but in regard

to contraries ; because, as every form has the nature of

good, so every privation, as such, has the nature of evil.

Reply Obj. 2. Good and evil are not constitutive differ-

ences except in morals, which receive their species from the

end, which is the object of the will, the source of all

morality. And because good has the nature of an end,

therefore good and evil are specific differences in moral

things;good in itself, but evil as the absence of the due

end. Yet neither does the absence of the due end by itself

constitute a moral species, except as it is joined to the

undue end;just as we do not find the privation of the sub-

stantial form in natural things, unless it is joined to another

form. Thus, therefore, the evil which is a constitutive

difference in morals is a certain good joined to the priva-

tion of another good; as the end proposed by the intem-

perate man is not the privation of the good of reason, but

the delight of sense without the order of reason. Hence

evil is not a constitutive difference as such, but by reason

of the good that is annexed.

Reply Obj. 3. This appears from the above. For tlie

Philosopher speaks there of good and evil in morality.

Because in that respect, between good and evil there is

a medium, as good is considered as something rightly

ordered, and evil as a thing not only out of right order,

but also as injurious to another. Hence the Philosopher

says {Ethic, iv. i.) that a prodigal man is foolish, but not

evil. And from this evil in morality, there may be a return

to good, but not from any sort of evil;

for from blindnessthere is no return to sight, although blindness is an evil.

Reply Obj. 4. A thing is said to act in a threefold sense.

Li one way, formally, as when we say that whiteness

makes white; and in that sense evil considered even as a

privation is said to corrupt good, forasnuich as it is itself

a corruption or privation of good. In another sense a thing

is said to act effectively, as when a painter makes a wall

white. Thirdly, it is said in the sense of the final cause,

as the end is said to effect by moving the efficient cause.

But in these two ways evil does not effect anything of



g. 48. Art. 2 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA 26b

itself, that is, as a privation, but by virtue of the good

annexed to it. For every action comes from some form ;

and everything which is desired as an end, is a perfection.

And therefore, as Dionysius says {Div. Nom. iv.) : Evil

does not act, nor is it desired, except by virtue of sonic

good joined to it: ivhile of itself it is nothing definite, ana

beside the scope of our ivill and intention.

Reply Obj. 5. As was said above, the parts of the uni-

verse are ordered to each other, according as one acts on

the other, and according as one is the end and exemplarof the other. But, as was said above, this can only happen

to evil as joined to some good. Hence evil neither belongs

to the perfection of the universe, nor does it come under

the order of the same, except accidentally, that is, by reason

of some good joined to it.

Second Article,

whether evil is found in things ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article —Objection i . It would seem that evil is not found in things.

For whatever is found in things, is either something, or a

privation of something, that is a not-being. But Dionysius

says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil is distant from existence, and

even more distant from non-existence. Therefore evil is

not at all found in things.

Obj. 2. Further, being and thing are convertible. If,

therefore, evil is a being in things, it follows that evil is athing, which is contrary to what has been said (A. i).

Obj. 3. Further, the %vliite unmixed ivith black is the

most white, as the Philosopher says {Topic, iii. 4). There-

fore also the good unmixed with evil is the greater good.

But God makes always what is best, much more than

nature does. Therefore in things made by God there is

no evil.

On the contrary, On the above assumptions, all prohibi-

tions and penalties would cease, for thev exist only for

evils.





Q. 48. Art. 3 THE SUMMA THF.OLOGICA 268

(Q. XLVIL, A. 2). And the whole itself, which is the

universe of creatures, is all the better and more perfect if

some things in it can fail in goodness, and do sometimes

fail, God not preventing this. This happens, firstly, be-

cause it belongs to Providence not to destroy, hut to save

nature, as Dionysius says {Div. No7n. iv.); but it belongs

to nature that what may fail should sometimes fail

secondly, because, as Augustine says {Enchir. 11), God is

so powerful that He can even make good out of evil.

Hence many good things would be taken away if God

permitted no evil to exist; for fire would not be generated

if air was not corrupted, nor would the life of a lion be

preserved unless the ass were killed. Neither would aveng-

ing justice nor the patience of a sufferer be praised if there

were no injustice.

