T5 B61 Visa Policy- Kyl Fdr- 11-12-02 DOS-Kelly Response to Kyl Questions 207

8/14/2019 T5 B61 Visa Policy- Kyl Fdr- 11-12-02 DOS-Kelly Response to Kyl Questions 207

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I n i t f d S t a t r > D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e

Dear Senator Kyi:I am replying to your letter of October 30 in whichyou raise substantial issues of concern regarding the visaissuance process at the Department of State. Enclosed youwill find answers to the specific questi ons you aske d.A major portion of your letter discusses the visaapplications of the 9/11 hijackers. The report of theGeneral Accounting Office (GAO) to which you refer dealtwith this issue in considerable detail, and State has found

that document to be an invaluable blueprint to be put touse in addressing deficiencies in the visa issuanceprocess. The Depar tment concurs in most of the GAO'srecommendations, many of which we have already begun toimplement. We look forward to working with both of you aswe advance further in this area.

State is working closely with Justice to resolve thoselegal issues on which we have different interpretations,but takin g every step to safeguard our national securitywhile doing so. In no case in which DOJ objects to issuanceof a visa do we authorize visa a pprov al unless Justice'sconcerns are fully resolved. We do not issue visas overthe objections of the Justice Department or any othernational security agency. We worked closely with DOJ andthe intelligence community to design special clearanceprocedures (explained in detail in the attachment) to gobeyond our already vastly expanded visa lookout system andto subject applicants of particular concern to extrascrutiny. We are undertaking numerous initiatives toimprove the language competence, functional, and areaknowledge of our consular officers.

The HonorableJon Kyi,United States Senate.


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I appreciate the interest you have both taken in thisvital area of work for the State Department and trust thatthe enclosed document will further clarify our position andprogress.

Sincerely,

Paul V. KellyAssistant SecretaryLegislative Affairs


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I.I. To your knowledge, has the report in Section 201 ofthe Border Security Act, due in August, been completed onidentifying law information and intelligence communityinformation needed by the State Department to screen visaapplicants and by INS to determine inadmissibility ordeportability? If not, please tell us why it hasn't beencompleted.The State Department's input to this report was firstsubmitted on August 20 to the Office of Homeland Security,which is coordinating the administration's response to thereport. The Department has been in close contact withHomeland Security about the report since then. State'ssubmission to the report is included as an attachment tothis letter.


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Electronic data exchange with FBI. Electronic data exchange with FB I that wil l a l low them tosend name check resu l ts back to DO S in an electronic form.Electronic access to Interpol U.S. National Central Bureau Information. This in form at ionrelates to criminal a ctivities of individu al aliens, wh ich is clea rly relevant to visa el ig ib i l i ty .D O S presently receives paper copies of Interpol USNCB notices and enters them m anu ally intoth e Consular Lookout and Support System, a process th at wou ld be great ly expedited by anelectronic access to th i s in format ion . D O S also needs Interpol lost passport data , wh ichpresently is not received at all.Electronic access to FBI photographs. Photographic information in FBI records for w h i c h D O Salready receives extract records to aid in identif icat ion of inel ig ible subjects .Access to Customs database regarding drug traffickers or other criminals or suspectedcriminals. DO S present ly sees a l imited amount of information in TECS; i t wo uld be helpful fo rvisa adjudict ion if consular off ice rs could hav e access to the same TECS informat ion tha tCustoms or INS officers are able to see.Inte l l i gence I n format ionData maintained by intelligence agencies on terrorists and those w ho support terrorist activities.This includes data on all individuals th e Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) suspects ofinvolvement in terrorist activity, an electron ic mean s to transfer this data, as well as aninteragency agreement for the CIA to share this data consisten t with approp riate pro tectio ns toprevent the unauthorized disclosure of intel l igence sources and methods and other sensi t ivenational securi ty inform ation.Travel HistoryData on aliens who have been identified through Computer Aided Profiling System (CAPS) ashigh-risk. The Federal Aviat ion Administrat ion/Transportat ion Securi ty Administrat ion(FAA/TSA) current ly ut i l izes a profi l ing system to filter critical details about travelers. Thissystem assigns red or green coding to direct additional security screening of passengers orluggage. Access to CAPS would enable the INS to readi ly iden t ify travelers w ho have alreadybeen deemed l ikely to pose a higher than norma l securi ty risk.Data on actions taken by INS. The DOS needs more com plete access to INS data regardingal iens ' inel igibi l i ty , inadm issibi l i ty or w ithdraw al of appl icat ion for adm ission; data on al ienssubject to deportation and those who have been deported; data recording the arrival anddeparture of aliens to and from th e United States, as well as data on overstays, including th e dataentered in the Non-Immigrant Information System (NIIS).Watchl i s t sBiograph ical data from all other Federal agency watch lists of aliens. Access to watch l is ts f romal l Federal agencies.


