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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAA!A, A"RA#AM $. SARM%ENTO, &'( MO)EMENT O$ ATTORNE*S $OR "ROT#ER#OO!,%NTEGR%T* AN! NAT%ONAL%SM, %NC. +MA"%N%, petitioners,

vs.

#ON. UAN C. TU)ERA, i' i/ 0&p&0i &/ E0i A//i/&' o Pr/i(', #ON. OA7U%N )ENUS, i' i/0&p&0i &/ !p E0i A//i/&' o Pr/i(' , MEL7U%A!ES P. !E LA CRUZ, i' i/ 0&p&0i &/ !ir0or,M&l&0&&' R0or(/ O::i0, &'( $LOREN!O S. PA"LO, i' i/ 0&p&0i &/ !ir0or, "r& o: Pri'i', respondents.

ESCOL%N, J.;

Invoking the peoples right to be infor!ed on !atters of public concern, a right recogni"ed in #ection $, Article I% of the &'()

Philippine Constitution, 1 as *ell as the principle that la*s to be valid and enforceable !ust be published in the +fficial a"ette or

other*ise effectivel- pro!ulgated, petitioners seek a *rit of !anda!us to co!pel respondent public officials to publish, andorcause the publication in the +fficial a"ette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, procla!ations,

e/ecutive orders, letter of i!ple!entation and ad!inistrative orders.

#pecificall-, the publication of the follo*ing presidential issuances is sought0

a1 Presidential 2ecrees Nos. &3, 33, )(, )4, 5', $6, &7), &(&, &(', &46, &'(, 377, 3)6, 3$5, 34$, 3'4, )7), )&3,

)36, )35, )3$, ))(, )55, )54, )5', )$7, )$&, )$4, 676, 67$, 6&5, 63(, 63', 665, 66(, 6(), 64$, 6'&, 57), 576,

53&, 534, 55&, 5$$, 5(), 5(6, 5'6, 5'', $66, $54, $$&, (&4, ()&, ()), ('), 477, 473, 4)5, 4)$, '3), ')5, '$&,

&7&(8&7)7, &757, &7$78&7$&, &745, &&6), &&$5, &&$$, &363, &36$, &357, &3(4, &3(', &)77, &$66, &((3, &474,

&4&7, &4&)8&4&(, &4&'8&43$, &43'8&467, &4638&46(.

b1 9etter of Instructions Nos.0 &7, )', 6', (3, &7(, &74, &&$, &)7, &)$, &6&, &57, &5), &55, &$&, &(), &47, &4(,

&44, &'3, &'), &'', 373, 376, 375, 37', 3&&83&), 3&58336, 33$8334, 3)&83)', 36&8365, 364, 35&, 35)83$&, 3$)8

3$', 3(&83(), 3(5834), 345834', 3'&, 3'), 3'(83'', )7&8)7), )7', )&38)&5, )35, )3(, )6), )6$, )6', )5(, )54,

)$3, )$(, )(7, )43, )45, )4$, )'$8)'(, 675, 6)48667, 6668 665, 6(), 64$, 644, 6'4, 57&, )'', 53(, 5$&, 5($,

54(, 5'6, 5'', $77, $73, $7', $&7, $&&, $&3, $&5, $6&, $63, $$5, (73, (&38(&), (3$, 4)(84)', 4(484(', 44&,

443, ')'8'67, '$6,''(,&&6'8&&(4,&&478&3(4.

c1 eneral +rders Nos.0 &6, 53, 54, 5', $7, $3, $), $6 : $5.

d1 Procla!ation Nos.0 &&3$, &&66, &&6(, &&5&, &&'$, &3(7, &34&, &)&'8&53$, &53', &5)3, &5)5, &5)4, &5678

&56(, &5578&554, &5$&8&544, &5'78&5'5, &5'68&$77, &$7$8&$7', &$&38&$34, &$)78&$6', &$'68&$'5, &$'(8&(7&, &(758&(3), &()&8&()6, &()(8&(63, &(66, &(6$8&(5&, &(53, &(56, &($3, &($68&(4(, &(4'8&('5, &('(,

&477, &4738&476, &47$8&47(, &4&38&4&6, &4&$, &4358&43$, &43', &4)&8&4)3, &4)58&4)$, &4)'8&467, &46)8

&466, &46$8&46(, &46', &45)8&454, &4$7, &4$$, &4$4, &4(7, &4($8&44', &4'3, &'77, &'&4, &'3), &')), &'53,

&'$), &'$58&'$$, &'$48&'46, &'4$83734, 37)783766, 376$83&65, 3&6(83&$&, 3&$)83366.

e1 E/ecutive +rders Nos.0 6&&, 6&), 6&6, 63(, 63'8656, 65(8 6(&, 6(686'3, 6'6857(, 57'85&7, 533, 5368534,

5)&85)3, 5)$, 5)4, 56)8566, 56', 55&855), 5$7, 5$), 5$(85$4, 5(7, 5(6, 5'), 5'6, 5'48$76, $7', $&&8 $6(, $6'8

$((, $('8(7), (758(7(, (&38(4$, (448453, 456845(.

f1 9etters of I!ple!entation Nos.0 (, 4, ', &7, &&833, 3583(, )', 57, 5&, 5', ($, 4784&, '3, '6, '5, &7(, &37, &33,

&3).

g1 Ad!inistrative +rders Nos.0 )6(, )64, )538)56, )$78 )(4, )4786)), 6)$86)'.



;he respondents, through the #olicitor eneral, *ould have this case dis!issed outright on the ground that petitioners have no

legal personalit- or standing to bring the instant petition. ;he vie* is sub!itted that in the absence of an- sho*ing that petitioners

are personall- and directl- affected or pre<udiced b- the alleged non8publication of the presidential issuances in =uestion 2 said

petitioners are *ithout the re=uisite legal personalit- to institute this !anda!us proceeding, the- are not being >aggrieved parties>

*ithin the !eaning of #ection ), Rule $5 of the Rules of Court, *hich *e =uote0

#EC. ). Petition for Mandamus.?@hen an- tribunal, corporation, board or person unla*full- neglects the

perfor!ance of an act *hich the la* specificall- en<oins as a dut- resulting fro! an office, trust, or station, or

unla*full- e/cludes another fro! the use a rd en<o-!ent of a right or office to *hich such other is entitled, andthere is no other plain, speed- and ade=uate re!ed- in the ordinar- course of la*, the person aggrieved thereb-

!a- file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts *ith certaint- and pra-ing that <udg!ent be

rendered co!!anding the defendant, i!!ediatel- or at so!e other specified ti!e, to do the act re=uired to be

done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pa- the da!ages sustained b- the petitioner b- reason of the

*rongful acts of the defendant.

pon the other hand, petitioners !aintain that since the sub<ect of the petition concerns a public right and its ob<ect is to co!pel

the perfor!ance of a public dut-, the- need not sho* an- specific interest for their petition to be given due course.

;he issue posed is not one of first i!pression. As earl- as the &'&7 case of Severino vs. Governor General , 3 this Court held that

*hile the general rule is that >a *rit of !anda!us *ould be granted to a private individual onl- in those cases *here he has so!e private or particular interest to be subserved, or so!e particular right to be protected, independent of that *hich he holds *ith the

public at large,> and >it is for the public officers e/clusivel- to appl- for the *rit *hen public rights are to be subserved Mithchell

vs. Board!en, (' M.e., 6$'1,> nevertheless, >*hen the =uestion is one of public right and the ob<ect of the !anda!us is to

procure the enforce!ent of a public dut-, the people are regarded as the real part- in interest and the relator at *hose instigation

the proceedings are instituted need not sho* that he has an- legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to sho* that

he is a citi"en and as such interested in the e/ecution of the la*s igh, E/traordinar- 9egal Re!edies, )rd ed., sec. 6)&1.

;hus, in said case, this Court recogni"ed the relator 9ope #everino, a private individual, as a proper part- to the !anda!us

proceedings brought to co!pel the overnor eneral to call a special election for the position of !unicipal president in the to*n

of #ila-, Negros +ccidental. #peaking for this Court, Mr. Dustice rant ;. ;rent said0

@e are therefore of the opinion that the *eight of authorit- supports the proposition that the relator is a proper

part- to proceedings of this character *hen a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in A!erica

*ere other*ise, *e think that it *ould not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason that it is al*a-s

dangerous to appl- a general rule to a particular case *ithout keeping in !ind the reason for the rule, because, if

under the particular circu!stances the reason for the rule does not e/ist, the rule itself is not applicable and

reliance upon the rule !a- *ell lead to error

No reason e/ists in the case at bar for appl-ing the general rule insisted upon b- counsel for the respondent. ;he

circu!stances *hich surround this case are different fro! those in the nited #tates, inas!uch as if the relator

is not a proper part- to these proceedings no other person could be, as *e have seen that it is not the dut- of the

la* officer of the overn!ent to appear and represent the people in cases of this character.

;he reasons given b- the Court in recogni"ing a private citi"ens legal personalit- in the afore!entioned case appl- s=uarel- to the

present petition. Clearl-, the right sought to be enforced b- petitioners herein is a public right recogni"ed b- no less than the

funda!ental la* of the land. If petitioners *ere not allo*ed to institute this proceeding, it *ould indeed be difficult to conceive of

another person to initiate the sa!e, considering that the #olicitor eneral, the govern!ent officer generall- e!po*ered to

represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.

Respondents further contend that publication in the +fficial a"ette is not a sine =ua non re=uire!ent for the effectivit- of la*s

*here the la*s the!selves provide for their o*n effectivit- dates. It is thus sub!itted that since the presidential issuances in

=uestion contain special provisions as to the date the- are to take effect, publication in the +fficial a"ette is not indispensable for

their effectivit-. ;he point stressed is anchored on Article 3 of the Civil Code0

Art. 3. 9a*s shall take effect after fifteen da-s follo*ing the co!pletion of their publication in the +fficial

a"ette, unless it is other*ise provided, ...



;he interpretation given b- respondent is in accord *ith this Courts construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, 4 this

Court has ruled that publication in the +fficial a"ette is necessar- in those cases *here the legislation itself does not provide for

its effectivit- date8for then the date of publication is !aterial for deter!ining its date of effectivit-, *hich is the fifteenth da-

follo*ing its publication8but not *hen the la* itself provides for the date *hen it goes into effect.

Respondents argu!ent, ho*ever, is logicall- correct onl- insofar as it e=uates the effectivit- of la*s *ith the fact of publication.

Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easil- reached that said Article 3 does not

preclude the re=uire!ent of publication in the +fficial a"ette, even if the la* itself provides for the date of its effectivit-. ;hus,

#ection & of Co!!on*ealth Act $)4 provides as follo*s0

#ection &. ;here shall be published in the +fficial a"ette &1 all i!portant legisiative acts and resolutions of a

public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines 31 all e/ecutive and ad!inistrative orders and procla!ations,

e/cept such as have no general applicabilit- )1 decisions or abstracts of decisions of the #upre!e Court and

the Court of Appeals as !a- be dee!ed b- said courts of sufficient i!portance to be so published 61 such

docu!ents or classes of docu!ents as !a- be re=uired so to be published b- la* and 51 such docu!ents or

classes of docu!ents as the President of the Philippines shall deter!ine fro! ti!e to ti!e to have general

applicabilit- and legal effect, or *hich he !a- authori"e so to be published. ...

;he clear ob<ect of the above8=uoted provision is to give the general public ade=uate notice of the various la*s *hich are to

regulate their actions and conduct as citi"ens. @ithout such notice and publication, there *ould be no basis for the application ofthe !a/i! >ignorantia legis non e/cusat.> It *ould be the height of in<ustice to punish or other*ise burden a citi"en for the

transgression of a la* of *hich he had no notice *hatsoever, not even a constructive one.

Perhaps at no ti!e since the establish!ent of the Philippine Republic has the publication of la*s taken so vital significance that at

this ti!e *hen the people have besto*ed upon the President a po*er heretofore en<o-ed solel- b- the legislature. @hile the

people are kept abreast b- the !ass !edia of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pa!bansa?and for the diligent ones,

read- access to the legislative records?no such publicit- acco!panies the la*8!aking process of the President. ;hus, *ithout

publication, the people have no !eans of kno*ing *hat presidential decrees have actuall- been pro!ulgated, !uch less a definite

*a- of infor!ing the!selves of the specific contents and te/ts of such decrees. As the #upre!e Court of #pain ruled0 >Ba<o la

deno!inacion generica de le-es, se co!prenden ta!bien los regla!entos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares - Reales

ordines dictadas de confor!idad con las !is!as por el obierno en uso de su potestad.

5

;he ver- first clause of #ection I of Co!!on*ealth Act $)4 reads0 >;here shall be published in the +fficial a"ette ... .> ;he

*ord >shall> used therein i!poses upon respondent officials an i!perative dut-. ;hat dut- !ust be enforced if the Constitutional

right of the people to be infor!ed on !atters of public concern is to be given substance and realit-. ;he la* itself !akes a list of

*hat should be published in the +fficial a"ette. #uch listing, to our !ind, leaves respondents *ith no discretion *hatsoever as to

*hat !ust be included or e/cluded fro! such publication.

;he publication of all presidential issuances >of a public nature> or >of general applicabilit-> is !andated b- la*. +bviousl-,

presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or other*ise i!pose a burden or. the people,

such as ta/ and revenue !easures, fall *ithin this categor-. +ther presidential issuances *hich appl- onl- to particular persons or

class of persons such as ad!inistrative and e/ecutive orders need not be published on the assu!ption that the- have been

circulari"ed to all concerned. 6

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances >of a public nature> or >of general applicabilit-> is a re=uire!ent

of due process. It is a rule of la* that before a person !a- be bound b- la*, he !ust first be officiall- and specificall- infor!ed of

its contents. As Dustice Claudio ;eehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC <0

In a ti!e of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions *hich all for! part of the la* of the land, the

re=uire!ent of due process and the Rule of 9a* de!and that the +fficial a"ette as the official govern!ent

repositor- pro!ulgate and publish the te/ts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people !a-

kno* *here to obtain their official and specific contents.

;he Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, *hich have not been published, shall have no force

and effect. #o!e !e!bers of the Court, =uite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision !ight have on acts

done in reliance of the validit- of those presidential decrees *hich *ere published onl- during the pendenc- of this petition, have

put the =uestion as to *hether the Courts declaration of invalidit- appl- to P.2.s *hich had been enforced or i!ple!ented prior to



their publication. ;he ans*er is all too fa!iliar. In si!ilar situations in the past this Court had taken the prag!atic and realistic

course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Ban 8 to *it0

;he courts belo* have proceeded on the theor- that the Act of Congress, having been found to be

unconstitutional, *as not a la* that it *as inoperative, conferring no rights and i!posing no duties, and hence

affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. #helb- Count-, &&4 .#. 635, 663 Chicago, &. : 9. R-.

Co. v. ackett, 334 .#. 55', 5$$. It is =uite clear, ho*ever, that such broad state!ents as to the effect of a

deter!ination of unconstitutionalit- !ust be taken *ith =ualifications. ;he actual e/istence of a statute, prior to

such a deter!ination, is an operative fact and !a- have conse=uences *hich cannot <ustl- be ignored. ;he pastcannot al*a-s be erased b- a ne* <udicial declaration. ;he effect of the subse=uent ruling as to invalidit- !a-

have to be considered in various aspects8*ith respect to particular conduct, private and official. Fuestions of

rights clai!ed to have beco!e vested, of status, of prior deter!inations dee!ed to have finalit- and acted upon

accordingl-, of public polic- in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, de!and

e/a!ination. ;hese =uestions are a!ong the !ost difficult of those *hich have engaged the attention of courts,

state and federal and it is !anifest fro! nu!erous decisions that an all8inclusive state!ent of a principle of

absolute retroactive invalidit- cannot be <ustified.

Consistentl- *ith the above principle, this Court in !utter vs. Este"an 9 sustained the right of a part- under the Moratoriu! 9a*,

albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said la* *as declared unconstitutional b- this Court.

#i!ilarl-, the i!ple!entationenforce!ent of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the +fficial a"ette is >an operative

fact *hich !a- have conse=uences *hich cannot be <ustl- ignored. ;he past cannot al*a-s be erased b- a ne* <udicial declaration

... that an all8inclusive state!ent of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidit- cannot be <ustified.>

Gro! the report sub!itted to the Court b- the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought b- petitioners to be

published in the +fficial a"ette, onl- Presidential 2ecrees Nos. &7&' to &7)7, inclusive, &3(4, and &')( to &')', inclusive, have

not been so published. 1= Neither the sub<ect !atters nor the te/ts of these P2s can be ascertained since no copies thereof are

available. But *hatever their sub<ect !atter !a- be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished P2s has ever been

i!ple!ented or enforced b- the govern!ent. In Pesigan vs. #ngeles, 11 the Court, through Dustice Ra!on A=uino, ruled that

>publication is necessar- to apprise the public of the contents of penal1 regulations and !ake the said penalties binding on the

persons affected thereb-. > ;he cogenc- of this holding is apparentl- recogni"ed b- respondent officials considering the!anifestation in their co!!ent that >the govern!ent, as a !atter of polic-, refrains fro! prosecuting violations of cri!inal la*s

until the sa!e shall have been published in the +fficial a"ette or in so!e other publication, even though so!e cri!inal la*s

provide that the- shall take effect i!!ediatel-.

@EREG+RE, the Court hereb- orders respondents to publish in the +fficial a"ette all unpublished presidential issuances

*hich are of general application, and unless so published, the- shall have no binding force and effect.

#+ +R2ERE2.



Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-5060 January 26, 1910

THE UNITE ST!TES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.LUIS TORI"IO, defendant-appellant.

Rodriguez & Del Rosario, for appellant. Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.

C!RSON, J.:

The evidence of record fully sustains the findins of the trial court that the appellant slauhtered or caused to be slauhteredfor hu!an consu!ption, the carabao described in the infor!ation, "ithout a per!it fro! the !unicipal treasure of the

!unicipality "herein it "as slauhtered, in violation of the provisions of sections #$ and ## of Act No. %%&', an Act reulatinthe reistration, brandin, and slauhter of lare cattle.

(t appears that in the to"n of Car!en, in the Province of Bohol, "herein the ani!al "as slauhtered there is no !unicipalslauhterhouse, and counsel for appellant contends that under such circu!stances the provisions of Act No. %%&' do notprohibit nor penali)e the slauhter of lare cattle "ithout a per!it of the !unicipal treasure. *ections #$, #%, #+, and ## ofthe Act are as follo"s

*EC. #$. No lare cattle shall be slauhtered or illed for food at the !unicipal slauhterhouse ecept upon per!itsecured fro! the !unicipal treasure. Before issuin the per!it for the slauhter of lare cattle for hu!anconsu!ption, the !unicipal treasurer shall re/uire for branded cattle the production of the oriinal certificate ofo"nership and certificates of transfer sho"in title in the person applyin for the per!it, and for unbranded cattlesuch evidence as !ay satisfy said treasurer as to the o"nership of the ani!als for "hich per!it to slauhter has

been re/uested.

*EC. #%. No per!it to slauhter has been carabaos shall be ranted by the !unicipal treasurer unless suchani!als are unfit for aricultural "or or for draft purposes, and in no event shall a per!it be iven to slauhter forfood any ani!al of any ind "hich is not fit for hu!an consu!ption.



*EC. #+. The !unicipal treasurer shall eep a record of all per!its for slauhter issued by hi!, and such recordshall sho" the na!e and residence of the o"ner, and the class, se, ae, brands, nots of radiated hair co!!onlyno" as re!olinos or co"lics, and other !ars of identification of the ani!al for the slauhter of "hich per!it isissued and the date on "hich such per!it is issued. Na!es of o"ners shall be alphabetically arraned in therecord, toether "ith date of per!it.

A copy of the record of per!its ranted for slauhter shall be for"arded !onthly to the provincial treasurer, "hoshall file and properly inde the sa!e under the na!e of the o"ner, toether "ith date of per!it.

*EC. ##. Any person slauhterin or causin to be slauhtered for hu!an consu!ption or illin for food at the!unicipal slauhterhouse any lare cattle ecept upon per!it duly secured fro! the !unicipal treasurer, shall bepunished by a fine of not less than ten nor !ore than five hundred pesos, Philippine currency, or by i!prison!entfor not less than one !onth nor !ore than si !onths, or by both such fine and i!prison!ent, in the discretion ofthe court.

(t is contended that the proper construction of the lanuae of these provisions li!its the prohibition contained in section #$and the penalty i!posed in section ## to cases 0%1 of slauhter of lare cattle for hu!an consu!ption in a municipalslaughter "ithout a per!it duly secured fro! the !unicipal treasurer, and 0+1 cases of illin of lare cattle for food in amunicipal slaughterhouse "ithout a per!it duly secured fro! the !unicipal treasurer2 and it is ured that the !unicipality ofCar!en not bein provided "ith a !unicipal slauhterhouse, neither the prohibition nor the penalty is applicable to cases ofslauhter of lare cattle "ithout a per!it in that !unicipality.

3e are of opinion, ho"ever, that the prohibition contained in section #$ refers 0%1 to the slauhter of lare cattle for hu!anconsu!ption, any"here, "ithout a per!it duly secured fro! the !unicipal treasurer, and 0+1 epressly and specifically to theillin for food of lare cattle at a !unicipal slauhterhouse "ithout such per!it2 and that the penalty provided in section ##applies enerally to the slauhter of lare cattle for hu!an consu!ption, any"here, "ithout a per!it duly secured fro! the!unicipal treasurer, and specifically to the illin for food of lare cattle at a !unicipal slauhterhouse "ithout such per!it.

(t !ay be ad!itted at once, that the pertinent lanuae of those sections taen by itself and ea!ined apart fro! the contetfairly ad!its of t"o constructions one "hereby the phrase 4at the !unicipal slauhterhouse4 !ay be taen as li!itin andrestrictin both the "ord 4slauhtered4 and the "ords 4illed for food4 in section #$, and the "ords 4slauhterin or causinto be slauhtered for hu!an consu!ption4 and the "ords 4illin for food4 in section ##2 and the other "hereby the phrase4at the !unicipal slauhterhouse4 !ay be taen as li!itin and restrictin !erely the "ords 4illed for food4 and 4illin forfood4 as used in those sections. But upon a readin of the "hole Act, and eepin in !ind the !anifest and epressedpurpose and ob5ect of its enact!ent, it is very clear that the latter construction is that "hich should be adopted.

