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1 Surveillance, prevention and control of infectious disease and trauma in South Australia A thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Philosophy (Applied Epidemiology) of The Australian National University Bernadette Kenny February 2019 Communicable Disease Control Branch / Prevention and Population Health Branch, Department for Health and Wellbeing, SA Health, Government of South Australia Field Supervisors: NCEPH Academic Supervisor: Dr Megge Miller Dr Tambri Housen Ms Helen Thomas © Copyright by Bernadette Kenny, 2019 All Rights Reserved

Surveillance, prevention and control of infectious disease ... · (ARM). My role was to assist health services serving the refugee Rohingya population in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh

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  • 1

    Surveillance, prevention and control of infectious disease and trauma in South

    Australia

    A thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Philosophy (Applied Epidemiology) of The Australian National University

    Bernadette Kenny

    February 2019

    Communicable Disease Control Branch / Prevention and Population Health Branch, Department for Health and Wellbeing, SA Health, Government of South Australia

    Field Supervisors: NCEPH Academic Supervisor: Dr Megge Miller Dr Tambri Housen Ms Helen Thomas

    © Copyright by Bernadette Kenny, 2019 All Rights Reserved

  • 2

    Originality statement

  • 3

    “Epidemiology is in large part a collection of methods for finding things

    out on the basis of scant evidence, and this by its nature is difficult.”

    Alex Broadbent, University of Johannesburg philosopher commenting on epidemiology in ‘The Epi Monitor’

  • 4

    Acknowledgements

    Firstly, I would like to thank each of my field supervisors at SA Health, Dr Megge

    Miller and Ms Helen Thomas, for sharing their experience, expertise and advice. Their

    guidance and, just as important, their support has been invaluable in making the last two

    years a rewarding experience.

    Thank you to my Australian National University (ANU) academic supervisor, Dr

    Tambri Housen. I especially appreciated Tambri’s support during the writing of this

    bound volume and her role in securing my Global Outbreak Alert and Response

    Network (GOARN) deployment to Bangladesh.

    Thanks especially to Prevention and Population Health Branch Director, Dr Katina

    D’Onise, Communicable Disease Control Branch (CDCB) Director, Dr Louise Flood,

    and CDCB Disease Surveillance and Investigation Section (DSIS) Manager, Ms Emma

    Denehy, and my field supervisors, for allowing me the opportunity to complete the

    Master of Philosophy (Applied Epidemiology) (MAE) at SA Health and for kindly

    allowing me to be deployed with GOARN during the placement.

    Special thanks to my colleagues at SA Health; their friendship and encouragement were

    invaluable in making the last two years enjoyable. I would particularly like to thank

    Principal Statistician, Kamalesh Venugopal, Public Health Nurse, Emma Collins and

    colleagues in CDCB’s Disease Surveillance and Investigation Section whose work

    contributed greatly to my field projects. I would also like to thank DSIS Manager,

    Emma Denehy, for her ongoing support.

    Thanks to my cohort of MAE scholars who provided friendship, practical support and

    fun from the first day of the course, especially my ANU course-block housemates, Jana

    Sisnowski and Cushla Coffey, and, my colleague in Bangladesh, Julia Maguire.

    Thank you to all the ANU team working on the Master of Philosophy (Applied

    Epidemiology) (MAE) Program.

    Lastly, thank you to my partner, Dr Uwe Kopke, for his unfailing support always and, to

    my adult sons, Thomas and William, for their enthusiastic encouragement.

  • 5

    Table of Contents Originality statement ......................................................................................................... 2 Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................... 4 Chapter 1: Overview of field placement at SA Health and summary of completion of Master of Philosophy (Applied Epidemiology) course requirements .......................... 6

    Introduction .................................................................................................................. 7 Summary of completion of Master of Philosophy (Applied Epidemiology) course requirements ...................................................................................................... 8

    Field Placement Projects: ........................................................................................ 8 Additional MAE Requirements: .............................................................................. 9

  • 6

    Chapter 1: Overview of field placement at SA Health and summary of completion of Master of

    Philosophy (Applied Epidemiology) course requirements

  • 7

    Introduction My Master of Philosophy (Applied Epidemiology) (MAE) field placement was within

    both the Communicable Disease Control Branch (CDCB) and the Prevention and

    Population Health Branch (PPH) of the Department for Health and Wellbeing,

    SA Health, Government of South Australia (SA).

    CDCB is responsible for implementing the South Australian Public Health Act 2011

    with the aim of reducing the communicable disease burden within SA. CDCB develops

    and implements policies, best practice guidelines and information and, performs public

    health interventions including notifiable infectious disease surveillance, response to

    disease outbreaks and, implementation of national and SA immunisation programs. The

    branch consists of the following six units which report to the Branch Director:

    • Specialist Services (Medical Specialists and SA Rheumatic Heart Disease Program)

    • Disease Surveillance and Investigation Section (DSIS)

    • Immunisation Section

    • Sexually Transmissible Infection & Blood Borne Virus Section

    • Infection Control Service

    • Data and Corporate Services

    Prior to commencing the MAE program, I was working as a Public Health Nurse within

    CDCB DSIS and, during my field placement, I continued to work casually as a Public

    Health Nurse covering on-call shifts on evenings and weekends; the on-call work

    involved interview and follow-up of cases of notifiable infectious diseases such as

    invasive meningococcal disease, for which urgent public health action aimed at

    preventing further cases is required. As a MAE scholar within CDCB, I participated in

    the routine work of DSIS including performing the weekly epidemiological review of

    the notification data and presenting a PowerPoint summary of the review to DSIS and

    CDCB Medical staff at the weekly epidemiological review meeting.

    The Prevention and Population Health Branch monitors, analyses, reports and makes

    recommendations on disease, illness, abnormality, injury and related risk-factor

    information in SA. The core functions of the Prevention and Population Health Branch

  • 8

    are mandated under the SA Health Care Act, 2008 and the South Australian Public

    Health Act, 2011.

    At the commencement of my MAE placement, the Prevention and Population Health

    Branch consisted of the following four functional units, all of which report to the

    Branch Director:

    • SA Cancer Registry (SACR)

    • Pregnancy Outcomes (Statistics) Unit (POU)

    • Strategic Evaluation and Reporting Unit (SERU)

    • Health Statistics Unit (HSU)

    Epidemiologists and scholars within the Epidemiology Branch are encouraged to attend

    the Epidemiology Branch monthly Journal Club and to take turns in presenting journal

    articles and leading the discussion. Consequently, I had the opportunity to lead the

    discussion of an article which assessed the effectiveness of a community treatment

    program on the prevalence and infection intensity of lymphatic filariasis and soil

    transmitted helminth infections.

    In March 2018 I was deployed with the World Health Organization Global Outbreak

    Alert and Response Network (GOARN) via the Australian Response MAE Network

    (ARM). My role was to assist health services serving the refugee Rohingya population

    in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh with infection prevention and control. This was a rewarding

    experience on many levels including witnessing ‘Field Epidemiology Training

    Program’ graduates from around the world working collaboratively together.

    Summary of completion of Master of Philosophy (Applied Epidemiology) course requirements Field Placement Projects: Analyse a public health data set

    To generate the first state-wide descriptive South Australian Trauma Registry (SATR)

    Annual Report, I analysed data for trauma events managed, and recorded in the SATR

    by the three South Australian Major Trauma Service hospitals between 1 July 2011 and

    30 June 2016 (Chapter 4). Analysis of a public health dataset was also a component of

    my three other completed field projects (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3).

  • 9

    Investigate an acute public health problem or threat

    I was the Lead Investigator for a protracted outbreak of Salmonella Hessarek infection

    in South Australia from March 2017 to July 2018 (Chapter 2). I was also the Lead

    Investigator for the investigation into a cluster of seven cases of Salmonella

    Typhimurium phage-type 9 associated with a hotel in South Australia in January 2018

    and, I participated in other CDCB DSIS outbreak investigations, for example,

    I interviewed persons designated as ‘controls’ in a case-control study for an outbreak of

    Salmonella Havana in SA in April 2018. In April 2017, I was the Lead Investigator for

    an investigation into a cluster of three cases of invasive meningococcal disease,

    serotype W, in residents of a remote Aboriginal community in the far North of SA. The

    three cases were part of a multistate outbreak of meningococcal serotype W infection in

    central Australia with most cases occurring in Northern Territory residents. Whilst no

    further cases occurred in South Australia, my role as Lead Investigator facilitated

    experience in communication with colleagues in other Australian jurisdictions and

    multiple organisations participating in a targeted vaccination campaign.

    Design and conduct an epidemiological study

    I conducted a descriptive epidemiological study of SA notifications of Shiga toxin-

    producing Escherichia coli infection between 1 February 2017 and 30 June 2018

    (Chapter 3).