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1.2. Section 202 of the Border Security Act requires theSecretary of State to develop and implement "no fewer than 4languages designated as high priori ties by the Secr etary ofState, after consultation with the Attorney General and thedirector of the Central Intelligence Agency and develop andimplement sensitive algorithms on those languages within 18months after enactment." What languages are the StateDepartment going to choose?

We are confident that we will meet this requirement ahead ofthe deadline. The first two algorithms, one for Arabic anda second for Russian/Slavic languages, have been developedand are currently operational within the Consular Lookoutand Support System (CLASS), State's namecheck system. Anadditional algorithm has been developed and tested for theHispanic language group and will be ready for fullimplementation in early 2003. We are now researching thebest target language for a fourth algorithm. Linguisticexperts on East Asian languages have provided ussuggestions.


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1.3. Section 304 of the Border Security Act requires that aterrorist look-out committee be maintained within each U.S.mission. Each committee is required to submit monthlyreports to the Secretary of State describing its activitiesand whether or not information on known or suspectedterrorists was developed during the month. Has theSecretary of State received these reports? To my knowledgethe State Department has not submitted to Congress, asrequired by Section 304, any quarterly_reports on the statusof the committees. Why has no report been submitted toCongress?In the early 1990's, the Department created the Visas Viperprogram to improve interagency reporting on terrorists. Werevised this program in light of section 304 of the BorderSecurity Act. The Visas Viper committees now meet on amonthly basis. We have received reports from 91% of ourmissions for the month of September, the most recent monthfor which we have statistics. Each month we individuallycontact those missions that have not reported to ensure thatthey submit their reports and to remind them of theimportance of these meetings. The first..-report to Congresswas submitted in November 2002 (it is a classified report,and therefore cannot be attached to this reply).


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1.4. The General Accounting Of fi ce report referred to inour letter to you details repeatedly the need for additionaltraining in counter-terrorism and other national securityareas for consular officers. It is our understanding that,currently, t he only new training that of fic ers are receivingpost-9/11 is a one-day seminar on employing interviewtechniques provided by the FBI to bet ter screen v isaapplicants. Section 305 of the Border Security Act requiresthat consular off icer s be speciall y and extensively trainedin the identification of individuals ineligible to receivevisas on security and related grounds (section 212(a)(3) ofthe Immigration and Nationality Act). Please update us onwhat additional training might be offe red to consularofficers.Since September 11, the State Department has made numerouschanges and additions to the Foreign Service Institute's(FSI) Basic Consular Course and other consular trainingcourses, and more changes are being planned regardingcounter-terrorism and security issues.Changes made to the 26-day Basic Consular Course to addresssecurity training include: Additional sessions on interviewing techniques and tips

in addition to the two long role-playing sessions thatexisted previously;

A session on namechecking and Security Advisory Opinion(SAO) requirements;

Additional time spent on accountability and managementissues with special emphasis on protection of computerpasswords;

Limits of class size to eight students to ensure themaximum individual attention.

FSI created a four-day course on Advanced ConsularNamechecking Techniques. This provides students anunderstanding of the language algorithms used in theConsular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) to improve theevaluation of namecheck matches.FSI has introduced relevant material in other consulartraining courses:


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More training in effective interviewing; Additional briefings on profiles of terrorist groups and

fraud detection training; and enhanced instruction on visa fraud and malfeasance.


