Takhar_Strategy[1]

COMMUNITY-BASED STABILIZATION GRANTS: a STRATEGY FOR TAKHAR

Final Draft; 25th July 2010 Edward J. McDonnell III; USAID GDO for Takhar

Section 1 – Overview of Takhar With its capital in Taloqan comprising a quarter of the province’s population, the largely rural province of Takhar splinters into seventeen districts. While most of Takhar has enjoyed several years of peace and incipient prosperity, the province started from a large social deficit after twenty-five years of invasions, civil war, neglect from Kabul and brutal rule by the Taliban. To some extent, and largely by default, the ‘salutary neglect’ of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) over the past eight years has stimulated the province’s progress in governance. With less attention from the international donor community, Takharis have begun to “make do” with what they have. Takhar’s population ranges from about 900,000 in the winter to over one million in the summer depending upon the seasonal migrations of kuchis (ranging from 5-15% of the population). Roughly half of the populace was not yet born when the erstwhile Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan. The population of Takhar is evenly distributed between large villages (>1,000 residents) and medium-sized villages (400-1,000) while the population skew toward the population centers is not intense. As Wikipedia states, the major ethnic groups in the province are Uzbeks and Tajiks followed by Pashtuns and Hazara. Takhar grows a wide variety of agricultural crops, including cereals (rice, wheat and maize), fruit (melons and mulberries), almonds and vegetables. Animal husbandry supplements these crops throughout the province, both for meat and dairy products. Sesame and cotton are also cultivated across Takhar as cash crops. Irrigated areas approximate 875,000 acres while the rain-fed areas normally exceed two million acres. While industry has atrophied attendant to years of volatile investment conditions, the focus on small amounts gold combed each week from the river-beds confirms the ‘survival paradigm’ by which Takharis view their prospects. In actuality, Takhar has several abundant deposits in minerals waiting to be extracted. Education stands out as this province’s number-one challenge. Reports vary but only half or less of the youngsters attend grade school. Since democracy depends upon thinking and private enterprise upon inventiveness, such restricted opportunities do not serve Takhar’s future well. Currently, the three hundred-eight schools in operation – a vast improvement through the efforts of international NGOs – fall shy of the perceived minimum threshold by at least 25%. But all is not bleak, here; once female teachers begin to enter high-school faculties, girls will increase as a percentage of students. The population appears to support this trend. Of 260,000 students, 60% are male; nonetheless, this represents a significant improvement in just four years, with overall attendance up by a third and girls in school up by more than half. Literacy rates of 15-20% (twice as high for men as for women) emphasize the centrality of education to Takhar’s development. Deprived for many years of attention and resources, Takhar remains instrumental to containing an eastward drift of the insurgency weighing down neighbouring Kunduz as anti-government elements (AGEs) begin to attract people other than Pashtuns. Since most farmers survive only from one harvest to the next, USAID contributions to Takhar focus upon an immediate agricultural impact through seed and fertilizer vouchers and the build-out of longer-term health-care capabilities. In 2010 and 2011, USAID plans to expand its reach into the province through civil service capacity building, local governance and communally led repair projects.

Section 2 – Targeted Districts/Communities Selected Introduction: The security context. Takhar is generally peaceful but violent demonstrations in early June disturbed its usual tranquillity. A widely viewed but unfounded television report of



proselytism across Afghanistan by Western faith-based NGOs had provoked the public’s ire. During the demonstrations against the German PAT on June 10th and 12th, an Afghan guard was injured by one of the many rocks hurled against the compound. The PAT believes there were incidents, without adverse results, of small arms fire against it. Generally, the further north one goes in the province, the higher the incidence of crime. The population-to-police ratio of 550-to-1 can not sustain civil order over the intermediate to long-term, particularly with the drug-induced lawlessness of the remote district of Darqad. With 3% of the provincial population, Darqad is isolated by branches of the Amu Darya River which wedge it against Tajikistan. The line ministries in Kabul neglect Darqad as evidenced by two clinics for 25-30,000 people and very few schools. The insurgent stronghold of the Dashte Archi district of northeast Kunduz Province has infected this remote and vulnerable corner of Takhar. The AGE trouble is spilling over into the Khawja Bawhuddin District and other neighbouring districts of Khawja Ghawr and Dashte Qala, placing 100,000 people at risk. Recent but preliminary forward operations by the Afghan Security Forces are beginning to redress this absence of governance and rule of law in Darqad. Concurrent with the entrance of a German mentoring team for a recently deployed Afghan National Army (ANA) battalion west of Taloqan, USAID will extend its scope to include local governance and, to some extent at least, the CBSG program. To consolidate the stabilization of the wider province, the CBSG strategy proposed herein does not target the worst districts of Darqad and Yangi Qala as these are sectors to be cleared. Instead, the stabilization strategy contains an eastward drift of the insurgency based on two premisses.