Third Article,

whether evil is in good as in its subject?

We proceed thus to the Third Article —Objection i. It would seem that evil is not in good as its

subject. For good is something that exists. But Dionysius

says (Div. Nom. iv. 4) that evil does not exist, nor is it in

that ivhich exists. Therefore, evil is not in good as its

subject.

Obj. 2. Further, evil is not a being; whereas good is a

being. But not-being does not require being as its subject.

Therefore, neither does evil require good as its subject.

Obj. 3. Further, one contrary is not the subject of

another. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore, evil

is not in good as in its subject.

Obj. 4. F'urther, the subject of whiteness is called white.

Therefore, also, the subject of evil is evil. If, therefore,

evil is in good as in its subject, it follows that good is evil,

against what is said (Isa. v. 20) : Woe to you who call evil

good, and good evil

On the contrary, Augustine says {Enchir. 14) that evil

exists only in good.

I answer that, As was said above (A, i), evil imports the



269 OF KVIL Q. 48. Art. 3

absence of good. But not every absence of good is evil.

For absence of good can be taken in a privative and in a

negative sense. Absence of good, taken negatively, is not

evil ; otherwise, it would follow that what does not exist is

evil, and also that everything would be evil, through not

having the good belonging to something else ; for instance,

a man would be evil who had not the swiftness of the roe,

or the strength of a lion. But the absence of good, taken

in a privative sense, is an evil ; as, for instance, the priva-

tion of sight is called blindness.

Now, the subject of privation and of form is one and the

same—viz., being in potentiality, whether it be being in

absolute potentiality, as primary matter, which is the

subject of the substantial form, and of privation of the

opposite form ; or whether it be being in relative poten-

tiality, and absolute actuality, as in the case of a trans-

parent body, which is the subject both of darkness andlight. It is, however, manifest that the form which makes

a thing actual is a perfection and a good ; and thus every

actual being is a good; and likewise every potential being,

as such, is a good, as having a relation to good. For as

it has being in potentiality, so has it goodness in potenti-

ality. Therefore, the subject of evil is good.

Reply Obj. i. Dionysius means that evil is not in exist-

ing things as a part, or as a natural property of any exist-

ing thing.

Reply Obj. 2. Not-being, understood negatively, does

not require a subject ; but privation is negation in a subject,

as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv., text. 4), and such not-

being is an evil.

Reply Obj. 3. Evil is not in the good opposed to it as in

its subject, but in some other good, for the subject of blind-

ness is not sight, but animal. Yet, it appears, as Augus-

tine says {Enchir. 13), that the rule of dialectics here fails,

where it is laid down that contraries cannot exist together.

But this is to be taken as referring to good and evil in

general, but not in reference to any particular good and

evil. For white and black, sweet and bitter, and the like

contraries, are only considered as contraries in a special



Q. 48. Art. ^ THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA 270

sense, because they exist in some determinate genus

whereas gopd enters into every genus. Hence one good

can coexist with the privation of another good.

Reply Obj. 4. The prophet invokes woe to those who say

that good as such is evil. But this does not follow from

what is said above, as is clear from the explanation given.

Fourth Article,

whether evil corrupts the whole good?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article —Objection i. It would seem that evil corrupts the whole

good. For one contrary is wholly corrupted by another.

But good and evil are contraries. Therefore evil corrupts

the whole good.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says {Enchir. 12) that evil

hurts inasmuch as it takes away good. But good is all

of a piece and uniform. Therefore it is wholly taken away

by evil.

Obj. 3. Further, evil, as long as it lasts, hurts, and takes

away good. But that from which something is always

being removed, is at some time consumed, unless it is

infinite, which cannot be said of any created good. There-

fore evil wholly consumes good.

On the contrary, Augustine says {Enchir., lac. cit.) that

evil cannot wholly consume good.

I answer that, Evil cannot wholly consume good. To

prove this we must consider that good is threefold. One

kind of good is wholly destroyed bv evil, and this is the

i;ood opposed to the evil, as light is wholly destroyed bydarkness, and sight by blindness. Another kind of good

is neither wholly destroyed nor diminished by evil, and

I hat is the good which is the subject of evil; for by dark-

ness the substance of the air is not injured. And there is

also a kind of good which is diminished by evil, but is not

wholly taken away ; and this good is the aptitude of a

subject to some actuality.

