Sun_Wagner(2014)ChangingAttitudesConceptPlacement

The Big Bang Thinking: Changing Attitudes toward “Thinking” with Concept Placement

Emily Sun B.S.J. Student

E.W. Scripps School of Journalism 363 Richland Ave., Apt. 254

Ohio University Athens, OH 45701

Voice: (614) 725-6218

E-Mail: [email protected]

&

Carson B Wagner* Asst. Professor and

Director, ViDS Effects Laboratory E.W. Scripps School of Journalism

204 Schoonover Center Ohio University

Athens, OH 45701

Voice: (740) 593-9808 E-Mail: [email protected]

Paper presented to the Mass Communication & Society Division at the 2014 Midwinter Conference of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, Norman, OK, February 28 – March 1, 2013.

Changing Evaluations with Concept Placement – 2

Introduction Product Placement (PPL) in movies (Matthes, 2012) and TV shows (Andriasova & Wagner, 2004) have been shown to subconsciously persuade viewers, changing “implicit associations” (see Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), or subconscious evaluations of brands. Similar responses have been shown with regard to consuming other subtle stimuli such as sports sponsorships (Wagner & Clark, 2013) and music in advertising (Johnson & Wagner, 2011). Even anti-drug ads, when participants’ motivation and/or opportunity to process the ads “centrally,” or with a relatively high degree of effort (see Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), were diminished with experimental manipulations, such that the ads could only be processed “peripherally,” or with little effort, demonstrated the importance of peripheral processing in creating strong anti-drug implicit associations. While tangible products, such as fabric softener, food, and beverages–subjects of prior studies’ findings–might be placed purposefully, could intangible concepts on which a program is based cause concept evaluation changes, even if the “placement” of the concept is unintentional?

Prior research including the above suggest they can, and we might call such instances “concept placements,” or CPL, because although most product placements today may be purchased, with products shown intentionally, product placements can occur unintentionally, as well (Russell, 1998). The same is true of major concepts that serve as the basis for media texts.

Concept Placement has been defined “simply as the presence of a concept within a media text” (Wagner, Sun, & Clark, 2013, p. 4) and it is distinguished from Product Placement in two ways: 1) PPLs require the presence of a brand via a brand identifier, but with CPL, any concept can be promoted

or degraded; and 2) brands have multiple attributes, whereas, with CPL, a single concept, as opposed to a construct, is the target for belief evaluation (see Bem, 1970).

An initial examination of CPL showed that differences liking levels for a TV show could elicit significant differences in expressed evaluations toward the show’s main CPL, based on the Underlying Subject Matter (USM; Biglan, 1973). The show examined was “The Big Bang Theory,” and differences in evaluations toward the concept “thinking,” as well as significant differences in Need for Cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), which refers to the extent to which one will “enjoy thinking,” were shown as a function of liking more of liking less/disliking a TV show and its characters. However, the study could not show change in evaluations of the CPL, “thinking.”

That experiment was purposefully designed to provide the best chance to elicit significant difference in evaluations of the CPL, because, if, given such a chance, no differences were found, then it could be concluded that CPLs would likely not cause differential responses of any kind (Sundar, 1999). However, given that differences were found, it was suggested that research investigate the possibility of evaluation change, as opposed to difference or modification (see Bennett & Iyengar, 2008, 2010; Wagner, 2001). To do so requires a comparison of responses to consuming media, wherein a difference is shown between a pre-test and a post-test measure, or that a difference is shown between a control group that sees no stimulus and an experimental group that sees a stimulus. So then, to continue investigating the potential of CPL, this article presents a controlled, between-participants laboratory experiment, comparing responses of an experimental group that viewed a set of clips from “The Big Bang Theory” to a control group that saw no stimulus.


Literature Review

Due to their subtlety, prior research on product placements (PPLs; e.g., Matthes, 2012; Andriasova & Wagner, 2004), sports sponsorships (Wagner & Clark, 2013), and music in advertising (Johnson & Wagner, 2011) help provide the groundwork for a hypothesis about the potential of CPLs to change belief evaluations toward the concept, because CPL is also a subtle occurrence (unintentional) or tactic (intentional) that could potentially change evaluations of the main CPL concept.

