Syria, Chemical Weapons and Armed Intervention...Syria, Chemical Weapons and Armed Intervention The legality of the 2017 and 2018 airstrikes against Syria after the chemical weapons

Syria, Chemical Weapons and Armed Intervention The legality of the 2017 and 2018 airstrikes against Syria after the chemical weapons attacks Word count: 50,730

Arno Swyngedouw Student number: 01711256 Supervisor(s): Prof. Dr. Tom Ruys Commissioner: Alexandra Hofer A dissertation submitted to Ghent University in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Laws Academic year: 2018 – 2019

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Formyparents,

Thankyou.

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Tableofcontent

Listoftables 7

Listofabbreviations 8

Chapter1:ResearchDesign 9

1.1. Introduction 9

1.2. Methodologyandstructure 11

Chapter2:Syria:“thepeopledemandthefalloftheregime” 13

2.1.Introduction 14

2.2.ThecivilwarinSyriaanditsgeopoliticalimportance 15

2.3.Humanrightsviolationsandchemicalweaponsattacks 16

2.4.InterventioninSyria 18

2.4.1.InterventionbytheUSinSyriain2017 19

2.4.2.InterventionbytheUS,theUKandFranceinSyriain2018 22

2.5.UnitedNationsSecurityCouncilresolutionsregardingSyria 26

2.6.Conclusion 30

Chapter3:InternationalLawontheUseofForce 31

3.1.Introduction 31

3.2.JusadBellum:Historicalintroduction 31

3.3.TheUNCharter 35

3.4.Theprohibitionontheuseofforce 36

3.5.Exceptionstotheprohibitionontheuseofforce 39

3.5.1.Interventionbyinvitation 39

3.5.2.TheUNSecurityCouncilasauthorizingpower 41

3.5.2.1.Impliedorpresumedauthorizationtouseforce 43

3.5.3.Self-defence 45

3.5.3.1.Anticipatoryself-defence 48

3.6.Conclusion 51

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Chapter4:AHumanitarianIntervention? 54

4.1.Introduction 54

4.2.Humanitarianintervention:anhistoricintroduction 54

4.3.Unilateralhumanitarianintervention 58

4.3.1Internationalcustomaryrule? 61

4.3.2.Kosovoaspracticeofunilateralhumanitarianintervention 63

4.3.3.Syriaaspracticeofunilateralhumanitarianintervention 67

4.4.Collectivehumanitarianintervention 69

4.4.1.ResponsibilitytoProtect 70

4.5.Conclusion 76

Chapter5:ACaseforReprisals? 79

5.1.Introduction 79

5.2.Internationalprohibitionontheuseofchemicalweapons 79

5.3.Armedreprisals 83

5.4.Circumstancesprecludingunlawfulness 87

5.5.Conclusion 91

Chapter6:AWayForward:UnitingforPeaceResolution 92

6.1.Introduction 92

6.2.TheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil’svetopower 92

6.3.UnitingforPeaceResolutionasapossibleavenue? 97

6.4.UnitingforPeaceResolutioninthecaseofSyria 101

6.5.Conclusion 104

Chapter7:Conclusion 106

Bibliography 109

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ListoftablesTable1:Overviewofthe12vetoesexercisedintheUNSCwithrespecttotheSyrianconflict

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ListofabbreviationsCWC ChemicalWeaponsConventionESS EmergencySpecialSessionEU EuropeanUnionICC InternationalCriminalCourtICISS InternationalCommissiononInterventionandStateSovereigntyICJ InternationalCourtofJusticeIS IslamicStateNATO NordAtlanticTreatyOrganisationOPCW OrganisationfortheProhibitionofChemicalWeaponsOSCE OrganisationforSecurityandCo-operationinEuropeP5 PermanentFiveMembersoftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilR2P ResponsibilitytoProtectUK UnitedKingdomUS UnitedStatesUN UnitedNationsUNGA UnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyUNSC UnitedNationsSecurityCouncilUNSMIS UnitedNationsSupervisionMissiononSyria

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Chapter1:Researchdesign1.1. IntroductionIn recent years, human rights violations have been at the center of the international politicaldebate.Countlessexamplesofhumanrightsabusecanbegiven: thegenocide inRwanda, thewarinformerYugoslavia,theviolationsofhumanrightsbydictatorsinLibyaandSyria,andtheoffencesinMyanmarin2017.Thesearejustafewexamplesofsituationswheregravebreachesagainst human rights were made. One important observation can be deduced from this. Inapparently similar cases, theUNSecurityCouncil (UNSC) formulatedadifferent responsewithregardtowhetherornottointerveneinthesituationofmassivehumanrightsbreaches.Insomecases(YugoslaviaandLibya),aninterventionwasconductedbutincontrast,inothercases(likeSyria orMyanmar) an interventionwas not initiated to protect the civilian population againsthuman rights violations. This is because theUNSecurity Council is a strongly politicizedbody,shapedbytheveto-rightofthePermanentfivemembers(P5)oftheCouncil. Recently, thishasbeenmostclearlyobserved in thehandlingof theconflict inSyria. InSyria, there was no intervention, although atrocities are being committed. This is due to thesystematicvetoesofRussia.Sincetheoutbreakof thewar inSyria,Russiaused itsvetopowermorethan12timestoblockresolutions.ThecontinuousvetouseofsomeofthePermanentfivemembershasledtoadeadlockintheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil.Notonlytheuseofveto,butalsothemerethreattousetherighttovetohasledtoinactiononthesideoftheUNSCandconsequently theUNSChas not been able to act effectively in the face ofwidespreadhumanrights violations in the Syrian conflict. The conflict in Syria included the gruesome use ofinternationallyforbiddenchemicalweaponsonseveraloccasions. In2017,theUSreactedonaunilateralbasisbyconductingmissile strikesagainstmilitary infrastructure inSyria.TheUSdidnot justify this attack on a specific legal basis but made reference to vital national securityinterests. The attacks could be considered to be a form of self-defence, retaliation orpunishment.1 Again in 2018, the US, the UK and France conducted missile strikes againstchemicalweaponsproduction facilities in Syria, aftera chemicalweaponsattackby theSyrianregimeinDouma.BothinterventionswhereconductedonaunilateralbasiswithoutUNSecurityCouncilauthorization. ThisisanewevolutionintheconflictinSyria.TheUNSCfailstointerveneonacollectivebasisbythesystematicvetoesofRussia.Inconsequence,thedebatenowevolvesfromafocusoncollectiveaction tooneonunilateral intervention.Thequestionsarise, then,onwhat legal 1C.GRAY,InternationalLawandtheUseofForce,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2018,57-58.;C.HENDERSON,Theuseofforceandinternationallaw,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2018,403.

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basistheseairstrikeswereconductedandifthesecouldbeconsideredlawfulunderinternationallaw.ThemissilestrikeinSyriaafterthechemicalweaponsattackswerenotconductedwithanexplicit legal justification. TheUS rationalized the strikeson thebasisof vitalnational securityinterests and to deter the use of chemical weapons. The UK based the intervention onhumanitarian considerations and the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. It is from thesestatementsthatthreepossiblelegalbaseswillbeanalysed,namelytherighttoself-defence,thedoctrine of humanitarian intervention and the law on reprisals and countermeasures. I shallanalyse and document the case of Syria as a prime example of the failure of the collectivesecurityframeworkoftheUnitedNations.TheSyriancaseisusedasanemblematiccaseandredthreadtoanalysethefunctionoftheUNSCtomaintaintheinternationalpeaceandsecurity.ItisconsideredthattheUNSCfailsinitsprimaryresponsibilityasaresultofthedeadlockcausedbythe continuous vetoes or threat to use the right to veto of (some) of the Permanent fivemembers. Consequently, states resort to unilateral action and therefore, the unilateral use offorce.

Insum,myresearchquestionisasfollows:“WeretheairstrikesbytheUSin2017andtheairstrikesbytheUS,theUKandFrancein2018inSyriaafterthechemicalweaponsattackslegalunderinternationallaw?Toanswertheseresearchquestionsmyresearchshallrelatethecase-study analysis to potential legal ground for intervention. My method will be based on anextensiveenquiry intoon the legal texts and literature related to jus adbellum, humanitarianinterventionandreprisals.Thisdissertation,first,describestheinterventionsinSyriaof2017and2018. It maps out the legal justification form the intervening states, the reactions of theinternational community and the process in the United Nations Security Council. Therationalizations of the intervening stateswill bemobilized in three distinct legal justifications,namely self-defence as an exception to the use of force, the doctrine of humanitarianinterventionandreprisalsorcountermeasures.Itisassessediftheseinterventions,basedontheabove legal justifications, can be considered legal under public international law and thecontemporary jus ad bellum. The applicable legal framework is described and applied to thesituationinSyria.Therefore,closeattentionispaidtotheUNCharterandtheprohibitiontouseforceenshrinedinArticle2(4)oftheCharter.Inaddition,thepositionofunilateralandcollectivehumanitarianinterventionwillbeanalysedinpublicinternationallaw,andthisinrelationshiptothe Syrian intervention. Further, the law on reprisals and countermeasures is analysed as apossiblelegaljustificationfortheinterventionsinSyria.Finally,theSyriancaseandtheunilateralreactionsbyseveralstatesinthisconflicthavequestionedtheUNSCasaninstitutiontomaintainthe international peace and security and act collectively. The UNSC is characterized by acontinuous deadlock in the Syrian case and, therefore, the Uniting for Peace Resolution isanalysedasapossiblealternativeavenue toUNSecurityCouncil authorization.Thismayopenagain an avenue to return to collective action legitimized by the international community,insteadofunilateralactionbythemostpowerfulstates.

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1.2. Methodologyandstructure

ThemostauthoritativelistingofthesourcesofinternationallawcanbefoundinArticle38oftheStatuteoftheInternationalCourtofJustice.AccordingtotheInternationalCourtofJustice,thereare five types of sources: the international conventions, international custom, the generalprinciplesoflawrecognisedbycivilizednations,caselawandlegaldoctrine.Thisarticlegoesasfollows:

“1.TheCourt,whosefunctionistodecideinaccordancewithinternationallawsuchdisputesasaresubmittedtoit,shallapply:

a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expresslyrecognizedbythecontestingstates;

b. internationalcustom,asevidenceofageneralpracticeacceptedaslaw;c. thegeneralprinciplesoflawrecognizedbycivilizednations;d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of themost

highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for thedeterminationofrulesoflaw.

2.ThisprovisionshallnotprejudicethepoweroftheCourttodecideacaseexaequoetbono,ifthepartiesagreethereto.”2

These sources will be the basis of my research. The dissertation mobilises on an extensiveliterature study from relevant legal scholars in the field of international public lawand lawofarmed conflict such as Dinstein, Ruys, Henderson, Gray and Kolb. This literature study issupported by the relevant international conventions and judicial decision of the responsibleinternational bodies in order to situate the casewithin the appropriate legal framework. ThemainfocusisontheinternationalconventionsrelatedtothelawonarmedconflictsuchastheUN Charter. In addition, an extensive study is undertaken of the relevant United Nationsresolutions, both by the General Assembly as the Security Council. The central topic of thismaster’sdissertationisananalysisofthelegalityofthe2017and2018airstrikesbytheUS,UKandFranceinSyriaaftertheSyriangovernmentcommittedchemicalweaponsattacksagainstitsowncivilians. TheUSgovernment legitimized this attackon thebasisof vital national securityinterests anddeterring theuseof chemicalweapons in the future. TheUKgovernmentbasedtheirlegitimationonthedoctrineofhumanitarianintervention.Thisdissertationanalysestheselegitimationsinlightofcontemporaryinternationalpubliclaw.Themainquestionis:“Werethe

2StatuteoftheInternationalCourtofJustice,26June1945.

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airstrikesbytheUSin2017andtheairstrikesbytheUS,theUKandFrancein2018inSyriaafterthechemicalweaponsattackslegalunderinternationallaw?”

Thedissertation is structured in the followingmanner.Chapter2 includesadescriptionof theeventsoccurringinSyriafromthebeginningofthecivilwarin2011untiltheairstrikesin2018bytheTrumpadministrationafterthechemicalweaponsattacks.Ananalysisofjustificationsoftheinterventionbytheinterveningpartiesandthereactionsoftheinternationalcommunitytowardsthe2017and2018airstrikesispresented.Inaddition,theprocessintheUNSecurityCouncilisanalysed based on the relevant UNSC resolutions andmeeting records concerning the Syriancrisis.

Chapter3,inturn,discussesandanalysesthecontemporarylawontheuseofforce.AnanalysisiscarriedoutofthecurrentlegalframeworkoftheprohibitionontheuseofforceprovidedforinArticle2(4)of theCharter. The focus lieson theexceptions toprohibitionon theuseof forceprovidedforintheCharter,namelyself-defenceandSecurityCouncilauthorisation.Inaddition,the customary exception of intervention by invitation is briefly explored. The chapter focusesmainly on the exception of self-defence to the use of force and if this can legitimize theinterventioninSyria.ThemainsourcesthatsupportthisanalysisaretheUNCharter,therelevantliterature on the topic, including scholars as Dinstein, Grey, Henderson, Kolb and Ruys andrelevantjudgementsoftheInternationalCourtofJustice.Chapter 4 assesses humanitarian intervention in contemporary international public law. AdistinctionismadebetweencollectivehumanitarianinterventionundertheauspicesoftheUNSecurityCouncilandthelatestdevelopmentinthisregard,namelytheResponsibilitytoProtectand unilateral humanitarian intervention. The main sources are the various reports thatdeveloped the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, the UN Charter, the relevant doctrine andapplicableICJjudgements.TheinterventioninSyriawillbeassessedinthislightanditisanalysedif unilateral or collective humanitarian intervention can be considered a legitimation of theairstrikesagainstSyria.Chapter 5 probes deeper and asks the question if reprisals or circumstances precludingwrongfulness,morespecificallycountermeasures,canprovidealegitimationoftheinterventionin Syria. The International Law Commission Draft Articles on Responsibility of States forInternationallyWrongfulActsisthemainsourceofthissection,complementedwiththerelevantlegaldoctrine.Chapter6, finally,discusses thechallenges related to theUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil vetopowerandexaminestheUnitingforPeaceResolutionasapotentialwayforwardtodealwiththe

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deadlock intheUNSecurityCouncilregardingtheconflict inSyria.Thissectionissupportedbythe relevantUnitedNationsGeneralAssembly resolutionsandmeeting records, supplementedwithlegaldoctrine.Intheconcludingchapter,themainfindingsandargumentsaresummarized.

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Chapter2:Syria:“Thepeopledemandthefalloftheregime”2.1. IntroductionInthischapter,theSyriancaseisdescribed.Syriaisanimportantrecentexamplethatillustratesthefailureoftheinternationalcommunityinitsresponsibilitytopreventandendhumanrightsviolations. Syria is an interesting case for several reasons. Firstly, at first sight, it is a caserelativelysimilartoLibya,whereacollectiveinterventionwasconducted.Secondly,thereareawiderangeof interestsatplay in theSyrianconflict; it isat thecentreof theMiddle-East, theconflictwiththeIslamicState(IS)isintenseandtherearedifferentgeopoliticalinterestsofthePermanent fivemembers of the UNSC at play in the region. Thirdly, the conflict in Syria canillustrateingreatdetailthefunctioningoftheUNSecurityCouncilanddeadlockinthiscontext.During several moments in the civil war, Syrian President al-Assad did not shy away fromattackingthecivilianpopulation.Hedoesthisnotonlywithconventionalweaponsbutalsowithbannedchemicalweapons.Thissystematicallyviolateshumanrights.However,theUNSecurityCouncildoesnotmanagetopreventthesehumanrightsviolations.ThisisduetothesystematicvetoesofRussia.Alreadyin2011and2012,RussiaandChinavetoedresolutionstointerveneinSyria on the basis of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).3 Over the years, several otherresolutionsregardinginterventionhavebeenvetoed.4Mostrecently,theconflictfurtherevolvedwith the US and allies bombings against Syria’s chemical weapons facilities. These bombingswerenotauthorizedbytheUNSCandconductedonaunilateralbasis.Thisisanewevolutionintheconflict inSyria.DuetoRussia'ssystematicveto, theUS, theUKandFrancefeltobligedtounilaterallyintervene,withoutUNSCauthorization.Thischapterdescribesconsecutivelythecivilwar and geopolitical importance of Syria, the human rights violations and chemical weaponsattacks, the interventions in Syria, the states reactions against both interventions and theUNSecurityCouncilresolutionsregardingSyria. 3 Draft Resolution S/2011/612 United Nations Security Council (4 October 2011), UN Doc.S/2011/612 (2011).; Draft Resolution S/2012/77 United Nations Security Council (4 February2012),UNDoc.S/2012/77(2012).;DraftResolutionS/2012/538UnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(19July2012),UNDoc.S/2012/538(2012).4 J. BORGER, “Russia blocks UN resolution on eastern Ghouta ceasefire”, The Guardian, 22Februari 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/22/russia-un-resolution-eastern-ghouta-ceasefire-syria (consultation on 15 april 2018).; M. KENNEDY, “Russia Vetoes U.S.Resolution On Syria In U.N. Security Council, Npr, 10 April 2018,https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/04/10/601153602/u-n-security-council-meets-about-syria-as-inspectors-prepare-to-head-in(consultationon15april2018).

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2.2. ThecivilwarinSyriaanditsgeopoliticalimportanceIncomparablewaysasinTunisia,EgyptandLibya,the'ArabSpring'alsoledtorevoltsinSyria.Asignificant part of the population protested in Damascus to demand greater participation,equality,freedom,respectforhumanrightsanddemocracy.Theprotestersalsodemandedtheexpulsion frompower of President al-Assad. President al-Assadhas been in power since 2000andsucceededhis father,whohad ruledSyria for29years.al-Assad (Jr.)won theelections in2007 with 99.8% of the votes and in 2014 with 88.7%. The escalating protests met withrepressionandviolenceby theal-Assadmilitias.Thecivilprotestseventually resulted ina civilwarbetweentheregimeofal-Assadandtherebels.5Thiscivilwar immediately ledtomassivehumanrightsviolationsbymilitiamembersloyaltoal-Assad,butalsobyrebelgroups.IncontrasttotherapidresponseoftheUNSecurityCouncilinLibya,aclearUNresponseremainedelusiveforthecaseofSyria.Sincethebeginningofthecivilwar,theconflictescalatedtoincludeseveralotherstatesandpoliticalgroups.ThecivilwarinSyriaispoliticallyveryfractured.Awiderangeof heterogeneous political groups with different affiliations, such as the National Coalition ofSyrianRevolutionaries,theFreeSyrianArmy,KurdishgroupsandvariousJihadistgroupslikeISISareall involved.6ThethenHighCommissionerforHumanRightsZeidRaadAlHusseinstatedin2017thattheconflictinSyriawasthe“worstman-madedisastertheworldhasseensinceWorldWarII”.7

ThecrisisinSyriaiscomplicatedandcomplexduetothesignificantgeopoliticalpositionof Syria in the region. Since the 1970s, when the al-Assad regime came to power, the SovietUnionhasalwaysmaintainedgoodrelationswithSyria,especiallyatthestrategicandeconomiclevel.In1980,SyriaandRussiasignedatreatyoffriendshipandcooperation.WithitspositionintheMiddleEast,Syria remainsoneofRussia'smost importantpartnersandallies tosecure itspresence in theMiddle East. Syria hosts one of themost important military bases of Russia,outside the former SovietUnion, in Tartus, aport city inWesternSyriaon theMediterraneanSea.RussiaemphasizedtheimportanceoftheportbysendingmilitarywarshipstoTartussinceNovember28,2011.8InadditionRussiahasseveralfinancialinterestsinSyria,withinvestments

5V.NANDA,“ThefutureunderinternationallawoftheresponsibilitytoprotectafterLibyaandSyria”.MichiganStateInternationalLawReview,2013,1-42.6M.BINDER,TheUnitedNationsandthePoliticsofSelectiveHumanitarianIntervention,Cham,SpringerInternationalPublishing,2017,301p.7UNNews,14March2017,Syria‘worstman-madedisastersinceWorldWarII’UNrightschief,https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/03/553252-syria-worst-man-made-disaster-world-war-ii-un-rights-chief;Y.NAHLAWI,“OvercomingRussianandChineseVetoesonSyriathroughUnitingforPeace”,JournalofConflictandSecurityLaw,2019,123.8 C. HARMER, “Russia’s Syrian Naval Base”, 21 August 2012, The Diplomat.http://thediplomat.com/2012/08/russias-syrian-naval-base/;T.GROVE,“Russiasendingwarships

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inthenaturalresourcesofSyria(GasandOil)andarmstrade.9Assuch,RussiablockedseveralUNSC resolutions, inter alia, those who condemned the attacks against civilian population,authorised investigations concerning the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian government,andpreventedthesituationtobereferredtotheinternationalcriminalcourt.102.3. HumanrightsviolationsandchemicalweaponsattacksOn 22 August 2011 the UN Human Rights Council mandated the Independent InternationalCommission of Inquiry on the Syrian and Arab Republic to investigate possible human rightsviolations.ThiscommissionhasconcludedthatvariouswidespreadandsystematichumanrightsviolationswerecommittedbytheSyriangovernment.11AccordingtotheSyrianObservatoryforHumanRights thedeath toll since thebeginningof thewar isashighas511,000peopleasofMarch201812andaccordingtotheUNHCRasofJuly2019morethan5.6millionpeoplehavefledthecountryandmorethan6.1millionpeopleareinternallydisplaced.13Butitismostlytheuseofchemicalweaponsthathasattractedthemostwidespreadanduniversalcondemnation.14

DuringthecourseoftheSyrianconflictchemicalweaponsattacksweredocumentedonarepeatedbasis.HumanRightsWatch registered85 chemicalweaponsattacksbetweenAugust

to its base in Syria.”, Reuters, 28 November 2012,http://af.reuters.com/article/egyptNews/idAFL5E7MS1XT20111128?sp=true;R.ALLISON,“RussiaandSyria:explainingalignmentwitharegimeincrisis.”InternationalAffairs,2013,795-823.;M.SCHARF, “Striking a Grotian Moment: How the Syrian Airstrikes Changed International LawRelatingtoHumanitarianIntervention”,ChicagoJournalofInternationalLaw,2019,586-614.9N. I.ERAMEH,“Humanitarian intervention,Syriaandthepoliticsofhumanrightsprotection”,TheInternationalJournalofHumanRights,2017,517-530.;D.TREISMAN,“WhyRussiaprotectsSyria’s Assad.” CNN, 4 February 2012, http://edition.cnn.com/2012/02/02/opinion/treisman-russia-syria/; R. ALLISON, “Russia and Syria: explaining alignment with a regime in crisis.”InternationalAffairs,2013,795-823.;A.BELLAMY, “FromTripoli toDamascus? Lesson learningandtheimplementationoftheResponsibilitytoProtect”InternationalPolitics,2014,23-44.10M.SCHARF,“StrikingaGrotianMoment:HowtheSyrianAirstrikesChangedInternationalLawRelatingtoHumanitarianIntervention”,ChicagoJournalofInternationalLaw,2019,586-614.11 M. ALMARY, “The Necessity for a permanent disincentive: examining the use of chemicalweaponswithafocusonSyria’scivilwar”,SouthwesternJournalofInternationallaw,2018,312-313.12 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “World Reports – Syria events of 2019”, 2019,https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/syria13 UNHCR, “Syria – Protection”, 2019, https://www.unhcr.org/sy/protection; UNHCR, “SyriaRegionalRefugeeReponse,2019,https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria.14 Y. NAQVI, “Crossing the red line: The use of chemical weapons in Syria and what shouldhappennow”,InternationalReviewoftheRedCross,2019,1-35.

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2013 and February 2018.15 The independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syriadocumented25chemicalweaponsattacks16andtheOPCWFactFindingMission foundseveralinstances of the use of chemical weapons.17 Both Human RightsWatch and the IndependentCommission of Inquiry have stated that the Syrian government is responsible formost of thechemical weapons attacks.18 In addition, the UN-OPCW Joint InvestigativeMission concluded,

15HUMANRIGHTSWATCH,“Syria:AYearOn,ChemicalWeaponsAttacksPersist”,4April2018,https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/04/04/syria-year-chemical-weapons-attacks-persist16IndependentCommissionofInquiryontheSyrianArabRepublic,“ChemicalWeaponsAttacksDocumented by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian ArabRepublic”, 15 January 2018,https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc/iicisyria/pages/documentation.aspx17 OPCW, 10 September 2014, Second Report of the OPCW Fact-FindingMission in Syria KeyFindings, S/1212 (2014),https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/Fact_Finding_Mission/s-1212-2014_e_.pdf; OPCW, 29 October 2015, Report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in SyriaRegarding Alleged Incidents in the Idlib Governorate of the Syrian Arab Republic Between 16March and 20 May 2015, S/1319 (2015),https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/Fact_Finding_Mission/s-1319-2015_e_.pdf;OPCW,23November2015,FurtherReportsof theOPCWFact-FindingMission inSyria, EC-M-50/DEC.1 (2015), https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/EC/M-50/en/ecm50dec01_e_.pdf; OPCW, 1 May 2017, Report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission inSyriaRegardingtheIncidentof16September2016asReportedintheNoteVerbaleoftheSyriaArab Republic Number 113 Dated 29 November 2016, S/1491 (2017),https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/Fact_Finding_Mission/s-1491-2017_e_.pdf;OPCW,28June2017,ReportoftheOPCWFact-FindingMissioninSyriaRegardingan Alleged Incident in Khan Shaykhun, Syrian Arab Republic, April 2017, S/1510 (2017),https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/Fact_Finding_Mission/s-1510-2017_e_.pdf;OPCW,13June2018,ReportoftheOPCWFact-FindingMissioninSyriaRegardingAllegedIncidentsinLtamenah,TheSyrianArabRepublic24and25March2017,S/1636(2018),https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/S_series/2018/en/s-1636-2018_e_.pdf;OPCW, 15May 2018,Report of theOPCW Fact-FindingMission in Syria Regarding an AllegedIncident in Saraqib, Syrian Arab Republic on 4 February 2018, S/1626 (2018),https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/S_series/2018/en/s-1626-2018_e_.pdf;OPCW,1March2019,ReportoftheFact-FindingMissionRegardingtheIncidentofAllegedUseofToxicChemicalsasaWeapon inDouma,SyrianArabRepublic,on7April2018,S/1731 (2019),https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2019/03/s-1731-2019%28e%29.pdf.; R.BARBER, “Uniting forPeaceNotAgression:Responding toChemicalWeapons in SyriaWithoutBreakingtheLaw”,JournalofConflictandSecurityLaw,2018,71-110.18HUMANRIGHTSWATCH,“Syria:AYearOn,ChemicalWeaponsAttacksPersist”,4April2018,https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/04/04/syria-year-chemical-weapons-attacks-persist

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before itsmandatewas ended, that the Syrian Governmentwas responsible for at least fourchemicalweaponsattacks.19

2.4. InterventioninSyria

InAugust2012,then,USPresidentBarackObamawarnedtheSyrianregimenottocrosstheredline of using biological and chemical weapons. The reasoning was that if al-Assad would usechemicalweaponsthiswouldleadtoanAmericanmilitaryresponse.20WhentheSyrianregime‘crossedtheredline’byusingchemicalweaponson21August2013inGhouta,itdidnotpromptanUS interventionby PresidentObama, becausehedid not obtain approval by theAmericanCongress.21 As a reaction to the chemical weapons attacks in Ghouta, the United Kingdom’sgovernment declared in a motion: “(...) the use of chemical weapons is a war crime undercustomarylawandacrimeagainsthumanity,andthattheprincipleofhumanitarianinterventionprovidesasoundlegalbasisfortakingaction.”22However,itwouldnotgetthatfar,sinceRussia

19UNITEDNATIONSSECURITYCOUNCIL,24August2016,ThirdReportoftheOrganisationfortheProhibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism UN DocS/2016/738, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2016_738.pdf.; UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, 21 October 2016,FourthReportoftheOrganisationfortheProhibitionofChemicalWeapons-UnitedNationsJointInvestigative Mechanism, UN Doc S/2016/888, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2016_888.pdf; UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, 26 October 2017,SeventhReportoftheOrganisationfortheProhibitionofChemicalWeapons-UnitedNationsJointInvestigative Mechanism, UN Doc S/2017/904,https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2017_904.pdf;R.BARBER,“UnitingforPeaceNotAgression:RespondingtoChemical Weapons in SyriaWithout Breaking the Law”, Journal of Conflict and Security Law,2018,71-110.20M.SCHARF,“StrikingaGrotianMoment:HowtheSyrianAirstrikesChangedInternationalLawRelatingtoHumanitarianIntervention”,ChicagoJournalofInternationalLaw,2019,586-614.;A.LAGERWALL,“ThreatsofandActualMilitaryStrikesAgainstSyria–2013and2017”,inT.RUYS,O.CORTENandA.HOFER(eds),TheUseofForceinInternationalLaw–aCase-basedApproach,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,829.21HUMANRIGHTSWATCH,“AttacksonGhouta:AnalysisofAllegedUseofChemicalWeaponsinSyria”, 10 September 2013, www.hrw.org/report/2013/09/10/attacks-ghouta/analysis-alleged-use-chemical-weapons-syria.(consultation4april2019).22 House of Commons Debates, volume 566, column 1426, 29 augustus 2013,https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm130829/debtext/130829-0001.htm#1308298000351; C. GRAY, International Law and the Use of Force,Oxford, OxfordUniversityPress,2018,57.