The diminution, however, of this kind of good is not to

be considered bv wav of subtraction, as diminution in



271 OF EVIL g. 48. Art.4

quantity, but rather by way of remission, as diminution in

qualities and forms. The remission likewise of this habi-

tude is to be taken as contrary to its intensity. For this

kind of aptitude receives its intensity by the dispositions

whereby the matter is prepared for actuality ; which the

more they are multiplied in the subject, the more is it fitted

to receive its perfection and form; and, on the contrary,

it receives its remission by contrary dispositions, which,

the more they are multiplied in the matter, and the more

they are intensified, themore

is the potentiality remitted

as regards the actuality.

Therefore, if contrary dispositions cannot be multiplied

and intensified to infinity, but only to a certain limit,

neither is the aforesaid aptitude diminished or remitted

infinitely, as appears in the active and passive qualities of

the elements ; for coldness and humidity, whereby the

aptitude of matter to the form of fire is diminished or

remitted, cannot be infinitely multiplied. But if the con-

trary dispositions can be infinitely multiplied, the aforesaid

aptitude is also infinitely diminished or remitted; yet,

nevertheless, it is not wholly taken away, because its root

always remains, which is the substance of the subject.

Thus, if opaque bodies were interposed to infinity

betweenthe sun and the air, the aptitude of the air to light would

be infinitely diminished, but still it would never be wholh'

removed while the air remained, which in its very nature

is transparent. Likewise, addition in sin can be made to

infinitude, whereby the aptitude of the soul to grace is

more and more lessened ; and these sins, indeed, are like

obstacles interposed between us and God, according to

isa. lix. 2 : Our sins have divided between us and God.

Yet the aforesaid aptitude of the soul is not wholly taken

away, for it belongs to its very nature.

Reply Obj. i. The good which is opposed to evil is

wholly taken away ; but other goods are not wholly re-

moved, as said above.

Reply Obj. 2. The aforesaid aptitude is a medium

between subject and act. Hence, where it touches act, it

is diminished by evil; but where it touches the subject, it



y. 48. Art. 5 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA 272

remains as it was. Therefore, although good is like to

itself, yet, on account of its relation to different things, it is

not wholly, but only partially taken away.

Reply Obj. 3. Some, imagining that the diminution of

this kind of good is like the diminution of quantity, said

that just as the continuous is infinitely divisible, if the

division be made in an ever same proportion (for instance,

half of half, or a third of a third), so is it in the present case.

But this explanation does not avail here. For when in a divi-

sion we keep the same proportion,

wecontinue to subtract

less and less; for half of half is less than half the whole.

But a second sin does not necessarily diminish the above

mentioned aptitude less than a preceding sin, but per-

chance either equally or more.

Therefore it must be said that, although this aptitude is

a finite thing, still it may be so diminished infinitely, not

per se, but accidentally; according as the contrary dis-

positions are also increased infinitely, as explained above.

Fifth Article.

whether evil is adequately divided into pain*

and fault?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—Objection i. It would seem that evil is not adequarelv

divided into pain and fault. For every defect is a kind of

evil. But in all creatures there is the defect of not being-

able to preserve their own existence, which nevertheless is

neither a pain nor a fault. Therefore evil is inadequatelv

divided intopain and fault.

Obj. 2. Further, in irrational creatures there is neither

fault nor pain ; but, nevertheless, they have corruption

and defect, which are evils. Therefore not everv evil is a

pain or a fault.

Obj. 3. Further, temptation is an evil, but it is not a

fault : for temptation which involves no consent, is not a

sin, but an occasion for the exercise of virtue, as is said in

* Pain here means penalty : such was its original signification,

being derived from poena. In this sense we sav Pain of death, Pain

of loss. Pain of sense.—Ed.



273 ^^ L^VIL O .)8. Art. s

a gloss on 2 Cor. xii. ; nor is it a pain ; because temptation

precedes the fault, and the pain follows afterwards. There-

fore, evil is not sufficiently divided into pain and fault.

