Takenaka - The Japanese in Peru

8/13/2019 Takenaka - The Japanese in Peru

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The Japanese in Peru: History of Immigration, Settlement, and RacializationAuthor(s): Ayumi TakenakaReviewed work(s):Source: Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 31, No. 3, East Asian Migration to Latin America(May, 2004), pp. 77-98Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3185184.

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TheJapanese n PeruHistoryof Immigration,Settlement,and Racialization

byAyumi Takenaka

Peruvians of Japanesedescent, though constitutingonly 0.3 percentofPeru'spopulation,were broughtto the world's attentionby the election ofAlbertoFujimori,the son of Japanese mmigrants,as president,andtodaythey arearguablyone of the country'smost influentialethnic communitiesbotheconomicallyandpolitically.While well integratednto Peruviansoci-ety,theyremainaracial/ethnicminorityandaclose-knitcommunity.Promi-nent butclosed, the Japanese-Peruvian ommunityhas evolved through heprocessesof immigration, ettlement,andracialization verthepastcentury.At the end of the nineteenthcenturyin Japan,the rumorspreadthat acountrycalled Peru somewhereon theoppositesideof the earthwas full ofgold. This country,moreover,was a paradisewith a mildclimate,rich soilfor farming,familiardietarycustoms, and no epidemics, accordingto theadvertisementsof Japanese emigration companies (Konno and Fujisaki,1984). A Japanese mmigrant n Peru,now in her late 80s, told me, Icamehere becauseI heard herewasgold and no snow in thiscountry. Another, nhis 90s, said that he had followed his uncle to Peru because I wanted tobecome a farmer.Owning land was my dream. With various dreams inmind,some 790 Japanese,all men betweenthe ages of 20 and45, left Japanin 1898to work on Peru'scoastalplantationsas contract aborers.Theirpur-pose was simple:to earn and save moneyfor thereturnhomeupontermina-tionof their our-year ontracts.The25-yen monthlysalaryon Peru'splanta-tions was more thandouble theaveragesalary n ruralJapan Suzuki, 1992).Infouryears'time, then,theyexpectedtheirsavingstoamount o860 yen.The historythatfollowed is one of miseryandhardship.Japanese mmi-grationwas simultaneouslya form of exclusion from Japan.Ratherthanbeing simply voluntary abormigration orhigherwages, it was shapedby aAyumiTakenakas anassistantprofessorof sociology atBrynMawrCollege.Theresearch on-ducted orthispaperwasfundedbythe Research nstituteortheStudyof Man,theToyotaFoun-dation,and theMatsushita nternational oundation.The authorgratefullyacknowledgestheirsupport.LATINAMERICANPERSPECTIVES, ssue 136, Vol.31 No. 3, May2004 77-98DOI: 10.1177/0094582X04264745? 2004 LatinAmericanPerspectives

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78 LATINAMERICANPERSPECTIVES

broader nternational ontext in which the sending country(Japan)and thereceivingcountry(Peru)in addition to a thirdcountry(the United States)playeda role. This article examines this context.

EMIGRATION FROM JAPANWHY DID THEY EMIGRATE?

Japaneseemigrationto Peru was initially encouraged by the Japanesegovernment.As soonastheMeijigovernment 1868-1911) hadreplaced heclosed Tokugawa egime(1600-1868), Japanbeganto look outward,partic-ularlyto the West.Emigrationbegan n 1868as a form of contractmigrationto Hawaii under direct state sponsorship.Between 1868 and 1942, over776,000 Japaneseemigrated,primarily o NorthAmerica(48.2 percent)andSouth America(31.6 percent)(JICA, 1994).Manyof them were sentby thegovernment, itherdirectlyorindirectly,orby private migrationcompaniesworkingin close cooperationwith the government.To encourage emigra-tion, the government provided subsidies for emigrantsand establishedanumberof institutions: he Social Affairs Bureau(1921) within the HomeMinistryin 1921, the Ministryof Overseas Affairs (Takumusho) n 1929,the EmigrationCenterin 1927, and the EmigrationCooperativeSocieties(KaigaiIjuKumiai) n 1927 (Tigner,1981).Emigrationwasencouraged,aboveall,as awayto controlJapan's apidlygrowing population Idei, 1930; Yoshida, 1909;Ministryof ForeignAffairs,1949; 1971). Althoughthepopulationstayedstable at about30 million dur-ing theTokugawaperiod,it reached38 million in 1888, 56 millionin 1920,and 79 millionin 1947,accompaniedby rapid ndustrialdevelopment Min-istry of ForeignAffairs, 1958). In hindsight,however,emigrationdid notsolve Japan's populationproblem (Crocker,1931); the approximately1millionemigrants ent abroadover 80 yearsconstitutedmerely2.5 percentofJapan'spopulationgrowthduring heperiod,anegligiblerate ncomparisonwith thecomparable iguresforEngland 74.2 percent),Italy(46.8 percent),andGermany 14.6 percent) Wakatsuki ndSuzuki,1975).Moreover,whileemigrationwas being encouraged,there was an influx of laborersfromJapan'snewly acquiredoverseascolonies.Amongthem were770,000 Kore-ansbrought ntoJapanbetween 1917 and 1927to meet thegrowingdemandfor manual laborers(though 570,000 Koreans also left Japan duringtheperiod)(Idei, 1930).Emigrationwas more thana means of population eduction;nfact,itwasan importantpartof the Meiji government'spolicy of industrialization nd


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Takenaka THEJAPANESE N PERU 79

Westernization.The governmentviewed emigrationas a vital tool for gain-ing economic benefits, particularlyas a means to increasecapital by wayof remittances(Ministryof ForeignAffairs, 1971; Wakatsukiand Suzuki,1975).Although he totalnumberof emigrants emained mall,theeconomicrole of emigrationwas significant.In 1933, remittances ent to Japan 98.6millionyen) constitutedas much as 10percentof Japan's otal tradesurplus(Suzuki, 1992), and the Japanese immigrants n Brazil alone broughtinUS$3.8 million by travelingback to Japan(Wakatsukiand Suzuki, 1975).The governmentenvisioned emigrantsas promotingbilateralties, therebystimulatingtrade, tourism, and other commercial activities and helpingsecure resources and territorial xpansion abroad(Wakatsukiand Suzuki,1975;NihonKaigaiKyokai,1950).Citingthe colonialhistoryof prosperousEuropean ountries,Japanese tatesmenand scholarsoftenstressed hatemi-grationand territorial xpansionwere criticalto theprosperityof theJapa-nese race (Jiho Shinpo,January4, 1896, cited in Wakatsuki,1987). In his1906 essay JapaneseColonialism (Nihon Shokumin-ron),MironuTogoasserted he importanceof Japan'sdutyto expandabroadas the only Asiancountrycapableof becominga colonialpower(Kumei, 1995),andaccordingto ShigenobuOkuma n TheExpansionof the Yamato Japanese)Race andColonial Projects (1908), the most urgent task is to send emigrants(shokumin) .. under the banner of the rising sun (quotedin Wakatsuki,1987: 195). Emigrationwas correlatedwith colonialism: Sendmillions ofJapanese migrants o California o constructNewJapan nd Builda coun-tryfor the Japaneseracein the Rockies (quotedin Wakatsuki,1987: 192).Indeed, the terms emigrants (imin)' and colonists (shokumin orkaitakumin)werefrequentlyusedinterchangeably rcombined(ishokumin)untilwell intothe 1930s. Emigrationassumed a particularly trongnationalcharacterduring he 1910sand1920,whenmigratory lows were directed oless desirablecountries(e.g., SouthAmerica)afterJapanese mmigration othe United States ended andemigrationwas promoted n the name of thenation.