    Evaluate or establish a surveillance or other health information system

    I evaluated the SA surveillance system for Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli

    infection, from June 2016 to December 2018 (Chapter 3).

    Additional MAE Requirements: Critical review of the scientific literature

    A literature review was completed for each of the field projects listed above (Chapter 2,

    Chapter 3 and Chapter 4).

  • 10

    An abstract and oral presentation at a national or international scientific conference

    I presented a summary of the SA Salmonella Hessarek investigation at the 9th Southeast

    Asia & Western Pacific Bi-regional Training Programs in Epidemiology and Public

    Health Interventions Network (TEPHINET) Scientific Conference, 5-9 November 2018.

    Kenny B, Miller MJ, Housen T. A protracted outbreak of Salmonella Hessarek

    infection associated with one brand of eggs, South Australia, March 2017- July

    2018 presented at the 9th Southeast Asia & Western Pacific Bi-regional Training

    Programs in Epidemiology and Public Health Interventions Network

    (TEPHINET) Scientific Conference, Vientiane, Laos; 5-9 November 2018.

    (Chapter 2)

    Preparation of an advanced draft of a paper for publication in a national or international peer reviewed journal

    I have published an article summarising the SA S. Hessarek investigation in the peer-

    reviewed scientific journal, ‘Communicable Diseases Intelligence’ (CDI).

    Kenny B, Miller MJ, McEvoy V, Centofanti A, Stevens CP, Housen T. A

    protracted outbreak of Salmonella Hessarek infection associated with one brand of

    eggs, South Australia, March 2017 - July 2018. Commun Dis Intell (CDI)

    [Internet]. 2019 May [cited 15 May 2019];43:1-9.

    Available at https://doi.org/10.33321/cdi.2019.43.22 (Chapter 2)

    In partnership with other MAE scholars and graduates, I published an article reflecting

    our experience during deployment to Bangladesh with GOARN in Global Biosecurity.

    Alam N, Kenny B, Maguire JE, McEwen S, Sheel M, Tolosa MX. Field

    epidemiology in action: an Australian perspective of epidemic response to the

    Rohingya health emergencies in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. Global Biosecurity

    [Internet]. 2019 Feb [cited 14 February 2019];1(1):119–122.

    DOI: http://doi.org/10.31646/gbio.14

    A report for a non-scientific audience

    Whilst deployed to the World Health Organization in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh,

    I prepared and presented a PowerPoint presentation about infection prevention and

  • 11

    control measures for Cholera for non-clinical staff at two health services servicing the

    Rohingya refugee population.

    Kenny B. Infection Prevention and Control (IPC) at Oral Rehydration Points

    (ORPs) presented to clinical and non-clinical staff from two proposed Oral

    Rehydration Points for acute watery diarrhoea, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh; 6 May

    2018. (Chapter 5)

    Teaching including Lessons from the Field (LFF)

    I conducted a ‘lessons from the field’ education session on performing risk assessment

    during outbreak investigations for my MAE peers, taught in two course-block education

    sessions for first-year MAE scholars, prepared and taught infection prevention and

    control education sessions for clinical and non-clinical Health Service staff in Cox’s

    Bazar, Bangladesh and participated in a panel presentation and discussion session for

    the Master of Public Health course, ‘Global Public Health’, at the University of

    Adelaide.

    Kenny B. Lessons from the field 6: Rapid risk assessment in outbreak

    investigation; conducted via teleconference, 20 March 2018 (Chapter 5).

    Kenny B, Willis G. Public health surveillance workshop; presented at MAE

    course-block, 1 March 2018 (Chapter 5).

    Willis G, Kenny B, Strobel N, Jones R. Writing tips; presented at MAE course-

    block, 9 March 2018 (Chapter 5).

    Kenny B. Infection Prevention and Control (IPC) at Oral Rehydration Points

    (ORPs); presented to clinical and non-clinical staff from two proposed Oral

    Rehydration Points for acute watery diarrhoea, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 6 May

    2018 (Chapter 5).

    Kenny B, Hornsey E. Infection Prevention and Control for Healthcare Workers;

    presented to clinical staff from five Health Services, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh,

    7 May 2018 (Chapter 5).

    Panel presentation and discussion for the Master of Public Health course, ‘Global

    Public Health’, at the University of Adelaide, 9 July 2018.

  • 12

    MAE Course blocks

    I completed the following five required course-blocks at ANU in 2017 and 2018:

    • POPH8917 Public Health Surveillance

    • POPH8915 Outbreak Investigation

    • POPH8913 Analysis of Public Health Data

    • POPH8916 Research Design and Methods

    • POPH8914 Issues in Applied Epidemiology

  • 13

    Chapter 2: An investigation into a protracted outbreak of Salmonella Hessarek

    infection, South Australia, March 2017 to July 2018

  • 14

    Table of Contents Chapter 2: An investigation into a protracted outbreak of Salmonella Hessarek infection, South Australia, March 2017 to July 2018 ..................................................... 13

    List of Figures ............................................................................................................ 14

    List of Tables .............................................................................................................. 14

    Prologue ...................................................................................................................... 15

    My role................................................................................................................... 15

    Lessons learned ...................................................................................................... 16

    Impact of the work ................................................................................................. 18

    Acknowledgements................................................................................................ 19

    Master of Philosophy (Applied Epidemiology) core activity requirements .......... 20

    Scope of this chapter .............................................................................................. 20

    CDI article: A protracted outbreak of Salmonella Hessarek infection associated with one brand of eggs - South Australia, March 2017- July 2018 ............................ 21

    Abstract .................................................................................................................. 21

    Introduction............................................................................................................ 22

    Methods ................................................................................................................. 23

    Results ................................................................................................................... 24

    Discussion .............................................................................................................. 27

    Appendix 2.1: OzFoodNet Salmonella Hypothesis Generating Questionnaire ......... 31

    Appendix 2.2: South Australian CDCB ‘Outbreak Meeting - Risk Assessment’ template ...................................................................................................................... 40

    Appendix 2.3: PowerPoint presentation for the 9th Southeast Asia & Western Pacific Bi-regional Training Programs in Epidemiology and Public Health Interventions Network (TEPHINET) Scientific Conference, Vientiane, Laos, 7 Nov 2018. ................................................................................................................... 45

    References .................................................................................................................. 49

    Chapter 3 ......................................................................................................................... 52

    List of Figures Figure 1: Notifications of Salmonella Hessarek infection by month of illness onset, 1 Jan 2012 to 3 July 2018 ................................................................................................ 25

    List of Tables Table 1: Food items consumed by cases of S. Hessarek infection, South Australia, 1 March 2017 to 3 July 2018 .......................................................................................... 26

  • 15

    Prologue My role For a protracted outbreak of Salmonella Hessarek infection in South Australia,

    I reviewed all original laboratory and medical notifications, identified the increase in

    S Hessarek notifications occurring in March 2017, initiated the investigation into the

    increase in notifications and, was the Lead Investigator for the epidemiological

    investigation.

    During the investigation, I conducted a literature search, reviewed the South Australian

    (SA) Communicable Disease Control Branch’s (CDCB’s) records of previous

    S. Hessarek cluster investigations, conducted hypothesis generating telephone

    interviews of cases using the OzFoodNet Salmonella Hypothesis Generating

    Questionnaire (Appendix 2.1), recorded the information obtained via the questionnaires

    in a food-frequency Microsoft Excel spreadsheet and performed the epidemiological

    analysis for the investigation. My role as Lead Investigator included documentation of

    the outbreak and the investigation; specifically, I initiated and maintained the CDCB

    Notifiable Infectious Diseases Surveillance (NIDS) database system investigation

    record and a time-line summary of the investigation and saved all related

    correspondence to CDCB’s secure, on-line episode folder for this investigation.

    I also coordinated and chaired the outbreak investigation meetings between personnel

    from CDCB, the SA Health Food and Controlled Drugs Branch (FCDB), the

    Department of Primary Industries and Regions SA Biosecurity SA division (PIRSA)

    and, on one occasion, the SA Health Chief Public Health Officer. For these meetings,

    I prepared ‘Outbreak Meeting - Risk Assessment’ documents (Please see Appendix 2.2

    and Chapter 5 Appendix 5.1 ‘Lessons from the field: Rapid Risk Assessment’) which

    summarised the epidemiological data, outbreak status (monitor, escalate or stand-

    down), overall risk assessment (consequences of the outbreak and likelihood of the

    consequences occurring) and completed and planned investigation action items for each

    outbreak meeting and, prepared and distributed formal Situation Reports which

    communicated the status of the outbreak and the investigation to the SA Health Chief

    Public Health Officer and CDCB, FCDB and PIRSA personnel.