The Act pri!arily sees to protect the 4lare cattle4 of the Philippine (slands aainst theft and to !ae easy the recovery andreturn of such cattle to their proper o"ners "hen lost, strayed, or stolen. To this end it provides an elaborate and co!pulsorysyste! for the separate brandin and reistry of o"nership of all such cattle throuhout the (slands, "hereby o"ners areenabled readily and easily to establish their title2 it prohibits and invalidates all transfers of lare cattle unacco!panied bycertificates of transfer issued by the proper officer in the !unicipality "here the contract of sale is !ade2 and it provides alsofor the disposition of thieves or persons unla"fully in possession, so as to protect the rihts of the true o"ners. All this,!anifestly, in order to !ae it difficult for any one but the rihtful o"ner of such cattle to retain the! in his possession or todispose of the! to others. But the usefulness of this elaborate and co!pulsory syste! of identification, restin as it does onthe official reistry of the brands and !ars on each separate ani!al throuhout the (slands, "ould be larely i!paired, ifnot totally destroyed, if such ani!als "ere re/uirin proof of o"nership and the production of certificates of reistry by theperson slauhterin or causin the! to be slauhtered, and this especially if the ani!als "ere slauhtered privately or in aclandestine !anner outside of a !unicipal slauhterhouse. 6ence, as it "ould appear, sections #$ and ## prohibit andpenali)e the slauhter for hu!an consu!ption or illin for food at a !unicipal slauhterhouse of such ani!als "ithout a

per!it issued by the !unicipal treasurer, and section #+ provides for the eepin of detailed records of all such per!its inthe office of the !unicipal and also of the provincial treasurer.

(f, ho"ever, the construction be placed on these sections "hich is contended for by the appellant, it "ill readily be seen thatall these carefully "ored out provisions for the reistry and record of the brands and !ars of identification of all lare cattlein the (slands "ould prove in lare part abortion, since thieves and persons unla"fully in possession of such cattle, andnaturally "ould, evade the provisions of the la" by slauhterin the! outside of !unicipal slauhterhouses, and thus en5oythe fruits of their "rondoin "ithout eposin the!selves to the daner of detection incident to the brinin of the ani!alsto the public slauhterhouse, "here the brands and other identification !ars !iht be scrutini)ed and proof of o"nershipre/uired.

3here the lanuae of a statute is fairly susceptible of t"o or !ore constructions, that construction should be adopted "hich"ill !ost tend to ive effect to the !anifest intent of the la"!aer and pro!ote the ob5ect for "hich the statute "as enacted,

and a construction should be re5ected "hich "ould tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat theob5ect "hich the leislator souht to attain by its enact!ent. 3e are of opinion, therefore, that sections #$ and ## of the Actprohibit and penali)e the slauhterin or causin to be slauhtered for hu!an consu!ption of lare cattle at any place"ithout the per!it provided for in section #$.



(t is not essential that an eplanation be found for the epress prohibition in these sections of the 4illin for food at a!unicipal slauhterhouse4 of such ani!als, despite the fact that this prohibition is clearly included in the eneral prohibitionof the slauhter of such ani!als for hu!an consu!ption any"here2 but it is not i!probable that the re/uire!ent for the issueof a per!it in such cases "as epressly and specifically !entioned out of superabundance of precaution, and to avoid allpossibility of !isunderstandin in the event that so!e of the !unicipalities should be disposed to !odify or vary the eneralprovisions of the la" by the passae of local ordinances or reulations for the control of !unicipal slauhterhouse.

*i!ilar reasonin applied to the specific provisions of section #% of the Act leads to the sa!e conclusion. 7ne of thesecondary purposes of the la", as set out in that section, is to prevent the slauhter for food of carabaos fit for ariculturaland draft purposes, and of all ani!als unfit for hu!an consu!ption. A construction "hich "ould li!it the prohibitions andpenalties prescribed in the statute to the illin of such ani!als in !unicipal slauhterhouses, leavin unprohibited andunpenali)ed their slauhter outside of such establish!ents, so !anifestly tends to defeat the purpose and ob5ect of theleislator, that unless i!peratively de!anded by the lanuae of the statute it should be re5ected2 and, as "e have alreadyindicated, the lanuae of the statute is clearly susceptible of the construction "hich "e have placed upon it, "hich tends to!ae effective the provisions of this as "ell as all the other sections of the Act.

(t appears that the defendant did in fact apply for a per!it to slauhter his carabao, and that it "as denied hi! on the roundthat the ani!al "as not unfit 4for aricultural "or or for draft purposes.4 Counsel for appellant contends that the statute, inso far as it undertaes to penali)e the slauhter of carabaos for hu!an consu!ption as food, "ithout first obtainin a per!it"hich can not be procured in the event that the ani!al is not unfit 4for aricultural "or or draft purposes,4 is unconstitutionaland in violation of the ter!s of section 8 of the Philippine Bill 0Act of Conress, 9uly %, %:$+1, "hich provides that 4no la"shall be enacted "hich shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property "ithout due process of la".4

(t is not /uite clear fro! the aru!ent of counsel "hether his contention is that this provision of the statute constitutes atain of property for public use in the eercise of the riht of e!inent do!ain without providing for the compensation of theowners, or that it is an undue and unauthori)ed eercise of the police po"er of the *tate. But "hatever !ay be the basis ofhis contention, "e are of opinion, appropriatin, "ith necessary !odifications understood, the lanuae of that reat 5urist,Chief 9ustice *ha" 0in the case of Co!. vs. Te"sbury, %% Met., 88, "here the /uestion involved "as the constitutionality ofa statute prohibitin and penali)in the tain or carryin a"ay by any person, includin the o"ner, of any stones, ravel, orsand, fro! any of the beaches in the to"n of Chesea,1 that the la" in /uestion 4is not a tain of the property for public use,"ithin the !eanin of the constitution, but is a 5ust and leiti!ate eercise of the po"er of the leislature to reulate andrestrain such particular use of the property as "ould be inconsistent "ith or in5urious to the rihts of the public. All property isac/uired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to in5ure the e/ual rihts of others or reatly i!pairthe public rihts and interest of the co!!unity.4

(t !ay be conceded that the benificial use and eclusive en5oy!ent of the property of all carabao o"ners in these (slands is

to a reater or less deree interfered "ith by the provisions of the statute2 and that, "ithout in/uirin "hat /uantu! ofinterest thus passes fro! the o"ners of such cattle, it is an interest the deprivation of "hich detracts fro! their riht andauthority, and in so!e deree interferes "ith their eclusive possession and control of their property, so that if thereulations in /uestion "ere enacted for purely private purpose, the statute, in so far as these reulations are concerned,"ould be a violation of the provisions of the Philippine Bill relied on be appellant2 but "e are satisfied that it is not such atain, such an interference "ith the riht and title of the o"ners, as is involved in the eercise by the *tate of the riht ofe!inent do!ain, so as to entitle these o"ners to co!pensation, and that it is no !ore than 4a 5ust restrain of an in5uriousprivate use of the property, "hich the leislature had authority to i!pose.4

(n the case of Co!. vs. Aler 0' Cush., 8#, ;&1, "herein the doctrine laid do"n in Co!. vs. Te"sbury 0supra1 "as revie"edand affir!ed, the sa!e e!inent 5urist "ho "rote the for!er opinion, in distinuishin the eercise of the riht of e!inentdo!ain fro! the eercise of the soverein police po"ers of the *tate, said

3e thin it is settled principle, ro"in out of the nature of "ell-ordered civil society, that every holder of property,ho"ever absolute and un/ualified !ay be his title, holds it under the i!plied liability that his use of it !ay be soreulated that is shall not be in5urious to the e/ual en5oy!ent of others havin an e/ual riht to the en5oy!ent oftheir property, nor in5urious to the rihts of the co!!unity. . . . Rihts of property, lie all other social andconventional rihts, are sub5ect to such reasonable li!itations in their en5oy!ent as shall prevent the! fro! beinin5urious, and to such reasonable restrain and reulations establish by la", as the leislature, under the overninand controllin po"er vested in the! by the constitution, !ay thin necessary and epedient.

This is very different fro! the riht of e!inent do!ain, the riht of a overn!ent to tae and appropriate privateproperty to public use, "henever the public eiency re/uires it2 "hich can be done only on condition of providin areasonable co!pensation therefor. The po"er "e allude to is rather the police po"er, the po"er vested in theleislature by the constitution, to !ae, ordain, and establish all !anner of "holeso!e and reasonable la"s,statutes, and ordinances, either "ith penalties or "ithout, not repunant to the constitution, as they shall 5ude to be

for the ood and "elfare of the co!!on"ealth, and of the sub5ects of the sa!e.

(t is !uch easier to perceive and reali)e the eistence and sources of this po"er than to !ar its boundaries orprescribe li!its to its eercise.



Applyin these principles, "e are opinion that the restrain placed by the la" on the slauhter for hu!an consu!ption ofcarabaos fit for aricultural "or and draft purpose is not an appropriation of property interests to a 4public use,4 and is not,therefore, "ithin the principle of the eercise by the *tate of the riht of e!inent do!ain. (t is fact a !ere restriction orli!itation upon a private use, "hich the leislature dee!ed to be deter!ental to the public "elfare. And "e thin that anea!ination of the eneral provisions of the statute in relation to the public interest "hich it sees to safeuard and thepublic necessities for "hich it provides, leaves no roo! for doubt that the li!itations and restraints i!posed upon theeercise of rihts of o"nership by the particular provisions of the statute under consideration "ere i!posed not for privatepurposes but, strictly, in the pro!otion of the 4eneral "elfare4 and 4the public interest4 in the eercise of the sovereinpolice po"er "hich every *tate possesses for the eneral public "elfare and "hich 4reaches to every species of property"ithin the co!!on"ealth.4

<or several years prior to the enact!ent of the statute a virulent contaious or infectious disease had threatened the totaletinction of carabaos in these (slands, in !any sections s"eepin a"ay seventy, eihty, and in so!e cases as !uch asninety and even one hundred per cent of these ani!als. Ariculture bein the principal occupation of the people, and thecarabao bein the "or ani!al al!ost eclusively in use in the fields as "ell as for draft purposes, the ravaes of thedisease "ith "hich they "ere infected struc an al!ost vital blo" at the !aterial "elfare of the country. lare areas ofproductive land lay "aste for years, and the production of rice, the staple food of the inhabitants of the (slands, fell off tosuch an etent that the i!poverished people "ere co!pelled to spend !any !illions of pesos in its i!portation,not"ithstandin the fact that "ith sufficient "or ani!als to cultivate the fields the arable rice lands of the country couldeasily be !ade to produce a supply !ore that sufficient for its o"n needs. The drain upon the resources of the (slands "assuch that fa!ine soon bean to !ae itself felt, hope san in the breast of the people, and in !any provinces the eneriesof the bread"inners see!ed to be paraly)ed by the apparently hopeless strule for eistence "ith "hich they "ereconfronted.

To !eet these conditions, lare su!s of !oney "ere epended by the =overn!ent in relievin the i!!ediate needs of thestarvin people, three !illions of dollars "ere voted by the Conress of the >nited *tates as a relief or fa!ine fund, public"ors "ere undertaen to furnish e!ploy!ent in the provinces "here the need "as !ost pressin, and every effort !ade toalleviate the sufferin incident to the "idespread failure of the crops throuhout the (slands, due in lare !easure to the lacof ani!als fit for aricultural "or and draft purposes.

*uch !easures, ho"ever, could only te!porarily relieve the situation, because in an aricultural co!!unity !aterialproress and per!anent prosperity could hardly be hoped for in the absence of the "or ani!als upon "hich such aco!!unity !ust necessarily rely for the cultivation of the fields and the transportation of the products of the fields to !aret. Accordinly efforts "ere !ade by the =overn!ent to increase the supply of these ani!als by i!portation, but, as appearsfro! the official reports on this sub5ect, hope for the future depended larely on the conservation of those ani!als "hich hadbeen spared fro! the ravaes of the diseased, and their redistribution throuhout the (slands "here the need for the! "as

reatest.

At lare epense, the services of eperts "ere e!ployed, "ith a vie" to the discovery and applications of preventive andcurative re!edies, and it is hoped that these !easures have proved in so!e deree successful in protectin the presentinade/uate supply of lare cattle, and that the radual increase and redistribution of these ani!als throuhout the Archipelao, in response to the operation of the la"s of supply and de!and, "ill ulti!ately results in practically relievinthose sections "hich suffered !ost by the loss of their "or ani!als.

As "as to be epected under such conditions, the price of carabaos rapidly increase fro! the three to five fold or !ore, andit !ay fairly be presu!ed that even if the conservative !easures no" adopted prove entirely successful, the scant supply"ill eep the price of these ani!als at a hih fiure until the natural increase shall have !ore nearly e/uali)ed the supply tothe de!and.

Coincident "ith and probably inti!ately connected "ith this sudden rise in the price of cattle, the cri!e of cattle stealinbeca!e etre!ely prevalent throuhout the (slands, necessitatin the enact!ent of a special la" penali)in "ith theseverest penalties the theft of carabaos and other personal property by rovin bands2 and it !ust be assu!ed fro! theleislative authority found that the eneral "elfare of the (slands necessitated the enact!ent of special and so!e"hatburdenso!e provisions for the brandin and reistration of lare cattle, and supervision and restriction of their slauhter forfood. (t "ill hardly be /uestioned that the provisions of the statute touchin the brandin and reistration of such cattle, andprohibitin and penali)in the slauhter of diseased cattle for food "ere enacted in the due and proper eercise of the policepo"er of the *tate2 and "e are of opinion that, under all the circu!stances, the provision of the statute prohibitin andpenali)in the slauhter for hu!an consu!ption of carabaos fit for "or "ere in lie !anner enacted in the due and propereercise of that po"er, 5ustified by the eient necessities of eistin conditions, and the riht of the *tate to protect itselfaainst the over"hel!in disaster incident to the further reduction of the supply of ani!als fit for aricultural "or or draftpurposes.

(t is, "e thin, a fact of co!!on no"lede in these (slands, and disclosed by the official reports and records of thead!inistrative and leislative depart!ents of the =overn!ent, that not !erely the !aterial "elfare and future prosperity ofthis aricultural co!!unity "ere threatened by the ravaes of the disease "hich s"ept a"ay the "or ani!als durin theyears prior to the enact!ent of the la" under consideration, but that the very life and eistence of the inhabitants of these(slands as a civili)ed people "ould be !ore or less i!periled by the continued destruction of lare cattle by disease orother"ise. Confronted by such conditions, there can be no doubt of the riht of the ?eislature to adopt reasonable



!easures for the preservation of "or ani!als, even to the etent of prohibitin and penali)in "hat "ould, under ordinaryconditions, be a perfectly leiti!ate and proper eercise of rihts of o"nership and control of the private property of theciti)en. The police po"er rests upon necessity and the riht of self-protection and if ever the invasion of private property bypolice reulation can be 5ustified, "e thin that the reasonable restriction placed upon the use of carabaos by the provisionof the la" under discussion !ust be held to be authori)ed as a reasonable and proper eercise of that po"er.

As stated by Mr. 9ustice Bro"n in his opinion in the case of awton vs. !teele 0%8+ >.*., %##, %#@1

The etent and li!its of "hat is no"n as the police po"er have been a fruitful sub5ect of discussion in the appellate

courts of nearly every *tate in the >nion. (t is universally conceded to include everythin essential to the publicsafely, health, and !orals, and to 5ustify the destruction or abate!ent, by su!!ary proceedins, of "hatever !aybe rearded as a public nuisance. >nder this po"er it has been held that the *tate !ay order the destruction of ahouse fallin to decay or other"ise endanerin the lives of passers-by2 the de!olition of such as are in the path ofa conflaration2 the slauhter of diseased cattle2 the destruction of decayed or un"holeso!e food2 the prohibition of "ooden buildins in cities2 the reulation of rail"ays and other !eans of public conveyance, and of inter!ents inburial rounds2 the restriction of ob5ectionable trades to certain localities2 the co!pulsary vaccination of children2 theconfine!ent of the insane or those afficted "ith contaious deceases2 the restraint of varants, bears, andhabitual drunards2 the suppression of obscene publications and houses of ill fa!e2 and the prohibition of a!blinhouses and places "here intoicatin li/uors are sold. "eyond this, however, the !tate may interfere wherever the pu#lic interests demand it, and in this particular a large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature todetermine, not only what the interests of the pu#lic re$uire, #ut what measures are necessary for the protection ofsuch interests. 0Barbier vs. Connolly, %%# >. *., +'2 idd vs. Pearson, %+; >. *., %.1 To 5ustify the *tate in thusinterposin its authority in behalf of the public, it !ust appear, first, that the interests of the public enerally, as

distinuished fro! those of a particular class, re/uire such interference2 and, second, that the !eans arereasonably necessary for the acco!plish!ent of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Theleislature !ay not, under the uise of protectin the public interests, arbitrarily interfere "ith private business, ori!pose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon la"ful occupations. (n other "ords, its deter!ination as to "hatis a proper eercise of its police po"ers is not final or conclusive, but is sub5ect to the supervision of the court.

<ro! "hat has been said, "e thin it is clear that the enact!ent of the provisions of the statute under consideration "asre/uired by 4the interests of the public enerally, as distinuished fro! those of a particular class24 and that the prohibition of the slauhter of carabaos for hu!an consu!ption, so lon as these ani!als are fit for aricultural "or or draft purposes"as a 4reasonably necessary4 li!itation on private o"nership, to protect the co!!unity fro! the loss of the services of suchani!als by their slauhter by i!provident o"ners, te!pted either by reed of !o!entary ain, or by a desire to en5oy theluury of ani!al food, even "hen by so doin the productive po"er of the co!!unity !ay be !easurably and danerouslyaffected.

Chief 9ustice Redfield, in Thorpe vs. Rutland Burlinton R. R. Co. 0+' t., %&$1, said 0p. %&:1 that by this 4eneral policepo"er of the *tate, persons and property are sub5ected to all inds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the eneralco!fort, health, and prosperity of the *tate2 of the perfect riht in the leislature to do "hich no /uestion ever "as, or, uponacno"lede and eneral principles, ever can be !ade, so far as natural persons are concerned.4

And Cooley in his 4Constitutional ?i!itations4 0@th ed., p. '#;1 says

(t "ould be /uite i!possible to enu!erate all the instances in "hich the police po"er is or !ay be eercised,because the various cases in "hich the eercise by one individual of his rihts !ay conflict "ith a si!ilar eerciseby others, or !ay be detri!ental to the public order or safety, are infinite in nu!ber and in variety. And there areother cases "here it beco!es necessary for the public authorities to interfere "ith the control by individuals of theirproperty, and even to destroy it, "here the o"ners the!selves have fully observed all their duties to their fello"s

and to the *tate, but "here, nevertheless, so!e controllin public necessity de!ands the interference ordestruction. A stron instance of this description is "here it beco!es necessary to tae, use, or destroy the privateproperty of individuals to prevent the spreadin of a fire, the ravaes of a pestilence, the advance of a hostile ar!y,or any other reat public cala!ity. 6ere the individual is in no deree in fault, but his interest !ust yield to that4necessity4 "hich 4no"s no la".4 The establish!ent of li!its "ithin the denser portions of cities and villaes "ithin"hich buildins constructed of infla!!able !aterials shall not be erected or repaired !ay also, in so!e cases, bee/uivalent to a destruction of private property2 but reulations for this purpose have been sustained not"ithstandinthis result. 3harf lines !ay also be established for the eneral ood, even thouh they prevent the o"ners of "ater-fronts fro! buildin out on soil "hich constitutes private property. And, "henever the leislature dee! it necessaryto the protection of a harbor to forbid the re!oval of stones, ravel, or sand fro! the beach, they !ay establishreulations to that effect under penalties, and !ae the! applicable to the o"ners of the soil e/ually "ith otherpersons. *uch reulations are only 4a 5ust restraint of an in5urious use of property, "hich the leislature haveauthority4 to i!pose.

*o a particular use of property !ay so!eti!es be forbidden, "here, by a chane of circu!stances, and "ithout thefault of the po"er, that "hich "as once la"ful, proper, and unob5ectionable has no" beco!e a public nuisance,endanerin the public health or the public safety. Millda!s are so!eti!es destroyed upon this rounds2 andchurchyards "hich prove, in the advance of urban population, to be detri!ental to the public health, or in daner ofbeco!in so, are liable to be closed aainst further use for ce!etery purposes.



These citations fro! so!e of the hihest 5udicial and tet-boo authorities in the >nited *tates clearly indicate the "idescope and etent "hich has there been iven to the doctrine us in our opinion that the provision of the statute in /uestionbein a proper eercise of that po"er is not in violation of the ter!s of section 8 of the Philippine Bill, "hich provide that 4nola" shall be enacted "hich shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property "ithout due process of la",4 a provision "hichitself is adopted fro! the Constitution of the >nited *tates, and is found in substance in the constitution of !ost if not all ofthe *tates of the >nion.

The 5ud!ent of conviction and the sentence i!posed by the trial court should be affir!ed "ith the costs of this instanceaainst the appellant. *o ordered.

Arellano, %.., 'orres, ohnson, (oreland and )lliott, ., concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-2#69$ Ju%y $1, 196&

ERMIT!-M!L!TE HOTEL !N MOTEL OPER!TORS !SSOCI!TION, INC., HOTEL EL M!R INC. an' GOCHIU, petitioners-appellees,

vs.

THE HONOR!"LE CIT( M!(OR O) M!NIL!, respondent-appellant.*ICTOR !L!"!N+!, intervenor-appellee.

*angani#an, A#ad and Associates aw +ffice for respondent-appellant.

. (. Aruego, 'enchavez and Associates for intervenor-appellee.

)ERN!NO, J.:

The principal /uestion in this appeal fro! a 5ud!ent of the lo"er court in an action for prohibition is "hether 7rdinance No.

&'@$ of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause. The lo"er court held that it is and ad5uded it

4unconstitutional, and, therefore, null and void.4 <or reasons to be !ore specifically set forth, such 5ud!ent !ust be

reversed, there bein a failure of the re/uisite sho"in to sustain an attac aainst its validity.

The petition for prohibition aainst 7rdinance No. &'@$ "as filed on 9uly 8, %:@# by the petitioners, Er!ita-Malate 6otel and

Motel 7perators Association, one of its !e!bers, 6otel del Mar (nc., and a certain =o Chiu, "ho is 4the president and

eneral !anaer of the second petitioner4 aainst the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila "ho "as sued in his capacity

as such 4chared "ith the eneral po"er and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to ive the necessary

orders for the faithful eecution and enforce!ent of such ordinances.4 0par. %1. (t "as alleed that the petitioner non-stoc

corporation is dedicated to the pro!otion and protection of the interest of its eihteen 0%;1 !e!bers 4operatin hotels and

!otels, characteri)ed as leiti!ate businesses duly licensed by both national and city authorities, reularly payin taes,

e!ployin and ivin livelihood to not less than +,8$$ person and representin an invest!ent of !ore than P# !illion.4 % 0par.

+1. (t "as then alleed that on 9une %#, %:@#, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted 7rdinance No. &'@$,

approved on 9une %&, %:@# by the then ice-Mayor 6er!inio Astora, "ho "as at the ti!e actin as Mayor of the City of

Manila. 0par. #1.

