Training and Evaluation Outline Report

Task Number: 71-9-3240 Task Title: Suppress Enemy Air Defenses (Division Echelon and Above [Operational]) Supporting Reference(s):

Condition: The command is conducting or preparing to conduct operations as a joint task force, joint force land component command, Army forces, or Army service component command headquarters.  The command's headquarters may or may not have integrated joint staff augmentation, liaisons, unit, and individual attachments.  The command has received an operations plan, or warning, operations, or fragmentary order from higher headquarters and is exercising mission command.  The commander has issued guidance on suppressing enemy air defenses.  The command is prepared to interface with joint, interagency, governmental authorities,nongovernmental organizations, and multinational forces.  The command has established communications with subordinate and adjacent units, and higher headquarters.  The mission command system is operational and processing information in accordance with standard operating procedures.   Some iterations of this task should be performed in MOPP.

Standard: The staff suppresses enemy air defenses in the joint operational area by neutralizing, destroying, or temporarily degrading surface-based threat air defenses.  The staff integrates suppression of enemy air defenses  with the joint air operations plan and the air tasking order.  Note:  Task steps and performance measures may not apply to every staff, unit or echelon. Prior to evaluation, coordination should be made between evaluator and the evaluated staff�s or units' higher headquarters to determine the performance measures that may not be evaluated.

Safety Level: Low

Cue: None

Step Number Reference ID Reference Name Required PrimaryADRP 3-0 Unified Land Operations Yes NoADRP 5-0 The Operations Process Yes NoADRP 6-0 Mission Command Yes NoATP 3-01.4 U) MULTI-SERVICE TACTICS

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURESFOR JOINT SUPPRESSION OFENEMY AIR DEFENSE (J-SEAD)(S//NF) MCRP 3-22.2A; NTTP 3-01.42;AFTTP 3-2.28}

No No

JOINT PUB 2-0 Joint Intelligence Yes NoJOINT PUB 3-0 Joint Operations Yes NoJOINT PUB 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats Yes Yes

Task Statements

DANGER

Leaders have an inherent responsibility to conduct Risk Management to ensure the safety of all Soldiers andpromote mission accomplishment.

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Remarks: None Notes: Note 1: While Army doctrine has changed to mission command over command and control (C2 - which is now acomponent of mission command), and changed from using ISR (Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Surveillance) toinformation collection (comprised of reconnaissance and surveillance, security operations, and intelligence operations),joint doctrine still retains the primacy of C2 over mission command as well as the use of ISR. Commanders and staffs ofArmy headquarters serving as a joint task force, joint force land component command, Army forces, or Army servicecomponent command headquarters should refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine for the exercise and use of C2and ISR. Note 2: Task content last updated: 5 March 2012. References updated: 12 Aug 2013.

WARNING

Risk Management is the Army’s primary decision-making process to identify hazards, reduce risk, and preventboth accidental and tactical loss. All soldiers have the responsibility to learn and understand the risksassociated with this task.

CAUTION

Identifying hazards and controlling risks across the full spectrum of Army functions, operations, and activitiesis the responsibility of all Soldiers.

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TASK STEPS 1. The staff, led by the current operations cell, establishes mission command within the joint operations area by:

a. Determining the designated joint force air component commander (JFACC), the airspace control authority, and thearea air defense commander.

b. Determining command relationships between operating forces to support suppression of enemy air defense(SEAD) operations.

c. Coordinating, synchronizing, and integrating mission command systems and processes among forces to supportrapid targeting.

d. Establishing liaison officers and parties between the forces.

e. Establishing interoperable communications across all levels and units responsible for SEAD.

f. Establishing an integrated mission command, communications system and information collection infrastructurescapable of generating and passing intelligence, operational information, and orders in the shortest possible time.

g. Verified the common operational picture at operational mission command nodes reflect timely, accurate,complete, and clear operational information.

h. Determining subordinate elements that could support SEAD operations.

i. Determining which joint fire support mission command agencies supported SEAD operations.

2. The staff, led by the intelligence cell, conducts intelligence preparation of the operational environment by:

a. Determing the threat’s air and missile capabilities and support infrastructure in the joint operations area (JOA).

b. Requesting augmentation, if required, of communication and intelligence systems and sensors, to supportinformation sharing and near real-time targeting and attack from available sources within the (JOA).

c. Collecting information on threat capabilities to include:

(1) Integrating air defense.

(2) Mission command networks.

(3) Radar coverage.