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1.5. Please provide us an update on whether the JusticeDepartment and the Department of State have determined, asprovided for in Section 307 of the Border Security Act,whether any visa waiver countries are failing to report thetheft of passports.To date, INS and the Department of State have conducted sixfull reviews of Visa Waiver countries (Argentina, Belgium,Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, and Uruguay), and have completedfive reports based on these reviews (Uruguay is stillpending). The remaining countries will be reviewed duringthe next two years. Of the six countries, the reviews ofBelgium and Portugal raised concerns on reporting of stolenpassports.Belgium has historically had the most problems with theft ofpassports and timely reporting, but the causes of theseproblems appear to have been rectified. Prior to 1998,passport production was decentralized throughout Belgium,and blank passports were stored in 550 local communes. TheGovernment of Belgium has been cooperative in providinginformation on stolen passports to the USG, but its effortswere hampered by an unreliable database comprisinginformation from the communes, which were not always promptor thorough in providing information to the nationalgovernment. As a result, Belgium's reporting wasinconsistent and untimely. In 1998, Belgium centralizedpassport production at one secure facility in Brussels andstored all blank passports in one centralized location.This has decreased thefts and improved the timeliness andaccuracy of Belgium's reporting.INS reported that on two recent occasions stolen Portuguesepassports were used by aliens to try to gain entry into theUnited States before the USG received notice of the theft.The Department is preparing a demarche to the Government ofPortugal on these incidents in coordination with INS.


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1.6. Please provide us with an update, as provided for inSection 308 of the Border Security Act, on the entry ofstolen passports into its existing data system.We fully launched our program to include lost and stolenpassport information in the visa lookout database inSeptember 2001. We fully deployed a program to include lostand stolen US passport data in our passport database inJanuary 2002.All lost and stolen passport data, both foreign and U.S.,are passed in near real-time to the Interagency BorderInspection System (IBIS) database. It is thereforeavailable to INS and U.S. Customs inspectors at U.S. ports-of-entry. There are currently approximately 80,000 U.S. and250,000 foreign lost and stolen passport entries in thedatabase.

Prior to visa issuance, visa officers check the foreignpassport numbers of all visa applicants against the CLASSlookout database. Any matching passport information isreturned to the adjudicating officer at post as a "hit" withthe namecheck results for appropriate action.The Department is preparing software and data-entry changes,now in design, that will permit checking passport inventorynumbers in addition to passport issuance numbers.Deployment is now estimated to be in the fourth quarter ofFY 2003.


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1.7. Please report on how the Department of State iscomplying with the requirement, Section 606 of the BorderSecurity Act, that State retain, for a period of sevenyears, every application of a nonimmigrant visa.We are retaining all nonimmigrant visa (NIV) applicationsfor seven years, as mandated by the Border Security Act.When local storage capacity is exceeded, our posts forwardNIV applications to our Kentucky Consular Center (KCC). Thestaff at KCC subsequently prepares the applications forstorage and ships them to the National Records Center forretention.

I I


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1.8. The Border Security Act directs the Attorney Generaland Secretary of State to issue machine-readable, tamper-resistant biometric visas by October 26, 2004. Pleaseprovide an update on the timeline for meeting this deadline.Global deployment of a program for a visa that uses abiometric identifier other than a digitized photograph(which we have already incorporated into our visa) is aformidable challenge because non-photographic biometricshave never before been used on such a scale.Section 303 of the Border Security Act calls for theSecretary of State, the Attorney General, and the NationalInstitute for Standards and Technology (NIST), actingjointly, to submit to the appropriate committees of Congressby November 10, 2002, a comprehensive report assessing theactions that will be necessary to meet this requirement.Representatives from the Department of State, the Departmentof Justice, and NIST have been meeting regularly to draftthe required comprehensive report. A draft report is nowgoing through the standard inte~agency clearance process.It will address legal, technical, and operational issuesrelated to using fingerprints and a digital photo inmachine-readable travel documents in a coordinated manner inthe visa issuance and the border inspection process.The program will entail over 7,000,000 annual biometricenrollments of visa applicants, with enrollment operationsin almost every country on earth. The draft report as itnow stands estimates that the Department, INS and the FBIwill need approximately $3.8 billion in development andrecurring costs over a four year period to collect and usebiometric data, build up appropriate lookout systems, anddevelop cross agency interoperable databases.