After "hich the alleed rievances aainst the ordinance "ere set forth in detail. There "as the assertion of its bein beyond

the po"ers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it "ould reulate !otels, on the round that in the

revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other la", no reference is !ade to !otels2 that *ection % of the challened

ordinance is unconstitutional and void for bein unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it "ould i!pose



P@,$$$.$$ fee per annu! for first class !otels and P&,8$$.$$ for second class !otels2 that the provision in the sa!e section

"hich "ould re/uire the o"ner, !anaer, eeper or duly authori)ed representative of a hotel, !otel, or lodin house to

refrain fro! entertainin or acceptin any uest or custo!er or lettin any roo! or other /uarter to any person or persons

"ithout his fillin up the prescribed for! in a lobby open to public vie" at all ti!es and in his presence, "herein the

surna!e, iven na!e and !iddle na!e, the date of birth, the address, the occupation, the se, the nationality, the lenth of

stay and the nu!ber of co!panions in the roo!, if any, "ith the na!e, relationship, ae and se "ould be specified, "ith

data furnished as to his residence certificate as "ell as his passport nu!ber, if any, coupled "ith a certification that a person

sinin such for! has personally filled it up and affied his sinature in the presence of such o"ner, !anaer, eeper or duly

authori)ed representative, "ith such reistration for!s and records ept and bound toether, it also bein provided that the

pre!ises and facilities of such hotels, !otels and lodin houses "ould be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or

the Chief of Police, or their duly authori)ed representatives is unconstitutional and void aain on due process rounds, not

only for bein arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also for bein vaue, indefinite and uncertain, and lie"ise for the

alleed invasion of the riht to privacy and the uaranty aainst self-incri!ination2 that *ection + of the challened ordinance

classifyin !otels into t"o classes and re/uirin the !aintenance of certain !ini!u! facilities in first class !otels such as a

telephone in each roo!, a dinin roo! or, restaurant and laundry si!ilarly offends aainst the due process clause for bein

arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive, a conclusion "hich applies to the portion of the ordinance re/uirin second class

!otels to have a dinin roo!2 that the provision of *ection + of the challened ordinance prohibitin a person less than %;

years old fro! bein accepted in such hotels, !otels, lodin houses, tavern or co!!on inn unless acco!panied by

parents or a la"ful uardian and !ain it unla"ful for the o"ner, !anaer, eeper or duly authori)ed representative of such

establish!ents to lease any roo! or portion thereof !ore than t"ice every +& hours, runs counter to the due process

uaranty for lac of certainty and for its unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character2 and that insofar as the penaltyprovided for in *ection & of the challened ordinance for a subse/uent conviction "ould, cause the auto!atic cancellation of

the license of the offended party, in effect causin the destruction of the business and loss of its invest!ents, there is once

aain a transression of the due process clause.

There "as a plea for the issuance of preli!inary in5unction and for a final 5ud!ent declarin the above ordinance null and

void and unenforceable. The lo"er court on 9uly @, %:@# issued a "rit of preli!inary in5unction orderin respondent Mayor to

refrain fro! enforcin said 7rdinance No. &'@$ fro! and after 9uly ;, %:@#.

(n the a ans"er filed on Auust #, %:@#, there "as an ad!ission of the personal circu!stances reardin the respondent

Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are licensed to enae in the hotel or !otel business in the City of Manila, of the

provisions of the cited 7rdinance but a denial of its alleed nullity, "hether on statutory or constitutional rounds. After

settin forth that the petition did fail to state a cause of action and that the challened ordinance bears a reasonable relation,to a proper purpose, "hich is to curb i!!orality, a valid and proper eercise of the police po"er and that only the uests or

custo!ers not before the court could co!plain of the alleed invasion of the riht to privacy and the uaranty aainst self

incri!ination, "ith the assertion that the issuance of the preli!inary in5unction e parte "as contrary to la", respondent

Mayor prayed for, its dissolution and the dis!issal of the petition.

(nstead of evidence bein offered by both parties, there "as sub!itted a stipulation of facts dated *epte!ber +;, %:@&,

"hich reads

%. That the petitioners Er!ita-Malate 6otel and Motel 7perators Association, (nc. and 6otel del Mar (nc. are duly

orani)ed and eistin under the la"s of the Philippines, both "ith offices in the City of Manila, "hile the petitioner

=o Chin is the president and eneral !anaer of 6otel del Mar (nc., and the intervenor ictor Alaban)a is a resident

of Bauio City, all havin the capacity to sue and be sued2

+. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incu!bent City Mayor and chief eecutive of the City of Manila

chared "ith the eneral po"er and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to ive the necessary

orders for the faithful eecution and enforce!ent of such ordinances2

#. That the petitioners are duly licensed to enae in the business of operatin hotels and !otels in Malate and

Er!ita districts in Manila2

&. That on 9une %#, %:@#, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted 7rdinance No. &'@$, "hich "as

approved on 9une %&, %:@#, by ice-Mayor 6er!inio Astora, then the actin City Mayor of Manila, in the absence

of the respondent reular City Mayor, a!endin sections @@%, @@+, @@;-a, @@;-b and @@: of the co!pilation of theordinances of the City of Manila besides insertin therein three ne" sections. This ordinance is si!ilar to the one

vetoed by the respondent Mayor 0Anne A1 for the reasons stated in its &th (ndorse!ent dated <ebruary %8, %:@#

0Anne B12



8. That the eplanatory note sined by then Councilor 6er!inio Astora "as sub!itted "ith the proposed ordinance

0no" 7rdinance &'@$1 to the Municipal Board, copy of "hich is attached hereto as Anne C2

@. That the City of Manila derived in %:@# an annual inco!e of P%$%,:$&.$8 fro! license fees paid by the %$8

hotels and !otels 0includin herein petitioners1 operatin in the City of Manila. wph/.01t

Thereafter ca!e a !e!orandu! for respondent on 9anuary ++, %:@8, "herein stress "as laid on the presu!ption of the

validity of the challened ordinance, the burden of sho"in its lac of confor!ity to the Constitution restin on the party "ho

assails it, citin not only 2.!. v. !alaveria, but lie"ise applicable A!erican authorities. *uch a !e!orandu! lie"iserefuted point by point the aru!ents advanced by petitioners aainst its validity. Then barely t"o "ees later, on <ebruary &,

%:@8, the !e!orandu! for petitioners "as filed reiteratin in detail "hat "as set forth in the petition, "ith citations of "hat

they considered to be applicable A!erican authorities and prayin for a 5ud!ent declarin the challened ordinance 4null

and void and unenforceable4 and !ain per!anent the "rit of preli!inary in5unction issued.

After referrin to the !otels and hotels, "hich are !e!bers of the petitioners association, and referrin to the alleed

constitutional /uestions raised by the party, the lo"er court observed 4The only re!ainin issue here bein purely a

/uestion of la", the parties, "ith the nod of the Court, areed to file !e!oranda and thereafter, to sub!it the case for

decision of the Court.4 (t does appear obvious then that "ithout any evidence sub!itted by the parties, the decision passed

upon the alleed infir!ity on constitutional rounds of the challened ordinance, dis!issin as is undoubtedly riht and

proper the untenable ob5ection on the alleed lac of authority of the City of Manila to reulate !otels, and ca!e to the

conclusion that 4the challened 7rdinance No. &'@$ of the City of Manila, "ould be unconstitutional and, therefore, null andvoid.4 (t !ade per!anent the preli!inary in5unction issued aainst respondent Mayor and his aents 4to restrain hi! fro!

enforcin the ordinance in /uestion.4 6ence this appeal.

As noted at the outset, the 5ud!ent !ust be reversed. A decent reard for constitutional doctrines of a funda!ental

character ouht to have ad!onished the lo"er court aainst such a s"eepin conde!nation of the challened ordinance. (ts

decision cannot be allo"ed to stand, consistently "ith "hat has hitherto been the accepted standards of constitutional

ad5udication, in both procedural and substantive aspects.

Pri!arily "hat calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the presu!ption of validity that

attaches to a challened statute or ordinance. As "as epressed cateorically by 9ustice Malcol! 4The presu!ption is all in

favor of validity . The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lihtly set aside. The councilors

!ust, in the very nature of thins, be fa!iliar "ith the necessities of their particular !unicipality and "ith all the facts and

circu!stances "hich surround the sub5ect and necessitate action. The local leislative body, by enactin the ordinance, has

in effect iven notice that the reulations are essential to the "ell bein of the people . The 9udiciary should not lihtly

set aside leislative action "hen there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rihts under the uise of police

reulation.+

(t ad!its of no doubt therefore that there bein a presu!ption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable,

unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face "hich is not the case here. The principle has been no"here better

epressed than in the leadin case of +3Gorman & 4oung v. 5artford 6ire 7nsurance %o.,# "here the A!erican *upre!e

Court throuh 9ustice Brandeis tersely and succinctly su!!ed up the !atter thus The statute here /uestioned deals "ith a

sub5ect clearly "ithin the scope of the police po"er. 3e are ased to declare it void on the round that the specific !ethod of

reulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of la". As underlyin /uestions of fact!ay condition the constitutionality of leislation of this character, the resu!ption of constitutionality !ust prevail in the

absence of so!e factual foundation of record for overthro"in the statute.4 No such factual foundation bein laid in the

present case, the lo"er court decidin the !atter on the pleadins and the stipulation of facts, the presu!ption of validity

!ust prevail and the 5ud!ent aainst the ordinance set aside.

Nor !ay petitioners assert "ith plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally defective as bein repunant to the due

process clause of the Constitution. The !antle of protection associated "ith the due process uaranty does not cover

petitioners. This particular !anifestation of a police po"er !easure bein specifically ai!ed to safeuard public !orals is

i!!une fro! such i!putation of nullity restin purely on con5ecture and unsupported by anythin of substance. To hold

other"ise "ould be to unduly restrict and narro" the scope of police po"er "hich has been properly characteri)ed as the

!ost essential, insistent and the least li!itable of po"ers,&etendin as it does 4to all the reat public needs.48 (t "ould be, to

paraphrase another leadin decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allo"ed itself to bedeprived of its co!petence to pro!ote public health, public !orals, public safety and the enera "elfare.@ Neatively put,

police po"er is 4that inherent and plenary po"er in the *tate "hich enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full to the co!fort,

safety, and "elfare of society.'



There is no /uestion but that the challened ordinance "as precisely enacted to !ini!i)e certain practices hurtful to public

!orals. The eplanatory note of the Councilor 6er!inio Astora included as anne to the stipulation of facts, speas of the

alar!in increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in reat part to the eistence of

!otels, "hich 4provide a necessary at!osphere for clandestine entry, presence and eit4 and thus beco!e the 4ideal haven

for prostitutes and thrill-seeers.4 The challened ordinance then proposes to chec the clandestine harborin of transients

and uests of these establish!ents by re/uirin these transients and uests to f ill up a reistration for!, prepared for the

purpose, in a lobby open to public vie" at all ti!es, and by introducin several other a!endatory provisions calculated to

shatter the privacy that characteri)es the reistration of transients and uests.4 Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees

"as intended to discourae 4establish!ents of the ind fro! operatin for purpose other than leal4 and at the sa!e ti!e, to

increase 4the inco!e of the city overn!ent.4 (t "ould appear therefore that the stipulation of facts, far fro! sustainin any

attac aainst the validity of the ordinance, arues elo/uently for it.

(t is a fact "orth notin that this Court has invariably sta!ped "ith the seal of its approval, ordinances punishin varancy

and classifyin a pi!p or procurer as a varant2 ; provide a license ta for and reulatin the !aintenance or operation of

public dance halls2: prohibitin a!blin2%$ prohibitin 5ueten2%% and !onte2%+prohibitin playin of panuinui on days other

than *undays or leal holidays2%# prohibitin the operation of pinball !achines2%& and prohibitin any person fro! eepin,

conductin or !aintainin an opiu! 5oint or visitin a place "here opiu! is s!oed or other"ise used,%8 all of "hich are

intended to protect public !orals.

7n the leislative orans of the overn!ent, "hether national or local, pri!arily rest the eercise of the police po"er, "hich,

it cannot be too often e!phasi)ed, is the po"er to prescribe reulations to pro!ote the health, !orals, peace, ood order,safety and eneral "elfare of the people. (n vie" of the re/uire!ents of due process, e/ual protection and other applicable

constitutional uaranties ho"ever, the eercise of such police po"er insofar as it !ay affect the life, liberty or property of any

person is sub5ect to 5udicial in/uiry. 3here such eercise of police po"er !ay be considered as either capricious, "hi!sical,

un5ust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional uaranty !ay call for

correction by the courts.

3e are thus led to considerin the insistent, al!ost shrill tone, in "hich the ob5ection is raised to the /uestion of due

process.%@ There is no controllin and precise definition of due process. (t furnishes thouh a standard to "hich the

overn!ental action should confor! in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid.

3hat then is the standard of due process "hich !ust eist both as a procedural and a substantive re/uisite to free the

challened ordinance, or any overn!ental action for that !atter, fro! the i!putation of leal infir!ity sufficient to spell its

doo!D (t is responsiveness to the supre!acy of reason, obedience to the dictates of 5ustice. Neatively put, arbitrariness isruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process re/uire!ent, official action, to paraphrase Cardo)o, !ust not

outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. ue process is thus hostile to any official action !arred by lac

of reasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as freedo! fro! arbitrariness. (t is the e!bodi!ent of the sportin idea of

fair play.%' (t eacts fealty 4to those strivins for 5ustice4 and 5udes the act of officialdo! of "hatever branch 4in the liht of

reason dra"n fro! considerations of fairness that reflect Fde!ocraticG traditions of leal and political thouht.4%; (t is not a

narro" or 4technical conception "ith fied content unrelated to ti!e, place and circu!stances,4 %: decisions based on such a

clause re/uirin a 4close and perceptive in/uiry into funda!ental principles of our society.4+$ Huestions of due process are

not to be treated narro"ly or pedantically in slavery to for! or phrases.+%

(t "ould thus be an affront to reason to sti!ati)e an ordinance enacted precisely to !eet "hat a !unicipal la"!ain body

considers an evil of rather serious proportion an arbitrary and capricious eercise of authority. (t "ould see! that "hat

should be dee!ed unreasonable and "hat "ould a!ount to an abdication of the po"er to overn is inaction in the face of

an ad!itted deterioration of the state of public !orals. To be !ore specific, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt the

need for a re!edial !easure. (t provided it "ith the enact!ent of the challened ordinance. A stron case !ust be found in

the records, and, as has been set forth, none is even atte!pted here to attach to an ordinance of such character the taint of

nullity for an alleed failure to !eet the due process re/uire!ent. Nor does it lend any se!blance even of deceptive

plausibility to petitionersI indict!ent of 7rdinance No. &'@$ on due process rounds to sinle out such features as the

increased fees for !otels and hotels, the curtail!ent of the area of freedo! to contract, and, in certain particulars, its alleed

vaueness.

Ad!ittedly there "as a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the challened ordinance for hotels and

!otels, %8$J for the for!er and over +$$J for the latter, first-class !otels bein re/uired to pay a P@,$$$ annual fee and

second-class !otels, P&,8$$ yearly. (t has been the settled la" ho"ever, as far bac as %:++ that !unicipal license feescould be classified into those i!posed for reulatin occupations or reular enterprises, for the reulation or restriction of

non-useful occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes only.++ As "as eplained !ore in detail in the above Cu

>n5ien case 0+1 ?icenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police po"er and the riht to eact a fee

!ay be i!plied fro! the po"er to license and reulate, but in f iin a!ount of the license fees the !unicipal corporations



are allo"ed a !uch "ider discretion in this class of cases than in the for!er, and aside fro! applyin the "ell-no"n leal

principle that !unicipal ordinances !ust not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a eneral rule,

declined to interfere "ith such discretion. The desirability of i!posin restraint upon the nu!ber of persons "ho !iht

other"ise enae in non-useful enterprises is, of course, enerally an i!portant factor in the deter!ination of the a!ount of

this ind of license fee. 6ence license fees clearly in the nature of privilee taes for revenue have fre/uently been upheld,

especially in of licenses for the sale of li/uors. (n fact, in the latter cases the fees have rarely been declared unreasonable. +#

Moreover in the e/ually leadin case of utz v. Araneta+& this Court affir!ed the doctrine earlier announced by the A!erican

*upre!e Court that taation !ay be !ade to i!ple!ent the stateIs police po"er. 7nly the other day, this Court hadoccasion to affir! that the broad tain authority conferred by the ?ocal Autono!y Act of %:8: to cities and !unicipalities is

sufficiently plenary to cover a "ide rane of sub5ects "ith the only li!itation that the ta so levied is for public purposes, 5ust

and unifor!.+8

As a !atter of fact, even "ithout reference to the "ide latitude en5oyed by the City of Manila in i!posin licenses for

revenue, it has been eplicitly held in one case that 4!uch discretion is iven to !unicipal corporations in deter!inin the

a!ount,4 here the license fee of the operator of a !assae clinic, even if it "ere vie"ed purely as a police po"er

!easure.+@ The discussion of this particular !atter !ay fitly close "ith this pertinent citation fro! another decision of

sinificance 4(t is ured on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees that the enforce!ent of the ordinance could deprive the! of

their la"ful occupation and !eans of livelihood because they can not rent stalls in the public !arets. But it appears that

plaintiffs are also dealers in refrierated or cold storae !eat, the sale of "hich outside the city !arets under certain

conditions is per!itted . And surely, the !ere fact, that so!e individuals in the co!!unity !ay be deprived of theirpresent business or a particular !ode of earnin a livin cannot prevent the eercise of the police po"er. As "as said in a

case, persons licensed to pursue occupations "hich !ay in the public need and interest be affected by the eercise of the

police po"er e!bar in these occupations sub5ect to the disadvantaes "hich !ay result fro! the leal eercise of that

po"er.4+'

Nor does the restriction on the freedo! to contract, insofar as the challened ordinance !aes it unla"ful for the o"ner,

!anaer, eeper or duly authori)ed representative of any hotel, !otel, lodin house, tavern, co!!on inn or the lie, to

lease or rent roo! or portion thereof !ore than t"ice every +& hours, "ith a proviso that in all cases full pay!ent shall be

chared, call for a different conclusion. Aain, such a li!itation cannot be vie"ed as a transression aainst the co!!and of

due process. (t is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it "as intended to curb the opportunity for the i!!oral or

illeiti!ate use to "hich such pre!ises could be, and, accordin to the eplanatory note, are bein devoted. 6o" could it

then be arbitrary or oppressive "hen there appears a correspondence bet"een the undeniable eistence of an undesirablesituation and the leislative atte!pt at correction. Moreover, petitioners cannot be una"are that every reulation of conduct

a!ounts to curtail!ent of liberty "hich as pointed out by 9ustice Malcol! cannot be absolute. Thus 47ne thouht "hich

runs throuh all these different conceptions of liberty is plainly apparent. (t is this I?ibertyI as understood in de!ocracies, is

not license2 it is Iliberty reulated by la".I (!plied in the ter! is restraint by la" for the ood of the individual and for the

reater ood of the peace and order of society and the eneral "ell-bein. No !an can do eactly as he pleases. Every !an

!ust renounce unbridled license. The riht of the individual is necessarily sub5ect to reasonable restraint by eneral la" for

the co!!on ood The liberty of the citi)en !ay be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order

and safety, or other"ise "ithin the proper scope of the police po"er.4+;

A si!ilar observation "as !ade by 9ustice ?aurel 4Public "elfare, then, lies at the botto! of the enact!ent of said la", and

the state in order to pro!ote the eneral "elfare !ay interfere "ith personal liberty, "ith property, and "ith business and

occupations. Persons and property !ay be sub5ected to all inds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the eneral

co!fort, health, and prosperity of the state To this funda!ental ai! of our =overn!ent the rihts of the individual are

subordinated. ?iberty is a blessin "ithout "hich life is a !isery, but liberty should not be !ade to prevail over authority

because then society "ill fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be !ade to prevail over liberty because then the

individual "ill fall into slavery. The citi)en should achieve the re/uired balance of liberty and authority in his !ind throuh

education and personal discipline, so that there !ay be established the resultant e/uilibriu!, "hich !eans peace and order

and happiness for all.+:

(t is note"orthy that the only decision of this Court nullifyin leislation because of undue deprivation of freedo! to

contract, *eople v. *omar ,#$ no loner 4retains its virtuality as a livin principle. The policy of laissez faire has to so!e etent

iven "ay to the assu!ption by the overn!ent of the riht of intervention even in contractual relations affected "ith public

interest.#%

3hat !ay be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved "ere freedo! of the !ind or the person, thestandard for the validity of overn!ental acts is !uch !ore riorous and eactin, but "here the liberty curtailed affects at

the !ost rihts of property, the per!issible scope of reulatory !easure is "ider.#+ 6o" 5ustify then the alleation of a denial

of due processD



?astly, there is the atte!pt to i!pun the ordinance on another due process round by invoin the principles of vaueness

or uncertainty. (t "ould appear fro! a recital in the petition itself that "hat see!s to be the rava!en of the alleed

rievance is that the provisions are too detailed and specific rather than vaue or uncertain. Petitioners, ho"ever, point to

the re/uire!ent that a uest should ive the na!e, relationship, ae and se of the co!panion or co!panions as indefinite

and uncertain in vie" of the necessity for deter!inin "hether the co!panion or co!panions referred to are those arrivin

"ith the custo!er or uest at the ti!e of the reistry or enterin the roo! 3ith hi! at about the sa!e ti!e or co!in at any

indefinite ti!e later to 5oin hi!2 a proviso in one of its sections "hich cast doubt as to "hether the !aintenance of a

restaurant in a !otel is dependent upon the discretion of its o"ners or operators2 another proviso "hich fro! their

standpoint "ould re/uire a uess as to "hether the 4full rate of pay!ent4 to be chared for every such lease thereof !eans

a full dayIs or !erely a half-dayIs rate. (t !ay be ased, do these alleations suffice to render the ordinance void on its face

for alleed vaueness or uncertaintyD To as the /uestion is to ans"er it. <ro! %onnally v. General %onstruction

%o.## to Adderley v. 6lorida,#& the principle has been consistently upheld that "hat !aes a statute susceptible to such a

chare is an enact!ent either forbiddin or re/uirin the doin of an act that !en of co!!on intellience !ust necessarily

uess at its !eanin and differ as to its application. (s this the situation before usD A citation fro! 9ustice 6ol!es "ould

prove illu!inatin 43e aree to all the eneralities about not supplyin cri!inal la"s "ith "hat they o!it but there is no

canon aainst usin co!!on sense in construin la"s as sayin "hat they obviously !ean.4#8

That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, "ith all due allo"ance for the aru!ents pressed "ith such vior and

deter!ination, the attac aainst the validity of the challened ordinance cannot be considered a success. <ar fro! it.

Respect for constitutional la" principles so unifor!ly held and so uninterruptedly adhered to by this Court co!pels a

reversal of the appealed decision.

3herefore, the 5ud!ent of the lo"er court is reversed and the in5unction issued lifted forth"ith. 3ith costs.

Reyes, .".., (a8alintal, "engzon, .*., 9aldivar, !anchez, %astro and Angeles, ., concur.

%oncepcion, %.. and Dizon, ., are on leave.


SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-11$90 Mar 26, 191



EL "!NCO ESP!/OL-)ILIPINO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.

*ICENTE P!L!NC!, a'n3ra3or o4 3 3a3 o4 Enrao Pa%ana Tan7unyn, defendant-appellant.

Ait8en and De!elms for appellant.

5artigan and :elch for appellee.

STREET, J.8

This action "as instituted upon March #%, %:$;, by 4El Banco Espanol-<ilipino4 to foreclose a !ortae upon various

parcels of real property situated in the city of Manila. The !ortae in /uestion is dated 9une %@, %:$@, and "as eecuted by

the oriinal defendant herein, Enracio Palanca Tan/uinyen y ?i!/uinco, as security for a debt o"in by hi! to the ban.