  • 16

    My role also included liaison with the CDCB OzFoodNet Senior Epidemiologist to

    periodically obtain Australian national data for S. Hessarek notifications, discuss

    whether OzFoodNet epidemiologists in other Australian states and territories were

    willing to interview cases of S. Hessarek in their jurisdictions and, discuss the

    possibility of conducting whole genome sequencing (WGS) of human and egg

    S. Hessarek isolates in SA for the period during and prior to the investigation.

    Additionally, I attended meetings of CDCB, OzFoodNet, SA Pathology (including the

    Australian Salmonella Reference Centre (ASRC)) and South Australian Health and

    Medical Research Institute (SAHMRI) personnel to discuss options and current

    limitations for WGS testing of SA S. Hessarek isolates.

    In addition to preparing ‘Outbreak Meeting - Risk Assessment’ documents and

    Situation Reports, I reported the epidemiology of the outbreak and progress of the

    investigation to CDCB personnel both verbally at CDCB daily morning meetings and

    periodically via PowerPoint presentations at CDCB’s weekly epidemiological review

    meetings. I submitted an abstract to the 9th Southeast Asia & Western Pacific

    Bi-regional Training Programs in Epidemiology and Public Health Interventions

    Network (TEPHINET) Scientific Conference; the abstract was accepted for an oral

    presentation, and I presented a summary of the investigation (Appendix 2.3) at the

    conference on 7 November 2018. Finally, I was the primary author of an article

    summarising the outbreak and investigation which was published in ‘Communicable

    Diseases Intelligence’ (CDI) in May 2019.1

    Lessons learned • Investigation of outbreaks of disease which include only small numbers of cases are

    worthwhile as they can be productive in determining risks to public health and

    opportunities for public health action.

    • In addition to conducting a literature search, review of the information from

    previously conducted, unpublished local investigations, which may or may not have

    identified sources of previous outbreaks, can cumulatively assist exposure

    assessment in subsequent outbreak investigations.

    • The availability of well-researched and well-tested ready-to-use questionnaires such

    as the OzFoodNet Salmonella Hypothesis Generating Questionnaire, prior to the

    commencement of an investigation, can facilitate timely collection of high-quality

  • 17

    data when conducting investigations into diseases where the epidemiology is

    established.

    • Ideally, when investigating outbreaks of foodborne disease, an analytical study

    such as a case-control study is conducted to obtain information on exposure to

    suspected source food items for both affected persons and a comparison group of

    persons who were not unwell; the results of such a study may or may not

    statistically support the investigation hypothesis about the source of the

    outbreak. However, it is not always feasible to conduct a timely and informative

    analytical study for outbreaks which include only small numbers of cases and

    thus, the level of evidence might rely on descriptive epidemiological evidence

    and laboratory evidence only.

    • In addition to the immediate outbreak investigation team which, for this

    investigation, included CDCB, FCDB and PIRSA, many other organisations,

    such as OzFoodNet, other Australian state and territory communicable disease

    units and SAHMRI, can contribute to an investigation by providing information

    and/or practical assistance.

    • Individual members of outbreak investigation teams may reach differing

    conclusions regarding the public health risks and the nature and urgency of

    outbreak control actions which are deemed necessary at various stages of the

    investigation; differing perspectives result from numerous factors including the

    differing roles of the outbreak team members and, the relevant legislation and

    priorities for their particular units and organisations.

    • Formal communication tools, such as the CDCB ‘Outbreak Meeting - Risk

    Assessment’ template (Please see Appendix 2.2 and Chapter 5 Appendix 5.1

    ‘Lessons from the field: Rapid Risk Assessment’) and the associated ‘Incident

    Response Protocol’ can assist outbreak investigation teams by providing a

    formal process for managing the investigation ensuring shared:

    o comprehensive documentation of known and missing hazard, exposure and

    context outbreak assessment information, required for assessing the overall

    level of risk (consequences and likelihood of the consequences occurring)

    associated with the outbreak;

    o risk-assessment and assessment of the current outbreak status (monitor,

    escalate or stand-down) by all involved in the investigation;

  • 18

    o documentation of completed and planned investigation actions;

    o documentation of the formal communications, such as Situation Reports, to

    occur following each outbreak investigation meeting and, the date or

    circumstances that will trigger the next outbreak meeting.

    • It is important for the outbreak investigation team collectively to have a good

    understanding of the circumstances in which the outbreak is occurring and the

    circumstances in which outbreak control activities will occur; these circumstances

    include, for example, the industry production and supply processes pertaining to

    contaminated food items and any legislation or standards which may influence

    outbreak control activity, such as, the Primary Production and Processing Standard

    for Eggs and Egg Products (Standard 4.2.5) of the Australian Food Standards

    Code.

    • There is not always a quick and easy way to eliminate sources of outbreaks in the

    short-term; human health risks may need to be considered in, for example, the

    context of long-term, industry-wide management of the factors posing risk of

    disease.

    Impact of the work This investigation:

    • Identified a protracted source of salmonellosis in humans; the implicated egg brand

    was found to be the cause of illnesses occurring in SA during a period of

    17 months, 1 March 2017 to 3 July 2018, and there is suggestive evidence that the

    particular egg brand may be the source of SA cases of Salmonella Hessarek

    occurring over a four year period, since 2014.

    • Raises questions about whether the risk of contamination of eggs with Salmonella

    in Australia has changed since the risk assessment conducted and considered during

    development of the Primary Production and Processing (PPP) Standard for Eggs

    and Egg Products (Standard 4.2.5) of the Australian Food Standards Code

    (gazetted in 2011). Isolation of Salmonella Hessarek in the contents of the

    implicated egg brand but not in the whole egg rinse samples, both during this

    investigation and during a SA retail food survey in 2014, challenge the premise

    that, in Australia, Salmonella contamination in eggs occurs via dirty or cracked

    eggs, a premise which was a component of the risk assessment for Standard 4.2.5.

  • 19

    • Triggered a research study “Understanding the behaviour of Salmonella

    Typhimurium and Salmonella Hessarek; their ability to penetrate egg shells and

    their growth in eggs stored at different temperatures” which is being conducted by

    the University of Adelaide in conjunction with SA Health.

    • Triggered a proposed WGS study of Salmonella Hessarek isolates from 2010 to

    2018; the SAHMRI is proposing to undertake this study in partnership with CDCB

    and SA Pathology.

    • Contributed to the Global Literature on Salmonella Hessarek which, prior to this

    investigation, included only one published report of a S. Hessarek outbreak in

    humans.4

    Acknowledgements I wish to acknowledge and thank:

    • OzFoodNet Senior Epidemiologist, Dr Megge Miller and, the Manager and staff of

    CDCB’s Disease Surveillance and Investigation Section (DSIS).

    • The staff of FCDB and the staff of PIRSA.

    • Dr Lex Leong (SAHMRI) .

    • Helen Hocking (ASRC) and, Dr Rod Ratcliff (former, SA Pathology).

    • The staff of the Food and Environmental Laboratory (SA Pathology).

    • The Australian OzFoodNet epidemiologists in Victoria and New South Wales.

    • SA Health Chief Public Health Officer, Dr Paddy Phillips, and CDCB Director, Dr

    Louise Flood.

    • Dr Tambri Housen, Australian National University.

  • 20

    Master of Philosophy (Applied Epidemiology) core activity requirements This chapter is written in fulfilment of the field placement core activity requirements:

    • Investigation of an acute public health problem.

    • An abstract and oral presentation of a project presented at a national or international

    scientific conference (Appendix 2.3).

    • Preparation of an advanced draft of a paper for publication in a national or

    international peer reviewed journal.

    Scope of this chapter This chapter describes a South Australian outbreak of Salmonella Hessarek and the

    subsequent epidemiological investigation into the cause of the outbreak by reproducing

    an article published by the peer-reviewed scientific journal, ‘Communicable Diseases

    Intelligence’.1

  • 21

    CDI article: A protracted outbreak of Salmonella Hessarek infection associated with one brand of eggs - South Australia, March 2017- July 2018 Authors

    B Kenny,1 MJ Miller, 1, 2 V McEvoy,3 A Centofanti, 3 CP Stevens, 3 T Housen.4

    1. Communicable Disease Control Branch, Department for Health and Wellbeing,

    SA Health, Government of South Australia.

    2. OzFoodNet

    3. Food and Controlled Drugs Branch, Department for Health and Wellbeing,

    SA Health, Government of South Australia.

    4. National Centre for Epidemiology and Population Health, Research School of

    Population Health, Australian National University.