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1.9. Several months ago, the State Department conducted astaff briefing on Border Security Act requirements,including the biometric requirement for October 26, 2004.The State Department indicated in that briefing that "allnonimmigrant vis as incorporate a photo that can easily bematched by INS inspectors to the database record that isavailable at all ports of entry." How, in the absence ofreliable data capture by a U.S. Government entity, does theState Department assert that a non-digitized photograph usedfor nonimmigrant visas meets the biometric featuresrequirement intended by the authors of the Border SecurityAct?

The Department does not regard non-digitized photos asmeeting the intent of the Border Security Act. When weindicated in that briefing that "all nonimmigrant visasincorporate a photo that can easily be matched by INSinspectors to the database record that is available at allports of entry," we were referring to a digital imagephotograph that can be and is transmitted electronicallyfrom visa issuing posts to both State and INS, to beavailable at all ports of entry. This process becameoperational in December 2001, before the Border SecurityAct, and constitutes a breakthrough in datashare. We see itas an important step toward use of biometrics amongexecutive agencies as contemplated by the Act.This development has allowed INS inspectors to detectnumerous cases of visa fraud by comparing the personpresenting the visa, and the photo in the visa as presentedat port of entry, with the digitized photograph incorporatedinto the visa when it was issued.For most posts, electronic visa records are available from1996 to the present. Currently, the Consular ConsolidatedDatabase contains over 50,000,000 records of nonimmigrantvisa data, and approximately 16,500,000 have photographsincluded in the record.


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II.1. Why did the State Department in its written responseto the GAO about its report, after all the evidencepresented that showed that the 9/11 terrorists should nothave received visas based solely on Section 214(b) of theINA, continue to declare "based on the information availableto the interviewing consular officers, and in fact allinformation av ailable to the Department at that point, theapplicants qualified for visas"?

Clearly the applicants intended to engage in terroristactivity while in the United States. If this fact had beenknown, it would have required that their visas be denied.No one knew their intentions, however, and we cannot saythat the information available to our consular officers whenthe hijackers applied for their visas required that thevisas be denied. The officers checked the lookout system,as they were required to do, and found no "hit." Prior toSeptember 11, this left them free to issue the visa unlessthey found some other basis for denial stemming from theirown review of the case. At that time our consular officersfocused their review overwhelmingly on the prospect that theapplicant might be intending to immigrate to the USillegally for economic motivations. Section 214 (b) of theINA was and is the principal legal tool available toconsular officers to deter illegal immigration.

The basic question in the mind of a consular officerwhen evaluating a visa application where there was nolookout "hit" before 9/11 was: will the applicant travel tothe US for some legitimate purpose and return to his or herhome country at the end of that period of travel. It is inthis context that the applications of the hijackers werereviewed, coming as most of them did from Saudi Arabia, awealthy country whose citizen visitors had an exemplaryrecord of compliance with our immigration laws. WhileSection 214 (b) of the INA applies individually toparticular applicants, the circumstances of the society fromwhich they came heavily influenced its practicalapplication. A consular officer's use of the history ofimmigration compliance of the demographic is a key andlegitimate factor in assessing a visa application.

The visa applications of the hijackers should have beenproperly completed in every case. It would not necessarilybe a fatal defect, however, in a "B" visa application (i.e.a visa issued for business or pleasure) to lack specificdata about one's hotel of destination. Neither would aconsular officer necessarily refuse an application formisspellings, especially not if the applicant's native


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language uses a non-Roman script alphabet. Since we do notknow what supporting documentation was available to theconsular officer, no one is in a position to know whether ornot it would have made a difference if the applications hadall been completed properly. All we know for sure is thatthe consular officers found no lookout "hit" and thenconcluded, on the basis of the information available to themthat the applicants were not intending immigrants and thatthey qualified for visas. Much as we wish they had reacheda different result, we would be disingenuous were we to say,now, that they made an impermissible decision. We cannot andshould not seek to shift blame to them. Attempting to do sosimply distracts from the need to address the systemicweaknesses that explain why these aliens were able to obtainvisas and then enter and remain in the United States.