>pon March #%, %:$@, the debt a!ounted to P+%;,+:&.%$ and "as dra"in interest at the rate of ; per centu! per annu!,

payable at the end of each /uarter. (t appears that the parties to this !ortae at that ti!e esti!ated the value of the

property in /uestion at P+:+,88;, "hich "as about P'8,$$$ in ecess of the indebtedness. After the eecution of this

instru!ent by the !ortaor, he returned to China "hich appears to have been his native country2 and he there died, upon

9anuary +:, %;%$, "ithout aain returnin to the Philippine (slands.

As the defendant "as a nonresident at the ti!e of the institution of the present action, it "as necessary for the plaintiff in the

foreclosure proceedin to ive notice to the defendant by publication pursuant to section #:: of the Code of Civil Procedure.

An order for publication "as accordinly obtained fro! the court, and publication "as !ade in due for! in a ne"spaper ofthe city of Manila. At the sa!e ti!e that the order of the court should deposit in the post office in a sta!ped envelope a copy

of the su!!ons and co!plaint directed to the defendant at his last place of residence, to "it, the city of A!oy, in the E!pire

of China. This order "as !ade pursuant to the follo"in provision contained in section #:: of the Code of Civil Procedure

(n case of publication, "here the residence of a nonresident or absent defendant is no"n, the 5ude !ust direct a

copy of the su!!ons and co!plaint to be forth"ith deposited by the cler in the post-office, postae prepaid,

directed to the person to be served, at his place of residence

3hether the cler co!plied "ith this order does not affir!atively appear. There is, ho"ever, a!on the papers pertainin to

this case, an affidavit, dated April &, %:$;, sined by Bernardo Chan y =arcia, an e!ployee of the attorneys of the ban,

sho"in that upon that date he had deposited in the Manila post-office a reistered letter, addressed to Enracio Palanca

Tan/uinyen, at Manila, containin copies of the co!plaint, the plaintiffIs affidavit, the su!!ons, and the order of the court

directin publication as aforesaid. (t appears fro! the post!asterIs receipt that Bernardo probably used an envelope

obtained fro! the clerIs office, as the receipt purports to sho" that the letter e!anated fro! the office.

The cause proceeded in usual course in the Court of <irst (nstance2 and the defendant not havin appeared, 5ud!ent "as,

upon 9uly +, %:$;, taen aainst hi! by default. >pon 9uly #, %:$;, a decision "as rendered in favor of the plaintiff. (n this

decision it "as recited that publication had been properly !ade in a periodical, but nothin "as said about this notice havin

been iven !ail. The court, upon this occasion, found that the indebtedness of the defendant a!ounted to P+&:,#88. #+,

"ith interest fro! March #%, %:$;. Accordinly it "as ordered that the defendant should, on or before 9uly @, %:$;, deliver

said a!ount to the cler of the court to be applied to the satisfaction of the 5ud!ent, and it "as declared that in case of the

failure of the defendant to satisfy the 5ud!ent "ithin such period, the !ortae property located in the city of Manila should

be eposed to public sale. The pay!ent conte!plated in said order "as never !ade2 and upon 9uly ;, %:$;, the courtordered the sale of the property. The sale too place upon 9uly #$, %:$;, and the property "as bouht in by the ban for the

su! of P%%$,+$$. >pon Auust ', %:$;, this sale "as confir!ed by the court.

About seven years after the confir!ation of this sale, or to the precise, upon 9une +8, %:%8, a !otion "as !ade in this

cause by icente Palanca, as ad!inistrator of the estate of the oriinal defendant, Enracio Palanca Tan/uinyen y

?i!/uinco, "herein the applicant re/uested the court to set aside the order of default of 9uly +, %:$;, and the 5ud!ent

rendered upon 9uly #, %:$;, and to vacate all the proceedins subse/uent thereto. The basis of this application, as set forth

in the !otion itself, "as that the order of default and the 5ud!ent rendered thereon "ere void because the court had never

ac/uired 5urisdiction over the defendant or over the sub5ect of the action.

At the hearin in the court belo" the application to vacate the 5ud!ent "as denied, and fro! this action of the court icente

Planca, as ad!inistrator of the estate of the oriinal defendant, has appealed. No other feature of the case is here underconsideration than such as related to the action of the court upon said !otion.

The case presents several /uestions of i!portance, "hich "ill be discussed in "hat appears to be the se/uence of !ost

convenient develop!ent. (n the first part of this opinion "e shall, for the purpose of aru!ent, assu!e that the cler of the



Court of <irst (nstance did not obey the order of the court in the !atter of !ailin the papers "hich he "as directed to send

to the defendant in A!oy2 and in this connection "e shall consider, first, "hether the court ac/uired the necessary

5urisdiction to enable it to proceed "ith the foreclosure of the !ortae and, secondly, "hether those proceedins "ere

conducted in such !anner as to constitute due process of la".

The "ord 45urisdiction,4 as applied to the faculty of eercisin 5udicial po"er, is used in several different, thouh related,

senses since it !ay have reference 0%1 to the authority of the court to entertain a particular ind of action or to ad!inister a

particular ind of relief, or it !ay refer to the po"er of the court over the parties, or 0+1 over the property "hich is the sub5ect

to the litiation.

The soverein authority "hich orani)es a court deter!ines the nature and etent of its po"ers in eneral and thus fies its

co!petency or 5urisdiction "ith reference to the actions "hich it !ay entertain and the relief it !ay rant.

9urisdiction over the person is ac/uired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his sub!ission to its authority, or

it is ac/uired by the coercive po"er of leal process eerted over the person.

9urisdiction over the property "hich is the sub5ect of the litiation !ay result either fro! a sei)ure of the property under leal

process, "hereby it is brouht into the actual custody of the la", or it !ay result fro! the institution of leal proceedins

"herein, under special provisions of la", the po"er of the court over the property is reconi)ed and !ade effective. (n the

latter case the property, thouh at all ti!es "ithin the potential po"er of the court, !ay never be taen into actual custody at

all. An illustration of the 5urisdiction ac/uired by actual sei)ure is found in attach!ent proceedins, "here the property issei)ed at the beinnin of the action, or so!e subse/uent stae of its proress, and held to abide the final event of the

litiation. An illustration of "hat "e ter! potential 5urisdiction over the res, is found in the proceedin to reister the title of

land under our syste! for the reistration of land. 6ere the court, "ithout tain actual physical control over the property

assu!es, at the instance of so!e person clai!in to be o"ner, to eercise a 5urisdiction in re! over the property and to

ad5udicate the title in favor of the petitioner aainst all the "orld.

(n the ter!inoloy of A!erican la" the action to foreclose a !ortae is said to be a proceedin /uasi in re!, by "hich is

epressed the idea that "hile it is not strictly speain an action in rem yet it partaes of that nature and is substantially

such. The epression 4action in re!4 is, in its narro" application, used only "ith reference to certain proceedins in courts of

ad!iralty "herein the property alone is treated as responsible for the clai! or obliation upon "hich the proceedins are

based. The action /uasi re! differs fro! the true action in re! in the circu!stance that in the for!er an individual is na!ed

as defendant, and the purpose of the proceedin is to sub5ect his interest therein to the obliation or lien burdenin the

property. All proceedins havin for their sole ob5ect the sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant, "hether by

attach!ent, foreclosure, or other for! of re!edy, are in a eneral "ay thus desinated. The 5ud!ent entered in these

proceedins is conclusive only bet"een the parties.

(n speain of the proceedin to foreclose a !ortae the author of a "ell no"n treaties, has said

Thouh no!inally aainst person, such suits are to vindicate liens2 they proceed upon sei)ure2 they treat property

as pri!arily indebted2 and, "ith the /ualification above-!entioned, they are substantially property actions. (n the

civil la", they are styled hypothecary actions, and their sole ob5ect is the enforce!ent of the lien aainst the res2 in

the co!!on la", they "ould be different in chancery did not treat the conditional conveyance as a !ere

hypothecation, and the creditorIs riht ass an e/uitable lien2 so, in both, the suit is real action so far as it is aainstproperty, and sees the 5udicial reconition of a property debt, and an order for the sale of the res. 03aples,

Proceedins (n Re!. sec. @$'.1

(t is true that in proceedins of this character, if the defendant for "ho! publication is !ade appears, the action beco!es as

to hi! a personal action and is conducted as such. This, ho"ever, does not affect the proposition that "here the defendant

fails to appear the action is $uasi in rem2 and it should therefore be considered "ith reference to the principles overnin

actions in rem.

There is an instructive analoy bet"een the foreclosure proceedin and an action of attach!ent, concernin "hich the

*upre!e Court of the >nited *tates has used the follo"in lanuae

(f the defendant appears, the cause beco!es !ainly a suit in personam, "ith the added incident, that the property

attached re!ains liable, under the control of the court, to ans"er to any de!and "hich !ay be established aainst

the defendant by the final 5ud!ent of the court. But, if there is no appearance of the defendant, and no service of

process on hi!, the case beco!es, in its essential nature, a proceedin in rem, the only effect of "hich is to sub5ect



the property attached to the pay!ent of the defendant "hich the court !ay find to be due to the plaintiff. 0Cooper

vs. Reynolds, %$ 3all., #$;.1

(n an ordinary attach!ent proceedin, if the defendant is not personally served, the preli!inary sei)ure is to, be considered

necessary in order to confer 5urisdiction upon the court. (n this case the lien on the property is ac/uired by the sei)ure2 and

the purpose of the proceedins is to sub5ect the property to that lien. (f a lien already eists, "hether created by !ortae,

contract, or statute, the preli!inary sei)ure is not necessary2 and the court proceeds to enforce such lien in the !anner

provided by la" precisely as thouh the property had been sei)ed upon attach!ent. 0Roller vs. 6olly, %'@ >. *., #:;, &$82

&& ?. ed., 8+$.1 (t results that the !ere circu!stance that in an attach!ent the property !ay be sei)ed at the inception of theproceedins, "hile in the foreclosure suit it is not taen into leal custody until the ti!e co!es for the sale, does not

!aterially affect the funda!ental principle involved in both cases, "hich is that the court is here eercisin a 5urisdiction over

the property in a proceedin directed essentially in re!.

Passin no" to a consideration of the 5urisdiction of the Court of <irst (nstance in a !ortae foreclosure, it is evident that

the court derives its authority to entertain the action pri!arily fro! the statutes orani)in the court. The 5urisdiction of the

court, in this !ost eneral sense, over the cause of action is obvious and re/uires no co!!ent. 9urisdiction over the person

of the defendant, if ac/uired at all in such an action, is obtained by the voluntary sub!ission of the defendant or by the

personal service of process upon hi! "ithin the territory "here the process is valid. (f, ho"ever, the defendant is a

nonresident and, re!ainin beyond the rane of the personal process of the court, refuses to co!e in voluntarily, the court

never ac/uires 5urisdiction over the person at all. 6ere the property itself is in fact the sole thin "hich is i!pleaded and is

the responsible ob5ect "hich is the sub5ect of the eercise of 5udicial po"er. (t follo"s that the 5urisdiction of the court in suchcase is based eclusively on the po"er "hich, under the la", it possesses over the property2 and any discussion relative to

the 5urisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant is entirely apart fro! the case. The 5urisdiction of the court over

the property, considered as the eclusive ob5ect of such action, is evidently based upon the follo"in conditions and

considerations, na!ely 0%1 that the property is located "ithin the district2 0+1 that the purpose of the litiation is to sub5ect the

property by sale to an obliation fied upon it by the !ortae2 and 0#1 that the court at a proper stae of the proceedins

taes the property into custody, if necessary, and epose it to sale for the purpose of satisfyin the !ortae debt. An

obvious corollary is that no other relief can be ranted in this proceedin than such as can be enforced aainst the property.

3e !ay then, fro! "hat has been stated, for!ulated the follo"in proposition relative to the foreclosure proceedin aainst

the property of a nonresident !ortaor "ho fails to co!e in and sub!it hi!self personally to the 5urisdiction of the court 0(1

That the 5urisdiction of the court is derived fro! the po"er "hich it possesses over the property2 0((1 that 5urisdiction over the

person is not ac/uired and is nonessential2 0(((1 that the relief ranted by the court !ust be li!ited to such as can beenforced aainst the property itself.

(t is i!portant that the bearin of these propositions be clearly apprehended, for there are !any epressions in the A!erican

reports fro! "hich it !iht be inferred that the court ac/uires personal 5urisdiction over the person of the defendant by

publication and notice2 but such is not the case. (n truth the proposition that 5urisdiction over the person of a nonresident

cannot be ac/uired by publication and notice "as never clearly understood even in the A!erican courts until after the

decision had been rendered by the *upre!e Court of the >nited *tates in the leadin case of Pennoyer vs. Neff 0:8 >. *.

'%&2 +& ?. ed., 8@81. (n the liht of that decision, and of other decisions "hich have subse/uently been rendered in that and

other courts, the proposition that 5urisdiction over the person cannot be thus ac/uired by publication and notice is no loner

open to /uestion2 and it is no" fully established that a personal 5ud!ent upon constructive or substituted service aainst a

nonresident "ho does not appear is "holly invalid. This doctrine applies to all inds of constructive or substituted process,

includin service by publication and personal service outside of the 5urisdiction in "hich the 5ud!ent is rendered2 and the

only eception see!s to be found in the case "here the nonresident defendant has epressly or i!pliedly consented to the

!ode of service. 0Note to Raher vs. Raher, #8 ?. R. A. FN. *. G, +:+2 see also 8$ ? .R. A., 8;82 #8 ?. R. A. FN. *.G, #%+

The idea upon "hich the decision in Pennoyer vs. Neff 0supra1 proceeds is that the process fro! the tribunals of one *tate

cannot run into other *tates or countries and that due process of la" re/uires that the defendant shall be brouht under the

po"er of the court by service of process "ithin the *tate, or by his voluntary appearance, in order to authori)e the court to

pass upon the /uestion of his personal liability. The doctrine established by the *upre!e Court of the >nited *tates on this

point, bein based upon the constitutional conception of due process of la", is bindin upon the courts of the Philippine

(slands. (nvolved in this decision is the principle that in proceedins in re! or /uasi in re! aainst a nonresident "ho is not

served personally "ithin the state, and "ho does not appear, the relief !ust be confined to the res, and the court cannot

la"fully render a personal 5ud!ent aainst hi!. 0e"ey vs. es Moines, %'# >. *., %:#2 &# ?. ed., @@82 6eidritter vs.Eli)abeth 7il Cloth Co., %%+ >. *., +:&2 +; ?. ed., '+:.1 Therefore in an action to foreclose a !ortae aainst a

nonresident, upon "ho! service has been effected eclusively by publication, no personal 5ud!ent for the deficiency can

be entered. 0?atta vs. Tutton, %++ Cal., +':2 Blu!ber vs. Birch, :: Cal., &%@.1



(t is suested in the brief of the appellant that the 5ud!ent entered in the court belo" offends aainst the principle 5ust

stated and that this 5ud!ent is void because the court in fact entered a personal 5ud!ent aainst the absent debtor for the

full a!ount of the indebtedness secured by the !ortae. 3e do not so interpret the 5ud!ent.

(n a foreclosure proceedin aainst a nonresident o"ner it is necessary for the court, as in all cases of foreclosure, to

ascertain the a!ount due, as prescribed in section +8@ of the Code of Civil Procedure, and to !ae an order re/uirin the

defendant to pay the !oney into court. This step is a necessary precursor of the order of sale. (n the present case the

5ud!ent "hich "as entered contains the follo"in "ords

Because it is declared that the said defendant Enracio Palanca Tan/uinyen y ?i!/uinco, is indebted in the

a!ount of P+&:,#88.#+, plus the interest, to the IBanco Espanol-<ilipinoI . . . therefore said appellant is ordered to

deliver the above a!ount etc., etc.

This is not the lanuae of a personal 5ud!ent. (nstead it is clearly intended !erely as a co!pliance "ith the re/uire!ent

that the a!ount due shall be ascertained and that the evidence of this it !ay be observed that accordin to the Code of Civil

Procedure a personal 5ud!ent aainst the debtor for the deficiency is not to be rendered until after the property has been

sold and the proceeds applied to the !ortae debt. 0sec. +@$1.

The conclusion upon this phase of the case is that "hatever !ay be the effect in other respects of the failure of the cler of

the Court of <irst (nstance to !ail the proper papers to the defendant in A!oy, China, such irreularity could in no "ise

i!pair or defeat the 5urisdiction of the court, for in our opinion that 5urisdiction rest upon a basis !uch !ore secure than"ould be supplied by any for! of notice that could be iven to a resident of a forein country.

Before leavin this branch of the case, "e "ish to observe that "e are fully a"are that !any reported cases can be cited in

"hich it is assu!ed that the /uestion of the sufficiency of publication or notice in a case of this ind is a /uestion affectin

the 5urisdiction of the court, and the court is so!eti!es said to ac/uire 5urisdiction by virtue of the publication. This

phraseoloy "as undoubtedly oriinally adopted by the court because of the analoy bet"een service by the publication and

personal service of process upon the defendant2 and, as has already been suested, prior to the decision of Pennoyer vs.

Neff 0supra1 the difference bet"een the leal effects of the t"o for!s of service "as obscure. (t is accordinly not surprisin

that the !odes of epression "hich had already been !olded into leal tradition before that case "as decided have been

brouht do"n to the present day. But it is clear that the leal principle here involved is not effected by the peculiar lanuae

in "hich the courts have epounded their ideas.

3e no" proceed to a discussion of the /uestion "hether the supposed irreularity in the proceedins "as of such ravity as

to a!ount to a denial of that 4due process of la"4 "hich "as secured by the Act of Conress in force in these (slands at the

ti!e this !ortae "as foreclosed. 0Act of 9uly %, %:$+, sec. 8.1 (n dealin "ith /uestions involvin the application of the

constitutional provisions relatin to due process of la" the *upre!e Court of the >nited *tates has refrained fro! atte!ptin

to define "ith precision the !eanin of that epression, the reason bein that the idea epressed therein is applicable under

so !any diverse conditions as to !ae any atte!pt ay precise definition ha)ardous and unprofitable. As applied to a 5udicial

proceedin, ho"ever, it !ay be laid do"n "ith certainty that the re/uire!ent of due process is satisfied if the follo"in

conditions are present, na!ely2 0%1 There !ust be a court or tribunal clothed "ith 5udicial po"er to hear and deter!ine the

!atter before it2 0+1 5urisdiction !ust be la"fully ac/uired over the person of the defendant or over the property "hich is the

sub5ect of the proceedin2 0#1 the defendant !ust be iven an opportunity to be heard2 and 0&1 5ud!ent !ust be rendered

upon la"ful hearin.

Passin at once to the re/uisite that the defendant shall have an opportunity to be heard, "e observe that in a foreclosure

case so!e notification of the proceedins to the nonresident o"ner, prescribin the ti!e "ithin "hich appearance !ust be

!ade, is every"here reconi)ed as essential. To ans"er this necessity the statutes enerally provide for publication, and

usually in addition thereto, for the !ailin of notice to the defendant, if his residence is no"n. Thouh co!!only called

constructive, or substituted service of process in any true sense. (t is !erely a !eans provided by la" "hereby the o"ner

!ay be ad!onished that his property is the sub5ect of 5udicial proceedins and that it is incu!bent upon hi! to tae such

steps as he sees fit to protect it. (n speain of notice of this character a distinuish !aster of constitutional la" has used

the follo"in lanuae

. . . if the o"ners are na!ed in the proceedins, and personal notice is provided for, it is rather fro! tenderness to

their interests, and in order to !ae sure that the opportunity for a hearin shall not be lost to the!, than fro! anynecessity that the case shall assu!e that for!. 0Cooley on Taation F+d. ed.G, 8+', /uoted in ?eih vs. =reen, %:#

>. *., ':, ;$.1



(t "ill be observed that this !ode of notification does not involve any absolute assurance that the absent o"ner shall thereby

receive actual notice. The periodical containin the publication !ay never in fact co!e to his hands, and the chances that he

should discover the notice !ay often be very sliht. Even "here notice is sent by !ail the probability of his receivin it,

thouh !uch increased, is dependent upon the correctness of the address to "hich it is for"arded as "ell as upon the

reularity and security of the !ail service. (t "ill be noted, further!ore, that the provision of our la" relative to the !ailin of

notice does not absolutely re/uire the !ailin of notice unconditionally and in every event, but only in the case "here the

defendantIs residence is no"n. (n the liht of all these facts, it is evident that actual notice to the defendant in cases of this

ind is not, under the la", to be considered absolutely necessary.

The idea upon "hich the la" proceeds in reconi)in the efficacy of a !eans of notification "hich !ay fall short of actual

notice is apparently this Property is al"ays assu!ed to be in the possession of its o"ner, in person or by aent2 and he !ay

be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected "ith no"lede that proceedins have been instituted for its

conde!nation and sale.

(t is the duty of the o"ner of real estate, "ho is a nonresident, to tae !easures that in so!e "ay he shall be

represented "hen his property is called into re/uisition, and if he fails to do this, and fails to et notice by the

ordinary publications "hich have usually been re/uired in such cases, it is his !isfortune, and he !ust abide the

conse/uences. 0@ R. C. ?., sec. &&8 Fp. &8$G1.

(t has been "ell said by an A!erican court

(f property of a nonresident cannot be reached by leal process upon the constructive notice, then our statutes "ere

passed in vain, and are !ere e!pty leislative declarations, "ithout either force, or !eanin2 for if the person is not

"ithin the 5urisdiction of the court, no personal 5ud!ent can be rendered, and if the 5ud!ent cannot operate upon

the property, then no effective 5ud!ent at all can be rendered, so that the result "ould be that the courts "ould be

po"erless to assist a citi)en aainst a nonresident. *uch a result "ould be a deplorable one. 0Huarl vs. Abbett, %$+

(nd., +##2 8+ A!. Rep., @@+, @@'.1

(t is, of course universally reconi)ed that the statutory provisions relative to publication or other for! of notice aainst a

nonresident o"ner should be co!plied "ith2 and in respect to the publication of notice in the ne"spaper it !ay be stated

that strict co!pliance "ith the re/uire!ents of the la" has been held to be essential. (n =uaranty Trust etc. Co. vs. =reen

Cove etc., Railroad Co. 0%#: >. *., %#', %#;1, it "as held that "here ne"spaper publication "as !ade for %: "ees, "hen

the statute re/uired +$, the publication "as insufficient.

3ith respect to the provisions of our o"n statute, relative to the sendin of notice by !ail, the re/uire!ent is that the 5ude

shall direct that the notice be deposited in the !ail by the cler of the court, and it is not in ter!s declared that the notice

!ust be deposited in the !ail. 3e consider this to be of so!e sinificance2 and it see!s to us that, havin due reard to the

principles upon "hich the ivin of such notice is re/uired, the absent o"ner of the !ortaed property !ust, so far as the

due process of la" is concerned, tae the ris incident to the possible failure of the cler to perfor! his duty, so!e"hat as

he taes the ris that the !ail cler or the !ail carrier !iht possibly lose or destroy the parcel or envelope containin the

notice before it should reach its destination and be delivered to hi!. This idea see!s to be strenthened by the

consideration that placin upon the cler the duty of sendin notice by !ail, the perfor!ance of that act is put effectually

beyond the control of the plaintiff in the litiation. At any rate it is obvious that so !uch of section #:: of the Code of Civil

Procedure as relates to the sendin of notice by !ail "as co!plied "ith "hen the court !ade the order. The /uestion as to"hat !ay be the conse/uences of the failure of the record to sho" the proof of co!pliance "ith that re/uire!ent "ill be

discussed by us further on.