Product placement has had many definitions, over the years, increasingly more of which differ from larger, more inclusive definitions of product placement that frame it as the inclusion of a brand in a media text, whether done intentionally or unintentionally. For instance, some have defined it as “The practice of placing brand name products in movies as props” (Gupta & Gould, 1997), “The conceived insertion of a brand within a movie, broadcast, computer…and etc.,” (Soba & Aydin, 2013), or “A product and/or brand intentionally placed in a cultural medium,” (Lehu & Bressoud, 2008).

The last in that list is perhaps most inclusive, but along with the others, it does not include the unintentional appearance of brands in media texts, likely because, in recent years, PPL has become much more used as a strategic communication tactic that is done intentionally, in order to embed brand-related content into a media text in such a way so that it cannot be avoided by the audience, unless they willingly avoid parts of the media text, itself, which would, in turn, lead to missing (perhaps crucial) elements of a story. However, 90% of media consumers have expressed that they often “skip over” traditional ads (Soba & Aydin, 2013) not embedded in the media text, itself.

The study of PPLs as a marketing strategy has, in recent years, quickly grown in popularity, mostly in television (Lehu & Bressoud, 2008). With its generally inexpensive and simple execution, marketers have increasingly utilized product placement as a method of brand building (Soba & Aydin, 2013).

However, incidental inclusion of brands in media texts, it could be argued, also constitute “product placement,” according to those who provide broader definitions of the concept, for the process of theory building (see, e.g., Fisher & Wagner, 2004; Matthes, 2012; Russell, 1998), such that theories about the phenomenon can be as complex as the phenomenon, itself.

Similarly, the definition of “concept placement,” or CPL, also includes the (consciously) unintentional inclusion of major Underlying Subject Matter (USM; Biglan, 1973) in media texts. It is akin to “Selective Attention,” which, as per the words used to describe the theory, it is implied–if not denoted–that intention plays a role. That is because the description includes “selective,” which at least suggests that one has chosen to pay attention. However, the definition of “Selective Attention,” which refers to the “allocation of effort,” includes both voluntary, intentional attention, as well as involuntary, unintentional attention (see Kahneman, 1973). In order to explain the spectrum of instances in which we pay attention to some things but not others, involuntary attention must also be included in the definition.

Persuasion and Influence as a Function of Subtle Stimuli

It has been shown in many prior studies that subtle persuasion–or that to which we may not even be paying conscious attention–can persuade us (see, e.g., Andriasova & Wagner, 2004; Gilbert, Tarafodi, & Malone, 1993; Hawkins &


Hoch, 1992; Johnson & Wagner, 2011; Wagner & Clark, 2013; Wagner & Sundar, 2009). Such studies may be particularly interesting, because their findings are often very counterintuitive. Many, if not a large majority of, advertisers and PR professionals continue to believe that attention is a necessary factor in persuasion, as was presumed in early persuasion models such as the “Message-Learning Approach” (see Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953).

A relatively early study of subconscious influence showed that, at least at the moment of comprehension, we believe what we have consumed (Gilbert, Tarafodi, & Malone, 1993), the researchers used a number of different combinations to demonstrate the phenomenon. Various sets of participant groups were randomly assigned to different conditions – one of which could read statements as they crossed a computer screen, without distraction. However, the other groups’ limited cognitive capacity were filled with the distractor task of tapping keys on a button box that “matched” squares that would appear in the corners of the screen, as they read. All groups were told that information about a target to be judged would scroll across the screen, and that information that appeared in white letters was “true” information, while information that was false would appear in red letters. In the comparisons made between all of the sets of groups, those who had the extra task of pushing buttons that matched appearing boxes, it was shown, used the information in red significantly more than those who read the information without distraction – and the task was to decide the guilt or innocence of a suspect, as well as to suggest a length of the prison sentence, if one were to say the suspect was guilty! While it would seem to make life vastly easier, if we had the “super power” to see all false information written in red letters, the results of the study suggest

that, given today’s fast-paced (media) environment, we would still be persuaded by and use the information we saw printed in red letters, unless we took the time to make a mental note that the information were printed in red and was therefore false.

