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CASE DOCTRINE

RULE 62: INTERPLEADER

1. Wack Wack Country Club Inc. vs Won

G. R. No. 23851, March 26, 1976

It must be filed within a reasonable time after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by either of the contending claimants. Otherwise,he may be barred by laches or undue delay. It is too late when filed after judgment has been rendered against him in favor of one of the contending claimants, especially where he had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of the judgment and neglected the opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit where judgment was entered.

2. Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs Metro Container Corporation G. R. No. 127913, September 13, 2001

If a property was mortgaged and right has been consolidated after failure to redeem, interpleader may no longer be filed by the lessee who pretends not to know to whom payment should be made, because the question in the unlawful detainer suit is limited to the question of physical or material possession of the premises.

3. Lim vs Continental Development Corporation G. R. No. 41818, February 18, 1976

The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double liability but to protect him against a double vexation in respect of one liability.

4. Arreza vs Diaz G. R. No. 133113, August 30, 2001

The court in a complaint for interpleader shall determine the rights and obligations of the parties and adjudicate their respective claims. Such rights, obligations and claims could only be adjudicated if put forward by the aggrieved party in assertion of his rights.

5. Sy-Quia vs Sheriff of Ilocos Sur and De Leon G. R. No. L-22807, October 10, 1924

In respect to conflicting claims to property seized by the sheriff in the foreclosure of a chattel mortgage, the sheriff may bring an action of interpleader under section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure in order to determine the respective rights of the claimants. Though in such cases it may ordinarily be better practice for the

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sheriff to sell the property and hold the proceeds of the same subject to the outcome of the action of interpleader, his action in suspending the sale pending the determination of the action interpleader seems justified by the facts in the present case and the court will not interfere by mandamus.

6. Ocampo v. Tirona G. R. No. 147812, April 6, 2005

When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, there arises in reality a new action and the former are styled interpleaders, and in such a case the pleading which initiates the action is called a complaint of interpleader and not a cross-complaint.

7. Pagkalinawan vs Rodas G.R. No. L-1806 February 25, 1948

when it is not provided in a judgment that the defendants are liable to pay jointly and severally a certain sum of money, none of them may be compelled to satisfy in full said judgment.

8. Mesina vs Intermediate Appellate Court G. R. No. 70145, November 13, 1986

9. Vda. De Camilo vs Arcamo G. R. No. 15653, September 29, 1961

10. Beltran vs Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation G. R. No. 25138, August 28, 1969

RULE 63:DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

Almeda vs Bathala Marketing Industries, Inc. G. R. No. 150806, January 28, 2008

As a rule, the petition for declaratory relief should be dismissed in view of the pendency of a separate action for unlawful detainer.

Velarde vs Social Justice Society G. R. No. 159357, April 28, 2004

A justiciable controversy to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory. A petition filed with the trial

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court should contain a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim.

Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation vs CA G. R. No. 126911, April 30, 2003

A petition for declaratory relief does not essentially entail an executory process. There is nothing in its nature, however, that prohibits a counterclaim from being set-up in the same action.

Department of Budget and Management vs Manilas Finest Retirees Association G. R. No. 169466, May 9, 2007

Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation vs CA G. R. No. 126911, April 30, 2003

Araneta vs Gatmaitan G. R. No. 8895 and 9191, April 30, 1957

Jumamil vs Caf G. R. No. 144570, September 21, 2005

A taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge its validity. Parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation. The expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds.

Santos vs Aquino G.R. Nos. 86181-82 January 13, 1992

The petition for declaratory relief must be asked before a violation of the ordinance is committed. In this case, it was shown that petitioner did not pay the taxes already due. Another reason is that petitioner is not the real party in the case. Petitioner was only the manager of the theater, not the owner and as such he is not entitled to bring this action.

Edades vs Edades The case (hereditary rights in the property of

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G.R. No. L-8964. July 31, 1956 his alleged father and incidentally the recognition of his status as an illegitimate son of Emigdio) does not fall under the authorized causes for an action for declaratory relief. It does not concern a deed, will, contract or other written instrument. It does not affect a statute or ordinance whose construction or validity is questioned.

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs Viron Transportation Co., Inc G. R. No. 170656, August 15, 2007

The requisites are that (a) there must be a justiciable controversy, (b) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse, (c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy, and (d) the issue invoked must be ripe for judicial determination.

Republic of the Philippines vs Cipriano Orbecido III G. R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.

Quisimbing vs Garcia G. R. No. 175527 December 8, 2008

Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the court can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. Under such circumstances, inasmuch as a cause of action has already accrued in favor of one or the other party, there is nothing more for the court to explain or clarify, short of a judgment or final

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order.

CJH Development Corporation vs. Bureau of Internal Revenue G. R. No. 172457 December 24, 2008

A petition for declaratory relief cannot properly have a court decision as its subject matter. There are other remedies available to a party who is not agreeable to a decision whether it be a question of law or fact. If it involves a decision of an appellate court, the party may file a motion for reconsideration or new trial in order that the defect may be corrected. In case of ambiguity of the decision, a party may file a motion for a clarificatory judgment. One of the requisites of a declaratory relief is that the issue must be ripe for judicial determination. This means that litigation is inevitable or there is no adequate relief available in any other form or proceeding.

Ollada vs. Central Bank of the Philippines G. R. No. 11357, May 31, 1962

The rule is that an action for Declaratory Relief is proper only if adequate relief is not available through the means of other existing forms of action or proceeding.

Lim vs. Republic G. R. No. 29535 February 27, 1971

Declaratory relief in this jurisdiction is a special civil action which may lie only when 'any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by statute or ordinance,' demands construction thereof for a declaration of his rights thereunder. None of the above circumstances exists in the case under consideration. And this Court has already held that there is no proceeding established by law or the rules by which any person claiming to be a citizen may get a declaration in a court of justice to that effect or in regard to his citizenship.

Dy Poco vs. Commissioner of Immigration G. R. No. 22313, March 31, 1966

Where a declaratory judgment as to a disputed fact would be determinative of issues rather than a construction of definite stated rights, status, and other relations, commonly expressed in written instruments, the case is not one for declaratory judgment." And, here, the material issues are the citizenship of the mother and the

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illegitimacy of the petitioner, and the rights and status of the latter which are sought to be declared are dependent upon those disputed issues.

Singson vs. Republic G. R. No. 21855 January 30, 1968

Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for the settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to, their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power . . . At times, the law permits the acquisition of a given status, such as naturalization, by judicial decree. But, there is no similar legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our citizenry.

Government Service Insurance System Employees Assocoation vs. Alvendia G.R. No. L-15614 May 30, 1960

DECLARATORY RELIEF; PETITION UNNECESSARY IN MOOT CASES. If declaratory relief is not necessary or not proper where there is already an action pending in another court involving the same issue, or where the plaintiff has another more effective relief, with more reason should it be improper or unnecessary when it seeks judicial declaration upon questions already determined in a case in which the petitioner itself is a party.