Finally,emigrationwas regardedas a way of dealingwith the problemof poorfarmers.The transformation f traditional griculturebroughtaboutby industrialization,oupledwith themonetarypolicyfailureof 1881, left asmanyas 1 millionpeasanthouseholds out of work(Wakatsuki ndSuzuki,1975; Tsuchida,1998).Emigration,asthegovernmentviewedit,wouldpro-vide those excess farmerswithjob opportunities Idei, 1930) and civilizethose low-class citizens by providingthem with the opportunity o acquireadvancedWesternlabor discipline and ethics (quoted in WakatsukiandSuzuki, 1975:75). Eliminating hose low-classlaborers would benefit thecountry,since theirpoverty would pose a national threat Muto, 1963,


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quotedin Wakatsuki,1987: 177). Thus,anemigrationpolicy officially pro-mulgated o controlpopulationgrowthwas a vitalpartof Japan's modern-ization policy.WHO WASTHE EMIGRANT?

Throughout hehistoryof Japaneseemigration,emigrantssharedseveralcharacteristics.Demographically,heywerelargelymalesbetween the agesof 20 and45, a population argetedbothby employers(e.g., plantationown-ers) and by Japaneseemigrationcompanies.Many were second and latersons, often lacking the right to inheritfamily properties(WakatsukiandSuzuki, 1975). Because of primogenitureand ancestorworship,the eldestson usuallybecame successorof the household,daughtersmarriedwithoutsharing heinheritance,andyoungersons, single ormarried,migrated o thecity and sometimesabroadwhile still young (Maeyama,1994).Regionally,emigrantscame from the relativelypoor andpredominantlyagricultural outhwesternpartsof Japan.The majority,or 99 percent,werefarmers Ministryof ForeignAffairs, 1958) andpoorwithout much formaleducationor training Wakatsuki ndSuzuki, 1975;Irie, 1951). Among thepre-WorldWarII emigrants,almost half originatedfromjust four prefec-tures-Hiroshima, Okinawa,Kumamoto,and Fukuoka(JICA, 1994). Onereasonfor thisregionalconcentrationwas economic;rapid ndustrializationworsenedthe alreadyovercrowded onditionsof manysmall-scalefarmers,particularlyn poorerrural areas.Another factorwas the long traditionofemigration hatprevailedn thesepoorerruralareas,withyearsof experiencein sendingemigrants o thecityorabroad Wakatsuki ndSuzuki,1975).Theestablishmentof networks hroughprioremigrationwas also crucial,asper-sonal networksreduced he costs associatedwith movementsand settlement(NihonKaigai Kyokai,1950;MasseyandGarcia,1987).InPeru, nparticu-lar, these personalnetworksplayed an importantrole. After the Peruviangovernmentprohibitednew wavesof Japanese mmigrantsn 1927, theonlyway Japanesecouldimmigrate o Peruwas by invitationof familymembersalreadyresidentin the country.Finally,regionalconcentrationwas also aresult of recruitmentpolicy;boththe Japanesegovernmentand the emigra-tioncompaniestriedto recruitworkers romcertainprefecturesandvillagesto reduce the cost of recruitmentand ease the emigrants'adaptation o thehost country(Kodama,1989).Okinawa, n particular,was an important endingprefecture hroughoutJapanese migrationhistory.Oftheemigrantswho leftprior o 1926, 11per-cent were from Okinawa,and this proportion ncreased to 15 percentbe-tween 1926and 1941(JICA, 1994).Okinawawas and still is Japan'spoorest


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Takenaka THE JAPANESE N PERU 81

prefecture,andits weak economy and shortageof revenues made it depen-denton the centralgovernmentas apermanentburdenon the national rea-sury (Kerr,1959: 402). Emigration,encouragedby the Okinawanprefec-turalgovernment,quicklybecame a way of copingwith this situation.Afterthedecline of sugarpricesin the 1920s (ablow to Okinawa'svitalindustry),emigration lows accelerated o both mainlandJapanandabroad,primarilyto Hawaii,the UnitedStates, Brazil,and Peru(Tomiyama,1990).Because of the way it was induced,emigrationcame to carrya negativeconnotation ortheJapanesepublic. Emigrationwasaform of exclusion,andemigrantswere considered abandoned eople (kimin) pushedout by thegovernmentto feed the rest of the population.This image persists eventoday.2 Kiminalso refers to social outcasts and lower-classpeople ingeneral,such as day laborersanduntouchables.)The chasmbetweenJapa-nese immigrant(emigrant)communities and more recent arrivals fromJapan, uchasbusinessmen,students,and otherprofessionals, s alsoindica-tive of this statusdifference.

IMMIGRATION TO PERU:CONTEXT OF INCORPORATIONPeruemergedas adestinationas aresultof yet another orm of exclusion.Althoughthe United Stateswas not directlyinvolvedin Japanese mmigra-tion to Peru, t nonethelessplayedan influentialrole in inducingthismigra-tion by shutting ts doors to Japanese mmigrationby a 1907 gentlemen'sagreement. Priorto the agreement, he United States and Hawaii had been

the primarydestinations for Japaneseemigrationand had been preferredbecause of theirhigher wages. Denied access to these traditionaland moreprofitabledestinations,Japaneseemigrationcompanieshad to seek others,andsubsequentmigratory lows were directedto South America.Japaneseemigrationto SouthAmerica,reachingits peak in the 1910s, was directlycorrelatedwithdiminishingflows to North America.Peru was the first South Americancountryto receive Japaneseimmi-grants.Thecontract aboragreementwas a resultof thediplomaticrelation-ship established with Peruin 1873 (the first between Japanandany SouthAmerican country) and of the personal relationship between AugustoLeguia,the managerof a sugar manufacturing ompanyandlaterpresidentof Peru,and TeikichiTanaka,anemigrationagentfor the MoriokaEmigra-tion Company (Gardiner,1975; Normano and Gerbi, 1943). High labordemandfor plantationsalso contributed o the initiationof Japanese mmi-grationto Peru(see Fig. 1).