We particularly should not blame the consular officersfor not using Section 214(b) to deny visas in these cases.We now recognize that we have in the past allowed ourofficers to depend too heavily on the lookout system toalert them to national security cases. But as we work tostrengthen our officers' interview and other adjudicationskills to supplement the lookout system, we should not makethe mistake of turning to Section 214 (b) as anantiterrorism tool. Section 214 (b) is designed to allowconsular officers to deny visas to intending immigrantsbased on a field assessment of the applicant, withoutreferring the case to Washington. The application of 214(b)involves enormous discretion, with different officersoccasionally reaching different conclusions about the sameor similar applicants. Moreover, a 214(b) ineligibility isnot permanent -- it can be overcome by the applicant, e.g.,by returning later with new information about income orother relevant factors - nor does it bar issuance of animmigrant visa. National security issues cannot be left tothis kind of approach. If a consular officer has anysecurity concern about a case, it is imperative that thecase be referred to Washington for analysis and tracking,including lookout entry to guard against future visaapplications. The national security interests of the UnitedStates would not be well served if our consular officerswere to misread the GAO report as encouragement to useSection 214 (b) of the INA as a counter terrorism tool, andthereby to short circuit the important process ofcentralizing all cases of possible security interest inWashington, in a common database.

I S "


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II.2. The State Department instituted a 30-day name checksystem called Visas Condor in January 2002. It applies toindividuals for whom the 20-day name check is required. Canyou provide a general description of which visa applicantsare subject to the Visa s Condor check? Please provide uswith a complete list of which applicants are subject to the20-day check. To which governmental organizations (FBI,CIA) does the State Department send cables requestinginformation?Since 9-11 we have used two separate counter-terrorismmeasures. The first to be implemented was the 20-day hold.The second was Visas Condor, an interagency clearanceprocedure. (There are classified elements to both programswhich we would be pleased to brief you on at yourconvenience.)20-day hold: In November 2001, we imposed a mandatory 20-day hold on visa issuance for otherwise eligible applicantswho met certain demographic characteristics and werecitizens or natives of certain countries and territories.The demographic characteristics and list of countries areclassified. The criteria were developed by the Departmentof Justice and the Department of State. Biographic data onvisa applicants who met these criteria were submitted on adaily basis to the FBI's National Infrastructure ProtectionCenter (NIPC) for further evaluation. This was intended tobe an interim measure until we could implement improved,automated data sharing arrangements.As of July 2002, the Bureau of Consular Affairs hadsuccessfully incorporated into the consular lookout system,CLASS, over 8 million FBI records. One subset of this datais the records from the violent gangs-terrorist files of theBureau. We had also improved data share with intelligenceagencies. The TIPOFF database on terrorists and suspectedterrorists, which is linked to the CLASS lookout, hadobtained approximately 20,000 new or updated entries.Several months ago, at the request of the Department ofJustice, the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF)looked at some of the data that we had provided to the FBIthrough the 20-day hold. Reportedly FTTTF did not find anysignificant utility in this data. CA had submitted over150,000 names to NIPC through this procedure but noderogatory information that might be relevant to the visaapplication was reported to us for any of these individuals.DOJ reviewed these findings as well and agreed to the