The observations "hich have 5ust been !ade lead to the conclusion that the failure of the cler to !ail the notice, if in fact he

did so fail in his duty, is not such an irreularity, as a!ounts to a denial of due process of la"2 and hence in our opinion that

irreularity, if proved, "ould not avoid the 5ud!ent in this case. Notice "as iven by publication in a ne"spaper and this is

the only for! of notice "hich the la" unconditionally re/uires. This in our opinion is all that "as absolutely necessary to

sustain the proceedins.

(t "ill be observed that in considerin the effect of this irreularity, it !aes a difference "hether it be vie"ed as a /uestion

involvin 5urisdiction or as a /uestion involvin due process of la". (n the !atter of 5urisdiction there can be no distinction

bet"een the !uch and the little. The court either has 5urisdiction or it has not2 and if the re/uire!ent as to the !ailin ofnotice should be considered as a step antecedent to the ac/uirin of 5urisdiction, there could be no escape fro! the

conclusion that the failure to tae that step "as fatal to the validity of the 5ud!ent. (n the application of the idea of due

process of la", on the other hand, it is clearly unnecessary to be so riorous. The 5urisdiction bein once established, all that

due process of la" thereafter re/uires is an opportunity for the defendant to be heard2 and as publication "as duly !ade in



the ne"spaper, it "ould see! hihly unreasonable to hold that failure to !ail the notice "as fatal. 3e thin that in applyin

the re/uire!ent of due process of la", it is per!issible to reflect upon the purposes of the provision "hich is supposed to

have been violated and the principle underlyin the eercise of 5udicial po"er in these proceedins. 9ude in the liht of

these conceptions, "e thin that the provision of Act of Conress declarin that no person shall be deprived of his property

"ithout due process of la" has not been infrined.

(n the proress of this discussion "e have stated the t"o conclusions2 0%1 that the failure of the cler to send the notice to

the defendant by !ail did not destroy the 5urisdiction of the court and 0+1 that such irreularity did not infrine the

re/uire!ent of due process of la". As a conse/uence of these conclusions the irreularity in /uestion is in so!e !easureshorn of its potency. (t is still necessary, ho"ever, to consider its effect considered as a si!ple irreularity of procedure2 and

it "ould be idle to pretend that even in this aspect the irreularity is not rave enouh. <ro! this point of vie", ho"ever, it is

obvious that any !otion to vacate the 5ud!ent on the round of the irreularity in /uestion !ust fail unless it sho"s that the

defendant "as pre5udiced by that irreularity. The least, therefore, that can be re/uired of the proponent of such a !otion is

to sho" that he had a ood defense aainst the action to foreclose the !ortae. Nothin of the ind is, ho"ever, sho"n

either in the !otion or in the affidavit "hich acco!panies the !otion.

An application to open or vacate a 5ud!ent because of an irreularity or defect in the proceedins is usually re/uired to be

supported by an affidavit sho"in the rounds on "hich the relief is souht, and in addition to this sho"in also a

!eritorious defense to the action. (t is held that a eneral state!ent that a party has a ood defense to the action is

insufficient. The necessary facts !ust be averred. 7f course if a 5ud!ent is void upon its face a sho"in of the eistence of

a !eritorious defense is not necessary. 0%$ R. C. ?., '%;.1

The lapse of ti!e is also a circu!stance deeply affectin this aspect of the case. (n this connection "e /uote the follo"in

passae fro! the encyclopedic treatise no" in course of publication

3here, ho"ever, the 5ud!ent is not void on its face, and !ay therefore be enforced if per!itted to stand on the

record, courts in !any instances refuse to eercise their /uasi e/uitable po"ers to vacate a 5ude!ent after the

lapse of the ter! ay "hich it "as entered, ecept in clear cases, to pro!ote the ends of 5ustice, and "here it

appears that the party !ain the application is hi!self "ithout fault and has acted in ood faith and "ith ordinary

dilience. ?aches on the part of the applicant, if uneplained, is dee!ed sufficient round for refusin the relief to

"hich he !iht other"ise be entitled. *o!ethin is due to the finality of 5ud!ents, and ac/uiescence or

unnecessary delay is fatal to !otions of this character, since courts are al"ays reluctant to interfere "ith 5ud!ents,

and especially "here they have been eecuted or satisfied. The !ovin party has the burden of sho"in dilience,

and unless it is sho"n affir!atively the court "ill not ordinarily eercise its discretion in his favor. 0%8 R. C. ?., @:&,

@:8.1

(t is stated in the affidavit that the defendant, Enracio Palanca Tan/uinyen y ?i!/uinco, died 9anuary +:, %:%$. The

!ortae under "hich the property "as sold "as eecuted far bac in %:$@2 and the proceedins in the foreclosure "ere

closed by the order of court confir!in the sale dated Auust ', %:$;. (t passes the rational bounds of hu!an credulity to

suppose that a !an "ho had placed a !ortae upon property "orth nearly P#$$,$$$ and had then one a"ay fro! the

scene of his life activities to end his days in the city of A!oy, China, should have lon re!ained in inorance of the fact that

the !ortae had been foreclosed and the property sold, even supposin that he had no no"lede of those proceedins

"hile they "ere bein conducted. (t is !ore in eepin "ith the ordinary course of thins that he should have ac/uired

infor!ation as to "hat "as transpirin in his affairs at Manila2 and upon the basis of this rational assu!ption "e are

authori)ed, in the absence of proof to the contrary, to presu!e that he did have, or soon ac/uired, infor!ation as to the sale

of his property.

The Code of Civil Procedure, indeed, epressly declares that there is a presu!ption that thins have happened accordin to

the ordinary habits of life 0sec. ##& F+@G12 and "e cannot conceive of a situation !ore appropriate than this for applyin the

presu!ption thus defined by the la"iver. (n support of this presu!ption, as applied to the present case, it is per!issible to

consider the probability that the defendant !ay have received actual notice of these proceedins fro! the unofficial notice

addressed to hi! in Manila "hich "as !ailed by an e!ployee of the banIs attorneys. Adoptin al!ost the eact "ords

used by the *upre!e Court of the >nited *tates in =rannis vs. 7rdeans 0+#& >. *., #;82 8; ?. ed., %#@#1, "e !ay say that

in vie" of the "ell-no"n sill of postal officials and e!ployees in !ain proper delivery of letters defectively addressed, "e

thin the presu!ption is clear and stron that this notice reached the defendant, there bein no proof that it "as ever

returned by the postal officials as undelivered. And if it "as delivered in Manila, instead of bein for"arded to A!oy, China,there is a probability that the recipient "as a person sufficiently interested in his affairs to send it or co!!unicate its

contents to hi!.



7f course if the 5urisdiction of the court or the sufficiency of the process of la" depended upon the !ailin of the notice by

the cler, the reflections in "hich "e are no" indulin "ould be idle and frivolous2 but the considerations !entioned are

introduced in order to sho" the propriety of applyin to this situation the leal presu!ption to "hich allusion has been !ade.

>pon that presu!ption, supported by the circu!stances of this case, ,"e do not hesitate to found the conclusion that the

defendant voluntarily abandoned all thouht of savin his property fro! the obliation "hich he had placed upon it2 that

no"lede of the proceedins should be i!puted to hi!2 and that he ac/uiesced in the conse/uences of those proceedins

after they had been acco!plished. >nder these circu!stances it is clear that the !erit of this !otion is, as "e have already

stated, adversely affected in a hih deree by the delay in asin for relief. Nor is it an ade/uate reply to say that the

proponent of this !otion is an ad!inistrator "ho only /ualified a fe" !onths before this !otion "as !ade. No disability on

the part of the defendant hi!self eisted fro! the ti!e "hen the foreclosure "as effected until his death2 and "e believe that

the delay in the appoint!ent of the ad!inistrator and institution of this action is a circu!stance "hich is i!putable to the

parties in interest "hoever they !ay have been. 7f course if the !inor heirs had instituted an action in their o"n riht to

recover the property, it "ould have been different.

(t is, ho"ever, arued that the defendant has suffered pre5udice by reason of the fact that the ban beca!e the purchaser of

the property at the foreclosure sale for a price reatly belo" that "hich had been areed upon in the !ortae as the upset

price of the property. (n this connection, it appears that in article nine of the !ortae "hich "as the sub5ect of this

foreclosure, as a!ended by the notarial docu!ent of 9uly %:, %:$@, the parties to this !ortae !ade a stipulation to the

effect that the value therein placed upon the !ortaed properties should serve as a basis of sale in case the debt should

re!ain unpaid and the ban should proceed to a foreclosure. The upset price stated in that stipulation for all the parcels

involved in this foreclosure "as P+;@,$$$. (t is said in behalf of the appellant that "hen the ban bouht in the property forthe su! of P%%$,+$$ it violated that stipulation.

(t has been held by this court that a clause in a !ortae providin for a tipo, or upset price, does not prevent a foreclosure,

nor affect the validity of a sale !ade in the foreclosure proceedins. 0Kanco vs. Cru) 6errera and 3y Piaco, %% Phil. Rep.,

&$+2 Banco-EspaLol <ilipino vs. onaldson, *i! and Co., 8 Phil. Rep., &%;.1 (n both the cases here cited the property "as

purchased at the foreclosure sale, not by the creditor or !ortaee, but by a third party. 3hether the sa!e rule should be

applied in a case "here the !ortaee hi!self beco!es the purchaser has apparently not been decided by this court in any

reported decision, and this /uestion need not here be considered, since it is evident that if any liability "as incurred by the

ban by purchasin for a price belo" that fied in the stipulation, its liability "as a personal liability derived fro! the contract

of !ortae2 and as "e have already de!onstrated such a liability could not be the sub5ect of ad5udication in an action

"here the court had no 5urisdiction over the person of the defendant. (f the plaintiff ban beca!e liable to account for the

difference bet"een the upset price and the price at "hich in bouht in the property, that liability re!ains unaffected by thedisposition "hich the court !ade of this case2 and the fact that the ban !ay have violated such an obliation can in no "ise

affect the validity of the 5ud!ent entered in the Court of <irst (nstance.

(n connection "ith the entire failure of the !otion to sho" either a !eritorious defense to the action or that the defendant

had suffered any pre5udice of "hich the la" can tae notice, "e !ay be per!itted to add that in our opinion a !otion of this

ind, "hich proposes to unsettle 5udicial proceedins lon ao closed, can not be considered "ith favor, unless based upon

rounds "hich appeal to the conscience of the court. Public policy re/uires that 5udicial proceedins be upheld. The

!ai!u! here applicable is non /uieta !overe. As "as once said by 9ude Bre"er, after"ards a !e!ber of the *upre!e

Court of the >nited *tates

Public policy re/uires that 5udicial proceedins be upheld, and that titles obtained in those proceedins be safe fro!

the ruthless hand of collateral attac. (f technical defects are ad5uded potent to destroy such titles, a 5udicial sale

"ill never reali)e that value of the property, for no prudent !an "ill ris his !oney in biddin for and buyin that title

"hich he has reason to fear !ay years thereafter be s"ept a"ay throuh so!e occult and not readily discoverable

defect. 0Martin vs. Pond, #$ <ed., %8.1

(n the case "here that lanuae "as used an atte!pt "as !ade to annul certain foreclosure proceedins on the round that

the affidavit upon "hich the order of publication "as based erroneously stated that the *tate of ansas, "hen he "as in fact

residin in another *tate. (t "as held that this !istae did not affect the validity of the proceedins.

(n the precedin discussion "e have assu!ed that the cler failed to send the notice by post as re/uired by the order of the

court. 3e no" proceed to consider "hether this is a proper assu!ption2 and the proposition "hich "e propose to establish

is that there is a leal presu!ption that the cler perfor!ed his duty as the !inisterial officer of the court, "hich presu!ptionis not overco!e by any other facts appearin in the cause.

(n subsection %& of section ##& of the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared that there is a presu!ption 4that official duty has

been reularly perfor!ed24 and in subsection %; it is declared that there is a presu!ption 4that the ordinary course of



business has been follo"ed.4 These presu!ptions are of course in no sense novelties, as they epress ideas "hich have

al"ays been reconi)ed. 7!nia presu!untur rite et sole!niter esse acta donec probetur in contrariu!. There is therefore

clearly a leal presu!ption that the cler perfor!ed his duty about !ailin this notice2 and "e thin that stron

considerations of policy re/uire that this presu!ption should be allo"ed to operate "ith full force under the circu!stances of

this case. A party to an action has no control over the cler of the court2 and has no riht to !eddle unduly "ith the business

of the cler in the perfor!ance of his duties. 6avin no control over this officer, the litiant !ust depend upon the court to

see that the duties i!posed on the cler are perfor!ed.

7ther considerations no less potent contribute to strenthen the conclusion 5ust stated. There is no principle of la" bettersettled than that after 5urisdiction has once been re/uired, every act of a court of eneral 5urisdiction shall be presu!ed to

have been rihtly done. This rule is applied to every 5ud!ent or decree rendered in the various staes of the proceedins

fro! their initiation to their co!pletion 0oorhees vs. >nited *tates Ban, %$ Pet., #%&2 #8 >. *., &&:12 and if the record is

silent "ith respect to any fact "hich !ust have been established before the court could have rihtly acted, it "ill be

presu!ed that such fact "as properly brouht to its no"lede. 0The ?essee of =rinon vs. Astor, + 6o"., #%:2 %% ?. ed.,

+;#.1

(n !ain the order of sale Fof the real state of a decedentG the court are presu!ed to have ad5uded every /uestion

necessary to 5ustify such order or decree, vi) The death of the o"ners2 that the petitioners "ere his ad!inistrators2

that the personal estate "as insufficient to pay the debts of the deceased2 that the private acts of Asse!bly, as to

the !anner of sale, "ere "ithin the constitutional po"er of the ?eislature, and that all the provisions of the la" as

to notices "hich are directory to the ad!inistrators have been co!plied "ith. . . . The court is not bound to enterupon the record the evidence on "hich any fact "as decided. 0<lorentine vs. Barton, + 3all., +%$2 %' ?. ed., ';8.1

Especially does all this apply after lon lapse of ti!e.

Appleate vs. ?einton and Carter County Minin Co. 0%%' >. *., +881 contains an instructive discussion in a case

analoous to that "hich is no" before us. (t there appeared that in order to foreclose a !ortae in the *tate of entucy

aainst a nonresident debtor it "as necessary that publication should be !ade in a ne"spaper for a specified period of ti!e,

also be posted at the front door of the court house and be published on so!e *unday, i!!ediately after divine service, in

such church as the court should direct. (n a certain action 5ud!ent had been entered aainst a nonresident, after

publication in pursuance of these provisions. Many years later the validity of the proceedins "as called in /uestion in

another action. (t "as proved fro! the files of an ancient periodical that publication had been !ade in its colu!ns as

re/uired by la"2 but no proof "as offered to sho" the publication of the order at the church, or the postin of it at the front

door of the court-house. (t "as insisted by one of the parties that the 5ud!ent of the court "as void for lac of 5urisdiction.But the *upre!e Court of the >nited *tates said

The court "hich !ade the decree . . . "as a court of eneral 5urisdiction. Therefore every presu!ption not

inconsistent "ith the record is to be induled in favor of its 5urisdiction. . . . (t is to be presu!ed that the court before

!ain its decree too care of to see that its order for constructive service, on "hich its riht to !ae the decree

depended, had been obeyed.

(t is true that in this case the for!er 5ud!ent "as the sub5ect of collateral , or indirect attac, "hile in the case at bar the

!otion to vacate the 5ud!ent is direct proceedin for relief aainst it. The sa!e eneral presu!ption, ho"ever, is induled

in favor of the 5ud!ent of a court of eneral 5urisdiction, "hether it is the sub5ect of direct or indirect attac the only

difference bein that in case of indirect attac the 5ud!ent is conclusively presu!ed to be valid unless the record

affir!atively sho"s it to be void, "hile in case of direct attac the presu!ption in favor of its validity !ay in certain cases be

overco!e by proof etrinsic to the record.

The presu!ption that the cler perfor!ed his duty and that the court !ade its decree "ith the no"lede that the

re/uire!ents of la" had been co!plied "ith appear to be a!ply sufficient to support the conclusion that the notice "as sent

by the cler as re/uired by the order. (t is true that there ouht to be found a!on the papers on file in this cause an

affidavit, as re/uired by section &$$ of the Code of Civil Procedure, sho"in that the order "as in fact so sent by the cler2

and no such affidavit appears. The record is therefore silent "here it ouht to spea. But the very purpose of the la" in

reconi)in these presu!ptions is to enable the court to sustain a prior 5ud!ent in the face of such an o!ission. (f "e "ere

to hold that the 5ud!ent in this case is void because the proper affidavit is not present in the file of papers "hich "e call the

record, the result "ould be that in the future every title in the (slands restin upon a 5ud!ent lie that no" before us "ould

depend, for its continued security, upon the presence of such affidavit a!on the papers and "ould be liable at any !o!entto be destroyed by the disappearance of that piece of paper. 3e thin that no court, "ith a proper reard for the security of

5udicial proceedins and for the interests "hich have by la" been confided to the courts, "ould incline to favor such a

conclusion. (n our opinion the proper course in a case of this ind is to hold that the leal presu!ption that the cler

perfor!ed his duty still !aintains not"ithstandin the absence fro! the record of the proper proof of that fact.



(n this connection it is i!portant to bear in !ind that under the practice prevailin in the Philippine (slands the "ord 4record4

is used in a loose and broad sense, as indicatin the collective !ass of papers "hich contain the history of all the

successive steps taen in a case and "hich are finally deposited in the archives of the clerIs office as a !e!orial of the

litiation. (t is a !atter of eneral infor!ation that no 5ud!ent roll, or boo of final record, is co!!only ept in our courts for

the purpose of recordin the pleadins and principal proceedins in actions "hich have been ter!inated2 and in particular,

no such record is ept in the Court of <irst (nstance of the city of Manila. There is, indeed, a section of the Code of Civil

Procedure "hich directs that such a boo of final record shall be ept2 but this provision has, as a !atter of co!!on

no"lede, been enerally inored. The result is that in the present case "e do not have the assistance of the recitals of

such a record to enable us to pass upon the validity of this 5ud!ent and as already stated the /uestion !ust be deter!ined

by ea!inin the papers contained in the entire file.

But it is insisted by counsel for this !otion that the affidavit of Bernardo Chan y =arcia sho"in that upon April &, %:$;, he

sent a notification throuh the !ail addressed to the defendant at Manila, Philippine (slands, should be accepted as

affir!ative proof that the cler of the court failed in his duty and that, instead of hi!self sendin the re/uisite notice throuh

the !ail, he relied upon Bernardo to send it for hi!. 3e do not thin that this is by any !eans a necessary inference. 7f

course if it had affir!atively appeared that the cler hi!self had atte!pted to co!ply "ith this order and had directed the

notification to Manila "hen he should have directed it to A!oy, this "ould be conclusive that he had failed to co!ply "ith the

eact ter!s of the order2 but such is not this case. That the cler of the attorneys for the plaintiff erroneously sent a

notification to the defendant at a !istaen address affords in our opinion very sliht basis for supposin that the cler !ay

not have sent notice to the riht address.

There is undoubtedly ood authority to support the position that "hen the record states the evidence or !aes an aver!ent

"ith reference to a 5urisdictional fact, it "ill not be presu!ed that there "as other or different evidence respectin the fact, or

that the fact "as other"ise than stated. (f, to ive an illustration, it appears fro! the return of the officer that the su!!ons

"as served at a particular place or in a particular !anner, it "ill not be presu!ed that service "as also !ade at another

place or in a different !anner2 or if it appears that service "as !ade upon a person other than the defendant, it "ill not be

presu!ed, in the silence of the record, that it "as !ade upon the defendant also 0=alpin vs. Pae, %; 3all., #8$, #@@2

*ettle!ier vs. *ullivan, :' >. *., &&&, &&:1. 3hile "e believe that these propositions are entirely correct as applied to the

case "here the person !ain the return is the officer "ho is by la" re/uired to !ae the return, "e do not thin that it is

properly applicable "here, as in the present case, the affidavit "as !ade by a person "ho, so far as the provisions of la"

are concerned, "as a !ere inter!eddler.

The last /uestion of i!portance "hich "e propose to consider is "hether a !otion in the cause is ad!issible as aproceedin to obtain relief in such a case as this. (f the !otion prevails the 5ud!ent of 9uly +, %:$;, and all subse/uent

proceedins "ill be set aside, and the litiation "ill be rene"ed, proceedin aain fro! the date !entioned as if the

proress of the action had not been interrupted. The proponent of the !otion does not as the favor of bein per!itted to

interpose a defense. 6is purpose is !erely to annul the effective 5ud!ent of the court, to the end that the litiation !ay

aain resu!e its reular course.

There is only one section of the Code of Civil Procedure "hich epressly reconi)es the authority of a Court of <irst (nstance

to set aside a final 5ud!ent and per!it a rene"al of the litiation in the sa!e cause. This is as follo"s

*EC. %%#. >pon such ter!s as !ay be 5ust the court !ay relieve a party or leal representative fro! the 5ud!ent,

order, or other proceedin taen aainst hi! throuh his !istae, inadvertence, surprise, or ecusable nelect2

Provided, That application thereof be !ade "ithin a reasonable ti!e, but in no case eceedin si !onths after

such 5ud!ent, order, or proceedin "as taen.

An additional re!edy by petition to the *upre!e Court is supplied by section 8%# of the sa!e Code. The first pararaph of

this section, in so far as pertinent to this discussion, provides as follo"s

3hen a 5ud!ent is rendered by a Court of <irst (nstance upon default, and a party thereto is un5ustly deprived of a

hearin by fraud, accident, !istae or ecusable nelience, and the Court of <irst (nstance "hich rendered the

5ud!ent has finally ad5ourned so that no ade/uate re!edy eists in that court, the party so deprived of a hearin

!ay present his petition to the *upre!e Court "ithin sity days after he first learns of the rendition of such

5ud!ent, and not thereafter, settin forth the facts and prayin to have 5ud!ent set aside. . . .

(t is evident that the proceedin conte!plated in this section is intended to supple!ent the re!edy provided by section %%#2

and "e believe the conclusion irresistible that there is no other !eans reconi)ed by la" "hereby a defeated party can, by a

proceedin in the sa!e cause, procure a 5ud!ent to be set aside, "ith a vie" to the rene"al of the litiation.



The Code of Civil Procedure purports to be a co!plete syste! of practice in civil causes, and it contains provisions

describin "ith !uch fullness the various steps to be taen in the conduct of such proceedins. To this end it defines "ith

precision the !ethod of beinnin, conductin, and concludin the civil action of "hatever species2 and by section ':8 of

the sa!e Code it is declared that the procedure in all civil action shall be in accordance "ith the provisions of this Code. 3e

are therefore of the opinion that the re!edies prescribed in sections %%# and 8%# are eclusive of all others, so far as relates

to the openin and continuation of a litiation "hich has been once concluded.