Lim vs. Republic G. R. No. 29535 February 27, 1971

It is now well settled . . . that there is no proceeding established by law, or the rules, for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual . . . and that citizenship is not a proper subject for declaratory judgment..

Dela Llana vs. Commission on Elections

The matter of whether or not the holding of the December 17, 1977 referendum is unnecessary

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G. R. No. 47245, December 9, 1977

because the people, on several occasions, had already expressed their assent to the incumbent President's continuance in office and their approval of his programs of government, is a political and non-justiciable question, involving as it does the wisdom, no more and no less, of the decision to call for a referendum.

Tanda vs. Aldaya O. G. No. 11, 5175 September 15, 1956

DECLARATORY RELIEF; COURT DECISION NOT PROPER SUBJECT OF ACTIONS; REMEDY WHERE DECISION IS DOUBTFUL OR AMBIGUOUS. A court decision cannot be the subject of declaratory relief for the simple reason that if a party is not agreeable to a decision either on questions of law or of fact, he may file with the trial court a motion for reconsideration or a new trial in order that the defect may be corrected (section 1, Rule 37). The same remedy may be pursued by a party with regard to a decision of the Court of Appeals or of the Supreme Court (section 1, Rule 54, section 1, Rule 55, in connection with section 1, Rule 53). A party may even seek relief from a judgment or order of an inferior court on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence if he avails of that remedy within the terms prescribed by section 1, Rule 38. In the present case, the fundamental reason why the decision cannot be the subject of declaratory relief is predicated upon the principle of res judicata which stamps the mark of finality in a case which has been fully and definitely litigated in court.

Ollada vs. Central bank of the Philippines G. R. No. 11357, May 31, 1962

An action for declaratory relief should be filed before there has been a breach of a contract, statute or right. The rule is that an action for Declaratory Relief is proper only if adequate relief is not available through the means of other existing forms of action or proceeding.

Kawasaki Port Service Corporation vs. Amores G. R. No. 58340, July 16, 1991

xxx what is sought is a declaration not only that private respondent is a corporation for there is no dispute on that matter but also that it is separate and distinct from C.F. Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha

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and therefore, not liable for the latter's indebtedness. xxx The prevailing rule is that "where a declaratory judgment as to a disputed fact would be determinative of issues rather than a construction of definite stated rights, status and other relations, commonly expressed in written instrument, the case is not one for declaratory judgment." Thus, considering the nature of a proceeding for declaratory judgment, wherein relief may be sought only to declare rights and not to determine or try issues, there is more valid reason to adhere to the principle that a declaratory relief proceeding is unavailable where judgment would have to be made, only after a judicial investigation of disputed issues. In fact, private respondent itself perceives that petitioners may even seek to pierce the veil of corporate identity.

University of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals G. R. No. 97827, February 9, 1993

With respect to the prayer of the complaint for "judgment declaring plaintiff Tasadays to be a distinct ethnic community within the territory defined under Presidential Proclamation No. 995," the lower court is cautioned that the same is akin to a prayer for a judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship which may not be granted in a petition for declaratory relief. Indeed, it is not the province of the court to make pronouncements on matters beyond its ken and expertise. To be sure, in resolving the complaint for damages, the court may find congruence in what is justiciable and what falls within the field of the sciences. Still, it is best to keep in mind that its proper role and function is the determination of legal issues.

Tadeo vs. The Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan G. R. No. 16474, January 31, 1962

The appellant not being one of the contracting parties to the deed of sale but took part only as notary public before whom they acknowledge the execution thereof is not entitled to file an action for declaratory judgment. None of his rights or

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duties thereunder need be declared.

Chan vs. Galang G. R. No. 21732, October 17, 1966

Declaratory relief is discretionary upon the court to entertain. It may refuse to exercise the power to declare rights and to construe instruments in any case where the declaration or construction is not necessary and proper at the time under all the circumstances (Section 5, Rule 64, formerly Section 6, Rule 66, Rules of Court). The case at bar is such one case, for the proper forum in which to first resolve the disputed issue of citizenship is the Board of Commissioners.

Chua U vs Hon. Manuel Lim G. R. No. 19639, February 26, 1965

Courts are loath to interfere prematurely with administrative proceedings, and will not assume jurisdiction of declaratory judgment proceedings until administrative remedies have been exhausted. A petition for declaratory relief will be denied when other parties who would be necessarily affected by the judgment are not represented in the proceedings.

Adlawan vs. The Intermediate Appellate Court G. R. No. 73022, February 9, 1989

In such special civil action the judgment does not essentially entail an executory process since generally, other than a declaration of such rights and duties, other affirmative reliefs, as these are understood in ordinary civil actions, are not sought by the proponent. However, the Court has held that although the action is for a declaratory judgment but the allegations in the complaints are sufficient to make out a case for specific performance or recovery of property with claims for damages, and the defendants did not raise an issue in the trial court to challenge the remedy or form of the action availed of, the court can grant such affirmative relief as may be warranted by the evidence.

Tolentino vs. Board of Accountancy G.R. No. L-3062, September 28

Where plaintiff seeks declaratory relief not for his own personal benefit, or because his rights or prerogatives as an accountant or as an

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individual, are adversely affected, but rather for the benefit of persons belonging to other professions or callings, who are not parties in this case; or where plaintiff does not claim to have suffered any prejudice or damage to him or to his rights or prerogatives as an accountant by the use of the disputed trade name by the defendants, who also are certified accountants, the case does not properly come under Rule 66. In order that an action for declaratory relief may be entertained, it must be predicated on the following requisite facts or conditions: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.

Commissioner of Customs et. al vs Cloribel et. Al G. R. No. 21036, June 30, 1977

A third-party complaint is inconceivable when the main case is one for nothing more than a declaratory relief. In a third-party complaint, the defendant or third-party plaintiff is supposed to seek contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief from the third-party defendant is respect to the claim of the plaintiff against him.

Visayan Packing Corporation vs Reparations Commission G. R. No. 29673, November 12, 1987

There is nothing in the nature of a special civil action for declaratory relief that proscribes the filing of a counterclaim based on the same transaction, deed or contract subject of the complaint. A special civil action is after all not essentially different from an ordinary civil action, which is generally governed by Rules 1 to 56 of the Rules of Court, except that the former deals with a special subject matter which makes necessary some special regulation. But the identity between their fundamental nature is such that the same rules governing ordinary civil suits may and do apply to special civil actions if not inconsistent with or if they may serve to supplement the provisions of the peculiar rules governing special civil actions.

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Baguio Citizens Action Inc et. al vs The City Council and City Mayor of Baguio G. R. No. 27247, April 20, 1983

The non-inclusion of the squatters mentioned in the Ordinance in question as party defendants in this case cannot defeat the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Baguio. There is nothing in Section 2 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court which says that the non-joinder of persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration is a jurisdictional defect. Said section merely states that "all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration; and no declaration shall, except or otherwise provided in these rules, prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the action.'' This section contemplates a situation where there are other persons who would be affected by the declaration, but were not impleaded as necessary parties, in which case the declaration shall not prejudice them. If at all, the case may be dismissed not on the ground of lack of jurisdiction but for the reason stated in Section 5 of the same Rule stating that "the Court may refuse to exercise the power to declare rights and to construe instruments in any case where a decision would not terminate the uncertainly or controversy which gave rise to the action, or any case where the declaration or construction is not necessary and proper at the time under all circumstances."