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II.3. According to the GAO, as of August 1, 2002, theForeign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF) had identifieda total of 567 visa applicants who may pose a threat tonationa l securi ty. Of the 567 identified, 280 of them weredetermined to be ineligible by the task force based on theINA's terrorism provision. However, the State Departmentreceived the "refusal recommendation" on 200 of the 280after the 30-day Visas Condor program hold requirement hadexpired. Since the 30 days had expired, those 200individuals were given visas anyway! In a press briefing,your spokesman said that it was now the responsibility ofthe INS to find them. What is your response to this? Whatdo you know about these individuals? Were the rest of the567 applicants who were determined to be threats, accordingto the task force, turned down for visas or given visas? Doyou or the INS know where any of the 567 with approved visasare today?The Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF) originallyagreed to inform the Department of any interest in Condorcases within 30 days of receipt of a Condor clearance,having assured us that it had the capacity to review thesecases consistent with that timeline. It then failed toindicate interest in individual cases in a timely fashion,however. Nor did it inform us that it was falling behind.When we became aware of the delay in processing at FTTTF, wetook the initiative to revoke outstanding visas issued topersons in which FTTTF expressed interest after the 30 holdhad expired. We did not wait to obtain information todetermine whether the aliens are in fact ineligible, andsome of those whose visas were revoked may not beineligible. We will not know this until the interagencyconsultation process about these applications, which are onhold, is completed.Currently, the Department has hundreds of cases on holdbased on requests from the FBI, FTTTF, CIA, or otheragencies that we hold the cases while they search theirrecords for additional information. No visas are processedto conclusion when an agency requests a hold in connectionwith a particular case. It is important to remember,however, that a hold request sometimes called anobjection to issuance -- does not mean that an applicant isineligible for a visa. It simply means that there isfurther information that needs to be evaluated.So far, the Department has received no derogatoryinformation from FTTTF on the cases that it asked the


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Department to hold. When asked for information in somespecific cases being held at its request, FTTTF has clearedthe cases, indicating that it has no derogatory information.Our practice is to inform INS immediately when we revoke avisa, to ensure that the alien cannot travel on the visaeven if we are unable to recover it physically from him.(The visa is legally revoked regardless of whether we areable to physically mark it "revoked.") In addition toinforming INS officially, we enter the alien's name into thelookout system in a way that makes it accessible to INSofficers at ports of entry.


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II.4. The Visas Condor security check applies only to visasadjudicated after January 2002. The check does not apply topreviously issued visas. How is the State Departmentworking to identify still valid visitor visas (some visasare good for 10 years) of individuals who should be subjectto the Visas Condor check?We have two initiatives underway with respect to individualswho hold valid visas and may meet the criteria of the VisasCondor process.First, we match new TIPOFF entries of terrorists andsuspected terrorists against the database of issued visas.(These new entries arise because we regularly receive newlookout information from law enforcement and intelligenceagencies, as well as from overseas posts through the VisasViper program.) When we find that the subject of a newlookout entry related to terrorism holds a valid visa, theDeputy Assistant Secretary for Visa Services revokes it on aprudential basis. We provide a copy of the revocationcertificate to INS and make an additional lookout entry thatis shared with the IBIS lookout database (used by INS atports of entry) indicating that the visa has been revoked.Therefore, there are two lookout entries--one for actual orsuspected terrorist exclusions under immigration law, andone for the revocation of the visa. These entries ensurethat INS port of entry inspectors can stop the individual inquestion from entering the United States at any time in thefuture.Second, we have begun to run information in the ConsularConsolidated Database about visa holders who have thedemographic characteristics of the Visas Condor programagainst our lookout database. We are creating a projectteam to evaluate the potential "hits" of this initiative. Weare beginning with nationals of Saudi Arabia.


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11.5. According to the Justi ce Department, V isas Condorprogram namecheck provides sufficient evidence to deny avisa under the INA's terrorism provision. Justice bel iev esthat the law presumes a visa applic ant is inadmissible andplaces the burden of proof on the applicant to establish hisadmissibility. Therefore, a consular of fic er need not havespecific evidence that the applicant participated interrorist activities or associations to justify a denial.The State Department, according to the GAO report and thewritten response from the Sta te Department to the GAO, doesnot agree. Please prov ide us with an update on how ConsularAffairs plans to resolve this important national securityissue. One of the recommendations of the GAO is to"establish government-wide g uideli nes on the level ofevidence needed to deny a visa on terro rism grounds underINA section 212(a)(3)(B)." Are you going to work with theJustice Department to establish such guidelines?We are not issuing any visas when an agency has objected ina timely manner, regardless of any potential legaldisagreements between State and Justice. All such caseshave been suspended pending an evaluation of appropriatebackground information. When the objection was filed aftervisa issuance, we revoked the visa.With regard to legal issues, the Department is engaged incontinuing discussions with DOJ on this. The discussionsthus far have been at the working level, but we expect tohave a more formal exchange of views in the near future. Anumber of different legal questions are involved, as well asquestions of procedures to be followed in particular kindsof cases. We are confident that these issues can beresolved.