Get close to – but not in – a fire to put it out. In view of the murder of DAI employees in the heart of Kunduz three weeks ago, this activity manager can not, in good conscience, advocate direct activities in the contested districts of Darqad and, directly to its east, Yangi Qala. The aid proposition for these two districts is to target areas close to insurgent lines of communication (LOCs) through northern Dashte Qala and Khawja Ghawr. Khawja Bawhuddin, due southeast of Darqad and directly south of Yangi Qala, remains suitably positioned to quarantine the contested districts.

An ounce of prevention is worth of pound of cure. According to the Deputy Chief of Police in Takhar, conflict in northeast Baghlan, in the Burka district, threatens the peace of Eshkamish. In a similar manner, the eastern Kunduz district of Khanabad maintains a precarious security. The Khanabad river valley (flowing through southern Takhar) is known for its use as an avenue of weapons smuggling. The Bangi district of Takhar lies directly east of Khanabad. Targeted stabilization funding is calculated to confine to Khanabad any further deterioration of security to that district.

With only $450,000 left to obligate throughout the province over the next six months, CBSG will have to husband its resources carefully. To date, grants totaling $200,000 have been awarded to eleven schools. The funding constraint dictates that priorities be set among the target districts. These rank-ordered districts will spend up to their respectively assigned amounts, but the total of all districts shall not exceed $450,000. It is possible, perhaps likely, that lower-ranked districts may receive no assistance. Funding becomes available to lower ranked districts when the favoured areas have stabilized or exhausted funding availability as assigned. The rank-ordered provinces and a brief profile of each follow. The districts will require labor-intensive projects. Employment is challenging for



day-laborers with those fortunate enough to work earning only $2-5 per day depending on the season. Thus, it is very important to encourage the initiative of community development councils (CDCs) and other civic associations in designating the desired projects. First Priority: Khawja Ghar District; Up to $200,000. The northwestern extremity of this district is a flat-land along the Amu Darya, which facilitates the movement of AGEs and Taliban. The joint Bundeswehr-ANA forces will need to cut this LOC to isolate Darqad. Pashtun strongholds dot this river valley. Up to ten well thought-out grants in targeted villages, preferably with mixed ethnic populations, should buttress GIRoA legitimacy in areas with access to the enemy LOC. This positioning should afford an ideal staging area from which the ANA can sever the insurgent avenue of approach. Target communities will either include or neighbour the villages of Kuruk and Zard Kamar.

Source: “District-Level Socio-Economic Overview - Takhar Province”; Altai Consulting Group; Kabul; June 2009; p.149

District overview of Khawja Ghar. This district is Uzbek with 50,000 people and a robust agrarian economy relying largely upon micro-hydro-power. The district governor is a former anti-Taliban commander. He expresses concern over possible struggles with various AGEs. Subsistence farming predominates with some fruits being grown in the face of inadequate pest management programs. Essential services remain stable though open to improvement. Roughly 60% of children attend school, with a small majority being boys. Health care is limited but available. Ministry of Reconstruction and Rural Development (MRRD) funding has approached $1.9 million over five years with USAID contributing $400,000 in 2009, primarily for seed and fertilizer vouchers.