RULE 64: REVIEW OF JUDGMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS OR RESOLUTIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE COMISSION ON AUDIT

RULE 65 : CERTIORARI

Victorino Francisco vs Winai Permskul G. R. No. 81006, May 12, 1989

It is clear that where the decision of the appellate court actually reproduces the findings of fact or the conclusions of law of the court below, it is not a memorandum decision as envisioned in the above provision. The distinctive features of the

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memorandum decision are, first, it is rendered by an appellate court, and second, it incorporates by reference the findings of fact or the conclusions of law contained in the decision, order or ruling under review. At any rate, the reason for allowing the incorporation by reference is evidently to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower court, or portions thereof, in the decision of the higher court. The idea is to avoid having to repeat in the body of the latter decision the findings or conclusions of the lower court since they are being approved or adopted anyway.

New Frontier Sugar Corporation vs RTC G. R. No. 165001, January 31, 2007

Certiorari is a remedy for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. It is an original and independent action that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of. More importantly, since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment; or where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy. A petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty days from the notice of judgment, order, or resolution, and a motion for reconsideration is generally required prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to correct the alleged errors.

Jonhson Lee and Sonny Moreno vs CA G. R. No. 137914, December 4, 2003

The general rule is that, where a motion to quash is denied, the remedy is not certiorari but to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses involved in said motion, and if, after trial on the merits an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. And, even in the exceptional case where such denial may be the subject of a special civil action for certiorari, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed to give the trial court an

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opportunity to correct its error. Finally, even if a motion for reconsideration were filed and denied, the remedy under Rule 65 would still be unavailable absent any showing of the grounds provided for in Section l thereof. The petition before the Court of Appeals, subject of this appeal, did not allege any of such grounds.

Microsoft Corporation vs Best Deal Computer Center et. al. G. R. No. 148029, September 24, 2002

A special civil action for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is manifested. For an abuse to be grave the power must be exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law. There is grave abuse of discretion when respondent acts in a capricious or whimsical manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Even assuming that the orders were erroneous, such error would merely be deemed as an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. As long as the respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal.

Manuel Camacho vs Coresis et. al. G. R. No. 134372, August 22, 2002

From the records, we find no valid ground nor cogent reason to hold that the respondent Office had gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed Resolution dated June 3, 1997. Institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives and the methods on how best to attain them, free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. 22 It encompasses the freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds: who may teach, what may

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be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study." 23 The right of the school to confirm and validate the teaching method of Dr. Daleon is at once apparent in the third freedom, i.e., "how it shall be taught."

Robert Del Mar vs Court of Appeals G. R. No. 139008, March 18, 2002

Well-settled is the rule that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. Even if for this reason alone, the petition should not be given due course.

Leung Ben vs P. J. OBrien et. al. G.R. No. 13602 April 6, 1918

Where a Court of First Instance issues an attachment for which there is no statutory authority, it is acting irregularly and in excess of its jurisdiction in the sense necessary to justify the Supreme Court in entertaining an application for a writ of certiorari and quashing the attachment. In such case the remedy on the attachment bond or by appeal would not be sufficiently speedy to meet the exigencies of the case. Attachment is an exceedingly violent measure and its unauthorized issuance may result in the infliction of damage which could never be repaired by any pecuniary award at the final hearing.

Matiano Tengco vs Vicente Jocson et. al. G.R. No. 19427 September 2, 1922

Where the jurisdiction which a court exercises is special, created by an act of legislature, its modes of proceedings and powers are regulated and defined by the law and it cannot, under any supposed analogy to ordinary proceedings, exercise any power beyond that which the act of the legislature has given.

CONSOLIDATED CASE: PCGG vs Silangan Investors and Managers et. al. and PCGG vs Polygon Investors and Managers et. al. G. R. Nos. 167055-56 and 170673, March 25, 2010

Certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in character. It is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop. It offers only a limited form of review. Its principal function is to keep an inferior tribunal within its jurisdiction. It can be invoked only for an error of jurisdiction, that is, one where the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial

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body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Julies Franchise Corporation et. al vs Hon Chandler Ruiz et. al. G. R. No. 180988 August 28, 2009

In a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the court is narrow in scope. It is limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction. It is not to stray at will and resolve questions or issues beyond its competence such as errors of judgment. Errors of judgment of the trial court are to be resolved by the appellate court in the appeal by and of error or via a petition for review on certiorari in this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction. It is not a remedy to correct errors of judgment. An error of judgment is one in which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reversible only by an appeal. Error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law. As long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Severino Vergara vs Ombudsman G. R. No. 174567 March 13, 2009

This Court has consistently adopted a policy of non-interference in the exercise of the Ombudsman's constitutionally mandated powers. The Ombudsman, which is "beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of the public service". However, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman's action when there is grave abuse of discretion, in which case the certiorari jurisdiction of the Court may be exceptionally invoked pursuant to Section 1,

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Article VIII of the Constitution. We have enumerated instances where the courts may interfere with the Ombudsman's investigatory powers: (a)To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (b)When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (c)When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice; (d)When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (e)Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (f)When double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (g)Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (h)Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (i)Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance.

Concepcion Vda. De Daffon vs Court of Appeals G. R. No. 129017 August 20, 2002

Petitioner argues that the order which denied the Motion to Dismiss is an interlocutory order which is not appealable. Hence, it may be the subject of a special civil action for certiorari. However, for certiorari to lie, it must be convincingly proved that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion, or an act too patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law; or that the trial court exercised its power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility. In the case at bar, the trial court did not

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commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss. Thus, the Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing the petition for certiorari.

Gabriel Duero vs Court of Appeals G. R. No. 131282, January, 4, 2002

Indeed, ". . . the trial court was duty-bound to take judicial notice of the parameters of its jurisdiction and its failure to do so, makes its decision a 'lawless' thing." Since a decision of a court without jurisdiction is null and void, it could logically never become final and executory, hence appeal therefrom by writ of error would be out of the question. Resort by private respondent to a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was in order.

Eladio Dillena vs Court of Appeals G. R. No. 77660, July 28, 1988

The petition for certiorari which was belatedly filed by petitioner before the Court of Appeals on February 20, 1986 should have been dismissed outright because the remedy of certiorari does not lie where appeal has been lost. Certiorari cannot take the place of an appeal.

