T8 B6 FAA HQ Dan Noel Fdr- 4-28-04 MFR and Typed Notes 863

8/14/2019 T8 B6 FAA HQ Dan Noel Fdr- 4-28-04 MFR and Typed Notes 863

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Dan Noel, 4/28/04, Manager, Emergency Operations Staff

BackgroundNoel came to HQ, FAA, in 1988 as an Air Force liaison. He con verted to civilianposition in 1994 working in emergency procedures. In March 2000 assumed currentposition as Manager, Emergency O perations Staff. He is a rated com mercial airline pilot.Normal day prior to 9/11He had a relatively small staff, plus Washington Operations Center. Mae Avery wasmanager of the Em ergency Operations Staff. Mae Avery reported to him. Alsoresponsible for Continuity of Operations (COO P) and n ational disaster exercises.9/11He was seated in his office and got a call from one of the watch officers, probably JessieMcKie, and was told there were background possible threatening conversations heard ona flight deck. He doesn 't recall that work hijack was used. He went to WO C and saw thehole in the side of WT C One. He didn 't connect the events together at that point. Hesaw the other airplane hit the second tower. He was standing behind the O perationsofficers looking at the TV .W OC had a notification check list; Noel was on that list. His job, then, was to gathermore inform ation. Initially they didn't know w hat they had. The second impactconfirmed that they had a problem. However, he didn't equate the two incidents; perhapsthought they were two separate events. He didn 't know that there were two hijacks, onlythat there were threatening com mu nications in the cockpit.On 9/11 security was responsible for air piracy, so once the AGO watch is notified theWO C assumes a supporting role for the ACC . The ACC calls the shots, for what everpurpose the WOC activates that room .John Azzarello went over the notification list with him for air piracy events and thendiscussed the two nets, primary and tactical.The tactical net was often brought up first; that was an internal security net to bring themup to speed before they went out to external agencies. Whoever the AGO requested thatis what the WO C watch officers would do .The primary net brought in the NMC C and other interdepartmen tal entities. The primarynet could be brought up first, but that was typically not the case. A primary net, ifestablished, wo uld run separately from the tactical net and the tactical net would continueto operate


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He recalled that both nets were unclassified. They had maybe three STU Ills, perhapstw o in the ACC. H e couldn't recall if the STU's were S or TS; they were not SCI-capable. He did not recall that the NM CC called to establish a net on that day.On that day the W OC /ACC seemed to be working w ell; it was challenging trying to sortout what was real an d what was not. At one point, Monty Belger decided to initiateCO OP activities. So he was involved in establishing that capability. Mae w orked theOps C enter piece and he worked the COOP piece.H e recalled that M ike Weikert ran the ACC that day for Security. Mike ran exercises fo rSecurity. H e did not recall specifically any of the follow ing in the ACC: Longmire,Morse, Doug Davis, Griffith. He thought both nets were run from the dais and hethought that Mike Weikert operated from the dais.H e recalled learning in the aftermath that both the primary and tactical nets w ereestablished. H e recalled that someone said that NORAD was trying to place the blame.There was a question as to when FAA notified NORAD. There was an ATC in Bostonwho called NO RAD SOCC very early on. He recalled from the information that hispeople provided to Darlene Freeman's group that the tactical net was established at 0850and the prim ary net at 0920 and that the notifications were made to outside agencies atthat time.He was surprised to learn that military was not on the primary net around 1000.I took over questioning. Need to listen to tape to complete this portion of the MFR.He recalled a Sunday meeting (16 th) involving Belger an d other senior officials. He doesnot recall any spec ific tasking except at one time Belger reviewed the CO OP list withhim and shuffled it around.He does no t recall seeing the NO RAD press release or the list of military notificationsprepared by Darlene Freeman. He was shown and had never before seen the extract fromthe NEADS log.He had no perspective on notifications other than the fact that the primary net wasestablished, according to the log, at 0920 EOT.