Product placements can be viewed by consumers as making media texts seem more “real,” and in such a process, they are generally consumed without much effortful evaluation (Gupta & Gould, 1997). However, if PPLs are too obvious, consumers can become very aware of them and suspicious about their intentional placement. In turn, consumers can process the PPLs more consciously and become less receptive to them (Dens, Pelsmacker, Wouters, & Purnawirawan, 2012).

Especially when PPLs seem “natural” in a storyline, they are likely processed without much cognitive effort, or rather “peripherally” (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). It has been shown that PPLs can persuade more “subconsciously,” such that people don’t report being persuaded. Nonetheless, response latency measures of implicit associations (IATs; Greenwald, McGhee, & Scwartz, 1998) have shown that the same participants formed more positive associations with the products placed, as compared to those who did not watch a PPL stimulus (Andriasova & Wagner, 2004). As such, while PPLs may not generally persuade at the conscious level, they can be influencing us subconsciously.

Wagner’s (2004) and Wagner and Sundar’s (2003; 2009) studies have shown that participants who are manipulated to view anti-drug ads peripherally–by lowering the participants’ motivation and/or opportunity to view the stimulus–exhibited significantly more negative drug-related implicit associations, as compared to those who watched centrally – or those whose motivation and opportunity were manipulated to be as high as possible.


In studies examining “wear-out” and “wear-in” of music in advertising (see Johnson & Wagner, 2011), it was shown in a “wear-out” study that while participants expressed evaluations of the brand were more negative, due to the commercials being shown often over a long period of time, participants’ implicit associations were more positive, when the ads’ music was played. In a follow-up “wear-in” study, with commercials that had a new musical score, it was shown that expressed attitudes were more positive when the music was played, as opposed to being turned off, but participants implicit associations with the brand and its attributes were more negative when the music was turned on as opposed to being turned off.

Examining sports sponsorships, a study (Wagner & Clark, 2013) wherein a fictional brand was displayed on a banner across the bottom of the screen, it was found with an American audience that, when shown clips of the United States winning against Russia and the Soviet Union (positive moments), participants’ implicit associations with the brand and its attributes were more positive, as compared to a control group and a group who saw Russia and the USSR beating the US. The reverse was also true: that when the US lost to Russia and the USSR (negative moments), associations with the brand and its attributes became more negative. However, for expressed attitudes, differences were only shown between the positive and negative sports moments.

Evaluation Types and Decision-Making

It is commonly assumed that almost all decisions, to some extent, are based on conscious decision-making and the intention to act (Bargh, 2002). To the contrary, most consumer decisions are functions of subconscious psychological processes (Alba, 2000). The inability of consumers to justify

their reasoning for making “high-involvement” purchases is considerably common (Rossiter, Percy, & Donovan, 1991). And when confronted on their reasoning consumers commonly respond by attempting to “fill in the gaps” with possible clauses because they were not consciously aware of their decision process (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). These studies help demonstrate that, while we may think that we more often make “rational,” effortful decisions based on our known evaluations, instead, we are more likely to make decisions that are in line with our implicit associations.

Product placement studies have relied heavily on self-report measures (Law & Braun-LaTour, 2004), and in previous literature there is the assumption that placements are not as effective as traditional advertisements due to the lack of significant differences shown in study findings. However, because people often are not aware of the reasoning for their decisions, it can be argued that lack of effects in self-reported measures is not as crucial as may be commonly assumed (Bargh, 2002). It has also been argued that because of this, data from subconscious responses produced by memory contents may be equally, if not more, valuable than showing effects as measured by self-reports (Fazio, 1990). In other words, subconscious changes are likely the better method of determining the effectiveness of placements on evaluations.

Changing Concept Evaluations with Concept Placement

Many shows revolve around specific, abstract concepts–many that are not overtly mentioned repeatedly, but rather simply provide the basis for a media text–or, rather, “underlying subject matter” (USM; Biglan, 1973). USMs are, by definition, relatively subtle and generally implied by the focus of a story, as opposed to being made explicit


(Biglan, 1973) and so it can be predicted that the same cognitive mechanisms will be at work with USMs, which are likely subtly recognized (see Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), as those mechanisms are with other subtle stimuli. CPLs, in turn, derive from the (major) USM(s) of media texts, and so it is not that CPLs–as unintentional occurrences or intentionally-driven persuasive tactics–are overtly, specifically mentioned or shown in the way that PPLs name, show, or otherwise presented a brand identifier. Such logic also helps further distinguish CPLs from PPLs, in adding to the exploratory CPL literature (Wagner, Sun, & Clark, 2014).