Remedios Velasco Vda de Caldito vs Hon Rosalio Segundo et. al. G. R. No. 58187, September 30, 1982

Petitioner cannot avail of the remedy of certiorari as a substitute for appeal as the questioned order of dismissal is appealable. The proper remedy should have been to appeal the same. No circumstance had been shown to explain why such procedure was not observed, nor to justify a deviation from the same as to make available a petition for certiorari in lieu of taking an appropriate appeal. As may be noted, the petition was filed more than one year after the issuance of the order of dismissal complained of. Even in situations wherein certiorari is allowed as a remedy in lieu of appeal, said period may not be considered as a reasonable time within which to avail of such remedy. Moreover, the imputed error to the challenged order is not jurisdictional but merely one of judgment which is not correctible by certiorari.

MMDA V. JANCOM The remedy to obtain reversal or modification of

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ENVIRONMENTAL CORPORATION G. R. No. 147465, January 30, 2002

the judgment on the merits is appeal. This is true even if the error, or one of the errors, ascribed to the court rendering the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in the decision. The existence and availability of the right of appeal proscribes a resort to certiorari, because one of the requirements for availment of the latter remedy is precisely that "there should be no appeal" The few significant exceptions were: when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate; or when the broader interests of justice so require, or when the writs issued are null . . . or when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority."

RODRIGUEZ V. COURT OF APPEALS G. R. No. 134278 August 7, 2002

Clearly, where a police officer is dismissed by the PNP Director General and the dismissal is affirmed by the NAPOLCOM National Appellate Board, the proper remedy is to appeal the dismissal with the DILG Secretary. Neither certiorari nor mandamus can substitute for appeal where the latter is the proper remedy. The extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus will lie only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error of law in dismissing petitioner's special civil action for certiorari and mandamus.

CONEJOS V COURT OF APPEALS G. R. No. 149473, August 9, 2002

Petitioner's Petition for Certiorari should be summarily dismissed for adopting the wrong mode of appeal. Petitioner resorted to this special civil action after failing to appeal within the fifteen (15)-day reglementary period. This cannot be countenanced. The special civil action of certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal which petitioner already lost. Certiorari lies only where there is no appeal nor any plain,

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speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. There is no reason why the question being raised by petitioner, i.e., whether the appellate court committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitions, could not have been raised on appeal. Concededly, there were occasions when this Court treated a petition for certiorari as one filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, the circumstances prevailing in the instant case do not justify a deviation from a general rule. Notably, the instant petition was filed way beyond the reglementary period allowed under Rule 45 without any justifiable reason therefor nor any reasonable explanation being proffered by petitioner.

FELIZARDO V COURT OF APPEALS G. R. No. 112050 June 15, 1994

When the Municipal Trial Court ruled that it could act on the complaint for ejectment filed by the private respondent even without prior barangay conciliation proceedings, it committed a mere error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. We have held in many cases that while the referral of a case to the Lupon Tagapayapa is a condition precedent for the filing of a complaint in court, non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has already acquired over the subject matter and over the person of the defendant. Hence, the remedy available to the petitioner was to question the ruling of the court a quo in an ordinary appeal and not, as he mistakenly did, in a special civil action for certiorari.

ESCUDERO V DULAY G. R. No. 60578, February 23, 1988

Ordinarily, a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will not be a substitute or cure for failure to file a timely petition for review on certiorari (appeal) under Rule 45 of the Rules. Where, however, the application of this rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, the rule may be relaxed.

ACAIN V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

Thus, this Court ruled that where the grounds for dismissal are indubitable, the defendants had the

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G. R. No. 72706, October 27, 1987 right to resort to the more speedy, and adequate remedies of certiorari and prohibition to correct a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, committed by the trial court in not dismissing the case, and even assuming the existence of the remedy of appeal, the Court harkens to the rule that in the broader interests of justice, a petition for certiorari may be entertained, particularly where appeal would not afford speedy and adequate relief.

SALUDES V. PAJARILLO G.R. No. L-1121 July 29, 1947

Although an appeal from the decision of the municipal court was available, the same was not an adequate remedy, there being an order of execution issued by the municipal court, and certiorari therefore lies.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK V. FLORENDO G. R. No. 62082, February 26, 1992

The term excess of jurisdiction signifies that the court, board or officer has jurisdiction over a case but oversteps such jurisdiction while acting thereon. Even when appeal is available and is the proper remedy, this court has allowed a writ of certiorari when the orders of the lower court were issued either in excess of or without jurisdiction

JOSE V. ZULUETA G. R. No. 16598, May 31, 1961

It is true that in instances where the right to appeal still existed but would be inadequate to prevent the injury or wrong sought to be recovered; as for instance where execution had already been commenced, certiorari may be allowed, however, this pronouncement cannot be invoked in the instant case because not only is there no showing that appeal from the disputed orders would be inadequate and insufficient remedy, but also that, the right to such appeal, at the time the petition for certiorari was filed, has already been lost and no longer available.

MARCELO V. DE GUZMAN G. R. No. 29077 June 29, 1982

An appeal from the order of Judge de Guzman would neither be an adequate nor speedy remedy to relieve appellee of the injurious effects

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of the warrant. The seizure of her personal property has resulted in total paralyzation of her business, and recourse in appeal would have unduly delayed recovery of the articles and documents which have been improperly seized. Where the remedy of appeal cannot afford an adequate and expeditious relief, certiorari can he allowed as a mode of redress to prevent irreparable damage and injury to a party.

ST. PETER MEMORIAL PARK V. CAMPOS, JR. G. R. No. 38280 March 21, 1975

A restraining order issued by the Supreme Court enjoining a judge from enforcing his decision is intended to retain the status quo insofar as said decision and other circumstances surrounding it are concerned. Any court action or order that would change any circumstance of the decision is necessarily included in the scope of the restraining order. Thus, where the enjoined decision had been appealed when the restraining order was issued, an order dismissing the appeal tended to change the status quo, since by reason of the dismissal, the enjoined decision became final, Said dismissal constitutes a grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.

MARAHAY V. MELICOR G. R. No. 44980 February 6, 1990

Nevertheless, in the broader interests of justice, this Court has given due course to the present petition in consideration of the fact that this is not the first time we have passed upon a petition for certiorari, although the proper remedy is appeal, where the equities warrant such extraordinary recourse. This is especially true where, as in the case, petitioner's affidavit of merits shows that she has a good cause of action, that her counsel's affidavit of merits avers justifiable reasons for his non-appearance at said hearing, and the trial court is faulted with gravely abusing its discretion to the extent of denying due process to therein plaintiff. Significantly, it was respondent judge himself who advised petitioner to avail of said remedy in his order dismissing petitioner's second motion for reconsideration, obviously because appeal would not be a speedy and adequate remedy under the

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circumstances and considering that dismissals on technicalities are viewed with disapproval.

ASIAN TRADING CORPORATION V. COURT OF APPEALS G. R. No. 76276 February 15, 1999

Apt and proper is the observation by the respondent court that instead of filing a motion for reconsideration of or appealing from, subject judgment, the petitioners resorted to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is unavailable under the antecedent facts and circumstances.

MANGALIAG V PASTORAL G. R. No. 143951 October 25, 2005

Although this Court, the RTCs and the Court of Appeals (CA) have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition.