Obj. 4. On the contrary, It would seem that this division

is suoerfluous: for, as Augustine says {Enchir. 12), a thing

is evil because it hurts. But whatever hurts is penal.

Therefore every evil comes under pain.

/ answer that, Evil, as was said above (A. 3) is the

privation of good, which chiefly and of itself consists in

perfection and act. Act, however, is twofold ; first, and

second. The first act is the form and integrity of a thing

the second act is its operation. Therefore evil also is two-

fold. In one way it occurs by the subtraction of the form,

or of any part required for the integrity of the thing, as

blindness is an evil, as also it is an evil to be wanting in

any member of the body. In another way evil exists by

the withdrawal of the due operation, either because it doesnot exist, or because it has not its due mode and order.

But because good in itself is the object of the will, evil,

which is the privation of good, is found in a special way

in rational creatures which have a will. Therefore the evil

which comes from the withdrawal of the form and integrity

of the thing, has the nature of a pain ; and especially so on

the supposition that all things are subject to divine provi-

dence and justice, as was shown above (Q. XXII., A. 2);

for it is of the very nature of a pain to be against the will.

But the evil which consists in the subtraction of the due

operation in voluntary things has the nature of a fault ; for

this is imputed to anyone as a fault to fail as regards

perfect action, of which he is master by the will. There-fore every evil in voluntary things is to be looked upon as

a pain or a fault.

Reply Obj. i. Because evil is the privation of good, and

not a mere negation, as was said above (A. 3), therefore

not every defect of good is an evil, but the defect of the

good which is naturally due. For the want of sight is not

an evil in a stone, but it is an evil in an animal ; since it

is against the nature of a stone to see. So, likewise, it

is against the nature of a creature to be preserved in



Q. 48. Art. 6 THE SUMMA THIiOLOGlCA 274

existence by itself, because existence and conservation

come from one and the same source. Hence this kind of

defect is not an evil as regards a creature.

Reply Obj, 2. Pain and fault do not divide evil abso-

lutely considered, but evil that is found in voluntary things.

Reply Obj. 3. Temptation, as importing provocation to

evil, is always an evil of fault in the tempter; but in the

one tempted it is not, properly speaking, a fault ; unless

through the temptation some change is wrought in the one

who is tempted; for thus is the action of the agent in the

patient. And if the tempted is changed to evil by the

tempter he falls into fault.

Reply Obj. 4. In answer to the opposite argument, it

must be said that the very nature of pain includes the idea

of injury to the agent in himself, whereas the idea of fault

includes the idea of injury to the agent in his operation;

and thus both are contained in evil, as including the idea

of injury.

Sixth Article.

whether pain has the nature of evil more than

fault has ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article —Objection i. It would seem that pain has more of evil

than fault. For fault is to pain what merit is to reward.

But reward has more of good than merit, as its end. There-

fore pain has more evil in it than fault has.

Obj. 2. Further, that is the greater evil which is opposed

to the greater good. But pain, as was said above (A. 5),

is opposed to the good of the agent, while fault is opposed

to the good of the action. Therefore, since the agent is

better than the action, it seems that pain is worse than

fault.

Obj. 3. Further, the privation of the end is a pain con-

sisting in forfeiting the vision of God ; whereas the evil

of fault is privation of the order to the end. Thereforepain is a greater evil than fault.

On the contrary, A wise workman chooses a less evil in

order to prevent a greater, as the surgeon cuts off a limb



275 OF EVIL Q. 48. Art. 6

to save the whole body. But divine wisdom inflicts pain

to prevent fault. Therefore fault is a greater evil than

pain./ answer that, Fault has the nature of evil more than

pain has; not only more than pain of sense, consisting in

the privation of corporeal goods, which kind of pain

appeals to most men ; but also more than any kind of pain,

thus taking pain in its most general meaning, so as to

include privation of grace or glory.