“Attitude objects”–despite that the word “object” denotes something tangible–can also be intangible ideas (Fazio, 1986; 1990) and, therefore, subtly-presented CPLs are likely to be processed psychologically in the same manner as brands and products. We argue that that is likely even the case despite that brands and products, as “attitude objects,” reflect constructs, as opposed to concepts (see Bem, 1970), meaning that a concept is, almost by definition, of less depth than a construct.

So, in order to demonstrate that evaluation change can occur as a function of Concept Placement, it is necessary to choose and use a CPL for which the USM is particularly positively portrayed. That is among the same reasons why “The Big Bang Theory,” with its strong but subtle promotion of the major CPL, “thinking,” was initially chosen to demonstrate that differences can be elicited in evaluations of the major placed concept (Wagner, Sun, & Clark, 2014). The other reasons are that the show is among the most watched among the target audience of 18-24 year-olds–which matches the population from which the convenience sample for that study and this were drawn–and, perhaps beyond the implications for systematic demonstrations of CPL’s potential, it was deemed a concept

that is seen as positive including and beyond those who would seek to maintain the status quo. In other words, “thinking,” in and of itself, could be argued to be the basis of a well-functioning democracy. Therefore, the study would also have more practical import.

That said, among the various studies of subtle stimuli persuasion, sports sponsorships, used as subtle brand presentations, were demonstrated to be able to persuade both consciously and subconsciously, and in both negative and positive ways, depending on the manner in which the brand was framed (Wagner & Clark, 2013). Therefore, insofar as “concept placement” should work similarly to product placements and sports sponsorships, in a higher order of abstraction–that is, as subtle, persuasive stimuli, at the structural level–even though tangibility, among other factors, differ. While it may be more difficult to detect evaluation change as a function of CPLs, as compared to PPLs, the similarities of (subtle) media text embededness and (particularly) positive or negative framing, as a function of the CPL context, again, the same psychological mechanisms should be at work with CPLs as with PPLs. Those mechanisms are that by which we make positive or negative associations with the CPL, much as we would with an attitude object viewed peripherally, or without much effort (see Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). As such, based on theory and research about the effects of subtle (or peripherally-processed) but strongly-valenced contextual framing of brands (and drugs), it can be predicted that:

H1a: Viewers who see a main, positively-presented CPL will show more positive implicit evaluations toward the CPL, as compared to those who do not see the stimulus.


H1b: Viewers who see a main, positively presented CPL in a TV show will show more positive implicit CPL evaluations, as compared to those who do not see the stimulus.

Lastly, based on the findings of CPL

research examining CPL evaluation response differences based on differential liking of a program, which showed that one’s “Need for Cognition” (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) varied with the level of liking for the show (Wagner, Sun, & Clark, 2014), it can also be predicted that:

H1c: Viewers who see a main,

positively-presented CPL will show higher Need for Cognition, as compared to those who do not see the stimulus.

Methodology

In a two-condition between-participants experiment, all participants’ (N=67) product-related implicit associations and self-reported belief evaluations toward a placed concept were measured with paper-and-pencil scales. Prior to measurement, participants were randomly assigned to either an experimental or a control condition. Experimental condition participants first viewed a twelve-minute TV program compilation designed to maximize the positive portrayal of the main CPL, “thinking,” of the program, “The Big Bang Theory,” in order to determine whether an evaluative change can be demonstrated, as compared to a control group who saw no stimulus but simply completed the measures. Between groups, all participants completed the same measures in the same order, and both groups were told that they were participating in a general study examining the effects of media.

