T2 B10 Monograph-Presentation Drafts Fdr- Team 2 Essay- National Intelligence Reforms 687

8/14/2019 T2 B10 Monograph-Presentation Drafts Fdr- Team 2 Essay- National Intelligence Reforms 687

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9-11 COM MISSION SEN SITIVENOT FOR DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE THE COMMISSIONApril 29,2004

National Intelligence Reform sBackground: The attacks on the United States on September 11,2001 exposed severeshortcomings in our intelligence capabilities. We did not have effective access incountries w here we have no official presence; we were un able to penetrate hard targetslike terrorist organizations operating abroad or cells established in the United States.Our investigations have confirmed grave dysfunctions in our national securityintelligence establishment. They are of two kinds, structural and cultural.The structural problems are the simplest to understand and their remediesstraightforward. The government agencies charged with foreign and domestic intelligenceare the creatures of a different age with law s, regulations and organization fashioned forexternal w ars and internal threats of the last century w here strict separation of foreign anddomestic activities was desired.That legacy of nation-state focus, legislated walls and compartmentalized inform ationcannot deal with the kinds of transnational threats operating seamlessly at home andabroad with speed and agility. Our most senior intelligence officials do not haveauthorities, access and accountability to do what is expected of them. Nor do they havethe power to m ake the great organizational changes necessary to correct these problems.The Comm ission therefo re recomm ends specific sweeping organizational changes.More imp ortant than organizational reform is dealing with the second category ofdysfunction we have broadly defined as cultural; process over output; bureaucraticcareerism; groupthink; a law enforcement rather than preventive m indset; deep aversionto covert operations; fear of abusive litigation. These problems cannot be solved byorganizational changes how ever bold. They can be changed only by appointing,confirming and suppo rting proven leaders of talent and experience to the top positions ofthe intelligence establishment. It is they who must sweep aw ay the irrational security,classification and career path obstacles to create a new, agile innovative careerenvironment in which excellence no t mediocrity will flourish.To accomplish such change these leaders must have new community wide authoritiesover personnel policies, certain budg ets and ap propriations, and security classificationsand clearances.Some of these changes can be done by executive order, many will require legislation, andto succeed all will require major changes in Congressional oversight. We are makingspecific recommendations for congressional oversight reform.To implement its recommendations, the Commission believes the President shouldestablish, through Executive Order, a six-mon th Intelligence Transition Task Force to: 1)

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9-11 COMMISSION SENSITIVENOT FOR DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE THE COMMISSIONhelp develop legislation to implement the reforms; 2) develop a strategy forimplementing the reforms; and 3) report to the board on the status of the implementation.This Task Force would report to a board consisting of the Wh ite House Chief of Staff, theNational Security A dvisor and the Chairman of the President's Foreign IntelligenceAdvisory Board. The Task Force should include selected comm issioners from the 9/11and Iraq commissions and a staff selected from the law enforcement and intelligencecommunities.The Com mission recommends the following:1) Establish a National Intelligence Authority (NIA), which would be headed by aDirector of National Intelligence (DM). Confirmed by the Senate, with C abinet rank(Executive Level One), without a cabinet department. The United States IntelligenceCommunity as it is currently organized w ould be disbanded.

a) The National Intelligence Authority would include the existing and plannedcapabilities of: the CIA; the FBI National Security Intelligence Service, thenational imagery capabilities of the NGA; the national signals intelligencecapabilities of the NSA; the national imagery, signals, and communicationsacquisition programs and infrastructures of the NRO; the advanced science andtechnology capabilities of the CIA, NSA, and NRO; other specialized nationalcollection activities; and the all-source analytic capabilities of the CIA and theFBI.

b) The mission of the DNI is to oversee and direct the global netw ork of human andtechnical systems and organizations to collect, analyze and disseminate nationalintelligence to the President and the members of the National Security Council,whether the information originates within the United States or abroad. He/she isto have the powers and authorities necessary to bring about such changes as maybe required to accomplish that mission.c) The DNI would have the authority to nominate to the President the Director ofCIA, the Directors of NSA, NGA and NRO with concurrence of the SECDEF,and Director of FBI's National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS) withconcurrence of the Attorney G eneral.d) An executive office for executing his/her responsibilities would support the DNIwith such functions as: personnel managem ent, security policy, informationtechnology policy, budget and financial control, an inspector general,institutionalized lessons learned reviews, and support to customers, particularlythe Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security.e) Establish the position of C hief of National Intelligence (CNI) which would be the

senior career intelligence professional (Executive Level Two) w ho wo uld supportthe DN I in his role as the President's senior intelligence executive and who wo uldbe responsible for conveying intelligence to the President, the NSC and the DSC.The CNI would serve for a two year term renewed every two years for threeconsecutive terms.i) The National Intelligence Authority would be organized by national securitymissions established by the President. Each mission area (e.g., global



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9-11 COMMISSION SENSITIVENOT FOR DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE THECOMMISSION

terrorism, WMD proliferation, counterintelligence, China, Russia, emergingthreats, etc.) would be led by a Director General of National Intelligence. TheDirector Generals would report to the Chief of National Intelligence. TheDirector Generals would be the government's highest-ranking intelligenceofficial (Executive Level Three) responsible for their mission area andresponsible for both analysis and operations.

ii) The national intelligence agencies - CIA, NSA, NGA, NRO, NSIS, and othernational capabilities - would be responsible for training, equipping, andmanning the national intelligence mission areas and supporting the DirectorGenerals of National Intelligence. The heads of these agencies would reportto the Director of National Intelligence (Figure One).