ISAF and ANA

Staging areas

Insurgent Lines of

Communications



Second Priority: Dashte Qala District; Up to $150,000. Dashte Qala’s security has been declining along with that of Khawja Ghawr. The district’s incorporated territory includes the upper two-thirds of the LOC originating from the insurgent stronghold in the northeastern Kunduz distinct of Dashte Archi, through Khawja Ghawr and then Dashte Qala, ending in Darqad. Consequently, the tactics for Dashte Qala parallel those of Khawja Ghawr. Targeted areas will include the villages of Qazaq Qeshlaq and Kakol or areas nearby. By successfully disrupting that LOC, the local insurgency loses much of its sustainment, easing the way for the joint task-force to clear the area. Since the oft-discussed counter-offensive has been delayed by six-to-twelve months, carefully planned and successful stabilization strategies can offset the tactical advantage forfeited by the ANA. The impetus for kinetic clearing remains clearly military while the strategic initiative is now devolving upon civilian programs.


District Overview of Dashte Qala. With 4% of the province’s population, Dashte Qala is 80% Uzbek. The small Pashtun population remains arrayed along the Amu Darya River. Poppy-free since 2002, the district relies upon subsistence crops and pasture livestock. Some 55 schools educate most of the children. Development spending has largely bypassed Dashte Qala with spending rates per capita under the National Solidarity Program at a fraction of the level enjoyed by other districts. USAID spending in 2009 fell below $300,000 (80% vouchers). Third Priority: Khawja Bawhuddin District; up to $100,000. Khawja Bawhuddin’s current security problem derives from the potential emigration of people southward from Darqad. Security remains tenable only because the expected influx of Pashtuns from Darqad has yet to occur owing to the deferred ANA clearing operation. Strategically positioned and packaged

ISAF and ANA

Staging areas

Insurgent Lines of

Communications



community projects, initiated by local elders or leaders, will demonstrate how local government works together with, and ultimately for, people. Civic cooperation promotes local buy-in for allowing security forces to use empowered villages as staging areas to cut the LOC. Such support for the ANA will entail significant risk for the villagers, in towns west of the district center, should the clearing operation fail. It is ‘mission-critical’ then, for these people to realize the benefits of working together with the GIRoA. In short, in this neglected area, the GIRoA must demonstrate good faith through targeted projects. Such high-profile and inexpensive initiatives can legitimate governance by giving people a stake in it. That stake then becomes the foundation of public willingness to support the ANA so people can defend the benefits enjoyed by democratic governance.


District Overview of Khawja Bawhuddin. Khawja Bawhuddin has a small population (under 30,000) with a relatively small parcel of territory in a very wrong location, flanked by Darqad and Yangi Qala. Pashtuns make up 25% of the district’s population. Essential services lag other areas. Apparently, less than half of the children attend school and only one health center serves the district. Social spending reflects this gap with $750,000 over five years from the MRRD and $233,000 of USAID vouchers in 2009. Since Khawja Bawhuddin has fewer people living within it, fewer projects will suffice for staunching the infection of insurgency from Darqad and Yangi Qala. Since there is a higher percentage of Pashtuns in this district than either Khawja Ghawr or Dashte Qala, projects can put to work fighting-age males otherwise ideal for recruitment as ‘accidental insurgents’.

CBSG / GiRoA area of

consolidated legitimacy



Fourth Priority: Eshkamish District; up to $75,000. Eshkamish has been a relatively tranquil area until the decline of security in the Burka District in northeastern Baghlan. The eastern half of the Aliabad district of Kunduz, meanwhile, has maintained a precarious allegiance with the GIRoA. Should the area succumb to AGE pressures in western Aliabad and Burka, the insurgency could de-stabilize Eshkamish. Such an undesired development is less likely in the immediate term. Preventive measures can facilitate a focused clearing operation to the north. Otherwise, the ISAF-ANA LOC will stretch the length of Takhar, becoming attenuated by distance of terrain covered and increasingly vulnerable to rupture.