Participants Sixty-seven undergraduate students from a strategic communication class participated in the study for a course requirement introducing them to social science research methods. Each condition was run within individual sessions over a course of two weeks. 31 participants were randomly assigned to the experimental group and 36 participants were assigned to the control group. Participants were simply told that they were participating in a study “examining the effects of media.” All participants signed an informed consent form prior to participating in the study. Procedure

Upon arrival at each of the study sessions, which examined responses one participant at a time, participants were asked to draw a slip of paper that contained their identification (ID) numbers, which in turn signified their condition assignment, from an unsealed ZiplocTM bag that contained ID numbers for both conditions. The ID number sheets were approximately 1 inch by 1 inch squares that were folded into quarters before being placed in the baggie, so that participants could not see which numbers were on which sheets, through the clear baggie. As such, participants were randomly assigned to conditions.

After randomly selecting ID numbers, participants were asked to sign Informed Consent Forms (ICFs). The ICF documents explained their rights and responsibilities as research participants, and they contained the contact information of the principal investigators of the project. Following ICF administration, participants were then instructed— depending upon the condition to which they were randomly assigned–– to either watch a video and fill out questionnaires afterwards, or simply fill out the questionnaires.


Dependent Measures Dependent measures were

administered to all participants in the same order. Experimental condition participants completed the measures following stimulus presentation, while control group participants simply did so after signing informed consent forms. The first measure was an Implicit Attitude Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) developed by Lowery, Hardin, and Sinclair (2001) and demonstrated to measure differences in implicit attitudes. The measures were originally designed for stereotyping research and have been adapted to drug-related attitudes (Wagner, 2001; 2003; 2004; Wagner & Sundar, 2003; 2009), product placement brands (Andriasova & Wagner, 2004), brands advertised with jingles (Johnson & Wagner, 2011), and attitudes toward homosexuals (Liu & Wagner, 2013). They were similarly adapted by the authors for this study, to examine concept placement effects on evaluations of the concept “thinking.”

As with other variations on the IAT (e.g., Dasgupta, McGhee, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2000; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Rudman, Greenwald, Mellot, & Schwartz, 1999), the Lowery et. al (2001) measure uses five separate timed judgment stages. For each of the five stages, a list of words printed singularly in the middle of each page comprised the judgment items, and evaluations were indicated by checkmarks in the appropriate right and left-hand columns.

Before entering the judgment stages, participants were shown two lists of words (contained in the questionnaire packets) one at a time, and they were asked to become familiar with the words before the experiment progressed. The first set of words included names of both thinking-related words and colors, and the second included both positive and negative

adjectives. Eight words of each type were shown on the lists, and these words would later be used as judgment items for the evaluation tasks.

The list of thinking words included the eight synonyms attributed to Thinking: Analysis, Contemplation, Logic, Intellect, Inquiry, Cognition, Reasoning, and Theorizing. The list of colors included blue, orange, pink, gray, brown, yellow, purple, and red.

The list of positive adjectives included: good, pleasant, valuable, favorable, acceptable, nice, wonderful, and excellent. The list of negative adjectives included: bad, unpleasant, worthless, unfavorable, unacceptable, awful, horrible, and poor. The same adjectives appear on the semantic differential scales for the explicit evaluation measures used in this study, which have similarly been adapted from a prior evaluation assessment questionnaire (Palmgreen, Donohew, Lorch, Rogus, Helm, & Grant, 1991) to assess evaluations of various brands, drugs, and sexuality.

After participants studied each set of words and raised their heads to indicate that they had completed this portion of the measure, we began the judgment stages. The first two stages were “practice stages,” where participants could become familiar with the activity of categorizing words before being measured. In the first of these stages, the lists of thinking words and colors ran down the middle of the page, mixed in an unordered fashion, and participants were given twenty seconds to categorize them by placing a checkmark on the appropriate side as they moved sequentially down the page. Appropriate sides were indicated at the top of the page (i.e., “Thinking” was printed on the left or right, with “colors” opposing), and participants were given verbal instructions as to what the appropriate side


would be prior to beginning the timed judgment stage. For example: Colors Thinking

Red

Inquiry

The second stage was like the first,

except that the list was of the positive and negative adjectives and “positive” and “negative” anchored the sides.