2) Integrate Domestic Intelligence while ensuring civil liberties by creating within FBIan independent National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS) with complete access toall investigative intelligence and without law enforcement culture. Director of NSISto be selected by DNI, with concurrence of FBI.

3) Establish an NIA Chief of Intelligence Personnel to establish NIA-wide standards ofrecruitment, training, certification and promotion to provide flexible assignments andcareer paths across intelligence agencies and areas; to ensure the regular infusionthroughout the ranks of agents, analysts, and managers of thinkers from diversedisciplines and professions with and without the government; to establish reserveprograms similar to the uniformed services, and generally to foster innovation andcreativity and stifle bureaucratic careerism.

4) Strengthening competitive analysis to ensure the President and senior nationalsecurity officials receive accurate, timely, complete and well-vetted intelligenceproducts; as well as the complete vetting of government views and improved analyticquality control measures. Strengthen the tradecraft of all-source, strategicintelligence analysis within the CIA, DIA and other analytic components ontransnational topics through: required overseas tours by analysts, additional trainingin transnational issues, significant financial incentives for skills development, as wellas financial incentives to recruit linguists, additional analysts with area or scientificexpertise.a) Strengthen and keep independent, departmental intelligence elements like theDefense Intelligence Agency, the military service intelligence units and the State

Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Strengthen their capabilitythrough the setting of priorities, overseas tours, training in transnational issues,and language training.

b) Establish an Executive Research Service (300 positions) separate from theNational Intelligence Authority and the policy departments. It would direct thecollection, translation, analysis and production of national security-relatedresearch solely on the basis of openly available information. It would beresponsible to the National Security Council. It would contract out research andbuild research relationships with academia and research organizations.



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9-11 COMM ISSION SENSITIVENOT FOR DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE THE COMMISSION5) Fixing the information sharing problems among the intelligence and law enforcementcommunities that have come to light from the investigation of the September 11attacks:

a) A new approach of managing and sharing "meta-data" should be established tocombine information about intelligence reporting, open sources and lawenforcement cases into one database. This meta-da ta wou ld provide "pointers" tothe content generated by, and protected within, the intelligence collectionagencies including the FBI. This meta-data file would be available to all analystsfor research. [This approach is similar wh at was recommended by the ScowcroftReview and the Markle Fou ndation Task Force on Creating a Trusted InformationNetwork fo r Homeland S ecurity]

b) Establish th e position of N IA Chief Information Officer, independent of anyintelligence agency, reporting to the DNI, fo r oversight of all major IT systemsand the establishment of standard IT protocols across intelligence and lawenforcement agencies to facilitate seamless, real time info rmation integration.c) The NIA/CIO would execute a strategy to phase out legacy systems, acquire

compatible replacement systems, make recommendations to the DNI oninformation security an d approve al l major information technology acquisitions inth e N IA.6) Establish an NIA Chief of Security responsible for developing a common set ofsecurity rules, guidelines and programs across the National Intelligence Authority toallow fo r improved information sharing, th e breakdown of unnecessarycompartmentation, the increased protection of vital sources an d methods and a

streamlining of the background investigation process for new hires.7)

9/11 Classif ied Information

8) Strengthen DNI financial controls over the National Intelligence A utho rity byestablishing an appropriation fo r national intelligence an d developing the associatedfinancial systems fo r man agin g that appropriation.a) Declassify the aggregate budget amount for national intelligence. Details of theappropriations ac t would be classified an d reported in a consolidated classifiedannex to the President's Budg et prepared at the direction of the DNI.b) Establish a "National Intelligence Appropriations Act" that would includefunding for: 1) the Intelligence Community Management Account, 2) the CentralIntelligence Agency, 3) the Nation al Security Agency, 4) the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, 5) the National Reconnaissance Office, 6) the FBI'sNational Security Intelligence Service, and 7) other national intelligencecapabilities no t identified above.



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9-11 COMMISSION SENSITIVENOT FOR DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE THE COMMISSIONc) The National Intelligence Appropriations Act would be made to the Director of

National Intelligence, who would be held accountable for executing those fundsand their oversight. To meet this responsibility, the DNI would appoint a ChiefFinancial Officer (CFO) for the National Intelligence Authority.

d) The CFO would allocate resources to the national intelligence agencies inaccordance with OMB apportionment guidelines, the DNI's direction, and theauthorization and appropriations acts.


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T2 B10 Monograph-Presentation Drafts Fdr- Team 2 Essay- National Intelligence Reforms 687