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could obtain a diplomatic solution whereby the Syrian government ratified the ChemicalWeaponsConventiononSeptember14,2013andthereforecommittedtodestroy itschemicalweapons under the supervision of the Organisation for the Prohibition of ChemicalWeapons(OPCW).23Bytheendof2014,thejointOPCW-UNmissionannouncedthatitdestroyed96%ofthedeclaredchemicalstockpileofSyria24andagainon4January2016theOPCWstatedthatallchemicalweaponsdeclaredbySyriahadbeendestroyed.25NotwithstandingthedestructionofSyria’s chemical weapons, independent inquiries found on several occasions that chemicalweaponswere still beingusedbyParties inSyria, thisbybothgovernment forcesand ISIS (cf.infra).26

2.4.1 InterventionbytheUSinSyriain2017

On4April2017, theSyrian regimeagainattackedcivilianpopulationswithchemicalweapons,this time in the town of Khan Shaykhun in South Idlib.27 The international community rapidlycondemnedtheattack.However,RussiaandSyriareactedbystatingthattherewasinsufficientevidence that the Syrian regime was responsible for the attack in Idlib. The OPCW-UN JointinvestigativemechanismnonethelessconcludedthattheSyrianAirForcewasresponsibleforthesarinattackinSouthIdlib.28TheInternationalCommissionofInquiryontheSyrianArabRepublicappointedbytheUNHumanRightsCouncilalsoconcludedthattheattacksfoundtheirorigininSyrian controlled territory.29 The Trump administration claimed that the use of forbidden

23 Y. NAQVI, “Crossing the red line: The use of chemical weapons in Syria and what shouldhappennow”,InternationalReviewoftheRedCross,2019,1-35.24 OPCW, “Closure of the OPCW-UN Joint Mission”, 30 September 2014,https://opcw.unmissions.org/.25OPCW,“DestructionofSyrianChemicalWeaponsCompleted”,pressrelease,4January2016,availableat:www.opcw.org/news/article/destruction-of-syrian-chemical-weapons-completed/.26 UN Press Release DC/3668, 27 October 2016), United Nations, Security Council ConsidersFourth Report by Joint Investigative Mechanism,https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/dc3668.doc.htm; UN Press Release DC/3651, 30 Augustus2016,UnitedNations,JointInvestigativeMechanismPresentsItsThirdReporttoSecurityCouncil,https://www .un.org/press/en/2016/dc3651.doc.htm; Representative of the IndependentInternationalCommissionofInquityontheSyrianArabRepublicoftheHumanRightsCouncilonItsThirty-SeventhSession,1February2018,UNDoc.A/HRC/37/72.27A. LAGERWALL, “ThreatsofandActualMilitaryStrikesAgainstSyria–2013and2017”, inT.RUYS, O. CORTEN and A. HOFER (eds), The Use of Force in International Law – a Case-basedApproach,Oxford,OxfordUniversity Press, 848.;Meeting 7919of theUnitedNations SecurityCouncil(7April2017),UNDoc.S/PV.7919(2017).28RT,“UN-OPCWInvestigators ‘Confident’Damascus IstoBlameforAprilSarinAttack”,RT,27October2017,www.rt.com/news/407901-opcw-jim-syria-chemical-attack/.29Reportof the Independent InternationalCommissionof InquiryontheSyrianArabRepublic,

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chemicalweapons inSyriawouldbeared lineandconsequentlyon7April2017twoUSnavalvessels launched from theMediterranean Sea a total of 59missiles on theAl-ShayratmilitaryairbaseinHoms(controlledbytheSyrianregime).30ThestrikewassupportedbytheEuropeanUnion, the United Kingdom and several Middle-Eastern countries.31 The United States actedaloneandunilaterallyanddidnotarticulatealegalrationalefortheairstrike.32

PresidentTrumpstatedaftertheattack:“ItisinthisvitalnationalsecurityinterestoftheUnitedStatestopreventanddeterthespreadanduseofdeadlychemicalweapons”.33FormerUSAmbassadortotheUnitedNationsNikkiHaleyremarked inherspeechtotheUNonthe7thofApril that: “When the international community consistently fails in its duty to act collectively,thereare timeswhen statesare compelled to take theirownaction”.34 Russiadeclared, in thewords of Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, it to be: “an act of aggression under a completelyinvented pretext”.35 Russia stated that the unilateral use of force by the United States was aviolationofinternationallawandmorespecificallytheprohibitionontheuseofforce.Chinaontheotherhandhadamorenuancedposition.Itcalledforapoliticalsolutiontotheconflictandinsistedthatmilitarymeanswouldnotsolvetheproblem.36MichaelFallon,theBritishSecretaryofStateforDefencedeclaredthat:“wefullysupportthisstrike,itwaslimited,itwasappropriate,anditwasdesignedtotargettheaircraftandtheequipmentthattheUnitedStatesbelievewereused in the chemical attack and to deter President Assad from carrying out future chemicalattacks”.37 During a UN Security Council meeting of 7 April 2017, the UK stated that they UNDoc.A/HRC/36/55,8August2017,par.77.30A.SANDERS-ZAKRE,“TimelineofSyrianChemicalWeaponsActivity,2012-2019”.ArmsControlAssociation. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Activity.31M.SCHARF,“StrikingaGrotianMoment:HowtheSyrianAirstrikesChangedInternationalLawRelatingtoHumanitarianIntervention”,ChicagoJournalofInternationalLaw,2019,586-614.32M.SCHARF,“StrikingaGrotianMoment:HowtheSyrianAirstrikesChangedInternationalLawRelatingtoHumanitarianIntervention”,ChicagoJournalofInternationalLaw,2019,586-614.33NEWYORKTIMES,“TranscriptandVideo:TrumpSpeaksAboutStrikesinSyria,TheNewYorkTimes, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/world/middleeast/transcript-video-trump-airstrikes-syria.html34UNITEDSTATESMISSIONTOTHEUNITEDNATIONS,“RemarksataUNSecurityCouncilMeetingon the Situation in Syria, Ambassador Nikki Haley”, 7 April 2017,https://usun.state.gov/remarks/775535 BBC, “Syria War: World Reaction to US Missile Attack”, BBC, 7 April 2017,https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-3952608936Meeting7919oftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(7April2017),UNDoc.S/PV.7919(2017).37A.ANUSKHA,“SyriaAirstrike:UKoffersverbalbutNotMilitarySupporttoUS”,TheGuardian,7April 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/07/syria-airstrikes-uk-offers-verbal-but-not-military-support-to-us.; M. SCHARF, “Striking a Grotian Moment: How the SyrianAirstrikesChangedInternationalLawRelatingtoHumanitarianIntervention”,ChicagoJournalof

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supported the United States airstrike and that it was a proportionate response to thehumanitarian distress in Syria and it was a strong effort to save lives.38 France and GermanymadeajointstatementregardingtheairstrikeonSyria.Init,theystatedthatPresidental-Assadwasthesoleresponsibleandtherepeateduseofchemicalweaponsdemandedsanctions.39AttheUNSCmeetingof7April, Francestated that theairstrikewasa legitimate response to thechemicalweaponsattacksandthatthefutureuseoftheseweaponswillnotbetolerated.40

The states that showed political support for the US airstrikewhere: Australia, Canada,Israel,Italy,Japan,Saudi-Arabia,TurkeyandUkraine.Thestrikesweresupportedbymanystatesbuttheydidnotmention ifthesestrikeswere launchedinconformitywith international law.41The European Union found the intention of the US to prevent an deter the use of chemicalweaponsunderstandable,but insistedthatasolutionshouldbefoundintheframeworkoftheUnitedNationsandthatapoliticalsolutionistheonlywayforward.However,theairstrikeswerealsocondemnedbyseveralstates.Bolivia, Iran,Sweden,SyriaandUruguaywhereallcriticalofthe US airstrike, with arguments ranging from stating that the airstrikes where clearly illegalunderinternationallawtostatementsthattheprinciplesofinternationallawandtheprovisionsof theUNCharter should be followed. Senegal and Kazakhstan insisted on a political solutioninsteadofamilitaryone.42

The UN Secretary General, António Guterres, addressed in a letter to the UNSC thecontinuousstalemateintheUNSCregardingthesituationinSyriaandthehopetoresolveit:“AspreviouslydeterminedbytheSecurityCouncil,theuseofchemicalweaponsanywhereconstitutesathreat to internationalpeaceandsecurityandaseriousviolationof international law. Ihopethat theSecurityCouncilwillnowbeabletocometogetherandusethetoolsavailableto it to InternationalLaw,2019,586-614. 38Meeting7919oftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(7April2017),UNDoc.S/PV.7919(2017).39 Die Bundesregierung, 7 April 2017, Joint statement by Federal Chanchellor Merkel andPresident Hollande of France following the air strikes in Syria,https://archiv.bundesregierung.de/archiv-de/meta/startseite/joint-statement-by-federal-chancellor-merkel-and-president-hollande-of-france-following-the-air-strikes-in-syria-44285840Meeting7919oftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(7April2017),UNDoc.S/PV.7919(2017).41A. LAGERWALL, “ThreatsofandActualMilitaryStrikesAgainstSyria–2013and2017”, inT.RUYS, O. CORTEN and A. HOFER (eds), The Use of Force in International Law – a Case-basedApproach,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,849.42A. LAGERWALL, “ThreatsofandActualMilitaryStrikesAgainstSyria–2013and2017”, inT.RUYS, O. CORTEN and A. HOFER (eds), The Use of Force in International Law – a Case-basedApproach,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,850.;BBC,“SyriaWar:WorldReactiontoUSMissileAttack”, BBC, 7 April 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-39526089; M. PARK,“Who’s with the US on Syria strike and who isn’t”, CNN, 9 April 2017,https://edition.cnn.com/2017/04/07/world/syria-us-strike-world-reaction/index.html

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takeconcretestepstoensurethatthosewhohaveusedchemicalweaponsareheldaccountable,in order to deter and put an end to those inhumane acts. There can be no impunity for suchabhorrentattacks”.43

2.4.2 InterventionbytheUS,theUKandFranceinSyriain2018

OnApril7,2018anotherchemicalweaponsattacktookplace,thistimeinthetownofDouma.Morethan70civilianswerekilledintheattack.44TheOPCWconcludedthatvariouschlorinatedchemicals were found at the attack site.45 The OPCW-UN Joint investigative mechanism’smandatewasnotextendedduetovetoesusedbyRussia toblockresolutionsthatwouldhaveextended the mandate, therefore no conclusive perpetrator could be held responsible.46Nevertheless, this attack was condemned by the international community and a militaryresponseagainsttargetscontrolledbytheSyrianregime,onApril142018,wasquicklysetupbythe United States, the United Kingdom and France. They had no mandate by the UNSC,therefore,thebombingswereconductedonaunilateralbasis.Thisinterventionwasundertakenonthebasisofretaliationandhumanitarianarguments.

President Trump stated that: “The nations of Britain, France and the United States ofAmericahavemarshalledtheirrighteouspoweragainstbarbarismandbrutality.(…)Thepurposeofouractionstonightistoestablishastrongdeterrentagainsttheproduction,spread,anduseofchemicalweapons”.47Onthe13thofApril2018theSecretaryofDefenceJamesMattisreleasedapressstatementontheairstriketheyconductedagainstSyria. In thereportMattisstates that:“theUnited States have an important national interest in averting aworsening catastrophe in

43 Secretary-General of the United Nations, “Letter Dated 28 April 2017 from the Secretary-GeneralAddressedtothePresidentoftheSecurityCouncil–Progress intheEliminationoftheSyrianChemicalWeaponsProgramme”,28April2017,UNDocS/2017/373.44 WORLD HEALTH ORGANISATION, “WHO Concerned about Suspected Chemical Attacks inSyria”, 11 April 2018, https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/11-04-2018-who-concerned-about-suspected-chemical-attacks-in-syria.45 InterimReportof theOPCWFact-FindingMission in SyriaRegarding the IncidentofAllegedUse of Toxic Chemicals as aWeapon in Douma, Syrian Arab Republic, 7 April 2018, UNDoc.S/1645(2018).;Y.NAQVI,“Crossingtheredline:TheuseofchemicalweaponsinSyriaandwhatshouldhappennow”,InternationalReviewoftheRedCross,2019,1-35.46 Y. NAQVI, “Crossing the red line: The use of chemical weapons in Syria and what shouldhappennow”,InternationalReviewoftheRedCross,2019,1-35.47 BBC, “Syria Air Strikes: US and Allies Attack ‘ChemicalWeapons Sites”,BBC,14 April 2018,https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-43762251;Y.NAQVI,“Crossingtheredline:TheuseofchemicalweaponsinSyriaandwhatshouldhappennow”,InternationalReviewoftheRedCross,2019,1-35.

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Syria and specially deterring the use and proliferation of Chemical weapons”.48 Again it ismentioned that the strike was to prevent chemical weapons from being used. The USAmbassadortotheUN,NikkiHaley,statedintheUNSCon14April2018:“weactedtodeterthefutureuseofchemicalweaponsbyholdingtheSyrianregimeresponsibleforitsatrocitiesagainsthumanity”.49Theairstrikewasdonetodetertheuseofchemicalweaponsanditwasnotdoneinrevenge,punishmentorshowofforce.50

FrancealsomadeastatementattheUNSecurityCouncilemergencysessionof14April2018. France insisted that Syria violated all the chemical-weapons obligations under theChemical Weapons Convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol. It violated the principle ofdistinction, precaution and proportionality, all considered fundamental rules of humanitarianlaw. In addition, Syria violated Security Council resolutions 2118, 2209 and 2235. The use ofchemical weapons also constitutes a war crime under the Rome Statute of the InternationalCriminalCourt.Francestatedtheuseofchemicalweaponsis“animmediatedangertotheSyrianpeopleandtoourcollectivesecurity”.51AccordingtoFrancetheiractionwasfullyinlinewiththeobjectives and values of the Charter of the United Nations. In their words: “This action wasindeed necessary in order to address the repeated violations by the Syrian regime of itsobligations—obligationsstemmingfromthelaw,treatiesanditsowncommitments”.52FrancealsoreferredtotheInternationalPartnershipagainstImpunityfortheUseofChemicalWeaponswhichtheylaunchedinJanuary2018.Inthiscontexttheystatedtheywillneverallowimpunityfortheuseofchemicalweapons.53

The UK legitimized the attack on the grounds of humanitarian intervention.54 The UKGovernmentconsideredthattheUKmilitaryactionwaslegalunderinternationallawbecauseofthehumanitarianatrocities thatwerebeingcommittedagainst theSyrianpeopleand todeter

48UnitedStatesDepartmentofDefense,13April2018,StatementbySecretaryJamesN.Mattison Syria, https://dod.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/1493610/statement-by-secretary-james-n-mattis-on-syria/49UNITED STATESMISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, “Remarks at an Emergency UN SecurityCouncilMeetingonUS,UKandFrenchMilitaryStrikesinResponsetoSyria’sChemicalWeaponsUse”,14April2018,https://usun.state.gov/highlights/8388.50 UN Meetings Coverage SC13296, 14 April 2018, Following Air Strikes against SuspectedChemical Weapons Sites in Syria, Security Council Rejects Proposal to Condemn Aggression,https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13296.doc.htm51 Meeting 8233 of the United Nations Security Council (14 April 2018), UN Doc. S/PV/8233(2018).52Ibid.53Ibid.54PRIMEMINISTER’SOFFICE,PolicyPaper–Syriaaction–UKGovernmentlegalposition,14April2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/syria-action-uk-government-legal-position/syria-action-uk-government-legal-position(consultationon17April2018).

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thefurtheruseofchemicalweapons.AccordingtotheUKgovernmenttheUKisallowedtotakemeasures toendhumanitariansufferingonthebasisofhumanitarian interventionwhenthreeconditionsaremet:

“(i)thereisconvincingevidence,generallyacceptedbytheinternationalcommunityasawhole,ofextremehumanitariandistressonalargescale,requiringimmediateandurgentrelief;(ii) itmustbeobjectivelyclearthatthereisnopracticablealternativetotheuseofforceif livesaretobesaved;and(iii) the proposed use of force must be necessary and proportionate to the aim of relief ofhumanitarian suffering and must be strictly limited in time and in scope to this aim (i.e. theminimumnecessarytoachievethatendandfornootherpurpose)”.55AccordingtotheUKgovernment,theseconditionshavebeenmetbyactionsofSyriaintheuseof chemicalweapons.First,TheSyrian regimehasbeenusingchemicalweapons several timesduring the conflict since 2013. Second, UNSC resolutions condemning the use of chemicalweaponsandtosetupanimpartialinvestigativemechanismhavebeenblockedseveraltimesbyRussiaandotheravenueshavenotdissuadedSyriatousechemicalweapons.AccordingtotheUK there was no practicable alternative to the use of force for the purpose of deterring thefutureuseofchemicalweapons.Third,thestrikewasnecessaryandproportionateinendingthehumanitariansufferingofSyriancivilians.56 China stated in theUNSecurityCouncil emergency sessionon14April 2018 that: “anyunilateralmilitaryactionrunscountertothepurposesandprinciplesoftheCharteroftheUnitedNations,violatestheprinciplesofinternationallawandthebasicnormsgoverninginternationalrelations”.57Chinaexpressesthewillforpoliticalsettlement.Inaddition,atapressconferenceofthe Foreign Ministry on 16 April 2018 China stressed its viewpoint that international lawprohibitsretaliatoryforceagainstillegalbehaviourandunilateralhumanitarianinterferencehasnogroundininternationallaw.58 Russia again declared the airstrikes to be an act of aggression in violation of the UN

55PRIMEMINISTER’SOFFICE,PolicyPaper–Syriaaction–UKGovernmentlegalposition,14April2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/syria-action-uk-government-legal-position/syria-action-uk-government-legal-position(consultationon17April2018).56Ibid.57 Meeting 8233 of the United Nations Security Council (14 April 2018), UN Doc. S/PV/8233(2018).58 Meeting 8233 of the United Nations Security Council (14 April 2018), UN Doc. S/PV/8233(2018);A.DUNKELBERG,R. INGBER,P.PILLAIandE.POTHELET, “MappingStates’Reactions tothe Syria Strikes of April 2018”, 2018, https://www.justsecurity.org/55157/mapping-states-reactions-syria-strikes-april-2018/

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Charterandthenormsandprinciplesof international law.59Russiaconsideredtheairstrikes inSyriaasanactofaggressionagainstasovereignstateandinviolationoftheUNCharterandthenormsandprinciplesofinternationallaw.Theyproposedadraftresolutionthatcondemnedtheaggressiveairstrike,whichwasnotacceptedbytheUNSC.60

Severalstatesshowedtheirpoliticalsupportforthe interventionbytheUS,theUKandFrance but did not mention or defend the legality of the strikes. Australia, Albania, Belgium,Bahrain, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia,Germany,Greece,Ireland,Israel,Italy,Japan,Jordan,Lithuania,Macedonia,NATO,NewZealand,Oman, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, The Netherlands, Norway,Turkey, Ukraine and United Arab Emirates all expressed their political support to theintervention. Other states politically condemned the intervention such as: Algeria, Morocco,Sudan,SwitzerlandandTunisia,andothersmentionedtheillegalityofthestrikesuchas:Bolivia,Costa Rica, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Iran, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, South Africa, Syria andVenezuela.61ThebroadsupportforthestrikeswasreflectedinavoteattheUNSC,whereadraftresolutionproposedbyRussiacondemningthestrikewasvotedagainstby8votesagainstand4abstentions.62

59 A. DUNKELBERG, R. INGBER, P. PILLAI and E. POTHELET, “Mapping States’ Reactions to theSyriaStrikesofApril2018”,2018,https://www.justsecurity.org/55157/mapping-states-reactions-syria-strikes-april-2018.; M. SCHARF, “Striking a Grotian Moment: How the Syrian AirstrikesChanged International Law Relating to Humanitarian Intervention”, Chicago Journal ofInternationalLaw,2019,586-614.60 Meeting 8233 of the United Nations Security Council (14 April 2018), UN Doc. S/PV/8233(2018).61 A. DUNKELBERG, R. INGBER, P. PILLAI and E. POTHELET, “Mapping States’ Reactions to theSyriaStrikesofApril2018”,2018,https://www.justsecurity.org/55157/mapping-states-reactions-syria-strikes-april-2018/; H. ELLIS-PETERSEN and P. BEAUMONT, “World Reacts to OvernightStrikes on Syria by US, UK and French Forces”, The Guardian, 14 April 2018,https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/14/airstrikes-syria-world-reacts-bombing-us-uk-french-forces.;R.BARBER,“UnitingforPeaceNotAgression:RespondingtoChemicalWeaponsinSyriaWithoutBreakingtheLaw”,JournalofConflictandSecurityLaw,2018,71-110.62 R. BARBER, “Uniting for Peace Not Agression: Responding to Chemical Weapons in SyriaWithout Breaking the Law”, Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 2018, 78.; UN MeetingsCoverage SC13296, 14 April 2018, Following Air Strikes against Suspected Chemical WeaponsSites in Syria, Security Council Rejects Proposal to Condemn Aggression,https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13296.doc.htm

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2.5. UnitedNationsSecurityCouncilresolutionsregardingSyriaInthissectionachronologicaloverviewofthemostimportantUNSC(draft)resolutionsregardingthecivilwarinSyriawillbedescribed.

On4October2011,adraftresolutionpreparedbyFrance,Germany,PortugalandtheUKcondemningsystematichumanrightsviolationsbytheSyrianregimewasblockedbythevetoofChinaandRussia.63BothChinaandRussiamotivatedtheirvetobasedontherighttoacountry'ssovereigntyandnon-interventionby the international community.Theyalsodidnotbelieve inthe appropriateness of sanctions to stop the violence by both parties to the conflict. Russiaarguedthat themodelused inLibya ('Responsibility toProtect' implementedbyNATO)shouldnotbeused.TheMinistryofForeignAffairsofRussiaelaboratedontheso-calledexcessesoftheinterventioninLibya:Itdidnotresolvetheconflictbutaggravatedthecivilwar,theno-flyzoneledtobombingsofoilinstallations,aTV-stationandciviliantargetsandthearmsembargoledtoablockadeofhumanitarianaids.64YetRussiaclarifiedthattheyarenotsupportersoftheAssadregimebutareinfavourofapeacefulsolution.ChinareiterateditsdemandthatactionsbytheUNSecurityCouncil shouldbe legitimizedby theUNCharterand the international communityshouldtakeintoaccounttheprincipleofnon-interventioninthesovereigntyofastate.65

On4February2012,aproposalmadebyalargecoalitionofcountries(Bahrain,Colombia,Egypt, France,Germany, Jordan,Kuwait, Libya,Morocco,Oman,Portugal,Qatar, SaudiArabia,Togo, Tunisia, Turkey,UnitedArabEmirates,UnitedKingdomand theUnited States)washeldbackbythevetoesofRussiaandChina.ThisproposaldemandedanendtotheviolencebybothpartiesandproposedapeaceplanledbySyria.66Amilitaryaction,legitimizedunderArticle42oftheUNcharter,wasexplicitlynotincludedtomeettheconcernsofChinaandRussia,butwithoutresult.67Russiaarguedthatitwasanunbalancedproposalthatonlyfocusedonal-Assad'stroopsandnotontheviolentactsoftheopposition.Russiadenouncedthefactthattheothermembers

63 Draft Resolution S/2011/612 United Nations Security Council (4 October 2011), UN Doc.S/2011/612(2011).64 The Ministry of Foreign Affaires of the Russian Federation, 5 October 2011, Statement inExplanationofVotebyVitalyChurkin,PermanentRepresentativeoftheRussianFederationtotheUN, on the Draft Resolution on the Situation in Syria, New York, October 4, 2011.https://rusemb.org.uk/press/24865 Meeting6627of theUnitedNations SecurityCouncil (4October2011).UNDoc. S/PV.6627(2011).66 Draft Resolution S/2012/77 United Nations Security Council (4 February 2012), UN Doc.S/2012/77(2012).67 A. GARWOOD-GOWERS, “The responsibility to protect and the Arab Spring: Libya as the

exception, Syria as thenorm?”University ofNew SouthWales Law Journal, 2013, 594-618.

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insinuatedonregimechangeinsteadofsupportingapeaceplanledbySyria.Chinareiterateditsclaimofnon-interventionandrespectforthesovereigntyofSyria.68

Resolution2042wasunanimouslyapprovedbytheUNSecurityCouncilon14April2012.This approved the 6-point plan of Kofi Annan and sent 30 observers to Syria to monitor thecease-fire agreement enforced by the Kofi-Annan peace plan.69 Resolution 2043 wasunanimouslyadoptedon21April2012. Inthisresolution,the30observerswereraisedto300andaUNSupervisionMissioninSyria(UNSMIS)wassetupinSyriatomonitortheplan.70

Alsoon19July2012theproposalofFrance,Germany,Portugal,theUK,andtheUSwasterminatedby the vetoesofChinaandRussia. In thisproposal, theUNSupervisionMission inSyriawouldbeextendedandtheUNSecurityCouncilthreatenedwithsanctionsiftheviolencedidnotend.71RussiaandChinaarguedthattheresolutiondidnotcondemntheviolationsoftheoppositionandonlythoseofal-Assad.Italsodidnotexplicitlyexcludeamilitaryinterventionbythe international community.72 The disagreement about the proposals revolved around twocentral problems: firstly, the interpretation of the events on the ground and secondly, thereactiontotheviolenceinSyria.Westerncountriessawthesituationasaviolentrepressionofpro-democracy protests by the authoritarian al-Assad regime. The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India,ChinaandSouthAfrica)countriesandespeciallyChinaandRussia,on theotherhand,sawthesituation as a legitimate government response to armed rebels attacking the government'sinfrastructure. On the one hand, theWestern countries and the Arab League argued for thedeposition of al-Assad and, on the other hand, China and Russia countered all proposals thatincludedasenseofregimechange.73

Resolution 2118 was unanimously adopted on September 27, 2013. In it, the Syriangovernment'schemicalweaponsattacksonitsownpopulationinGhoutawerecondemned.Theinternational community’s reaction was swift. Resolution 2118 reinforced the Framework inwhich Syriawould join the CWCand established a timeline inwhich Syria had to destroy andeliminateitschemicalweaponsandwouldallowon-siteinspections.Resolution2118madeveryclearthatchemicalweaponswereprohibitedwiththefollowingwords:“determinedthattheuse 68 Meeting6711of theUnitedNations SecurityCouncil (4 February2012).UNDoc.S/PV.6711(2012).69Resolution2042of theUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil (14April2012).UNDoc.S/RES/2042(2012).70Resolution2043of theUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil (21April2012).UNDoc.S/RES/2043(2012).71 Draft Resolution S/2012/538 United Nations Security Council (19 July 2012), UN Doc.S/2012/538(2012).72 Meeting6810oftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(12December2012).UNDoc.S/PV.6810(2012).73 A. GARWOOD-GOWERS, “The responsibility to protect and the Arab Spring: Libya as theexception,Syriaasthenorm?”UniversityofNewSouthWalesLawJournal,2013,594-618.

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of chemical weapons anywhere constituted a threat to international peace and security, andcalledforthefullimplementationoftheOPCW”.74Resolution2118gaveSyriatimetomid-2014todestroytheirchemicalweaponsstockwiththehelpoftheOrganizationfortheProhibitionofChemicalWeapons(OPCW).75 On 22May 2014 a draft resolution was vetoed by Russia and China that would havereferred the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court. Chinabased its vetoon theargument that theprincipleofcomplementaryandthe judicial sovereigntyofstatesshouldberespected.76TwootherdraftresolutionswerevetoedbyRussiaandChinain2016.Onthe8thofOctober a French-Spanish proposed draft resolution that called for an immediate end ofbombardmentsandmilitaryflightsaboveAleppo,wasvetoedbyRussia.AccordingtoRussiathedraft resolution was “politically-charged” and “unbalanced”.77 Again, on December 5 2016, adraft resolution was vetoed by Russia and China. This draft resolution asked for the end ofattacks on Aleppo for a period of at least one week and would have given access forhumanitarianassistance.78On28of February2017againamotion for resolutiondrawnupbyFrance,theUKandtheUScondemnedthechemicalattackandreiteratedtheSecurityCouncil’swarningtoactunderChapterVIIoftheUNCharterwhen illegalchemicalweaponswereused,was vetoed by Russia and China.79 In 2017, four other draft resolutionwere vetoed solely byRussia. On April 12 2017, Russia blocked a resolution that condemned the chemical weapons

74Resolution2118of theUnitedNations SecurityCouncil (27SeptemberApril 2013).UNDoc.S/RES/2118(2013).75Resolution2118of theUnitedNations SecurityCouncil (27SeptemberApril 2013).UNDoc.S/RES/2118(2013).76DraftResolutionS/2014/348oftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(22May2014),UNDoc.S/2014/348 (2014).; UN Meetings Coverage SC11407, 22 May 2014, Referral of Syria toInternationalCriminalCourtFailsasNegativeVotesPreventSecurityCouncilfromAdoptingDraftResolution,https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11407.doc.htm.77DraftResolutionS/2016/846oftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(8October2016),UNDoc.S/2016/846(2016).;UNMeetingsCoverageSC12545,8October2016, SecurityCouncilFailstoAdopt Two Draft Resolutions on Syria, Despite Appeals for Action Preventing ImpendingHumanitarianCatastropheinAleppo,https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12545.doc.htm.;TheMinistry of Foreign Affaires of the Russian Federation, 9 October 2016, Foreign Ministrystatement in connection with Russia’s veto of the French-proposed UN Security Council draftresolution on Syria on October 8, 2016, http://special.mid.ru/en/web/guest/maps/sy/-/asset_publisher/9fcjSOwMERcf/content/id/2494622.78DraftResolutionS/2016/1026oftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(5December2016),UNDoc.S/2016/1026(2016).;UNMeetingsCoverageSC12609,5December2016,SecurityCouncilFailstoAdoptDraftResolutiontoEndAttacksonAleppoasTwoPermanentMembersCastVeto,https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12609.doc.htm.79DraftResolution S/2017/172of theUnitedNations SecurityCouncil (28 February2017),UNDoc.S/2017/172(2017).

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attackonKhanShaykhun.According toRussiaan independentandobjective investigationwasneeded before condemning certain parties.80 The 24th October, 16th November and 17thNovember2017RussiavetoedadraftresolutionthatrenewedtheJointInvestigativeMechanismoftheUnitedNationsandtheOPCWontheuseofchemicalweaponsinSyria.81Todate,thelastresolution vetoed by Russia was on 10 April 2018. This draft resolution was proposed as areactiontothechemicalweaponsattacksonDouma.Thedraftresolutionwantedtolaunchanindependentmechanismofinvestigationintotheincidentandidentifythepersonsresponsible.82

80DraftResolutionS/2017/315of theUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil (12April 2017,UNDoc.S/2017/315 (2017).; UN Meetings Coverage SC12791, 10 April 2017, Security Council Fails toAdopt Resolution Condemning Chemical Weapons Use in Syria, Following Veto by RussianFederation,https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12791.doc.htm.81 Draft Resolution S/2017/884 of the UnitedNations Security Council (24October 2017),UNDoc.S/2017/884(2017).;DraftResolutionS/2017/962oftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(16November 2017), UN Doc. S/2017/962 (2017).; Draft Resolution S/2017/970 of the UnitedNations Security Council (17 November 2017), UN Doc. S/2017/970 (2017).; UN MeetingsCoverage SC13040, 24 October 2017, Security Council Fails to Renew Mandate of JointInvestigativeMechanismonChemicalWeaponsUseinSyria,asPermanentMembercastsVeto,https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc13040.doc.htm.; UN Meetings Coverage SC13072, 16November 2017, Security Council Fails to Adopt 2Draft Resolutions on ExtendingMandateOfJoint Mechanism Investigating Chemical Weapons Attacks in Syria,https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc13072.doc.htm.; UN Meetings Coverage SC13076, 17November2017,SecurityCouncil Fails for FourthTime toRenewMandateof JointMechanismInvestigating Chemical Weapons Attacks in Syria,https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc13076.doc.htm.82DraftResolutionS/2018/321oftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil (10April2018),UNDoc.S/2018/321(2018).;UNMeetingsCoverageSC/13288,10April2018,FollowingThreeDraftTextson Chemical Weapons Attack in Syria, Security Council Fails to Agree Upon IndependentInvestigativeMechanism,https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13288.doc.htm.

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2.6. ConclusionThecivilwarinSyriahasevolvedfromcivilunrestaftertheArabSpringtoalargescaleconflictwithavarietyofdifferentactors,fromtheSyriangovernmentbackedbyRussiaagainsttheFreeSyrianarmyandotherpoliticalgroups, to the fightagainst ISISandthe interventionby theUSand other countries. This situation has led to a humanitarian catastrophe for the Syrianpopulation resulting in thousands of deaths andmillions of refugees and internally displacedpersons.TheSyrianarmyhasnotbackeddownon itseffortstostopthecivilwarandusedonseveral occasions internationally forbidden chemical weapons. Despite the continuous humanrights violations in Syria, an international responsehasbeenobstructedby a stalemate in theUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilthroughtheuseofvetopowers.ThecontinuesvetoesbyRussiaandChinathwartedallpossibilitiestotakecollectivemeasuresundertheauspicesoftheUnitedNations Security Council. The repeated use of chemical weapons and deadlock in the UnitedNationsSecurityCouncilintroducedanewstageintheconflictinSyria,inthesensethattheUS(in 2017) and the US, the UK and France (in 2018) engaged in a unilateral airstrike, withoutSecurity Council authorisation, against Syria as a reaction to the use of these weapons. Bothinterventions were internationally supported by several states, without acknowledging thelegality of the strike. No explicit legal justification was given, but the US rationalized thisinterventionontwogrounds.First,theUSarguedthatitisinthevitalnationalsecurityinterestof the US to end the use of chemical weapons. Second, it stated that the intervention wasneededtodetertheuseandpreventfutureattackswithchemicalweapons.FrancefollowedthereasoningoftheUSby insistingthatthe interventionwasconductedtodetertheuseoftheseweapons. The UK, however, legitimized the intervention on the doctrine of humanitarianintervention and argued that the conditionswere fulfilled to intervene unilaterally to end thehumanitariancatastropheandhumanrightsviolationscausedbytheuseofchemicalweapons.The statements of theUS, theUK and France can be possibly categorized under self-defence,countermeasures or reprisals and humanitarian intervention. In the following section thesepossiblelegaljustificationsfortheinterventionbytheUS,theUKandFrancewillbeanalysedinthecontextofcontemporaryinternationalpubliclaw.

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Chapter3:InternationalLawontheUseofForce

3.1. Introduction

Asdemonstrated inChapter2, the international communityhasbeenunable to takeaction inthe case of Syria due to the deadlock in the UNSC by the continuous veto use of Russia.Consequently,theUSintervenedin2017andtheUS,theUKandFranceagainintervenedin2018inSyriaafterthechemicalweaponsattacksbytheSyrianregimeagainst itsownpopulation.InthefollowingchaptersItisconsideredifthisintervention,byairstrikesintheterritoryofSyria,islegalunderinternationalpubliclaw.TheUSlegitimizedtheinterventiononvitalnationalsecurityinterest.Therefore,thefollowingchapterlooksatthecontemporaryjusadbelluminthelightofthe intervention in Syria. First, a historical introduction of the jus ad bellum is provided.Subsequently, the prohibition on the use of force and its exceptions is analysed. Finally, thisframeworkisappliedtotheinterventionsinSyria.

3.2. JusadBellum:Historicalintroduction

JusAdBellum isthelawgoverningtherecoursetoforce.83Jusadbellum, inclassicaltimes,hasoftenbeenlinkedwiththenotionof‘just’and‘unjust’wars.84Thenotionof‘just’warmeansthattheremustbealegitimatereasontostartawarwithanothercountryandonlyasalastresorttosolveaconflict.85Thiswasbasedonamoralisticassumptiontowardsconflict.86Oneofthemainconditionsof this justcausewas that itcouldonlyoccurasa reactiontowardsanotherstate’sbehaviourorasareactionagainstapriordelict.Thisdoctrinehadseveralshortcomings,not inthe least that therewasnoagreedupon listof limitative circumstances that amount toa justwar.Thisdoctrinewasrapidlyabandonedinthe19thcenturyand, inthisera, international lawdid not forbid the use of war. It only limited measures short of war, like retorsions andreprisals.87Stateshadtheright touse forcetoensuretheir rightsor toprotect their interests.

83 T. RUYS, “International Law on the Use of Force” in J. WOUTERS, P. DE MAN and N.VERLINDEN(eds.),Armedconflictsandthelaw,Antwerp,Intersentia,2016,109.84 C. HENDERSON, The use of force and international law, Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress,2018,10.85M.E.O’CONNELL, “The prohibition on the use of force” inN.D.WHITE and C. HENDERSON,ResearchHandbookonInternationalConflictandSecurityLaw,Cheltenham,EdwardElgar,2013,90.86 C. HENDERSON, The use of force and international law, Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress,2018,10.87 T. RUYS, “International Law on the Use of Force” in J. WOUTERS, P. DE MAN and N.VERLINDEN(eds.),Armedconflictsandthelaw,Antwerp,Intersentia,2016,107-150.

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International lawwas indifferent to theuseof forceby states and itwas seen as a pursuit ofpolicybyothermeans.88Thefirstinstanceoflimitingthisright,bydoctrinenotbytreaties,wasaftertheCarolineincident.TheCarolinewasanAmericanshipthatwassunkbyBritishforcesin1837.TheBritishforceslegitimisedthisattackonthegroundsofself-defence.AccordingtoGreatBrittan, the Caroline was used to support Canadian rebels in their fight against Britishcolonization.89ThethenAmericanMinisterofForeignAffairs,DanielWebster,reactedandstatedthatthestateusingviolencemustdemonstratethatanattackbytheotherstatewasimminentand that therewerenootheroptions than touse violence to supress the impendingattack.90AccordingtoWebstertheconditionstowhichtheactofself-defencemustcomplyinordertobelegitimateare:1.A response toanarmedattack (imminent threatofdanger is sufficient)2. Itmustbenecessary3.Itmustbelimitedtothegoalofself-defenceand4.Themeasuremustbereasonableandproportionate.91

Theincreasingbloodywars,largenumbersofvictimsandmodernweaponsofwarmadetheneedforalawofarmedconflictmoreandmorepressing.TheJusinbellowascreated,inthefirst Geneva Convention in 1864, concerning the protection of wounded soldiers on thebattlefield.TheregulationoftheJusinbellobecameanimportantpartoftherestrictionsontheuseofforce.92ThefirststepsreallytolimittherighttowarbystatesweretakenwithTheHaguePeace Conferences. Two conferences were held in 1899 and 1907 respectively, as a firstmultilateralapproachtoregulateJusadbellum.TheHagueconferencesfocusedonthepeacefulresolutionof internationalconflicts,andwhenthiswasnotpossible,ontheregulationonhowwar should be waged. In 1899, The Convention for the Pacific Settlement of InternationalDisputes stated that states should first give mediation a chance before going to war. ThecontractingpartiesagreethatthepeacefulresolutionofdisputesistheirmainpriorityasstatedinArticle1ofthisConvention“Withaviewtoobviatingasfaraspossiblerecoursetoforceintherelations between States, the Contracting Powers agree to use their best efforts to ensure the

88 C. HENDERSON, The use of force and international law, Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress,2018,11.89A.AUST,HandbookonInternationalLaw,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2010,209.90A.C.AREND, “International Lawand thePreemptiveUseofMilitaryForce”,TheWashingtonQuarterly, 2003, 91.; C. HENDERSON, The use of force and international law, Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2018,12.91A.AUST,HandbookonInternationalLaw,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2010,209-210.92 N. MELZER, International Humanitarian Law: A Comprehensive Introduction, Geneva,InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross,2016,360p.