District Overview of Eshkamish. With 57,000 inhabitants and a mixed population, Eshkamish represents roughly 6% of Takhar’s population. The agriculture is undeveloped with one third of the land cultivated (and only a quarter of that by irrigation). Rain-fed live-stock farming thrives as implied by one of the highest livestock-to-household ratios across Takhar. Essential services are relatively strong and over half of the children attend school. While Afghan spending has been decent over five years at $2 million, USAID’s spending was only $300,000 in 2009. As the security profile strengthens with limited quick-impact stabilization grants, other USAID programs (e.g., the Afghan Clean Energy Project or the Sustainable Water Systems and Sanitation Program) can supplement these initial efforts to sustain the growing legitimacy of the district government and, through it, the GIRoA. Towns of interest will include, or be proximate to, Pombak-i-Bala and Marzek.

Area targeted

for stability



Fifth Priority: Bangi District; up to $50,000. Security in the Khanabad district of eastern Kunduz has slipped over the last four months. The Khanabad River valley also remains the conduit of weapons, and possibly drug, smuggling. Some of these illicit profits make their way to the various factions of AGEs, local and outsider. The proceeds and goods of smuggling monies often flow to Dashte Archi through the Bu’in village area of Khanabad. An intermediate sized flood-readiness project by IDEA-New in Bu’in has tentatively stabilized the area, creating the time for Takhar to firm up its western border. While this situation is not yet acute, it is prudent to consolidate the security of Bangi district to preclude the spill-over of unrest, or worse, into Takhar. Target areas will include, or be close to, Kal Bacha and Jagda Kamar.


District Overview of Bangi. Bangi is a peaceful, prosperous district sharing its longest border with Khanabad district in Kunduz. The Khanabad River valley has been a criminal corridor for drugs and weapons smuggling, originating in two proximate Pashtun-influenced districts of Kunduz: Khanabad (40% of the district population) and Dashte Archi (45%). Bangi remains an anti-Taliban bulwark since it is 80-85% Uzbek. The assistance required should not be high; its value lies in signalling to the local population that the GIRoA has not forgotten these people. Section 3 – Linking Communities with the Government of the GIRoA

The strategy and tactics described above are, admittedly, quite ambitious. Nonetheless, they can succeed with effective positioning of projects timed carefully with events. To consolidate advantageous positions favorable to counter-insurgency, these projects should be launched as discrete initiatives identified by CDCs or other civic enterprises.

Targeted

Hold Area

ISAF and ANA

Staging area



Subsequently, following approval of twenty or twenty-five projects by CBSG, the Governor can award these pre-funded initiatives to three-to-five District Governors in a series of town-hall meetings or district development assemblies. Ideally, these projects ought to be discussed openly at these public forums by the three or four core members of the sponsoring CDCs. During these communal gatherings, those CBSG proposals would be mingled among other non-CBSG proposals. At the end of these civic assemblies, Governor Taqwa or the District Governor would ‘award’ at least the CBSG projects to the CDC leaders in recognition of the risks they assume by declaring their allegiance to the GIRoA. These events would enable people to see how a legitimate government is supposed to function. These villagers would realize what they have to gain and, therefore, what they need to defend. Should CBSG better serve Takharis as a lower-profile component of a larger effort led by the German Technical Corp. (GTZ), this outcome will be acceptable if in harmony with the strategic aims of the program. In fact, GTZ is leading determined stabilization and development efforts in Takhar. Consequently, this Activity Manager welcomes CBSG serving as an informal support mission to a NATO ally designed to supplement its hard-earned successes to date. References

Takhar Provincial Profile; Ministry of Reconstruction and Rural Development; 2007.

The Northern Front: The Afghan insurgency spreading beyond the Pashtuns; Antonio Giustozzi and Christoph Reuter; Afghan Analysts’ Network; June 23rd 2010.

District-Level Socio-Economic Overview - Takhar Province; Altai Consulting Group; Kabul; June 2009.

The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One; David Kilcullen; 2009.

Discussions with GTZ, the Deputy Provincial Chief of Police et al.; June 2010.

Provincial Development Plan for Takhar; 2007 and 2009; UNDP and MRRD.

Provincial Profile: Takhar; date unknown (likely 2007); The Asia Foundation.

Wikipedia; “Takhar Province”; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Takhar_Province.

[Map of] Afghanistan-Takhar Province; Afghan Information Management Services; 2003.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Takhar_Province

Documents

Takhar_Strategy[1]