SPOUSES ROMERO V. COURT OF APPEALS G. R. No. 142406, May, 16, 2005

Lis pendens, which literally means pending suit, refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment. Founded upon public policy and necessity, lis pendens is intended to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated, and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation. Its notice is an announcement to the whole world that a particular property is in litigation and serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property. The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect: (1) to keep the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment to prevent the defeat of the final judgment by successive alienations;

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and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will promulgate subsequently.

HEIRS OF HINOG V MELICOR G. R. No. 140954 April 12, 2005

Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of this Court; and (b) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a trier of facts.

LAW FIRM OF ABRENICA, TUNGOL AND TIBAYAN V. COURT OF APPEALS G. R. No. 143706, April 5, 2002

An appellate court is imbued with sufficient discretion to review matters, not otherwise assigned as errors on appeal, in the following instances: (a) Grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter; (b) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law; (c) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; (d) Matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise

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or which the lower court ignored; (e) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; (f) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question properly assigned, is dependent.

FORTUNE GUARANTEE AND INSURANCE CORP. V. COURT OF APPEALS G. R. No. 110701 March 12, 2002

Accordingly, when a party adopts an improper remedy, as in this case, his petition may be dismissed outright. However, in the interest of substantial justice, the strict application of procedural technicalities should not hinder the speedy disposition of this case on the merits. Thus, while the instant petition is one for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the assigned errors are more properly addressed in a petition for review under Rule 45.

METRO TRANSIT ORGANIZATION V. COURT OF APPEALS G. R. No. 142133 November 19, 2002

The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is indispensable before resort to the special civil action for certiorari to afford the court or tribunal the opportunity to correct its error, if any. However, the following have been recognized as exceptions to the rule: (a) where the order is a patent of nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for

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reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved."

Government of the United States of America v. Purganan G. R. No. 148571 September 24, 2002

This Court has allowed a direct invocation of its original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari when there are special and important reasons therefor. In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition proceedings, we deem it best to take cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings constitute a matter of first impression over which there is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.

Butuan Bay Word Export Corporation v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-45473 April 28, 1980

Indeed, before a petition for certiorari can be brought against an order of a lower court, all available remedies must be exhausted. Likewise, in a host of cases. We ruled that before filing a petition for certiorari in a higher court, the attention of the lower court should first be called to its supposed error and its correction should be sought. If this is not done, the petition for certiorari should be denied. The reason for this rule is that issues which Courts of First Instance are bound to decide should not summarily be taken from them and submitted to an appellate court without first giving such lower courts the opportunity to dispose of the same with due

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deliberation.

Philippine Consumers Inc v National Telecommunications Commission G. R. No. 63318 November 25, 1983

CERTIORARI; REMEDY AVAILABLE DESPITE EXSISTENCE OF APPEAL IF DICTATED BY PUBLIC WELFARE AND ADVANCEMENT OF PUBLIC POLICY. Anent the question that petitioner should have appealed the decision of respondent NTC, instead of filing the instant petition, suffice it to say that certiorari is available despite existence of the remedy of appeal where public welfare and the advancement of public policy so dictate, or the orders complained of were issued in excess of or without jurisdiction.

Yau v Manila Banking Corp. G. R. No. 126731 July 11, 2002

The petition before the appellate court could have been dismissed outright since, as a rule, the CA, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, will not take cognizance of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, unless the lower court has been given the opportunity to correct the error imputed to it. This Court has settled that as a general rule, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non in order that certiorari shall lie. However, there are settled exceptions to this Rule, one of which is where the assailed order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction, which is evident in this case.

Aquino v National Labor Relations Commission G. R. No. 98108 September 3, 1993

On the procedural issues raised, we hold that where an interlocutory order was allegedly issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such order may be questioned before this Court on a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. To delay the review of the order until the appeal from the decision of the main case, would not afford the party adversely affected by the said order a speedy, plain and adequate remedy. Regarding the failure of petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration before the NLRC, such failure may be excused where the order sought to be reviewed is a patent nullity.

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Bache and Co. v Ruiz G. R. No. 32409 February 27, 1971

When the questions raised before this Court are the same as those which were squarely raised in and passed upon by the court below, the filing of a motion for reconsideration in said court before certiorari can be instituted in this Court is no longer a prerequisite. In the case at bar time is of the essence in view of the tax assessments sought to be enforced by respondent officers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue against petitioner corporation, On account of which immediate and more direct action becomes necessary. Lastly, the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the deprivation of petitioners' fundamental right to due process taints the proceeding against them in the court below not only with irregularity but also with nullity.

National Electrification Administration v Court of Appeals G. R. No. 32490 December 29, 1983

In the eyes of the law, the two disputed Orders were patent nullities, thus excepting the instant case from the general rule that before Certiorari or Mandamus may be availed of petitioner must first file a Motion for Reconsideration. Respondent Judge, in effect, deprived petitioner of its right to appeal and any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, hence, making petitioner's resort to the instant petition a virtual necessity. Public interest being involved, a Motion for Reconsideration need not be availed of. Petitioner averred that time was of the essence because respondents were in the process of executing the assailed judgment of the Trial Court with precipitate haste, the enforcement of which would have impaired petitioner corporation's operations and funds. Motion for Reconsideration is no longer a prerequisite where there is urgent necessity and any further delay would prejudice the interests of

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the Government.

Vda. De Sayman v Court of Appeals G. R. No. 25596 April 28, 1993

It is true that as a general rule, a motion for reconsideration should precede recourse to certiorari in order to give the trial court an opportunity to correct the error that it may have committed. The said requirement is not absolute and may be dispensed with in instances where the filing of a motion for reconsideration would serve no useful purpose, such as when the motion for reconsideration would raise the same point stated in the motion. In the case at bar, the question of whether a writ of execution may issue under the circumstances obtaining is purely one of law, and the need for urgent relief therefrom is patent from the fact that the trial court had already issued a writ for the execution of the judgment complained of in the petition for relief.

Peroxide Philippines Corporation v Court of Appeals G. R. No. 92813 July 31, 1991

A motion for reconsideration was correctly dispensed with by respondent court since the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding had beer duly raised and passed upon by the lower court. Also, under the circumstances therein a motion for reconsideration would serve no practical purpose since the trial judge had already had the opportunity to consider and pass upon the questions elevated on certiorari to respondent court.

Central Bank v Cloribel G. R. No. 26971 April 11, 1972

It is true that petitioner herein did not seek a reconsideration of the order complained of, and that, as a general rule, a petition for certiorari will not be entertained unless the respondent has had, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the error imputed to him. This rule is subject, however, to exceptions, among which are the following, namely: 1) where the issue raised is one purely of law; 2) where public interest is involved; and 3) in case of urgency. These circumstances are present in the case at bar. Moreover, Judge Cloribel has already had an

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opportunity to consider and pass upon the very same questions raised in the petition herein, so that a motion for reconsideration of his contested order would have served no practical purpose. The rule requiring exhaustion of remedies does not call for an exercise in futility.