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pacificsettlementofinternationaldifferences”.93In1907,thisconventionwasfurtherexpandedandTheConventionRespectingtheLimitationoftheEmploymentofForcefortheRecoveryofContractDebts94wasintroducedthatprohibitedtheuseofforcetorecovercontractdebts,butthiswas limitedby several exceptions. In addition, theConventionRelative to theOpeningofHostilitiesintroducedformalrequirementstomakeadeclarationofwar.95

AsaresultofWorldWar I,andthemanyatrocities ithadbroughtwith it, internationalorganizations and treaties were established for the promotion of peace. American PresidentWoodrow Wilson pleaded in its fourteen points plan to establish: “A generalassociation ofnationsmustbeformedunderspecificcovenantsforthepurposeofaffordingmutualguaranteesofpoliticalindependenceandterritorialintegritytogreatandsmallstatesalike.”96Consequently,theLeagueofNationswassetupwiththemaingoaltopreservepeaceandsecurityintheworld.The first collective security organisation was a fact. The Covenant of the League of Nationsregulated theuseof forceandbuilt furtheron the ideasofTheHagueConventions to resolveinternational conflict by peacefulmanners. Article 11 of the Covenant stated that anywar orthreatofwar,affectinganyoftheMembersoftheLeagueornot,shallbeamatterofconcerntothewhole League. Furthermore, inArticle 12 themembers agreed that: “it there should arisebetween them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture they will submit the matter either toarbitrationorjudicialsettlementortoenquirybytheCouncil,andtheyagreeinnocasetoresorttowaruntilthreemonthsaftertheawardbythearbitratorsorthejudicialdecision,orthereportby the Council”.97The contracting parties agreed to national disarmament,mutual respect foreach other’s territorial integrity and political independence and the safeguarding of peacebetween nations. The League of Nations never outlawed the use of war or use of force butintroducedseveralproceduralstepsastateshouldfollowbeforerecoursingtotheuseofforceagainstanotherstate.98Furthermore,in1924,thecontractingpartiesnegotiatedtheProtocolforthePacificSettlementofInternationalDisputes.99Thisprotocolprovidedforaframeworkfortheprohibition on the use of force but the protocol never entered into force due to a lack ofratifications. 93Article1HagueConvention (I) for thePacificSettlementof InternationalDisputesof29 July1899.;C.HENDERSON,Theuseofforceandinternationallaw,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2018,13.94HagueConvention(II)RespectingtheLimitationoftheEmploymentofForcefortheRecoveryofContractDebtsof18October1907.95HagueConvention(III)ConventionrelativetotheOpeningofHostilitiesof18October1907.96O.M.GALE,WoodrowWilson’sspeechesonthewar:Americanism,Chicago,ForgottenBooks,202p.97CovenantoftheLeagueofNationsof28April1919.98Y.DINSTEIN,War,aggressionandself-defence,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2012,83.99ProtocolforthePacificSettlementofInternationalDisputes,2October1924.

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On27August1928,theKellogg-Briandpact,namedaftertheFrenchministerofForeignAffairs Briand and the American minister of Foreign Affairs Kellogg, was concluded.100 TheKellogg-BriandpactannouncedtheshiftfromtheJusadbellumtotheJuscontrabellum.Article1ofthepactmakesthisveryclear:“TheHighContractingPartiessolemnlydeclareinthenamesoftheir respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of internationalcontroversies, and renounce it, as an instrument of national policy in their relations with oneanother”.101Itwasthefirsttreatythatincludedacomprehensiveprohibitiononuseofwar.TheonlywaytosettledisputeswasbypeacefulmeansasstatedbyArticle2ofthepact:“TheHighContractingPartiesagreethatthesettlementorsolutionofalldisputesorconflictsofwhatevernatureorofwhateverorigintheymaybe,whichmayariseamongthem,shallneverbesoughtexcept by pacific means”.102 War was condemned except for the right of self-defence, whichpartiesmade reservations upon. Even in the preamble it was declared that a state that usesviolenceagainstanotherstate,losestheprotectionofthepact,notonlyagainstthestatebeingattacked but also against other members of the pact.103 Even more than at the time of theestablishmentoftheLeagueofNationsin1919,theprohibitionofwarbecameauniversaldutyby nearly including all nations of the world at that time. The pact was confronted, from theoutset,withconsiderablechallengesanddifficulties: ithadno realmeansofenforcementandthereservationofcontractingpartiesrelatedtoself-defencemadetheagreementineffective.104Other shortcomingswere that theuseof forces ‘shortofwar’ could still bepursued, thepactonly applied towar in the formal sense, and theprohibitionofwar appliedonlybetween thecontractingstates.105Ashistoryhasdemonstrated,theLeagueofNationsandtheKellogg-Briandpact were not a great success in preventing another devastating World War. Another

100GeneralTreatyfortheRenunciationofWarasanInstrumentofNationalPolicyof27August1928.;C.HENDERSON,Theuseofforceandinternationallaw,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2018,15.101Article1GeneralTreatyfortheRenunciationofWarasanInstrumentofNationalPolicyof27August1928.102Article2GeneralTreatyfortheRenunciationofWarasanInstrumentofNationalPolicyof27August1928.103Y.DINSTEIN,War,aggressionandself-defence,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2012,86.104Q.WRIGHT,“ThemeaningofthePactofParis”,AmericanJournalofInternationalLaw,1933,43.105 C. HENDERSON, The use of force and international law, Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress,2018,15.;T.RUYS,“InternationalLawontheUseofForce”inJ.WOUTERS,P.DEMANandN.VERLINDEN(eds.),Armedconflictsandthelaw,Antwerp,Intersentia,2016,107-150.

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international organisation and treaty was needed to control the use of force in internationalrelations.In1945,theUnitedNationswasestablishedwiththesigningoftheUNCharter.1063.3. TheUNCharterNeithertheLeagueofNationsnortheKellogg-BriandPactweresufficienttoavoidanotherWorldWar.Theinternationalcommunityreactedagainbynegotiatinganewinternationalmechanismtosafeguardthepeaceandsecurityintheworld,namedtheUnitedCharter.107ThepreambleoftheCharteropensasfollows:“WETHEPEOPLESOFTHEUNITEDNATIONSDETERMINEDtosavesucceedinggenerationsfromthescourgeofwar,whichtwiceinourlifetimehasbroughtuntoldsorrowtomankind,(…)”.108On24October1945theUnitedNationsCharterentered intoforceand the United Nations was officially set up. It created an organisation with the purpose ofmaintaining international peace and security and introduced the contemporary era of theinternationallawontheuseofforce.109Inthissection,IfocusontheUNCharterandthemostimportantarticlesthatformtheUNframeworkwithregardtotheuseofforce.Article1oftheCharteroftheUnitedNationsdescribespurposesandprinciplesoftheUnitedNations:

“1. Tomaintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collectivemeasuresforthepreventionandremovalofthreatstothepeace,andforthesuppressionofactsof aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and inconformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement ofinternationaldisputesorsituationswhichmightleadtoabreachofthepeace;

2.Todevelopfriendlyrelationsamongnationsbasedonrespectfortheprincipleofequalrightsand self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthenuniversalpeace;

3.Toachieveinternationalco-operationinsolvinginternationalproblemsofaneconomic,social,cultural,orhumanitariancharacter,andinpromotingandencouragingrespectforhumanrightsand for fundamental freedoms forallwithoutdistinctionas to race, sex, language,or religion;and

106 C. HENDERSON, The use of force and international law, Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress,2018,15107Ibid.108PreambleUnitedNationsCharter.109 C. HENDERSON, The use of force and international law, Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress,2018,16.

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4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these commonends.”110

Point1ofthisarticleshowsthepurposeoftheUnitedNationsasasecurityorganizationwhosetaskistoprotectthesecurityofallthememberstates.WiththeintroductionofChapterVIIofthe Charter, a sanctioning mechanism was initiated which gives the United Nations SecurityCouncilthejurisdictionandinstrumentstoaddressthreatsandbreachesofinternationalpeaceand security (cf. infra).111 Additionally, the Charter encourages states to resolve their internalproblems by peaceful manners so that a spill-over into a breach of international peace andsecurity can be prevented. The United Nations Charter protects the principle of sovereignequalitybetween theirmemberstatesby stating thatnostatecan intervene inmatterswhichareessentiallywithin thedomestic jurisdictionofanystate.Therefore, it isconsideredthatnoState is above other states and there is no legal justification for the use of force against oneanother.112Article2(3)callsforallstatestosettletheirinternationaldisputesbypeacefulmeans.In addition, Article 2(7) introduces the principle of non-intervention by stating: “NothingcontainedinthepresentChartershallauthorizetheUnitedNationstointerveneinmatterswhichare essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members tosubmitsuchmatterstosettlementunderthepresentCharter;butthisprincipleshallnotprejudicethe application of enforcement measures under Chapter Vll”.113 This article includes theprohibition of the United Nations to intervene in the sovereignty of states except for themeasurestheUNSecurityCouncilcantakeunderChapterVIItosecureinternationalpeaceandsecurity.

3.4. Theprohibitionontheuseofforce

ThecruxofArticle2canbefoundinArticle2(4)UNCharterthatincludestheprohibitionontheuseofforce.Thisarticlestates:“AllMembersshallrefrainintheirinternationalrelationsfromthethreatoruseofforceagainsttheterritorialintegrityorpoliticalindependenceofanystate,orinany other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”.114 This provision is

110UnitedNations,CharteroftheUnitedNations,24October1945.111 T. RUYS, “International Law on the Use of Force” in J. WOUTERS, P. DE MAN and N.VERLINDEN(eds.),Armedconflictsandthelaw,Antwerp,Intersentia,2016,110.112Art.2(1)UNCharter;P.ARROCHA,“TheNever-endingDilemma:IstheUnilateralUseofForceby States Legal in Context of Humanitarian Intervention, Anuario Mexicano de DerechoInternacional,2011,11-44.113Article2(7)UNCharter.114C.GRAY,InternationalLawandtheUseofForce,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2018,32.;R.KOLB,InternationalLawontheMaintenanceofPeace:JusContraBellum,Cheltenham,EEElgar,

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bindingforallthememberstatesoftheUnitedNations.Itiscustomarylaw,asconfirmedbytheICJ in theNicaraguaCase aswell as jus cogens; therefore, it is also binding for all subjects ofinternational law.115 In addition, it is a general principle of international law according to theDeclaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperationamongstates.116The ICJdeclared in theArmedActivitiesontheTerritoryofCongothatArticle2(4)isacornerstoneoftheUNCharter.117 It isimportanttolookcloseratthisimportantarticlebecauseitcontainssomenuances.Firstly,Article2(4) is limitedto theuse (or threat)of forceby themembersof theUN in theirinternationalrelations.Thismeansthat,therefore,theuseofforceinternallywithinastateisnotcoveredbyArticle2(4).Whentheconflicthaspurelyanon-internationalcharacter, itdoesnotfallwithin thescopeofArticle2.These intra-stateconflictsare forexamplecivilwars, internaltroublesoroppression.Nevertheless,theuseofforcewithinastatemustbeinaccordancewiththerulesof internationalhumanitarian lawandhumanrights law.118Secondly, theUNChartersanctions theuseof force. Thismeans that a conflict or theuseof forcemustnothavebeencommittedinaformalwar.Small-scaleuseofforceorforceshortofwarissufficienttoviolateArticle2(4),suchas,forexample,reprisals.119Thirdly,thereisdiscussionaboutthescopetotheuseofforce:doesthisconcernonlyarmedforceoranykindofforcelikeeconomicforce?Thereisadivisionbetweendevelopinganddevelopedcountrieswhethertheuseofforcealsoincludeseconomiccoercionandarelevantdiscussion isbeingconductedonwhethercyber-attacksalso

2018,321.;T.RUYS,“InternationalLawontheUseofForce”inJ.WOUTERS,P.DEMANandN.VERLINDEN(eds.),Armedconflictsandthelaw,Antwerp,Intersentia,2016,110.115 ICJ, 27 June 1986, Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and againstNicaragua(Nicaraguav.UnitedStates),ICJReports14,par.190.;C.HENDERSON,Theuseofforceandinternationallaw,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2018,17.;T.RUYS,“InternationalLawontheUseofForce”inJ.WOUTERS,P.DEMANandN.VERLINDEN(eds.),Armedconflictsandthelaw,Antwerp,Intersentia,2016,107-150.;116 R. ROSENSTOCK, “The declaration of principles of international law concerning FriendlyRelations:asurvey”,AmericanJournalofInternationalLaw,1971,713.117ICJ,19December2005,ArmedactivitiesontheterritoryoftheCongo(DemocraticRepublicofthe Congo v.Uganda), ICJ Reports 2005, par. 148.; C.GRAY, International Lawand theUse ofForce,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2018,32.118Y.DINSTEIN,War,aggressionandself-defence,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2017,89. C. HENDERSON, The use of force and international law, Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress,2018,22.119Y.DINSTEIN,War,aggressionandself-defence,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2017,90.; C. HENDERSON,The use of force and international law,Cambridge, CambridgeUniversityPress,2018,16.

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constitute a use of force under Article 2(4).120 The state practice shows a trend that theprohibitiononlycoversarmedforce,andnotpsychologicoreconomicforce.121Accordingtocaselaw,thisuseofforcecanbebothdirectorindirectarmedforce.122AnotheraspectthatdeservesattentionisthefactthatArticle2(4)alsoincludestheprohibitionofthreatsoftheuseofforce.Thereisdiscrepancyintheinterpretationwhetheronlythreatsofunlawfulforceareforbiddenorwhetherthereisawiderprohibitionofthreatsofpossiblelawfulforceifthesethreatsmayposeathreattotheinternationalpeaceandsecurity.123AccordingtoDinstein,athreatoftheuseofforce is unlawful when the projected use of force is unlawful under international law.124AccordingtoHenderson,Article2(4)makesnodistinctionbetweenthethreatof forceandtheuse of force in terms of their significance and importance, but it is fundamentally clear thatstateshaveahigherdegreeoftolerancetowardsthreatsthantheactualuseofforce.125Fourth,there isdebateonthethresholdontheuseof forcetoactivatetheprohibitionofArticle2(4).Corten argues that there is a line between law enforcement (which is not a breach of theprohibition)andtheuseofforce.Cortenassessesthisonagravitytestandtheintentofthestatethatistakingaction.Hearguesthatintentisasanelementtotheprohibitionontheuseofforceand that an intervention is unlawfulwhen it canbe regardedas the intentional applicationofcoercionagainstastate.Thismeansthatthereisademinimisthresholdandtheprohibitiondoesnot includeallusesof armedconflict.126 In contrast,Ruys considers that there isnominimumthreshold to the use of force, but concedes that there appears to be gaining ground in legaldoctrineforthedeminimisthreshold(butcertainlynotshareduniversallyinlegaldoctrine).127In

120C.GRAY,InternationalLawandtheUseofForce,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2018,34.121L.BUCHHEIT,“Theuseofnonviolentcoercion:Astudy inLegalityunderArticle2 (4)of theCharteroftheUnitedNations”,UniversityofPennsylvaniaLawReview,1974,995.;Y.DINSTEIN,War, aggression and self-defence, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2017, 90.; C.HENDERSON, The use of force and international law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,2018,53.;T.RUYS,“InternationalLawontheUseofForce” inJ.WOUTERS,P.DEMANandN.VERLINDEN(eds.),Armedconflictsandthelaw,Antwerp,Intersentia,2016,111.122 ICJ, 27 June 1986, Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and againstNicaragua(Nicaraguav.UnitedStates),ICJReports14,par.108.;C.HENDERSON,Theuseofforceandinternationallaw,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2018,60.123C.GRAY,InternationalLawandtheUseofForce,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2018,35-36.124Y.DINSTEIN,War,aggressionandself-defence,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2017,91.125 C. HENDERSON, The use of force and international law, Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress,2018,26-30.126 O. CORTEN, The Law Against War: The Prohibition on the Use of Force in ContemporaryInternationalLaw,Oxford,HartPublishing,2010,76.127 O. CORTEN, The Law Against War: The Prohibition on the Use of Force in ContemporaryInternationalLaw,Oxford,HartPublishing,2010,66.;C.GRAY,InternationalLawandtheUseof

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additionDinsteinargues that there isnominimum thresholdof intensityprescribedbyArticle2(4).Nevertheless,hestillacknowledgesthatnoteverycross-borderintrusionisautomaticallyisa violation of the prohibition on the use of force.128 TheUnitedNations Charter includes twoexceptionstothefundamentalprohibitionontheunilateraluseofforce.TheUNCharterpermitstheuseofviolenceontwooccasions:TheauthorizationbytheSecurityCouncil(cf.infra)andtheright to self-defence as described in Article 51 of the UN Charter. There is also a customaryexceptionthatallowsinterventionifconsenthasbeenobtainedfromthestatewithinwhichtheinterventiontakesplace,theso-calledinterventionbyinvitation.

3.5. Exceptionstotheprohibitionontheuseofforce

3.5.1 InterventionbyinvitationThe first exception to the prohibition on the use of force is the intervention by invitation.Although theSyriangovernmenthasnot invited the interveningparties to takeaction in Syriaagainsttheuseofchemicalweaponsandthereforethislegaljustificationfortheuseofforceisnot applicable for the actions conducted by the US, the UK and France. For the sake ofcompleteness,Iincludedashortparagraphonthisimportantexceptiontotheuseofforce. Intervention by invitation finds its basis in state practice and opinio iuris.129 In theNicaraguacase it isstatedthat“interventionisallowableattherequestofthegovernment”.130There areno references to the interventionby invitation in theUNCharter but it is generallyaccepted not to violate the prohibition on the use of force.With intervention by invitation, astate is asked by another state to provide assistance on the territory of the requesting state.Consequently,thereisnounlawfulviolationofthesovereigntyoftherequestingstate.Statesaresovereignandcanconsenttoanotherstatetousemilitaryforcewithintheterritoryofthefirststate without violating international laws. For example the military help of Russia within the

Force, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018, 37.; C. HENDERSON, The use of force andinternational law,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2018,66.;T.RUYS,“Themeaningofforce and theboundaries of the jus adbellum: are “minimal’ uses of force excluded fromUNCharterArticle2(4)?,TheAmericanJournalofInternationalLaw,2014,159.128Y.DINSTEIN,War,aggressionandself-defence,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2017,91.129 T. RUYS, “International Law on the Use of Force” in J. WOUTERS, P. DE MAN and N.VERLINDEN(eds.),Armedconflictsandthelaw,Antwerp,Intersentia,2016,113.130 ICJ, 27 June 1986, Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and againstNicaragua(Nicaraguav.UnitedStates),ICJReports14,par.246.

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territoryoftheSyrianstateisbasedonaninvitationbytheSyrianregime.131Thereareseveralconditions to be fulfilled before the intervention canbe found legitimate in international law.First,therequesthastobemadebeforetheinterventionandbythedejuregovernment.Thisisthe government that holds control over the state’s territory and/or is recognized as thelegitimategovernmentofthestate.Aninvitationcannotbeinvokedbytheoppositiontowardsathirdstateforassistanceintheirfightagainstthelegitimategovernment.Ifthiswerepossible,itthiswouldleadtoabuseoftheinterventionbyinvitationtointerveneininternalaffairsandtobypass the prohibition on the use of armed force.132 A common example of the use ofintervention by invitation is to control uprisings or insurrections. This condition has to benuancedasan invitation to intervene cannotbe invokedwhen theuprisingsevolve towardsacivil war. Second, the intervention by the third state should stop when the inviting statewithdraws its consent, thereby rendering illegalany futureuseof forceon the territoryof therequestingstate.133ThiswasunderlinedintheArmedActivitiescase.Thecourtstatedthatthereisaviolationoftheprohibitionontheuseofforceandtheprincipleofnon-interventionwhenastate continues its intervention after thewithdrawal of permission by the requesting state.134Thecontextinwhichtheconsentisgivenisequallyimportant.Theconsentofthestatemustbetrue, voluntary and clear in intention of the requesting state. Therefore, it is important toconsiderthattheconsentmustbegivenbythepersonoragentthathasauthorizationtodosoonbehalfof the state.Consent ismostlygivenbyagovernment representing thestateas thecompetentauthority.Thiscanleadtodifficultywhenitisnotsufficientlyclearanymorewhichisthe legitimate government representing the state. There is no right for opposition groups orrebels to invite a third country to intervene in the state.135 Government legitimacy is oftenchallenged in cases of civil war and intervention by invitation can become much less clear.Consider,forexample,inthecaseofYemen.136

131A.GUIDERO,andM.CARTERHALLWARD,GlobalResponsestoConflictandCrisisinSyriaandYemen,PalgraveMacmillanUK,2019,15-31.132 ICJ, 27 June 1986, Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and againstNicaragua(Nicaraguav.UnitedStates),ICJReports14,par.246.133ICJ,19December2005,ArmedactivitiesontheterritoryoftheCongo(DemocraticRepublicoftheCongov.Uganda), ICJReports2005,par.39–71.;T.RUYS,“InternationalLawontheUseofForce” in J. WOUTERS, P. DE MAN and N. VERLINDEN (eds.), Armed conflicts and the law,Antwerp,Intersentia,2016,113.134ICJ,19December2005,ArmedactivitiesontheterritoryoftheCongo(DemocraticRepublicoftheCongov.Uganda),ICJReports2005,par.162-163.135ICJ,Nicaraguecase,par246.136A.,GUIDERO,andM.,CARTERHALLWARD,GlobalResponsestoConflictandCrisisinSyriaandYemen,PalgraveMacmillanUK,2019,15-31.

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3.5.2 TheUNSecurityCouncilasauthorizingpowerThesecondexception to theprohibitionon theuseof force is theauthorizationof theUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil.WiththeintroductionoftheUnitedNations,afirsteffectivecollectivesecuritysystemwassetuptoprotecttheinternationalpeaceandsecurity.137Thissystemisbuiltaround the central role of the United Nations Security Council as international peacekeeper.Article 24 of theUnitedNations Charter describes the functions andpowers of theUNSC: “Inorder toensurepromptandeffectiveactionby theUnitedNations, itsMembers conferon theSecurityCouncilprimary responsibility for themaintenanceof internationalpeaceandsecurity,andagreethatincarryingoutitsdutiesunderthisresponsibilitytheSecurityCouncilactsontheirbehalf (…)”.138The authorizing capacity of theUN Security Council has its origin in ChapterVIregarding: “Pacific settlement of disputes” and Chapter VII regarding: “Action with respect tothreats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression”. Chapter VI details thecompetence of the United Nations Security Council to impose non-binding recommendations.TheserecommendationsarebasedonthecompetenceoftheCounciltoinvestigatedisputesandrecommendmethods or procedures of adjustment. Non-compliance to the recommendationsmayleadtoactionsbasedonChapterVIIoftheCharter.

ThecruxoftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil’scompetences lies inChapterVIIoftheCharter,whichgivesthepowertotheCounciltoimposebindingdecisions.139Article39oftheUNCharter gives authority to the UN Security Council to oversee the international peace.140 TheUnited Nations Security Council has the power to imposemeasures if a threat to the peace,breach to the peace or an act of aggression has taken place.141 Threat to the peace is thebroadestofthethreeandisnot limitedtothreatsofforce.142 Alsoviolationsofhumanrights,

137 C. HENDERSON, The use of force and international law, Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress,2018,87.;T.RUYS,“InternationalLawontheUseofForce”inJ.WOUTERS,P.DEMANandN.VERLINDEN(eds.),Armedconflictsandthelaw,Antwerp,Intersentia,2016,133.138Article24UnitedNationsCharter.139 C. HENDERSON, The use of force and international law, Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress,2018,88.;T.RUYS,“InternationalLawontheUseofForce”inJ.WOUTERS,P.DEMANandN.VERLINDEN(eds.),Armedconflictsandthelaw,Antwerp,Intersentia,2016,134.140 C. HENDERSON, The use of force and international law, Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress,2018,93.141R.KOLB,InternationalLawontheMaintenanceofPeace:JusContraBellum,Cheltenham,EEElgar,2018,115.;O.CORTEN,TheLawAgainstWar,Oxford,HartPublishing,2010,316.142 C. HENDERSON, The use of force and international law, Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress,2018,94.;M.L.SERNAGALVÁN,“Interpretationofarticle39oftheUNCharter(threattothepeace)bythesecuritycouncil:isthesecuritycouncilalegislatorfortheentireinternationalcommunity?”,AnuarioMexicanodeDerechoInternacional,2001,162.

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humanitarianlaw,terroristactivities143andviolationsofdemocraticprinciples144canbeseenasathreat to the peace. The interpretation of the threat to the peace extends widely by evenincluding theEbolaoutbreak inAfrica.Otherexamples include theoppressionof theKurdsbySadamHussein,thesituationinformerYugoslaviaandthegenocideinRwanda.145Eventhoughpeace refers to the international peace and pure internal conflict or troubles fall outside itsscope,theUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil’spracticedemonstratesthatathreattothepeacecanalsoappearininternalsituations(forexampleSouthAfricaundertheApartheidregime).146ThisisnotabreachofArticle2(7)oftheUNCharterbecause,asseenabove,article2(7)includesanexceptionwithregardtoactionsimposedunderChapterVII.Abreachtothepeaceandactsofaggression imply thatarmedforceshavebeenusedand is therefore interpreted inanarrowersense.147Themaindifferencebetweenbreachtothepeaceandactofaggressionisthattheactof aggression implies liabilityofoneormoreparties in the conflict. In contrast, breach to thepeaceisusedinamoreneutralwaywithoutimplyingliability.148Thebreachtothepeacehas,todate, only been invoked with respect to the situation North-Korea/South-Korea,Argentina/Falklands, Iraq/Iran and Iraq/Kuwait.149 Article 40 of the UN Charter describes thepower of the United Nations Security Council to adopt provisional measures. Provisionalmeasurescanbetakeninordertopreventasituationfromdeteriorating.Themainsanctioningcapacity of the UN Security Council lies in Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter. Article 41

143 Resolution 731 of the United Nations Security Council (21 January 1992), UN Doc.S/RES/731(1992).; Resolution 1214 of the the United Nations Security Council (8 December1998),UNDoc.S/RES/1214(1998).144 Resolution 841 of the United Nations Security Council (16 June 1993),UNDoc. S/RES/841(1993).145 Resolution 688 of the United Nations Security Council (5 April 1991),UN Doc. S/RES/688(1991).; Resolution 713 of theUnitedNations Security Council (25 September 1991),UNDoc.S/RES/713(1991).;Resolution836oftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(4June1993),UNDoc.S/RES/836(1993).146J.FROWEIN,“Article39”,inSIMMA,B.,MOSLER,H.,PAULUS,A.,andCHAITIDOU, E., (eds.),TheCharterof theUnitedNations:ACommentary,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2013,720-721.147 C. HENDERSON, The use of force and international law, Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress,2018,96.148 T. RUYS, “International Law on the Use of Force” in J. WOUTERS, P. DE MAN and N.VERLINDEN(eds.),Armedconflictsandthelaw,Antwerp,Intersentia,2016,134-135.149 Resolution 82 of the United Nations Security Council (25 June 1950), UN Doc. S/RES/82(1950).;Resolution502oftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(3April1982),UNDoc.S/RES/502(1982).;Resolution598oftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(20July1987),UNDoc.S/RES/598(1987).; Resolution 660 of the United Nations Security Council (2 Augustus 1990), UN Doc.S/RES/660(1990).

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describes the non-military measures that the UN Security Council can implement. This couldincludethefollowingmeasures:endingdiplomaticrelations,disruptingcommunicationandthecompleteorpartialendingofeconomic relationswith thesanctionedcountry. If themeasuresthatcanbetakenonthebasisofArticle41of theUNcharterarenotsufficient,memberscanbase their measures on Article 42. This article lists the various military actions that may becarriedoutbymembersoftheUnitedNations.ThesecanonlybeusediftheactionscarriedoutaccordingtoArticle41oftheUNCharterarenotsufficienttoendtheconflict.Underthisarticle,membersof theUnitedNationshave the legitimacy touse theirmilitary forces to restoreandsafeguard international peace and security. According to Article 25, the Member States arerequired to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordancewith theCharter.Regionalorganisationsareoftenusedtotakemilitaryaction.ItisonthebasisofArticle53thattheUNSCcanauthoriseregionalorganisationstotakeenforcementmeasures.Article54,furthermore, clarifies that these organisationsmust keep theUN Security Council at all timesinformed of their activities. TheUN Security Council has built the habit to authoriseMemberStatesor regional organisations toundertakemilitary action, insteadofordering states tousearmed force. This offers the possibility for the states and/or regional organisations to decidewhetherandtowhatdegreetheywilltakepartinthemilitaryaction.150

3.5.2.1. ImpliedorpresumedauthorisationtouseforceAsmentionedabove,theUNSecurityCouncilcanauthorisestatesandregionalorganisationstouse force tomaintainor restore the internationalpeaceandsecurity.TheUNSecurityCouncilcanauthorisetheuseofforceonanexplicitbasiswhentheyusespecifictermssuchas ‘touseforce’ in their resolutions.On theotherhand, authorisation can alsobe implicitwhen theUNSecurityCouncilauthorisesmemberstatestouse‘allnecessarymeans’toachieveanobjective.ThelatteristhemostcommonusedbytheUNSCtoauthorisetheuseofforce.Inrecentyears,we have seen several cases that resolutions by theUNSCwere further interpreted to includepresumed or implied authorisation by the UNSC to use force based on the behaviour of theUNSC. This can be presumed or implied by behaviour of theUNSC before or after the use offorce. In this situation, there was neither explicit authorisation to ‘use force’ or implicitauthorisation to use ‘all necessary means’.151 The presumption of the existence of an 150 C. HENDERSON, The use of force and international law, Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress,2018,97-98.;R.KOLB,InternationalLawontheMaintenanceofPeace:JusContraBellum,Cheltenham, EE Elgar, 2018, 141-161.; T. RUYS, “International Law on the Use of Force” in J.WOUTERS, P. DE MAN and N. VERLINDEN (eds.), Armed conflicts and the law, Antwerp,Intersentia,2016,138.151 O. CORTEN, The Law Against War: The Prohibition on the Use of Force in ContemporaryInternationalLaw,Oxford,HartPublishing,2010,348.

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authorisationhavebeeninvokedinseveralcases,forexampletheOperationProvideComfortin1991,Operation Allied Force in 1999 andOperation Enduring Freedom in 2001. InOperationProvideComfort,theuseofforcewasbasedonresolution688oftheUNSCthatcondemnedtherepression of Iraqi civilians in many parts of Iraq but did not mention explicit or implicitauthorisation to use force.152 The intervention in Yugoslavia was based on three UNSCresolutionsthatdidnotexplicitlyorimplicitlyallowedfortheuseofforceofindividualstatesorregional organisations.153 In addition, itwas argued that the absence of condemnation by theUNSC against the Intervention in Yugoslavia was equivalent to an authorisation. This wasforemostobservedintherejectionofadraftresolutionbyRussiacondemningtheinterventionby 12 votes to three. The last argument legitimizing the intervention by presumption ofauthorisationwastheconsecrationoftheeffectsoftheinterventioninResolution1244(1999).Resolution 1244 approved the agreement between the belligerents and did not condemn theintervention by NATO.154 Again Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 in Afghanistan waslegitimizedonanUNSCresolutionthatcondemnedthe9/11attacksbutdidnotallowfortheuseof force.155 In addition, the military intervention in Iraq by the United States in 2003 waslegitimizedon thepresumptionof themaintenanceofaprevisionauthorisation thatapprovedtheuseofforceagainstIraqin1991.Resolution678(1990)authorisedtheuseofallnecessarymeanstoenforceinternationalpeaceandsecurity.Onthebasisofthisresolution,theFirstGolfWar against Iraq was conducted. The effects of this resolutions were ended after theinterventionof1991byresolution687(1991) inwhich Iraqwascalledupontonotbreachtheinternationalpeaceagain. It isonthisbasisthattheinterveningstates in2003consideredthat

152 Resolution 688 of the United Nations Security Council (5 April 1991),UN Doc. S/RES/688(1991), par 1.; O. CORTEN, The Law Against War: The Prohibition on the Use of Force inContemporaryInternationalLaw,Oxford,HartPublishing,2010,351.;C.HENDERSON,Theuseofforceandinternationallaw,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2018,144-149.153Resolution1160oftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(31March1998),UNDoc.S/RES/1160(1998).;Resolution1199of theUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil (23September1998),UNDoc.S/RES/1199(1998).;Resolution1203oftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil (24October1998),UNDoc.S/RES/1203(1998).O. CORTEN, The Law Against War: The Prohibition on the Use of Force in ContemporaryInternationalLaw,Oxford,HartPublishing,2010,355.154Meeting3989of theUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil (26March1999).UNDoc.S/PV.3989(1999).;O.CORTEN,TheLawAgainstWar:TheProhibitionontheUseofForceinContemporaryInternationalLaw,Oxford,HartPublishing,2010,385.;C.GRAY,InternationalLawandtheUseofForce,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2018,365.;155 Resolution 1368 of the United Nations Security Council (12 September 2001). UN Doc.S/RES/1368(2001).