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Year

Figure 1. Japanese Emigration o PeruIn the late nineteenthcentury,after the Pacific War with Chile (1879-1883),Peruenteredaphaseof rapideconomicgrowthas a resultof economicexpansion nWesternEuropeandthesubsequentncrease n demand orrawmaterials.The rushof European apitalbrought he agriculturalevolutiontothe Peruvian oast(Fukumoto,1997).Productionof cotton ncreased rom

less than5,000 tons in 1891 to 24,000 tons in 1913 (MasudaandYanagida,1999). Exportsof agriculturalproducts,particularlyof sugarcane,cotton,and guano, also increased-from 14,000 soles in 1900-1904 to 150,000soles in 1940-1943 (Fukumoto,1997).Thisrequiredarmiesof cheaplabor,but it poseda problem.Peru'splantationshadlong dependedon slavelabor,butslaverywas abolishedin 1854. The coolie trade,which broughtover87,000 Chinese indenturedaborers,was abolishedin 1874. An alternativewas to bring indigenous populationsfrom Peru's interior,but this failedbecauseof peasants'attachment o their ands and theextremelyharsh aborconditions(Normanoand Gerbi, 1943; Masuda and Yanagida,1999). Theotheralternativewas to rely on immigration.The Peruvian tate,dominatedbypeopleof Europeandescent,hadalwaysconsideredEuropean immigrationdesirable.In 1892, one statesmanob-served hat twasnecessary o improve urrace byincorporatingEuropeanimmigrants; ndians, blacks, and Asians were considered inferiorraces

0 Illlf I II I IIIIIII III II III II II III III III I In- I III II III II Ifiil Irl II IIn009?bb ~lxq:) ~ ?09?9ro9 9?9 3?962x(b 9,x? ~ rte: 3 5 q:b 0 Co

K,,< ,


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TakenakaTHEJAPANESENPERU 83

(Fukumoto,1997). Since achieving its independencein 1821 throughtheefforts of criollos (SouthAmerican-borndescendantsof Europeans),Peruhas beenpracticallydominatedby whitesconstitutingroughly10percentofthepopulation; he majorityof the indigenous population 47 percentof thepopulationtoday), the mestizos (40 percent),and the small populationofAsians and blacks(3 percent)were notpartof the independencemovementand always fell below whites in Peru's racialhierarchy.This hierarchyhasremained undamentallyunchanged o this day.In an attempt o attractEuropean mmigrants, he Peruviangovernmentimplementedvarious laws to give them incentives;the whitepreferencelaws of 1873 and 1906 subsidizedEuropeanand U.S. immigrantsexclu-sively, and special labor recruitmentprograms argetedthe Irish(in 1851)andtheSpanish in 1860) (Suzuki,1992;Vasquez,1970).Yet,becauseEuro-peans often preferred o immigrateto other countries such as Argentina,Chile, and Brazil, these efforts largely failed. Relative to these countries,Peru was politicallyunstablebecauseof its long historyof militaryregimesand was consideredeconomicallyundesirable,with lower standardsof liv-ing. The economic andpoliticaldominanceof the latifundistasalso posedobstaclesforimmigrants,eavingthem ittleopportunityo cultivateandownland (Vasquez,1970). In fact, severalEuropeangovernments,notablythatof Italy, stronglyadvised their citizens against emigratingto Peru(Tigner,1978).Faced with the nationalcrisisof laborshortages, he Peruviangovern-ment,underpressure romplantationowners,turned tseyes to the Orient.Itreluctantly acknowledgedthe need to allow Japaneseimmigration, hop-ing that this would encourage European immigration.The TokyoKeizaiShimbun quoted n Rippy, 1949:52) describedthe situationas follows:Thegovernmentf Peruwelcomeswhiteworkers nd s notanytoo fondofyellow aborers, utbusinessnthiscountrys notsufficiently evelopedoappealo white abor.twill,therefore,eobligedodepend ponFarEasternimmigrants.If the JapaneseMinister of Foreign Affairs and the emigrationcompaniesut orth lltheir fforts,hiscountry illbecome secondHawaii.Perudidnot become a secondHawaii,butit nonetheless ed thewayby redi-recting Japanese mmigration lows from North America to the South.Japanese mmigrantsn Peruwereincorporated s indentured aborers nits transition rom a slave economy to capitalism.During roughlythe sameperiod,IndianandChinese ndentured aborersweresimilarlysubstitutedorAfrican slaves in theAmericas; his succession,VanderVeer(1995) argues,was effective inundercuttingAfricanworkers'abilitytobargain.As did theirAfrican and Chinesepredecessors n Peru,Japanese mmigrants esponded


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to the harshworkingconditions anddiscriminatoryreatment n theplanta-tionsby rebelling,protesting,andrunningaway,andmanyof themeven diedthere.Even afterslaveryand the coolie tradeofficially ended, colonial-styleworkrelationspersisted n Peruwell into the latetwentiethcentury.Theplantationowners,mostlyItalians,English,orPeruviansof Europeanances-try, generallymistreatedJapanese mmigrants,whippingthemoccasionally,delaying payments, and violating other conditions stipulated in theircontracts Irie, 1951).Contraryo what thejob advertisements tated,work conditions were soharsh, he climateanddietaryconditionsso different,andtropicaldiseases soprevalent hat 150 out of 790 immigrants n the firstgroup perished n epi-demics before theirfour-yearcontractsexpired(Irie, 1951). Onone planta-tion, CasaBlanca,only 30 out of 226 Japanese mmigrantswere fit to workafter hreemonths PeruShimpo,1975).By 1909the death oll had ncreasedto 7.6 percent,or 481 out of 6,292 migrantswho were sent by emigrationcompanies(Irie, 1951). Manyothersfell sick andfled theplantations.Evenastheyacknowledged heseproblems,emigration ompanies ailed to stepinand, in fact, continuedto send emigrantsto Peru(Wakatsukiand Suzuki,1975).Upon fleeing orterminatingheircontracts, hemajoritydid not return oJapandespite theirintentions;within the first ten years afterimmigration,just 6 percentreturnedhome, having been unable to save enough money(Peru Shimpo, 1975). Another4 percent left for other countries such asBolivia, Argentina,Mexico, and the United States (Peru Shimpo, 1975).Some remained n Peru'sruralareas.Yet,farmingopportunities eyondcon-tractplantationwork were limited for Japanese immigrants,arable landsbelonged to the colonists, and the preestablishedSpanish-controlledandsystemdeniedJapaneseaccessto new lands.The decreeof May 1910clearlystipulated hat thecolonists in the Sierramountain egioncanonly be Peru-vians or Europeans Gardiner,1975). Consequently, he majorityof Japa-nese immigrantsheaded for urbancenters such as Lima and its neighboringport city,Callao.

SETTLEMENT IN PERU:RACIAL DISCRIMINATIONSOJOURNING AS URBAN MIDDLEMAN MERCHANTS

In 1909,tenyearsafter he initial mmigration,herewere493 JapanesenLima (Fukumoto, 1997). Upon arriving n cities with little capital,limited


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commandof the language,andfew personalcontacts,Japanese mmigrantsbecame street vendors or domestic servants.Majorindustrieswere domi-natedby Europeansand Peruviansof Europeandescent,becausethe Peru-vian government permittedonly Europeansto develop them (Vasquez,1970).Theimmigrants bserved heprevalenceof foreign-ownedstores,andas they amassedcapitaltheyestablishedtheir own.The host society's efforts to undermine mmigrants'economic activitiesoften resulted ntheirconcentrationn certainoccupations Bonacich,1973).Justas Japanese mmigrants n San Franciscoand Buenos Aires were con-centratedn thelaundrybusiness,so inLimatheystartedout as barbers.Bar-ber shops requiredrelativelylittle capitaland skills and thus wereeasy forimmigrants o start.The first Japanese-ownedbarbershop was opened in1904, and within two years the numberhadjumped to 15 (PeruShimpo,1975). After the JapaneseBarbers'Association was established n 1907 asthe first formalJapaneseassociation,the numberof Japanese-ownedbarbershopsfurtherncreased. n 1914,80 outof the 110 barber hopsin Limawereownedby Japanese 72.7 percent),andby 1924 theirsharehad increased o73.9 percent(130 out of 176) (PeruShimpo, 1975; Irie, 1951).

