Summary of Session 3

Post-Fukushima Operational Safety Improvements

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Fred Dermarkar

IAEA International Conference on Operational SafetyVienna International Centre 23-26 June 2015

International Atomic Energy Agency2

Key points - Process

• Application of insights from Periodic Safety Reviews resulted in several back-fits that addressed, a-priori, lessons learned from Fukushima– Filtered Containment Venting

– Severe Accident Management Guidelines

– Level 1 and Level 2 Probabilistic Safety Assessments

• Collaboration has resulted in a consistent definition of requirements based on of Lessons Learned– Examples: WENRA Stress Test; INPO / WANO SOER; IAEA Expert

Meetings; Owner Group Initiatives

– Common approach facilitates continued information exchange and sharing of lessons learned through implementation

• Follow-up Peer Review by ENSREG resulted in the compilation of Best Practices and Common Challenges– Enables raising the standard of implementation of lessons learned

International Atomic Energy Agency3

Key points - Technology

• Most member states have implemented enhancements to strengthen Defence-in-Depth:– Modifications to make their plants more robust to extreme natural events

– Modifications, as necessary, to ensure plant is able to respond with installed equipment for a period of time that is sufficient to enable the installation of non-permanent equipment to prevent the large and widespread release of contamination

– Non-permanent, Commercial Grade equipment to augment the capability to provide emergency water and power supplies

– Severe Accident Management Guidelines

– Modifications to enhance monitoring capabilities during severe accidents

• Notable other developments:– Robotics to assist with accident response (eg, INTRA initiative)

– Hardening of selected emergency systems to levels well beyond current design basis

International Atomic Energy Agency4

Key points - People

• Training

• Enhanced Emergency Response Facilities:– Strengthened on-site facilities

– Diverse, Redundant and Independent off-site facilities

– Mobile command and control units

• Augmented Support:– Rapid Response Force (FARN)

– Regional Centres (US)

• Exercises and Drills:– More realistic

– Broader in scope, longer in duration

– Expanded involvement of interfacing community, governmental, regulatory industry and international organizations

International Atomic Energy Agency5

• Human and Organisational Aspects under severe conditions– Decision making while confronted with significant uncertainties

– Degraded communication

– Managing stress of on-site staff, including caring for family members

– Command and Control

– Enabling organisational and individual resilience• Flexibility to adapt to changing, uncertain and stressful conditions

• Leadership

Potential areas for further improvements

International Atomic Energy Agency

…Thank you for your attention!

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