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whenresolution687wasbreached,byIraqtheyagainhadtheauthorisationoftheUNSCtouseallnecessarymeansbasedonresolution678.156

The doctrine of implied or presumed authorisation has been considered unlawful byseveralscholarsandhasnotbeenconsecratedinstatepracticeorintheUNCharter.Inaddition,thedoctrineofimpliedorpresumedauthorisationrisksunderminingtheauthorityoftheUN.Asaconsequence,theUNSCcanbecomeunwillingtoapproveresolutionsmentioningactionsunderChapterVIIoftheUNCharterbecauseoftheriskthattheseresolutionscanbeusedasimpliedjustificationfortheuseofforce.157

3.5.3 Self-defenceThe third exception to the prohibition on the use of force is self-defence. As seen above thehistoricaldefinitionof self-defencewasgiven in theCarolinecase. TheUnitedNationsCharterformallyintroducedinArticle51therighttoself-defence.Article51statesthefollowing:“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against aMember of theUnitedNations, until the SecurityCouncil has takenmeasures necessary tomaintain international peace and security.MeasurestakenbyMembersintheexerciseofthisrightofself-defenceshallbeimmediatelyreportedtotheSecurityCounciland shallnot inanywayaffect theauthorityand responsibilityof theSecurityCouncilunderthepresentChartertotakeatanytimesuchactionasitdeemsnecessaryinordertomaintainorrestoreinternationalpeaceandsecurity.”158This provides states with the possibility to react, under certain conditions, unilaterally orcollective,with legal forceagainst illegalviolence.Therewillconsequentlyalwaysbeonestatethatusesillegalviolence.159IntheLegalityoftheThreatorUseofNuclearWeaponscase,theICJ

156 Resolution 678 of the United Nations Security Council (29 November 1990). UN Doc.S/RES/678(1990).;Resolution687oftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(3April1991).UNDoc.S/RES/687 (1990).; O. CORTEN, The Law AgainstWar: The Prohibition on the Use of Force inContemporaryInternationalLaw,Oxford,HartPublishing,2010,361-362.;C.GRAY,InternationalLawandtheUseofForce,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2018,363.157 O. CORTEN, The Law Against War: The Prohibition on the Use of Force in ContemporaryInternationalLaw,Oxford,HartPublishing,2010,399.;C.GRAY,InternationalLawandtheUseofForce, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018, 361.; C. HENDERSON, The use of force andinternationallaw,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2018,149.158Art.51,ChapterVII,CharteroftheUnitedNations.;C.GRAY,InternationalLawandtheUseofForce,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2018,124.159Y.DINSTEIN,War,aggressionandself-defence,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2017,

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concluded that the right to self-defence is imbedded into the right to survive of a state.160AccordingtoRandelzhofernoteveryillegitimateuseofforceopenstherighttoself-defence.Anattack that leads to the right of self-defence must be an armed attack, not economic orideological aggression. In order for the use of force to reach the level of an armed attack, asmentioned in Article 51 of the Convention, its severitymust exceed aminimum threshold orgravity.Thearmedattackmustbeofarelativelylargescaleandwithsubstantialeffects.Belowthat threshold attacks based on self-defence are not allowed.161 On the other hand, Dinsteinarguesthatitisnotnecessaryfortheattacktobelarge-scale,directandimportant.Inhisview,evena frontier incident can lead toactsof self-defence.Only trivial incidents areexcludedbyArticle51.Accordingtothisview,thelegitimacyoftheself-defenceliesintheproportionality,inthe sense that the response cannot exceed the intensity of the attack.162 The question thenariseswhatconstitutesanarmedattack.The ICJusesthedefinitionofaggressionassetout inResolution3314oftheUNGeneralAssembly.Thisdefinitionstatesthefollowing:“aggressionisthe use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or politicalindependence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of theUnitedNations,assetoutinthisDefinition”.163Anarmedattackmustconsistoftheuseofforceofacertaingravityaimedattheterritory,agent,ornationalsofthetargetstate.164AccordingtoArticle51theindividualstatecanchooseindependentlytoinvoketherighttoself-defence,butithas tonotify theUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil immediately,whichcanratify thedecisionoftheindividualstate.IfthestatefailstonotifytheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil,theinvocationofArticle51wouldbeillegitimate.Inaddition,thestateinquestioncanonlyinvokeitsrighttoself-defence until the United Nations Security Council has taken the measures necessary to

197.160ICJ,8July1996,LegalityoftheThreatorUseofNuclearWeapons,ICJReports1996,par.96.161A. RANDELZHOFERandG.NOLTE, “Article 51” inB. SIMMA,H.MOSLER,A. PAULUSandE.CHAITIDOU(eds.),TheCharteroftheUnitedNations:ACommentary,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2013,1401.162Y.DINSTEIN,War,aggressionandself-defence,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2017,209.;R.KOLB, InternationalLawontheMaintenanceofPeace:JusContraBellum,Cheltenham,EEElgar,2018,400.163Resolution3314(XXIX)oftheUnitedNationsGeneralAssembly(14December1974).;ICJ,19December 2005, Armed activities on the territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of theCongo v. Uganda), ICJ Reports 2005, 168 p.; ICJ, 27 June 1986, Case concerningMilitary andParamilitaryActivities inandagainstNicaragua(Nicaraguav.UnitedStates), ICJReports14,4–35.164 O. CORTEN, The Law Against War: The Prohibition on the Use of Force in ContemporaryInternationalLaw,Oxford,HartPublishing,2010,403.

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maintain internationalpeaceandsecurity.165ThecriteriaofWebstercreatedaftertheCarolinecase are still pertinent. According to the ICJ, the criteria proportionality and necessity of theaction are fundamental to the exercise of the right to self-defence.166 In addition, the actionsmustbelimitedtoitspurpose,insetheprotectionagainstarmedattack.Thecannotbeusedasa punitive action. Thus, armed reprisals are still unlawful (cf. Infra). Necessitymeans that noothermeans are available to end the armed attack and themeans should be directed at thesourceofthearmedattack.Necessityalsohasatimecomponent;itcanonlybelegitimizedwhenthetimebetweenbothattacksisreasonablyshort.Proportionalitymeansthattheself-defenceshouldbeproportionaterelatedtothefirstattack,this inrelationtogravity,duration, locationandrangeoftargets.167Inaddition,areactionbasedonself-defenceagainstanattackmustbeimmediate. The immediacy of the reaction can be assessed based on two situations. The firstsituation is that the attackwas just a single act. In that case, the act of self-defencemust beimmediate, but a reasonable period of time between attack and self-defence is allowed. Thesecondsituationisthisofanenduringactofaggression.Inthiscasetheactofself-defencecanbeexercisedatalatertimeandaslongasthearmedaggressioncontinues.168

Self-defencecanbeconductedonanindividualorcollectivebasis.Individualself-defencerefers to the right of a state to defend its sovereignty against an unlawful attack by anotherstate. Collective self-defence refers to the right of others to assist allies whose nationalsovereignty has been breached by another country.169 This collective self-defence is triggeredaftertherequestfromtheattackedstate,whichhasformallydeclaredtobeattackedandwhich 165Y.DINSTEIN,War,aggressionandself-defence,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2017,253-260.;C.GRAY,InternationalLawandtheUseofForce,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2018,126.; T. RUYS, “International Law on the Use of Force” in J. WOUTERS, P. DE MAN and N.VERLINDEN(eds.),Armedconflictsandthelaw,Antwerp,Intersentia,2016,115.166 ICJ, 27 June 1986, Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and againstNicaragua(Nicaraguav.UnitedStates),ICJReports14,par.176;ICJ,8July1996,LegalityoftheThreat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ Reports 1996, par. 41; ICJ, 6 November 2003, OilPlatforms(IslamicRepublicofIranv.UnitedStatesofAmerica),ICJReports2003,par.43andpar.73–77.; O. CORTEN, The Law AgainstWar,Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010, 249-252.; C. GRAY,International Law and the Use of Force, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018, 157.; C.HENDERSON, The use of force and international law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,2018,226-238.167Y.DINSTEIN,War,aggressionandself-defence,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2017,249-252.;C.GRAY,InternationalLawandtheUseofForce,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2018,159.;M.DIXON,Textbookon InternationalLaw,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2011,315.;T.RUYS, “International Lawon theUseof Force” in J.WOUTERS, P.DEMANandN.VERLINDEN(eds.),Armedconflictsandthelaw,Antwerp,Intersentia,2016,125-126.168R.KOLB,InternationalLawontheMaintenanceofPeace:JusContraBellum,Cheltenham,EEElgar,2018,392-393.169Art.51,ChapterVII,CharteroftheUnitedNations.

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requestsforassistancefromthirdstates.170IntheNicaraguacase,theICJstatedthatitisevidentthatastatethatwantstoinvokecollectiveself-defencemustmakeanexplicitandpublicrequestforhelp.171Accordingtolegaldoctrine,therequestdoesnotconstituteofformalrequirements;itissufficientthatitisclearthatthestaterequestsforcollectiveself-defence.172Memberstatescanmake use of regional arrangements to enforce their actions based on the collective self-defence,forexampletheOrganizationforSecurityandCo-operationinEurope(OSCE).173

3.5.3.1 Anticipatoryself-defence

One of themain contentious points of self-defence is if the armed attackmust already haveoccurred to trigger the right to self-defence. Anticipatory self-defence revolves around thequestionofwhetheranarmedattackmustalreadyhavetakenplacetoactivatetherighttoself-defence,orwhetherstatescanalsoanticipateanarmedattackandthereforerelyontherighttoanticipatory self-defence.174 Anticipatory self-defence falls under several terms; for example,preventive self-defence, pre-emptive self-defence and interceptive self-defence. According toHenderson,thesetermsareoftenusedirregularlyandinconsistentlyandthisleadstoconfusionon the use and the impact on customary practice.175 The proponents of the anticipatory self-defenceclaimthat this isacustom lawrule thatwasestablished in theCarolinecase.Asseenabove, AmericanMinister of Foreign AffairsWebster stated that to invoke your right to self-defence, it is sufficient for the armed attack to be imminent. This doctrine evolved to 170 T. RUYS, “International Law on the Use of Force” in J. WOUTERS, P. DE MAN and N.VERLINDEN(eds.),Armedconflictsandthelaw,Antwerp,Intersentia,2016,116.171 ICJ, 27 June 1986, Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and againstNicaragua(Nicaraguav.UnitedStates),ICJReports14,par.232.172T.RUYS, ‘ArmedAttack’andArticle51of theUNCharter:Evolutions inCustomaryLawandPractice,NewYork, CambridgeUniversity Press, 2010, 89.; T. RUYS, “International Lawon theUseofForce”inJ.WOUTERS,P.DEMANandN.VERLINDEN(eds.),Armedconflictsandthelaw,Antwerp,Intersentia,2016,126.173Art.53,ChapterVIII,CharteroftheUnitedNations.;E.C.LUCK,UNSecurityCouncil:Practiceand Promise. New York, Routledge, 2006, 186 p.; C. BURKE. “The Humanitarian InterventionDiscourse: A Debate on the edge of the law” in C. BURKE, An equitable framework forhumanitarianintervention,Oxford,HartPublishing,2013,6-89.174 T. RUYS, “International Law on the Use of Force” in J. WOUTERS, P. DE MAN and N.VERLINDEN(eds.),Armedconflictsandthelaw,Antwerp,Intersentia,2016,107-150.;M.WOOD,“International law and the use of force: what happens in practice?”, Indian Journal ofInternationalLaw,2013,357.;O.CORTEN,TheLawAgainstWar,Oxford,HartPublishing,2010,406.175 C. HENDERSON, The use of force and international law, Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress,2018,275.

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international customary law.176 On the other hand, the case law has been hesitant toacknowledgetheexistenceoftherighttoanticipatoryself-defence.BothintheNicaraguacaseas well as in the Armed Activities case the court avoided the question of anticipatory self-defence.177Eveninthestatepracticeandopiniojurus,therewaslittleevidencefortherighttoanticipatoryself-defence.178Aftertheterroristattacksof9/11andtheglobalwaronterror,theanticipatoryself-defenceagaincameintothespotlight.ThethenUSPresidentGeorgeW.BushenlistedtheBushdoctrineintheUSNationalSecurityStrategy.Accordingtothisdoctrine,theUSmustbepreparedtostopterroristandroguestatesbeforetheyareabletouseweaponsofmassdestruction. This strategy focused on the concept of imminent treat and the defence againstthese kinds of threats. According to the Bush Doctrine, imminence of the threat is no longernecessarytoinvokeself-defence,thisduetothechangingnatureofinternationalthreatssuchasnuclearweapons and terrorism. This opened the door to legalize pre-emptive and preventiveself-defence.179 In this kindof self-defence, preventive action canbe taken in response tonotonlyimminentthreatsbutalsonon-imminentthreats.180 Theconceptofanticipatoryself-defenceisstillverycontestedduetoseveralreasons.InthereportoftheUNHigh-LevelonThreat,ChallengesandChangeitisstatedthatmilitaryactioncanbetakenwhenthreatisimminent,buttheydidnotendorsetheuseofmilitaryactionagainstnon-imminentthreats.181Theopponentsbasetheirrejectiononseveralreasons.First,suchwideinterpretationofself-defencewouldcreatetoomuchriskofabuse;itisnotclearthenwhenanattackisjustanactofaggressionorapreventiveactionagainstanon-imminentthreat.ThisdoesnotfollowtheobjectandpurposeofArticle51,inthesensethattheobjectiveistopreventthe

176 C. HENDERSON, The use of force and international law, Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress,2018,277.177 ICJ, 27 June 1986, Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and againstNicaragua(Nicaraguav.UnitedStates),ICJReports14,par.102-106;ICJ,ArmedActivitiescase,Judgement,par.222.178C.GRAY,InternationalLawandtheUseofForce,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2018,175.;T.RUYS,“InternationalLawontheUseofForce”inJ.WOUTERS,P.DEMANandN.VERLINDEN(eds.),Armedconflictsandthelaw,Antwerp,Intersentia,2016,117.179A.C.AREND, ‘InternationalLawandthePreemptiveUseofMilitaryForce’,TheWashingtonQuarterly,2003,96.;THEWHITEHOUSE,“TheNationalSecurityStrategyoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica: September2002”,www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nss/nss_sep2002.pdf (consultation1February2018).180C.GRAY,InternationalLawandtheUseofForce,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2018,248-253.; T. RUYS, “International Law on the Use of Force” in J. WOUTERS, P. DE MAN and N.VERLINDEN(eds.),Armedconflictsandthelaw,Antwerp,Intersentia,2016,118.181ReportoftheHigh-LevelPanelonThreats,ChallengesandChangeAmoreSecureWorld:OurSharedResponsibility(2December2004),UNDoc.A/59/565,(2004).§§188–192.

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abusiveuseofunilateralforce.182Thesecondargumentisbasedontheliteral interpretationofArticle 51 of the UN Charter. Article 51 mentions the phrase “if an armed attack occurs”.According to theopponents this should be read restrictively,whichmeans thatArticle 51 canonly be invoked when an armed attack occurs, not before. Third, the opponents contest theprecedentvalueoftheCarolinecase(thatpermittedpreventiveself-defencethatwasconsideredcustomary law) because it precedes the outlawing of the use of force set forth in the UNCharter.183 Fourth, most states are not willing to accept anticipatory self-defence and aretherefore even less inclined to accept pre-emptive self-defence, for example the Non-AlignedMovementhaverejectedthedoctrineseveraltimes.184 182R.KOLB,InternationalLawontheMaintenanceofPeace:JusContraBellum,Cheltenham,EEElgar,2018,385.;T.RUYS,“InternationalLawontheUseofForce” inJ.WOUTERS,P.DEMANandN.VERLINDEN(eds.),Armedconflictsandthelaw,Antwerp,Intersentia,2016,118.183O.CORTEN,TheLawAgainstWar,Oxford,HartPublishing,2010,407.;J.A.GREEN,“Dockingthe Caroline: Understanding the Relevance of the Formula in Contemporary CustomaryInternational Law concerning Self-Defense”,Cardozo Journal of International and ComparativeLaw,2006,440.;A.L.LAPOSI,“AnticipatorySelf-Defence”,CaietedeDreptPenal,2014,107.;M.B. OCCELLI, “Sinking the Caroline: Why the Caroline Doctrine's Restrictions on Self-DefenseShouldNotBeRegardedasCustomaryInternationalLaw”,SanDiegoInternationalLawJournal,2003,479-480.;T.RUYS, “International Lawon theUseofForce” in J.WOUTERS,P.DEMANandN.VERLINDEN(eds.),Armedconflictsandthelaw,Antwerp,Intersentia,2016,117.184C.GRAY,InternationalLawandtheUseofForce,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2018,248-251.

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3.6. ConclusionThe2017missileattackbytheUSandthe2018missileattackbytheUS,theUKandFranceinSyriawereclearlyaviolationoftheprohibitionontheuseofforceprovidedforinArticle2(4)oftheUNCharter.TheUNCharterpermitstheuseofviolenceontwooccasions:Theauthorizationby the Security Council and the right to self-defence. In addition, the customary rule ofinterventionbyinvitationcanallowfortheuseofforce.

First, the interventionby invitation cannotbe consideredas a legal justification for theinterventioninSyria.Syriadidnotinviteorgaveconsentfortheinterveningpartiestointerveneagainsttheuseofchemicalweapons. Second,as shownabove theUNSecurityCouncildidnotmanage toadopta resolutionauthorizing the use of force in Syria as a reaction to the chemicalweapon attacks due to thesystematicvetoesofRussiaandChina. InadditionPresidentTrumpstated in2017 that: “Syriaused banned chemical weapons, violated its obligations under the Chemical WeaponsConvention, and ignored the urging of the UN Security Council”.185 This statement can beinterpretedasan impliedauthorisationbytheUNSecurityCounciltouseforce.Theresolutionconsidered in this regard is Resolution 2118 (2013). In this resolution theUN Security Councildecidedthatinthecaseofnon-compliancewiththemeasuresinthisresolution,whichorderedSyria to respect its international obligations to destroy its chemicalweapons, theUNSC couldpossibly decide on measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.186 Nevertheless, the non-complianceoftheseobligationsmustfirstbeestablishedbytheUNSCandRussiainsistedduringthe drafting of Resolution 2118 that this resolution did not fall under Chapter VII of the UNCharter.Therefore,coercivemeasurescouldonlybeimposedwhenanewexplicitresolutionoftheUNSCnotedthenon-complianceandauthorizedtheuseofallnecessarymeasures.Thus,noimpliedorpresumedauthorisationbytheUNSCcanbeconsideredinthiscase.187Thiscanalsobe seen in relation to the resolutions regarding the situation and conflict in Syria. Russia andChina vetoed the first three draft resolutions on the situation in Syria because, according tothem, thiscouldopen thedoor tomilitary intervention.188The following resolutions thatwere 185NEWYORKTIMES,“TranscriptandVideo:TrumpSpeaksAboutStrikesinSyria,TheNewYorkTimes, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/world/middleeast/transcript-video-trumpairstrikes-syria.html186 Resolution 2118 of the United Nations Security Council (27 September 2013). UN Doc.S/RES/2118(2013).187A.LAGERWALL,“ThreatsofandActualMilitaryStrikesAgainstSyria–2013and2017”, inT.RUYS, O. CORTEN and A. HOFER (eds), The Use of Force in International Law – a Case-basedApproach,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,852.188Meeting6627oftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil (4October2011).UNDoc. S/PV.6627(2011).; Meeting 6711 of the United Nations Security Council (4 February 2012). UN Doc.

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adoptedwererelatedtothecondemnationoftheuseofchemicalweaponsinSyriaandprovidedfor humanitarian access for the UN. Both resolutions were not adopted with reference toChapter VII and did not include a reference to the ‘use of all necessary measures’.189 OtheradoptedresolutionsmentionedtheexistenceofathreattothepeaceandinternationalsecurityandunderlinedtheobligationunderArticleofthe25UNChartertoallmembersstatestoaccepttheCouncil’sdecisionsbuttherewasnoelementthatcouldprovidefortheauthorisationtouseforce.190

Third, it can be argued that the airstrikeswhere conducted on the justification of self-defence.PresidentTrumpstatedthatitwasinthevitalnationalsecurityinterestsoftheUnitedStates to prevent and deter the use of chemical weapons. Therefore, the airstrike could beinterpreted as justified under self-defence. There was no basis for individual self-defencebecausetherewasnoimminentthreattotheUnitedStatesitselfandtheattackwasnotdirectedattheUnitedStatesorAmericannationals.Noevidencewasprovidedtoconcludethatanarmedattack was imminent.191 Collective self-defence is also not applicable because Syria usedchemical weapons against its own people and there was no other state subject of an armedattack.Lastly,anticipatoryself-defenceisalsonotapplicablebecausetherewasnoevidenceoftheintentionofSyriatousethechemicalweaponsagainsttheUnitedStatesoritscitizensinthefuture. Itwas not a reaction to an ongoing or imminent treat but rather as away to preventfutureuseofchemicalweapons.Preventiveself-defenceisunlawful.Therighttoself-defenceas

S/PV.6711(2012).;Meeting6810oftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(12December2012).UNDoc. S/PV.6810 (2012).; C. GRAY, International Law and the Use of Force, Oxford, OxfordUniversityPress,2018,385.189 Resolution 2118 of the United Nations Security Council (27 September 2013). UN Doc.S/RES/2118(2013).;Resolution2139oftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(22February2014).UN Doc. S/RES/2139 (2014).; Resolution 2165 of the United Nations Security Council (14 July2014).UNDoc.S/RES/2165(2014).;Resolution2191oftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(17December2014).UNDoc.S/RES/2191 (2014).;Resolution2209of theUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil (6March 2015).UN Doc. S/RES/2209 (2015).; Resolution 2235 of the United NationsSecurity Council (7 August 2015).UNDoc. S/RES/2235 (2015).; Resolution 2258 of theUnitedNations Security Council (22 December 2015). UN Doc. S/RES/2258 (2015).; C. GRAY,InternationalLawandtheUseofForce,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2018,385.190C.GRAY,InternationalLawandtheUseofForce,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2018,385.;191A.LAGERWALL,“ThreatsofandActualMilitaryStrikesAgainstSyria–2013and2017”, inT.RUYS, O. CORTEN and A. HOFER (eds), The Use of Force in International Law – a Case-basedApproach,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,851.

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recognizedinArticle51oftheUNCharterdoesnotallowforanarmedattackagainstanattackthathasnotyetoccurred.Theattackmustalmostcertainlybeimminenttobelawful.192

192M.SCHMITTandC.FORD,“AssessingU.S.JustificationsforUsingForceinResponsetoSyria’sChemicalAttacks:An International LawPerspective, Journal ofNational Security Law&Policy,2017,283-303.

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Chapter4:AHumanitarianIntervention?

4.1. IntroductionChapter 3 considered the contemporary Jus ad bellum and placed the interventions in Syriawithinthisframework.ItwasconcludedthatbothinterventionsfoundnojustificationsundertheUNCharterandcustomarylaw.TheinterventionsviolatedArticle2(4)oftheUNCharterandnoexceptions provided by the Charter were applicable to legitimize the airstrikes. As showed inChapter2,humanitarianconsiderationswhereimportantfortheinterveningpartiesandtheUKspecifically legitimized their participation in the airstrikes under the doctrine of humanitarianintervention. The following chapter assesses if this rationale can be considered as a legaljustification for the interventions. A close examination is presented of the doctrine ofhumanitarian intervention incontemporarypublic international law.First,abroad introductionon humanitarian intervention is provided. Second, the position of unilateral humanitarianinterventionininternationalpubliclawisanalysed.Third,collectivehumanitarianinterventionismorecloselyexamined,andinparticular itsmostrecentiteration,namelytheResponsibilitytoProtect.Finally,the interventions inSyriaareanalysedwithintheframeworkofbothunilateralandcollectivehumanitarianintervention.4.2. Humanitarianintervention:anhistoricintroductionAnother (more contested) exception to the prohibition on the use of force is humanitarianintervention. Humanitarian intervention can be defined as: “the use of force to protectindividualsorgroupsofindividualsagainstmassivehumanrightsviolationsintheirownstate”.193The concept of humanitarian intervention has a long history, from the just war doctrine toGrotius’s internationaldiplomacyviewto thepresentdoctrineof theResponsibility toProtect.The just war doctrine can be traced back to the writings of Aristoteles in his attempts todetermine when waging war was just. From his perspective, war was seen as a deplorablemeasuretoconductinternationalpolitics,butinsome‘just’circumstanceswarwaspermissible.These circumstances or criteria varied from self-defence, safeguarding safety and honor, andpunishment as reaction to a provocation. Different authors throughout the ages havewrittenabout the just war doctrine and the different criteria, from Cicero, and Thomas Aquinas toGrotius.194Thelattercanbeperceivedasoneofthefoundersofinternationalpubliclawaswe

193 T. RUYS, “International Law on the Use of Force” in J. WOUTERS, P. DE MAN and N.VERLINDEN(eds.),Armedconflictsandthelaw,Antwerp,Intersentia,2016,128.194 B. COPPIETERS andN. FOTION (eds.),Moral Constraints onWar, Lanham, Lexington, 2002,

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seeittoday.Grotiusdistilled,fromcenturiesofpriorwritingsregardingthejustwardoctrine,sixcriteria of just causes: 1) defence of persons and/or territory, 2) recovery of lost territory, 3)retaliations,4)sufficientjustification,5)proportionality,thecostofwarmustnotbehigherthanthe reward, 6) war as last resort. None of these criteria involved a form of humanitarianintervention or assistance. The just war doctrine was not concerned with humanitarianintervention.Nevertheless,thefirsttracesofhumanitarianconcernscanbefoundinthewritingsof Grotius. Different scholars observed in the writings of Grotius a principle of humanitarianintervention, in that theprincipleofsovereigntystopswhenoutrageuponhumanitybegins.195Grotius stated thatwarwas ‘just’ against every nation that violated the lawof nature, in thissensewaragainstanationthatisinflictingsufferinguponitscivilianscanbeseenasajustcauseforwar.196TwodifferenttheoriesofGrotiuswillbefocusedon:firstly,thetheoryofinternationalpunishment.Thistheorygivesstatesthepossibilitytowagewarsagainstotherstatesthatviolatethelawofnatureorthepositivelawofnations.Itwasnotimportantagainstwhomtheviolationsoccurredandthestatedidnothavetoproofitsconcerninthematter.Humanrightsviolationsare an example of violating the law of nature. Secondly, Grotius formulated the guardianshiptheory of humanitarian intervention. In this theory,Grotiusmakes a comparison between thestate-subjectrelationshipasaparent-childrelationship. Thestatehasto lookafterhiscitizenslikeparentsaftertheirchildren.Whenastatefailstoprotecttheircitizensanddothemharm,anotherstatecan interveneandprovideassistance.Thestatethatabandonsthe lawofnatureandtreatstheirpeopleinhumanelylosestherightofindependentsovereignty.Thiscanbeseenascollectiveself-defenceonbehalfof thepeople.Theseprinciplesarestill reflected in today’sviews of what justifies humanitarian intervention. States today consider humanitarianinterventiontobeawaytoprotectpeopleagainstsufferingandcruelty.197

Historically,therehavebeenseveralcasesofunilateralhumanitarianinterventionbeforethe adoption of the UN Charter; for example, the intervention in Ottoman Greece in 1827,Intervention inOttomanSyria in1861and the intervention inCuba in1898.Nevertheless, theinterveningpowersonlyusedunilateralhumanitarianconsiderationsasasubsidiarygroundnext

344p.195 H. LAUTERPACHT, “The Grotian Tradition in International Law”, British Year Book ofInternational Law, 1946, 46.; A. HERACLIDES and A. DIALLA,Humanitarian Intervention in thelongNineteenthCentury:SettingthePrecedent,Manchester,ManchesterUniversityPress,2015,274p.196 A. HERACLIDES and A. DIALLA,Humanitarian Intervention in the long Nineteenth Century:SettingthePrecedent,Manchester,ManchesterUniversityPress,2015,274p.197E.J.CRIDDLE,“ThreeGrotianTheoriesofHumanitarianIntervention”,TheoreticalInquiriesinLaw,2015,473-506.

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to another legal basis, such as self-defence or consent.198 There has been little state practicerelating to humanitarian intervention since the adoption of the UN Charter, for example theintervention in Bangladeshof 1971, the intervention in Cambodia in 1978, the intervention inUganda in 1979 and the intervention in Kosovo in 1999. Again, the legal justifications wheremostly based on other legal ground and humanitarian concerns where subordinate.199 In theNicaraguacase,theICJrejectedtheuseofforcebytheUnitedStatesinNicaragua.TheICJstatedthat“whiletheUnitedStatesmightformitsownappraisalofthesituationastorespecttohumanrights inNicaragua,theuseofforcecouldnotbetheappropriatemethodtomonitororensuresuch respect”.200 With this case law, the ICJ seemed to reject unilateral humanitarianintervention.201 It is fromthe interventionoftheUK,theUSandFrance in1991 in Iraq,wherethey imposed a no-fly zone to protect Kurds and Shiites against Sadam Hussein, thathumanitarianinterventioncameagainontheforefront.202ItwastheUnitedKingdomthatstatedthat intervention can be justified in case of extreme humanitarian need. TheUnited Kingdomuses three conditions to determine if a humanitarian intervention is legitimate: 1. Convincingevidenceofextremehumanitariandistressonalargescaleandrequiringimmediaterelief.Thisevidenceshouldbyacceptedbytheinternationalcommunityasawhole.2.Objectivelyclearthatnootheralternativetotheuseofforceisavailable,and3.Theuseofforceshouldbenecessaryandproportionatetotheaimoftherelief.Thismustbelimitedintimeandscope.203ThesecondeventwherehumanrightsconcernswhereusedtolegitimizeaninterventionwaswiththeNATOinterventionintoYugoslavia(Kosovo).AgaintheUKandevenBelgiumbasedtheirparticipationon the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.204 The concept of humanitarian interventionfurther developed in the wake of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in2004,whichdevelopedtheResponsibilitytoProtectdoctrine.Thisdoctrinedevelopedasystem

198R.KOLB,InternationalLawontheMaintenanceofPeace:JusContraBellum,Cheltenham,EEElgar, 2018, 422.; P. TZENG, “Humanitarian Intervention at the Margins: An Examination ofRecentIncidents”,VanderbiltJournalofTransnationalLaw,2017,429.199R.KOLB,InternationalLawontheMaintenanceofPeace:JusContraBellum,Cheltenham,EEElgar,2018,423.200 ICJ, 27 June 1986, Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and againstNicaragua(Nicaraguav.UnitedStates),ICJReports14,par.268.201 T. RUYS, “International Law on the Use of Force” in J. WOUTERS, P. DE MAN and N.VERLINDEN(eds.),Armedconflictsandthelaw,Antwerp,Intersentia,2016,128.202C.GRAY,InternationalLawandtheUseofForce,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2018,42-44.203PrimeMinister’sOffice,Policypaper:ChemicalweaponusebySyrianregime:UKgovernmentlegalposition,29August2013,www.gov.uk/government/publications/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-uk-government-legal-position/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-uk-government-legal-position-html-version204 T. RUYS, “International Law on the Use of Force” in J. WOUTERS, P. DE MAN and N.VERLINDEN(eds.),Armedconflictsandthelaw,Antwerp,Intersentia,2016,129-130.

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ofinternationalresponsibilitywhenastatefailstoprotectitsowncitizensagainsthumanrightsviolationsundertheauspiceofamandateoftheUNSCtointervene.Thisdoctrineintegratedtheconceptofhumanitarian intervention intothecollectivesecuritysystemoftheUnitedNations.ThecompetencetoenforcethisresponsibilitylieswiththeUNSCandnotwithindividualstates.In that sense, unilateral humanitarian intervention evolved to collective humanitarianintervention.ThisdoctrinewasfirstusedintheinterventioninLibya.205

Humanitarianinterventionhasoftendevelopedasareactiontopoliticalevents,fromtheunilateralinterventioninYugoslaviatothecollectiveinterventioninLibya.Itisacontestedandcontroversial means of ending atrocities because of its tension between the principle ofsovereigntyontheonehandandtheendingofhumanrightsabusesontheother.Humanitarianinterventioncanoftenbeseenasanideologicalinstrumentandhasconsequentlybeencriticizedfor being a vehicle for regime change, imperialismand/or fostering geopolitical and economicagendas. The prime example in this regard is the critique of China and Russia against theintervention in Libya, and consequently the vetoes against an intervention in Syria.206 TheEastern countries, China and Russia, accuse the Western countries to use humanitarianintervention as an excuse to force through regime change. On the other hand, the WesterncountriesblameChinaandRussiatoturnablindeyetoatrocitiesthataretakingplaceinSyriaand let their geopolitical interests in the region prevail against the issue of human rightsviolations.207Secondly,at theheartofhumanitarian intervention lies thebalancebetween thesovereignty, independence and self-determination of a nation state on the one hand and thedesiretoendhumanrightsviolationsandatrocitiesontheother.208 Inaddition, therearealsoinstitutionalchallengesrelatedtotheUnitedNationssystem.OnlytheUNSecurityCouncilcanauthorizeahumanitarianintervention.Thissystemisplaguedbyaninstitutionalstatusquodueto the veto powers of the Permanentmembers. China and Russia stand squarely against theUnited States, theUnited Kingdom and France in thismatter. This leads often to a stalematewhenhumanrightsviolationsareoccurring intheworld,asseen inthecasesofSyria.TheUN 205Resolution1973oftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(17March2011),UNDoc.S/RES/1973(2011).;C.HENDERSON,Theuseofforceandinternationallaw,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress, 2018,401-402.; T.RUYS, “International Lawon theUseof Force” in J.WOUTERS,P.DEMANandN.VERLINDEN(eds.),Armedconflictsandthelaw,Antwerp,Intersentia,2016,131.206 G. MELLING, “Beyond Rhetoric? Evaluating the Responsibility to Protect as a norm ofhumanitarianintervention”,JournalontheUseofForceandInternationalLaw,2018,1-19.207N.I.ERAMEH,“Humanitarianintervention,Syriaandthepoliticsofhumanrightsprotection”,TheInternationalJournalofHumanRights,2017,517-530.208 A. HERACLIDES and A. DIALLA,Humanitarian Intervention in the long Nineteenth Century:SettingthePrecedent,Manchester,ManchesterUniversityPress,2015,274p.;P.EMERTONandT. HANDFIELD, “Humanitarian intervention and the Modern State System” in S. LAZAR, H.FROWE,P.EMERTONandT.HANDFIELD,TheOxfordHandbookofEthicsofWar,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2018,Chapter7.

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SecurityCouncilhasbeenselectiveinitsresponsetohumanrightsviolationsandabuses.209Because of its contested and controversial status in international law, humanitarian

interventionhasnotbecomepartofcustomaryinternationallaw.Therefore,thecompetencetodecide over humanitarian interventions should lie with the UNSC.210 Although humanitarianinterventionhasalonghistory,weencounterconsiderablereluctancebytheUNSecurityCouncilto intervene incaseofhumanitariancatastropheandhumanitarian interventionstill remainsarare event.211 The following section analyses the contemporary international public law onunilateralandcollectivehumanitarian interventionanddiscussesthemissileattacksbytheUS,UKandFranceagainstSyriawithinthisframework.