There is a twofold reason for this. The first is that

one becomes evil by the evil of fault, but not by the evil

of pain, as Dionysius says{Div. Nom. iv.) : To be punished

is not an evil; but it is an evil to be made worthy of

punishrnent. And this because, since good absolutely con-

sidered consists in act, and not in potentiality, and the

ultimate act is operation, or the use of something possessed,it follows that the absolute good of man consists in good

operation, or the good use of something possessed. Now

we use all things by the act of the will. Hence from a good

will, which makes a man use well what he has, man is

called good, and from a bad will he is called bad. For a

man who has a bad will can use ill even the good he has, as

when a grammarian of his own will speaks incorrectly.

Therefore, because the fault itself consists in the disordered

act of the will, and the pain consists in the privation of

something used by the will, fault has more of evil in it

than pain has.

The second reason can be taken from the fact that God

is the author of the evil of pain, but not of the evil of

fault. And this is because the evil of pain takes away

the creature's good, which may be either something created,

as sight, destroyed by blindness, or something uncreated,

as by being deprived of the vision of God, the creature

forfeits its uncreated good. But the evil of fault is properly

opposed to uncreated good : for it is opposed to the fulfil-

ment of the divine will, and to divine love, whereby the

divine good is loved for itself, and not only as shared by

the creature. Therefore it is plain that fault has more

evil in it than pain has.



Q. 48. Art. 6 THE SUMMA THKOLOGICA 276

Reply Obj. i. Although fault results in pain, as merit

in reward, yet fault is not intended on account of the

pain, as merit is for the reward ; but rather, on the contrary,

pain is brought about so that the fault may be avoided,

and thus fault is worse than pain.

Reply Obj. 2. The order of action which is destroyed by

fault is the more perfect good of the agent, since it is the

second perfection, than the good taken away by pain,

which is the first perfection.Reply Obj. 3. Pain and fault are not to be compared as

end and order to the end ; because one may be deprived

of both of these in some way, both by fault and by pain;

by pain, accordingly as a man is removed from the end

and from the order to the end; by fault, inasmuch as this

privation belongs to the action which is not ordered to its

due end.



QUESTION XL IX.

THK CAUSE OF EVIL.


We next inquire into the cause of evil. Concerning this

there are three points of inquiry : (i) Whether good can

be the cause of evil ? (2) Whether the supreme good, God,

is the cause of evil ? (3) Whether there be any supreme

evil, which is tlie first cause of all evils?

First Article,

whether good can be the cause of evil ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :

Objection i. It would seem that good cannot be the cause

of evil. For it is said (Matth. vii. 18) : A good tree cannot

bring forth evil fruit.

Obj. 2. Further, one contrary cannot be the cause of

another. But evil is the contrary to good. Therefore

good cannot be the cause of evil.

Obj. 3. Further, a deficient effect can proceed only from

a deficient cause. But evil is a deficient effect. There-fore its cause, if it has one, is deficient. But everything

deficient is an evil. Therefore the cause of evil can only

be evil.

Obj. 4. Further, Dionysius says {Div. Norn, iv.) that

evil has no cause. Therefore good is not the cause of evil.

On the contrary, Augustine says {Contra Julian, i. q) :

There is no possible source of evil except good.

I ans^ver that, It must be said that every evil in some

way has a cause. For evil is the absence of the good,

which is natural and due to a thing. But that anything

277




fail from its natural and due disposition, can come only

from some cause drawing it out of its proper disposition.

For a heavy thing is not moved upwards except by someimpelling force; nor does an agent fail in its action except

from some impediment. But only good can be a cause;

because nothing can be a cause except inasmuch as it is a

being, and every being, as such, is good.

And if we consider the special kinds of causes, we see

that the agent, the form, and the end, import some kind of

perfection which belongs to the notion of good. Even

matter, as a potentiality to good, has the nature of good.

Now that good is the cause of evil by way of the material

cause was shown above (Q. XLVI 1 1., A. 3). For it was

shown that good is the subject of evil. But evil has no

formal cause, rather is it a privation of form ; likewise,

neither has it a final cause, but rather is it a privationof order to the proper end; since not only the end has the

nature of good, but also the useful, which is ordered to the

end. Evil, however, has a cause by way of an agent, not

directly, but accidentally.