    Abstract Salmonella Hessarek is an uncommon serovar in Australia. We report on the

    investigation of a protracted outbreak of 25 cases of S. Hessarek gastroenteritis in which

    cases were defined as any laboratory confirmed case of Salmonella Hessarek notified to

    the South Australian Communicable Disease Control Branch from 1st March 2017 to 3

    July 2018. We conducted a descriptive case series investigation interviewing all cases

    and 17 (68%) reported consuming brand X free-range eggs. Four samples of one-dozen

    brand X eggs were cultured for the presence of Salmonella spp. One out of the four

    samples returned positive for S. Hessarek in the contents of the eggs; Salmonella was

    not present in any of the whole egg rinses of the four samples. The high proportion of

    cases reporting the consumption of brand X free-range eggs and the isolation of S.

    Hessarek from sampling four dozen brand X eggs is an unusually strong signal

    implicating brand X eggs as the source of this outbreak. From a public health

    perspective, it is important to understand the behaviour of S. Hessarek including its

    ability to be present in the content of eggs and further research is recommended. The

    findings in this investigation into a rare Salmonella serovar highlight the need for

    continuous monitoring of the epidemiology of Salmonella in Australia including the

    epidemiology of egg-associated Salmonella outbreaks of human disease.

  • 22

    Key words Salmonella, Hessarek, gastroenteritis, foodborne disease, eggs

    Introduction Salmonella Hessarek is an uncommon serovar in Australia. From 1 January 2012 to

    31 December 2016, there were 96 notifications of S. Hessarek nationally, (the National

    Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System Salmonella public dataset does not include

    Salmonella notified in the Australian Capital Territory), representing 0.1% of Australian

    Salmonella notifications for the five-year period.2 Of the 96 notifications, 52 (54%)

    were for residents of South Australia, a state in which 7% of the Australian population

    resides. For the five-year period, the rate of S. Hessarek notifications in South

    Australians was more than seven times higher than the rate for Australians overall; 3.1

    compared to 0.4 notifications per 100,000 persons.3 Globally, there is one published

    report of a S. Hessarek outbreak in humans; in 2005, five cases notified within the

    Australian Capital Territory were sourced to free range eggs served at a restaurant.4

    S. Hessarek was originally isolated from a Common Raven (Corvus corax) in Iran in

    19535 and has subsequently been detected in outbreaks of septicaemic salmonellosis in

    wild birds (Song Thrushes and European Starlings)6,7,8 and, in European mammals

    (lynx9, red foxes10 and free-range pigs11), possibly transmitted through ingestion of

    infected birds.6

    The South Australian (SA) Communicable Disease Control Branch (CDCB) observed

    an increase in S. Hessarek notifications beginning around mid-2014. Between

    November 2016 and February 2017, two to six S. Hessarek cases per month (Figure 1)

    amongst a total of 136 Salmonella notifications per month were being monitored. On 21

    March 2017, the CDCB became aware of five cases of S. Hessarek notified in the three

    weeks since 1 March 2017. This was more than the expected 0.8 S. Hessarek

    notifications in March, based on data for the years 2012 to 2016. An investigation

    commenced to identify any common cause of illness for which appropriate public health

    action could be implemented to prevent further cases.

  • 23

    Methods Epidemiological investigation

    A retrospective review of previous S. Hessarek cluster investigations in SA was

    undertaken. We extracted outbreak records from 1 January 2001 to 21 March 2017 from

    the SA OzFoodNet Outbreak Register and the SA Notifiable Infectious Disease

    Surveillance System, identified investigations of S. Hessarek and, reviewed the

    investigation summaries to look for potential sources of the pathogen.

    A case-series investigation was conducted to generate hypotheses about the source of

    S. Hessarek infection in cases notified in SA since 1 March 2017. We interviewed all

    persons notified with S. Hessarek infection between 1 March 2017 and 3 July 2018

    using the national OzFoodNet Salmonella Hypothesis Generating Questionnaire. The

    data collected via the questionnaire include demographic details, clinical information

    including date of illness onset and symptoms experienced, information regarding any

    contact with persons with gastroenteritis in the seven days prior to onset of illness,

    travel history, environmental exposures such as animal contact and consumption of

    untreated water, food items eaten outside of the home, a seven day open-ended food

    history and specific questions regarding poultry and egg consumption.

    Questionnaire responses relating to egg consumption, including brands of eggs

    consumed, were compared with data from 20 other SA community Salmonella clusters

    which were investigated using the same Salmonella Hypothesis Generating

    Questionnaire between 1 March 2017 and 3 July 2018. This comparison was intended to

    identify whether the pattern of consumption of particular egg brands reported during the

    S. Hessarek investigation was similar to the pattern of consumption of particular egg

    brands reported in SA in general. A case-control study was not conducted as we initially

    anticipated that there would be insufficient cases to generate a meaningful result and,

    later in the investigation, there was deemed to be sufficient epidemiological and

    laboratory evidence to identify the source of the outbreak without case-control study

    evidence.

    An outbreak case was defined as any laboratory confirmed case of Salmonella Hessarek

    notified to the South Australian Communicable Disease Control Branch from 1st March

    2017 to 3 July 2018. All S. Hessarek notifications were confirmed by the Australian

    Salmonella Reference Centre.

  • 24

    Data were analysed using Microsoft Excel 2010 (Microsoft USA).

    The investigation was conducted under the auspices of the SA Public Health Act, 2011

    and covered under the Australian National University Human Research Ethics

    Committee approval (2017/909). The SA Department for Health and Ageing Human

    Research Ethics Committee granted approval for publication of the findings

    (HREC/17/SAH/113).

    Environmental investigation

    Based on the responses of seven cases interviewed between 22 March and 7 April 2017,

    on 10 April 2017 the SA Health Food and Controlled Drugs Branch (FCDB) conducted

    retail sampling of brand X free-range eggs; four samples of one-dozen eggs with best

    before dates between 21 April and 12 May 2017 were collected from two retail stores

    and cultured for the presence of Salmonella spp. by the SA Pathology Food and

    Environmental Laboratory.

    Results Epidemiological investigation

    CDCB had investigated previous clusters of S. Hessarek infection in SA; in 2006 a

    cluster of nine cases of S. Hessarek was associated with raw or semi-cooked eggs, in

    2014, an investigation of eight cases found that seven cases consumed chicken and six

    consumed eggs with three cases consuming brand X free-range eggs and, in January

    2016, an investigation of six cases found that four consumed eggs, with one case

    reporting consumption of brand X eggs and another case reporting purchase of eggs of

    an unknown brand in the isolated SA region where brand X eggs are produced.

    Between 1 March 2017 and 3 July 2018, 25 cases met the case definition (Figure 1).

    The median age of cases was 49 years (age range 1-91 years) with nine cases (36%)

    aged 71 years or older. Fifteen cases were male and ten were female. Twenty-one cases

    lived in metropolitan Adelaide and four were non-metropolitan residents. Ten cases

    (40%) were hospitalised and two other cases occurred in pregnant women.

  • 25

    Figure 1: Notifications of Salmonella Hessarek infection by month of illness onset, 1 Jan 2012 to 3 July 2018

    Twenty-four of the 25 cases (96%) reported eating eggs; 23 cases (92%) consumed eggs

    at home including five cases (20%) who consumed eggs both at home and away from

    home and, one case (4%) consumed eggs away from home only. Seventeen cases (68%)

    are known to have consumed brand X free-range eggs, another brand of eggs was

    named by three cases (12%). Twenty-four cases responded to questions about food

    items other than eggs and one case declined these questions. Ten cases (42% of 24

    respondents) consumed poultry cooked at home and eight cases (33% of 24

    respondents) consumed chicken which was purchased cooked however, there were no

    chicken items with common brands or from common retail outlets. Eleven other food

    items were reported by more than 25% of cases but, with the exception of bottled water,

    no common brands or common retail outlets were identified. Three brands of bottled

    water were each named by two to four cases (8-17%). Contact with dogs, cats and/or

    dried pet food was reported by seven to ten cases (29-42%) but further detail did not

    indicate any of these exposures as a possible common source (Table 1).

    The eggs consumed were cooked in a variety of ways including; fried, boiled,

    scrambled, poached, as omelette and in Béchamel sauce. Seven cases consumed raw

    egg; in smoothies (three cases), in raw cake batter (three cases) and one case sucked raw

    eggs (Table 1).

  • 26

    Table 1: Food items consumed by cases of S. Hessarek infection, South Australia, 1 March 2017 to 3 July 2018

    * The number of cases interviewed varies as one case declined interview for all food items except eggs.

  • 27

    Environmental investigation

    One out of four samples returned positive for S. Hessarek in the contents of the eggs.

    Salmonella was not present in any of the whole egg rinses of the four egg samples.

    Additionally, FCDB identified that S. Hessarek had been isolated from the content of

    brand X brand eggs but not the whole egg rinse during a retail food survey in 2014.12

    Discussion The high proportion of cases reporting the consumption of brand X free-range eggs and

    the isolation of S. Hessarek from sampling four dozen brand X eggs is an unusually

    strong signal implicating brand X eggs as the source of this protracted S. Hessarek

    outbreak in South Australia. There is also absence of another possible source based on

    the hypothesis generating interviews.