4.3. Unilateralhumanitarianintervention

Unilateralhumanitarian intervention istheuseofarmedforceto intervene inanotherstatetopreventorendahumanitariancrisis intheabsenceof theauthorizationof theUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil.212Kolbdefinesthisas:“humanitarianinterventionconsistsoftheuseofforceinopposition to massive violations of the most fundamental human rights, in the territory ofanother State, and for thepurposeof puttingan end to the violence”.213TheUKhasplayed aleading role in the development of the doctrine of unilateral humanitarian intervention.According to the UK six principles should be followed. First, the focus must lie on conflictprevention.Aninterventionisanadmissionoffailureofprevention.Second,armedforceshouldbealastresort.Third,theresponsibilitytoendtheviolencelieswiththestatewithinwhichitisoccurring. Fourth, the international community should intervene when a state is unable orunwilling to end a humanitarian catastrophe. There should be convincing evidence of humanrights violations and there is no practical alternative to the use of force to end these humanrightsviolations.Fifth,theuseofforceshouldbeproportionatetothehumanitarianpurposeandinaccordancewithinternationallaw.Sixth,theuseofforceshouldbecollectiveandnotdoneonaunilateralbasis.214Ontheotherhand,thenon-alignmentmovement215,ChinaandRussiahave 209M.BINDER,TheUnitedNationsandthePoliticsofSelectiveHumanitarianIntervention,Cham,SpringerInternationalPublishing,2017,301p.210 T. RUYS, “International Law on the Use of Force” in J. WOUTERS, P. DE MAN and N.VERLINDEN(eds.),Armedconflictsandthelaw,Antwerp,Intersentia,2016,129-131.211 C.B. WALLING, “Human rights norms, State Sovereignty and Humanitarian Intervention”,HumanRightsQuarterly,2015,383-413.212 C. HENDERSON, The use of force and international law, Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress, 2018, 379.; P. TZENG, “Humanitarian Intervention at the Margins: An Examination ofRecentIncidents”,VanderbiltJournalofTransnationalLaw,2017,415-461.213R.KOLB,InternationalLawontheMaintenanceofPeace:JusContraBellum,Cheltenham,EEElgar,2018,417.214C.GRAY,InternationalLawandtheUseofForce,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2018,55.

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been consistent in their opposition tohumanitarian intervention. TheUShasnotdevelopedadoctrineofhumanitarianinterventionandstatedonseveraltimesthattheyhadnotadoptedthislegalrationale.216Thiscontinuedoppositionshowsthatthedoctrineisnotfirmlyestablishedininternational law. The decisions not to rely on humanitarian intervention for the OperationEnduringFreedominAfghanistanandOperationIraqiFreedominIraqasalegaljustifications,butinstead to rely on (implied) Security Council resolutions shows the contested figure ofhumanitarian intervention.217 After the chemical weapons attacks on Ghouta in 2013, the UKpublisheda reportadvocatingagain forhumanitarian interventionwhere it setout itsviewonthedoctrine.Inthereport,theUKstatedthatitwouldbepermittedunderinternationallawtotakesteps toendthehumanrightscatastrophe inSyriabydeterringanddisruptingthe futureuseof chemicalweapons, if theUNSCwere tobeblockedby systematic vetoesbyRussiaandChina.Threeconditionsshouldbemettointerveneinthiscase.Thefirstconditionisthatthereshouldbesufficientevidence,generallyacceptedbytheinternationalcommunityasawhole,ofextreme humanitarian distress on a large scale requiring immediate and urgent relief. Thesecondconditionisthatthereshouldbenootherpracticalalternativetotheuseofforcetosavelivesandthirdly,theuseofforceshouldbenecessaryandproportionatetotheaimofendingthehumanitarian catastrophe. Only Denmark expressly showed its support for the right ofhumanitarian intervention.218 The UK Government did not receive permission by the Britishparliamenttointervene.219 As shown above, Article 2(4) of theUNCharter contains the prohibition on the use offorceininternationalrelations.OnlyanauthorizationbytheUNSecurityCouncilorself-defenceare exceptions in the UN Charter to this prohibition. The proponents argue that unilateralhumanitarian intervention can be legitimate in case of large-scale and massive violations ofhuman rights and only as last resort. According to them, the use of force for humanitarianreasons is not explicitly prohibited by Article 2(4) and this could allude to the possibility thatunilateralhumanitarianinterventionisanimpliedexception.220Thisarticlecanbereadinawaythat theuseof force isnot illegal if it isnotdirectedat the territorial integrityor thepolitical 215FinalDocumentofthe17thMinisterialConference(2014),UNDoc.A/68/573,par.673.216C.GRAY,InternationalLawandtheUseofForce,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2018,52.217Ibid,56.218DanishMilitaryofForeignAffairs,30August2013,GeneralPrincipledConsiderationsontheLegal Basis for a Possible Military Operation in Syria,www.ft.dk/samling/20121/almdel/upn/bilag/298/1276299/index,htm.; C. HENDERSON, The useofforceandinternationallaw,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2018,403.219 BBC, “Syria crisis: Cameron Loses Commons Vote on Syria Action”,BBC , 30 August 2013,www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-23892783.; C. GRAY, International Law and the Use of Force,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2018,57.220 C. HENDERSON, The use of force and international law, Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress,2018,382.

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independenceofastate,or if it isconsistentwiththePrinciplesof theUN.221 It isarguedthathumanitarian intervention is not directed against the territorial integrity or politicalindependenceofastatebecausethemaingoalistoendthelargescalehumanrightsatrocities.It can be considered within the aim of the Principles of the UN, which include inter alia theprotectionofhumanrights.222ThepromotionofhumanrightsisoneofthemainpurposesoftheUnitedNationsand theprotectionofhuman rights canbe consideredasaway to control theinternationalpeaceand security. It thencanbeargued that theuseof force forhumanitarianreasonsisconsideredwithinthepurposeoftheUNandthereforeisnobreachofart.2(4).223Incontrast, this interpretation can be rebuked. It is contradictory to consider a humanitarianinterventionnotaninfringementoftheterritorialintegrityandpoliticalindependenceofastatewhenitisconsideredwithinthepurposeoftheUnitedNations.OneofthemainpurposesoftheUNisalsotheprohibitiontouseforceininternationalrelationsandtheuseofpeacefulmeanstosolveinternationalconflicts.TheopponentsarguethatthiswouldbeinconflictwithArticle2(4)of theUNCharterby violating the territorial integrity and independenceof a state and this isincompatiblewiththeobjectivesoftheUNandaninterventioncanonlybelegitimizedbytheUNSecurityCouncil.An intervention inastate’s territory,evenforhumanitarianconsiderations, isstillabreachofthatstate’ssovereigntyandterritorialintegrity.Inaddition,itwouldviolatethenon-interventionprincipleofArt.2(7)and thecustomary ruleofnon-intervention. Inaddition,theonlyexceptionstotheprohibitionontheuseofforceareclearlydescribedintheCharter.224Unilateral humanitarian intervention could lead towidespread use of armed force, and statescouldusethistopursuetheireconomicandpoliticalagenda.Itmustalsobeconsideredwhenan

221C.GRAY,InternationalLawandtheUseofForce,Oxford,Oxforduniversitypress,2008,31.;O.CORTEN, The Law Against War: The Prohibition on the Use of Force in ContemporaryInternationalLaw,Oxford,HartPublishing,2010,498.222 O. DORR and A. RANDELZHOFER, “Ch.I Purposes and principles, , Article 2 (4)” SIMMA, B.,MOSLER,H.,PAULUS,A.,andCHAITIDOU,E.,(eds.),The Charter of the United Nations: ACommentary,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2013,222.;C.HENDERSON,Theuseofforceandinternationallaw,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2018,383.223 P.ARROCHA, “TheNever-endingDilemma: Is theUnilateralUseof Forceby States Legal inContextofHumanitarianIntervention,AnuarioMexicanodeDerechoInternacional,2011,11-44.;F.TESÓN,HumanitarianIntervention:AnInquiryIntoLawandMorality,NewYork,Transnational,1997,151.224 O. CORTEN, The Law Against War: The Prohibition on the Use of Force in ContemporaryInternationalLaw,Oxford,HartPublishing,2010,497.

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intervention is based on humanitarian reasons and when a humanitarian argument is beingmisusedforotherreasons,suchasregimechange.225

4.3.1 Internationalcustomaryrule?Thissectiondelvesintothequestionifthereisaninternationalcustomaryruleofhumanitarianintervention.Inorderforaruletobeelevatedtointernationalcustomarylawitmustmeettwoconditions. First, a uniform and constant state practice, considerable consistency, and generalacceptancebya largemajorityofthestateswithinthe internationalcommunityarenecessary.Second,theopiniojurismustbepresent,whichmeansthebeliefthatastateislegallyboundtoact in a certainway in a particular situation.226 Customary law is defined in Article 38 of thestatuteoftheInternationalCourtofJusticeas:“generalpracticeacceptedaslaw”.227AccordingtotheNorthSeaContinentalShelfcasethecreationofaruleofcustomaryinternationallawcanbecreated inarelativelyshort time,as longas itcomplieswiththerequirementofuniformityandwidespreadpractice.228Inaddition,theCommitteeonFormationofCustomaryInternationalLaw states that the qualification of international custom law depends on the density of thepractice not the duration.229 The state practice is the objective element,whichmeans statesbehave in a certainway and this behaviour showsa certainuniformity/consistency, generalityandsustainabilityovertime.Uniformity/Consistencypresupposesthatstatesgenerallybehaveoractinasimilarway.Anoccasionalbreachoftheconsistencydoesnotmeanthatthecustomaryrulecannotbeusedanymore,aslongastheruleitselfisnotquestioned.Generalitymeansthatasufficientnumberofstatesparticipateinthestatepracticewithoutthenecessityoftherebeingafixednumberofstates.Sustainabilityovertimemeansthatthepracticemustrepeatitselfoveraperiodoftime.However,thereisnofixeddurationrequirement.Statepracticeisderivedfromthe behaviour of states such as military action, official declarations and voting behaviour. Itreflects themotives that formthebasis forassessing thebehaviourof thestate.230Theopinio

225 O. CORTEN, The Law Against War: The Prohibition on the Use of Force in ContemporaryInternational Law, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010, 499.; C. HENDERSON, The use of force andinternationallaw,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2018,384.226 M. WOOD, “International Law and the Use of Force: What Happens in Practice?”, IndianJournalofInternationalLaw,2013,352.227StatuteoftheInternationalCourtofJustice,26June1945.228 ICJ, 20 February 1969, North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany vDenmark;FederalRepublicofGermanyvNetherlands)ICJReports4,1969.229Committeeonformationofcustomary(gen.)internationallaw,“Finalreportofthecomittee:statementoftheprinciplesapplicabletotheformationofgeneralcustomaryinternationallaw”,2000,20.230 J.L. DUNOFF, S. RATNER and D. WIPPMAN, International law: norms, actors, process: a

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jurisisthesubjectiveelement,whichmeansthatthereisaformofacceptanceorrecognitionbystates that the practice reflects a legal norm. In theNorth Sea Continental Shelf case, the ICJclearlydefinedtheopiniojurisas:“...notonlymustamounttoasettledpractice,buttheymustalsobesuch,ortobecarriedout insuchway,astobeevidenceofabeliefthatthispractice isrenderedobligatorybytheexistenceoftheruleoflawrequiringit.Theneedforsuchbelief, i.e.the existence of a subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sivenecessitates.Thestatesconcernedmustthereforefeelthattheyareconformingtowhatamountstobealegalobligation”.231Evidenceofopiniojuriscanbefoundinstatementsofstateswheretheyexpressthemselvesonthelegallybindingnatureoftheparticulartypeofstatepractice.Itcanalsobeimplicitlyderivedfromthebehaviourofstates,whensuchstatementasaboveisnotmade.Itisimportanttomentionthatalsostatesthatnotactivelyfollowthecustomaryrulewillbeboundby this rule.Statescanonlyescape thebindingeffectofan international customaryrule if they have persistently opposed the realisation of the new rule. The state has to be ‘apersistentobjector’,fromtheoutset,oftheinternationalcustomaryruletonotbeboundbythebindingeffect.232

The question then arises if there is an international customary rule of unilateralhumanitarianintervention.Therefore,theconstitutionalelements,statepracticeandopiniojurisshouldbepresent.Statesneedtoexplicitlyjustifytheuseofforcebyreferringtohumanitarianintervention. There has been little evidence of a state practice of unilateral humanitarianintervention before the establishment of the United Nations. Unilateral humanitarianinterventionwasnotconsistentlyanduniformlyinvokedbystatesoveracertainperiodoftime.Inaddition, therewasnoopinio juris.233 Statesare very reluctant toappeal to thedoctrineofhumanitarian intervention and there is strong criticism of the doctrine from the internationalcommunity.Asstatedabove,thereasoningoftheUSintheNicaraguacasewasnotacceptedbythe ICJ. The state practice is not sufficiently substantial or generally accepted to speak of aninternational customary rule. States have intervened and are intervening in other states, buthumanitarian arguments are not often used as a justification for intervention. Usually theinterventionswerejustifiedbyself-defence,theprotectionofnationalsabroadortheconsenttotheintervention.Inaddition,thevastmajorityofstatesresisttheunilateraluseofforce,evenon

problemorientedapproach,Philadelphia,WoltersKluwer,2010,149.231 ICJ, 20 February 1969, North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany vDenmark;FederalRepublicofGermanyvNetherlands)ICJReports4,1969,par77.232 T. RUYS, Inleiding tot het internationaal recht, Gent, VRG Gent, 2017, 39-48.; A.KACZOROWSKA,PublicInternationallaw,NewYork,Routhledge,2010,36.233J.L.HOLZGREFE,“Thehumanitarianinterventiondebate”,inHOLZGREFE,J.L.,andKEOHANE,R.O., (eds), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas, Cambrigde,CambridgeUniversityPress,2009,45.

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humanitarian grounds.234 The fact that humanitarian intervention is practically not invokedbyitselfpointstoalackofstatepracticeandalackofopinioiuris,sothatunilateralhumanitarianinterventiondoesnotyetappeartohaveanindependentlegalbasisininternationalcustomarylaw.235

In addition, theprohibitionon theuseof force is anormof jus cogens,anorm that isacceptedandapprovedbytheinternationalcommunityasastandardfromwhichnoderogationcanbedone.236Aderogationfromajuscogensisonlypossibleifitischangedbyalaternormofjuscogens.237Thismeansthatanexceptioncreatedby internationalcustomary lawmustmeethighstandards.Therefore, ifyouwanttochangethecurrent legal regimeregardingtheuseofforce,acustomaryinternationalruleofhumanitarianinterventionisnotenough.Theprohibitionontheuseofforceisapreemptoryoneandcanonlybealteredbyanotherjuscogensrule.Evenif a customary rule of humanitarian intervention existed, itwould be still be in breach of thehigherruleoftheprohibitionontheuseofforce.238

4.3.2 Kosovoasstatepracticeofunilateralhumanitarianintervention?

On24March1999 theNATO ledby theUnited States intervened in the conflict in YugoslaviaundertheOperationAlliedForces.Thepurposeoftheinterventionwastoendthehumanitariancatastrophe, suffering, suppression and violence against civilians that was taking place inYugoslavia.239 The United Nations Security Council did not give prior authorisation for theinterventionand, therefore, theNATOdidnot receiveamandateunderChapterVIIof theUNChartertousearmedforce.TheUNSCwas,likethesituationinSyria,notabletofulfilitsdutyofmaintainingtheinternationalpeaceandsecurityduetothesystematicuseofvetopowers.Asaconsequenceofthisinaction,theNATOdecidedtotakeunilateralaction.NATOdidnotexpresslyrelyonthedoctrineofhumanitarianinterventionand,infact,offerednoclearlegalexplanation

234 T. FRACK, “Interpretation and change in the law of humanitarian intervention”, in J. L.HOLZGREFE, and R. O. KEOHANE (eds),Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and PoliticalDilemmas,Cambrigde,CambridgeUniversityPress,2009,216-226.235 P.ARROCHA, “TheNever-endingDilemma: Is theUnilateralUseof Forceby States Legal inContextofHumanitarianIntervention,AnuarioMexicanodeDerechoInternacional,2011,11-44.236 R. KOLB, Peremptory International Law – Jus Cogens: A General Inventory, Londen,Bloomsbury,2015,2.237 Art. 53 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and InternationalOrganizationsorbetweenInternationalOrganizations.238 P.ARROCHA, “TheNever-endingDilemma: Is theUnilateralUseof Forceby States Legal inContextofHumanitarianIntervention,AnuarioMexicanodeDerechoInternacional,2011,11-44.239C.GRAY,InternationalLawandtheUseofForce,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2018,46.

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or justification for the intervention.240 According to the then Secretary-General of the NATO,JavierSolana,itwasthemoraldutyoftheinternationalcommunitytointerveneinthisconflict.On the eve of 23 March 1999 Javier Solana made a statement: “(…) All efforts to achieve anegotiated,politicalsolutiontotheKosovocrisishavingfailed,noalternativeisopenbuttotakemilitaryaction. (…)Ourobjective is topreventmorehumansufferingandmore repressionandviolenceagainstthecivilianpopulationofKosovo.(…)Wemusthalttheviolenceandbringanendto the humanitarian catastrophe nowunfolding in Kosovo. (…)Wemust stop an authoritarianregimefromrepressingitspeopleinEuropeattheendofthe20thcentury.Wehaveamoraldutytodoso.(…)”.241TheNATOhadalmostnomaterialandstrategicinterestsintheregion,exceptfor geographical stability. According to scholar Tesón: “The factwas that a dictatorial regimewascommitting heinous ongoing atrocities against an ethnic group, and that analliance ofdemocracies acted to stop them. It is unreasonable to label theseactions, in this context, asanythingotherthanahumanitarianintervention”.242

Nevertheless, two Member States legitimized their actions under the principle ofhumanitarianintervention,namelytheUnitedKingdomandBelgium.TheUKgovernmentbasedtheir legitimisation on their interpretation of international law that recognised an exceptionalright to use force when there is a situation of overwhelming humanitarian necessity andthereforeahumanitarianinterventionwaspermissiblewithouttheauthorisationoftheUNSC.243BelgiumarguedbeforetheICJthatitwasanarmedhumanitarianinterventioncompatiblewithart 2(4) of the UN Charter and that it was based on Security Council Resolutions (affirmingimplied or presumed Security Council authorization244). According to Belgium, a humanitariancatastrophewas occurring in Yugoslavia,whichhadbeen establishedby theUNSC. Therefore,the NATO had the obligation to intervene to protect human rights. The interventionwas notaddressedagainsttheterritorialintegrityandpoliticalindependenceofYugoslaviabutmerelytoprotectpeopleagainstahumanitariancatastrophe.245Thiscasenever led toaverdictbecausethe ICJ determined that theCourt did not possess jurisdiction to solve this dispute. Therefore

240 C. HENDERSON, The use of force and international law, Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress,2018,394.241 Secretary General of NATO, Press Statement (1999) 040 (23 March 1999),https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_27615.htm242C.GRAY, InternationalLawandtheUseofForce,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2018,45-58.; F. TESÓN, “Kosovo: A powerful precedent for the doctrine of humanitarian intervention”,AmsterdamLawforum,2009,http://amsterdamlawforum.org/article/view/62/119.243 R. BARBER, “Uniting for Peace Not Agression: Responding to Chemical Weapons in SyriaWithoutBreakingtheLaw”,JournalofConflictandSecurityLaw,2018,71-110.244 O. CORTEN, The Law Against War: The Prohibition on the Use of Force in ContemporaryInternationalLaw,Oxford,HartPublishing,2010,356.245C.GRAY,InternationalLawandtheUseofForce,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2018,50.

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thereisnoconclusiveverdictonthelegalityofhumanitarianinterventionininternationallaw.246Othernationsdidnot legitimize the actionson thedoctrineof humanitarian intervention, butexpressed their concernabouthumanitarianconsiderationsandmainlybased the interventiononUNSC resolutions.247 The principle resolutions they based their actions onwere Resolution1160,Resolution1199andResolution1203of theUNSC.248Resolution1160 imposedanarmsembargoonYugoslavia,asked forapolitical solutionandconsideredadditionalmeasures ifnopoliticalsolutionwouldbeachieved.249Resolution1199oftheUNSCdeclaredthat:“shouldtheconcrete measures demanded in this resolution and resolution 1160 (1998) not be taken, toconsiderfurtheractionandadditionalmeasurestomaintainorrestorepeaceandstabilityintheregion”.250InResolution1203,theUNSCdeterminedthatthesituationinKosovowasathreattothepeace.Theyinsistedonthecessationofhostilities,thewithdrawalofcertainforcesandthecommitment toseekapolitical resolution. If theseconditionswouldnotbe fulfilled, theUNSCdecideditcouldtakeactionsunderChapterVIIoftheUNCharter.AtthatmomenttheUNSCdidnotauthorizetheuseofforceandRussiamadeitfundamentallyclear itwouldvetotheuseofforceinKosovo.251NATOSecretary-GeneralJavierSolanaexplainedinhislettertotheNATOthelegalgroundfor the intervention. In this letter,hereferredtothe fact thatYugoslaviahadnotcompliedwiththeconditionssetforwardinUNSCResolution1160andResolution1998,whichwere both enacted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and referred to the possiblehumanitariancatastropheduetotheinactionoftheUNSC.Thereforehestatedthat:“Iconcludethat theAllies believe that in the particular circumstanceswith respect to the present crisis inKosovoasdescribedinUNSecurityCouncilResolution1199,therearelegitimategroundsfortheAlliancetothreaten,andifnecessary,touseforce”.252

246ICJ,1999,LegalityofUseofForce(Yugoslaviav.Belgium),ICJreports124,1999,Pleadings12.;P. ARROCHA, “The Never-ending Dilemma: Is the Unilateral Use of Force by States Legal inContextofHumanitarianIntervention,AnuarioMexicanodeDerechoInternacional,2011,11-44.247Meeting3988of theUnitedNations SecurityCouncil (24March1999),UNDoc.S/PV/3988(1999),par.5,6and8.248C.GRAY,InternationalLawandtheUseofForce,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2018,48.249Resolution1160oftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(31March1998),UNDoc.S/RES/1160(1998).250 Resolution 1199 of the United Nations Security Council (23 September 1998), UN Doc.S/RES/1199(1998).251 Resolution 1203 of the United Nations Security Council (24 October 1998), UN Doc.S/RES/1203(1998)par.1–3.;M.SCHARF,“StrikingaGrotianMoment:HowtheSyrianAirstrikesChanged International Law Relating to Humanitarian Intervention”, Chicago Journal ofInternationalLaw,2019,586-614252 “Letter fromSecretary-General Solana, addressed to the permanent representatives to theNorthAtlanticCouncil”,9October1998inB.SIMMA,“NATO,theUNandtheUseofForce:LegalAspects”,EuropeanJournalofInternationalLaw,1999,7.

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The intervention in Kosovo was seen by most states and scholars as illegal underinternationallaw.253TheIndependentInternationalCommissiononKosovoconcludedthatitwasillegalunderinternationallawbutlegitimateonmoralreasons.TheCommission’sreportstatedthat:“TheNATOmilitaryinterventionwasillegalbutlegitimate.Itwasillegalbecauseitdidnotreceive prior approval from the United Nations Security Council. However, the CommissionconsidersthattheinterventionwasjustifiedbecausealldiplomaticavenueshadbeenexhaustedandbecausetheinterventionhadtheeffectofliberatingthemajoritypopulationofKosovofromalongperiodofoppressionunderSerbianrule”.254 There isat themoment too littleevidence toconsider this situationasa statepracticeandnotsufficientopiniojuristoconsiderunilateralhumanitarianinterventionlegalonthebasisof customary law. Only Belgium and the UK based their legitimisation on humanitarianintervention. Others states invoked other legal grounds and most states objected to thehumanitarianinterventionasanexceptiontotheprohibitionontheuseofforce.255Ontheotherhand, Bruno Simma argued in an article following the intervention in Kosovo that theinterventionwasunlawful,butonlyseparatedfromlegalityby‘athinredline’.Hearguedthatonthe basis of the circumstances surrounding the intervention, in the sense that states have anerga omnes obligation to respect human rights and the Security Council approved severalresolutions on the situation in Kosovo. The intervention was justified by the specificcircumstances, but it should not be considered a precedent for future interventions to halthumanitarian catastrophe.256 In addition, Antonio Cassese argued that there was an opinionecessitatis for the intervention,meaning that therewas a lack of belief in the legality of theoperation,butitwasnecessarynonetheless.257 253 R. BARBER, “Uniting for Peace Not Agression: Responding to Chemical Weapons in SyriaWithoutBreakingtheLaw”,JournalofConflictandSecurityLaw,2018,71-110.;C.HENDERSON,Theuseofforceandinternationallaw,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2018,397.254 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, Kosovo Report: Conflict, InternationalResponse,LessonsLearned,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2000,4.255MinisterialDeclaration,23rdAnnualMeetingoftheMinistersforForeignAffairsoftheGroupof77,24September1999;DeclarationoftheGroupof77SouthSummit,Havana,Cuba,10–14April2000.C.GRAY, InternationalLawandtheUseofForce,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2018, 52-56; C. HENDERSON, The use of force and international law, Cambridge, CambridgeUniversityPress,2018,396.256 C. HENDERSON, The use of force and international law, Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress, 2018, 397; B. SIMMA, “NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects”, EuropeanJournalofInternationallaw,1999,1.257A.CASSESE,“AFollow-Up:ForcibleHumanitarianCountermeasuresandOpinioNecessitatis”,European Journal of International Law, 1999, 791.; C. HENDERSON, The use of force andinternationallaw,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2018,399.

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4.3.3 Syriaasstatepracticeofunilateralhumanitarianintervention?The question can be asked if a new customary international rule has been created by theinterventionsagainst thechemicalweaponsattacksof theSyrian regime in the sense that theuseofforceisallowedwhenitisusedtorespondtoandpreventtheuseofforbiddenchemicalweaponsagainstcivilianswhentheUNSCisblockedbythevetoof(someof)thePermanentfivemembersandconsequentlyanauthorizationforaninterventionisimpeded.TheICJdeclaredintheNicaraguacasethat:“reliancebyaStateonanovelrightoranunprecedentedexceptiontothe principle [of non-intervention]might, if shared in principle by other States, tend toward amodificationof customary international law”.258Customary international lawcan in that sensegrowbyintroducinganewpracticeandotherstatesallowingthenewpracticeandacceptingitasnewlaw.TheInterventionbytheUS,theUKandFranceonhumanitariangroundtoendtheuseofgruesomechemicalweaponscanbeseeninthatregardasthefirstuseofanewpractice.AccordingtoScharf,theinternationalcommunitycanthenactinthreeways.Thefirstwayistoaccept and support the new practice as a new rule of customary law. The second way is tocondemn it completely, and the third way is silence, in the sense of indifference. Normally,customary international law takesmany years or decades to become established as a bindinglegalnorm,butsometimescertaineventscanenableittodevelopfairlyquickly.259Internationalcustomary law has been developed on a more rapidly in two instances. First, in situationsinvolvingnewtechnologies,likedrillingtechnologyinthecontextoftherulesonthecontinentalshelfandspacetechnology in thecontextof theuseofouterspace.Second, insituations thatinvoke widespread sentiments of moral outrage, for example the conflicts in Rwanda andYugoslavia.Thisledtocustomaryrulesconcerningcrimesinnon-internationalarmedconflicts.260TheinterventionoftheUSin2017andtheinterventionoftheUS,theUKandFrancein2018canbeconsideredwithinthecontextofmoraloutrage.261 Thereareseveralcircumstanceswhichcouldspeakinfavourofanewrapidlydevelopedcustomaryruletoallowtheuseofforceintheexceptionalcircumstancewhenchemicalweaponsarebeingused.First,Syriafindsitselfinanimmensehumanitariancrisis.Countlesshumanrightsviolationshavebeenobservedbyseveralpartiestotheconflict.Theurgencyofthisconflictsetthe stage for a more rapid development of customary international law. Second, the 2018

258 ICJ, 27 June 1986, Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and againstNicaragua(Nicaraguav.UnitedStates),ICJReports14,par.207.259M.SCHARF,“StrikingaGrotianMoment:HowtheSyrianAirstrikesChangedInternationalLawRelatingtoHumanitarianIntervention”,ChicagoJournalofInternationalLaw,2019,586-614.260 T. TREVES, “Customary International Law” in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA of PublicInternationallaw,2006,par.24.261M.SCHARF,“StrikingaGrotianMoment:HowtheSyrianAirstrikesChangedInternationalLawRelatingtoHumanitarianIntervention”,ChicagoJournalofInternationalLaw,2019,586-614.

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airstrikewasnotexecutedbyonestate,butby threestatesacting together.Francemotivatedthe airstrike by stating that itwas in compliancewith the principles and values of theUnitedNationsCharter.262TheUnitedStateslegitimizedtheairstrikeonthebasisoftheUSinterestsinmitigating humanitarian disasters and the deterrence of the use and proliferation of chemicalweapons.263 The United Kingdom legitimized the airstrike on the doctrine of humanitarianintervention stating that: “any State is permitted under international law, on an exceptionalbasis,totakemeasuresinordertoalleviateoverwhelminghumanitariansuffering”.264TheUnitedKingdom did not see any other alternative than the use of force to end the use of chemicalweapons by the Syrian regime and by that means end the human suffering of the Syrianpeople.265 All of the countries share invoking humanitarian reason and the need to protectcivilian lives. Third, there was widespread international support for the airstrike in Syria. 56statesand theNATOexpressed their legalpositionon the interventionby theUK, theUSandFrance. The Russian sponsored resolution to condemn the airstrike was rejected. Only China,Russia and Bolivia voted in favour. Cote d’Ivoire, France, Kuwait, The Netherlands, Poland,Sweden, UK and US voted against and Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan and Peruabstained.266AsSchmittandChristopheputforward:“Whatwemaybewitnessing,then,istheslow and somewhat painful birth of a nascent right in customary international law allowingStates to act forcefully to put an end to theuseof particularly repugnantweaponryagainst acivilian population, or perhaps even one countenancing forceful State responses to otheregregiousformsofterrorizingandmassacringcivilianpopulationsinothercountries.If,however,this commendable norm of international law is ever to fully crystallize, States must have themoralcouragetosetforththeirlegalbasisforuseofforceintheformofexplicitexpressionsofopiniojuris.Theirfailuretodoso,amongotherthings,leavestheworldlesssafe”.267

262 A. DUNKELBERG, “Mapping States’ Reactions to the Syria Strikes of April 2018”, 2018,https://www.justsecurity.org/55157/mapping-states-reactions-syria-strikes-april-2018.263UnitedStatesDepartmentofJustice,“AirstrikesAgainstSyrianChemical-WeaponsFacilities”,31May2018,https://www.justice.gov/olc/opinion/april-2018-airstrikes-against-syrian-chemical-weapons-facilities264Meetingrecord8233oftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(14April2018),S/PV.8233(2018).265 PRIMEMINISTER’S OFFICE,Policy Paper – Syria action – UKGovernment legal position, 14April 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/syria-action-uk-government-legal-position/syria-action-uk-government-legal-position(consultationon17April2018).266DraftResolutionS/2018/355oftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(14April2018),UNDoc.S/2018/355(2018);M.SCHARF,“StrikingaGrotianMoment:HowtheSyrianAirstrikesChangedInternationalLawRelatingtoHumanitarianIntervention”,ChicagoJournalofInternationalLaw,2019,586-614.267M.SCHMITTandC.FORD,“AssessingU.S.JustificationsforUsingForceinResponsetoSyria’sChemicalAttacks:An International LawPerspective, Journal ofNational Security Law&Policy,2017,303.

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Nonetheless,therewasnoclearlegaljustificationfortheairstrikesagainstSyria,onlytheUKexplicitlyusedhumanitarian interventionasa legitimationfortheiractions. Inaddition,thestateswhosupportedthe2018airstrikedidnotmentionhumanitarianintervention.NATOand33otherstatesexpressedtheirsupportfortheStrike,butdidnotacknowledgethelegalityoftheaction. TheG77 and three other states expressed political support, but underlined that it theprocess should be UN-led and actions should be in compliance with UN Security Councilresolutions.TheAfricanUnionand17otherstatesdidnotcondemnorsupportedtheairstrikes,butemphasised the importanceof international lawand12 states condemned the strikesandfound them illegal under international law.268 These statements do not support an uniformopinio juris that is necessary todevelopa customary international rule.AsBarber states:“thefact that the concerned States and their supporters made no reference to a norm permittingmilitary intervention in relationtochemicalweaponsuseconfirmsthat theydidnot regardtheCharterasencompassingsuchanexceptiontotheprohibitionoftheuseofforce”.269

4.4. Collectivehumanitarianintervention

“When a State neverthelesswas “manifestly failing” to protect its population from thefourspecifiedcrimesandviolations,theyconfirmedthattheinternationalcommunitywaspreparedtotakecollectiveaction ina ‘timelyanddecisivemanner’throughtheSecurityCouncilandinaccordancewiththeCharteroftheUnitedNations.”270

ThisquotefromthereportoftheUNSecretary-GeneralBanKi-moonin2009withregardtotheR2P shows themandateof theUNSecurityCouncil to legitimizean interventionbasedon theR2P norm. Therefore, the legitimisation of interventions based on the R2P norm is ultimatelywiththeUNSecurityCouncil.271Collectivehumanitarianinterventionfollowsfromtheactionsofthe UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The UN Security Council canauthorizeastate,groupofstatesoraregionalorganizationtointerveneintheterritoryofathird 268 A. DUNKELBERG, “Mapping States’ Reactions to the Syria Strikes of April 2018”, 2018,https://www.justsecurity.org/55157/mapping-states-reactions-syria-strikes-april-2018/.; R.BARBER, “Uniting forPeaceNotAgression:Responding toChemicalWeapons in SyriaWithoutBreakingtheLaw”,JournalofConflictandSecurityLaw,2018,71-110.269 R. BARBER, “Uniting for Peace Not Agression: Responding to Chemical Weapons in SyriaWithoutBreakingtheLaw”,JournalofConflictandSecurityLaw,2018,90.

270UNGENERALASSEMBLY.UNDocA/63/677,ReportoftheSecretary-General:ImplementingtheResponsibilitytoProtect,12January2009http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/SGRtoPEng%20(4).pdf(consultationon23February2018). 271J.MORRISandN.WHEELER,“TheResponsibilityNottoVeto:AResponsibilityTooFar”inA.J.BELLAMY and T. DUNNE (eds.),TheOxfordHandbook of the Responsibility to Protect, Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2016,Chapter13.