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II.6. According to the GAO report, the State Department'sown system TIPOFF identified 178 applicants in FY 2001 asknown or suspected terrorists, but State denied visas toonly 81 of those applicants . Please provid e us withcomprehensive information about why the rest of the visaswere issued, despite being identified in the StateDepartment's system, TIPOFF.TIPOFF was deliberately designed to be over-inclusive. Thatis, it seeks to capture a broader range of persons thanwould necessarily be found ineligible for a visa under theterrorist ineligibility of the Immigration and NationalityAct. Thus, we enter names of persons about whom we haverelatively little information, but enough to warranttracking them as suspected terrorists. By entering the namein the system, we hold in abeyance the applications of anyalien in TIPOFF while we check with relevant agencies forall information available about the alien at the time anyvisa application is filed. The resulting information isthen evaluated in light of the applicable legal standard. Bycasting a wider net through TIPOFF, we assure ourselves thatpersons potentially subject to the terrorist ineligibilitywho apply for visas will undergo a thorough review indetermining admissability.With regard to the individuals noted above who were notdenied visas, 18 withdrew or abandoned their applications.The other 79 would have been issued visas either because,after evaluating all information available at the time ofapplication, the applicants were found not to be excludableor because they were granted a waiver of ineligibility.Waivers are granted by Justice/INS upon a State or consularofficer recommendation; in terrorist cases, the granting ofa waiver generally indicates that the alien did not pose animmediate threat and that it was in the national interest toissue a visa. (We would have to do additional research toprovide more specific information about the 79 cases.)Importantly, applications adjudicated in FY 2001 (andprevious years) were adjudicated under the provisions of INA212(a)(3)(B) before it was amended by the USA Patriot Acteffective October 26, 2001. In the Patriot Act theAdministration proposed, and Congress agreed, to expand theterrorist exclusion in a number of ways that State andJustice thought important. Current applications arereviewed under section 212(a)(3)(B) as amended by thePatriot Act.


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II.7. According to the GAO, the State Department (based onthe Border Security Act's state-sponsor-of-terrorismprovision) requires personal interviews for all applicantswho are over the age of 16 and are from countries identifiedas state sponsors of terrorism. For which other countriesis the State Department requiring such interviews? Whattypes of interviews are required for individuals from SaudiArabia?As a response to the Border Security Act, the Departmentinstructed all consular officers to interview all visaapplicants over the age of 16 from state sponsors ofterrorism. The Department has otherwise instructed consularofficers to review their practices in light of presentregulation. Interviews are generally required by regulation,with certain exceptions.With regard to individuals from Saudi Arabia, Embassy Riyadhand Consulate Jeddah have required all applicants betweenthe ages of 12-70 to interview for nonimmigrant visas sinceJuly 20, 2002. Exceptions are made for applicants fordiplomatic and official visas and for limited cases ofinterest to the USG. Consular officers may waive thepersonal appearance of applicants under 12 or elderlyapplicants over 70, but these applicants can be interviewedif the consular officer has questions about theirapplications.


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II.8. What is the State Department's interview policy forindividuals who are being processed in a third country for aU.S. visa? We note that, according to the GAO report, inthe London, England, and Ottawa, Canada, office there isconcern that too many interviews are being waived based onthe department's "best practices," which allows for thewaiving of a visa application based on a belief that anapplicant will not illegally immigrate to the U.S.This issue is clearly addressed in the Department's ForeignAffairs Manual. The Department's policy on interviews ofindividuals applying for a visa in a third country in 9 FAM41.102 Note 4, "Personal Appearance Required," states:

"A personal appearance is required for applicantswho: (1) Do not reside in the consular district where heor she is making application."


