THE STRUGGLE TO GOVERN THE COMMONSThomas Dietz, Elinor Ostrom and Paul C. Stern

HARDIN (1968) ABOUT ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE

Two Factors as key drivers Demand for Environmental Services (Due to

increasing resource consumption per capita) Social Institutions (as rules of organizing

consumptions) Propositions- Which institutions would be

successful? A centrally controlled mechanism Private property rights

SOURCES OF ACCELERATED SCARCITY

Increasing population Consumption Technological developments aimed at

resource extractions. This may not be correct always Example: Hydraulic fracturing aka Fracking

CRITICISM ON HARDIN

Oversimplifying (McCay & Acheson, 1987, Dasgupta, 1996) Only two types of credible institutions. Neglects the success of certain social groups i.e.

herders Though these examples are rare But they do exist nevertheless.

EXAMPLE OF INEFFECTIVE AND IN EFFECTIVE INSTITUTIONS

Global Fishery Loss Great Oceanic loss (80% predatory fish loss

within 15 years of industrialization) (Myers &Worm, 2003)

Greater Inland fishery reserves depletion which are free resources. (Finlayson,1994) (Hanna,1998)

Maine lobster fishery has been rather sustainable due to local involvement (Acheson,2003)

EXAMPLE OF INEFFECTIVE AND IN EFFECTIVE INSTITUTIONS

Montreal Protocol Aimed at reducing Ozone Depleting Substances

(ODS) A success story for intergovernmental

implementation

RULE MAKING IN DIVERSE SOCIAL ENVIORNMENT

A fairly challenging task due to Social and cultural differences Conflicting ethics and interests Social tendency to evade rules

How a successful common rule should be crafted? The resources used can be monitored. The changes in resource, resource user

population and related-tech development is moderate

User communities are more glued. Outsiders can be excluded at lower costs. Users support effective monitoring

REQUIREMENTS OF ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE

Information provision Good, reliable and timely information about

stock, flow, changes and generation of environmental variable. Example Canadian Northern Cod Fish

In 1977, government allowed fishing on 200 KM zone Generous finishing quotas and licenses were allowed Inflated estimates about growth and stock

replenishment were provided to policymakers This led a moratorium on fishing in 2002.

REQUIREMENTS OF ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE

Dealing with Conflicts Difference in social as well as economical values

makes conflict an inherent factor in multilateral governance structures.

Thus conflict resolution is essential for ensuring compliance

Example: Mississippi River regulation Continuous input from engineers, wildlife and water

department, local land owners, environmental organizations, academics etc

A comprehensive plan with ownership of all stakeholders

REQUIREMENTS OF ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE

Inducting Rule compliance Ensuring that rules are generally followed with

tolerance modest violations. Good rule is to impose moderate sanctions on

first violation and then gradually increasing it with the increasing frequency.

Example: Tradable Environmental Emissions (TEAs)

REQUIREMENTS OF ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE

Providing infrastructure Often ignored Helps in effective monitoring and prompt policy

response to diversions observed. Acceptability to Change

Rules need to follow an open structure Increased adaptability in differing situations may

lead to conflict of interests and thus undermining of body of rules.

A GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENT POLICY MAKING

LITERATURE SURVEY

Ferrara, Missios, Murat (2009) Studied the preferential practices in international

trade Utilized the three stage game with behavioral

impact of discriminated and uniform tariffs (MFN) on exporting countries

Findings suggested that non-discrimination leads to lower emissions by exporting countries.

Ferrara, I., P. Missios, et al. (2009). "Trading rules and the environment: Does equal treatment lead to a cleaner world?" Journal of Environmental Economics & Management 58(2): 206-225.

LITERATURE SURVEY

Devlin-Foltz, Lim (2008) Study employs a public goods game in which

participants can punish each other for free-riding.

Paper predicts and finds evidence for the punishment of free-ridership, even when not punishing is the profit-maximizing strategy

The paper finds participants will punish more when designated the sole punisher for a group, than when all group members are allowed to punish.

Study suggests individual responsibility is important for ensuring the strength of institutions aimed at punishing selfish behavior

LITERATURE SURVEY

Devlin-Foltz, Z. and K. Lim (2008). "Responsibility to Punish: Discouraging Free-Riders in Public Goods Games." Atlantic Economic Journal 36(4): 505-518.

LITERATURE SURVEY

Chou, Sylla (2008) The article presents a study which provides a game

theory perspective of international environment and knowledge for global public goods (GPGs).

Stresses that GPGs possess properties of non-rivalry in consumption and non-excludability to all countries which would create the free-rider problem.

Suggests that all countries must participate in the international environment agreement (IEA) to resolve problem of knowledge creation through implementation of intellectual property rights.

Chou, P. B. and C. Sylla "The provision of global public goods: a game-theoretic comparison of international environment and knowledge." International Journal of Networking & Virtual Organisations 8(3): 254-263.

QUESTIONS, COMMENTS, IMPROVEMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS?

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