Gradually, apanese mmigrants xpanded heirbusinessesto otherareas,notablysmallgrocerystores,clothingstores,andrestaurants,ndestablishedtheirstatusas a successfulmiddlemanminority Gardiner, 975).In 1930,45 percentof Japanese mmigrantswereownersof smallbusinesses,mostlyin food-relatedenterprises 60 percent)such as grocerystores(20 percent)and cafds (11 percent),followed by barbershops (9 percent). They sooncame to dominatecertainsectors;by the late 1930s, threeout of everyfoursmallcoffee, candy,or refreshment hopswere runby theJapanese Alegriaand Saco, 1942). Almost a quarterof the mechanical,watchmaking,andrepairshopsin Lima wereJapanese,as were42 out of 53 machineshops,92out of 192restaurants, nd78 out of 114 bakeries Morimoto,1992).Amongpublic marketvendors and streetpeddlers,Japaneserepresentedsome 20percentof the total,while Peruviansconstituted55 percentand Chinese 12percent(NormanoandGerbi,1943).Thishighconcentration n small businessesreflected,apart rom a lackofalternatives,heimmigrants'desireto save as muchmoneyaspossiblebeforereturninghome. Unlike an industrialplant,a small businesscan be liquidatedeasily. Anotherreasonfor their success as merchantswas the immigrants'sojourningmentality.First, tencouraged hem to be thrifty, elyingoncheapor nonwage family labor(Bonacich, 1973). Their limited contact with theoutside worldhelpedthem to save instead of spending moneyon social andculturalactivities,andmostof themused theirstoresforliving quartersPeruShimpo, 1975). Second,it helpedcultivatea sense of ethnicsolidarity, ince


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theyhad little reason to assimilate,and this solidarityprovedconvenient ortheirbusinesses.In addition o theavailabilityof cheaplabor, heireconomicties with Japanpermittedaccess to Japaneseproducersof low-cost goods(Tigner,1978), and numerous ethnic associationshelpedtheirbusinessesflourish.Above all, tanomoshigroups,smallrotating-credit nions,playedakey role in financingandexpanding heir businesses(Morimoto, 1979). By1915 there were over40 suchgroups,some of which latergrewinto formalfinancial institutions,immigrantsoften being unfamiliarwith and deniedaccess to Peruvianbanks.Thesetrust-based roupshelpedfoster communalsolidarityand a sense of ethnicidentityand continued o be importanthalf acenturylater,when Japanese-Peruvians,or the most part,still engaged insmall businesses.The immigrants'ethnic solidaritywas furtherreinforcedby increasinghostilityfrom the outsideworld.Middlemanminorities hroughouthe worldface increasing discriminationas they become economically successful(Zenner,1991),anddiscrimination,n turn,reinforces heirsojourningmen-tality.This dilemma ies in the natureof beingmiddlemen,who feel alienintheverycountrywheretheyexerteconomic influence(Bonacich, 1973). Asresentmentagainstthem grew,it took on a racial tone. The Japanesemer-chantscame to be known as chinos de la esquina(street-corer Chinese)andbeganto face animosityfrom the host society.BECOMING A RACIAL MINORITY

The Japanese mmigrants' uccess led to their racialization, hich, inturn,accelerateddiscrimination.Theanti-Japanesemovementproducedvar-iousdiscriminatorymeasuresagainst mmigrantsandeventuallyexploded nthe racial riot of 1940.

Exclusionarymeasures. Resentmentagainst the Japanesefirst surgedamongPeruvianworkers. n 1917,Lima'scentral aborunionestablished heAnti-Asian Association and appealedto the presidentto abolish yellowimmigration hrough ts newspaperLa Hoja Amarilla(The Yellow Page)(Suzuki,1992).A series of discriminatorymeasures ollowed,mostlyaimedat curtailing urtherJapanese mmigration.The first such measure was theabolition of contractmigration n 1923. Thepretext or this was that a largenumberof Japanese mmigrantshad fled the plantations,but the truthwasthatdemand orplantationaborhad declined(PeruShimpo,1975).Theendof contractmigrationmade futureJapanese mmigrationpossible only byinvitationby family membersalreadyresidingin Peru. A 1936 decreere-strictedJapanesereentryinto Peru (Peru Shimpo, 1975) and practically


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haltedJapanese mmigrationby limitingthenumberof qualified mmigrantsto 16,000 per nation (the numberof Japanesein the country-20,385 in1930-already exceeded the quota)and forbidding mmigrationof racialgroups. Although his termwasleftundefined, tclearlytargetedAsiaticandparticularly apanese mmigrants PeruShimpo, 1975;Tigner,1978). (Chi-nese immigrationwassimilarlyrestricted; 1909agreementimitedChineseimmigration o families of those resident n Peru,and two additionalproto-cols [in 1932and1934]brought t to halt[Tigner,1978].Also, between 1923and 1944, regulationswere imposed on Chinese emigrationand reentry[Wong,1994].)Legalrestrictions xtendedto the realm of citizenshipeven amongPeru-vian-bor children(thus Peruviancitizens) of Japanese immigrants.Oneyear afterthe 1936 immigration aw was introduced, he Peruviangovern-ment addedanotherrestrictiveclause, prohibitingregistrationof any alienoffspringborn n Peruprior o 1936(Barnhart, 962;Suzuki,1992).Thereaf-ter,Japanesewho had notregistered he birthsof their childrenbefore 1936were unableto do so. Not having proofof birth n Peruimplieda denialofPeruviancitizenship.Moreover,a 1940 actintroduced urther estrictionson

citizenship:second-generation mmigrantswho left Perufor theirparents'homelandto live, study,or undergo militarytrainingduringtheirminorityautomatically ost their Peruviancitizenship. (This clause appliedonly topersonsbornin Peruof foreignersfrom us sanguinis [blood-basedcitizen-ship] countriessuch as Japan[Barnhart,1962].) Althoughthe word Japa-nese nowhereappeared, hese measuresimplicitly targetedthe Japanese.ThatJapanese mmigrantsoccasionallysenttheir children o Japan ortheireducation was viewed as an act of betrayaland a sign of anti-Peruvianmilitancy.Discriminatorymeasures also restrictedeconomic activities. AlthoughtheJapanesewerenot the sole target, hesemeasureswereimplicitlyaimedatbreakingthe Japanese monopoly over variousretail businesses in Lima(NormanoandGerbi,1943). The most notoriouswas the 80 PercentLawof 1932, which required hat at least 80 percentof the employees in everybusinessenterprisebe Peruvian.The 1936decree further estricted apanesebusinessesby making t illegalto transferbusinessownership PeruShimpo,1975). In addition,the Japanese-PeruvianCommerceTreatyof 1928 wasannulled n 1934, andimportsof Japanese extiles wereregulated NormanoandGerbi,1943). Fundsin the hands of Japanesewere frozen,while someJapanese-ownedshops were expropriatedand Japanese-heldland leaseswere transferredo native Peruvians Titiev,1951).Hostilitieseventuallyextended into the realm of culture, with resent-mentbeingtranslatedntothe attachmento theJapaneseof negativecultural