In proof of this, we must know that evil is caused in the

action otherwise than in the effect. In the action evil is

caused by reason of the defect of some principle of action,

either of the principal or the instrumental agent; thus the

defect in the movement of an animal may happen by reason

of the weakness of the motive power, as in the case of

children, or by reason only of the ineptitude of the instru-

ment, as in the lame. On the other hand, evil is caused

in a thing, but not in the proper effect of the agent, some-times by the power of the agent, sometimes by reason of

a defect, either of the agent or of the matter. It is caused

by reason of the power or perfection of the agent when

there necessarily follows on the form intended by the agent

the privation of another form ; as, for instance, when on

the form of fire there follows the privation of the form of

air or of water. Therefore, as the more perfect the fire is in

strength, so much the more perfectly does it impress its

own form, so also the more perfectly does it corrupt the

contrary. Hence that evil and corruption befall air and



279 THE CAUSE OF EVIL Q. 49- Art. i

water conies from the perfection of the fire : but this is

accidental; because fire does not aim at the privation of

the form of water, but at the bringing in of its own form,

though by doing this it also accidentally causes the other.

But if there is a defect in the proper effect of the fire—as,

for instance, that it fails to heat—this comes either by

defect of the action, which implies the defect of some

principle, as was said above, or by the indisposition of the

matter, which does not receive the action of fire, the agent.

But this very fact that it is a deficient being is accidentalto good to which of itself it belongs to act. Hence it is

true that evil in no way has any but an accidental cause;

and thus is good the cause of evil.

Reply Obj. i. As Augustine says {Contra Julian, i.) : The

Lord calls an evil will the evil tree, and a good ivill a good

tree. Now, a good will does not produce a morally bad

act, since it is from the good will itself that a moral act is

judged to be good. Nevertheless the movement itself of

an evil will is caused by the rational creature, which is

good; and thus good is the cause of evil.

Reply Obj. 2. Good does not cause that evil which is con-

trary to itself, but some other evil : thus the goodness of

the fire causes evil to the water, and man, good as to his

nature, causes an act morally evil. And, as explained

above (Q. XIX., A. 9), this is by accident. Moreover, it

does happen sometimes that one contrary causes another

by accident : for instance, the exterior surrounding cold ^

heats (the body) through the concentration of the inward

heat.

Reply Obj. 3, Evil has a deficient cause in voluntarv

things otherwise than in natural things. For the natural

agent produces the same kind of effect as it is itself, unless

it is impeded by some exterior thing; and this amounts to

some defect belonging to it. Hence evil never follows in

the effect, unless some other evil pre-exists in the agent or

in the matter, as was said above. But in voluntary thingsthe defect of the action comes from the will actuallv

deficient, inasmuch as it does not actually subject itself to

its proper rule. This defect, however, is not a fault, but

I. s? 19



Q. 49. Art. 2 THE SUMMA TIIEOLOGICA 280

fault follows upon il from the fact that the will acts with

this defect.

Reply Obj. 4. Evil has no direct cause, but only an acci-

dental cause, as was said above.

Sfxond Article,

whether the supreme good, god, is the cause of evil ?

We proceed tJuis to the Second Article:—Objection i. It would seem that the supreme good, God,

is the cause of evil. For it is said (Isa. xlv. 5, 7) : I aw the

Lord, and there is no other God, forming the light, and

creating darkness, making peace, and creating evil. And

(Amos iii. 6), Shall there be evil in a city, which the Lord

hath not done?

Obj. 2. Further, the effect of the secondary causeis

reduced to the first cause. But good is the cause of evil,

as was said above (A. i). Therefore, since God is the

cause of every good, as was shown above (Q. II., A. 3;

Q. VI., AA. I, 4), it follows that also every evil is from

God.

Obj. 3. Further, as is said by the Philosopher (Phys. ii.,

text. 30), the cause of both safety and danger of the ship

is the same. But God is the cause of the safety of all

things. Therefore He is the cause of all perdition and of

all evil.

On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. LXXXIII.,

Qu. 21) that, God is not the author of evil, because He is

not the cause of tending to not-being.1 answer that. As appears from what was said (A. i),

the evil which consists in the defect of action is always

caused by the defect of the agent. But in God there is no

defect, but the highest perfection, as was shown above

(O. IV., A. i). Hence, the evil which consists in defect

of action, or which is caused by defect of the agent, is not

reduced to God as to its cause.