    Brand X eggs are produced in SA and are predominantly sold in SA. A limitation of the

    epidemiological investigation is that we did not have information on the proportion of

    the SA population who usually consume brand X eggs. For reasons stated previously, a

    case-control study was not conducted and, SA lacks a food frequency consumption

    database to compare cluster investigation results with the foods that are consumed by

    healthy people in the community. Egg consumption data, obtained from case interviews

    in 20 other SA Salmonella clusters during the same time period, 1 March 2017 to 3 July

    2018, found that only 5/189 (3%) of interviewed persons and 5/125 (4%) of respondents

    reporting egg consumption, consumed brand X eggs. This suggests that the proportion

    of cases reporting consumption of brand X eggs in the S. Hessarek investigation is not

    simply a reflection of market share for brand X eggs within SA, however, it is possible

    that egg consumption patterns for persons who have not experienced Salmonella

    infection may differ from those who have and who were interviewed.

    The ongoing nature of this outbreak reflects the difficulty in controlling Salmonella

    infection in free range laying flocks. Brand X eggs are produced on a free-range farm

    and birds raised in free range production systems are potentially exposed to different

    environmental stressors than caged birds, including social stress and aggression,

    predation, or thermal challenges with stress known to be a determinant of shedding of

    Salmonella.13 Additionally, the control of rodents and other potentially infected animals

    and environments is challenging on free-range farms. Salmonella contamination of eggs

    is a complex issue affected by variables at each stage of the food production process.

  • 28

    Currently, the literature regarding the benefits of free range, barn and caged production

    processes with respect to Salmonella contamination is conflicting. However, the current

    literature does indicate that it is not yet achievable to produce eggs guaranteed to be

    Salmonella free.14

    Because Salmonella can be highly persistent in both infected birds and diverse

    environmental reservoirs, global egg safety programs include interventions at multiple

    stages of egg production and supply to the public.15 However, the specific interventions,

    such as requirements for vaccination of laying flocks against specific Salmonella

    serovars, requirements for monitoring for Salmonella on egg farms, requirements for

    egg pasteurisation or other actions when Salmonella is detected in a laying flock,

    requirements for washing of eggs, and requirements for mandatory refrigeration of eggs

    vary vastly between countries and vary with respect to which specific Salmonella

    serovars the interventions apply to (often, interventions are applicable to Salmonella

    serovars S. Enteritidis and S. Typhimurium only).15 To illustrate, egg washing with

    sanitizers is one of the most common methods of reducing eggshell contamination in

    Australia, Japan, and the USA but the technique is banned in the European Union16; the

    major advantage of egg washing is the removal of faecal debris thereby reducing the

    overall bacterial load on the eggshell surface however, the process requires strict

    control, especially of rinse water temperature and quality, to avoid adverse results

    including cracking of the shell, damage to the egg cuticle layer and egg penetration by

    Salmonella bacteria.17

    The variation in egg safety programs internationally results from variation in the

    perceived risk of contaminated eggs between countries; each country’s risk management

    / tolerance / perception being influenced by local industry, environmental, cultural and

    epidemiological factors, for example, the types of Salmonella contaminating eggs.

    Stringent egg safety programs in the USA and Europe have resulted from the prevalence

    of Salmonella Enteritidis in those countries. S. Enteritidis has a special ability to

    colonize the ovary/oviduct of laying hens for long periods and therefore to internally

    contaminate eggs, and has been the most frequent serovar associated with egg-related

    foodborne outbreaks in Europe since the mid-1980s.18 S. Enteritidis is, however, not

    endemic to Australian commercial layer flocks, a factor which was taken into account

    during the Food Standards Australia New Zealand (FSANZ) risk assessment of egg

    production and processing in Australia, a component of the development of the Primary

  • 29

    Production and Processing (PPP) Standard for Eggs and Egg Products (Standard 4.2.5),

    gazetted in May 2011.19

    In Australia, egg producers must comply with Standard 4.2.5 and under clause 11(1) an

    egg producer must not sell or supply eggs or egg pulp for human consumption if it

    knows, ought to reasonably know or to reasonably suspect, that the eggs are

    ‘unacceptable’. ‘Unacceptable egg’ is defined as; a cracked egg or a dirty egg or, ‘egg

    product’ (defined as the contents of an egg in any form) which has not been pasteurised

    or subjected to heating or other processes that provide a lethal effect on any pathogenic

    micro-organisms in the egg product or, egg product which contains a pathogenic micro-

    organism whether or not the egg product has been processed as previously described.20

    The definition of ‘unacceptable egg’ and clauses restricting the sale of such product do

    not automatically restrict the sale of whole eggs which are not known to be

    contaminated but are from a producer or farm where Salmonella has been isolated

    within whole eggs or when a farm or producer has been associated with an outbreak of

    human disease.

    An important consideration in the risk assessment on which the Primary Production and

    Processing (PPP) Standard for Eggs and Egg Products (Standard 4.2.5) of the Australian

    Food Standards Code is based is the premise that, in Australia, Salmonella

    contamination in eggs occurs via dirty or cracked eggs. Our finding of S. Hessarek in

    the content of eggs but not in the egg-shell rinse on two occasions and, our association

    of S. Hessarek contaminated eggs with cases of human salmonellosis raise questions

    regarding whether the risk of contamination of eggs with Salmonella in Australia has

    changed since Standard 4.2.5 was introduced in 2011.

    There are two pathways for eggs to become internally contaminated with Salmonella;

    direct contamination occurs during the formation of an egg in the reproductive track of

    hens (including ovary and oviduct) whereas, indirect contamination occurs after an egg

    has been laid and Salmonella contaminating the outside of the egg penetrates through

    the shell membrane.21 From a public health perspective, it is important to understand the

    behaviour of S. Hessarek including its ability to be present in the content of eggs and

    further research is recommended. It is noted that a high proportion of cases in this

    investigation were elderly or pregnant and/or consumed raw egg which suggests that S.

    Hessarek might be an opportunistic rather than highly virulent cause of Salmonella

    infection in humans.

  • 30

    To determine whether cases of S. Hessarek notified prior to March 2017 were associated

    with the source identified in this investigation, we explored the possibility of conducting

    whole genome sequencing (WGS) of human and egg S. Hessarek isolates in SA since

    2014. However, as S. Hessarek is a rare Salmonella, no S. Hessarek reference genome,

    required for the WGS analysis, is available globally. Further research incorporating

    WGS of S. Hessarek would require generation of a complete reference genome for S.

    Hessarek based on consideration of the public health benefit of WGS in understanding

    the epidemiology of this rare Salmonella serovar.

    The findings in this investigation highlight the need for continuous monitoring of the

    epidemiology of Salmonella in Australia including the epidemiology of egg-associated

    Salmonella outbreaks of human disease. Any substantial changes in the epidemiology of

    egg-associated Salmonella need to be considered in future risk assessments related to

    Salmonella in eggs and future reviews of the Primary Production and Processing

    Standard for Eggs and Egg Products (Standard 4.2.5) of the Australian Food Standards

    Code. Joint efforts from Australian national and state/territory Communicable Disease

    Control, Food Safety and Primary Industry organisations are essential to the control of

    Salmonella in the Australian egg supply chain.

  • 31

    Appendix 2.1: OzFoodNet Salmonella Hypothesis Generating Questionnaire

  • 32

  • 33

  • 34

  • 35

  • 36

  • 37

  • 38

  • 39

  • 40

    Appendix 2.2: South Australian CDCB ‘Outbreak Meeting - Risk Assessment’ template

    Outbreak Team Meetings- Agenda and Minutes Template

    Outbreak name Pathogen (if known) Cluster or Location

    Reference No. NIDS Outbreak # / PHMS Event #

    Date and time

    of meeting

    Attendees

    Trigger

    1. Apologies 2. Actions previous meeting 3. Rapid Risk Assessment

    Hazard assessment

    What is the pathogen?

    If there is no pathogen, what are the symptoms of the illness that has been reported?

    How many people are affected?

    What are the age groups and sex of cases?

    What is the severity of the disease?

    Number and % hospitalised:

    Number of fatalities:

  • 41

    Exposure assessment

    What is the most likely mode of transmission? Why?

    [please consider the evidence to suggest if foodborne, person-to-person, animal-to-person etc]

    What exposures have been associated with this hazard in the past?

    [literature review, historical outbreaks etc]

    If outbreak is a point source, how many people are known or likely to be exposed?

    [is there a booking list or estimate of number of meals served?]

    What are the most frequently consumed food items?

    [food frequency analysis- is this normal?]

    What is the probable source of the outbreak (if known)?