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state for thepurposeof ending serious human rights violations.272 This is an exception to theprohibition on the use of force set forth in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Therefore, theapplicationisgenerallyundisputedunderinternational law.Thefollowingsectiondescribesthedevelopment of the Responsibility to Protect, a new iteration to the debate on humanitarianinterventionundertheauspicesofthecollectivesecuritymechanismoftheUNSecurityCouncil.

4.4.1 ResponsibilitytoProtect

ThehumanitariancatastrophesinRwandaandBosniawasastarkremindertotheinternationalcommunity that the international framework relating to theprotectionofhuman rights in theworld was not sufficient to end human right atrocities. The 1990s were characterized bysituations of excessive violence and human rights violations within state borders. Theinternational community stood and watched. The international community respondedinsufficientlyandineffectivelytotheseatrocities.InRwanda,in1994,800.000peoplewerekilledinthegenocide.Againin1995,8000menwereslaughteredinSrebrenicaunderthe‘protection’oftheUnitedNations.273ThisineffectivenesswascausedbyadivisionwithintheUnitedNationsanditsmembersonhowinternationalhumanrightsviolationsshouldbeaddressed.Thedebateformed around a North-South division, whereby the global North pleaded for a form ofhumanitarianinterventionwhiletheglobalSouthwasstronglyopposedtothisandpleadedfortheprotectionof theprinciple of sovereignty.274 Consequently, theUNwasunable to reach aconsensusonanappropriateresponsetothesecrisissituationsandhumanrightsviolationskepton occurring on a great scale. In 1999, after theNATO intervention in Yugoslavia, Kofi Annandeclared in its annual UN General Assembly speech regarding unauthorized humanitarianintervention:“Tothose forwhomthegreatest threattothe futureof internationalorder is theuseofforceintheabsenceofaSecurityCouncilmandate,onemightask—notinthecontextofKosovo—but in the context of Rwanda: If, in those dark days and hours leading up to thegenocide,acoalitionofStateshadbeenpreparedtoact indefenceoftheTutsipopulation,butdid not receive prompt Council authorization, should such a coalition have stood aside and

272T.G.WEISS,“PeaceOperationsandHumanitarianIntervention”inJ.A.KOOPS,T.TARDY,N.MACQUEEN and P. WILLIAMS (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of United Nations PeacekeepingOperations,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2015,Chapter16.273D.GIERYCZ,“FromHumanitarianIntervention(HI)toResponsibilitytoProtect(R2P)”,CriminalJusticeEthics,2010,112.;R.THAKUR,“TheResponsibilitytoProtectat15”,InternationalAffairs2016,416;G.EVANS,TheResponsibilitytoProtect:EndingMassAtrocityCrimesOnceandforAll,Washington,TheBrookingsInstitution,2008,28-29. 274 G. EVANS, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All,Washington,TheBrookingsInstitution,2008,30.

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allowedthehorrortounfold?”275ItwaswithKofiAnna’smillenniumchallengethatthefirststepswere taken to address this discussion. In 2000, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan asked theUnitedNationsGeneral assembly: “... if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptableassault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross andsystematicviolationsofhumanrightsthataffecteverypreceptofourcommonhumanity?”276 TheInternationalCommissiononInterventionandStateSovereignty(ICISS),sponsoredbyCanada, was established to consider this question. In 2001, the ICISS published a report thatestablished the term ‘Responsibility toProtect’. ICISS tried tomerge thedifferentviewsof theglobal South and North regarding intervention by underlining that peaceful options wereincluded, in parallel to military ones and by stressing that human rights abuses are aninternationalresponsibility.277Thebasicprinciplesare:

“1.Statesovereigntyimpliesresponsibility,andtheprimaryresponsibilityfortheprotectionofitspeoplelieswiththestateitself.

2. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency,repressionorstatefailure,andthestateinquestionisunwillingorunabletohaltoravertit,theprincipleofnon-interventionyieldstotheinternationalresponsibilitytoprotect“.278

The ICISS report clarifies that state sovereignty also implies responsibility: the state has theprimaryresponsibilitytoprotectitspopulation.Whenthestatefails,orisunableorunwillingtostop serious suffering of the population as a result of an internalwar, riot or repression, theprincipleofnon-interventionwillbesubordinatedtotheinternationalresponsibilitytoprotect.This implies that sovereigntynotonlymeansprotectionagainst interference fromoutside,butthatit isalsoamatterforthestatetopropagatepositiveresponsibilitiesforthewelfareofthepopulation. The primary responsibility of the state is protect its own citizens, the residualresponsibilitylieswiththebroaderinternationalcommunityofstates,whichshouldtakeactionwhenthestateinquestionclearlycannotordoesnotwanttoassumeitsresponsibilityorwhenit 275 Secretary-General Presents His Annual Report to General Assembly, UN Press Release,UNDoc. SG/SM/7136-GA/9596, 20 September 1999,https://www.un.org/press/en/1999/19990920.sgsm7136.html

276K.ANNAN,‘WethePeoples’inMillenniumreport.NewYork,UnitedNations,2000, http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/pdfs/We_The_Peoples.pdf,p.48(consultationon 17February2018).

277 G. EVANS, The Responsibility to protect, Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All,Washington,TheBrookingsInstitution,2008,32.

278ICISS,TheResponsibilitytoProtect:ReportoftheInternationalCommissiononIntervention andStateSovereignty,2001,http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf,11 (consultationon17February2018).

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isresponsibleforatrocitiesagainstitsowncitizens.279 The Responsibility to Protect has three main components. First, the responsibility topreventapopulationfromsuffering.This isapreventivemeasure.Theinterventionisaimedatpreventing theescalationof theconflictandtoavoidahumanitariancatastrophe.Second, theresponsibilitytoreactwhenharmoccurs.Harmisdeterminedbyalarge-scalelossoflifeorlargescaleethniccleansing.Thismeans thathumanrightsviolationshaveoccurredorareoccurringandthataninterventionisneededtoendthehumanitariancatastrophe.Third,theresponsibilitytorebuildafterintervention.Aftertheemergencysituationandpossibleintervention,statesarecalledupontosupportthetargetstate in itsrecovery.Theresponsibilityresideswiththestatewheretheharmoccurs,butwhenitisthestateitselfthatcommitsharmorisunwillingorunableto end the harm, then it is the international community’s responsibility to protect thepopulation.280The reportestablished fourkeyprinciples formilitary interventionbasedon theR2P. The first principle, namely the just cause threshold, states that an intervention onhumanitarian grounds can be legitimate in a situation of large-scale loss of life or large scale‘ethniccleansing’asaresultoftheactionsorinactionsofthestatewhohastheresponsibilitytoprotect its own citizens. The second principle contains the precautionary principles. The firstprecautionaryprinciplestatesthattheinterventionshouldbefocusedontherightintention,thatis on stopping human suffering. The second precautionary principle states thatmilitary actioncan only be a last resort when peaceful means are not any longer possible. The thirdprecautionaryprinciplecontainstheprincipleofproportionality;thescale,durationandintensityoftheinterventionshouldbetheminimumnecessarytosecuretheprotectionofhumanrights.The last precautionary principle requires that the intervention has reasonable prospects. Thechance of success should be reasonable and the consequences should be no worse than theintervention itself.Theprincipleof the rightauthority is the lastprinciple.Thisprinciplestatesthat there isnobetterbody than theUNSecurityCouncil toallow formilitary intervention.AstatemustformallyrequestamandatefromtheUNSecurityCouncilbeforetheycantakeaction.Inaddition,theUNSecurityCouncilhasaresponsibilitytoinvestigate.Itshouldverifythefactsandconditionsontheground.TheICISSalsowantstomaketheUNSecurityCouncilworkbetterthanithasthusfar.Therefore,thePermanentfivemembersoftheUNSecurityCouncilshouldagreenot to invoke their vetopowers inmatterswhere their essential state interests arenot

279ICISS,TheResponsibilitytoProtect:ReportoftheInternationalCommissiononIntervention andStateSovereignty,2001,http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf,11

(consultation on 17 February 2018). C. HENDERSON, The use of force and international law,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2018,154.

280ICISS,TheResponsibilitytoProtect:ReportoftheInternationalCommissiononIntervention andStateSovereignty,2001,http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf,12

(consultationon17 February2018).; Y.NAHLAWI, “TheResponsibility toProtect andObama’sRedLinOnSyria”,GlobalResponsibilitytoProtect,2016,76-101.

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involvedorwhen there ismajority support for intervention.The reportemphasizes thatwhenthe UNSC fails to act, other alternatives can be taken, such as, for example, the “Uniting forPeace”procedure(cf.infra)oractionbyregionalorganisationsunderChapterVIIIoftheCharter,provided they receiveauthorizationby theUNSecurityCouncil. In this regard, the ICISSwarnsthat in the situation that theUNSC fails toact, the concerned state coulduseothermeansofactiontoendtheatrocitiesandthestatureandcredibilityoftheUNmayconsequentlysuffer.281

In 2004 and 2005, two other documents were prepared to clarify the scope of theResponsibility to Protect. First of all, in the report of the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan,published in2004,entitled:“AmoreSecureWorld:OurSharedResponsibility”,heappointedapanelto“recommendclearandpracticalmeasurestoensureeffectivecollectiveaction,basedonthorough analysis of future threats of peace and security”.282 This report containedrecommendations onhow theworld should dealwith challenges regarding collective security,includingtheimplementationoftheResponsibilitytoProtect.283In2005,inthereport“InLargerFreedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All”, Secretary-General KofiAnnan insistedon the international community to embrace theR2Pas thebasis for collectiveactionagainstgenocide,ethniccleansingandcrimesagainsthumanity.284AttheUN2005worldsummit, theResponsibility toProtectwasunanimouslyadoptedat theUnitedNationsGeneralAssembly.285Butafewclauseswerenonethelessamendedduringthesummit.First,themilitaryforceshouldbeexclusivelyunderUNSecurityCouncilcontrol. Second,thecriteria ‘largescalelossoflife’and‘largescaleethniccleansing’weremorecloselydefinedasgenocide,warcrimes,crimesagainsthumanity,andethniccleansing.Third,unwillingorunabletoprotectwaschangedinto‘manifestlyfailing’toprotect.286Inthe2009UNSecretary-Generalreport‘ImplementingtheResponsibility to Protect’, Ban-Ki Moon defined three pillars as crucial for the R2P: first, the

281ICISS,TheResponsibilitytoProtect:ReportoftheInternationalCommissiononIntervention andStateSovereignty,2001,http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf,12.

282ReportoftheHigh-levelPanelonThreats,ChallengesandChange,“Amoresecureworld:oursharedresponsibility”,2december2004,UNDoc.A/59/565.;283 G. EVANS, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All,Washington, The Brookings Institution, 2008, 46.; C. HENDERSON, The use of force andinternationallaw,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2018,155.284 Report of the Secretary-General, “In larger freedom: towards development, security andhumanrightsforall”,21March2005,UNDoc.A/59/2005.285 Resolution 60/1 of the United Nations General Assembly (24 oktober 2005), UN Doc.A/RES/60/1(2005).;C.GRAY,InternationalLawandtheUseofForce,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2018,59.286A.GARWOOD-GOWERS,“TheresponsibilitytoprotectandtheArabSpring:Libyaastheexception,Syriaasthenorm?”,UniversityofNewSouthWalesLawJournal,2013,594-618.;C.STAHN, “Responsibility ToProtect: Political RhetoricOr Emerging LegalNorm?”,TheAmericanJournalOfInternationalLaw2007,108-110.

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responsibilityof each state toprotect itsownpopulationagainst genocide,war crimes, ethniccleansingandcrimesagainsthumanity.Second,theassistanceoftheinternationalcommunityincapacitybuilding inregardofpillarone. Itemphasizesthe importanceofcooperationbetweenstates. And, third, the intervention by the international community if the state is manifestlyfailing to protect its population. This can be achieved by means of diplomacy, humanitarianassistance,ortheuseofforce,thusunderChapterVI,VIIorVIIIoftheUnitedNationsCharter.Measures taken under Chapter VII must be authorized by the UN Security Council. The UNGeneralAssemblycanexerciseitsfunctionsunderArticle10toArticle14oftheCharter,aswellasundertheUnitingforPeaceprocedure.ChapterVIandVIIIspecifythepeacefulmeasuresthatmaybeassignedby intergovernmentalbodiesorby theSecretary-Generalof theUN.Noneofthesepillars ismore importantthantheothers,andthethreepillarsdonotpointtoaspecificranking.287 The introduction of Responsibility to Protect announced the end of the principle ofsovereignty as an absolute form of authority, and transformed it into a kind of responsibilitytowardshumanrights.288TheResponsibility toProtect implies thatsovereignty isno longeranabsolutedefenceagainstthe interferencebyanotherstate. Itcreatesaresponsibilityuponthestatetoprotectitsnationalsagainsthumanrightsviolations,butalsoaresponsibilitytowardstheinternationalcommunitytoprotectpeopleagainstgrosslarge-scalehumanrightsviolations.Thisisclearlydiscernabletrendthatalreadystartedwiththeestablishmentofinternationaltribunals,the International Criminal Court and the Pinochet case. It shows the commitment of theinternational community to enforce the compliance with international agreements andobligations.TheResponsibilitytoProtectconnectstheideaofsovereigntywiththeprotectionofhumanrights.289 In theyears that theR2Pdoctrinehasbeen ineffect, it remainscontroversialand contested. From the intervention in Libya on the basis of R2P to the non-intervention in

287ReportoftheSecretary-General:ImplementingtheResponsibilitytoProtect,12January2009,

UN Doc. A/63/677, http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/SGRtoPEng%20(4).pdf.; C. GRAY,InternationalLawandtheUseofForce,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2018,59.288 A. KOLB, “The “Responsibility While Protecting”: A recent twist in the evolution of the“Responsibility to Protect”.” in N.WEIB and J-M. THOUVENIN (eds.), The Influence of HumanRightsonInternationalLaw,Cham,SpringerInternationalPublishing,2015,79-91.;P.G.ERCAN,Debating theFutureof the ‘Responsibility toProtect’: TheEvolutionofaMoralNorm, London,PalgraveMacmillanUK,2016,212p.;R.THAKUR,TheUnitedNations,PeaceandSecurity:FromCollectiveSecuritytotheResponsibilitytoProtect,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversitypress,2016,444 p.; G.MELLING, “Beyond Rhetoric? Evaluating the Responsibility to Protect as a norm ofhumanitarianintervention”,JournalontheUseofForceandInternationalLaw,2018,1-19.289P.BAEHRandC.FLINTERMAN,”Humanitaireinterventie–dehuidigestandvanzaken”,inD.HELLEMAenH.REIDING(eds.),Humanitaireinterventieensoevereiniteit.Degeschiedenisvandetegenstelling,Amsterdam,Boom,2004.

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relatively similar cases (Syria, Myanmar), it is not considered to be a general success.290 TheResponsibility toProtectcannotyetbeseenasastrongbindingnormof international lawandshould be rather understood as mere political rhetoric that adds nothing novel, legallyspeaking.291 To date it has only been used in three instances to legitimize third-partymilitaryinterventiononthebasisofhumanitarianconcerns,namelyinLibyain2011,inCoted’Ivoirein2011 and in Mali in 2013.292 There is also no unambiguous opinio juris and a lack of statepractice.293

290 G. MELLING, “Beyond Rhetoric? Evaluating the Responsibility to Protect as a norm ofhumanitarianintervention”,JournalontheUseofForceandInternationalLaw,2018,1-19.291 C. HENDERSON, The use of force and international law, Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress,2018,164.292Resolution1973oftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(17March2011),UNDoc.S/RES/1973(2011).; Resolution 1975 of the United Nations Security Council (30 March 2011), UN Doc.S/RES/1975(2011).;Resolution2100oftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(25April2013),UNDoc.S/RES/2100(2013).293V.TZEVELEKOS,BeyondtheResponsibilitytoProtect:GeneratingChangeinInternationalLaw,Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2016, 442.; J. BELLAMY, S.E. DAVIES and L. GLANVILLE (eds.), TheResponsibilitytoProtectandInternationalLaw,Leiden,MartinusNijhoffPublishers,2011,60.;C.O’DONNELL,“TheDevelopmentof theResponsibility toProtect:AnExaminationof theDebateovertheLegalityofHumanitarianIntervention”,DukeJournalofcomparativeandinternationallaw,2014,578.

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4.5. Conclusion

As argued in the previous chapter, the 2017 and 2018 airstrikes against Syria violated theterritorial integrity andpolitical independenceof Syria. There is a clear infringementofArticle2(4)oftheUNCharter.Theinterveningpartiescouldnotlegitimizetheiractionsonself-defence,consent and no UN Security Council authorisation was given for the missile strikes. In thischapter,itisassesedifunilateralorcollectivehumanitarianinterventioncanbeconsideredasalegal basis for theairstrikes in Syria.After the2017missile attacks against Syria,USPresidentTrumpcalled:“onallcivilizednationstojoinusinseekingtoendtheslaughterandbloodshedinSyria”.294 In2018,USPresidentTrumpstated:“Theevilandthedespicableattack leftmothersandfathers,infantsandchildren,thrashinginpainandgaspingforair.Thesearenottheactionsofaman;theyarecrimesofamonster instead”.295TheUSAmbassadortotheUN,NikkiHaleystatedintheUNSCon14April2018:“weactedtodeterthefutureuseofchemicalweaponsbyholding the Syrian regime responsible for its atrocities against humanity”.296 The US did notexpressly base their legitimation on humanitarian intervention but sets clearly humanitariangoals to its military operation.297 In addition, the UK legitimized the attack on humanitariangrounds.298

As shown in this chapter, these interventions cannot be legitimized on the basis ofunilateral or collective humanitarian intervention. Regarding collective humanitarianintervention, the Responsibility to Protect doctrine sets out the necessity of an UNSCauthorisation toconductahumanitarian intervention.299TheResponsibility toProtectdoctrinedoesnotallowfortheunilateraluseofforceundertheumbrellaofhumanitarianintervention.

294NEWYORKTIMES,“TranscriptandVideo:TrumpSpeaksAboutStrikesinSyria,TheNewYorkTimes,6 April 2017,https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/world/middleeast/transcript-video-trump-airstrikes-syria.html295 BBC, “Syria air strikes: President Trump statement in full”, BBC, 4 April 2018,https://www.bbc.com/news/world-43766967.296UNITEDSTATESMISSIONTOTHEUNITEDNATIONS, “Remarks at an EmergencyUNSecurityCouncilMeetingonUS,UKandFrenchMilitaryStrikesinResponsetoSyria’sChemicalWeaponsUse”,14April2018,https://usun.state.gov/highlights/8388.297A.LAGERWALL,“ThreatsofandActualMilitaryStrikesAgainstSyria–2013and2017”, inT.RUYS, O. CORTEN and A. HOFER (eds), The Use of Force in International Law – a Case-basedApproach,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,852.298 PRIMEMINISTER’S OFFICE,Policy Paper – Syria action – UKGovernment legal position, 14April 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/syria-action-uk-government-legal-position/syria-action-uk-government-legal-position299A.LAGERWALL,“ThreatsofandActualMilitaryStrikesAgainstSyria–2013and2017”, inT.RUYS, O. CORTEN and A. HOFER (eds), The Use of Force in International Law – a Case-basedApproach,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,843.

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This condition was not fullfilled due to the systematic vetoes by Russia in de UNSC and,therefore,nohumanitarianinterventioncouldbeconductedonacollectivebasis. UnilateralhumanitarianinterventioninSyriacanbeconsideredillegalunderinternationallawonthreegrounds.First,Unilateralhumanitarianinterventionistodatenoexceptiontotheprohibitionontheuseofforce.ThiswasexplicitymentionedintheNicaraguacaseandtheICJstated,withoutgivingadefinitejudgement,inthelegalityontheuseofforcecase(inlightoftheintevention in Yugoslavia) that: “under the present circumstances such use raises very seriousissues of international law”.300 Second, there is no justification under international customarylaw. As demonstrated above, there is no international customary rule thatwould legitimize aunilateralhumanitarianintervention.Thestatepracticeandopiniojurisislackingtoconsiderthisawell-foundedcustomaryrule.OnlytheUKhasexpresslyacceptedhumanitarianinterventionaslegalunderinternationallaw.AftertheinterventioninYugoslavia,onlyBelgiumandtheUKreliedon the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. States that invoked humanitarian interventionhave often done this as a subsidiary claim in support of other justifications, for example self-defence.301 Inaddition, the intervention in Syria cannotbe considered thebeginningof anewcustomary ruleallowing for theuseof forcebasedonahumanitarian imperative todeterandpreventtheuseofchemicalweapons.Bothinterventionswerenotexpresslylegitimizedonthebasis of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention and the justifications for the interventionslackedclarity.Thepossibilityexiststhatiftheyexplicitlybasedtheirlegitimationonhumanitarianintervention, no widespread support would be present. In addition, there was also strongcondemnationof several statesagainst the intervention,whichmakes it far fromunanimouslyaccepted.302Furtherstatepractice isneededtoconsiderthedevelopmentofanewcustomaryrule.Timewilltellifthiswasjustaparticularmomentlinkedtoaparticularcontextandsituationorifitisaseedplantedforafurtherentrenchmentofacustomaryrule.ItcouldbesaidthattheUS,theUKandFrance’sinterventioninSyriareflectstheinterventioninYugoslavia,inthesensethat itwas clearly illegalbut legitimate todo soonmoral grounds.Third, itopens theway toabuse and violence.303 The debate on unilateral humanitarian intervention is based on two 300Legalityofuseofforce(order)2June1999,ICJreports1999,17.;A.LAGERWALL,“ThreatsofandActualMilitaryStrikesAgainstSyria–2013and2017”,inT.RUYS,O.CORTENandA.HOFER(eds),TheUseofForceinInternationalLaw–aCase-basedApproach,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,844.301R.KOLB,InternationalLawontheMaintenanceofPeace:JusContraBellum,Cheltenham,EEElgar,2018,432.302A.LAGERWALL,“ThreatsofandActualMilitaryStrikesAgainstSyria–2013and2017”, inT.RUYS, O. CORTEN and A. HOFER (eds), The Use of Force in International Law – a Case-basedApproach,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,853.303R.KOLB,InternationalLawontheMaintenanceofPeace:JusContraBellum,Cheltenham,EEElgar, 2018, 431-432. Y. DINSTEIN,War, aggression and self-defence, Cambridge, CambridgeUniversityPress,2017,97-98.

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absolutes. On the one hand, the danger of returning to unilateral armed conflict and, on theother hand, the danger of passivity in the face of human rights violations and atrocities.304 Inaddition,wemustalsonobeblindforgeopoliticalconsiderationsandthefactthatstatesarenotlikely to intervene in a conflict that is costly on lives andmoney without tangible interest inreturn.AsKolbmentions:“toallowunilateralhumanitarianinterventionmeanstoallowitonalargescale,whileatthesametimedrawingaveilovertherealpoliticalmotivations leadingtointerventionsinsomecasesandnon-interventioninothers.”305

304R.KOLB,InternationalLawontheMaintenanceofPeace:JusContraBellum,Cheltenham,EEElgar,2018,433.305Ibid,432.

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Chapter5:ACaseforReprisals?5.1. IntroductionAspreviouschaptersshowed,boththeinterventionin2017andtheinterventionin2018cannotbeconsidered legalundertheUNCharterorthedoctrineofhumanitarian intervention. In thischapter, it isconsideredifthelawonarmedreprisalscanbemobilisedasa justificationtouseforce.InChapter2,itisexplainedthataccordingtotheUStheairstrikeswerealsoconductedtodeter and prevent the use of internationally forbidden chemical weapons. President BarackObama described the use of chemical weapons as a red line that cannot be ignored. The USstatedaftertheattacksthattheattackswereanecessaryandproportionateresponse.Thiscanbe assessed as a retaliatory strike and armed reprisal against the violation of an internationalobligation.Thefollowingchapterdescribestheinternationalprohibitionontheuseofchemicalweapons.Itprovidesanhistoricintroductionandconsidersthemostrecentconvention,namelythe1993ChemicalWeaponsConvention. Inthenextsection, the lawonreprisals isexamined.Subsequently, the ILC’s circumstances precluding wrongfulness is analysed as a possible legaljustification. Finally, The intervention in Syria as a reaction to the chemical weapon attack isanalysedinlightofthelawonreprisalsandcountermeasures.5.2. Internationalprohibitionontheuseofchemicalweapons“Ihave,atthispoint,notorderedmilitaryengagementinthesituation.Butthepointthatyoumadeaboutchemicalandbiologicalweaponsiscritical...WehavebeenverycleartotheAssadregime,butalsotootherplayersontheground,thataredlineforusiswhenwestartseeingawholebunchofchemicalweaponsmovingaroundorbeingutilized.Thatwouldchangemycalculus.Thatwouldchangemyequation.”(BarackObama,statement20August2012).306

PresidentObamamadethisstatement inAugust2012asawarningfortheal-AssadRegimetonotuseforbiddenchemicalweapons.HeiteratedthattheuseoftheseweaponsisaredlineandareactionoftheUSshouldbeexpected.Inthefollowingsectionthelawonchemicalweaponsisanalysed. The Hague conventions of 1899 and 1907 were the first conventions to codify andregulatetheuseofmeansandmethodsofwarfareintheconductofhostilities. Itwasthefirstcodificationofthecustomarylawofwar.Thefirstprohibitionontheuseofchemicalweaponsin

306THEWHITEHOUSE,“RemarksbythePresidenttotheWhiteHousePressCorps”,20August2012, www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/08/20/remarks-president-white-house -press-corps.

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warfarewas codified in TheHague declaration of 1899 concerning AsphyxiatingGases.307 Theconventions includedaprohibitionontheuseoftoxicandpoisonousweapons.308Article23ofthe1907TheHagueConventionprohibitstheuseofpoisonorpoisonousweaponsandweaponscausing unnecessary suffering.309 As the mass use of chemical weapons in World War Idemonstrated, state parties did not comply to this. Therefore, after the horrors of chemicalwarfare during WOI, these conventions were supplemented, during the interbellum, by theProtocolontheUseofAsphyxiating,PoisonousorOtherGases,andofBacteriologicalMethodsofWarfare,theso-calledGenevaProtocolof1925.310Theprotocolincludedaprohibitionontheuseofsuffocating,toxicorsimilargases inwartime.Theprotocoldidnot includea listofwhatkind of chemical substances were included in the prohibition. In addition, there was noprohibitionontheproduction,storageandtransferofchemicalweapons.Butmostimportantlymostcountriessubmittedreservationsinwhichtheystatedthattheprohibitiontousechemicalweaponswould only apply against other state parties andwhen chemicalweaponswould beused against them, the obligation not to use chemical weapons would cease to exist.311 Inaddition, the treaty had no verification or enforcementmeasures and no sanction were everimposed by the international community for violations of the treaty.312 Syria is party to theGeneva Protocol of 1925 and is therefore legally bound by its provisions. However, as statedabove, thepartiesonly agreed tobeboundbetween themselves. States areonlyparty to theconvention.Therefore,itcreatesnolegalobligationforSyriatorefrainfromchemicalweaponsattacksinanon-internationalarmedconflict,suchasagainstrebelforcesincivilwar.313Howeverin1966, theUNGAcalledforallstatestoabidebytheprotocoland,again in1969, itdeclared

307TheHaguedeclarationof1899concerningasphyxiatinggases,28July1899.308 R. KOLB andR.HYDE,An Introduction to the International LawofArmedConflicts,Oxford,HartPublishing,2008,17.309Convention(IV)RespectingtheLawsandCustomsofWaronLandanditsannex:RegulationsConcerningtheLawsandCustomsofWaronLand,18October1907.310ProtocolfortheProhibitionoftheUseinWarofAsphyxiating,PoisonousorOtherGases,andofBacteriologicalMethodsofWarfare,Geneva,17June1925311 N. RAICEVIC, “The history of prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in internationalhumanitarianlaw”,FactaUniversitatis: LawandPolitics, 2001, 621;N.MELZER, InternationalHumanitarianLaw:AComprehensiveIntroduction,Geneva,InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross,2016,34.312 A. BELL, “Using Force against theWeapons of theWeak: Examining a Chemical-BiologicalWeaponsUsage Criterion forUnilateral Humanitarian Intervention under the Responsibility toProtect”,CardozoJournalofInternationalandComparativeLaw,2014,261-320.313ProtocolfortheProhibitionoftheUseinWarofAsphyxiating,PoisonousorOtherGases,andof BacteriologicalMethods ofWarfare,Geneva, 17 June 1925.; J. BLAKE andA.MAHMUD, “ALegal“RedLine”?SyriaandtheUseofChemicalWeapons inCivilConflict”,UCLALawReview,2013,251.

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thatthebanontheuseofchemicalweaponsininternationalarmedconflictwasastandardruleofinternationallaw.314

Themost recent andmost comprehensive regulation on the prohibition on the use ofchemicalweapons is setout in the1993ChemicalWeaponsConvention (CWC),whichenteredinto force in1997.315 Itwas the first international instrument toabsolutelyprohibit theuseofchemical weapons and reacted to the weaknesses of the 1907 The Hague and 1925 Genevatreaties.TheCWCisthefirstmultilateralarmscontrolandnon-proliferationtreatythatcallsforthetotaldestructionofacategoryofweaponsofmassdestructionwithinacertaintimeperiodandintroducingacomprehensiveverificationsystem.316Notonlyistheuseofchemicalweaponsforbidden,butalsotheproduction,development,acquisition,stockpiling,retentionandtransferofchemicalweapons.Whenastateisinpossessionofchemicalweaponsitshoulddestroyit.TheChemical Weapons Convention is administered by the Organization for the Prohibition ofChemicalWeapons(OPCW),whichisbasedinTheHague.TheOPCWhasthedutytomonitorthechemical industry, destroy existing chemical weapons, assist treaty parties and promote theinternational cooperation to support the implementationof the treaty. In addition, theOPCWrequires from the state parties that they provide national reporting on industrial chemicalproductionand toaccept inspectionsby theOPCW.317TheChemicalWeaponsConventionhas193 state parties and is therefore quasi-universal; only Egypt, Israel, North Korea and SouthSudanarenotparty to theconvention.Nevertheless, theCWCalsohas someshortcomings. Itlacksmandatory sanctions to ensure enforcement and it does not apply to non-signatories ornon-stateparties.318

Despitetheseshortcomings,the InternationalCommitteefortheRedCrossstated in itscompilation Customary International Humanitarian Law that the prohibition on chemicalweapons is a rule of customary law in both international and non-international armedconflicts.319IntheTadiccasebeforetheICTY,chemicalweaponsarereferredtoasanexampleof 314 Resolution 2162B (XXI) of the United Nations General Assembly (5 December 1966).;Resolution2603(XXIV)oftheUnitedNationsGeneralAssembly(16December1969).315 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use ofChemicalWeaponsandonTheirDestruction13Januari1993.316M., ALMARY, “The Necessity for a permanent disincentive: examining the use of chemicalweaponswithafocusonSyria’scivilwar”,SouthwesternJournalofInternationallaw,2018,301-335.317 N. MELZER, International Humanitarian Law: A Comprehensive Introduction, Geneva,InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross,2016,120.318 M. SCHARF, “Clear and present danger: enforcing the international ban on biological andchemical weapons through sanctions, use of force, and criminalization,Michigan Journal ofInternationalLaw,1999,477-521.319 J.-M. HENCKAERTS and L. DOSWALD-BECK, Customary International Humanitarian LawVolumeI:Rules,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2005,261-263.

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aweaponsthatisconsideredinherentlyinhumaneinalltypesofarmedconflict.ItfoundthattheGenevaProtocolof1925was customary international lawand stated that: "there indisputablyemerged a general consensus in the international community on the principle that the use ofchemical weapons is also prohibited in internal armed conflicts".320 There is no persistentobjector and there are only statements of states against the use of chemical weapons.321 Incontrast,chemicalweaponshaveoftenbeenusedasameansofwarfare,fromtheSovietUnionin 1921, Portugal in 1970, Iraq in 1988 and Syria in recent times. It has always been stronglydeniedandcondemnedbythestateinquestion;thatfactaloneindicatesthattheyacknowledgetheexistenceoftheprohibitionontheuseofchemicalweapons.Therefore,itcannotbeseenasa way to contest the customary rule against the use of chemical weapons.322 As far as statepracticeisconcerned,itisindeedtruethatseveralstateshaveusedchemicalweapons,butTheInternationalCourtof Justiceclearly states that statepracticedoesnothave tobecompletelyuniformtoserveasabasisforcustomarylaw.Moreover,itisnotbecauseacustomaryruleexiststhat it can never be broken. Legal standards are violated and sanctioned on a daily basis.323Lastly, the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons is also considered an obligation ergaomnesthatisownedtotheinternationalcommunityasawholeandanon-derogablejuscogensnorm.324

The International Criminal Court (ICC) also prohibits the use of chemicalweapons. TheRomeStatuteprohibitstheuseofchemicalweaponsininternationallyarmedconflictsandcouldbeconsideredawarcrimeorusedtocommitgenocideorcrimesagainsthumanity.325However,SyriahasnotratifiedtheRomeStatuteandisthereforenoparty.TheICChasconsequentlynojurisdictionovercrimescommittedinSyriaunlessasituationisreferredtotheICCbytheUNSCorSyriaaccepts the jurisdictiononanad-hocbasis.Before2017, the ICCcouldonlyprosecute

320ICTY,15July1999,Prosecutorv.Tadic,ICTYIT-94-1-A.par.499.321 J.-M. HENCKAERTS and L. DOSWALD-BECK, Customary International Humanitarian LawVolumeI:Rules,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2005,261-263.322 J.BLAKEandA.MAHMUD,“ALegal“RedLine”?SyriaandtheUseofChemicalWeapons inCivilConflict”,UCLALawReview,2013,256.323 ICJ, 20 November 1950, Colombian-Peruvian asylum Case (Columbia v. Peru), ICJ Reports1950,par.276-277;ICJ,20February1969,NorthSeaContinentalShelfCases(FederalRepublicofGermanyvDenmark;FederalRepublicofGermanyvNetherlands)ICJReports4,1969,par.73.324 A. HENRIKSEN, “Trump’s Missile Strike on Syria and the Legality of Using Force to DeterChemicalWarfare”, Journal of Conflicts and Security Law, 2018, 33-48.; A. BELL, “Using ForceagainsttheWeaponsoftheWeak:ExaminingaChemical-BiologicalWeaponsUsageCriterionforUnilateral Humanitarian Intervention under the Responsibility to Protect”, Cardozo Journal ofInternationalandComparativeLaw,2014,261-320.325RomeStatuteoftheInternationalCriminalCourt,July171998.