Laguna Metts Corporation v Court of Appeals G. R. No. 185220 July 27, 2009

If the Court intended to retain the authority of the proper courts to grant extensions under Section 4 of Rule 65, the paragraph providing for such authority would have been preserved. The removal of the said paragraph under the amendment by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC of Section 4, Rule 65 simply meant that there can no longer be any extension of the 60-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari. The rationale for the amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC is essentially to prevent the use (or abuse) of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to delay a case or even defeat the ends of justice. Deleting the paragraph allowing extensions to file petition on compelling grounds did away with the filing of such motions. As the Rule now stands, petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration.

Ouano vs. PGTT International Investment Corporation G. R. No. 134230 July 17, 2002

Concurrence of jurisdiction does not grant a party seeking any of the extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file his petition with the court of his choice. This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition. The hierarchy of courts determines the appropriate forum for such petitions. Thus, petitions for the issuance of such extraordinary writs against the first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the RTC, and those against the latter, with the CA.

Relampagos v Cumba and Commission on Elections

Although the Constitution grants the COMELEC appellate jurisdiction, it does not grant it any

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G. R. No. 118861 April 27, 1995 power to exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, unlike in the case of this Court which is specifically conferred with such authority in Section 5(1) of Article VIII. It also pointed out that the doctrine laid down in Pimentel vs. COMELEC (101 SCRA 769 [1980]) that neither the Constitution nor any law has conferred jurisdiction on the COMELEC to issue such writs still finds application under the 1987 Constitution.

Monteban v Tanglao-Dacanay G. R. No. 136062 April 7, 2005

It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is not the province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra ordinem beyond the ambit of appeal. Stated elsewise, factual matters, now being raised by petitioner, cannot normally be inquired into by this Court in acertiorari proceeding. It cannot be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties and analyze, assess and weigh them again, in order to ascertain if the trial and the appellate courts were correct in according superior credit to this or that piece of evidence of one party or the other.

Uy v Sandiganbayan G. R. No. 11544 July 6, 2004

special civil action for certiorari is limited to the determination of whether or not public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed decisions. Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. We do not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan in this case.

RULE 65: PROHIBITION

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Pacificador v Commission on Elections G. R. No. 178259 March 13, 2009

Clearly, not only does prohibition not lie against the COMELEC First Division which has the mandate and power to hear and decide pre-proclamation controversies; the assailed Resolution has also become final and executory in view of the failure of petitioners to file a timely motion for reconsideration of said Resolution in accordance with the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and the Rules of Court.

Rivera v Espiritu G. R. No. 135547 January 23, 2002

The assailed agreement is clearly not the act of a tribunal, board, officer, or person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. It is not the act of public respondents Finance Secretary Edgardo Espiritu and Labor Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma as functionaries of the Task Force. Neither is there a judgment, order or resolution of either public respondents involved. Instead, what exists is a contract between a private firm and one of its labor unions, albeit entered into with the assistance of the Task Force. The first and second requisites for certiorari and prohibition are therefore not present in this case. Furthermore, there is available to petitioners a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. While the petition is denominated as one for certiorari and prohibition, its object is actually the nullification of the PAL-PALEA agreement. As such, petitioners' proper remedy is an ordinary civil action for annulment of contract, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the regional trial courts. Neither certiorari nor prohibition is the remedy in the present case.

Vera v Avelino G.R. No. L-543 August 31, 1946

Petitioners pray for a writ of prohibition. Under the law, prohibition refers only to proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person, exercising functions judicial or ministerial. (Rule 67, section 2, Rules of Court.) As the respondents do not exercise such kind of functions, theirs being legislative, it is clear the dispute falls beyond the scope of such special remedy.

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The Nacionalista Party v Bautista G.R. No. L-3452 December 7, 1949

The authorities and decision of courts are almost unanimous that prohibition will not lie to determine the title of a de facto judicial officer, since its only function is to prevent a usurpation of jurisdiction by a subordinate court.

Montes v Court of Appeals G. R. No. 143797 May 4, 2006

The act sought to be enjoined having taken place already, there is nothing more to restrain. Thus, the instant petition has been unmade as a mere subject matter of purely theoretical interest. Prohibition, as a rule, does not lie to restrain an act that is already fait accompli.

Gonzales v Narvasa G. R. No. 140835 August 14, 2000

Clearly, prohibition is an inappropriate remedy since the body sought to be enjoined no longer exists. It is well established that prohibition is a preventive remedy and does not lie to restrain an act that is already fait accompli. At this point, any ruling regarding the PCCR would simply be in the nature of an advisory opinion, which is definitely beyond the permissible scope of judicial power.

Tan v Commission on Elections G. R. No. 73155, July 11, 1986

Considering that the legality of the plebiscite itself is challenged for non-compliance with constitutional requisites, the fact that such plebiscite had been held and a new province proclaimed and its officials appointed, the case before Us cannot truly be viewed as already moot and academic. Continuation of the existence of this newly proclaimed province which petitioners strongly profess to have been illegally born, deserves to be inquired into by this Tribunal so that, if indeed, illegality attaches to its creation, the commission of that error should not provide the very excuse for perpetuation of such wrong. For this Court to yield to the respondents' urging that, as there has been fait accompli, then this Court should passively accept and accede to the prevailing situation is an unacceptable suggestion. Dismissal of the instant petition, as respondents so propose is a proposition fraught with mischief. Respondents' submission will

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create a dangerous precedent. Should this Court decline now to perform its duty of interpreting and indicating what the law is and should be, this might tempt again those who strut about in the corridors of power to recklessly and with ulterior motives, create, merge, divide and/or alter the boundaries of political subdivisions, either brazenly or stealthily, confident that this Court will abstain from entertaining future challenges to their acts if they manage to bring about a fait accompli.

RULE 65: MANDAMUS

Sy Ha versus Emilio Galang G. R. No. L-18513 April 27, 1963

It should be recalled that this is a petition for mandamus which will only lie to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary duty, for, as it was aptly held, mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any matter in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court. 2 Likewise, it was held that the determination of whether or not an applicant for a visa has a non-immigrant status, or whether his entry into this country would be contrary to public safety, is not a simple ministerial function, but one involving the exercise of discretion, which cannot be controlled by mandamus.

Mantrade/FMMC Division Employees and Workers Union versus Bacungan G. R. No. L-48437 September 30, 1986

Respondent corporation contends that mandamus does not lie to compel the performance of an act which the law does not clearly enjoin as a duty. True it is also that mandamus is not proper to enforce a contractual obligation, the remedy being an action for specific performance (Province of Pangasinan vs. Reparations Commission, November 29, 1977, 80 SCRA 376). In the case at bar, however, in view of the above-cited subsequent decisions of this Court clearly defining the legal duty to grant holiday pay to monthly salaried employees, mandamus is an appropriate equitable remedy

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(Dionisio vs. Paterno, July 23, 1980, 98 SCRA 677; Gonzales vs. Government Service Insurance System, September 10, 1981, 107 SCRA 492).