The !otion in the present case does not confor! to the re/uire!ents of either of these provisions2 and the conse/uence is

that in our opinion the action of the Court of <irst (nstance in dis!issin the !otion "as proper.

(f the /uestion "ere ad!ittedly one relatin !erely to an irreularity of procedure, "e cannot suppose that this proceedin

"ould have taen the for! of a !otion in the cause, since it is clear that, if based on such an error, the ca!e to late for relief

in the Court of <irst (nstance. But as "e have already seen, the !otion attacs the 5ud!ent of the court as void for "ant of

5urisdiction over the defendant. The idea underlyin the !otion therefore is that inas!uch as the 5ud!ent is a nullity it can

be attaced in any "ay and at any ti!e. (f the 5ud!ent "ere in fact void upon its face, that is, if it "ere sho"n to be a nullity

by virtue of its o"n recitals, there !iht possibly be so!ethin in this. 3here a 5ud!ent or 5udicial order is void in this

sense it !ay be said to be a la"less thin, "hich can be treated as an outla" and slain at siht, or inored "herever and

"henever it ehibits its head.

But the 5ud!ent in /uestion is not void in any such sense. (t is entirely reular in for!, and the alleed defect is one "hich

is not apparent upon its face. (t follo"s that even if the 5ud!ent could be sho"n to be void for "ant of 5urisdiction, or for lacof due process of la", the party arieved thereby is bound to resort to so!e appropriate proceedin to obtain relief. >nder

accepted principles of la" and practice, lon reconi)ed in A!erican courts, a proper re!edy in such case, after the ti!e for

appeal or revie" has passed, is for the arieved party to brin an action to en5oin the 5ud!ent, if not already carried into

effect2 or if the property has already been disposed of he !ay institute suit to recover it. (n every situation of this character

an appropriate re!edy is at hand2 and if property has been taen "ithout due process, the la" concedes due process to

recover it. 3e accordinly old that, assu!in the 5ud!ent to have been void as alleed by the proponent of this !otion, the

proper re!edy "as by an oriinal proceedin and not by !otion in the cause. As "e have already seen our Code of Civil

Procedure defines the conditions under "hich relief aainst a 5ud!ent !ay be productive of conclusion for this court to

reconi)e such a proceedin as proper under conditions different fro! those defined by la". >pon the point of procedure

here involved, "e refer to the case of People vs. 6arrison 0;& Cal., @$'1 "herein it "as held that a !otion "ill not lie to

vacate a 5ud!ent after the lapse of the ti!e li!ited by statute if the 5ud!ent is not void on its face2 and in all cases, after

the lapse of the ti!e li!ited by statute if the 5ud!ent is not void on its face2 and all cases, after the lapse of such ti!e,"hen an atte!pt is !ade to vacate the 5ud!ent by a proceedin in court for that purpose an action reularly brouht is

preferable, and should be re/uired. (t "ill be noted taen verbati! fro! the California Code 0sec. &'#1.

The conclusions stated in this opinion indicate that the 5ud!ent appealed fro! is "ithout error, and the sa!e is accordinly

affir!ed, "ith costs. *o ordered.

Arellano, %.., 'orres, %arson, and Avance0a, ., concur.

E% "ano Eano%-)%no :. *n3 Pa%ana G.R. No. L-11$90,Mar 26, 191El Banco Espanol-<ilipino vs. Palanca=.R. No. ?-%%#:$, March +@, %:%;

9>R(*(CT(7N, 673 ACH>(RE 9urisdiction over the property "hich is the sub5ect of the litiation !ay result either fro! asei)ure of the property under leal process, "hereby it is brouht into the actual custody of the la", or it !ay result fro! theinstitution of leal proceedins "herein, under special provisions of la", the po"er of the court over the property is reconi)ed and!ade effective. The action to foreclose a !ortae is said to be a proceedin /uasi in re!, by "hich is epressed the idea that "hile it is not



strictly speain an action in re! yet it partaes of that nature and is substantially such. >E PR7CE** (N <7REC?7*>RE PR7CEE(N=* Property is al"ays assu!ed to be in the possession of its o"ner, inperson or by aent2 and he !ay be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected "ith no"lede that proceedins have beeninstituted for its conde!nation and sale.

<ACT*Enracio Palanca Tan/uinyen y ?i!/uinco !ortaed various parcels of real property in Manila to El Banco Espanol-<ilipino. After"ards, Enracio returned to China and there he died on 9anuary +:, %;%$ "ithout returnin aain to the Philippines. The!ortaor then instituted foreclosure proceedin but since defendant is a non-resident, it "as necessary to ive notice bypublication. The Cler of Court "as also directed to send copy of the su!!ons to the defendants last no"n address, "hich is in

A!oy, China. (t is not sho"n "hether the Cler co!plied "ith this re/uire!ent. Nevertheless, after publication in a ne"spaper ofthe City of Manila, the cause proceeded and 5ud!ent by default "as rendered. The decision "as lie"ise published andafter"ards sale by public auction "as held "ith the ban as the hihest bidder. 7n Auust ', %:$;, this sale "as confir!ed by thecourt. 6o"ever, about seven years after the confir!ation of this sale, a !otion "as !ade by icente Palanca, as ad!inistrator ofthe estate of the oriinal defendant, "herein the applicant re/uested the court to set aside the order of default and the 5ud!ent,and to vacate all the proceedins subse/uent thereto. The basis of this application "as that the order of default and the 5ud!entrendered thereon "ere void because the court had never ac/uired 5urisdiction over the defendant or over the sub5ect of the action.

(**>E

3hether or not the lo"er court ac/uired 5urisdiction over the defendant and the sub5ect !atter of the action 3hether or not due process of la" "as observed

R>?(N=

7n 9urisdiction

The "ord O5urisdiction is used in several different, thouh related, senses since it !ay have reference 0%1 to the authority of thecourt to entertain a particular ind of action or to ad!inister a particular ind of relief, or it !ay refer to the po"er of the court overthe parties, or 0+1 over the property "hich is the sub5ect to the litiation.

The soverein authority "hich orani)es a court deter!ines the nature and etent of its po"ers in eneral and thus fies itsco!petency or 5urisdiction "ith reference to the actions "hich it !ay entertain and the relief it !ay rant.

6o" 9urisdiction is Ac/uired

9urisdiction over the person is ac/uired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his sub!ission to its authority, or it isac/uired by the coercive po"er of leal process eerted over the person.

9urisdiction over the property "hich is the sub5ect of the litiation !ay result either fro! a sei)ure of the property under lealprocess, "hereby it is brouht into the actual custody of the la", or it !ay result fro! the institution of leal proceedins "herein,under special provisions of la", the po"er of the court over the property is reconi)ed and !ade effective. (n the latter case theproperty, thouh at all ti!es "ithin the potential po"er of the court, !ay never be taen into actual custody at all. An illustration ofthe 5urisdiction ac/uired by actual sei)ure is found in attach!ent proceedins, "here the property is sei)ed at the beinnin of theaction, or so!e subse/uent stae of its proress, and held to abide the final event of the litiation. An illustration of "hat "e ter!potential 5urisdiction over the res, is found in the proceedin to reister the title of land under our syste! for the reistration of land.6ere the court, "ithout tain actual physical control over the property assu!es, at the instance of so!e person clai!in to beo"ner, to eercise a 5urisdiction in re! over the property and to ad5udicate the title in favor of the petitioner aainst all the "orld.

(n the ter!inoloy of A!erican la" the action to foreclose a !ortae is said to be a proceedin /uasi in re!, by "hich isepressed the idea that "hile it is not strictly speain an action in re! yet it partaes of that nature and is substantially such. Theepression 4action in re!4 is, in its narro" application, used only "ith reference to certain proceedins in courts of ad!iralty"herein the property alone is treated as responsible for the clai! or obliation upon "hich the proceedins are based. The action

/uasi re! differs fro! the true action in re! in the circu!stance that in the for!er an individual is na!ed as defendant, and thepurpose of the proceedin is to sub5ect his interest therein to the obliation or lien burdenin the property. All proceedins havinfor their sole ob5ect the sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant, "hether by attach!ent, foreclosure, or other for!of re!edy, are in a eneral "ay thus desinated. The 5ud!ent entered in these proceedins is conclusive only bet"een theparties.

(t is true that in proceedins of this character, if the defendant for "ho! publication is !ade appears, the action beco!es as to hi!a personal action and is conducted as such. This, ho"ever, does not affect the proposition that "here the defendant fails to appearthe action is /uasi in re!2 and it should therefore be considered "ith reference to the principles overnin actions in re!.

;G.R. No. 110$&9. No:<r 2, 199&=

HON. !RM!N )!"ELL!, n aa3y a SECRET!R( O) THE EP!RTMENT O) EUC!TION, CULTURE

!N SPORTS> R. NILO ROS!S, n aa3y a REGION!L IRECTOR, ECS-NCR> R. "IEN*ENIOIC!SI!NO, n aa3y a 3 SUPERINTENENT O) THE ?UE+ON CIT( SCHOOLS an' I*ISION> !LM!"ELL! O. "!UTIST!, !UROR! C. *!LEN+UEL! an' TERESIT! *. IM!GM!LI@, petitioners, vs. THE COURT

O) !PPE!LS, ROS!RITO !. SEPTIMO, ERLIN! ". E LEON, CL!RISS! T. IM!!NO, @IL)REO N."!C!NI, M!RIN! R. *I*!R, *ICTORI! S. U"!LO, JENNIE L. OG@E, NORM! L. RONGC!LES, EIT! C.



SEPTIMO, TERESIT! E. E*!NGELIST!, C!T!LIN! R. )R!G!NTE, RE"ECC! . "!GOG, M!RIL(NN! C. AU,M!RISS! M. S!MSON, HENEIN! ".C!RILLO, NIC!SIO C. "R!*O, RUTH ). L!C!NIL!O, MIR!SOL C."!LIGO, )ELIS! S. *ILL!CRUEL, M!. *IOLET! ELI+!"ETH (. HERN!NE+, !NTONIO C. OC!MPO,

!RI!NO S. *!LENCI! an' ELEUTERIO S. *!RG!S, respondents.

E C I S I O N

P!NG!NI"!N, J.8

ue process of la" re/uires notice and hearin. 6earin, on the other hand, presupposes a co!petent and

i!partial tribunal. The riht to be heard and, ulti!ately, the riht to due process of la" lose !eanin in the absence of

an independent, co!petent and i!partial tribunal.

S3a3n3 o4 3 Ca

This principium is eplained by this Court as it resolves this petition for revie" on certiorari assailin the May +%,

%::# ecisionF%G of the Court of AppealsF+G in CA-=.R. *P No. +:%$' "hich affir!ed the trial courts decision, F#G as

follo"s

@EREG+RE, the decision appealed fro! is AGGIRME2 and the appeal is 2I#MI##E2.

;he on. Ar!and Gabella is hereb- +R2ERE2 substituted as respondent8appellant in place of for!er #ecretar- Isidro Cario and

henceforth this fact should be reflected in the title of this case.

#+ +R2ERE2.61

T !n3'n3 )a3

The facts, as found by Respondent Court, are as follo"s

+n #epte!ber &(, &''7, then 2EC# #ecretar- Cario issued a return8to8*ork order to all public school teachers *ho had participated in talk8outs and strikes on various dates during the period #epte!ber 3$, &''7 to +ctober &4, &''7. ;he !ass action

had been staged to de!and pa-!ent of &)th !onth differentials, clothing allo*ances and passage of a debt8cap bill in Congress,

a!ong other things.

7n 7ctober %;, %::$, *ecretary Cario filed ad!inistrative cases aainst herein petitioner-appellees, "ho are

teachers of the Mandaluyon 6ih *chool. The chare sheets re/uired petitioner-appellees to eplain in "ritin "hy

they should not be punished for havin taen part in the !ass action in violation of civil service la"s and reulations,

to "it

&. grave !isconduct

3. gross neglect of dut-

). gross violation of Civil #ervice 9a* and rules on reasonable office regulations

6. refusal to perfor! official dut-

5. conduct pre<udicial to the best interest of the service

$. absence *ithout leave HA@+9

At the sa!e ti!e, *ecretary Cario ordered petitioner-appellee to be placed under preventive suspension.

The chares "ere subse/uently a!ended by EC*-NCR Reional irector Nilo Rosas on Nove!ber ', %::$ to

include the specific dates "hen petitioner-appellees alleedly too part in the strie.

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Ad!inistrative hearins started on ece!ber +$, %::$. Petitioner-appellees counsel ob5ected to the procedure

adopted by the co!!ittee and de!anded that he be furnished a copy of the uidelines adopted by the co!!ittee for

the investiation and i!position of penalties. As he received no response fro! the co!!ittee, counsel "aled

out. ?ater, ho"ever, counsel, "as able to obtain a copy of the uidelines.

7n April %$, %::%, the teachers filed a an in5unctive suit 0Civil Case No. @$@'81 "ith the Reional Trial Court in

Hue)on City, charin the co!!ittee appointed by *ecretary Cario "ith fraud and deceit and prayin that it be

stopped fro! further investiatin the! and fro! renderin any decision in the ad!inistrative case. 6o"ever, the trial

court denied the! a restrainin order.

They then a!ended their co!plaint and !ade it one for certiorari and !anda!us. They alleed that the

investiatin co!!ittee "as actin "ith rave abuse of discretion because its uidelines for investiation place the

burden of proof on the! by re/uirin the! to prove their innocence instead of re/uirin *ecretary Cario and his staff

to adduce evidence to prove the chares aainst the teachers.

7n May #$, %::%, petitioner-appellee Adriano *. alencia of the Ra!on Masaysay 6ih *chool filed a !otion to

intervene, allein that he "as in the sa!e situation as petitioners since he had lie"ise been chared and

preventively suspended by respondent-appellant Cario for the sa!e rounds as the other petitioner-appellees and

!ade to shoulder the burden of provin his innocence under the co!!ittees uidelines. The trial court ranted his

!otion on 9une #, %::% and allo"ed hi! to intervene.

7n 9une %%, %::%, the *olicitor =eneral ans"ered the petitioner for certiorari and !anda!us in behalf of

respondent EC* *ecretary. (n the !ain he contended that, in accordance "ith the doctrine of pri!ary resort, the trial

court should not interfere in the ad!inistrative proceedins.

The *olicitor =eneral also ased the trial court to reconsider its order of 9une #, %::%, allo"in petitioner-

appellee Adriano *. alencia to intervene in the case.

Mean"hile, the EC* investiatin co!!ittee rendered a decision on Auust @, %::%, findin the petitioner-

appellees uilty, as chared and orderin their i!!ediate dis!issal.

7n Auust %8, %::%, the trial court dis!issed the petition for certiorari and !anda!us for lac of !erit. Petitioner-

appellees !oved for a reconsideration, but their !otion "as denied on *epte!ber %%, %::%.

The teachers then filed a petition for certiorari "ith the *upre!e Court "hich, on <ebruary %;, %::+, issued a

resolution en #anc declarin void the trial courts order of dis!issal and reinstatin petitioner-appellees action, even as

it ordered the latters reinstate!ent pendin decision of their case.

Accordinly, on March +8, %::+, the trial court set the case for hearin. 9une ;, %::+, it issued a pre-trial order

"hich reads

As pra-ed for b- #olicitor Bernard ernande", let this case be set for pre8trial conference on Dune &(, &''3 at &0)7 p.!., so as toe/pedite the proceedings hereof. In *hich case, 2EC# #ecretar- Isidro Cario, as the principal respondent, is hereb- ordered to

PER#+NA99J APPEAR before this Court on said date and ti!e, *ith a *arning that should he fail to sho* up on said date, the

Court *ill declare hi! as IN 2EGA9;. #tated other*ise, for the said Pre8;rial Conference, the Court *ill not recogni"e an-

representative of his.

By aree!ent of the parties, the trial conference "as reset on 9une +@, %::+. 6o"ever, *ecretary Cario failed to

appear in court on the date set. (t "as eplained that he had to attend a conference in Maraondon, Cavite. (nstead,

he "as represented by Atty. Reno Capinpin, "hile the other respondents "ere represented by Atty. 9ocelyn Pili. But

the court 5ust the sa!e declared the! as in default. The *olicitor =eneral !oved for a reconsideration, reiteratin that

Cario could not personally co!e on 9une +@, %::+ because of prior co!!it!ent in Cavite. (t "as pointed out that

Cario "as represented by Atty. Reno Capinpin, "hile the other respondents "ere represented by Atty. 9ocelyn Pili,

both of the EC*-NCR and that both had special po"ers of attorney. But the *olicitor =enerals !otion for

reconsideration "as denied by the trial court. (n its order of 9uly %8, %::+, the court stated



;he Motion Gor Reconsideration dated Dul- ), &''3 filed b- the respondents thru counsel, is hereb- 2ENIE2 for lack of !erit. It

appears too obvious that respondents si!pl- did not *ant to co!pl- *ith the la*ful orders of the Court.

;he respondents having lost their standing in Court, the Manifestation and Motion, dated Dul- ), &''3 filed b- the +ffice of the

#olicitor eneral is hereb- 2ENIE2 due course.

#+ +R2ERE2.

7n 9uly #, %::+, the *olicitor =eneral infor!ed the trial court that Cario had ceased to be EC* *ecretary andased for his substitution. But the court failed to act on his !otion.

The hearin of the case "as thereafter conducted e parte "ith only the teachers allo"ed to present their

evidence.

7n Auust %$, %::+, the trial court rendered a decision, in "hich it stated

;he Court is in full accord *ith petitioners contention that Rep. Act No. 6$(7 other*ise kno*n as the Magna Carta for Public

#chool ;eachers is the pri!ar- la* that governs the conduct of investigation in ad!inistrative cases filed against public school

teachers, *ith Pres. 2ecree No. 47( as its supple!ental la*. Respondents erred in believing and contending that Rep. Act. No.

6$(7 has alread- been superseded b- the applicable provisions of Pres. 2ecree No. 47( and E/ec. +rder No. 3'3. nder the Rulesof #tatutor- Construction, a special la*, Rep. Act. No. 6$(7 in the case at bar, is not regarded as having been replaced b- a

general la*, Pres. 2ecree No. 47(, unless the intent to repeal or alter the sa!e is !anifest. A perusal of Pres. 2ecree No. 47(

reveals no such intention e/ists, hence, Rep. Act No. 6$(7 stands. In the event that there is conflict bet*een a special and a

general la*, the for!er shall prevail since it evidences the legislators intent !ore clearl- than that of the general statute and !ust

be taken as an e/ception to the eneral Act. ;he provision of Rep. Act No. 6$(7 therefore prevails over Pres. 2ecree No. 47( in

the co!position and selection of the !e!bers of the investigating co!!ittee.Conse=uentl-, the co!!ittee tasked to investigate

the charges filed against petitioners *as illegall- constituted, their co!position and appoint!ent being violative of #ec. ' of Rep.

Act. No. 6$(7 hence all acts done b- said bod- possess no legal color *hatsoever.

Anent petitioners clai! that their dis!issal *as effected *ithout an- for!al investigation, the Court, after consideration of the

circu!stances surrounding the case, finds such clai! !eritorious. Although it cannot be gain said that respondents have a cause of action against the petitioner, the sa!e is not sufficient reason to detract fro! the necessit- of basic fair pla-. ;he !anner of

dis!issal of the teachers is tainted *ith illegalit-. It is a dis!issal *ithout due process. @hile there *as a se!blance of

investigation conducted b- the respondents their intention to dis!iss petitioners *as alread- !anifest *hen it adopted a procedure

provided for b- la*, b- shifting the burden of proof to the petitioners, kno*ing full- *ell that the teachers *ould bo-cott the

proceedings thereb- giving the! cause to render <udg!ent e/8parte.

;he 2I#MI##A9 therefore of the teachers is not <ustified, it being arbitrar- and violative of the teachers right to due process. 2ue

process !ust be observed in dis!issing the teachers because it affects not onl- their position but also their !eans of livelihood.

@EREG+RE, pre!ises considered, the present petition is hereb- RAN;E2 and all the =uestioned ordersdecisions of the

respondents are hereb- declared N99 and %+I2 and are hereb- #E; A#I2E.

;he reinstate!ent of all the petitioners to their for!er positions *ithout loss of seniorit- and pro!otional rights is hereb-

+R2ERE2.

;he pa-!ent, if an-, of all the petitioners back salaries, allo*ances, bonuses, and other benefits and e!olu!ents *hich !a- have

accrued to the! during the entire period of their preventive suspension andor dis!issal fro! the service is hereb- like*ise

+R2ERE2.

#+ +R2ERE2.51

<ro! this adverse decision of the trial court, for!er EC* *ecretary (sidro Cario filed an appeal "ith the Court of Appeals raisin the follo"in rounds

(. The trial court seriously erred in declarin appellants as in default.





((. The trial court seriously erred in not orderin the proper substitution of parties.

(((. The trial court seriously erred in holdin that R.A. No. &@'$, other"ise no"n as Mana Carta for Public

*chool Teachers, should overn the conduct of the investiations conducted.

(. The trial court seriously erred in rulin that the dis!issal of the teachers are "ithout due process. F@G

As !entioned earlier, the Court of Appeals affir!ed the RTC decision, holdin in the !ain that private

respondents "ere denied due process in the ad!inistrative proceedins instituted aainst the!.

6ence, this petition for revie".F'G

T Iu

Before us, petitioners raise the follo"in issues

I

3hether or not Respondent Court of Appeals co!!itted rave abuse of discretion in holdin in effect that private

respondents "ere denied due process of la".

II

3hether or not Respondent Court of Appeals seriously erred and co!!itted rave abuse of discretion in applyin

strictly the provision of R.A. No. &@'$ in the co!position of the investiatin co!!ittee.

III

3hether or not Respondent Court of Appeals co!!itted rave abuse of discretion in dis!issin the appeal and

in affir!in the trial courts decision.F;G

These issues, all closely related, boil do"n to a sinle /uestion "hether private respondents "ere denied due

process of la".

T Cour3 Ru%n

The petition is bereft of !erit. 3e aree "ith the Court of Appeals that private respondents "ere denied due

process of la".

na% o4 u Pro

At the outset, "e !ust stress that "e are tased only to deter!ine "hether or not due process of la" "as

observed in the ad!inistrative proceedins aainst herein private respondents. 3e note the *olicitor =enerals

etensive dis/uisition that overn!ent e!ployees do not have the riht to strie. F:G 7n this point, the Court, in the case

of "angalisan vs. %ourt of Appeals,F%$G has recently pronounced, throuh Mr. 9ustice <loren) . Realado

It is the settled rule in this <urisdiction that e!plo-ees in the public service !a- not engage in strikes. @hile the Constitution

recogni"es the right of govern!ent e!plo-ees to organi"e, the- are prohibited fro! staging strikes, de!onstrations !ass leaves,

*alk8outs and other for!s of !ass action *hich *ill result in te!porar- stoppage or disruption of public services. ;he right of

govern!ent e!plo-ees to organi"e is li!ited onl- to the for!ation of unions or associations, *ithout including the right to strike.