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the use of chemical weapons in the case of an international armed conflict.326 In 2017, anamendment, the Kampala amendment, was added to the Rome Statute, on the proposal ofBelgium,toextendtheuseofchemicalweaponsasawarcrimealsotonon-internationalarmedconflicts.327 Nevertheless, as long as Syria is no party to the Rome Statute they cannot beprosecutedbeforetheICC.Intheory,asituationcanbereferredtotheICCbytheUNSCbutthiswill beunlikely considering the vetopowersofRussia andasmentionedaboveRussia alreadyvetoed a draft resolution referring the situation to the ICC. In addition, Syria can accept thejurisdictionoftheICConanad-hocbasisbutthiswouldputal-Assadatriskofprosecution,whichagainisinconceivable.328

Thissectionshowedthattheuseofchemicalweaponsisprohibitedininternationallaw.Syria is party to theChemicalWeaponsConventionand it is a ruleof international customarylaw. The use of chemical weapons is both prohibited in international as in non-internationalarmed conflicts. The question then arises if there is a justification for reprisals andcountermeasures inthecasewhenthisprohibitionisnotabidedby.This isthethemeweshalltakeupinthenextsection.5.3. ArmedreprisalsReprisalsaredefinedbyDarcyas“atraditionalactofself-helpunderinternationallaw,consistingofabreachofinternationallawinresponsetoapriorviolationbyanotherstateandundertakenforthepurposeofenforcingcompliance”and“asactsofforcibleself-help,involvinganunlawfuluseofforcefallingshortofwar,byonestateinresponsetoapriorviolationofinternationallawby another”.329 In theNaulilaa case reprisalswere defined as “acts of self-help by the injuredState,actsinretaliationforactscontrarytointernationallawonthepartoftheoffendingState,which have remained unredressed after a demand for amends”.330 Reprisals can therefore be

326Art.8(b)RomeStatute;J.BLAKEandA.MAHMUD,“ALegal“RedLine”?SyriaandtheUseofChemicalWeaponsinCivilConflict”,UCLALawReview,2013,253-254.327FOD BUITENLANDSE ZAKEN, “Drie nieuwe oorlogsmisdaden erkend dankzij België”, 15December 2017,https://diplomatie.belgium.be/nl/newsroom/nieuws/2017/drie_nieuwe_oorlogsmisdaden_erkend_dankzij_belgie328 Y. NAHLAWI, “The Responsibility to Protect and Obama’s Red Line On Syria”, GlobalResponsibilitytoProtect,2016,76-101.329S.DARCY,“RetaliationandReprisal”,inM.WELLER(ed.),TheOxfordHandbookoftheUseofForceinInternationalLaw,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2015,879and881.330 Naulilaa Incident Arbitration (Portugal v Germany), 31 July 1928, Arbitral Tribunal 2 RIAA,1012.;T.RUYS, “Sanctions,RetorsionsandCountermeasures:Conceptsand International Legal

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seenas lawenforcementwith themain goal to imposea return to legality.331Reprisals variesfromeconomicsanctions,therefusaltopayadebttotherecoursetoarmedforce.332BeforetheadoptionoftheUNCharterreprisalswhereconsideredaslawful.Theuseofforcebyareprisalbecamelawfulwhenitwascarriedoutinreactiontoapreviousunlawfulactandthereprisalwasdonetoachievecompensationortopreventanddeter futureunlawfulacts.TheNaulilaacasedescribedthreeconditionsforareprisaltobelawful.First,apreviousviolationofinternationallawby the state that is theobjectof the reprisal. Second, ademand for redress thatwasnotsatisfied and third, proportionality of the reprisal.333 With the introduction of UN Charter,reprisalshavebecomeclearlyunlawful.NotonlydoesArticle2(4)prohibittheuseofforcebutalsoArticle2(3)thatobligesstatestosettledisputesbypeacefulmeansrulesoutmeasuresshortofwar, including reprisals.334 TheUnitedNations Security Council andGeneral Assembly havebothstatedthatreprisalsareillegalunderinternationallaw.335TheICJconsideredreprisalstobeunlawfulintheNuclearWeaponsAdvisoryOpinion.336Nevertheless,reprisalscanrestrictivelybeallowedontwooccasions;first,inthecaseofself-defencebyonthespotreactionand,second,inthecaseduringjusinbello(whenitdoesnotviolateinternationalhumanitarianlawandisnottakenagainstprotectedpersonsandobjects).337 Nonetheless, there is a significant gap between the prohibition on reprisals and statepractice.According toKretzmer,militaryoperations that canbe consideredasarmed reprisalsbasedonself-defencearestillfairlyprevalent.Therehasbeendebateaboutreprisalsasaform Framework.”inL.VANDENHERIK(eds.),ResearchHandbookonUNSanctionsandInternationalLaw,Cheltenham,EdwardElgarPublishing,2017,50.331 C. HENDERSON, The use of force and international law, Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress,2018,241.332 T. RUYS, “Sanctions, Retorsions and Countermeasures: Concepts and International LegalFramework.”inL.VANDENHERIK(eds.),ResearchHandbookonUNSanctionsandInternationalLaw,Cheltenham,EdwardElgarPublishing,2017,51.333 Naulilaa Incident Arbitration (Portugal v Germany), 31 July 1928, Arbitral Tribunal 2 RIAA,1012.;D.KRETZMER,“TheInherentRighttoSelf-DefenseandProportionalityinJusadBellum”,EuropeanJournalofInternationalLaw,2013,251.334 C. HENDERSON, The use of force and international law, Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress,2018,242.335 Resolution 188 of the United Nations Security Council (9 April 1964),UN Doc. S/RES/188(1964).; Resolution 270 of the United Nations Security Council (26 August 1969), UN Doc.S/RES/270(1969).;Resolution2625(XXV)oftheUnitedNationsGeneralAssembly(25October1970), Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operationamongStates,principle1. 336ICJ,8July1996,LegalityoftheThreatorUseofNuclearWeapons,ICJReports1996,par.46.337R.KOLB,InternationalLawontheMaintenanceofPeace:JusContraBellum,Cheltenham,EEElgar,2018,444.

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of self-defence, being preventive instead of punitive. States often stress that themotives forthese armed attacks are preventive in nature and not punitive.338 It is, however, difficult todistinguish between an attack based on self-defence and an act of reprisal. According toHenderson,distinguishingelementsforreprisalstobeconsideredasanactofself-defenceareaprior armed attack and a sufficient temporal proximity with the armed attack to which itresponds.339Kretzmeraddsthatthepunitivenatureoftheactionisalsoanimportantelement.Whenanaction isdonetopunish forharmdoneor todeterunlawfulacts, it isconsideredanunlawful reprisal.340 Dinstein introduced the idea of defensive armed reprisals. Asmentionedabove, there is often a time lapse between the armed attack that initiated the right to self-defence and forcible actions taken in self-defence. A question that relates to this issue is ifdefensivearmedreprisalsarealegalformofself-defenceininternationallaw.Defensivearmedreprisalstakeplaceafterthearmedattackhascometoanendandcanthereforeoftenbeseenashavingothermotives,suchasretaliationorhavingapunitivenature.341Thegoalofdefensivearmed reprisals is for the delinquent state to abide the law in the future and to deter futurebreachesofinternationallaw.Armedreprisalsarenotlawfulwhentheyarepurelypunitiveandbasedonnon-defensivemotives.Tobe lawful, thearmedreprisalsmustbedefensivewiththeprimemotivetobeprotective,andnotgofurthersothatitcouldbeconsideredaretribution.342AccordingtoDinsteinadefensivearmedreprisalcanbeconductedafteracertainlapseoftimeafter the initial armed attack that triggered the self-defence had occurred. Dinstein furtherelaborates, based on Judge Simma’s Separate opinion on the Oil Platforms case343, thatproportionate defensive measures by the victim would be legally justified in certaincircumstances.344 In addition, Bowett considered the idea of reasonable reprisals as “certainreprisalsthat,evennotacceptedasjustified,willatleastavoidcondemnation”.345

338 D. KRETZMER, “The Inherent Right to Self-Defense and Proportionality in Jus ad Bellum”,EuropeanJournalofInternationalLaw,2013,257.339 C. HENDERSON, The use of force and international law, Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress,2018,246.340 D. KRETZMER, “The Inherent Right to Self-Defense and Proportionality in Jus ad Bellum”,EuropeanJournalofInternationalLaw,2013,254.341 C. HENDERSON, The use of force and international law, Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress,2018,241.342Y.DINSTEIN,War,aggressionandself-defence,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2017,272.343ICJ,6November2003,OilPlatforms(IslamicRepublicofIranv.UnitedStatesofAmerica),ICJReports2003,331-332.344Y.DINSTEIN,War,aggressionandself-defence,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2017,274.345D.BOWETT,“ReprisalsInvolvingRecoursetoArmedForce”,AmericanJournalofInternationalLaw,1972,1.

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In contrast, Kolb states that defensive reprisals should not be permissible because thiswouldallowastatetouseforceatitsownconvenience,whichiscontrarytotheUNCharter.346Therefore, there is a potential for abuse that could lead to further retaliation and greaterinstability.347Moreover, delayed reprisals can hardly be called ‘necessary’ to repel the attack.Thedistinctionbetweenpreventiveandpunitivereprisalsisthenhardtomake.348AccordingtoHenderson, states continue to justify their actions on the basis of self-defence and condemnarmedreprisals,butheconsiders:“whilethereisnothingtoindicatethatstateshavebeguntoexpresslyacceptthelawfulnessofarmedreprisalsordefensivearmedreprisalsundertheguiseofself-defence,their lawfulness,at least incertaincircumstances,hasarguablyseeped inthroughthebackdoor”.349AsBowett alreadymentioned in1972:“while reprisals remain illegalde juretheyhavebecomeaccepteddefacto”.350Becauseoftheacceptednatureofthesestrikes,thiscanleadtoablurringofthedistinctionbetweenself-defenceandunlawfulreprisals.351 The International Law Commission addressed armed reprisals in the Draft Articles onStateResponsibility. Itmadea cleardistinctionbetween self-defence and theuseof reprisals,respectivelyArticle21 (self-defence)andArticle22 (countermeasures).352Thecommissionalsoaddressedthethinkinginwhicharmedreprisalscouldbeperceivedlawfulunderself-defence.Itstated: “The contrary trend, aimed at justifying the noted practice of circumventing theprohibition by qualifying resort to armed reprisals as self-defence, does not find any plausiblelegaljustificationandisconsideredunacceptablebytheCommission.Indeed,armedreprisalsdonotpresent those requirementsof immediacyandnecessity,whichwouldonly justifyapleaofself-defence”.353Itisshowedthatarmedreprisalsareclearlyillegalunderinternationallaw.Thefollowingpartofthischaptertakesacloserlookatthenotionofcountermeasuresasdescribed 346R.KOLB,InternationalLawontheMaintenanceofPeace:JusContraBellum,Cheltenham,EEElgar,2018,444.347S.DARCY,“RetaliationandReprisal”,inM.WELLER(ed.),TheOxfordHandbookoftheUseofForceinInternationalLaw,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2015,902.348R.KOLB,InternationalLawontheMaintenanceofPeace:JusContraBellum,Cheltenham,EEElgar,2018,445.349 C. HENDERSON, The use of force and international law, Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress,2018,247.350 D. BOWETT, “Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force’ (1972), American Journal ofInternationalLaw,10-11.351 C. HENDERSON, The use of force and international law, Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress, 2018, 247.; T. RUYS, ’Armed Attack’ and Article 51 of the UN Charter, Evolutions inCustomaryLawandPractice,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2011,107.352DraftArticlesonStateResponsibility,ReportoftheInternationalLawCommission353 International Law Commission, Summary record of the 2424th Meeting, 21 July 1995,YearbookoftheInternationalLawCommission(1995),297.

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bytheInternationalLawCommissionintheDraftArticlesonStateResponsibility inthesectioncircumstancesprecludingunlawfulness.

5.4. Circumstancesprecludingunlawfulness

The statements of the US, the UK and France indicate that the intervention in Syria was areaction to the infringement of Syria’s international obligation to not use forbidden chemicalweapons.IthasbeenshownabovethattheinterventionsviolatedArticle2(4)oftheUNCharter.The question that is addressed here is if there are other justifications on which a state canexonerate its international responsibility not to use force. The ILC Draft Articles on StateResponsibility describe six circumstances that may exclude the unlawful nature of acts thatviolateinternationallaworinthewordsoftheILC:“circumstancesthatprecludewrongfulness”.These six circumstances are: consent, self-defence, countermeasures in respect of aninternationallywrongfulact,forcemajeure,distressandnecessity.354Itcanbehardlyarguedthatthe intervention in Syria can be justified by self-defence as seen above. In addition, forcemajeurecannotbeinvoked.Accordingtothedefinitionofforcemajeure,themanifestationofanirresistibleforceorunforeseeneventbeyondthecontrolofthestate,canonlybeappliedifthestatehasnochoicebuttoactinviolationofinternationallaw.355Thesituationofdistressrefersto thesituation inwhichapersonwhose factsareattributable to theState is ina situationofdanger, either personally or in relation to persons under its care. The intervention in Syria isincompatible with distress because the objective intervention was broader than defined bydistress(inthesensethatdistresscanonlybeinvokedwhensavingone’sownlifeorthelivesofpeople in one’s care).356 Necessity is another justification precluding unlawfulness. ThejustificationofnecessitycanonlybeinvokedinexceptionalcircumstancesaccordingtotheICJinthe Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case.357 Two cumulative conditions should be fulfilled to invokenecessity.First,thewrongfulact“istheonlywayforthestatetosafeguardanessentialinterestagainstagraveandimminentperil”andsecond,thewrongfulact“doesnotseriouslyimpairanessentialinterestoftheStateorStatestowardswhichtheobligationexists,oroftheinternational

354 ILC, Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, withcommentaries:Commentaryarticle40ARSIWA,2001.355Article23,ILC,DraftarticlesonResponsibilityofStatesforInternationallyWrongfulActs,withcommentaries:Commentaryarticle40ARSIWA356 O. CORTEN, The Law Against War: The Prohibition on the Use of Force in ContemporaryInternationalLaw,Oxford,HartPublishing,2010,222.357ICJ,25September1997,Gabcikovo-NagymarosProject(HungaryvSlovakia),ICJReports1997,par.50-58.

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communityasawhole”.358 The Syrian interventiondoesnotmeet these criteria as it certainlyharmstheterritorial integrityofthetargetstate.359Art25(2)(a)oftheDraftArticlesalsostatesthat necessitymay not be invokedwhen the international obligation in question excludes thepossibility of invoking necessity. In that sense, the UN Charter excludes the possibility ofnecessityasanexceptiontotheuseofforce.360 Inaddition, it isonlythestatewhoseinterestsarebeinghurtbytheunlawfulmeasurethatcaninvokenecessityasajustification.Thechemicalweaponsattackswereagainst the civiliansof Syria itself,othernationalswerenotaffected.361Consent,forcemajeure,self-defence,distressandnecessitycannotbeused,accordingtothesedefinitions,asajustificationinthecaseoftheinterventioninSyria.362Thequestionthenarisesiftheinterventioncanbelegitimizedbycountermeasures.

CountermeasuresaredescribedinArt.22oftheILCas:“[t]hewrongfulnessofanactofaStatenotinconformitywithaninternationalobligationtowardsanotherStateisprecludedifandto the extent that the act constitutes a countermeasure taken against the latter State inaccordance with chapter II of part three.”363 As discussed above, countermeasures find theirbasisinthedoctrineofreprisals.Thepurposeofacountermeasureistoputpressureonastateto stop the infringement it has committed against an international obligation. This concept istherefore justified by the need to restore equality between sovereign states and the balancedistortedbythebreachofinternationalobligations.364Severalproceduralstepshavetobetakenbeforeproceedingtocountermeasures.First, thestatethat is infringing international lawmustbesummonedtoputanendtotheinfringement.Second,thatstatehastobeinformedoftheintentiontotakecountermeasurestoputanendtotheinfringement.Third,whenasettlementprocedure is ongoing, one must await the outcome before taking countermeasures.

358 Art. 25, Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. C.HENDERSON, The use of force and international law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,2018,385.359 C. HENDERSON, The use of force and international law, Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress,2018,385.360 O. CORTEN, The Law Against War: The Prohibition on the Use of Force in ContemporaryInternationalLaw,Oxford,HartPublishing,2010,200.361M.SCHMITTandC.FORD,“AssessingU.S.JustificationsforUsingForceinResponsetoSyria’sChemicalAttacks:An International LawPerspective, Journal ofNational Security Law&Policy,2017,283-303.362 ILC, Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, withcommentaries:Commentaryarticle40ARSIWA,2001,112,§2.363Art.22,DraftarticlesonResponsibilityofStatesforInternationallyWrongfulActs.364 E. KATSELLI, The Problem of Enforcement in International Law: Countermeasures, the Non-InjuredStateandtheideaofInternationalCommunity,Routledge,2009,2.

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Substantially,thecountermeasuresmustbeproportionate,reversibleandoncetheinfringementisended,thecountermeasuresmustbestopped.365

It is unclear if individual states,which arenot affectedby the infringementby anotherstate, can invoke measures to protect general or collective interests, such as human rightsviolations.Thepermissibilityofcountermeasuresbystatesotherthanthosethatareaffectedbythe internationalwrongful conducthas longbeensubject todebate. IthasbeenconfirmedbytheICJthatallstatescaninvoketheinternationalresponsibilityofanotherstateinrespectofabreachofanergaomnesnormbeforeaninternationalcourtbutthereisnorelevantcaselawonthepossibilitytotakecountermeasuresbynon-injuredstates.366Article54includesareservationclauseleavingopenthepossibilityforthirdstatestoalsotakecollectivecountermeasures.But,The International Law Commission found that: “[t]he current state of international law oncountermeasurestaken inthegeneralorcollective interest isuncertain.Statepractice issparseand involvesa limitednumberof States.Atpresent, thereappears tobeno clearly recognisedentitlement of States referred to in Article 48 to take countermeasures in the collectiveinterest”.367

Nevertheless, According to Article 50 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility,countermeasures do not affected the obligation of states to refrain from the threat or use offorce368 and Article 26 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility state that none of thesecircumstances can be invoked if thiswould be in violation of a norm of general internationallaw.369Thus,countermeasuresshouldbenon-forcibleinnatureandarmedcountermeasuresarenolongerpermittedbytheUNCharter.Therefore,thepossibilitytorelyoncountermeasuresinexcludedinrelationtotheuseofforce.370TheCharterclearlyrulesoutthepossibilityofinvoking

365 C. HENDERSON, The use of force and international law, Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress,2018,33-34.;T.RUYS,Inleidingtothetinternationaalrecht,Gent,VRGGent,2017,139.366 T. RUYS, “Sanctions, Retorsions and Countermeasures: Concepts and International LegalFramework.”inL.VANDENHERIK(eds.),ResearchHandbookonUNSanctionsandInternationalLaw,Cheltenham,EdwardElgarPublishing,2017,68.367 ILC, Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, withcommentaries:Commentaryarticle40ARSIWA,2001,par139.368Art.50,DraftarticlesonResponsibilityofStatesforInternationallyWrongfulActs.O.CORTEN,The LawAgainstWar:TheProhibitionon theUseof Force inContemporary International Law,Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010, 223.; T., RUYS, “Sanctions, Retorsions and Countermeasures:ConceptsandInternationalLegalFramework.”inVANDENHERIK,L., (eds.),ResearchHandbookonUNSanctionsandInternationalLaw,Cheltenham,EdwardElgarPublishing,2017,19-51.369 O. CORTEN, The Law Against War: The Prohibition on the Use of Force in ContemporaryInternationalLaw,Oxford,HartPublishing,2010,199.370 C. HENDERSON, The use of force and international law, Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress,2018,34.;T.RUYS, “Themeaningof forceand theboundariesof the jusadbellum:are

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any circumstances excluding unlawfulness, whether it is based on necessity, distress orcountermeasures,tojustifytheuseofforce.Theuseofforce,accordingtotheCharter,willonlybe lawfulwhen necessary tomaintain the international peace and security authorised by theSecurityCouncilorwhenitisinself-defence.371

“minimal’ uses of force excluded from UN Charter Article 2(4)?, The American Journal ofInternationalLaw,2014,162.371 O. CORTEN, The Law Against War: The Prohibition on the Use of Force in ContemporaryInternationalLaw,Oxford,HartPublishing,2010,216.

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5.5. ConclusionAsdiscussedinthischapter,chemicalweaponsarebannedundertheGenevaGasProtocol,theChemical Weapons Convention and by customary international law. Syria is party to bothconventions,thereforetheiruseintherecentchemicalweaponsattackswasaninternationallywrongfulactasitbreachedalegalobligationimposedonSyriabythosetreaties.Neitherofthetreatiesimposeforciblemeasureswhenaprovisionisbreached.Inaddition,theprohibitionontheuseofchemicalweaponsisalsocustomaryinternationallawandcouldbeconsideredtobean obligation erga omnes. The ICJ concluded in theBarcelona Traction case that erga omnesobligations exist and they are considered obligations owned to the entire internationalcommunity.372Ergaomnesobligationsarealsodescribed intheArticlesonStateResponsibilityas:"everyState,byvirtueofitsmembershipintheinternationalcommunity,hasalegalinterestintheprotectionofcertainbasicrightsandthefulfilmentofcertainessentialobligations".373Thedutytonotuseprohibitedchemicalweapons,as longstandinganduniversallyacceptedasit is,canbeseenassuchanobligation.Inaddition,SyriabreachedUNSCresolution2118thatcreatedtheframeworkfortheeliminationofSyrianchemicalweapons. One of the possibilities to remedy this breach of international law is the use ofcountermeasures or reprisals. The main problem with considering the airstrikes ascountermeasures is that the Draft Articles on State Responsibility make clear thatcountermeasures cannot be forcible actions. Therefore, the use of force is not allowed.Nevertheless, in the Oil Platforms case, judge Simma expressed, in a separate opinion, thatforcible countermeasures can be perceived appropriate as long the force does not rise to thegravityofanarmedattack.374Inthecontextoftheairstrikes,itcanbearguedthatthisexceedsthethresholdofanarmedattackand,therefore,itcannotbejustifiedasacountermeasure.375Inaddition, armed reprisals, as shown above, are not legal under international public law.Therefore, thearmed interventionby theUS, theUKandFrancecannotbe legitimizedon thebasis of reprisals or countermeasures. They had no right under international law to deter orprevent theuseof chemicalweaponsby theuseof forceunder the legitimationof reprisalorcountermeasures. 372 ICJ, 5 February 1970, Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company (Belgium v. Spain), ICJReports3,1970,par.33.373 ILC, Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, withcommentaries:CommentaryarticleArticle1,commentary4.374ICJ,6November2003,OilPlatforms(IslamicRepublicofIranv.UnitedStatesofAmerica),ICJReports2003,par.13-16375M.SCHMITTandC.FORD,“AssessingU.S.JustificationsforUsingForceinResponsetoSyria’sChemicalAttacks:An International LawPerspective, Journal ofNational Security Law&Policy,2017,283-303.

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Chapter6:AWayForward:UnitingforPeaceResolution6.1. Introduction

The Syrian conflict showed theUN Security Council’s shortcoming in reacting to humanitariancrisesaroundtheworld.InAugust2012,theSecretary-GeneraloftheUNstatedinrelationtothesituation inSyriathat it is:“atestofeverythingthisOrganizationstandsfor, IdonotwanttheUnited Nations to fail that test.”376 As shown in Chapter 2, several resolutions regarding thesituation inSyriahavebeenblockedbythecontinuousvetoofseveralPermanentmembersoftheUNSecurityCouncil,andtheUNSecurityCouncilhas,todate,failedtoactagainstatrocitiesandhumanrightsviolationsinSyria.Asaconsequence,theUS,theUKandFranceconducted,ona unilateral basis, military airstrikes against Syria without the authorisation of the UNSC. Theunilateral actions by these countries were a consequence of the inability of the UN SecurityCounciltoactcollectivelyuponthecrisis.InthischapterthevetopowersoftheP5membersoftheUNSCwillbeassessedandthemainchallengesrelatedtothesepowersand,consequently,theresultingineffectivenessoftheUNSCtomaintaintheinternationalpeaceandsecuritywillbeanalysed. In addition, in order to avoid unilateral actions by states, the Uniting for PeaceResolutionwillbeproposedasapossibleavenuetoovercomethesechallenges.

6.2. TheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil’svetopowers

WiththeintroductionoftheUNCharterandtheUnitedNationssystem,theUNSecurityCouncilwassetuptoprotecttheinternationalpeaceandsecurity.OneofthemainmechanismsintheUNSecurityCouncil is the right toveto for thePermanent fivemembersof theUNSC,namelyChina, the United Kingdom, The United States, France and Russia.377 The right to veto isdescribed in Article 27 (3) of the UN Charter: “Decisions of the Security Council on all othermattersshallbemadebyanaffirmativevoteofninemembersincludingtheconcurringvotesofthePermanentmembers;providedthat,indecisionsunderChapterVI,andunderparagraph3ofArticle 42, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting”.378 The veto right is not explicitlyreferredtointhisarticlebutthereferencetothenecessityofconcurringvotesofthePermanentmembers of the UNSC makes it perfectly clear that these votes are necessary to approve aresolution,whichisdefactoavetopowerwhentheconcurringvoteisnotgiven.Thisgivesthe

376UNNews,3August2012,AsSyriaFightingContinues,GeneralAssemblyUrgesImmediateHaltto Violence, https://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=42624&Cr=Syria&Cr1=#.WMkpdfXXJdg[377 C. HENDERSON, The use of force and international law, Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress,2018,87.378Article27(3)UNCharter

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Permanentfivememberstherighttoblockeachresolution.ThePermanentfivemembersonlyhave a right to veto on substantive resolutions, not on proceduralmatters. However,when aPermanentmember of the Security Council is absent or abstains voluntarily from voting, thesubstantiveresolutionwillnotbevetoedandcanproceed.379AccordingtoArticle27oftheUNCharter,thePermanentmembersalsodonothavetherighttoexercisetheirvetopowersrelatedtopacificsettlementofdisputesandwhenaPermanentmemberhimselfispartytoadispute.380ThisruleisoftennotfollowedintheUNSC.381 ThevetopowersofthePermanentfivemembersoftheUNSChaveoftenbeencriticizedbecause it impedes the UNSC to function as the protector of the international peace andsecurity. Throughout history countless incidents, events and crises have not been resolvedbecauseofthis, likethegenocideinRwanda,theconflict informerYugoslavia,andthecurrentcrisis in Syria.Many states are in favour of abolishing the veto powers and critique it for theinconsequentnatureofitsuse.382ThereareseveralmaincritiquesofthevetorightoftheP5inthe UNSC. First, the possibility of abuse of the veto powers. The UNSC members have theresponsibility tomaintain the international peace and security, the duty to act in accordancewiththePurposesandPrinciplesoftheUnitedNationsandtofulfilingoodfaiththeobligationsassumedbytheminaccordancewiththepresentCharter.383ThishasalsobeenconfirmedbytheICJthatstatedthatstatesshouldexercisetheirobligationsingoodfaith.384ItthencanbearguedthatthePermanentfivemembersoftheUNSCarenotactingingoodfaithwhentheyusetheirveto powers, evenwhen it is necessary tomaintain the international peace and security. Therighttovetocanthereforebeabusedtodefendthestate’snationalinterestortheinterestsofitsallies.385 Second, the right to veto affects the sovereign equality of states.Article 2 of theUNCharterstatesthat:“TheOrganizationisbasedontheprincipleofthesovereignequalityofallits

379J.WOUTERSandT.RUYS,“SecurityCouncilReform:ANewVetoforaNewCentury?”,EgmontPaper,No.9,2005,1-39.;Y.DINSTEIN,War,aggressionandself-defence,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2017,341–342.380Article27(3)UNCharter.381 T. SHINDLMAYR, “Obstructing the Security Council: The Use of the Veto in the TwentiethCentury”,JournaloftheHistoryofInternationalLaw,2001,222.382J.WOUTERSandT.RUYS,“SecurityCouncilReform:ANewVetoforaNewCentury?”,EgmontPaper,No.9,2005,1-39.383Art.1(1)UNCharter;Art.2(2)UNCharter;Art.24(2)UNCharter.384 ICJ,28May1948,ConditionsofAdmissionofaState toMembership in theUnitedNations(article4oftheCharter),ICJReports1948,par.63.385R.KOLB,InternationalLawontheMaintenanceofPeace:JusContraBellum,Cheltenham,EEElgar,2018,112.;G.MELLINGandA.DENNETT,“TheSecurityCouncilvetoandSyria:respondingtomass atrocities through the “Uniting for Peace” resolution”, Indian Journal of InternationalLaw,2017,289.

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Members”.386 By giving five members of the United Nations a veto power contradicts thisequality.Nonetheless,thestatesthemselvesagreeduponthissystemandthiswasnecessarytoconvincethePermanentfivemembersoftheUNSCtojointheUN,itwasinfactaconditionsinequa non.387 In addition, it can be perceived as undemocratic. Even when a majority of themembersapprovetheresolution,oneofthePermanentfivememberscanvetoandabolishtheresolution.388Third,therighttovetoaffectsthelegitimacyoftheUNSecurityCouncil.Legitimacyisoftenmeasuredontheextenttowhichthebodypursuesgoodandfairoutcomesandmakesdecisionsinaprocessthatappearstobefairandjust.389Itisinthiscontextthatrighttovetoofthe Permanent five members should be analysed. The right to veto gives a privilege to thePermanentfivemembers,whichinconsequencegivesthemtheprivilegetoputtheinterestsofthemselves above the other UNmembers. In addition, the Permanent five members are notrepresentative of the whole UN population; they were the victors of WOII. TherepresentativenessofthememberstatesintheUNSecurityCouncilisperceivedasanissue,andtherehasbeendebatewhethertoadotherstatestothePermanent five,suchas India,Brazil,Germanyor Japan.390 It isalsoharmful to the legitimacyof theSecurityCouncil that it appliesdoublestandardstocountriesinthesamesituation.Thisaffectsthesenseofjustice,evenifitisspecific toapolitical institution. Inaddition, it isproblematic that inseveralcases theSecurityCouncil does not respond consistently or effectively to genocides and other atrocities thatundermineinternationalpeaceandsecurity.391Asseeninthecrisis inSyriaandthecontinuousstalemateintheUNSCtoactuponthiscrisis,itdemonstratesthatthevetopowersoftheUNSCcandisturbofhampermaintaining the internationalpeaceandsecurityandcould leadtoself-helpandunilateralaction.392 Asaresponsetothesecritiquescountlessproposalstoreformtherighttovetohavebeen

386Article2UNCharter387 B. FASSBENDER, UN Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto: A ConstitutionalPerspective,Springer,1998,436p.388L.MÄLKSOO,“GreatPowersthenandnow:SecurityCouncilReformandresponsestothreatsto peace and security”, in P.G., DANCHIN, H., FISCHER,United Nations Reform and the NewCollectiveSecurity,CambridgeUniversityPress,NewYork,2010,113.389 B. FASSBENDER, UN Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto: A ConstitutionalPerspective,Springer,1998,219.390 C. HENDERSON, The use of force and international law, Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress,2018,88.391L.MÄLKSOO,“GreatPowersthenandnow:SecurityCouncilReformandresponsestothreatsto peace and security”, in P.G., DANCHIN, H., FISCHER,United Nations Reform and the NewCollectiveSecurity,CambridgeUniversityPress,NewYork,2010,95.392 G. MELLING and A. DENNETT, “The Security Council veto and Syria: responding to massatrocitiesthroughthe“UnitingforPeace”resolution, IndianJournalofInternationalLaw,2017,290.

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madethroughouttheyears.Alreadyin1999,inthecontextofthe(humanitarian)interventioninKosovo,theIndependent InternationalCommissiononKosovostatedin itsreport:“thecurrentsystem allowing any Permanent United Nations Security Council member to paralyze the UNactionthroughtheuseofthevetomustbeadjustedinajudiciousmannertodealeffectivelywithcases of extreme humanitarian crisis.”393 In 2001, the ICISS stated in its report that it isintolerable that a veto can override the rest of humanity on matters of grave humanitarianconcernandurgestheP5nottousethevetoincasesofgenocideandlarge-scalehumanrightsviolations.394 In 2004, the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel Report on Threats, Challengesand Change, a more secure world: our shared responsibility proposed a revision of the vetopowersof theUNSC.Thereport stated that thevetosystemhadan important functionat thebirthoftheUNtoprotecttheinterestsofthethenso-calledsuperpowers,butthatisshouldbereconsideredinaneraofincreasingdemocracyandofasituationinwhichvitalinterestsoftheinternationalcommunityareatplay.ThereportaskedthePermanentfivememberstorenouncethe use of their veto powers when genocide or large-scale human rights violations areoccurring.395 As discussed above, several actions have been initiated to reform or abolish the vetorightsofthePermanentfivemembersoftheUNSC,buttodatenoattempthasbeensuccessful.The continuous failure of the UNSC to maintain the international peace and security and topreventmassatrocitiesandhumanrightsviolationshasdamagedtheauthorityandlegitimacyofthe UNSC. As a response to this inaction, several scholars and states have suggested thepossibility for thevoluntarynon-exerciseof the right toveto.396TheResponsibilitynot tovetowasproposedbyCanadaasareactiontotheResponsibilitytoProtect.TheCanadiangovernmentproposedthatthePermanentfivemembersoftheUNSCshouldnotusetheirvetopowerswhengenocideorotherhumanrightsatrocitiesareoccurringandwhentheirvitalnationalinterestarenotatstakeinthecrisis.397Onseveraloccasion,theFrenchgovernmentexpressedtheirdesirenot tousetheright toveto insituationswhenmasshumanrightsviolationsandatrocitiesareoccurring.Francehasbeenavocalpioneeronthistopicsince2013.Ontheoccasionofalecture

393 The Independent international commission on Kosovo: The Kosovo Report, Oxford, OxfordUniversityPress,2000,198.394 ICISS,TheResponsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Interventionand State Sovereignty, 2001, http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf, par 6.13,6.20,6.39.395ReportoftheHighLevelPanelonThreats,ChallengesandChange,Amoresecureworld:oursharedresponsibility,29november2004,para.256.396J.WOUTERSandT.RUYS,“SecurityCouncilReform:ANewVetoforaNewCentury?”,EgmontPaper,No.9,2005,1-39.397 A. BLÄTTER, and P.D. WILLIAMS, The Responsibility Not To Veto, Global Resp. Protect,MartinusNijhoffPublishers,Leiden,2011,301.