The third stage was a critical judgment phase, or one that was measured, and it included all four sets of words. The list began with either a positive or negative adjective, or a thinking word or color name, with the next word coming from the opposite category (name or adjective) and the word after that coming from the initial category, and so on and so forth. The appropriate judgment side was a combination of both thinking words or colors and positive or negative words. In other words, one of the sides would be the appropriate side for either thinking words and negative or positive, while the other would be for colors and the opposite type of adjective. Further, the sides matched those used in the preceding practice stages for all participants. Participants were again allotted twenty seconds to categorize as many of these terms as they could, moving sequentially down the page. This phase included two such lists given one after the other.

The fourth stage was another practice stage. As the measure calculates attitudes by differencing the number of items correctly categorized when pairing negative words with negative adjectives against thinking coupled with positive adjectives, the appropriate side for each thinking word and color in the fifth critical stage would need to be switched while

keeping positive and negative constant. This stage was introduced to allow participants familiarity with categorizing thinking words and colors on the sides opposite those they had just done, and the list therefore only included thinking words and colors.

The fifth stage was again a critical phase, requiring simultaneous categorization of both names and adjectives. This phase was the same as the third stage except that the appropriate side for thinking words and color names was switched, and participants were therefore categorizing these names with the opposite kind of adjective.

Following SOA assessment, participants self-reported their evaluations of the concept, “thinking,” using a measure that has been adapted from prior research (Palmgreen, et al, 1991) to measure evaluations of drugs (e.g., Wagner & Sundar, 2009), brands (e.g., Andriasova & Wagner, 2004; Johnson & Wagner, 2011; Wagner & Clark, 2013), and homosexuals, in general (Liu & Wagner, 2013). The measure consists of eight five-item semantic differential scales with positive and negative anchors – the same adjectives as those that were used in the implicit, response latency measures. The instructions for this measure read: Below is a list of word pairs. Circle one of the numbers near the word in the pair that best describes how you feel about the following statement: “I believe thinking is…”

Lastly, participants reported their attitudes towards the extent to which they “enjoy thinking” with the Need for Cognition scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). The scale contains 18 nine-point Likert scale items on which responses range from -4 to +4, indicating participants’ levels of (dis)agreement with the 18 statements. The instructions read: Describe the extent to which you agree with each statement using the following values: -4 = very strong disagreement, -3 = strong disagreement, -2


= moderate disagreement, -1 = slight disagreement, 0 = neither agreement nor disagreement, +1 = slight agreement, +2 = moderate agreement, +3 = strong agreement +4 = very strong agreement. Data Analysis

To test the three hypotheses, we entered each dependent variable (the Explicit CPL Attribute Evaluation Index, the Implicit CPL Attribute Evaluation Index, and the Need for Cognition index) per hypothesis, into a one-tailed t-test, with condition (Experimental and Control) as the independent variable.

To test H1a, which said that those who saw the positively-presented CPL would show higher explicit attribute evaluations about the program’s main CPL, “Thinking,” as compared to those who did not see the stimulus, we entered the “Explicit CPL Attribute Evaluation Index” as the dependent variable. No significant difference was found [t(65)=-0.40, p=.65], such that those who liked the program more did not show higher scores on the Explicit CPL Attribute Evaluation Index (M=12.33, SD=3.60), as compared to those who liked the program less (M=11.86, SD=5.34). Therefore, H1a was not supported.

To test H1b, which said that those who saw the positively-presented CPL would show higher explicit attribute evaluations about the program’s main CPL, “Thinking,” as compared to those who did not see the stimulus, we entered the “Implicit CPL Attribute Evaluation Index” as the dependent variable. A marginally-significant difference was found [t(65)=1.49, p=.07), such that there was a marginally-significant difference between the implicit CPL evaluations of the attribute between the group who saw CPL in the stimulus (M=3.35, SD=7.25) and those who did not (M=0.41, SD=8.86). Therefore, H1b was marginally supported.

To test H1c, which said that those who saw the positively-presented CPL would demonstrate a higher Need for Cognition–a measure that shows how much one would “enjoy thinking” (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982, p. 116) the study’s main CPL–as compared to those who did not see the stimulus, we entered the “Need for Cognition Index” as the dependent variable. No significant difference was found [t(65)=-1.11, p=.13], such that those who saw the positively-presented CPL did not show higher scores on the Need for Cognition Index (M=7.80, SD=10.23), as compared to those who did not see the stimulus (M=4.94, SD=10.47). Therefore, H1c was not supported.