    [consider epidemiological information, trace back results, food/environmental sampling results?]

    Is there likely to be on-going exposure?

    [are cases still being reported? Is product likely to still be in the marketplace? Is the restaurant still serving high risk food?]

    Are cases confined to South Australia?

    [Is this a possible multi-jurisdictional outbreak?]

  • 42

    Context assessment

    Are there any factors about the event that might be associated with the environment, behaviours, social or cultural practices?

    [is there any particular cuisine being consumed or cultural group affected?]

    Are vulnerable populations affected?

    [are cases occurring in an aged care facility, child care centre, hospital etc?]

    What is the likelihood that all suspected cases will be identified?

    [is the event likely to get bigger? Do we need to consider active case finding?]

    Are there sufficient resources to respond?

    [are their sufficient human resources and laboratory capacity available to respond?]

    Are there any political sensitivities?

    [media etc.]

  • 43

    Overall assessment

    [Mark the appropriate box below] Mark Level of overall risk Actions

    Low Managed according to standard response protocols between the two primary investigators (in consultation with team managers)

    Moderate Consider outbreak meetings and preparation of situation reports. Ensure Directors are informed.

    High

    Convene outbreak meetings, prepare situation reports and inform Directors. Outbreak meetings will be held as required by the team, but with a minimum of weekly.

    Very high Daily outbreak meetings, daily situation reports with distribution to CPHO, legal, media and communications

    4. Actions a. From rapid risk assessment

    (e.g. assigning actions to fill any gaps in evidence such as literature review about the pathogen etc.)

    b. Further investigations

    i. Epidemiological Options include: obtain medical notifications for cases with pending typing, continue hypothesis generating interviews, move to analytical epidemiological study.

    ii. Microbiological Options include: request samples, request further typing at reference laboratory

    iii. Environment and food chain Options include: traceback, sampling plan (include numbers of samples, types of samples), correspondence with Local Govt/regulators, correspondence with Food Business.

    c. Control measures

  • 44

    5. Communications

    People/organisations Yes/No/NA Person responsible/method

    Situation Report

    Branch Directors

    CPHO/CMO

    Minister

    Media /communications unit

    Legal

    Public

    Healthcare providers

    Local Government EHOs National bodies (OFN/NFIRP/ CDNA/AHPPC/BFSN)

    Others (specify)

    6. Assess outbreak status

    i. Monitor/ Escalate/ Stand Down

    7. Next Meeting (Date, time, location)

  • 45

    Appendix 2.3: PowerPoint presentation for the 9th Southeast Asia & Western Pacific Bi-regional Training Programs in Epidemiology and Public Health Interventions Network (TEPHINET) Scientific Conference, Vientiane, Laos, 7 Nov 2018.

    .

  • 46

  • 47

  • 48

  • 49

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    protracted outbreak of Salmonella Hessarek infection associated with one brand

    of eggs, South Australia, March 2017 - July 2018. Commun Dis Intell [Internet].

    2019 May [cited 15 May 2019];43:1-9. Available at

    https://doi.org/10.33321/cdi.2019.43.22

    2. Australian Government Department of Health. National Notifiable Disease

    Surveillance System; Salmonella Public Dataset [Internet]. Canberra. 2018

    [Revised 4 July 2018, Cited 4 July 2018]. Available at:

    http://www9.health.gov.au/cda/source/pub_salmo.cfm

    3. Australian Bureau of Statistics. 3101.0 - Australian Demographic Statistics, Dec

    2013 [Internet] Canberra. 2014 [Revised 24 September 2014, Cited 8 August

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    A7C5708380CA257D5D0015EB95?opendocument

    4. OzFoodNet Working Group. OzFoodNet: Enhancing foodborne disease

    surveillance across Australia: quarterly report, January to March 2005. Commun

    Dis Intell [Internet] 2005 [cited 2 Jun 2018];29(2):196-9. Available at

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    au.virtual.anu.edu.au/documentSummary;dn=507997363216461;res=IELAPA

    5. Neel R, Le Minor L, Kawah M. Une nouvelle espe`ce de salmonella isole´e chez

    un corbeau (Corvus corax): Salmonella Hessarek. Annales de l’Institut Pasteur.

    1953;85:271-4.

    6. Velarde R, Porrero MC, Serrano E, Marco I, García M, Téllez S et al.

    Septicemic salmonellosis caused by Salmonella Hessarek in wintering and

    migrating Song Thrushes (Turdus philomelos) in Spain. Journal of Wildlife

    Diseases [Internet] 2012 [cited 2 Jun 2018];48(1):113-21. Available at

    http://www.bioone.org.virtual.anu.edu.au/doi/pdf/10.7589/0090-3558-48.1.113

    7. Singer NY, Weissman Y, Yom-Tov Y, Marder U. Isolation of Salmonella

    Hessarek from starlings (Sturnus vulgaris). Avian Diseases. 1977;21:117-9.

    https://doi.org/10.33321/cdi.2019.43.22

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    8. Magistrali CM, Latini E, Manuali C, Neri C, Panzieri V, Bazzucchi A et al.

    Cases of salmonellosis from S. Hessarek in European Starling (Sturnus vulgaris)

    in the center of Italy. Sanita` Pubblica Veterinaria. 2008;49.

    http://indice.spvet.it/arretrati/numero-49/005.html. Accessed September 2011.

    [In Italian]

    9. OIE (World Organization for animal health). Report of the meeting of the OIE

    working group on wildlife diseases: 73rd Annual General Session of the

    International Committee. [Internet] Paris. 2005. [cited 1 Jul 2018]. Available at

    http://www.oie.int/doc/ged/D3888.PDF.

    10. `Handeland K, Nesse LL, Lillehaug A, Vikøren T, Djønne B, Bergsjø B. Natural

    and experimental Salmonella Typhimurium. infections in foxes (Vulpes vulpes).

    Veterinary Microbiology 2008;132:129-34.

    11. Gomez-Laguna J, Hernandez M, Creus E, Echeita A, Otal J, Herrera-Leon S et

    al. Prevalence and antimicrobial susceptibility of Salmonella infections in free

    range pigs. Veterinary Journal. 2011;190:176-8.

    12. South Australian Department of Health and Ageing. SA Health Food Act

    Report: year ending 30 June 2014. [Internet] Adelaide. Government of South

    Australia. 2014 [cited 2 Jun 2018]. Available from

    http://www.sahealth.sa.gov.au/wps/wcm/connect/1bd053004659eb248ff1bf7950

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    14_WEB.PDF?MOD=AJPERES&CACHE=NONE&CONTENTCACHE=NON

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    13. Chousalkar KK, McWhorter A. Egg Production Systems and Salmonella in

    Australia. In: Ricke SC, Gast RK, editors. Producing safe eggs: microbial

    ecology of Salmonella. [Internet] London, United Kingdom, San Diego, CA,

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    14. Whiley H, Ross K. Salmonella and eggs: from production to plate. Int. j. Res.

    Public Health. 2015;12:2543-56. Available at

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    15. Gast RK. Microbiology of shell egg production in the United States. In: Ricke

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    Bain M, editors. Improving the Safety and Quality of Eggs and Egg Products.

    Cambridge. Woodhead Publishing Limited. 2013:163-77.

    17. Galiş AM, Marcq C, Marlier D, Portetelle D, Van I, Beckers Y et al. Control of

    Salmonella contamination of shell eggs—preharvest and postharvest methods: a

    review. Compr. Rev. Food Sci. Food Saf. 2013;12:155-82.

    18. Thorns CJ. Bacterial food-borne zoonoses. Rev. Sci. Tech. 2000;19:226-39.

    19. Food Standards Australia New Zealand. Primary Production and Processing

    Standard for Eggs and Egg Products: Final assessment Report. (Proposal P301).

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    _%20Egg%20Products%20PPPS%20FAR%20FINAL%20AMENDED%20240

    61.pdf

    20. Food Standards Australia New Zealand. Primary Production and Processing

    (PPP) Standard for Eggs and Egg Products (Standard 4.2.5) of the Australian

    Food Standards Code. 20 May 2011. Available at

    https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2011L00860

    21. Howard ZR, O’Bryan CA, Crandall PG, Ricke SC. Salmonella Enteritidis in

    shell eggs: Current issues and prospects for control. Food Res. Int. 2012;45:755-

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    com.virtual.anu.edu.au/science/article/pii/S0963996911002602

    https://www-sciencedirect-com.virtual.anu.edu.au/science/article/pii/S0963996911002602https://www-sciencedirect-com.virtual.anu.edu.au/science/article/pii/S0963996911002602

  • 52

    Chapter 3

    Chapter 3 of this bound volume is for restricted access only and has been submitted as a

    separate document. Chapter 3 includes:

    • Section 1: Shiga toxin producing Escherichia coli: overview, epidemiology and

    public health significance.