More recently, in acinto vs. %ourt of Appeals,F%%G the Court eplained the schoolteachers riht to peaceful

asse!bly vis-a-vis their riht to !ass protest

Moreover, the petitioners here, e/cept Merlinda Dacinto, *ere not penali"ed for the e/ercise of their right to asse!ble peacefull-

and to petition the govern!ent for a redress of grievances. Rather, the Civil #ervice Co!!ission found the! guilt- of conduct

pre<udicial to the best interest of the service for having absented the!selves *ithout proper authorit-, fro! their schools during






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regular school da-s, in order to participate in the !ass protest, their absence ineluctabl- resulting in the non8holding of classes and

in the deprivation of students of education, for *hich the- *ere responsible. ad petitioners availed the!selves of their free ti!e

88 recess, after classes, *eekends or holida-s 88 to dra!ati"e their grievances and to dialogue *ith the proper authorities *ithin the

bounds of la*, no one 88 not the 2EC#, the C#C or even this Court 88 could have held the! liable for the valid e/ercise of their

constitutionall- guaranteed rights. As it *as, the te!porar- stoppage of classes resulting fro! their activit- necessaril- disrupted

public services, the ver- evil sought to be forestalled b- the prohibition against strikes b- govern!ent *orkers. ;heir act b- its

nature *as en<oined b- the Civil #ervice la*, rules and regulations, for *hich the- !ust, therefore, be !ade ans*erable.&31

(n the present case, ho"ever, the issue is not "hether the private respondents enaed in any prohibited activity"hich !ay "arrant the i!position of disciplinary sanctions aainst the! as a result of ad!inistrative proceedins. As

already observed, the resolution of this case revolves around the /uestion of due process of la", not on the riht of

overn!ent "orers to strie. The issue is not "hether private respondents !ay be punished for enain in a

prohibited action but "hether, in the course of the investiation of the alleed proscribed activity, their riht to due

process has been violated. (n short, before they can be investiated and !eted out any penalty, due process !ust first

be observed.

(n ad!inistrative proceedins, due process has been reconi)ed to include the follo"in 0%1 the riht to actual or

constructive notice of the institution of proceedins "hich !ay affect a respondents leal rihts2 0+1 a real opportunity

to be heard personally or "ith the assistance of counsel, to present "itnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to

defend ones rihts2 0#1 a tri#unal vested with competent ;urisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasona#le guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality 2 and 0&1 a findin by said tribunal "hich

is supported by substantial evidence sub!itted for consideration durin the hearin or contained in the records or

!ade no"n to the parties affected.F%#G

The leislature enacted a special la", RA &@'$ no"n as the (agna %arta for Public *chool Teachers, "hich

specifically covers ad!inistrative proceedins involvin public schoolteachers. *ection : of said la" epressly

provides that the co!!ittee to hear public schoolteachers ad!inistrative cases should be co!posed of the school

superintendent of the division as chair!an, a representative of the local or any eistin provincial or national teachers

orani)ation and a supervisor of the division. The pertinent provisions of RA &@'$ read

#ec. 4. #afeguards in 2isciplinar- Procedure. Ever- teacher shall en<o- e=uitable safeguards at each stage of an- disciplinar- procedure and shall have0

a. the right to be infor!ed, in *riting, of the charges

b. the right to full access to the evidence in the case

c. the right to defend hi!self and to be defended b- a representative of his choice andor b- his organi"ation, ade=uate ti!e being

given to the teacher for the preparation of his defense and

c. the right to appeal to clearl- designated authorities. No publicit- shall be given to an- disciplinar- action being taken against a

teacher during the pendenc- of his case.

#ec. '. Ad!inistrative Charges. Ad!inistrative charges against a teacher shall be heard initiall- b- a co!!ittee co!posed of the

corresponding #chool #uperintendent of the 2ivision or a dul- authori"ed representative *ho *ould at least have the rank of a

division supervisor, *here the teacher belongs, as chair!an, a representative of the local or, in its absence, an- e/isting provincial

or national teachers organi"ation and a supervisor of the 2ivision, the last t*o to be designated b- the 2irector of Public

#chools. ;he co!!ittee shall sub!it its findings, and reco!!endations to the 2irector of Public #chools *ithin thirt- da-s fro!

the ter!ination of the hearings0 Provided, ho*ever, ;hat *here the school superintendent is the co!plainant or an interested part-,

all the !e!bers of the co!!ittee shall be appointed b- the #ecretar- of Education.

The foreoin provisions i!ple!ent the eclaration of Policy of the statute2 that is, to pro!ote the ter!s of

e!ploy!ent and career prospects of schoolteachers.

(n the present case, the various co!!ittees for!ed by EC* to hear the ad!inistrative chares aainst private

respondents did not include a representative of the local or, in its absence, any eistin provincial or national teachers

orani)ation as re/uired by *ection : of RA &@'$. Accordinly, these co!!ittees "ere dee!ed to have no co!petent







5urisdiction.Thus, all proceedins undertaen by the! "ere necessarily void. They could not provide any basis for the

suspension or dis!issal of private respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a teachers orani)ation in these

co!!ittees "as indispensable to ensure an i!partial tribunal. (t "as this re/uire!ent that "ould have iven

substance and !eanin to the riht to be heard. (ndeed, in any proceedin, the essence of procedural due process is

e!bodied in the basic re/uire!ent of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. F%&G

Petitioners arue that the EC* co!plied "ith *ection : of RA &@'$, because all the teachers "ho "ere

!e!bers of the various co!!ittees are !e!bers of either the Hue)on City *econdary Teachers <ederation or the

Hue)on City Ele!entary Teachers <ederation F%8G and are dee!ed to be the representatives of a teachers orani)ationas re/uired by *ection : of RA &@'$.

3e disaree. Mere !e!bership of said teachers in their respective teachers orani)ations does not ipso

facto !ae the! authori)ed representatives of such orani)ations as conte!plated by *ection : of RA &@'$. >nder

this section, the teachers orani)ation possesses the riht to indicate its choice of representative to be included by the

EC* in the investiatin co!!ittee. *uch riht to desinate cannot be usurped by the secretary of education or the

director of public schools or their underlins. (n the instant case, there is no dispute that none of the teachers

appointed by the EC* as !e!bers of its investiatin co!!ittee "as ever desinated or authori)ed by a teachers

orani)ation as its representative in said co!!ittee.

Contrary to petitioners asseverations,F%@G

RA &@'$ is applicable to this case. (t has not been epressly repealed bythe eneral la" P ;$', "hich "as enacted later, nor has it been sho"n to be inconsistent "ith the latter. (t is a

funda!ental rule of statutory construction that repeals by i!plication are not favored. An i!plied repeal "ill not be

allo"ed unless it is convincinly and una!biuously de!onstrated that the t"o la"s are so clearly repunant and

patently inconsistent that they cannot co-eist. This is based on the rationale that the "ill of the leislature cannot be

overturned by the 5udicial function of construction and interpretation. Courts cannot tae the place of Conress in

repealin statutes. Their function is to try to har!oni)e, as !uch as possible, see!in conflicts in the la"s and

resolve doubts in favor of their validity and co-eistence. F%'G Thus, a subse/uent eneral la" does not repeal a prior

special la", unless the intent to repeal or alter is !anifest, althouh the ter!s of the eneral la" are broad enouh to

include the cases e!braced in the special la".F%;G

The afore!entioned *ection : of RA &@'$, therefore, reflects the leislative intent to i!pose a standard and aseparate set of procedural re/uire!ents in connection "ith ad!inistrative proceedins involvin public

schoolteachers. Clearly, private respondents riht to due process of la" re/uires co!pliance "ith these re/uire!ents

laid do"n by RA &@'$. Ver#a legis non est recedendum.

6ence, Respondent Court of Appeals, throuh Mr. 9ustice icente . Mendo)a "ho is no" a !e!ber of this

Court, perceptively and correctly stated

Respondent8appellants argue that the Magna Carta has been superseded b- the Civil #ervice 2ecree HP.2. No. 47( and that

pursuant to the latter la* the head of a depart!ent, like the 2EC# secretar-, or a regional director, like the respondent8appellant

Nilo Rosas, can file ad!inistrative charges against a subordinate, investigate hi! and take disciplinar- action against hi! if

*arranted b- his findings.Respondent8appellants cite in support of their argu!ent the follo*ing provisions of the Civil #ervice

2ecree HP.2. No. 47(0

#ec. )(. Disci$linary %urisdiction. 88

b ;he heads of depart!ents, agencies and instru!entalities /// shall have <urisdiction to investigate and decide !atters involving

disciplinar- action against officers and e!plo-ees under their <urisdiction /// .

#ec. )4,. Procedure in #dministrative Cases #gainst &on'Presidential #$$ointees. 8

a Ad!inistrative Proceedings !a- be co!!enced against a subordinate officer or the e!plo-ee b- the head of depart!ent or

officer of e=uivalent rank, or head of local govern!ent, or chiefs of agencies, or regional directors, or upon s*orn, *ritten

co!plaint of another persons.

;here is reall- no repugnance bet*een the Civil #ervice 2ecree and the Magna Carta for Public #chool ;eachers. Although the

Civil #ervice 2ecree gives the head of depart!ent or the regional director <urisdiction to investigate and decide disciplinar-

















!atters, the fact is that such po*er is e/ercised through co!!ittees. In cases involving public school teachers, the Magna Carta

provides that the co!!ittee be constituted as follo*s0

#ec. '. Ad!inistrative Charges. 8 Ad!inistrative charges against a teacher shall be heard initiall- b- a co!!ittee co!posed of the

corresponding #chool #uperintendent of the 2ivision or a dul- authori"ed representative *ho *ould at least have the rank of a

division supervisor, *here the teacher belongs, as chair!an, a representative of the local or, in its absence, an- e/isting provincial

or national teachers organi"ation and a supervisor of the 2ivision, the last t*o to be designated b- the 2irector of Public

#chools. ;he co!!ittee shall sub!it its findings, and reco!!endations to the 2irector of Public #chools *ithin thirt- da-s fro!

the ter!ination of the hearings0 Provided, ho*ever, that *here the school superintendent is the co!plainant or an interested part-,all the !e!bers of the co!!ittee shall be appointed b- the #ecretar- of Education.

Indeed, in the case at bar, neither the 2EC# s1ecretar- nor the 2EC#8NCR regional director personall- conducted the

investigation but entrusted it to a co!!ittee co!posed of a division supervisor, secondar- and ele!entar- school teachers, and

consultants. But there *as no representative of a teachers organi"ation. ;his is a serious fla* in the co!position of the co!!ittee

because the provision for the representation of a teachers organi"ation is intended b- la* for the protection of the rights of

teachers facing ad!inistrative charges.

;here is thus nothing in the Magna Carta that is in an- *a- inconsistent *ith the Civil #ervice 2ecree insofar as procedures for

investigation is concerned. ;o the contrar-, the Civil #ervice 2ecree, #1ec. )4Hb affir!s the Magna Carta b- providing that the

respondent in an ad!inistrative case !a- ask for a for!al investigation, *hich *as *hat the teachers did in this case b-=uestioning the absence of a representative of a teachers organi"ation in the investigating co!!ittee.

;he ad!inistrative co!!ittee considered the teachers to have *aived their right to a hearing after the latters counsel *alked out

of the preli!inar- hearing. ;he co!!ittee should not have !ade such a ruling because the *alk out *as staged in protest against

the procedures of the co!!ittee and its refusal to give the teachers counsel a cop- of the guidelines. ;he co!!ittee concluded its

investigation and ordered the dis!issal of the teachers *ithout giving the teachers the right to full access of the evidence against

the! and the opportunit- to defend the!selves. Its predisposition to find petitioner8appellees guilt- of the charges *as in fact

noted b- the #upre!e Court *hen in its resolution in .R. No. &7&'6) HRosario #epti!o v. Dudge Martin %illara!a, Dr. it stated0

;he facts and issues in this case are si!ilar to the facts and issues in on. Isidro Cario, et al. v. on. Carlos C. +filada, et al. .R.

No. &7737$, August 33, &'$&.

As in the Cario v. +filada case, the officials of the 2epart!ent of Culture and Education are predisposed to su!!aril- hold the

petitioners guilt- of the charges against the!. In fact, in this case #ecretar- Cario, *ithout a*aiting for!al ad!inistrative

procedures and on the basis of reports and i!plied ad!issions found the petitioners guilt- as charged and dis!issed the! fro! the

service in separate decisions dated Ma- &$, &''& and August $, &''&. ;he teachers *ent to court. ;he Court dis!issed the case.&'1

<urther!ore, this Court sees no valid reason to disreard the factual findins and conclusions of the Court of

Appeals. (t is not our function to assess and evaluate all over aain the evidence, testi!onial and docu!entary,

adduced by the parties particularly "here, such as here, the findins of both the trial court and the appellate court

coincide.F+$G

(t is as clear as day to us that the Court of Appeals co!!itted no reversible error in affir!in the trial courts

decision settin aside the /uestioned orders of petitioners2 and orderin the un/ualified reinstate!ent of private

respondents and the pay!ent to the! of salaries, allo"ances, bonuses and other benefits that accrued to their benefit

durin the entire duration of their suspension or dis!issal. F+%G Because the ad!inistrative proceedins involved in this

case are void, no delin/uency or !isconduct !ay be i!puted to private respondents. Moreover, the suspension or

dis!issal !eted on the! is baseless. Private respondents should, as a conse/uence, be reinstated F++G and a"arded all

!onetary benefits that !ay have accrued to the! durin the period of their un5ustified suspension or dis!issal. F+#G This

Court "ill never countenance a denial of the funda!ental riht to due process, "hich is a cornerstone of our leal

syste!.

@HERE)ORE, pre!ises considered, the petition is hereby D)<7)D for its utter failure to sho" any reversible

error on the part of the Court of Appeals. The assailed ecision is thus A667R()D.

SO ORERE.















SUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-68288 l 11, 1986

!%OS!A!O GUZMAN, UL*SSES UR"%ZTON!O, &'( AR%EL RAMACULA, petitioners,vs.

NAT%ONAL UN%)ERS%T* &'( !OM%NGO L. #OCSON i' i/ 0&p&0i &/ Pr/i(' o: N&io'&l U'ir/i,respondents.

Efren (. Mercado and (aydee )orac for $etitioners.

Samson S. #lcantara for res$ondents.

NAR)ASA, J.:

Petitioners 2iosdado u"!an, l-sses rbi"tondo and Ariel Ra!acula, students of respondent National niversit-, have co!e to this

Court to seek relief fro! *hat the- describe as their schools >continued and persistent refusal to allo* the! to enrol.> In their petition

>for e/traordinar- legal and e=uitable re!edies *ith pra-er for preli!inar- !andator- in<unction> dated August (, &'46, the- allege0

& that respondent niversit-s avo*ed reason for its refusal to re8enroll the! in their respective courses is >the latters

participation in peaceful !ass actions *ithin the pre!ises of the niversit-.

3 that this >attitude of the Hniversit- is si!pl- a continuation of its cavalier if not hostile attitude to the students

e/ercise of their basic constitutional and hu!an rights alread- recorded in !ocie C. San %uan vs. &ational

*niversity+ #.C. .R. No. $566) H&'4) and its utter conte!pt for the principle of due process of la* to the pre<udice

of petitioners> and

) that >in effect petitioners are sub<ected to the e/tre!e penalt- of e/pulsion *ithout cause or if there be an-, *ithout

being infor!ed of such cause and *ithout being afforded the opportunit- to defend the!selves. Berina v. Phili$$ine

Maritime ,nstitute - &&( #CRA 54& &'4)1> .

In the co!!ent filed on #epte!ber 36, &'4$ for respondent niversit- and its President pursuant to this Courts re=uire!ent therefor 1 ,respondents !ake the clai!0

& that >petitioners failure to enroll for the first se!ester of the school -ear &'468&'45 is due to their o*n fault and not because of their

allegede/ercise of their constitutional and hu!an rights>

3 that petitioner rbi"tondo, sought to re8enroll onl- on Dul- 5, &'4$ >*hen the enroll!ent period *as alread- closed>

) that as regards petitioner u"!an, his >acade!ic sho*ing> *as >poor>, >due to his activities in leading bo-cotts of classes> that *hen

his father *as notified of this develop!ent so!eti!e in August, &'43, the latter had de!anded that his son >refor! or else *e *ill recall

hi! to the province> that u"!an *as one of the petitioners in .R. No. $566) entitled !ocie San %uan+ et al. vs. &ational *niversity+

et al.+ at the hearing of *hich on Nove!ber 3), &'4) this Court had ad!onished >the students involved Hto take advantage and !ake

the !ost of the opportunit- given to the! to stud-> that u"!an >ho*ever continued to lead or activel- participate in activities *ithin

the universit- pre!ises, conducted *ithout prior per!it fro! school authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes therein> that

!oreover, u"!an >is facing cri!inal charges for !alicious !ischief before the Metropolitan ;rial Court of Manila HCri!. Case No.

7$$66$ in connection *ith the destruction of properties of respondent niversit- on #epte!ber &3, &'4) >, and >is also one of the

defendants in Civil Case No. 4)3764) of the Regional ;rial Court of Manila entitled /&ational *niversity+ ,nc. vs. !ocie San %uan et

al./ for da!ages arising fro! destruction of universit- properties

6 that as regards petitioner Ra!acula, like u"!an >he continued to lead or activel- participate, contrar- to the spirit of the Resolution

dated Nove!ber 3), &'4) of this ... Court Hin .R. No. $566) in *hich he *as also one of the petitioners and to universit- rules and

regulations, *ithin universit- pre!ises but *ithout per!it fro! universit- officials in activities that disturbed or disrupted classes> and



5 that petitioners have >failures in their records, Hand are not of good scholastic standing. >

Respondents close their co!!ent *ith the follo*ing assertions, to *it0

& B- their actuations, petitioners !ust be dee!ed to have forfeited their privilege, if an-, to seek enroll!ent in respondent universit-.

;he rights of respondent universit-, as an institution of higher learning, !ust also be respected. It is also be-ond co!prehension *h-

petitioners, *ho continuall- despise and villif- respondent universit- and its officials and facult- !e!bers, should persist in seeking

enroll!ent in an institution that the- hate.

3 nder the circu!stances, and *ithout regard to legal technicalities, it is not to the best interest of all concerned that petitioners be

allo*ed to enroll in respondent universit-.

) In an- event, petitioners enroll!ent being on the se!estral basis, respondents cannot be co!pelled to enroll the! after the end of the

se!ester.

+n +ctober 3, &'46 this Court issued a resolution reading as follo*s0

... Acting on the Co!!ent sub!itted b- respondent, the Court Resolved to N+;E the sa!e and to re=uire a REP9J to

such Co!!ent. ;he Court further Resolved to I##E a MAN2A;+RJ INDNC;I+N, en<oining respondent to allo*

the enrol!ent of petitioners for the co!ing se!ester *ithout pre<udice to an- disciplinar- proceeding to *hich an- or

all of the! !a- be sub<ected *ith their right to la*ful defense recogni"ed and respected. As regards petitioner

2iosdado u"!an, even if it be a fact that there is a pending cri!inal charge against hi! for !alicious !ischief, the

Court nonetheless is of the opinion that, as above8noted, *ithout pre<udice to the continuation of an- disciplinar-

proceeding against hi!, that he be allo*ed to resu!e his studies in the !ean*hile. As sho*n in Anne/ 3 of the

petition itself, Mr. Duan P. u"!an, father of said petitioner, is e/tending full cooperation *ith petitioners to assure

that *hatever protest or grievance petitioner u"!an !a- have *ould be ventilated in a la*ful and peaceful !anner.

Petitioners REP9J inter alia0

& denied that rbi"tondo atte!pted to enroll onl- on Dul- 5, &'46 H*hen enroll!ent *as alread- closed, it being alleged that >*hile he

did tr- to enroll that da-, he also atte!pted to do so several ti!es before that date, all to no avail, because respondents ... persistentl-

refused to allo* hi! to do so> respondents ostensible reason being that rbi"tondo Hhad participated in !ass actions ... *ithin theschool pre!ises,> although there *ere no e/isting disciplinar- charge against petitioner rbi"tondo> at the ti!e

3 asserted that >neither the te/t nor the conte/t of the resolution 2 <ustifies the conclusion that >petitioners right to e/ercise their constitutional freedo!s>

had thereb- been restricted or li!ited and

) alleged that >the holding of activities H!ass action in the school pre!ises *ithout the per!ission of the school ... can be e/plained b-

the fact that the respondents persistentl- refused to issue such per!it repeatedl- sought b- the students. >

+n Nove!ber 3), &'46, this Court pro!ulgated another resolution, this ti!e reading as follo*s0

... ;he Court, after considering the pleadings filed and deliberating on the issues raised in the petition for

e/traordinar- legal and e=uitable re!edies *ith pra-er for preli!inar- !andator- in<unction as *ell as therespondents co!!ent on the petition and the repl- of counsel for petitioners to the respondents co!!ent, Resolved

to Ha give 2E C+R#E to the petition Hb consider the respondents co!!ent as AN#@ER to the petition and Hc

re=uire the parties to file their respective MEM+RAN2A *ithin t*ent- H37 da-s fro! notice. ... .

I!!ediatel- apparent fro! a reading of respondents co!!ent and !e!orandu! is the fact that the- had never conducted proceedings

of an- sort to deter!ine *hether or not petitioners8students had indeed led or participated >in activities *ithin the universit- pre!ises,

conducted *ithout prior per!it fro! school authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes therein> 3 or perpetrated acts of >vandalis!, coercion

and inti!idation, slander, noise barrage and other acts sho*ing disdain for and defiance of niversit- authorit-.>4 Parentheticall-, the pendenc- of a civil case for da!ages

and a cri!inal case for !alicious !ischief against petitioner u"!an, cannot, *ithout !ore, furnish sufficient *arrant for his e/pulsion or debar!ent fro! re8enroll!ent.

Also apparent is the o!ission of respondents to cite this Court to an- dul- published rule of theirs b- *hich students !a- be e/pelled or refused re8enroll!ent for poor

scholastic standing.

nder the Education Act of &'43, 5 the petitioners, as students, have the right a!ong others >to freel- choose their field of stud- sub<ect to e/isting curricula and to

continue their course therein up to graduation, e/cept in case of acade!ic deficienc-, or violation of disciplinar- regulations.>6Petitioners *ere being denied this right, or

being disciplined, *ithout due process, in violation of the ad!onition in the Manual of Regulations for Private #chools< that >Hno penalt- shall be i!posed upon an- student

e/cept for cause as defined in ... Hthe Manual andor in the school rules and regulations as dul- pro!ulgated and onl- after due investigation shall have been



conducted.>8 ;his Court is therefore constrained, as in Berina v. Phili$$ine Maritime ,nstitute+

9 to declare illegal this act of respondents of i!posing sanctions on students

*ithout due investigation.