But the evil which consists in the corruption of some

things is reduced to God as the cause. And this appears

as regards both natural things and voluntary things. For



28i THE CAUSE OF EVIL Q. 49 Art. 1

it was said (A. i) that some agent inasmuch as it produces

by its power a form to which follows corruption and defect,

causes by its power that corruption and defect. But it is

manifest that the form which God chiefly intends in things

created is the good of the order of the universe. Now, the

order of the universe requires, as was said above (Q. XXII.,

A. 2 arf 2; O. XLVIII., A. 2), that there should be some

things that can, and do sometimes, fail. And thus God,

by causing in things the good of the order of theuniverse,

consequently and as it were by accident, causes the corrup-

tions of things, according to i Kings ii. 6 : The 'Lord killetJi

and maketh alive. But when we read that God hath not

made death (Wis. i. 13), the sense is that God does not

will death for its own sake. Nevertheless the order of

justice belongs to the order of the universe: and this re-

quires that penalty should be dealt out to sinners. Andso God is the author of the evil which is penalty, but not of

the evil which is fault, by reason of what is said above.

Reply Obj. i. These passages refer to the evil of penalty,

and not to the evil of fault.

Reply Obj. 2. The effect of the deficient secondary cause

is reduced to the first non-deficient cause as regards whatit has of being and perfection, but not as regards what it

has of defect; just as whatever there is of motion in the act

of limping is caused by the motive power, whereas what

there is of obliqueness in it does not come from the motive

power, but from the curvature of the leg. And, likewise,

whatever there is of being and action in a bad action, is

reduced to God as the cause ; whereas whatever defect is in

it is not caused by God, but by the deficient secondary

cause.

Reply Obj. 3. The sinking of a ship is attributed to the

sailor as the cause, from the fact that he does not fulfil

what the safety of the ship requires ; but God does not fail

in doing what is necessary for the safety of all. Hencethere is no parity.




Third Article.

whether there be one supreme evil which is the

cause of every evil ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—Objection i. It would seem that there is one supreme evil

which is the cause of every evil. For contrary effects have

contrary causes. But contrariety is found in things,

according to Ecclus. xxxiii. 15 : Good is set against evil,

and life against death; so also is the sinner against a just

man. Therefore there are contrary principles, one of good,

the other of evil.

Obj. 2. Further, if one contrary is in nature, so is the

other. But the supreme good is in nature, and is the cause

of every good, as was shown above (Q. II., A.3;

Q. VI.

AA. 2,4). Therefore, also, there is a supreme evil opposed

to it as the cause of every evil.

Obj. 3. Further, as we find good and better things, so

we find evil and worse. But good and better are so con-

sidered in relation to what is best. Therefore evil and

worse are so considered in relation to some supreme evil.

Obj. 4. Further, everything participated is reduced to

what is essential. But things which are evil among us are

evil not essentially, but by participation. Therefore we

must seek for some supreme essential evil, which is the

cause of every evil.

Obj. 5. Further, whatever is accidental is reduced to that

which is per se. But good is the accidental cause of evil.

Therefore, we must suppose some supreme evil which is

the per se cause of evils. Nor can it be said that evil has

no per se cause, but only an accidental cause ; for it would

then follow that evil would not exist in the many, but only

in the few.

Obj. 6. Further, the evil of the effect is reduced to the

evil of the cause ; because the deficient effect comes from the

deficient cause, as was said above (AA. 1,2). But we can-

not proceed to infinity in this matter. Therefore, we must

suppose one first evil as the cause of every evil.



2^3 THE CAUSE OF EVIL Q. 44. Arx. t

On the contrary, The supreme good is the cause of every

being, as was shown above ((J.II., A. 3; O. VI., A. 4).

Therefore there cannot be any principle opposed to it as

the cause of evils.

/ answer that, It appears from what precedes that there

is no one first principle of evil, as there is one first principle

of good.