    • Section 2: Evaluation of the South Australian Shiga toxin-producing

    Escherichia coli surveillance system.

    • Section 3: The epidemiology of Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli in

    South Australia, February 2017 to June 2018.

  • 53

    Chapter 4:

    The South Australian Trauma Registry

    Annual Report, 1 July 2015 to 30 June

    2016: a descriptive epidemiological

    analysis

  • 54

    Table of Contents

    Chapter 4: The South Australian Trauma Registry Annual Report, 1 July 2015 to

    30 June 2016: a descriptive epidemiological analysis .......................................................... 53

    Index of Figures .................................................................................................................... 55

    Index of Tables ..................................................................................................................... 56

    Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................ 56

    Glossary ................................................................................................................................. 57

    Prologue ................................................................................................................................. 59

    My role ............................................................................................................................. 59

    Lessons learned ............................................................................................................... 59

    Impact of the work .......................................................................................................... 60

    Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................... 60

    Master of Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology core activity requirement ............ 61

    Executive Summary ............................................................................................................. 62

    Key Findings .................................................................................................................... 62

    Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 64

    Trauma Services .............................................................................................................. 64

    The South Australian Trauma System ......................................................................... 65

    Major Trauma Services .................................................................................................. 65

    The South Australian Trauma Registry ........................................................................ 66

    Aims and objectives of the project ............................................................................... 68

    Method ................................................................................................................................... 70

    Results ................................................................................................................................... 74

    Discussion ............................................................................................................................. 97

    Appendix 1 South Australian Trauma Registry (SATR) Inclusion Criteria ............. 105

    Appendix 2: SATR data quality issues, 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2016, variables

    for inclusion in the Annual Report only .......................................................................... 107

    Appendix 3: Summary of initial SATR data checking ................................................. 109

    Appendix 4 SPSS Data cleaning syntax for SATR Annual Report, 1 July 2015

    to 30 June 2016 ................................................................................................................... 117

    Appendix 5: Summary of consultation with South Australian State Trauma

    Committee regarding the content of the Annual Report ............................................... 137

    Appendix 6 SPSS Syntax for Data Analysis for SATR Annual Report, 1 July

    2015 to 30 June 2016 ......................................................................................................... 138

    References ........................................................................................................................... 147

  • 55

    Index of Figures

    Figure 1: Crude number of trauma events treated at South Australian Major Trauma

    Services, injury date 1st July 2011 to 30th June 2016 ........................................................ 76

    Figure 2: Number of trauma events treated at South Australian Major Trauma Services by

    day of arrival at Major Trauma Service, injury date 1st July 2015 to 30th June 2016 ..... 77

    Figure 3: Number of trauma events treated at South Australian Major Trauma Services by

    time of arrival at Major Trauma Service, injury date 1st July 2015 to 30th June 2016 .... 77

    Figure 4: Number of trauma events treated at South Australian Major Trauma Services by

    principal mode of transport to Major Trauma Service, injury date 1st July 2015 to 30th

    June 2016 .......................................................................................................................... 78

    Figure 5: Proportion of trauma events treated at South Australian Major Trauma Services

    by direct or indirect admission to Major Trauma Service and year, injury date 1st July

    2011 to 30th June 2016 ..................................................................................................... 79

    Figure 6: Proportion of trauma events treated at South Australian Major Trauma Services

    by trauma team call-out status and year, injury date 1st July 2011 to 30th June 2016 ....... 80

    Figure 7: Number of trauma events treated at South Australian Major Trauma Services by

    trauma team call-out status and year, injury date 1st July 2011 to 30th June 2016 ............ 80

    Figure 8: Number of trauma events treated at South Australian Major Trauma Services by

    number of days admitted, injury date 1st July 2015 to 30th June 2016 ............................ 81

    Figure 9: Age-specific annual incidence rate of trauma events treated at South Australian

    Major Trauma Services, per 100,000 South Australian population, injury date 1st July

    2011 to 30th June 2016 ..................................................................................................... 84

    Figure 10: Number of trauma events treated at South Australian Major Trauma Services

    by age group and sex, injury date 1st July 2015 to 30th June 2016 ................................... 85

    Figure 11: Age and sex-specific annual incidence rate of trauma events treated at South

    Australian Major Trauma Services, injury date 1st July 2015 to 30th June 2016 ............ 85

    Figure 12: Number of trauma events treated at South Australian Major Trauma Services

    by age group, sex and mortality, injury date 1st July 2015 to 30th June 2016 ................. 86

    Figure 13: Place of injury for trauma events treated at South Australian Major Trauma

    Services, injury date 1st July 2015 to 30th June 2016 ...................................................... 87

    Figure 14: Number of trauma events treated at South Australian Major Trauma Services

    by region, injury date 1st July 2011 to 30th June 2016 ..................................................... 88

    Figure 15: Proportion of trauma events treated at South Australian Major Trauma

    Services by NISS and age group, 1st July 2015 to 30th June 2016 ................................... 95

  • 56

    Index of Tables

    Table 1: Summary statistics for all trauma events treated at South Australian Major

    Trauma Services, injury date 1st July 2011 to 30th June 2016 ........................................... 75

    Table 2: Trauma events treated at South Australian Major Trauma Services - injury and

    death by age group and New Injury Severity Score (NISS), injury date 1st July 2015 to

    30th June 2016 .................................................................................................................. 83

    Table 3: Trauma events treated at South Australian Major Trauma Services by injury

    type, injury date 1st July 2011 to 30th June 2016 ............................................................. 89

    Table 4: Trauma events treated at South Australian Major Trauma Services by

    mechanism of injury and year, injury date 1st July 2011 to 30th June 2016 .................... 91

    Table 5: Road transport related trauma events treated at South Australian Major Trauma

    Services by transport mode, 1st July 2011 to 30th June 2016 .......................................... 92

    Table 6: Trauma events treated at South Australian Major Trauma Services by

    mechanism of injury, sex, region of injury and age group, injury date 1st July 2015 to

    30th June 2016 .................................................................................................................. 93

    Table 7: Trauma events treated at South Australian Major Trauma Services by NISS and

    year, injury date 1st July 2011 to 30th June 2016 ............................................................. 94

    Table 8: Trauma events treated at South Australian Major Trauma Services by NISS, sex,

    age group, region and mechanism of injury, 1st July 2015 to 30th June 2016 ................. 96

    Abbreviations

    AIS Abbreviated Injury Scale

    ICD-10-AM International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health

    Problems, 10th Revision (ICD-10) Version for 2010

    ISS Injury Severity Score

    NISS New Injury Severity Score

    SATS South Australian Trauma System

    SATR South Australian Trauma Registry

    SASTC South Australian State Trauma Committee

    SATRSC South Australian Trauma Registry Sub-Committee

  • 57

    Glossary

    Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS)

    An anatomically based, consensus derived, global severity scoring system that classifies

    an individual injury by body region according to its relative severity on a six-point scale;

    AIS 1-Minor, AIS 2-Moderate, AIS 3-Serious, AIS 4-Severe, AIS 5-Critical,

    AIS 6-Maximum (currently untreatable).

    The AIS scale is a measurement tool for single injuries and is the basis for calculating the

    internationally recognised ‘Injury Severity Score’ (ISS) and ‘New Injury Severity Score’

    (NISS) for patients with multiple injuries.1

    Case fatality rate

    The proportion of cases of a specified condition that are fatal within a specified time,

    usually expressed as a percentage.2

    Clinical Indicators

    Quantitative measures that assess health structures, processes and outcomes. For

    example, ’Time from arrival in Emergency Department to spinal clearance or diagnosis

    should not exceed 4 hours’.

    Injury Severity Score (ISS) / New Injury Severity Score (NISS)

    The ISS and the NISS assess the combined effects of multiple injuries in a patient and are

    based on an anatomical injury severity classification system, the Abbreviated Injury

    Scale. The ISS and the NISS are internationally recognised injury severity scoring

    systems which correlate with mortality, morbidity and other measures of severity. The

    ISS is calculated as the sum of the squares of the highest AIS code in each of the three

    most severely injured ISS Body Regions, maximum score = 75.3,4 The NISS is calculated

    as the sum of the squares of the three highest AIS codes regardless of body region,

    maximum score = 75.5 Trauma events with an ISS score of greater than 12 are considered

    ‘Major Trauma Events’.

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    Injury Types

    • Blunt (non-penetrating) injuries: resulting from an impact with a dull, firm surface

    or object, generally occur from mechanisms such as motor vehicle collisions,

    pedestrian impacts, falls and sports injuries.6

    • Penetrating injuries: require skin penetration by an external force as the principal

    component of injury. Examples include stab and gunshot wounds, glass-related

    injuries and impalements.7

    • Burn injuries: are caused by exposure to electrical, thermal or corrosive agents such

    as flames, hot substances, chemicals or radiation. Examples include situations where

    electricity has primarily damaged soft tissues (electrical burns).7

    • Immersion / Suffocation: placing a body under water or other liquid / the state or

    process of being deprived of air or unable to breathe.