University of the Philippines versus Judge Ruben Ayson G. R. No. 88386 August 17, 1989

Niceta Suanes versus The Chief Accountant of the Senate G. R. No. L-2460 October 26, 1948

Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members, or its officers to compel the performance of duties purely legislative in their character which rightly pertain to their legislative functions and over which they have exclusive control. In the case at bar, there is no pure or exclusive legislative function involved. The instant action relates to the performance of respondents' ministerial duty to disburse to the Electoral Tribunal the funds that rightly belong to it. "The Courts will not interfere by mandamus proceedings with the legislative department of the government in the legitimate exercise of its powers, except to enforce mere ministerial acts required by law to be performed by some officer thereof."

Benjamin Aquino versus Herminio Mariano G. R. No. L-30485 May 31, 1984

Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that can be resorted to only in cases of extreme necessity where the ordinary forms of procedure are powerless to afford relief where there is no other clear, adequate and speedy remedy. Before a writ of mandamus may be issued, it is obligatory upon the petitioner to exhaust all remedies in the ordinary course of law. He must show that the duty sought to be performed must be one which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office.

One Heart Sporting Club, Inc. versus Court of Appeals G. R. No. L-53790 October 23, 1981

The principle requiring the previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable where the question in dispute is purely a legal one. In the present case, the specific question submitted

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for resolution before the court a quo is whether or not P.D. 1535 intended to grant Dipolog Coliseum, an extension in the operation of its cockpit. The question being purely legal, there was no need for private respondent to exhaust administrative remedies and its action in seeking judicial redress is therefore justified.

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority versus Concerned Citizens of Manila Bay G. R. Nos. 171947-48, December 18, 2008

While the implementation of the MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. A discretionary duty is one that "allows a person to exercise judgment and choose to perform or not to perform." Any suggestion that the MMDA has the option whether or not to perform its solid waste disposal-related duties ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis.

RULE 66: QUO WARRANTO

Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon versus Antonio Mendez G.R. No. 103702 December 6, 1994

The special civil action of quo warranto is a "prerogative writ by which the Government can call upon any person to show by what warrant he holds a public office or exercises a public franchise." When the inquiry is focused on the legal existence of a body politic, the action is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto or any other credit proceeding. It must be brought "in the name of the Republic of the Philippines" and commenced by the Solicitor General or the fiscal "when directed by the President of the Philippines . . . ." Such officers may, under certain circumstances, bring such an action "at the request and upon the relation of another person" with the permission of the court. The Rules of Court also allows an individual to commence an action for quo warranto in his own name but this initiative can be done when he claims to be "entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another."

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Newman vs United States 238 US 537 April 13, 1915

The District Code makes a distinction between a "third person" and an "interested person" in maintaining quo warranto proceedings. While every citizen and every taxpayer is interested in the enforcement of law and in having only qualified officers execute the law, such general interest is not a private but a public interest, which is not sufficient to authorize the institution of quo warranto proceedings. The mere fact that one is a citizen and taxpayer of the District of Columbia does not make him an interested party who may maintain quo warranto proceedings against the incumbent of an office on the consent of the court, although the law officers of the government refuse such consent. An interested person within the meaning of the provisions of the District Code in regard to quo warranto proceedings is one who has an interest in the office itself peculiar to himself whether the office be elective or appointive.

Ferdinand Topacio versus Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan Gregory Santos Ong G. R. No. 179895 December 18, 2008

In the instance in which the Petition for Quo Warranto is filed by an individual in his own name, he must be able to prove that he is entitled to the controverted public office, position, or franchise; otherwise, the holder of the same has a right to the undisturbed possession thereof. In actions for Quo Warranto to determine title to a public office, the complaint, to be sufficient in form, must show that the plaintiff is entitled to the office. In Garcia v. Perez, this Court ruled that the person instituting Quo Warranto proceedings on his own behalf, under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, must aver and be able to show that he is entitled to the office in dispute. Without such averment or evidence of such right, the action may be dismissed at any stage.

Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company vs National

A franchise is a property right and cannot be revoked or forfeited without due process of law.

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Telecommunications and Cellcom, Inc G. R. No. 88404 October 18, 1990

The determination of the right to the exercise of a franchise, or whether the right to enjoy such privilege has been forfeited by non-user, is more properly the subject of the prerogative writ of quo warranto, the right to assert which, as a rule, belongs to the State "upon complaint or otherwise" the reason being that the abuse of a franchise is a public wrong and not a private injury. A forfeiture of a franchise will have to be declared in a direct proceeding for the purpose brought by the State because a franchise is granted by law and its unlawful exercise is primarily a concern of Government.

MADRIGAL VS LECAROZ G. R. No. 46218 October 23, 1990

The unbending jurisprudence in this jurisdiction is to the effect that a petition for quo warranto and mandamus affecting titles to public office must be filed within one (1) year from the date the petitioner is ousted from his position. We find this provision to be an expression of policy on the part of the State that persons claiming a right to an office of which they are illegally dispossessed should immediately take steps to recover said office and that if they do not do so within a period of one year, they shall be considered as having lost their right thereto by abandonment. There are weighty reasons of public policy and convenience that demand the adoption of a similar period for persons claiming rights to positions in the civil service. There must be stability in the service so that public business may (sic) be unduly retarded; delays in the statement of the right to positions in the service must be discouraged.

UNABIA VS CITY MAYOR G. R. No. 8759 May 25, 1956

In view of the period of one year within which actions for quo warranto may be instituted, any person claiming right to a position in the civil service should also be required to file his petition for reinstatement within the period of one year otherwise he is thereby considered as having abandoned his office.

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CRISTOBAL VS. MELCHOR G. R. No. 43203 July 29, 1977

'The pendency of administrative remedies does not operate to suspend the period of one year within which a petition for quo warranto should be filed. While it may be desirable that administrative remedies be first resorted to, no one is compelled or bound to do so, and as said remedies neither are pre-requisite to nor bar the institution of quo warranto proceedings, they should not be allowed to suspend the period of one year. Public interest requires that the right to a public office should be determined as speedily as practicable'

FORTUNO VS. PALMA G. R. No. 70203 December 18, 1987

In quo warranto proceedings instituted for the sole purpose of questioning the legality of the election of the directors of a corporation . . . preliminary injunction does not lie to prevent said directors and officers from discharging their offices and to restore the former directors, and the issuance thereof constitute an excess of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion.

CAESAR VS. GARRIDO G.R. No. 30705 March 25, 1929

A proceeding in the nature of quo warranto, to try the question of the eligibility of a candidate for office, can only be instituted against one who has been proclaimed as elected to the disputed office.