(4) Early warning and detection systems.

d. Disseminating collected information to applicable organizations and planners.

3. The staff, led by the plans cell, plans for SEAD by:

a. Verifying planners consider conducting SEAD operations through destructive and disruptive means.

b. Planning SEAD operations in coordination with other joint components.

c. Determining available resources from other Services to support SEAD operations.

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d. Determining the most effective means of attack and suppression by:

(1) Considering aircraft that provide long range, accurate, high payload, all-weather, and flexible capabilities.

(2) Considering unmanned aircraft systems to perform surveillance, reconnaissance, deception, jamming andattack functions.

(3) Considering missiles to include surface to surface, air to air, air to surface as well as air, land and sealaunched cruise missiles.

(4) Considering special operations forces (SOF) that have the ability to conduct direct action, provide terminalguidance, observe attacks, and collect intelligence.

(5) Considering surface fire support including artillery and naval gunfire.

(6) Considering armed helicopters that may be used in direct action.

e. Determining the availability of SOF aviation and ground forces to support SEAD operations.

f. Identifying SEAD objectives and the effects that support higher headquarters objectives.

g. Reviewing the commander’s guidance and intent.

h. Reviewing operational products pertinent to SEAD operations to include:

(1) Joint air operations plan.

(2) Master air attack plan.

(3) Aerospace operation directives.

(4) Joint integrated prioritized target list.

(5) Air tasking order (ATO).

(6) Airspace control plan (ACP).

i. Integrating the ACP with SEAD operations to regulate airspace for operational effectiveness.

j. Coordinating airspace control measures with other ongoing and planned operations within the JOA.

k. Verifying positive and procedural controls are in place to eliminate or mitigate the potential for fratricide.

l. Coordinating the employment of surface-to-surface fires in support of localized suppression within the force.

m. Establishing procedures for requesting surface fire support between subordinate operating forces.

n. Establishing procedures for ground operating forces requesting suppression support from the JFACC.

o. Providing input to higher headquarters, as required, for rules of engagement (ROE).

p. Requesting supplemental ROE as required.

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q. Using mission command systems to distribute combat identification information.

r. Using information system assets to provide situational awareness.

s. Using information warfare to disrupt threat capabilities to include:

(1) Vital air defense information transmissions.

(2) Situational awareness.

(3) Sensors.

t. Using SOF for threat assessment and post-attack reconnaissance that measures the results of SEAD operations.

u. Reviewing the commander’s list of approved time-sensitive targets for SEAD operations.

v. Integrating SEAD operations in to the overall targeting plan.

w. Addressing the availability of fire support resources, including electronic warfare (EW) and, intelligence andsurveillance, in the fire support estimate.

x. Integrating the EW plan with SEAD operations.

4. The staff, led by the current operations section, executes SEAD operations by:

a. Providing SEAD capabilities and/or forces to the JFACC to support SEAD operations across the JOA.

b. Targeting the threat’s air and missile threats.

c. Executing planned SEAD targets in accordance with the ATO.

d. Managing sensors, communication networks, and weapon systems.

e. De-conflicting the use of resources as necessary.

f. Adjusting tactical force suppression needs and target priorities as the current situation changes.

g. Maintaining appropriate mission command systems and processes to prevent any ROE violations.

5. The staff assesses SEAD operations by:

a. Assessing the results of localized suppression in support of specific operations.

b. Assessing the results of opportune suppression which includes self-defense and attack of targets of opportunity.

c. Verifying battle damage assessment (BDA) is conducted for each engagement.

d. Verifying BDA is sent using joint Service formats.

e. Assessing the effectiveness of electronic attacks to achieve the desired effects on the threat.

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(Asterisks indicates a leader performance step.)

f. Determining if threat air defenses, network assets, missiles, and sensors were destroyed, neutralized, disrupted, orlimited.

g. Verifying targets are re-attacked as a result of BDA.