Educational institutions of course have the po*er to >adopt and enforce such rules as !a- be dee!ed e/pedient for ... Hits

govern!ent, ... Hthis being> incident to the ver- ob<ect of incorporation, and indispensable to the successful !anage!ent of the

college.> 1= ;he rules !a- include those governing student discipline. Indeed, the !aintenance of >good school discipline> is a dut- specificall- en<oined on >ever- private

school> b- the Manual of Regulations for Private #chools11 and in this connection, the Manual further provides that8

... ;he school rules governing discipline and the corresponding sanctions therefor !ust be clearl- specified and

defined in *riting and !ade kno*n to the students andor their parents or guardians. #chools shall have the authorit-

and prerogative to pro!ulgate such rules and regulations as the- !a- dee! necessar- fro! ti!e to ti!e effective as of

the date of their pro!ulgation unless other*ise specified. 12

But, to repeat, the i!position of disciplinar- sanctions re=uires observance of procedural due process. And it bears stressing that due

process in disciplinar- cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings si!ilar to those prescribed for actions and

proceedings in courts of <ustice. ;he proceedings in student discipline cases !a- be su!!ar- and cross8e/a!ination is not, contrar- to

petitioners vie*, an essential part thereof. ;here are *ithal !ini!u! standards *hich !ust be !et to satisf- the de!ands of procedural

due process and these are, that H& the students !ust be infor!ed in *riting of the nature and cause of an- accusation against the! H3

the- shag have the right to ans*er the charges against the!, *ith the assistance of counsel, if desired H) the- shall be infor!ed of the

evidence against the! H6 the- shall have the right to adduce evidence in their o*n behalf and H5 the evidence !ust be dul- considered

b- the investigating co!!ittee or official designated b- the school authorities to hear and decide the case.

@EREG+RE, the petition is granted and the respondents are directed to allo* the petitioners to re8enroll or other*ise continue *ith

their respective courses, *ithout pre<udice to an- disciplinar- proceedings to *hich an- or all of the! !a- be sub<ected in accordance

*ith the standards herein set forth.

#+ +R2ERE2.

1eehanee+ C%.+ #"ad Santos+ 2eria+ )a$+ 2ernan+ Melencio'(errera+ #lam$ay+ Gutierre3+ %r.+ Cru3 and Paras+ %%.+ concur.



Ermita malate hotel v. City of manila

Labels: constitutional law, due process, police power

)a3 7n 9une %#, %:@#, the Municipal Board of Manila passed 7rdinance No. &'@$ "ith the follo"in provisions

/uestioned for its violation of due process

%. refrainin fro! entertainin or acceptin any uest or custo!er unless it fills out a prescribed for! in the lobby in

open vie"2

+. prohibitin ad!ission o less than %; years old2

#. usurious increase of license fee to P&,8$$ and @,$$$ o %8$J and +$$J respectively 0ta issue also12

&. !ain unla"ful lease or rent !ore than t"ice every +& hours2 and

8. cancellation of license for subse/uent violation.

The lo"er court issued preli!inary in5unction and petitioners raised the case to *C on certiorari.

Iu8 (s the ordinance co!pliant "ith the due process re/uire!ent of the constitutionD

H%' 7rdinance is a valid eercise of police po"er to !ini!i)e certain practices hurtful to public !orals. There is no

violation o constitutional due process for bein reasonable and the ordinance is en5oys the presu!ption of constitutionality

absent any irreularity on its face. Taation !ay be !ade to i!ple!ent a police po"er and the a!ount, ob5ect, and instance

of taation is dependent upon the local leislative body. 9ud!ent of lo"er court reversed and in5unction lifted.

Lao Gi v CA (1989) 180 SCRA 7569. =ancayo

<acts

<ilo!eno Chia 9r. "as !ade a <ilipino citi)en by virtue of 7pinion %:% by the *ecretary of 5ustice. 6o"ever, this "as revoed

"hen his fathers citi)enship "as cast aside due to fraud and !isrepresentation.

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Chares of deportation "ere filed aainst the Chias. Chares also alleed that they refused to reister as aliens and that

they co!!itted acts of undesirability.

The Chias said that the C( has no authority to deport the! "hich "as denied by the C(.

They filed a petition "ith the *upre!e Court for a "rit of preli!inary in5unction "hich "as dis!issed for lac of !erit. Their

M<R "as also denied.

Earlier, Manuel Chias case of falsification of public docu!ents in allein he "as a <ilipino citi)en. 6e "as alleed to have

done this for the sale of real property. The trial court ac/uitted hi! by sayin that 7pinion %:% "as res 5udicata and cant be

contravened by 7pinion %&'.

The C( set the hearin for the deportation case aainst the Chias and told the! to reister as aliens. The Chias toos

further action. Their petition for in5unctive relief "as denied by the C<( of Manila.

They also lost the appeal in the CA. The Chias !fr "as denied.

(n their *C petition, they see to set aside the CA decision. They arued that they "erent sub5ect to i!!ediate deportation,

the presence of fraud in the citi)enship, the CAs oversteppin of appellate 5urisdiction, and the resolution of the *C didnt

!ae a rulin that the petitioner entered the Philippines by false pretenses.

(ssue

%. oes the C( have the 5urisdiction to deter!ine the deportationD

6eld Kes. Petition ranted 6earin !ust be continued to deter!ine if they are really aliens

Ratio

*ection #' of the (!!iration act states

*EC. #'. 0a1 The follo"in aliens shall be arrested upon the "arrant of the Co!!issioner of (!!iration or of any

other officer desinated by hi! for the purpose and deported upon the "arrant of the Co!!issioner of (!!iration after a

deter!ination by the Board of Co!!issioners of the eistence of the round for deportation as chared aainst the alien

0%1 Any alien "ho enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act by !eans of false and !isleadin state!ents

or "ithout inspection and ad!ission by the i!!iration authorities at a desinated port of entry or at any place other than at

a desinated port of entry. 0As a!ended by *ec. %#, Rep. Act No. 8$#.1 ...

There !ust be a deter!ination of the eistence of the round chared, particularly illeal entry into the country. 7nly after

the hearin can the alien be deported. Also, there !ust be appositive findin fro! the C( that they are aliens before

co!pellin the! to reister as such. This po"er is the police po"er to protect the state fro! undesirable aliens in5urious to

the public ood.

*ince the deportation is a harsh process, due process !ust be observed. (n the sa!e la", it is provided that

No alien shall be deported "ithout bein infor!ed of the specific rounds for deportation nor "ithout bein iven a hearin

under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the Co!!issioner of (!!iration.

The acts or o!issions that they are chared of !ust be in ordinary lanuae for the person to be infor!ed and for the C( to

!ae a proper 5ud!ent. Also, the "arrants of arre"st !ust be in accordance "ith the rules on cri!inal procedure.

7n the infor!ation of a private prosecutor in the case eportation is the sole concern of the state. There is no 5ustification

for a private party to intervene.

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RESOLUTION OF THE COURT EN BANC DATED OCTOBER 15, 1991 PROVIDING

FOR THE REVISED RULE ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE FOR METROPOLITAN

TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL

COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS.

Pursuant to Section 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P Bg. 1!9" and to achie#e an

e$%editious and ine$%ensi#e deter&ination of the cases referred to herein' the ourt Reso#ed to

%ro&ugate the foo)ing Re#ised Rue on Su&&ary Procedure*chanro+es#irtuaa)i+rary

,.

A%%ica+iity

Section 1. Sco%e. - his rue sha go#ern the su&&ary %rocedure in the /etro%oitan ria ourts'

the /unici%a ria ourts in ities' the /unici%a ria ourts' and the /unici%a ircuit ria ourts in

the foo)ing cases faing )ithin their urisdiction*chanro+es#irtuaa)i+rary

A. i#i ases*chanro+es#irtuaa)i+rary

(1" A cases of forci+e entry and una)fu detainer' irres%ecti#e of the a&ount of da&ages or un%aidrentas sought to +e reco#ered. here attorney2s fees are a)arded' the sa&e sha not e$ceed t)enty

thousand %esos (P!0'000.00".

(!" A other ci#i cases' e$ce%t %ro+ate %roceedings' )here the tota a&ount of the %aintiff2s cai&

does not e$ceed ten thousand %esos (P10'000.00"' e$cusi#e of interest and costs.chanro+es #irtua

a) i+rary chanro+es #irtua a) i+rary

B. ri&ina ases*chanro+es#irtuaa)i+rary

(1" ioations of traffic a)s' rues and reguations4 chanro+es #irtua a) i+rary

(!" ioations of the renta a)4 chanro+es #irtua a) i+rary

(3" ioations of &unici%a or city ordinances4 chanro+es #irtua a) i+rary

(5" A other cri&ina cases )here the %enaty %rescri+ed +y a) for the offense charged is

i&%rison&ent not e$ceeding si$ &onths' or a fine not e$ceeding (P1'000.00"' or +oth' irres%ecti#e of

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other i&%osa+e %enaties' accessory or other)ise' or of the ci#i ia+iity arising therefro&* Pro#ided'

ho)e#er' that in offenses in#o#ing da&age to %ro%erty through cri&ina negigence' this Rue sha

go#ern )here the i&%osa+e fine does not e$ceed ten thousand %esos (P10'000.00".

his Rue sha not a%%y to a ci#i case )here the %aintiffs cause of action is %eaded in the sa&e

co&%aint )ith another cause of action su+ect to the ordinary %rocedure4 nor to a cri&ina case )here

the offense charged is necessariy reated to another cri&ina case su+ect to the ordinary

%rocedure.chanro+es #irtua a) i+rary chanro+es #irtua a) i+rary

Sec. !. eter&ination of a%%ica+iity. - 7%on the fiing of a ci#i or cri&ina action' the court sha

issue an order decaring )hether or not the case sha +e go#erned +y this Rue A %atenty erroneous

deter&ination to a#oid the a%%ication of the Rue on Su&&ary Procedure is a ground for disci%inary

action.chanro+es #irtua a) i+rary chanro+es #irtua a) i+rary

,,.

i#i ases

Sec. 3. Peadings. -

A. Peadings ao)ed. - he ony %eadings ao)ed to +e fied are the co&%aints' co&%usory

countercai&s and crosscai&s2 %eaded in the ans)er' and the ans)ers thereto.

B. erifications. - A %eadings sha +e #erified.

Sec. 5. uty of court. - After the court deter&ines that the case fas under su&&ary %rocedure' it

&ay' fro& an e$a&ination of the aegations therein and such e#idence as &ay +e attached thereto'dis&iss the case outright on any of the grounds a%%arent therefro& for the dis&issa of a ci#i action. ,f

no ground for dis&issa is found it sha forth)ith issue su&&ons )hich sha state that the su&&ary

%rocedure under this Rue sha a%%y. dc chanro+es #irtua a) i+rary

Sec. . Ans)er. - ithin ten (10" days fro& ser#ice of su&&ons' the defendant sha fie his ans)er

to the co&%aint and ser#e a co%y thereof on the %aintiff. Affir&ati#e and negati#e defenses not

%eaded therein sha +e dee&ed )ai#ed' e$ce%t for ac: of urisdiction o#er the su+ect &atter. ross

cai&s and co&%usory countercai&s not asserted in the ans)er sha +e considered +arred. he

ans)er to countercai&s or crosscai&s sha +e fied and ser#ed )ithin ten (10" days fro& ser#ice of

the ans)er in )hich they are %eaded.chanro+es #irtua a) i+rary chanro+es #irtua a) i+rary

Sec. 6. ;ffect of faiure to ans)er. - Shoud the defendant fai to ans)er the co&%aint )ithin the

%eriod a+o#e %ro#ided' the court' &otu %ro%rio' or on &otion of the %aintiff' sha render udg&ent as&ay +e )arranted +y the facts aeged in the co&%aint and i&ited to )hat is %rayed for therein*

Pro#ided' ho)e#er' that the court &ay in its discretion reduce the a&ount of da&ages and attorney2s

fees cai&ed for +eing e$cessi#e or other)ise unconsciona+e. his is )ithout %reudice to the

a%%ica+iity of Section 5' Rue 1 of the Rues of ourt' if there are t)o or &ore defendants.

Sec. <. Prei&inary conference4 a%%earance of %arties. - =ot ater than thirty (30" days after the ast

ans)er is fied' a %rei&inary conference sha +e hed. he rues on %retria in ordinary cases sha +e

a%%ica+e to the %rei&inary conference uness inconsistent )ith the %ro#isions of this Rue.chanro+es

#irtua a) i+rary chanro+es #irtua a) i+rary

he faiure of the %aintiff to a%%ear in the %rei&inary conference sha +e a cause for the dis&issa of

his co&%aint. he defendant )ho a%%ears in the a+sence of the %aintiff sha +e entited to udg&ent

on his countercai& in accordance )ith Section 6 hereof. A crosscai&s sha +e dis&issed.

,f a soe defendant sha fai to a%%ear' the %aintiff sha +e entited to udg&ent in accordance )ith

Section 6 hereof. his Rue sha not a%%y )here one of t)o or &ore defendants sued under a co&&on

cause of action )ho had %eaded a co&&on defense sha a%%ear at the %rei&inary conference.

Sec. 8. Record of %rei&inary conference. - ithin fi#e (" days after the ter&ination of the

%rei&inary conference' the court sha issue an order stating the &atters ta:en u% therein' incuding

+ut not i&ited to*chanro+es#irtuaa)i+rary

(a" hether the %arties ha#e arri#ed at an a&ica+e sette&ent' and if so' the ter&s thereof4

(+" he sti%uations or ad&issions entered into +y the %arties4.

(c" hether' on the +asis of the %eadings and the sti%uations and ad&issions &ade +y the %arties'

udg&ent &ay +e rendered )ithout the need of further %roceedings' in )hich e#ent the udg&ent sha

+e rendered )ithin thirty (30" days fro& issuance of the order4

(d" A cear s%ecification of &ateria facts )hich re&ain contro#erted4 and chanro+es #irtua a)

i+rary



(e" Such other &atters intended to e$%edite the dis%osition of the case.chanro+es #irtua a)

i+rary chanro+es #irtua a) i+rary

Sec. 9. Su+&ission of affida#its and %osition %a%ers. - ithin ten (10" days fro& recei%t of the order

&entioned in the ne$t %receding section' the %arties sha su+&it the affida#its of their )itnesses and

other e#idence on the factua issues defined in the order' together )ith their %osition %a%ers setting

forth the a) and the facts reied u%on +y the&.chanro+es #irtua a) i+rarychanro+es #irtua a)

i+rary

Sec. 10. Rendition of udg&ent. - ithin thirty (30" days after recei%t of the ast affida#its and

%osition %a%ers' or the e$%iration of the %eriod for fiing the sa&e' the court sha render udg&ent.

>o)e#er shoud the court find it necessary to carify certain &ateria facts' it &ay' during the said

%eriod' issue an order s%ecifying the &atters to +e carified' and re?uire the %arties to su+&it affida#its

or other e#idence on the said &atters )ithin ten (10" days fro& recei%t of said order. Judg&ent sha

+e rendered )ithin fifteen (1" days after the recei%t of the ast carificatory affida#its' or the e$%iration

of the %eriod for fiing the sa&e.

he court sha not resort to the carificatory %rocedure to gain ti&e for the rendition of the udg&ent.

,,,.

ri&ina ases

Sec. 11. >o) co&&enced. - he fiing of cri&ina cases faing )ithin the sco%e of this Rue sha +e

either +y co&%aint or +y infor&ation* Pro#ided' ho)e#er' that in /etro%oitan /ania and in harteredities. such cases sha +e co&&enced ony +y infor&ation' e$ce%t )hen the offense cannot +e

%rosecuted de oficio. chanro+es #irtua a) i+rary

he co&%aint or infor&ation sha +e acco&%anied +y the affida#its of the co&%iant and of his

)itnesses in such nu&+er of co%ies as there are accused %us t)o (!" co%ies for the court2s fies.,f this

re?uire&ent is not co&%ied )ith )ithin fi#e (" days fro& date of fiing' the care &ay +e

dis&issed.chanro+es #irtua a) i+rary chanro+es #irtua a) i+rary

Sec. 1!. uty of court. - chanro+es #irtua a) i+rary

(a" ,f co&&enced +y co&%iant. - @n the +asis of the co&%iant and the affida#its and other e#idence

acco&%anying the sa&e' the court &ay dis&iss the case outright for +eing %atenty )ithout +asis or

&erit and order the reease of the a&used if in custody.

(+" ,f co&&enced +y infor&ation. - hen the case is co&&enced +y infor&ation' or is not dis&issed%ursuant to the ne$t %receding %aragra%h' the court sha issue an order )hich' together )ith co%ies of

the affida#its and other e#idence su+&itted +y the %rosecution' sha re?uire the accused to su+&it his

counteraffida#it and the affida#its of his )itnesses as )e as any e#idence in his +ehaf' ser#ing co%ies

thereof on the co&%ainant or %rosecutor not ater than ten (10" days fro& recei%t of said order. he

%rosecution &ay fie re%y affida#its )ithin ten (10" days after recei%t of the counteraffida#its of the

defense.

Sec. 13. Arraign&ent and tria. - Shoud the court' u%on a consideration of the co&%aint or

infor&ation and the affida#its su+&itted +y +oth %arties' find no cause or ground to hod the accused

for tria' it sha order the dis&issa of the case4 other)ise' the court sha set the case for arraign&ent

and tria.

,f the accused is in custody for the cri&e charged' he sha +e i&&ediatey arraigned and if he enters a

%ea of guity' he sha forth)ith +e sentenced.chanro+es #irtua a) i+rary chanro+es #irtua a)

i+rary

Sec. 15. Prei&inary conference. - Before conducting the tria' the court sha ca the %arties to a

%rei&inary conference during )hich a sti%uation of facts &ay +e entered into' or the %ro%riety of

ao)ing the accused to enter a %ea of guity to a esser offense &ay +e considered' or such other

&atters &ay +e ta:en u% to carify the issues and to ensure a s%eedy dis%osition of the case.>o)e#er'

no ad&ission +y the accused sha +e used against hi& uness reduced to )riting and signed +y the

accused and his counse.A refusa or faiure to sti%uate sha not %reudice the accused.

Sec. 1. Procedure of tria. - At the tria' the affida#its su+&itted +y the %arties sha constitute the

direct testi&onies of the )itnesses )ho e$ecuted the sa&e. itnesses )ho testified &ay +e su+ected

to crosse$a&ination' redirect or recross e$a&ination. Shoud the affiant fai to testify' his affida#it

sha not +e considered as co&%etent e#idence for the %arty %resenting the affida#it' +ut the ad#erse

%arty &ay utiize the sa&e for any ad&issi+e %ur%ose.



;$ce%t in re+utta or surre+utta' no )itness sha +e ao)ed to testify uness his affida#it )as

%re#iousy su+&itted to the court in accordance )ith Section 1! hereof.chanro+es #irtua a)

i+rary chanro+es #irtua a) i+rary

>o)e#er' shoud a %arty desire to %resent additiona affida#its or counteraffida#its as %art of his direct

e#idence' he sha so &anifest during the %rei&inary conference' stating the %ur%ose thereof. ,f

ao)ed +y the court' the additiona affida#its of the %rosecution or the counteraffida#its of the defense

sha +e su+&itted to the court and ser#ed on the ad#erse %arty not ater than three (3" days after the

ter&ination of the %rei&inary conference. ,f the additiona affida#its are %resented +y the %rosecution'

the accused &ay fie his counteraffida#its and ser#e the sa&e on the %rosecution )ithin three (3" days

fro& such ser#ice.

Sec. 16. Arrest of accused. - he court sha not order the arrest of the accused e$ce%t for faiure to

a%%ear )hene#er re?uired. Reease of the %erson arrested sha either +e on +ai or on recognizance +y

a res%onsi+e citizen acce%ta+e to the court.

Sec. 1<. Judg&ent. - here a tria has +een conducted' the court sha %ro&ugate the udg&ent not

ater than thirty (30" days after the ter&ination of tria.chanro+es #irtua a) i+rary chanro+es #irtua

a) i+rary

,.

@//@= PR@,S,@=S

Sec. 18. Referra to u%on. - ases re?uiring referra to the u%on for conciiation under the%ro#isions of Presidentia ecree =o. 108 )here there is no sho)ing of co&%iance )ith such

re?uire&ent' sha +e dis&issed )ithout %reudice and &ay +e re#i#ed ony after such re?uire&ent

sha ha#e +een co&%ied )ith. his %ro#ision sha not a%%y to cri&ina cases )here the accused )as

arrested )ithout a )arrant.chanro+es #irtua a) i+rary chanro+es #irtua a) i+rary

Sec. 19. Prohi+ited %eadings and &otions. - he foo)ing %eadings' &otions or %etitions sha not

+e ao)ed in the cases co#ered +y this Rue* chanro+es #irtua a) i+rary

(a" /otion to dis&iss the co&%aint or to ?uash the co&%aint or infor&ation e$ce%t on the ground of

ac: of urisdiction o#er the su+ect &atter' or faiure to co&%y )ith the %receding section4

(+" /otion for a +i of %articuars4

(c" /otion for ne) tria' or for reconsideration of a udg&ent' or for o%ening of tria4

(d" Petition for reief fro& udg&ent4(e" /otion for e$tension of ti&e to fie %eadings' affida#its or any other %a%er4 chanro+es #irtua a)

i+rary

(f" /e&oranda4

(g" Petition for certiorari' &anda&us' or %rohi+ition against any interocutory order issued +y the

court4

(h" /otion to decare the defendant in defaut4 chanro+es #irtua a) i+rary

(i" iatory &otions for %ost%one&ent4

(" Re%y4

(:" hird %arty co&%aints4

(" ,nter#entions.

Sec. !0. Affida#its. - he affida#its re?uired to +e su+&itted under this Rue sha state ony facts of

direct %ersona :no)edge of the affiants )hich are ad&issi+e in e#idence' and sha sho) their

co&%etence to testify to the &atters stated therein.

A #ioation of this re?uire&ent &ay su+ect the %arty or the counse )ho su+&its the sa&e to

disci%inary action' and sha +e cause to e$%unge the inad&issi+e affida#it or %ortion thereof fro& the

record.chanro+es #irtua a) i+rary chanro+es #irtua a) i+rary

Sec. !1. A%%ea. - he udg&ent or fina order sha +e a%%eaa+e to the a%%ro%riate regiona tria

court )hich sha decide the sa&e in accordance )ith Section !! of Batas Pa&+ansa Bg. 1!9. he

decision of the regiona tria court in ci#i cases go#erned +y this Rue' incuding forci+e entry and

una)fu detainer' sha +e i&&ediatey e$ecutory' )ithout %reudice to a further a%%ea that &ay +e

ta:en therefro&. Section 10 of Rue <0 sha +e dee&ed re%eaed.

Sec. !!. A%%ica+iity of the reguar rues. - he reguar %rocedure %rescri+ed in the Rues of

ourt sha a%%y to the s%ecia cases herein %ro#ided for in a su%%etory ca%acity insofar as they are

not inconsistent here)ith. chanro+es #irtua a) i+rary


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Sec. !3. ;ffecti#ity. - his re#ised Rue on Su&&ary Procedure sha +e effecti#e on =o#e&+er 1'

1991.chanro+es #irtua a) i+rary chan ro+es #irtua a) i+rary

Bac: to o% 8 Bac: to /ain ,nde$ 8 Bac: to >o&e

>; >A= R@B;S ,R7A

A ,BRAR

C7,D EA=;

Phii%%ines F ord)ide F he

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