LUISON VS. GARCIA G.R. No. L-10981 April 25, 19581

A candidate who files a protest against one who has been proclaimed as having received the highest number of votes basing his protest merely on the ground of his ineligibility to hold office, cannot disguise his action so as to make his protest a justification to be seated in office. In other words, he cannot convert an action for quo warranto into an election protest. This is because these two cases are fundamentally different in nature and in purpose. In quo warranto, "there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, and the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate," while in a protest, "the question is as to who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots"

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GAERLAN VS. CATUBIG G. R. No. 23964 June 1, 1966

Distinction should be drawn between quo warranto referring to an office filed by election and quo warranto involving an office held by appointment. In the first case, what is to be determined is the eligibility of the candidate elect, while in the second case, what is determined is the legality of the appointment. In quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filed by election, when the person elected is ineligible, the court cannot declare that the candidate occupying the second place had been elected, even if he were eligible, since the law only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes, and has presented his certificate of candidacy. In quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filed by appointment, the court determines who had been legally appointed and can and ought to declare who is entitled to occupy the office.

TEODORO M. CASTRO vs AMADO DEL CASTILLO as Commissioner of Civil Service G. R. No. L-17915 January 31, 1967

The action of quo warranto involving right to an office, must be instituted within the period of one year. This provision is an expression of policy on the part of the State that persons claiming a right to an office of which they are illegally dispossessed should immediately take steps to recover said office and that if they do not do so within a period of one year, they shall be considered as having lost their right thereto by abandonment.

PEDRO T. ACOSTA vs DAVID FLOR G.R. No. 2122 September 13, 1905

A private person can not maintain an action for the removal of a public officer unless he alleges that he is entitled to the same office. When such an allegation is made but not proven, the court is justified in dismissing the case without inquiring into the right of the defendant to retain the office.

DR. NENITA PALMA-FERNANDEZ vs DR. ADRIANO DE LA PAZ, DR. SOSEPATRO AGUILA, and THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH G.R. No. 78946 April 15, 1988

An action for quo warranto must be filed within one year after the cause of action accrues (Sec. 16, Rule 66, Rules of Court), and the pendency of administrative remedies does not operate to suspend the running of the one-year period.

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JESUS GALANO, ET. AL. vs NEMESIO ROXAS, Mayor of San Mateo, Rizal G.R. No. L-31241 September 12, 1975

A petition for quo warranto and mandamus affecting titles of office must be filed within one (1) year from the date the petitioner is ousted from his position. This period is not interrupted by the prosecution of any administrative remedy. Accordingly, after said period had lapsed the remedy of the aggrieved party, if any lies exclusively with administrative authorities. While it may be desirable that administrative remedies be first resorted to, no one is compelled or bound to do so; and as said remedies neither are prerequisite to nor bar the institution of quo warranto proceedings, it follows that he who claims the right to hold a public office allegedly usurped by another and who desires to seek redress in the courts, should file the proper judicial action within the reglementary period. Public interest requires that the right to public office should be determined as speedily as practicable.

RULE 67: EXPROPRIATION

Charles River Bridge vs. Warren Bridge 11 Pet. 420, 641, U.S. 1837

The Court held that the state had not entered a contract that prohibited the construction of another bridge on the river at a later date. The legislature neither gave exclusive control over the waters of the river nor invaded corporate privilege by interfering with the company's profit-making ability. In balancing the rights of private property against the need for economic development, the Court found that the community interest in creating new channels of travel and trade had priority and it was enhanced by opening a second bridge. The Court acknowledged that only Congress had the power to regulate interstate commerce, but the states possessed a police power, entitling them to enact regulatory laws for the public benefit.

BARDILLON vs BARANGAY MASILI OF CALAMBA, LAGUNA G.R. No. 146886 April 30, 2003

An expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the exercise by the government of its authority

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and right to take property for public use. As such, it is incapable of pecuniary estimation and should be filed with the regional trial courts.

DE LA PAZ MASIKIP vs THE CITY OF PASIG G.R. No. 136349 January 23, 2006

The motion to dismiss contemplated in the above Rule clearly constitutes the responsive pleading which takes the place of an answer to the complaint for expropriation. Such motion is the pleading that puts in issue the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the defendant's property for the use specified in the complaint. All that the law requires is that a copy of the said motion be served on plaintiff's attorney of record. It is the court that at its convenience will set the case for trial after the filing of the said pleading.

THE CITY OF MANILA vs CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, ET AL. G. R. No. L-14355 October 31, 1919

The right of expropriation is not inherent power in a municipal corporation and before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it. A municipal corporation in this jurisdiction cannot expropriate public property. The land to be expropriated must be private, and the purpose of the expropriation must be public. If the court. upon trial, finds that neither of said condition exists, or that either one of them fails, the right to expropriate does not exist. If the property is taken in the ostensible behalf of a public improvement which it can never by any possibility serve, it is being taken for a use not public, and the owner's constitutional rights call for protection by the courts.

J. M. TUAZON & CO., INC. vs THE LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION, G.R. No. L-21064 June 30, 1970

The conclusion that inevitably was called for is worded thus: "It is, therefore, imperative that we declare, as we now do, that Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3453 which prohibits the filing of an ejectment proceeding, or the continuance of one that has already been commenced, even in the absence of expropriation proceedings offends our Constitution and, hence, is unenforceable."

MUNICIPALITY OF BIAN vs HON. JOSE MAR GARCIA

There are two (2) stages in every action of expropriation. The first is concerned with the

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G.R. No. 69260 December 22, 1989 determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint." An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter, as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, "no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard." The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. Obviously, one or another of the parties may believe the order to be erroneous in its appreciation of the evidence or findings of fact or otherwise. Obviously, too, such a dissatisfied party may seek reversal of the order by taking an appeal therefrom.

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY vs. HEIRS OF ISIDRO GUIVELONDO G.R. No. 154411 June 19, 2003

The outcome of the first phase of expropriation proceedings, which is either an order of expropriation or an order of dismissal, is final since it finally disposes of the case. On the other hand, the second phase ends with an order fixing the amount of just compensation. Both orders, being final, are appealable. An order of

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condemnation or dismissal is final, resolving the question of whether or not the plaintiff has properly and legally exercised its power of eminent domain. Once the first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the authority to expropriate and its public use can no longer be questioned.

CITY OF ILOILO vs HON. LOLITA CONTRERAS-BESANA, G.R. No. 168967 February 12, 2010

When the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. Even under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Procedure, under which the complaint for expropriation was filed, just compensation is to be determined "as of the date of the filing of the complaint." Here, there is no reason to depart from the general rule that the point of reference for assessing the value of the Subject Property is the time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation.

APO FRUITS CORPORATION vs THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 164195 February 6, 2007

But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation" and in the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation.

THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY vs. ROMANA VELASQUEZ, MELECIO ALLAREY and DEOGRACIAS MALIGALIG G.R. No. L-10278 November 23, 1915

The Supreme Court may substitute its own estimate of value as gathered from the record submitted to it, in cases where the only error of the commissioners is that they have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them; or that they have disregarded a clear preponderance of the evidence; or that they have used an improper rule of assessment in arriving at the amount of the award; provided always that

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the evidence be clear and convincing and the amount allowed by the commissioners i