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attributes.The Japanese, t was argued,were well suited to hardplantationworkbecause,like all Asian mmigrants, heywere accustomed oworkingas semislaves(Vasquez,1970). Since their standard f living was as low asthatof highlandIndians Beals, 1935), theywere happywith thelittletheygot (Vasquez,1970:82). As Japanese mmigrantsbecamesuccessful mid-dlemanmerchants, heir success was attributed o their cunning, shrewd-ness, and stinginess. La Cronica,an anti-Japanesenewspaper,remarkedin 1937: Theyare dishonest and aggressivewhen it comes to money andthey break laws. So, there is no way we can compete with Japanesemer-chants (quotedin PeruShimpo, 1975: 107). Alegriaand Saco (1942: 83)argued n a foreign policy journalthatstinginesswas the secret of Japanesesuccess: Theynevergo out to shows or events.Any clothingwill do if it isclean.Their lives are dedicated o their work. The formersenatorand anti-JapaneseadvocateSeoane(1943) alsoexplained hat heJapanesewere suc-cessful because Japanese arbers ivedfrugally,paidlittlerent,andchargedless for a haircutthan the Peruvian. Such negativeculturalcharacteristicswere noted not only by Peruvianauthoritiesbut also by journalistsand(pseudo-)historians Nakamoto,1988).

Since the Japanesewere racially and culturally ifferent,they werenaturally nfit to adaptto Peruviansociety: so went the argument n thelower house for the 1903JapaneseExclusion Act. Pointingto thehigh Japa-nese death toll on the plantations,Peruvianofficials concluded that theycould not adaptto Peruand thereforeshould return o Japan mmediately(Suzuki, 1992). In explaining theAsiatic laborproblem n the context ofincreasingJapanese mmigration o Peru,a congressmanexplicitlyreferredto theJapaneseas an alien racedissimilar n habits, morals,andprocessofthought (in the American Review of Reviews, 1907: 622-623). Seoane(1943: 675) also pointedto the Japanese's obscureculturalpractices, de-scribing hetanomoshias astrangeprocedure o obtaincapital andpicturebridesas strangeJapanesemarriagepractices. He went on: Whenthereare no marriageable apanesewomen available,young Japanesebachelorsfind theirwives through'sweet-heartships' which bring Japanesegirls ingroupsof 50 to 100 who smilingly greettheirhusbandseven withouthavingmet thembefore (674).Such culturalcharacteristicswere describedas notonly negativeand dif-ferentbut also dangerousandthreatening.First, t was suggestedthat ratherthancontributingo thePeruvianeconomy,the Japanesedrainedresources.According o a Peruvian tatesman, hey earn, ave,and sendmoneyhome(AlegriaandSaco, 1942).Comparedwith the Anglo-Saxonpowers refer-ring to white Europeans n general)who sent immense capitalto Peru todevelop mines and factories, the Japanese solely sent labor,not capital


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TakenakaTHEJAPANESENPERU 89

(Alegria and Saco, 1942). UnlikeAnglo-Saxon immigrants,not a singleJapanesenamehasendeared tself to Peruviannational eeling andnotaJap-anese is knownbutfor his mercantileactivities NormanoandGerbi,1943).Second, it was arguedthat the Japaneseposed a threatto the Peruvianeconomy. This view became widespread especially in the 1930s after LaPrensa waged a fierce campaign against Japaneseinfiltration Gerbi,1943; Suzuki, 1992). Duringthe campaign,one editor of the paper nsistedthat the foods and drinkssold by theJapanesewerepoisonous.Nationalismwas mobilizedagainst hisalleged danger;white Peruviansmade statementssuch as Eventhe manufacturing f chicha,anexclusivelynationaldrinkofPeru, s now in the handsof theJapanese Zegarra1941,quoted n NormanoandGerbi,1943:99).Third, t was asserted hattheJapaneseposed a threat o Peru'sracialandnational ntegration.Accordingto formerForeignMinisterUlloa, Asiaticswere unsuited o this European ountryand a menace o the racialhomogeneityof thePeruvianpeople (NormanoandGerbi,1943: 114)eventhoughdescendantsof Europeanswereclearlya numericalminority.More-over,since theydid not assimilatequicklyintoPeru'sEuropeanculture, heJapanesewereconsidereda cultural hreat. Unlikewell-assimilated talians,Japanesedid not speakSpanishorpracticeCatholicism LaPrensa,quotedin Normano and Gerbi, 1943: 122). They did not even attempt o becomeintegrated nto Peruviansociety; they participatedn rotating-credit nionsinstead of depositingtheirsavingsin Peruvianbanks,and not a single Japa-nese was listed among the foreign borrowersfrom the Banco Industrial,the majorPeruvianbank,in 1941 (cited in Titiev, 1951; Seoane, 1943). LaPrensa(quoted nAlegriaandSaco, 1942:84) also criticized heJapanese ortheir closed and secretive community:

In theJapaneseschools in Lima,the child is taught hathis primaryallegianceis toJapan. heseboysspeak apaneseetter hanSpanishnd eelthemselvesbound n nowayto thecountry f theirbirth.TheJapaneselagwaves ntheschoolbelow theEmperor'sortrait. heJapanesechoolsarealwayssur-rounded yhighwalls hatpreventhepasser-byrom eeingwithin.It was argued,moreover, hat students n Japaneseschools sworeallegianceto EmperorHirohitoevery day (Ulloa, cited in Normano andGerbi, 1943:123)and thattheonly social activitiestheyengagedin were themeetingsoftheirJapanesesocieties and for their nationalfestivity, the birthdayof theEmperor AlegriaandSaco, 1942: 83).Japanese endogamy further stirredcriticism. Unlike the Chinese, whocameto Peru withoutwives and mingled reelywithnatives, heJapanese


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were overwhelminglyendogamous(Normanoand Gerbi, 1943). Peruvianmarriage ecordsfor 1939 show thatJapanesewere the only nationalgroupthatregisteredmoreendogamousmarriages hanmixedmarriages o nativePeruvians.Accordingto Normanoand Gerbi(1943), only 79 Chinese chil-dren werebornof Chineseparents,as against268 bornof a Chinese fatherand a Peruvianmother.In contrast,out of 25 marriages nvolvingJapanesemen, 6 were to Japanesewomenand 19 were to Peruvian-bornapanese.Althoughthevalidityof thesefigureswasquestionable, incemostJapanesewerereluctant o register heirmarriageswith the Peruvianauthorities, heirratesof endogamywereneverthelesshighenoughto be criticizedas a signofdisloyalty o Peru.In part,Japanese mmigrants' esistanceto assimilationwas due to theirsojourningorientation; ince they plannedto return o Japan, heyhad littlereason odevelop lastingrelationshipswith membersof thesurrounding ostsociety (Bonacich,1973).Also, it was a form of self-defensein a hostileen-vironment (Nakamoto, 1988). One reason Japanese immigrantsbecamesmall-businessowners was that institutionalbarriersprevented hem fromestablishing argebusinesses andengagingin agriculture n their own land.