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for the UN General Assembly on 24 September 2013, the then President of France, FrançoisHollande,pleadedfora'codeofgoodconduct'fortheP5membersoftheUNSecurityCouncil.IftheP5membersdidnotabidebythis,theycouldlosetheirrightofveto.398Thiscodeofconductmeantthatiftherearemassivehumanrightsviolations,thePermanentfivemembersoftheUNSecurityCouncilwouldagreetothesuspensionoftheirvetopower.Thiscodeofconductwouldbe automatically imposed after the Secretary-General, at the request of at least 50 memberstates,woulddefine thecrimesasmass crimesagainsthuman rights.399Again in2015, FranceandMexicoproposedastatementwheretheyreiteratedthatgenocide,crimesagainsthumanityorlarge-scalewarcrimesareaninherentthreattotheinternationalpeaceandsecurityanditistheprimeresponsibilityoftheUNSCtoputanendtothesethreats.Inthisproposal,FranceandMexicoexpressedthedesirethattheUNSCshouldnotbeblockedbytherighttoveto.Theystatethat the right toveto isnotonlyaprivilegebutalsoholdsan international responsibility.400 In2013, the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group was set up to consider thequestionoftransparencyandlegitimacyoftheUNSC.Duringthe70thanniversaryoftheUNtheylaunchedacodeofconductfortheUNSC.Accordingtothiscodeofconduct,thePermanentfivemembersshouldnotusetheirvetopowersandthenon-permanentmembersshouldnotcastano-vote in a situation that the UNSC makes a decision on the prevention or termination ofgenocide,crimesagainsthumanityorwarcrimes.401Inaddition,AmnestyInternationalcalled,in2015,forthesuspensionofthevetoright intheeventofgenocideor large-scalehumanrightsviolations.402Alltheseeffortshavebeenturneddown.It isveryunlikelythatthevetorightwillbe abolished. The abolition of the right to veto is an amendment to theUN Charter and this

398F. HOLLANDE, Speech General Assembly of the United Nations. 68th session,http://gadebate.un.org/68/france,24September2013(consultationon10March2018).399 G. EVANS, The French Veto Restraint Proposal: Making it Work, Panel Presentation inInternationalConferenceonLimitingtheUseofVetoattheUNSecurityCouncil intheCaseofMassAtrocities,SciencesPo,Paris,2015.;J.MORRISandN.WHEELER.“TheResponsibilityNottoVeto:AResponsibilityTooFarinA.J.BELLAMYandT.DUNNE(eds.),TheOxfordHandbookoftheResponsibilitytoProtect,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2016,Chapter13.400 PoliticalDeclarationon SuspensionofVetoPowers inCasesofMassAtrocity PresentedbyFrance and Mexico,http://iccnow.org/documents/ENG_Mexico_Francepoliticaldeclaration_veto_NGO_translation_circa_Aug_21_2015.pdf(consultation15March2019).401CodeofConductRegardingSecurityCouncilactionagainstgenocide,crimesagainsthumanityorwarcrimes,http://www.centerforunreform.org/?q=node/798,24oktober2015.402AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, The State of the World’s Human Rights, 25 February 2015,https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/0001/2015/en/ (consultation on 10 March2018).

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requirestheapprovalofthePermanentfivemembers.403The continued stalemate in the UNSCbythevetopowersoftheP5membershasasaconsequencethatsuperpowerswillproceedtounilateralactionsandactoutsideoftheprocedureoftheUN,asseenintheSyriancrisis.

6.3. UnitingforPeaceResolutionasapossibleavenue?

AccordingtotheUNCharter,theUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilhastheprincipleresponsibilityto protect and safeguard the international peace and security. But what happens when itforsakesitsdutytomaintaintheinternationalpeaceandsecurity?ItisinthisregardandcontextthattheUnitingforPeaceResolutionwasproposedandadopted.WhentheUNSecurityCouncilabandonsthisdutybecauseofthevetopowersexercisedbyoneofitsPermanentfivemembersand is therefore not able to maintain the international peace and security, the UN GeneralAssemblycantaketheresponsibilitytomaintaintheinternationalpeaceandsecuritybasedontheUniting forPeaceResolution. In the ICISS reportof2001, theUniting forPeaceResolutionwasmentionedasapossiblevenuewhentheUNSCfailstoactagainsthumanitariancatastropheandthatcould“provideahighdegreeoflegitimacyforanintervention”.404 TheUnitingforPeaceResolutionwasadoptedasresolution377on3November1950.405TheresolutionwasadoptedinthecontextthattheUNambassadoroftheSovietUniontookuphisplaceintheUNSecurityCouncil.TheUnitedStatesintendedtocircumventfuturevetoesbytheSovietUnion intheUNSecurityCouncil,andapossiblestalemate,bymakingactionoftheUNGeneralAssemblypossible,thisinthecontextoftheKoreanwar.406Sincethatmoment,theUnitingforPeaceResolutionhasbeeninvoked11times.In7ofthe11casestheresolutionwas

403Article108UNCharter.;C.HENDERSON,Theuseof forceand international law,Cambridge,Cambridge University Press, 2018, 88.; J.WOUTERS and T. RUYS, “Security Council Reform: ANewVetoforaNewCentury?”,EgmontPaper,No.9,2005,1-39.

404M.SCHARF,“StrikingaGrotianMoment:HowtheSyrianAirstrikesChangedInternationalLawRelating to Humanitarian Intervention”,Chicago Journal of International Law, 2019, 586-614.;ICISS,TheResponsibilitytoProtect:ReportoftheInternationalCommissiononIntervention

and State Sovereignty, 2001, http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf, par. 6.29-6.30.;C.HENDERSON,Theuseofforceandinternational law,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2018,156.405 Resolution 377 (V) Of the United Nations General Assembly (3 November 1950),UN Doc.A/RES/377(V) (1950), A.; C. GRAY, International Law and the Use of Force, Oxford, OxfordUniversityPress,2018,268.406R.KOLB,InternationalLawontheMaintenanceofPeace:JusContraBellum,Cheltenham,EEElgar,2018,218.;A.UDOH,“Invokingthe‘UntingforPeace’Resolutionof1950toauthorizetheuse of humanitarian military intervention and prevent mass atrocities in Syria”,WillametteJournalofInternationalLawandDisputeResolution,2015,187-231.

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invokedbytheUNSecurityCouncil.Thelasttimeitwasinvokedwasin1997.407When there islack of unanimity in the UN Security Council because of the constant vetoes by one of thePermanent fivemembersof theCouncil, theUniting forPeaceResolutiongivestwooptionstocircumventthislockdown.Firstly,theUNSCcanreferacasetotheGeneralAssemblyonthebasisofaproceduralvote.ProceduralvotescannotbevetoedbyoneofthefivePermanentmembers.Proceduralresolutionscanbeadoptedwithouttheirconsent.AsupportofnineUNSCMemberstatesissufficienttoreferthesituationtotheUNGA.408Secondly,theUNGeneralAssemblyitselfcaninitiatetheUnitingforPeaceprocedureandconveneanEmergencySpecialSession(ESS).AmajorityoftheUNMembersshouldrequestthis.TheEmergencySpecialSessionmustbecalledwithin24hours after the request is receivedby theSecretary-Generalor after theproceduralvoteintheUNSC.409ThisproceduremakesitpossiblefortheGeneralAssemblyitselftorespondtoactsofaggressionandthreatstointernationalpeaceandsecurity.Whenthecaseisreferredto the General Assembly it can issue recommendations it deems necessary to restore theinternationalpeaceand security.410A two-thirdsmajorityvote isnecessary to recommend theuseof force.411 Inaddition, itmustbesufficientlyclear that there isa lackofunanimity in theUNSC, shown by the use of veto powers, and the UNSC, therefore, has forsaken its duty toprotect the international peace and security.412 The legal grounds for the Uniting for PeaceResolution canbe found in theUNCharter. The referral from theUNSC to theUNGA finds itsgroundsinArticle18,20and27oftheUNCharter.Article20declaresthataspecialsessionoftheUNGAcanbeinvokedbytheSecretary-GeneralattherequestoftheUNSCoramajorityofthemembersoftheUN.AccordingtoArticle18oftheCharter,amajorityoftheMembersofthe

407 A.J. CARSWELL, “Unblocking the UN Security Council: The Uniting for Peace Resolution”,JournalofConflictandSecurityLaw,2013,458-459.408R.KOLB,InternationalLawontheMaintenanceofPeace:JusContraBellum,Cheltenham,EEElgar, 2018, 220.; Y. NAHLAWI, “Overcoming Russian and Chinese Vetoes on Syria throughUnitingforPeace”,JournalofConflictandSecurityLaw,2019,111-143.409 A.J. CARSWELL, “Unblocking the UN Security Council: The Uniting for Peace Resolution”,JournalofConflictandSecurityLaw,2013,473.410Y.DINSTEIN,War,aggressionandself-defence,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2017,366.;C.HENDERSON,Theuseof forceand international law,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2018,104-105.411Y.NAHLAWI,“OvercomingRussianandChineseVetoesonSyriathroughUnitingforPeace”,JournalofConflictandSecurityLaw,2019,111-143.412 A.J. CARSWELL, “Unblocking the UN Security Council: The Uniting for Peace Resolution”,JournalofConflictandSecurityLaw,2013,458-459.;C.GRAY, InternationalLawandtheUseofForce,Oxford, OxfordUniversity Press, 2018, 268.; A. UDOH, “Invoking the ‘Unting for Peace’Resolutionof1950toauthorizetheuseofhumanitarianmilitaryinterventionandpreventmassatrocities inSyria”.Willamette Journalof InternationalLawandDisputeResolution,2015,187-231.

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UN(theUNGA)issufficienttocallforaspecialsessionoftheUNGAortoreferamatterfromtheUNSCtotheUNGA.Article27oftheUNCharterdescribestheproceduralvotetoconvoketheUNGAbytheUNSC.Article18alsoprovidesthelegalbasisforrecommendationsbytheUNGA,includingtheuseofforcewhereatwo-thirdmajorityisneeded.413 It is Important tonotice is that legal scholarsarenotunanimous in theirassessmentofthepoweroftheUNGAtoauthorizetheuseofforce.AndintheelevenresolutionspassedundertheUnitingforPeacemechanismnotoneresolutionimposedmilitarymeasuresandinvokedtheuse of force.414 In contrast, It can be interpreted that theUNGAhas residual responsibility tomaintaintheinternationalpeaceandsecurityiftheUNSCAisunableorunwillingtoexecuteitsprimary responsibility. Article 2(4) can be seen as only allocating primary responsibility to theUNSC but not exclusive responsibility.415 In the Certain Expenses case, the ICJ stated in anadvisoryopinionthattheresponsibilitiesconferredtotheUNSCareprimaryresponsibilitiesbutnotexclusive.416Nevertheless,thiswasmadeinthecontextofpeace-operationsandnotinthecontextoftheuseofforce,inthesensethattheUNGAcanhavethepossibilitytomaintainthepeacebutnotenforcethepeace.417 Thequestionthatcanbeaskedinthisregardis:whendoestheUNSCforsakeitsdutytomaintain the international peace and security? It is a difficult assessment to bemade by theGeneralAssembly.ItcanbearguedthatifthemajorityoftheUNGeneralAssemblyfindsthatthestalemate,invokedbyconstantuseofvetoes,isathreattotheinternationalpeaceandsecurity,this has amore democratic basis. In addition, theUNGeneral Assembly could argue that theexercise of the veto power is being misused and detrimental to the international peace andsecurity. Also the UN Security Council itself can determine if they forsake to maintain theinternationalpeaceandsecuritybyaproceduralvote,ifnineofthefifteenmembersfindthistobethecase.418 413UnitedNationsCharter,article18,20and27.414 C. HENDERSON, The use of force and international law, Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress, 2018, 115.; Y. NAHLAWI, “Overcoming Russian and Chinese Vetoes on Syria throughUnitingforPeace”,JournalofConflictandSecurityLaw,2019,111-143.;415Y.NAHLAWI,“OvercomingRussianandChineseVetoesonSyriathroughUnitingforPeace”,JournalofConflictandSecurityLaw,2019,111-143.416 ICJ,20July1962,CertainExpensesof theUnitedNations, ICJReports151,1962,at163.;C.HENDERSON, The use of force and international law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,2018,90.417 O. CORTEN, The Law Against War: The Prohibition on the Use of Force in ContemporaryInternationalLaw,Oxford,HartPublishing,2010,335.418 A.J. CARSWELL, “Unblocking the UN Security Council: The Uniting for Peace Resolution”,Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 2013, 472.; M. RAMSDEN, ““Uniting for Peace” andHumanitarianIntervention:TheAuthorisingFunctionoftheU.N.GeneralAssembly”,WashingtonInternationalLawJournal,2016,299-301.

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According to Article 11 of the UN Charter, the UN General Assembly can recommendmeasures regarding the international peace and security when the UNSC is affected by astalemate.Inaddition,Article12oftheUNChartergivestheUNGeneralAssemblythepossibilitytomakerecommendationsontheUNSecurityCouncil’srequest.419IntheConstructionofaWallcase this is further nuanced by the ICJ, inwhich it stated that: “there has been an increasingtendency(…)fortheGeneralAssemblyandtheSecurityCounciltodealinparallelwiththesamematterconcerningthemaintenanceofinternationalpeaceandsecurity”.420Ininternationallaw,there are two interpretations on the legal scope of the recommendations by theUNGeneralAssembly.ThefirstinterpretationstatesthattherecommendationsoftheGeneralAssemblydonot imply binding force. Consequently, states are not obligated to follow up on therecommendations of the UN General Assembly and the use of force based on theserecommendationswill not be automatically legitimate. Thus theUNGeneral Assembly cannotgive permission to states to use force when the UN Security Council fails to maintain theinternationalpeaceandsecurity.Accordingtothisinterpretation,therecommendationisnotanexceptiontotheprohibitionontheuseofforce.TheonlyexclusiveandlegitimateinstitutiontodothisistheUNSecurityCouncil.Theonlyfunctionoftheserecommendationsistobringcertainsituations that put the international peace and security into danger to the attention of theinternationalcommunity.421ThesecondinterpretationstatesthattherecommendationsbytheUNGeneralAssemblyarenotbindingon states,but theycanbeused to legitimize theuseofforce in accordance with international law. The mandate of the UNSC to maintain theinternationalpeaceandsecurityisdelegatedtotheUNGeneralAssembly,thereforetheUNGAhastherighttomandatetheuseofforce.Inaddition,theUNGeneralAssemblycandelegatetheuseof force to certain stateswhen the scope,purposeand timeframeof theuseof forceareexplicitlydescribed.Moreover,theUNGeneralAssemblyshouldmonitorandcontroltheuseofforceandhavethepossibilitytorevokethisdelegation.422ThisinterpretationoftheUnitingforPeace Resolution gives the UN General Assembly the possibility to recommend coercivemeasures if theSecurityCouncil fails tomaintain the internationalpeaceandsecurity through

419Article11andArticle12UNCharter.420ICJ,8December2003,ConsequencesoftheConstructionofaWallintheOccupiedPalestinianTerritory (Adivsory Opinion, ICJ Reports 136. par 27.; R. BARBER, “Uniting for Peace NotAgression: Responding to Chemical Weapons in Syria Without Breaking the Law”, Journal ofConflictandSecurityLaw,2018,109.421M.RAMSDEN,““UnitingforPeace”andHumanitarianIntervention:TheAuthorisingFunctionoftheU.N.GeneralAssembly”,WashingtonInternationalLawJournal,2016,279-282422M.RAMSDEN,““UnitingforPeace”andHumanitarianIntervention:TheAuthorisingFunctionof the U.N. General Assembly”,Washington International Law Journal, 2016, 278-284.; A.J.,CARSWELL, “Unblocking theUNSecurityCouncil:TheUniting forPeaceResolution”, JournalofConflictandSecurityLaw,2013,461.

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thesystematicuseofvetoes.Thisrecommendationwouldthenbeusedasalegitimatebasisforstates to use force in their international relations.423 Nevertheless, at the moment the statepracticedoesnotacceptthattheUNGeneralAssemblyhasthecompetencetoauthorisetheuseofforceandtheexclusivecompetencestilllieswiththeUNSecurityCouncil.TheUNGAcanonlymakenon-legallybindingrecommendationsonabreachofthepeaceoranactofaggression.424TheUnitingforPeaceResolutionhastodateneverbeenusedto legitimisetheuseofforce.425Nonetheless, theUniting forPeaceprocedurecouldpossiblybeusedforhumanitarianreasonsandlegitimiseahumanitarianintervention.426

6.4. UnitingforPeaceResolutioninthecaseofSyria?

Russia and China vetoed together 12UNSCdraft resolutions on Syria. They both vetoed draftresolutionsonOctober4th2011,February4th2012,July19th2012,May22th2014,December5th2016 and February 28th 2017.427 Russia alone vetoed 6 other draft resolutions onOctober 8th2016,April12th2017,October24th2017,November16th2017andApril10th2018.428Russiaand

423M.RAMSDEN,““UnitingforPeace”andHumanitarianIntervention:TheAuthorisingFunctionoftheU.N.GeneralAssembly”,WashingtonInternationalLawJournal,2016,282-285.424Y.DINSTEIN,War,aggressionandself-defence,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2017,366.;O. CORTEN,The LawAgainstWar: The Prohibition on theUse of Force in ContemporaryInternationalLaw,Oxford,HartPublishing,2010,330.;M.RAMSDEN,““Uniting forPeace”andHumanitarianIntervention:TheAuthorisingFunctionoftheU.N.GeneralAssembly”,WashingtonInternationalLawJournal,2016,291.;A.,UDOH,“Invokingthe‘UntingforPeace’Resolutionof1950 toauthorize theuseofhumanitarianmilitary interventionandpreventmassatrocities inSyria”.WillametteJournalofInternationalLawandDisputeResolution,2015,187-231.425 O. CORTEN, The Law Against War: The Prohibition on the Use of Force in ContemporaryInternational Law, Oxford,Hart Publishing, 2010, 332.; Y. DINSTEIN,War, aggression and self-defence,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2017,367.426M.RAMSDEN,““UnitingforPeace”andHumanitarianIntervention:TheAuthorisingFunctionoftheU.N.GeneralAssembly”,WashingtonInternationalLawJournal,2016,277-278.427 Draft Resolution S/2011/612 United Nations Security Council (4 October 2011), UN Doc.S/2011/612 (2011).; Draft Resolution S/2012/77 United Nations Security Council (4 February2012),UNDoc.S/2012/77(2012).;DraftResolutionS/2012/538UnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(19July2012),UNDoc.S/2012/538(2012).;DraftResolutionS/2014/348UnitedNationsSecurityCouncil (22 May 2014), UN Doc. S/2014/348 (2014).;Draft Resolution S/2016/1026 UnitedNations Security Council (5 December 2016), UN Doc. S/2016/1026 (2016).;Draft ResolutionS/2017/172 of the United Nations Security Council (28 February 2017), UN Doc. S/2017/172(2017).428 Draft Resolution S/2016/846 United Nations Security Council (5 December 2016),UNDoc.S/2016/846 (2016).; Draft Resolution S/2017/172 of the United Nations Security Council (28February2017),UNDoc.S/2017/172(2017).;DraftResolutionS/2017/844oftheUnitedNations

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China’srationalefortheirvetoeswerethatthedraftresolutionswerebiasedagainsttheSyrianregime.Thiscouldleadtomilitaryinterventionand,consequently,toregimechange.Incontrast,most of the 12 draft resolutions did not encompass military intervention and were veryrestrictive. Only three of the twelve resolutions invoked action under Chapter VII of the UNCharter.429 It can be considered that the vetoes of China and Russiawere taken in bad faith,abusive and in breach of Article 2(2) of the UN Charter. The justifications they gave can beconsidered as pretexts; in fact, their geopolitical and strategic aspects in the region aremoreimportanttothem(cf.supra).Inaddition,thewidespreadhumanrightsviolationsandatrocitiesinSyriawherefundamentallyclear.AccordingtoWhite,anindicationofanabusivevetoiswhenthisissystematicallyusedeveninthecaseofwidespreadhumanrightsviolations.430 On August 7th 2012 and December 18th 2013, the UNGA expressed their concern andfrustrations in the way the UNSC acted in relation to the situation in Syria. Both resolutionsreceivedthesupportofmorethan127nationsinwhichtheydeploredthefailureoftheSecurityCounciltoagreeonmeasurestoensurethecomplianceofSyrianAuthoritieswithitsdecisions.431Inresolution68/182ofDecember2013theUNGAreminded:“theSecurityCouncilofitsprimaryresponsibility for themaintenanceof internationalpeaceandsecurityand to takemeasures toputanend toall seriousviolationsof internationalhumanitarian lawandall seriousviolationsandabusesofinternationalhumanrightslawcommittedintheSyrianArabRepublic”.432Again,in2016,theUNGAadoptedaresolutioninwhichitstipulatedthattheresponsibilityoftheUNSCistoensurepromptandeffectiveactionwithregardtotheSyrianArabRepublicanditshouldtakeup its responsibility tomaintain the international peace and security.433 It was clear that theUNGAalsodisplayedtheirdiscontentwiththestalemateintheUNSCcausedbythesystematic

SecurityCouncil(24October2017),UNDoc.S/2017/844(2017).;DraftResolutionS/2017/962ofthe United Nations Security Council (16 November 2017), UN Doc.S/2017/962 (2017).;DraftResolution S/2017/962 of the United Nations Security Council (17 November 2017),UN Doc.S/2017/962(2017).;DraftResolutionS/2018/321oftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(10April2018),UNDoc.S/2018/321(2018).429Y.NAHLAWI,“OvercomingRussianandChineseVetoesonSyriathroughUnitingforPeace”,JournalofConflictandSecurityLaw,2019,111-143.430N.D.WHITE, “Commentary: International Institutions and theirRole inR2P”, inR.BARNESandV.TZEVELEKOS (eds),BeyondResponsibility toProtect:GeneratingChange in InternationalLaw,Intersentia,2016,150.431 Resolution 66/253B of the United Nations General Assembly (7 August 2012), UN Doc.A/RES/66/253B(2012).432 Resolution 68/182 of the United Nations General Assembly (30 January 2014), UN Doc.A/RES/68/182(2014)par.12.433 Resolution 71/130 of the United Nations General Assembly (19 December 2016),UN Doc.(2016) A/RES/71/130 (2016).; Y. NAHLAWI, “Overcoming Russian and Chinese Vetoes on SyriathroughUnitingforPeace”,JournalofConflictandSecurityLaw,2019,111-143.

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vetoes. It is fromthisobservation that theUniting forPeaceResolutioncouldbeacompellingsolutiontoovercometheUNSCdeadlock.

Source: Y. NAHLAWI, “Overcoming Russian and Chinese Vetoes on Syria through Uniting forPeace”,JournalofConflictandSecurityLaw,2019,111-143.The following conditions have to be fulfilled so the UNGA can consider to adopt a resolutionconcerningthesituationinSyria.First,aclearbreachofthepeaceoractofaggressionshouldbepresent.Second,thereislackofunanimityintheUNSC,duetothepersistentuseofvetopowersby one ormore of the Permanent fivemembers. Third, in consequence, the UNSC fails in itsprimaryresponsibility tomaintainthe internationalpeaceandsecurity.WhentheseconditionsarefulfilledtheUNGAhastheabilitytorecommendtheuseofforcetoendthecrisis.434BecauseofthesystematicvetoesusedbyChinaandRussia,theUNSCfailedinitsprimaryresponsibilitytomaintaintheinternationalpeaceandsecurity.ChinaandRussiahavecollectivelyvetoed12draftresolutions.StateshaverepeatedlymentionedtheinactionoftheUNSCinthecaseofSyriaasaproblem and asked for solutions. In addition, the UN General assembly has passed severalresolutions encouraging the UN Security Council to take action.435 This fulfils, in turn, the

434 A. UDOH, “Invoking the ‘Unting for Peace’ Resolution of 1950 to authorize the use ofhumanitarianmilitary interventionandpreventmassatrocities inSyria”.Willamette JournalofInternationalLawandDisputeResolution,2015,187-231.435 Resolution 66/253B of the United Nations General Assembly (7 August 2012), UN Doc.A/RES/66/253B (2012).; Resolution 67/262 of the United Nations General Assembly (4 June2013), UN Doc. A/RES/67/262 (2012).; Resolution 68/182 of the United Nations GeneralAssembly(30January2014),UNDoc.A/RES/68/182(2014).;R.BARBER,“UnitingforPeaceNotAgression: Responding to Chemical Weapons in Syria Without Breaking the Law”, Journal ofConflictandSecurityLaw,2018,109.

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conditions to refer the situation to the UNGA under the Uniting for Peace Resolution. Thereferral to theUNGAvia theUNSCproceduralvotewouldpresumablybeachieved.Asseen inthetableabovetherewaswithintheUNSCoftenamajorityof9votesormore.Asseenabove,the UNGA already voted on resolutions, in which they asked the UNSC to take up theirresponsibilityinthecaseofSyria,withamajorityofmorethan100membersstates.Therefore,the majority of two thirds in the UNGA could also possibly be attained.436 The UN GeneralAssembly could recommend several actions including the destruction of chemical weaponsfacilities,referraltotheICC,sanctions,ceasefiresandhumanitarianaccess.437

436Y.NAHLAWI,“OvercomingRussianandChineseVetoesonSyriathroughUnitingforPeace”,JournalofConflictandSecurityLaw,2019,111-143.437 R. BARBER, “Uniting for Peace Not Agression: Responding to Chemical Weapons in SyriaWithoutBreakingtheLaw”,JournalofConflictandSecurityLaw,2018,110.

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6.5. Conclusion

This chapter has considered the vetopowersof theUNSecurity Council in the context of thecrisisinSyria.ItdemonstratedthatthecontinuousvetoesbyRussiaandChinaledtoastalemateintheUNSecurityCouncil.This impededtheUNSecurityCouncil tomaintainthe internationalpeaceandsecurity,andmorespecifically,toactagainstthesystematichumanrightsviolationsandatrocitiesinSyria.ItisshowedthattheUNGeneralAssemblyhasasecondaryresponsibilityin this regardwhen the UN Security Council fails in its primary responsibility. The Uniting forPeaceResolutioncanbeseenasapossiblesolutiontothechallengesrelatedtotheUNSC,e.g.democratic deficit and abuse, by giving competence to the UN General Assembly to makerecommendations regarding the use of force. It has been shown that there is a wideinternationalconsensusaboutthefailureoftheUNSCinitsdutytoprotectinrelationtoSyria.ThemajorityofthemembersoftheUNSCandUNGAfoundtheactionsoftheUNSCinadequateregardingthecrisisinSyria.TheSyriansituationcontainsallconditionsprescribedbytheUnitingforPeaceResolutiontoreferthesituationtotheUNGeneralAssembly.AsWhiteputsis:“[w]henthere is strong evidence of a threat to the peace and of egregious violations of human rights,therearecompellingreasonstorecognizethattheAssemblyneedstoreviveitsapparentlylong-lost competence to recommend military action. In the face of genocide or crimes againsthumanity,bothegregiousviolationsofhumanrightsthatsitsquarelyintheremitoftheGeneralAssembly, and in the face of a deadlocked Security Council, the Assembly should come underincreasingpressuretofulfiltheUN’sresponsibilitytoprotect”.438

438N.D.WHITE, “TheRelationship between theUN Security Council andGeneral Assembly inMattersof InternationalPeaceandSecurity”, inM.WELLER(ed.),TheOxfordHandbookof theUseofForceinInternationalLaw,2015,309.

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Chapter7:ConclusionOn4April2017,theUSandon8April2018theUS,theUKandFranceintervenedinSyriaafterchemicalweaponsattacksoftheSyriangovernmentagainstitsowncivilians.Thesestatescouldnot stay on the sideline when widespread human rights violations were committed andinternationallyforbiddenchemicalweaponswerebeingused.Theyactedunilaterallybecausenoauthorization by theUnitedNations Securitywas obtained due to the veto-use of Russia andChina.NoexplicitjustificationwasgivenbytheinterveningpartiesexceptfortheUK,whoreliedonthedoctrineofhumanitarianintervention.TheUSarguedthattheinterventionwasnecessarytoprotectits“vitalnationalsecurityinterests”andtodetertheuseandfutureuseofchemicalweapons. France also argued that the intervention was a reaction to the use of forbiddenchemicalweapons.Therationalizationsoftheinterveningstatesweremobilizedinthreedistinctlegal justifications, namely self-defence as an exception to the use of force, the doctrine ofhumanitarianinterventionandreprisalsorcountermeasures.

It is fundamentally clear that the interventions in Syria after the chemical weaponsattackswereaviolationofarticle2(4)oftheUNCharter.ItclearlyviolatedtheterritorialintegrityandpoliticalindependenceofSyriaandcanbeconsideredanillegaluseofforceagainstanotherstate.TheexceptionsprovidedforintheUNCharterandcustomarylawarenotapplicable.Therewas no invitation or consent of the Syrian government for the parties to intervene. No UNSecurityCouncilauthorizationwasobtainedtouseforceduetothevetoesofChinaandRussia.Moreover, a presumed or implied authorization of the UNSC cannot be considered. The lastexception,therighttoself-defenceisalsonotapplicable.TheactionsoftheSyriangovernmentwerenotdirectedagainst theUnitedStationsor itssubjects,sono individualself-defencewaspossible. Collective self-defence, based on the defence of neighboring countries, is also not apossible base. No neighboring country asked help from the United States and even so, noneighboringcountrywasdirectlyaffectedbythechemicalweaponsattacks.Anticipatoryorpre-emptiveself-defenceisstillcontestedininternationalpubliclawandtherewasnoevidencethatchemicalweaponswouldbeusedinthefutureagainstAmericancitizensormilitarypersonalinSyria.The2017and2018 interventions inSyriacouldalsonotbeconsideredtobe legalunderinternational law when legitimized by humanitarian intervention. Unilateral humanitarianintervention is considered illegal as it is an infringement of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Inaddition,noevidencecanbeprovidedthattheseinterventionscanbeseenasthebirthofanewcustomaryrule.Neitherthestatepracticenortheopiniojurisispresent.Theinterveningstates,except for theUK,didnotexplicitlymentionhumanitarian interventionasa legal justification.Moreover,theinternationalcommunityshowednoacceptanceoftherationaleoftheUK,andinconsequenceof unilateral humanitarian intervention. Collective humanitarian intervention canalsonotlegallyjustifybothinterventions.Tobeconsideredlawful,theinterventionshouldthen

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beauthorizedbytheUNSecurityCouncil,assetforwardbytheprinciplesoftheResponsibilitytoProtect. This authorizationwas not forthcoming because of the vetoes of Russia (and China).Furthermore, the law on armed reprisals was examined as a possible justification for bothinterventions.ThestatementsoftheUS,theUKandFranceindicatethattheinterventioninSyriawas a reaction to the infringement of Syria’s international obligation to not use forbiddenchemical weapons and, therefore, the intervention could be considered as a reprisal. It wasconcluded that armed reprisals are illegal as a violation of Article 2(4) of theUN Charter andcouldonlybeperceived lawfulunder theguiseof self-defense, andeven thenonlywith strictconditions.AlsonojustificationoftheinterventionscouldbefoundintheDraftArticlesontheResponsibilityofStatesforInternationallyWrongfulActs.TheUS,theUKandFrancehadnorightunder international law to deter or prevent the use of chemicalweapons by the use of forceunderthelegitimationofreprisalorcountermeasures.Finally,theUnitingforPeaceResolutionwas considered as possible way forward out of the deadlock in the United Nations SecurityCouncilwithrespecttotheconflict inSyria.The internationalcommunityexpressedonseveralmomentstheirfrustrationontheinactionoftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilandthefailureto protect Syrian citizens against widespread human rights violations. The majority of themembersoftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilandGeneralAssemblyfoundtheactionsoftheUNSCinadequateregardingthecrisisinSyria.Therefore,theUnitingforPeaceResolutioncanbeconsidered to overcome the deadlock in the United Nations Security Council and to let theUnited Nations General Assembly take up its secondary responsibility to maintain theinternationalpeaceandsecurity.

Insum, thesystematicuseandthreatsofvetoesbyRussia impedestheUnitedNationsSecurity Council to act collectively in Syria. This in the wake of the massive human rightsviolationsand thegruesomechemicalweaponsattacks. This impassehad led to theunilateralactionbytheUSin2017andtheUS,theUKandFrancein2018.Theseinterventionswereclearlyillegalunderinternationalpubliclaw.Itcannotbeacceptedthatthemostpowerfulstatesresortagaintounilateraluseofforcetoresolveconflictsininternationalrelations.AsKolbputsit:“(…)inadivided,violentanduncertainworldfilledwiththreatsanddangers,whereitseemsbettertorelyonone’sownstrongrightarmthantoentrustone’sfatetocollectivesecuritysystemsthatmaybeboltedagainstone, ineffective,orboth. Such sentimentsnotonlyweaken the law,butalso contribute to themorewidespread unilateral use of force, leading theworld into a trulyviciousspiralofgreaterinsecurity–withthisinturndrivingStatestoeverstrongermeasuresofself-protection,andtovagueandaggressivedoctrinesofnationalsecurity”.439ThecrisisinSyriaisasymboloftheineffectivenessandlegitimacycrisisofthecollectivesecuritysystemoftheUNandputsitscredibilityinquestion.ThefailureoftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilundermines

439R.KOLB,InternationalLawontheMaintenanceofPeace:JusContraBellum,Cheltenham,EEElgar,2018,415.

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thecredibilityof international lawand its institutions.TheSyriancasesymbolizesthedecliningrespect for international rules and institutions and leads to unilateral action, that in turn, canleadtoanescalationofviolence.Asanalysed,theinterventionsinSyriawereillegalunderpublicinternational lawbutwidelysupportedby the internationalcommunity.Therefore, theUnitingforPeaceResolution isproposedtoovercomethechallengesrelatedtothevetopowerof theUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil and togivemoredemocratic legitimacy to theUnitedNationsSystem.Thiscouldbeasolutiontoactcollectivelyasaninternationalcommunityinthewakeofhumanrightsviolationsandinternationalcrimesthatareuniversallycondemned.

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