First, indeed, because the first principle of good is

essentially good, as was shown above (Q. VI., AA. 3, 4).

But nothing can be essentially bad. For it was shown

above that every being, as such, is good (Q. V., A. 3) ;and

that evil can exist only in good as in its subject (Q.

XLVIIL, A. 3).

Secondly, because the first principle of good is the

highest and perfect good which pre-contains in itself all

goodness, as shown above (Q. VI., A. 2). But there can-

not be a supreme evil ; because, as was shown above

(Q. XLVIII., A. 4), although evil always lessens good,

yet it never wholly consumes it; and thus, while good ever

remains, nothing can be wholly and perfectly bad. There-

fore, the Philosopher says {Ethic, iv. 5) that if the wholly

evil could be, it would destroy itself ; because all good being

destroyed (which it need be for something to be wholly

evil), evil itself would be taken away, since its subject is

good

.

Thirdly, because the very nature of evil is against the

idea of a first principle ; both because every evil is caused

by good, as was shown above (A. i), and because evil can

be only an accidental cause, and thus it cannot be the first

cause, for the accidental cause is subsequent to the direct

cause.

Those, however, who upheld two first principles, one

good and the other evil, fell into this error from the same

cause, whence also arose other strange notions of the

ancients; namely, because they failed to consider the uni-

versal cause of all being, and considered only the particular

causes <^f particular effects. For on that account, if they

found a thing hurtful to something- by the po\\cr of its

own nature, they thought that the very nature of that thing



Q. 49- Art. 3 THE SUMMA THiiOLOGiCA 284

was evil ; as, for instance, if one should say that the nature

of fire was evil because it burnt the house of a poor man.

The judgment, however, of the goodness of anything does

not depend upon its order to any particular thing, but

rather upon what it is in itself, and on its order to the

whole universe, wherein every part has its own perfectly

ordered place, as was said above (Q. XLVII., A. 2 ad i).

Likewise, because they found two contrary particular

causes of two contraryparticular effects, they did not know-

how to reduce these contrary particular causes to the uni-

versal common cause; and therefore they extended the

contrariety of causes even to the first principles. But since

all contraries agree in something common, it is necessary

to search for one common cause for them above their own

contrary proper causes ; as above the contrary qualities of

the elements exists the power of a heavenly body; and

above all things that exist, no matter how, there exists one

first principle of being, as was shown above (Q. II., A. 3).

Reply Obj. i. Contraries agree in one genus, and they

also agree in the nature of being; and therefore, although

they have contrary particular causes, nevertheless we must

comeat last to

onefirst

commoncause.

Reply Obj. 2. Privation and habit belong naturally to the

same subject. Now the subject of privation is a being in

potentiality, as was said above (Q. XLVIII., A. 3). Hence,

since evil is privation of good, as appears from what was

said above (ibid., AA. i, 2, 3), it is opposed to that good

which has some potentiality, but not to the supreme good,

who is pure act.

Reply Ob}. 3. Increase in intensity is in proportion to

the nature of a thing. And as the form is a perfection, so

privation removes a perfection. Hence every form, per-

fection, and good is intensified by approach to the perfect

term; but privation and evil by receding from that term.

Hence a thing is not said to be evil and worse, by reason

of access to the supreme evil, in the same way as it is said

to be good and better, by reason of access to the supreme

good.

Reply Obj. 4. No being is called evil by participation,



285 THE CAUSE OF EVIL Q. -19 Art. 3

but by privation of participation. Hence it is not necessary

to reduce it to any essential evil.

Reply Obj. 5. Evil can only have an accidental cause, as

was shown above (A. i). Hence reduction to any per se

cause of evil is impossible. And to say that evil is in the

greater number is simply false. For things which are

generated and corrupted, in which alone can there be

natural evil, are the smaller part of the whole universe.

And again, in every species the defect of nature is in the

smaller number. In man alone does evil appear as in the

greater number ; because the good of man as regards the

senses is not the good of man as man—that is, in regard

to reason ;and more men seek good in regard to the senses

than good according to reason.

Reply Obj. 6. In the causes of evil we do not proceed to

infinity, but reduce all evils to some good cause, whenceevil follows accidentallv.

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