Discussion Overall only one of our three hypotheses received support, and that support was marginal (p=.07). H1b, which predicted that implicit associations toward the concept of “thinking” would be more positive for those who saw the stimulus, as compared to those who did not, received that support, which suggests that it may have been the only measure sensitive enough to capture CPL evaluation change as a function of watching the stimulus for this study. In light of the prior research upon which this study was built, the result is not completely surprising. That is, in studies examining responses to anti-drug ads (e.g., Wagner, 2004; Wagner & Sundar, 2009) and product placements (PPLs; Andriasova & Wagner, 2004), only differences in implicit associations were shown, although explicit attitudes were also measured.

Due to findings from prior research (e.g., Wagner 2001), Wagner’s (2003) study was run specifically to determine whether traditional, self-report evaluation measures “exaggerate” the effectiveness of anti-drug ads, and the findings suggested that they do.


However, in the case of anti-drug ads, it was hypothesized that self-report report measures magnified the effects of anti-drug ads, due to the social undesirability of responding positively to drugs (Carifio, 1994; Carifio & Biron, 1978; Tourangeau & Smith, 1996), especially after watching an anti-drug ad, which could highlight the social undesirability, particularly in a study of their effects.

With socially-sensitive issues such as drugs, self-report measures have the disadvantage of affording participants the motivation and opportunity to ruminate about the responses they would like to give, prior to responding, which can lead to misrepresentation in two different ways (Dovidio & Fazio, 1991). People may knowingly hold positive attitudes toward drugs but respond in an opposite manner, as a function of imagining that the researcher (or others) may see their (socially undesirable) responses. Alternatively, people may unknowingly misrepresent themselves by presenting an “ideal self.” That is, they may consciously (want to) hold anti-dug attitudes, despite that they may subconsciously associate drugs with positivity.

Implicit association measures, though, were designed to investigate stereotyping in an “unobtrusive” manner, such that participants should not be able to control their responses (Fazio, 1990; Dovidio & Fazio, 1991). First, being a measure of response latency, wherein participants are simply asked to categorize various words while being “primed” (Berkowitz, 1984) with the object to be evaluated, such that semantically-related thoughts (e.g., memories concerning drugs) are brought to mind, along with the evaluations one may have formed, in the past, such that, if positive thoughts come to mind, upon being primed to think about drugs, then the prime will speed one’s

ability to categorize positive words and slow one’s ability to categorize negative words, and vice versa, for those who hold negative implicit associations. Hence, such measures are referred to as “response latency” measures, meaning that they depend on the amount of time it takes one to respond in categorizing positive and negative adjectives (Fazio, 1990; Dovidio & Fazio, 1991). In general, though, because the subject matter, “thinking,” has not been shown to be a particularly sensitive topic, especially in the same sense as drugs, it would stand to reason that we would not need to use response latency, implicit association measures to capture the effects of CPLs on evaluations of that concept. However, on a college campus such as that from which the participants were drawn, it would seem more likely that the idea of “thinking” would be thought of as socially desirable. In turn, that could lead participants to over-report positive evaluations of “thinking,” such that we may not be able to find differences between groups due to a “ceiling effect,” wherein all participants may have reported their liking of “thinking” so highly that there would be no room, at the top of the scale, to be able to find any effects. However, a review of the data clearly suggests that a ceiling effect was not the basis for not finding effects on the two self-report measures. On the other hand, the product placement (Andriasova & Wagner, 2004) and sports sponsorship (Wagner & Clark, 2013) studies employed response latency measures because they have been shown to be more sensitive in measuring evaluations (Fazio, 1990; Dovidio & Fazio, 1991; Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999). That is especially true of those responses that stem from psychological processes and mechanisms to which we do not have “introspective access” (Nisbett, 1977), or cannot consciously realize–and therefore