Similarly,the Japanesehad to constructtheir own school in Lima becausetherewere too few schools to accommodateevenPeruviannationals Titiev,1951). Regardless of their motivations,however, Japaneseresistance toassimilationresulted nreinforcing heanti-Japanesemovement n Peru.Thecycle was self-perpetuating; ttachment o the homeland was enhancedbyhost hostility and at the same time increased host hostility by being inter-pretedas a sign of disloyalty(Bonacich, 1973).Discrimination in context. The series of anti-Japanesemeasuresjustdescribedemergedatatimeof agrowingJapanesepresence n termsof bothdemographicandeconomicinfluence.Between 1918 and1930theJapanesepopulation n Perugrewfrom9,890 to 20,385, fasterthananyotherforeigngroup(PeruShimpo, 1975). By 1925 the Japanesehad become the largestforeign group nPeru,surpassing he ChineseandtheItalians,who had beenpartiallyabsorbed hrough ntermarriageGerbi, 1943). Theirpresencewasparticularlynoticeablebecauseof theirhigh concentrationn cities; 87 per-cent were concentratedn Lima,constituting32 percentof all foreignresi-dents in the metropolitanarea (Peru Shimpo, 1975). Perceivingthis as athreat,nativewhitePeruvians requently xaggeratedhe size of theJapanesepopulation.Although the 1940 census counted 25,000 Japanesecitizens(Normanoand Gerbi, 1943), Seoane (1943: 674) declared thatthere wereover 50,000 Japanese,including Peruvian-born aps. According to the1933 EnciclopediaItaliana, Peru was saturatedwith Japaneseworkmen


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andpeasants, although n realitythe Japanesemadeup far less than1 per-cent of Peru'spopulation 1933, vol. 17,p. 19, citedin NormanoandGerbi,1943:75).Animosities against the Japanesefurther ncreasedin the context of agrowingtradeimbalancebetween Peru andJapan.As a result of the rapidexpansionof the cottontrade,Japan'sbilateral radesurplus ncreased romUS$3.3 million in 1913toUS$74 millionin 1937 andUS$87 million in 1940(Rippy,1949).Addingremittances,as much as 113millionyen was drainedoutof Perubetween 1916 and 1935 (Suzuki, 1992).Beals (1935) warnedofthis threat n an article entitled Japan nvadesLatin America. Such crit-icisms intensified in the 1930s as Peru sank in the midst of a worldwideeconomicdepression.Politicalinstability ollowing the end of Leguia's 11-year-long dictatorial rule (1919-1930) furtheraggravatedanti-Japanesesentiment.

Duringthisperiodof economicandpolitical instability n the 1930s,Peruexperiencedawave of nationalism.TheGreatDepressionandLeguia'smis-handlingof the country's finances galvanizedthe forces of the left. Thenationalistsattributed eru'sgrowingeconomicand societalproblems othepenetration f foreign capital,whichhadincreased o US$400 million in themid-1930s(Connell, 1995).Indeed,theUnitedStates,Peru'smajorcreditor,controlledmost of its largestcorporations,while the Britishdominated tsprincipal railways, petroleum, mining, agriculture,manufacturing,andtrade.Italianscontrolled50 percentof Peru'sbanking,Germanscontrollednearlyhalfthesugarproduction,andtheJapanesepredominatedn theretailtradesand ncottonproduction Fortune,January1938,pp. 124-126, quotedin Connell, 1995). The growingnationalist entiment urtheraggravatedheanti-Japanesemovement(Gerbi,1943).AnimositiesagainsttheJapanese n the Americaswereintensifiedby theincreasingJapanesepresenceon thecontinentsandJapan'smilitaryaggres-sion in Asia duringthe 1930s. The United Statesviewed these expandinginterestswith uneasinessand,particularlyhrough he Pan-AmericanCon-ferencesheldbetween 1920and1940,encouragedLatinAmericancountriesto take measuresagainstthem (Rippy, 1949; PeruShimpo, 1975; Connell,1995). HavingbannedJapanese mmigrationn 1907, the UnitedStateshadannulledAsians' rightto naturalize n 1917. The subsequentNationalOri-ginsActof 1924,intended olimitincreasing mmigrationromsouthernandeasternEurope,also targetedthe Japanese,whose economic success wasviewed as a threatespeciallyin thecontextof recession(Kumei,1995).Fol-lowing the lead of the UnitedStates,CentralandSouth Americancountriesintroduced imilaracts of exclusion. InGuatemala,Panama,Venezuela,andParaguay, these laws excluded any nonwhite race (Rippy, 1949).


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Argentina,which stated tspreference orEuropean mmigrantsn itsconsti-tution,also allowedno Japanese mmigrants Wakatsuki ndSuzuki,1975).Likewise, Brazil,home to the largestJapanesepopulationon the continent,passed anti-Japanese mmigration egislationin 1923 (laterblockedby theparliamentby a small margin).It went on to enact the 2 Percent Law in1934, restrictingJapanese immigrationby setting immigrantquotas at 2percentof each nationalgroup(WakatsukiandSuzuki, 1975).U.S. involvementspurreddraconiandiscriminatorymeasures,particu-larly duringWorld WarII, in Peru.As an ally of the United States, Peruannulled tsdiplomaticrelationswithJapanas soon as the formerwenttowarwith Japan n 1941. This made the Japanese n Peru de facto enemy aliens,andanti-Japanesemeasuresescalatedwith aidfromtheUnited States.There-after,all community institutions were disbanded,and Japanese-languagepublicationsandmeetingsof morethan hreepersonswereprohibitedasspy-ing (PeruShimpo, 1975). Japanese-ownedbusinesses were eitherexpropri-atedorsubjected o forced sale to thehighestbidder,Japanese-owned epos-its in Peruvian banks were frozen (Thompson, 1974), and land leases toJapanese(as well as Germansand Italians)were canceled by a 1942 lawenacted ointly with the United States(Gerbi,1943). The freedom of Japa-nese to traveloutsidetheir home communitieswas also restricted.All these actions culminated n thedeportation f 1,800 Japanese o U.S.detentioncamps. Mostly communityand business leaders,these Japanesewere blacklistedby the U.S. embassyin Peru, kidnapped y the Peruvianpolice, andshippedto CrystalCity,Texas,togetherwith 500 or so Japanesefrom other Latin American countries (Connell, 1995; Emmerson, 1978).Among the 11 LatinAmericancountries,Peru was themajorcontributorotheJapanesedeportation rogram.Hometo75 percentof peopleof Japaneseoriginon the Pacific side of SouthAmericaandmostaggressive n its effortsto eliminatethem from its land,Peruquicklybecamethetargetof theUnitedStates,whose intention was to deportfromPeruall 30,000 Japanese,bothfirst-generation immigrants and the Peruvian-born second generation,regardlessof citizenship(Connell, 1995).Theprogram,ustifiedin the nameof national ecurity o eliminate dangerous nemyaliens, was carriedoutinorder to exchange them for U.S. soldiers detainedby the Japanese army(Connell, 1995). The deportationprogramsucceeded in debilitatingthealreadydamagedJapanesecommunity nstitutions.As hostility againstthe Japaneseescalatedin Peru,so did the processofracialization. After ll, remarkedSeoane(1943: 674), evenPeruvian-bornchildren of Japanese mmigrantswere in reality 'Japs'in theirspirit,theirorganization,will, and customs. TheJapanesewereperceivedas dangerousandproblematic o Peru,as Guevara 1939) argued n his book TheBiggest