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II.9. Training of Consular officers - please see question 4under Border Security Act.


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11.10. How do you plan to provide for recommended changes,or strengthening, of language capability among consularofficers at various posts around the world? For example,according to the GAO report, "Cairo reported that 90 percentof interviews are conducted in Arabic, yet most officerslack strong Arabic skills". When local staff are used tofill the language gap, how are they screened?First, we note that at the time of the GAO visit to Cairo,three of the American staff had Arabic training and did notuse translators for interview; two used translators.After September 11, 2001, the Department implemented changesto strengthen the language capability of consular officers. The Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (DRI) has been

refocused since September 11, 2001 to address increasedconsular requirements. As a result of increased fundingand increased hiring, we are better able to address theseneeds.

Full implementation of the DRI will also address thetraining needs of the department. Increasing overallemployment allows us to have enough employees to bothmeet mission requirements and send people to training.In the past year, we have used the first phase of newhiring to create more opportunities for extended languagetraining. Our goal is to fill all language-designatedpositions with fully qualified employees.

In the past year, overall language training hours rose byapproximately 20 percent. Importantly for visaoperations, the Department has increased the length ofinstruction for junior consular officers studying hardlanguages (such as Arabic) from 23 weeks to 30-36 weeks.

We have expanded programs and training opportunities toenhance language learning, hiring additional instructors,offering additional classes, providing language-continuation courses before the regular workday, sendingstudents to language immersion programs overseas, andproviding more language instruction at post.

We have begun rebuilding linguistically-skilled cadres,particularly in languages such as Arabic, Dari, Pashto,Persian/Farsi, and Tajiki (along with Chinese andRussian). These are particularly difficult languagesthat require even more study than "world languages" suchas Spanish. The resources required to increase skills inthese languages are significant. This will take a long-term commitment.

We are also in the process of exploring ways to develophighly advanced competencies in the most critical

u


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languages to better enable embassy staffs to get acrossAmerica's message, particularly through public diplomacyefforts. Furthermore, consular tradecraft elements that have beenregularly integrated into the language training are beingenhanced to include closer work with foreign language

documents and with fraud prevention. With increased resources, we have focused our efforts onbringing employees with existing language skills into theDepartment. Department recruiters are working withlanguage associations, language programs at universities,and in communities of native speakers.

We have reviewed and improved our language incentiveprogram during the last year to further encourageemployees to acquire additional language skills in"incentive languages" (such as Arabic) and to continue tomaintain and use those skills. Currently, over 400employees are receiving a bonus for serving a second tourusing an incentive language.

Regarding the screening of local staff (Foreign Service Nationalemployees), the Bureau of Diplomatic Security conducts backgroundinvestigations prior to hiring, as the host country permits. This issimilar to the full field background investigation conducted in theU.S. on applicants for the Foreign Service. Re-certifications arerequired every five years and require an update investigation. Inaddition, in Cairo, FSN interpreters are on a rotational schedule sothey do not know in advance which cases they may be translating.


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11.11. (No Question was submitted.)


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11.12. According to the GAO report, the "State Departmentplans to 1) issue new rules that will eliminate much ofthe discretion consular officers have in such things aswaiving interview of visa applicants and using travelagencies to process visa applications, 2) reduce theperiod of maximum validity of nonimmigrant visas from 10years to 5 years, and 3) redraft department guidance onwhen consular officers can issue less-than-full-validityvisas." Why haven't these changes in policy been pursuedby Consular Affairs already?As stated in our comments on the GAO draft report, theBureau of Consular Affairs is pursuing a number of policychanges that should improve the visa application process.We are continually making improvements in our visapolicies and procedures. The particular kinds of changesmentioned are ones that we are pursuing but that requireadvance resolution of a variety of legal, resource, andpolicy issues through internal and interagencycoordination processes and, in some cases, publication ofregulations.

Documents

T5 B61 Visa Policy- Kyl Fdr- 11-12-02 DOS-Kelly Response to Kyl Questions 207