    Major Trauma

    Multiple injuries requiring complex multidisciplinary management or single system

    injuries of a potentially life-threatening nature. These usually require complex

    management at specifically designated and equipped health facilities.8

    Minor Trauma

    Less serious injuries that usually involve a single part of the body, and that can be well

    managed with less specialised resources in a variety of clinical settings.8

    Mechanism of injury

    The primary circumstance or cause (external factor) of a trauma event (for example; fall

    from a height or high-speed motor vehicle accident).

    MedSTAR

    Operated by the South Australian Ambulance Service, MedSTAR is a twenty-four-hour

    emergency medical retrieval service that utilises specially trained teams to provide South

    Australians with the highest level of emergency medical patient care, treatment and

    transport (fixed wing ‘planes, helicopters or road ambulances) from any location in the

    state to the most appropriate medical facility.9

  • 59

    Prologue

    My role

    I was tasked with designing and creating the first state-wide descriptive South Australian

    Trauma Registry (SATR) Annual Report, 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016. Whilst preparing

    the report, I was able to identify SATR data quality issues within the system and to

    highlight these issues in preparation for the planned implementation of an on-line SATR

    database in January 2018, in addition to providing feedback to stakeholders. Preparation

    of the annual report provided me with an opportunity to explore the complexities

    involved in communicating the results of data analysis via a report format which can both

    meet the expectations of the report audience and comply with SA Health formal

    communication standards.

    Lessons learned

    • It is important to understand the dataset to be analysed, including data dictionary

    definitions, any changes to how the data has been recorded during the reporting

    period, any variations to how the data is being recorded at different sites and, reasons

    for any missing data items.

    • It is important to tailor the planned analysis and report content and format to the

    anticipated report audience and, if possible, to facilitate two-way open

    communication with stakeholders regarding the planned report.

    • It is important to be aware that:

    o the intended report audience might vary in their individual expectations of the

    required report,

    o some audience expectations might not be clearly communicated,

    o one single report content and format might not be suitable for both professional

    and lay audiences, and

    o available resources are likely to impact on the ability to meet audience

    expectations of the final report

    • As far as possible, users of a report should actively participate in the design of the

    report on an on-going basis so that there is a shared and realistic perception during the

    report planning stage of the extent to which the report will meet various expectations.

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    • How to use IBM SPSS Statistics 24 software syntax for reproducible data cleaning,

    re-coding and analysis and how to use of STATA (version 15) statistical software for

    statistical significance testing.

    • Organisations may have specific requirements for the format of their reports in terms

    of fonts, styles, colours and report layouts; these requirements serve multiple

    functions including ease of readability and recognition of the organisation’s brand.

    Impact of the work

    This data analysis:

    • Provided a baseline summary and identified trends in trauma events in

    South Australia for the South Australian State Trauma Committee (SASTC) and the

    Department for Health and Wellbeing (‘SA Health’). The SASTC provides

    governance for the South Australian Trauma Registry (SATR) and includes the

    clinical heads and senior trauma nurses from Adelaide metropolitan trauma services

    together with SA Health central office personnel from the Emergency Management

    Unit and the Prevention and Population Health Branch (PPH).

    • Identified aspects of the SATR that require quality improvement as SA implements a

    new on-line SATR in January 2018; in response, an initial monthly quality assurance

    report was introduced by PPH in September 2018.

    • Provided a template for future SATR annual reports and facilitated the SASTC’s

    shared understanding of what should be included in future annual reports; both, in

    terms of the content/format included in the annual report produced and, in terms of

    the content and format changes which the SASTC would like to include in future

    reports.

    • Progressed compliance with the SA Health Strategic Plan 2017-2020, which affirms

    that evidence and information is presented in a meaningful way and underpins

    clinical service design.10

    Acknowledgements

    I wish to acknowledge Helen Thomas, Manager of the SA Health Prevention and

    Population Health Branch Data Warehouse, who provided valuable technical advice, in

    particular, explanation regarding aspects of the SATR database. PPH Principal

  • 61

    Statistician, Kamalesh Venugopal, provided guidance regarding statistical significance

    testing and, PPH Communications Advisor, Karli Borresen, provided advice regarding

    formatting the report in accordance with the SA Health Communications Protocol Policy

    Directive.11 Dr Tambri Housen provided guidance regarding the writing of this chapter.

    Lastly, I wish to acknowledge the SA Nurse Trauma Coordinators who resolved data

    queries and clarified aspects of how the data should be interpreted, ensuring that the

    report made sense from a clinical perspective.

    Master of Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology core activity

    requirement

    This chapter is written in fulfilment of the field placement core activity requirement to

    analyse a public health dataset such as surveillance data.

  • 62

    Executive Summary

    The South Australian Trauma Registry (SATR) Annual Report includes data for trauma

    events managed and recorded in the SATR by the three South Australian (SA) Major

    Trauma Service hospitals; the Royal Adelaide Hospital, Flinders Medical Centre and, the

    Women’s and Children’s Hospital.

    This is the first South Australian state-wide descriptive annual report of the SATR data.

    Prior to this report, ongoing analysis of the trauma data was performed within individual

    hospitals for quality improvement and trauma audit activities but, analysis at the state-

    wide level was limited to a number of defined trauma clinical indicators only.

    Data for injuries that occurred between 1 July 2015 and 30 June 2016 are the focus of the

    annual report. For the purpose of comparison, data for the preceding four year period,

    1 July 2011 to 30 June 2015, have also been included in the analysis. The report has been

    produced in consultation with the SA State Trauma Committee and the SA Trauma

    Registry Sub-Committee.

    Key Findings

    In the year 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016:

    • In total, 3,035 trauma events were recorded in the SA Trauma Registry; a 35%

    increase since the year 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012 (2,244 events).

    • The injury rate per 100,000 South Australians was 178.6; this rate has risen from a

    rate of 136.9 in the year 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012, a 30.5% increase.

    • At the time of discharge from the Major Trauma Services, the proportion of people

    with trauma events known to have survived was 97.7% (2,945 out of 3,015).

    • Sixty-two trauma-related deaths occurred at the Major Trauma Services during the

    episode of care for the trauma event. The majority of deaths occurred in trauma

    events with a New Injury Severity Score (NISS) of greater than 12.

    • The overall rate of trauma-related deaths was 3.6 per 100,000 South Australians. The

    highest rate of deaths occurred in people aged 80 years and over; 23.3 deaths per

    100,000.

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    • The majority of trauma events occurred in males (66.7%) and in metropolitan areas

    (63.5%).

    • The highest rate of trauma occurred in people aged 15-19 years; the age-specific

    injury rate for this age-group was 327.4 trauma events per 100,000 South Australians.

    • There has been an upward trend in the annual rate of trauma events in all age groups

    since the year 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012; the largest increase occurred in the age-

    group 0-15 years with the rate of injury rising 66.3% from 119 to 198 trauma events

    per 100,000 South Australians in this age-group.

    • Just over half of the trauma events that occurred were road transport related (1,651

    events, 54.4%).

    • Trauma events in pedal cyclists rose to 22.0% (363) of all transport-related events,

    increasing from 13.8% (172) in the year 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012, an 8.2%

    increase.

    • Falls were the cause of 22.3% (678) of trauma events but accounted for 40.3% (25) of

    trauma-related deaths.

    • The proportion of trauma events not admitted to the Major Trauma Service hospital

    has risen each year from 24.5% (549 events) in the year 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012

    to 34.8% (1,051) in the year 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016.

    • The proportion of trauma events transferred directly to a Major Trauma Service (not

    treated at other hospitals en-route) increased slightly from 73% in the year 1 July

    2011 to 30 June 2012 to 79% in the year 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016.

  • 64

    Introduction

    Physical injury to the body (or “trauma”) is the sixth leading cause of death worldwide.12

    Nearly 8% of reported deaths in Australia are due to injuries with higher rates reported in

    men and in the oldest age group, 65 years and older.13 Injury is the leading cause of death

    in people under the age of 45 years.14

    In addition to the risk of death, the costs associated with injury include the cost of

    emergency department visits, hospital admissions and the added cost of significant

    human and societal burden with many injury survivors never returning to school, work, or

    their regular lives.15 ‘Years Lived with Disability’ (YLD) is a measure of the years of

    what could have been a healthy life but were instead spent in states of less than full health

    (Refer Box 1).16 Based on calculations of YLD, the Australian Burden of Disease Study:

    impact and causes of illness and death in Australia 2011 report states “