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National Problems.Moreover,they were consideredracially inferior.Theuse of theconceptofraceaggravated ndsimultaneouslyustifiedavarietyofdiscriminatorymeasures.This notionof racial difference andinferiority il-teredthrough o the Peruvianpublicandultimatelyexplodedin a riot.In May 1940 a mob of student-ledprotesters ootedJapanesebusinessesandresidences n downtownLimaone afteranother.Duringan entiredayoflooting,over 600 establishments-almost allJapanesebusinesses nLima-weredamaged(PeruShimpo, 1975);dozens were injuredand one Japanesewas killed.The police failed to stepin. The damageamounted o more thanUS$1.6 million(Gardiner,1975;PeruShimpo, 1975). In its extentand dam-age, this was the worstriotingin Peruvianhistory.Moreover, t was the firstraciallymotivatedriot to targeta specificpopulation.Accordingto Peruvianofficials,the riotersweremostlylower-classpeople actingout of envyof Jap-anese economic success (Connell, 1995). Whatevertheirmotives, the riotbecame a symbolof racial hatred.

CONSEQUENCES OF RACIALIZATION:JAPANESE-PERUVIANS TODAY

The 1940 riot had significantand somewhatparadoxicalconsequencesfortheJapanese n Peru.Itwas a turningpoint,prompting heimmigrantsoreflectupontheircommunity.For the firsttime,theyrecognizedtheneedtoopenupto andbecomeintegratednto Peruvian ociety. Having ost much oftheirproperty,heyhad to startagainfromthebeginningandgive up anyideaof returning ome,at leastanytimesoon. Inaddition,Japan'sdefeat n WorldWar II made it impossible to returnto their devastated,poverty-strickencountry,particularlyoOkinawa,whichwasseverelydamagedbythegroundbattle there.Thus, the riot set a new direction for the Japanese mmigrantsand theircommunity.Paradoxically,however, it also reinforced their communal solidarity.As the most traumaticevent in Nikkei history (Fukumoto, 1997: 521),Japanese-Peruviansontinue to talk about t to thisday and use it to expressanger owardotherPeruviansand to legitimizetheir difference romthem.Those whoexperienced heeventvividlyrememberhelootingof theirstoresandtheirhavinghidden nnearbyhouses. Even thosewho did notexperienceitdirectlymention he riot whenever heytalkabout heirhistory,discrimina-tion,andsuffering.A second-generation apanese-Peruviann his 50s askedme angrily, Do you thinkyou can trustthose people who once attackedusand confiscated all of our properties? According to a Japanese-Peruviancommunityleader, n a community-sponsored ssay contestfor children n


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1990 titled AboutMy Grandparents, irtually every Japanese-Peruvianchild wrote aboutthe riot.The riot was also a significanteventforJapanese-Peruviansnreinforcingtheirfearof outsiders. ven60 yearslater,Japanese-Peruviansontinuetolive infearof a recurrence ndtrytomaintainalow profile.Most of them didnotsupportFujimoriduringhisfirstpresidential lectionin 1990for fearthathis poor performancef electedmightlead to another iot. It was the nation'smajority-the poorerindigenousand mestizopopulations-who saw hopeandchange nthis nonwhitecandidate.Among ruling-classwhitePeruvians,hisemergenceas the firstnonwhitepresidential andidate reatedaconsider-

able backlash.SomeJapanese-Peruvianseported hattheirbusinesses wereattackedduringthe election campaign;others were denied entryto exclu-sive discos and clubs (for whites) on racialgrounds. Similarly,wheneverthere were anti-Fujimoriprotestson Lima's streets in the 1990s, Japanese-Peruviansfeared a second riot.As a legacy of discrimination, he riot pro-vides themwith a renewed sense of communitywith a distincthistory.The significanceof the 1940 riot indeedreflects the salience of race inorganizingPeruviansociety. Althoughracial labels- mestizo, Indian,white, Negro, or Asian -have been eliminatedfrom official docu-ments suchas thecensus andpersonal dentificationorms,the Peruviangov-ernment's race-blindpolicy has not significantlydiminishedthe salienceof race or alteredthe racialorder,with numerically ew whites on top, thenumericalmajorityof Indiansat the bottom,and othersin between.Today, Japanese-Peruvians ontinue to be treatedprimarilyin racialterms-as Asians, Orientals, r Chinese. A third-generation ativeofLima recalledhow he was botheredby his schoolmates: Theyyelled atme,

'chino,chino cochino' (Chinese,dirtyChinese). I knew I looked different,butI hated t when otherscalledmeChinese. As aracialminority,Japanese-Peruviansarealso treatedas foreigners.They are often asked aboutJapan,aboutwhichtheyknownothing.Whentheytravel, heyarefrequently reatedasJapanese ourists,andwhentheytravel o otherSouthAmericancountriestheyoftenimpressnativeswith theircommandof Spanish.At the sametime,theyareimmediatelyassociatedwith(former)PresidentFujimori.Althoughhe had no personalties with the Japanese-Peruvian ommunity,he quicklybecame representative f all Japanese-Peruviansas well as Japanese ngeneral)as the most famous Chino n Peru.In a way,the fact thathe waselectedpresidentassured hem of beingacceptedasfull-fledgedmembersofPeruviansociety.As one second-generation apanese-Peruvianaid, AfterFujimoriwas elected, we felt we were finally acceptedin this country.Wedidn't vote for him [in 1990], so Peruvians hemselves voted for this son ofJapanese.Theyweresayingthatyou arePeruviansust like us andyou have


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all the rights,includingthe rightto governthe country. Yet,theywere alsoaware hatwheneverhis opponentscriticizedhim,the issue of nationalmem-bershipand, particularly,doubts about his Peruvianness ame up (e.g.,whetherhe was trulyborn nPeru).IncriticizingtheFujimorigovernment,aprominent white)journalistoccasionallymade remarks uch as Weshouldrecover Peru for Peruvians.Japanese-Peruviansare distinguished by their physical appearance,which often stands out in a mostly Indian-mestizocountry,andhave beentreatedpositivelyornegativelydependingontheeconomicandpoliticalsitu-ation(see Lesser, 1999). Although Japanese-Peruvians erceivelittle racial

discriminationoday,theirhistoryof immigrationandsettlementas a racialminorityhas had a significantimpacton the creation and maintenanceofwhat s oftendescribedas athrivingandsimultaneouslyaclosedmajorracialethnic communityin Peru. Their racializationhas increased as they havebecome economically successful; in a countrywhere the majorityof thepopulationare poor Indian-mestizos,economically advantagedJapanese-Peruvianshave a reason to want to remain a distinct racialminority.