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COMMISSION SENSITIVEMEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Dan Noel, Manager, Emergency Operations StaffType: InterviewDate: 4/28/04Prepared by: Miles KaraSpecial Access Issues: NoneTeam: 8Participants (Comm ission):Participants (non-Commission):Location: FAA HQBackgroundNoel came to HQ, FAA, in 1988 as an Air Force liaison. He converted to civilianposition in 1994 working in emergency procedures. In Ma rch 2000 assumed currentposition as Manager, Em ergency O perations Staff. He is a rated comm ercial airline pilot.Normal day prior to 9/11He had a relatively small staff, plus Washington Operations Center. Mae Avery wasmanager of the Emergency Operations Staff. Mae Avery reported to him. Also, he wasresponsible for C ontinuity of O perations (COO P) and national disaster exercises.9/11He was seated in his office and got a call from one of the watch officers, probably JessieMcKie, and was told there were background possible threatening conversations heard ona flight deck. He doesn't recall that work hijack was used. He went to WOC and saw thehole in the side of WTC One. He didn't connect the events together at that point. Hesaw the other airplane hit the second tower. He was standing behind the Operationsofficers looking at the TV .WO C had a notification check list; Noel was on that list. His job , then, was to gathermore inform ation. Initially they didn't know what they had. The second impactconfirmed that they had a problem. However, he didn't equate the two incidents; perhapsthought they were two separate events. He didn't know that there were two hijacks, onlythat there were threatening comm unications in the cockpit.

COM MISSION SENSITIVE 1


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COMMISSION SENSITIVE

On 9/11 security was responsible for air piracy, so once the AG O watch is notified theWOC assumes a supporting role for the ACC. The ACC calls the shots, for what everpurpose the W OC activates that room.John Azzarello went over the notification list with him for air piracy events and thendiscussed the two n ets, primary and tactical.The tactical net was often brought up first; that was an internal security net to bring themup to speed before they wen t out to external agencies. W hoever the AGO requested thatis what the WOC watch officers would do .The primary net brought in the NMC C and other interdepartmen tal entities. The primarynet could be brought up first, but that was typically not the case. A primary net, ifestablished, would run separately from the tactical net and the tactical net wou ld continueto operateHe recalled that both nets were unclassified. They ha d maybe three STU Ills, perhapstwo in the ACC. He couldn't recall if the STU's were S or TS; they were not SCI-capable. He did not recall that the NM CC called to establish a net on that day.On that day the W OC /AC C seemed to be working well; it was challenging trying to sortout what was real and what was not. At one point, Monty Belger decided to initiateCOOP activities. So he was involved in establishing that capability. Mae w orked theOps Center piece and he worked the CO OP piece.He recalled that Mike Weikert ran the ACC that day for Security. Mike ran exercises forSecurity. He did not recall specifically any of the following in the ACC: Longmire,Morse, Doug Davis, Griffith. He thought both nets w ere run from the dais and hethought that Mike W eikert operated from the dais.He recalled learning in the aftermath that both the primary and tactical nets wereestablished. He recalled that someone said that NO RA D was trying to place the blame.There was a question as to when FA A notified NORA D. There was an ATC in Bostonwho called NORA D SOCC very early on. He recalled from the inform ation that hispeople provided to Darlene Freeman's group that the tactical net was established at 0850an d the primary net at 0920 and that the notifications were m ade to outside agencies atthat time.He was surprised to learn that military was not on the primary net around 1000.I took over questioning. Need to listen to tape to complete this portion of the MFR.He recalled a Sunday meeting (16 th) invo lving Belger and other senior officials. He doesnot recall any specific tasking except at one time Belger reviewed the CO OP list withhim and shuffled it around.

COMMISSION SENSITIVE 2


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He does not recall seeing the NO RAD press release or the list of m ilitary notificationsprepared by Darlene Freeman. He was shown and had never before seen the extract fromthe NEADS log.He had no perspective on notifications other than the fact that the primary net w asestablished, according to the log, at 0920 EOT.


Documents

T8 B6 FAA HQ Dan Noel Fdr- 4-28-04 MFR and Typed Notes 863