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PERFORMANCE MEASURES GO NO-GO N/A1. The staff, led by the current operations cell, established mission command withinthe joint operations area: a. Determined the designated joint force air component commander (JFACC),the airspace control authority, and the area air defense commander. b. Determined command relationships between operating forces to supportsuppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) operations. c. Coordinated, synchronized, and integrated mission command systems andprocesses among forces to supportrapid targeting. d. Established liaison officers and parties between the forces. e. Established interoperable communications across all levels and unitsresponsible for SEAD. f. Established an integrated mission command, communications system, andinformation collection infrastructures capable of generating and passing intelligence,operational information, and orders in the shortest possible time. g. Verified the common operational picture at operational mission commandnodes reflected timely, accurate, complete, and clear operational information. h. Determined what subordinate elements in the force could support SEADoperations. i. Determined which joint fire support mission command agencies supportedSEAD operations.2. The staff, led by the intelligence cell, conducted intelligence preparation of theoperational environment. a. Determined the threat’s air and missile capabilities and supportinginfrastructure within the area of operations. b. Requested augmentation, if required, of communication and intelligencesystems and sensors, that supported information sharing and near real-timetargeting and attack from available sources within the JOA. c. Collected information on threat capabilities to include: (1) Integrated air defense. (2) MC networks. (3) Radar coverage. (4) Early warning/detection systems. d. Disseminated collected information to applicable organizations and planners.3. The staff, led by the plans cell, planned for SEAD: a. Verified planners considered conducting SEAD operations through destructiveand disruptive means. b. Planned SEAD operations in coordination with other joint components. c. Determined available resources from other Services to support SEADoperations. d. Determined the most effective means of attack and suppression: (1) Considered aircraft that provided long range, accurate, high payload, all-weather, and flexible capabilities. (2) Considered unmanned aircraft systems to perform surveillance,reconnaissance, deception, jamming andattack functions. (3) Considered missiles to include surface to surface, air to air, air to surfaceas well as air, land and sealaunched cruise missiles. (4) Considered special operations forces (SOF) that have the ability toconduct direct action, provide terminalguidance, observe attacks, and collect intelligence. (5) Considered surface fire support that included artillery and naval gunfire. (6) Considered armed helicopters which may be used in direct action. e. Determined the availability of SOF aviation and ground forces to supportSEAD operations.

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f. Identified SEAD objectives and the effects that supported higher headquartersobjectives. g. Reviewed the commander’s guidance and intent. h. Reviewed operational products pertinent to SEAD operations to include: (1) Joint air operations plan (JAOP). (2) Master air attack plan. (3) Aerospace operations directive. (4) Joint integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL). (5) Air tasking order (ATO). (6) Airspace control plan (ACP) i. Integrated the ACP with SEAD operations to regulate airspace for operationaleffectiveness. j. Coordinated airspace control measures with other ongoing and plannedoperations within the JOA. k. Verified positive and procedural controls were in place to eliminate or mitigatethe potential for fratricide. l. Coordinated the employment of surface-to-surface fires in support of localizedsuppression within the force. m. Established procedures for requesting surface fire support betweensubordinate operating forces. n. Established procedures for ground operating forces requesting suppressionsupport from the JFACC. o. Provided input to higher headquarters, as required, for rules of engagement(ROE). p. Requested supplemental ROE as required. q. Used mission command systems to distribute combat identificationinformation. r. Used information system assets to provide situational awareness. s. Used information warfare to disrupt threat capabilities to include: (1) Vital air defense information transmissions. (2) Situational awareness. (3) Sensors. t. Used SOF for threat assessment and post-attack reconnaissance thatmeasured the results of SEAD operations. u. Reviewed the commander’s list of approved time-sensitive targets for SEADoperations. v. Integrated SEAD operations in to the overall targeting plan. w. Addressed the availability of fire support resources including electronicwarfare (EW) and, intelligence and surveillance, in the fire support estimate. x. Integrated the EW plan with SEAD Operations.4. The staff led by the current operations section, executed SEAD operations: a. Provided SEAD capabilities and/or forces to the JFACC to support SEADoperations across the JOA. b. Targeted the threat’s air and missile threats. c. Executed planned SEAD targets in accordance with the ATO. d. Managed sensors, communication networks, and weapon systems. e. Deconflicted use of resources as necessary. f. Adjusted tactical force suppression needs and target priorities as the currentsituation changed. g. Maintained appropriate mission systems and processes to prevent any ROEviolations.5. The staff assessed SEAD operations: a. Assessed the results of localized suppression that supported specificoperations. b. Assessed the results of opportune suppression that included self-defense andattack of targets of opportunity.

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ITERATION: 1 2 3 4 5 M COMMANDER/LEADER ASSESSMENT: T P U Mission(s) supported: None MOPP: Sometimes MOPP Statement: None NVG: Never NVG Statement: None Prerequisite Collective Task(s):

Supporting Collective Task(s):

c. Verified battle damage assessments (BDA) were conducted for eachengagement. d. Verified BDAs were sent using joint Service formats. e. Assessed the effectiveness of electronic attacks to achieve the desired effectson the threat. f. Determined if threat air defenses, network assets, missiles, and sensors weredestroyed, neutralized, disrupted, or limited. g. Verified targets were re-attacked as a result of BDA.