NOTES1. Yet,iminmeanta laborer ;ccording o theEncyclopediaof Japanese DiplomaticHis-tory,it referred o peopleand their families who voyagedto countries other than ChinaandKoreafor the purposeof labor quoted n Kumei,1995: 13).2. See, for example, Nihon o Suteta Nihonjin (The JapaneseWho AbandonedJapan)(Ishidoya,1991), SuteraretaNihonjin(AbandonedJapanese)(Fujisaki,1986), and DominikaIminwa KiminDatta (Japanese mmigrants o the DominicanRepublicWereAbandonedPeo-

ple) (KonnoandTakahashi,1993).

REFERENCESAlegria,Ciro and Alfredo Saco1942 Japanese pearhead n the Americas. Free World2 (February): 1-84.Barnhart,EdwardN.1962 Citizenship ndpoliticaltests in LatinAmericanrepublics n WorldWar I. HispanicAmericanHistorical Review42: 297-332.Beals, Carleton1935 JapannvadesLatinAmerica. AmericanMercury34 (133): 299-306.Bonacich,Edna1973 Atheoryof middlemanminorities. AmericanSociologicalReview38: 583-594.Connell,Thomas,III1995 The nternment f Latin-American apanese ntheUnitedStatesduringWorldWar I:Peruvian-Japanesexperience(WorldWarII). Ph.Ddiss., FloridaStateUniversity.


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Crocker,W. R.1931 TheJapanese PopulationProblem.New York:Macmillan.Emmerson,John1978 TheJapaneseThread.New York:Holt, Rinehartand Winston.Fujisaki,Yasuo1986SuteraretaNihonjin.Tokyo:Maruja.Fukumoto,Mary1997 Hacia un nuevo sol: Japoneses y sus descendientes en el Peru'.Lima: Asociaci6nPeruano-Japonesael Peru.Gardiner,Harvey1975 TheJapaneseand Peru,1873-1973. Albuquerque:Universityof New Mexico Press.Gerbi,Antonello

1943 TheJapanese n Peru Asia and theAmericas43: 43-46.Guevara,VictorJ.1939 Las grandes cuestiones nacionales: El petroleo, los ferrocarriles, la inmigracidnjaponesa, el problemamoral.Cuzco:TalleresTipograficosde H. G. Rozas Sucesores.Idei, Seishi1930 Japan'smigrationproblem. nternationalLabourReview22: 773-789.Irie,Toraji1951 Historyof Japanese migration o Peru. HispanicAmerican Historical Review 31:437-452 and 32: 73-82, 648-664.Ishidoya, Shigeru

1991Nihon o SutetaNihonjin.Tokyo:Soshisha.JICA(Japan nternationalCooperationAgency)1994Kaigai IjuTokei.Tokyo.Kerr,GeorgeH.1959 Okinawa:TheHistoryof an IslandPeople.Tokyo:CharlesE. Tuttle.Kodama,Masaaki1989Nihon IminshiKenkyu osetsu.Tokyo:Keisuisha.Konno,ToshihikoandYasuoFujisaki1984Iminshi.Vol. 1. Tokyo:Shinsensha.Konno,Toshihikoand YkiharuTakahashi1993DominikaImin wa KiminDatta.Tokyo:Akashi Shoten.Kumei,Teruko1995Gaikokujin MeguruShakaishi:KindaiAmerika oNihonjinImin.Tokyo:YuzankakuShuppansha.Lesser,Jeffrey1999NegotiatingNationalIdentity: mmigrants,Minorities,and theStruggle or Ethnicityin Brazil.Durham:DukeUniversityPress.Maeyama,Takashi1994 Ethnicity, ecretsocieties,and associations: heJapanese n Brazil, pp. 165-186 inJorgeI. Dominiguez(ed.),Race andEthnicity n LatinAmerica.New York:Garland.Massey, DouglasandFelipeGarciaE.1987 The social processof internationalmigration Articles,August,733-738.Masuda,Yoshio and ToshioYanagida1999 Peru:Taiheiyo o Andesu no Kuni.Tokyo:Chuo KoronShinsha.Ministryof ForeignAffairs1949NihonjinIminni KansuruShorai no Shomondai.Tokyo.1958 WagaKuniKaigai Ijuno Genjoto Kaigai IjuSeisakuno KihonHoko.Tokyo.


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1971 WagaKokuminno Kaigai Hatten:Iju 100-nen no Ayumi.Tokyo.Morimoto,Amelia1979Los inmigrantesjaponesesen el Peru.Lima: Tallerde EstudiosAndinos.1992 Peruno NihonjinImin.Tokyo:Nihon Hyoron-sha.Nakamoto,JorgeM.1988 Discriminaci6ny aislamiento:el caso de los Japonesesy sus descendientesen elPeri, pp. 175-203 in ConsejoNacionalde Cienciay Tecnologia,PrimerSeminariosobrePoblacionesInmigrantes.Lima.Nihon Kaigai Kyokai1950 Imin Dokuhon.Tokyo:Keizaioraisha.Normano,J. F and Anonello Gerbi1943 TheJapanesein SouthAmerica.New York:JohnDay.

PeruShimpo1975Zai PeruHojin 75-nen no Ayumi:1899-1974. Lima:PeruShimpo-sha.Rippy,J. Fred1949 TheJapanese n Latin America Inter-AmericanEconomicAffairs3(1): 50-65.Seoane,Manuel1943 TheJapaneseare still in Peru. Asia and the Americas43: 674-676.Suzuki,Joji1992NihonjinDekasegiImin.Tokyo:Heibonsha.Thompson, StephenI.1974 Survival f ethnicity ntheJapanese ommunityof Lima,Peru. UrbanAnthropology3: 243-261.Tigner,James1978 TheRyukuans n Peru TheAmericas35(1): 20-44.1981 JapanesemmigrationntoLatinAmerica:asurvey. ournalofInteramericanStudiesand WorldAffairs23: 457-482.Titiev,Mischa1951 TheJapanesecolony in Peru. FarEasternQuarterly10: 227-247.Tomiyama,Ichiro.1990 KindaiNihon Shakaito Okinawajin:Nihonjinninaru toyu koto.Tokyo:Nihon KeizaiHyoronsha.Tsuchida,Motoko1998 Ahistoryof Japaneseemigration rom the 1860s to the 1990s pp.77-119 in MyronWeinerand TadashiHanami(eds.), TemporaryWorkers r FutureCitizens?JapaneseandU.S.MigrationPolicies. New York:New YorkUniversityPress.VanderVeer,Peter(ed.)1995 NationandMigration:ThePoliticsof Spacein theSouthAsianDiaspora.Philadelphia:Universityof PennsylvaniaPress.Vasquez,Mario1970 Immigration ndmestizaje n 19th-century eru, pp.73-95 inMagnusMorner ed.),Race and Class in LatinAmerica.New York:ColumbiaUniversityPress.Wakatsuki,Yasuo1987 HattenTojokoku no Ijuno Kenkyu:Boribia ni okeruNihon Imin.Tokyo:TamagawaDaigakuShuppanbu.Wakatsuki,YasuoandJojiSuzuki1975Kaigai IjuSeisakushi-ron.Tokyo:FukumuraShuppan.


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Yoshida,Yosaburo1909 Sources and causes of Japaneseemigration. Annals of the AmericanAcademy ofPolitical and Social Science 34: 377-387.Zenner,Walter1991Minorities n the Middle: Cross-CulturalAnalysis.Albany:SUNY Press.

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Takenaka - The Japanese in Peru