would not report a difference in–our evaluations of the target. That is, if we do not imagine that we have been given good reason to change our evaluations of a target–such as a straightforward persuasive argument that can lead us to change our belief evaluations (see Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975)–then we likely will not change those evaluations (Andriasova & Wagner, 2004). Similar to product placements, which do not (or at least almost never) present reasons which we might believe and evaluate as positive, thereby changing our evaluation of the target. In other words, PPLs don’t offer arguments as to why audiences should change their beliefs and/or attitudes about a product, and as such, we are given no rational reason to change our evaluation (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). Those are among the reasons Andriasova and Wagner (2004) explored implicit association tests (IATs; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz) as a potential measure of PPL effectiveness, and those same arguments are true of CPLs, due to their similarities: embededness in media texts and that we are (generally) not given (a) specific reason(s) to like the USM that founds the CPL. Therefore, that argument seems most to be the most likely explanation for finding marginally-significant CPL evaluation change but not finding self-report change–with either the straightforward semantic differential questionnaire designed to gauge evaluations of thinking, or using the Need for Cognition scale–in this study. Based on the logic of experimentation (see Aronson, Carlsmith, & Brewer, 1985), potential reasons for not finding differences on those self-report measures are that: 1) the stimulus was not strong enough to elicit target CPL evaluation change; 2) the measures were not sensitive enough to gauge differences in responses; or 3) we may need to continue the study by adding more participants to it, which would

give us a better chance to show the change as it was sought.

Conversely, other comparisons of CPL evaluations, showed significant differences between the group who liked the show and characters more, as compared to the group who liked them less/disliked them–on both the same explicit evaluation measure and Need for Cognition Scale used here, as well as having shown the exact same stimulus–but no difference between the groups was shown, in terms of implicit associations (Wagner, Sun, & Clark, 2014). Moreover, those comparisons included far fewer participants than the present ones. So, it would seem that all three of the explanations based on the logic of experimentation can be ruled out, in considering the comparisons and significance of difference across the three measures, even though the differences shown here using the implicit association tests were marginal.

However, while each explanation was ruled out individually, the three were not ruled out, in tandem. By this we mean that by increasing the strength of the manipulation (perhaps by making it longer and/or more subtle and positive, with regard to the CPL), heightening the sensitivity of the measures (by using computerized response latency measures such as Cedrus’ SuperLab or Empirisoft’s MediaLab, which can analyze response time differences with much greater sensitivity), and by increasing the number of participants, we may be able to show a stronger difference between the control and experimental groups and demonstrate change across all three measures.

In continuing research on Concept Placement–beyond showing evaluation change, which has been argued to possibly be too difficult to find, given today’s media environment (Bennett & Iyengar, 2010)–it is suggested that the findings of prior Product


Placement research and persuasion research be considered. For example, the concept placed should not be so obvious as to arouse suspicions of the audience members about the intent of the placement (DeLorme, Reid, & Zimmer, 1994; Dens, Pelsmacker, Wouters, & Purnawirawan, 2012). Also, the mood of the scene(s) should reflect the valence one wishes to attach to the placed concept (Axelrod, 1963), and the CPL should fit with the plot of the media text (Russell, 2002). Lastly–although the entirety of the literature would offer far more suggestions–Concept Placement is likely to work better if the audience members desire to emulate the character(s) who reflect the main CPL (DeLorme & Reid, 1999).

In conclusion, this research report contributes to the CPL literature in setting up and suggesting methods for examining change as a function of Concept Placement – beyond that of simply listing experimental design types that allow us to show change. It gives specific theoretical and methodological suggestions for demonstrating evaluation change as a function of CPL. Moreover, with regard to subconscious influence, in particular, it suggests that perhaps more media texts with main CPL’s such as “thinking”–not in a certain way, but rather simply “thinking,” in and of itself–because rational thinking serves as the foundation for a well-functioning democracy. As such, to the extent we can map out ways in which media texts might promote ideas such as thinking–or rather, develop an understanding of the ways in which such ideas that have benefit beyond those who would seek to maintain the status quo–those ideas are useful and might be used to promote shifts in power structures and, in turn, the concentration of wealth and power within society as it exists, today (see, e.g., Varoufakis, 2014). This is

hopefully at least a very modest step in that direction.

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