TASK PERFORMANCE / EVALUATION SUMMARY BLOCKITERATION 1 2 3 4 5 M TOTAL

TOTAL PERFORMANCEMEASURES EVALUATEDTOTAL PERFORMANCEMEASURES GOTRAINING STATUS GO/NO-GO

StepNumber Task Number Title Proponent Status

71-9-5000 Execute the Operations Process (DivisionEchelon and Above [Operational])

71 - Combined Arms(Collective)

Approved

71-9-5150 Monitor Strategic Situation (DivisionEchelon and Above [ Operational])

71 - Combined Arms(Collective)

Approved

71-9-5200 Assess Operational Situation (DivisionEchelon and Above [Operational])

71 - Combined Arms(Collective)

Approved

71-9-5320 Issue Planning Guidance (Division Echelonand Above [Operational])

71 - Combined Arms(Collective)

Approved

71-9-5570 Conduct Joint Force Staff Operations(Division Echelon and Above [Operational])

71 - Combined Arms(Collective)

Approved

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Supporting Individual Task(s):

Supporting Drill Task(s): None

TADSS

StepNumber Task Number Title Proponent Status

71-9-1530 Achieve Air Superiority in the JointOperations Area (Division Echelon andAbove [Operational])

71 - Combined Arms(Collective)

Approved

71-9-2220 Direct Theater Strategic Surveillance andReconnaissance (Division Echelon andAbove [Operational])

71 - Combined Arms(Collective)

Approved

71-9-2250 Collect Target Information (DivisionEchelon and Above [Operational])

71 - Combined Arms(Collective)

Approved

71-9-2424 Provide Target Information for the JointOperational Area (Division Echelon andAbove [Operational])

71 - Combined Arms(Collective)

Approved

71-9-5111 Provide Positive Identification of FriendlyForces Within the Joint Operations Area(Division Echelon and Above [Operational])

71 - Combined Arms(Collective)

Approved

71-9-5450 Coordinate with Components, Theater, andother Support (Division Echelon and Above[Operational])

71 - Combined Arms(Collective)

Approved

71-9-6100 Provide Operational Air, Space, andMissile Defense (Division Echelon andAbove [Operational])

71 - Combined Arms(Collective)

Approved

71-9-6140 Conduct Defensive Counter Air Operationsin the Joint Operations Area (DivisionEchelon and Above [Operational])

71 - Combined Arms(Collective)

Approved

71-9-6160 Conduct Tactical Warning and AttackAssessment in the Joint Operations Area(Division Echelon and Above [Operational])

71 - Combined Arms(Collective)

Approved

71-9-6210 Prepare Operationally Significant Defenses(Division Echelon and Above [Operational])

71 - Combined Arms(Collective)

Approved

71-9-6510 Provide Counterreconnaissance in theJoint Operations Area (Division Echelonand Above [Operational])

71 - Combined Arms(Collective)

Approved

Step Number Task Number Title Proponent Status150-718-5315 Establish the Common Operational Picture 150 - Combined Arms

(Individual)Approved

Step ID TADSS ID Title Product Type QuantityNo TADSS specified

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Equipment (LIN)

Materiel Items (NSN)

Environment: Environmental protection is not just the law but the right thing to do. It is a continual process and startswith deliberate planning. Always be alert to ways to protect our environment during training and missions. In doing so, youwill contribute to the sustainment of our training resources while protecting people and the environment from harmfuleffects. Refer to FM 3-34.5 Environmental Considerations and GTA 05-08-002 ENVIRONMENTAL-RELATED RISKASSESSMENT. . Safety: In a training environment, leaders must perform a risk assessment in accordance with FM 5-19, Composite RiskManagement. Leaders will complete a DA Form 7566 COMPOSITE RISK MANAGEMENT WORKSHEET during theplanning and completion of each task and sub-task by assessing mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and supportavailable-time available and civil considerations, (METT-TC). Note: During MOPP training, leaders must ensure personnelare monitored for potential heat injury. Local policies and procedures must be followed during times of increased heatcategory in order to avoid heat related injury. Consider the MOPP work/rest cycles and water replacement guidelinesIAW FM 3-11.4, NBC Protection, FM 3-11.5, CBRN Decontamination. .

Step ID LIN Nomenclature QtyNo equipment specified

Step ID NSN LIN Title QtyNo materiel items specified

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