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8/4/2019 Taking the Pulse of HBCUs
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A R T I C L E S
Taking the Pulse of Historically Black Colleges
Sheldon Avery
Published online: 4 July 2009
# Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2009
The federal Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended, defines a
historically black institution of higher education as any historically black
college or university that was established prior to 1964, whose principle mission
was, and is, the education of black Americans.1 They are usually referred to as
HBCUs. Most private black colleges originated in the nineteen southern and
border states after the Civil War during and after Reconstruction (1867
1890).They were started by white northern missionaries and white and black church
groups, aided in the early years by the Freedmens Bureau, and in the later years
by white philanthropic foundations funded by Nelson Rockefeller, Andrew
Carnegie, Julius Rosenwald, and others. Most public black colleges, with the
exception of federally funded Howard University, were started after passage of
the Second Morrill Act in 1890 that provided federal funds for land grant
colleges.
Over time many black colleges closed or changed their mission and
curricula, and others were established. In 1900 only about 4,000 black
college students were enrolled in HBCUs, the great majority in the South.
Because of the prohibition against educating slaves before 1865 and the
meager resources provided for black education during Reconstruction, by
1900 only fifty-eight of the ninety-nine HBCUs had college-level curricula,
Acad. Quest. (2009) 22:327339
DOI 10.1007/s12129-009-9116-8
1Signed into U.S. law on November 8, 1965, the Higher Education Act of 1965 (Pub. L. No. 89-329), was
part of President Lyndon Johnsons Great Society domestic agenda. The act was reauthorized in 1968,
1972, 1976, 1980, 1986, 1992, 1998, and 2008. Before each reauthorization, Congress amends additional
h h l d li i f i i k h h
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and only 10 percent of black students were in postsecondary academic
programs. Between 1900 and 1930 black student enrollment had expanded to
29,000 and HBCUs began to develop into a viable higher education system.
Due to the Souths dual racial education system before the 1950s, HBCUswere the overwhelming source for an educated middle class of lawyers,
doctors, teachers, and leaders to serve the black community.2
Today there are about 103 HBCUs, slightly more than half private, the rest
public, and a few two-year institutions. Together they have graduated about
70 percent of all blacks who have received a college degree since the nations
founding. Although today only about 14 percent of black college students
attend HBCUs, 70 percent of all black doctors and dentists, 50 percent of all black engineers and public school teachers, and 35 percent of all black
attorneys received their bachelors degrees at an HBCU.3 Despite that record,
since the 1950s HBCUs have felt insecure about their future.
On May 24, 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court announced its decision in the
school desegregation case Brown v. Board of Education.4 This landmark case
has influenced contemporary American social and political history more than
any other in the last half century by overturning Plessy v. Ferguson,5 the 1896
ruling that made segregated public railway cars (and by extension all public
facilities) constitutional if they were separate but equal in some undefined way.
Plessy and the segregated land grant colleges set up in the South by the Second
Morrill Act gave legitimacy to the white Souths public separation of the races.
Since 1935, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) had been seeking integration of public schools through court cases
challenging Plessy by representing individual black students seeking access to
segregated law schools in Maryland (1935), Missouri (1938), Oklahoma (1948)and Texas (1950).6 Although the NAACP won all these cases, the Supreme
2See Julian B. Roebuck and Komanduri S. Murty, Historically Black Colleges and Universities: Their
Place in American Higher Education (Westport, CN: Praeger, 1993), chap. 2, for a good, brief history of
HBCUs. Another solid synopsis of the history of HBCUs is Walter R. Allen et al., Historically Black
Colleges and Universities: Honoring the Past, Engaging the Present, Touching the Future, Journal of
Negro Education 76, no. 3 (Summer 2007): 26380.3United Negro College Fund, Fact Sheet, revised February 2008, http://give.uncf.org/site/DocServer/
AEOS_about_uncf_factsheet.pdf?docID=541.4Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
328 Avery
http://give.uncf.org/site/DocServer/AEOS_about_uncf_factsheet.pdf?docID=541http://give.uncf.org/site/DocServer/AEOS_about_uncf_factsheet.pdf?docID=541http://give.uncf.org/site/DocServer/AEOS_about_uncf_factsheet.pdf?docID=541http://give.uncf.org/site/DocServer/AEOS_about_uncf_factsheet.pdf?docID=5418/4/2019 Taking the Pulse of HBCUs
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Court had not overturned Plessy because none of the states involved had
provided anything remotely resembling equal facilities for black students. In
Brown, the Court dealt with a situation in Kansas where conditions for black
studentsschool buildings, equipment, teacher preparation, training, andsalarieswere close enough to those conditions for white students that the
judges had to rule on the constitutionality of the separate but equal doctrine
itself. Based in large measure on the testimony of black psychologist Kenneth
Clarks contention that requiring the separation of black and white students in
schools (and potentially in institutions of higher learning) created a sense of
inferiority among minority blacks and violated their Fourteenth Amendment
right to
equal protection before the law,
the Warren Court unanimouslyoverturnedPlessy and announced that racially separate schools were inherently
unequal and therefore unconstitutional.
The Brown decision was hailed by most blacks and whites who opposed
what were called Jim Crow laws, but a number of HBCU presidents and
others with connections to these southern and border state institutions were
concerned that the Courts decision to desegregate all elementary and
secondary schools could also be used to integrate or eliminate HBCUs. They
feared the Court would extend the rejection of the separate but equal
doctrine to all public colleges and universities in the South and that many
black students at public and private HBCUs would choose or transfer to
predominantly white public universities (PWIs) because of their superior
facilities, program offerings, and comparable tuition costs.7
The United Negro College Fund (UNCF), an association of most of the
private HBCUs, anticipated the Courts decision and was ready to challenge
any attempt to shut down HBCUs. Formed in 1944 by twenty-seven privateaccredited four-year HBCUs to coordinate fundraising from white and black
supporters of black higher education to raise money to provide scholarships,
improve facilities, and use the media to promote HBCUs, UNCF could speak
as one voice for some of the best known and most respected HBCUsFisk,
Morehouse, Spelman, Dillard but faced a dilemma following the Brown
decision. For ten years it had promoted its member colleges and HBCUs in
7See M Christopher Brown II Collegiate Desegregation and the Public Black College: A New Policy
Taking the Pulse of Historically Black Colleges 329
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general as superior to PWIs for black students academically, socially,
psychologically, and culturally. But now the Court was saying that
segregated schools were inherently inferior for minority students. How could
UNCF spokesman reconcile these messages? Would white business leadersstop supporting UNCF? Would black students abandon HBCUs? If UNCF
members and public HBCUS began actively recruiting white students to
compensate for likely diminished black enrollment, would that alter the
HBCUs social and academic environment and undermine their basic mission
to provide black students quality education and racial uplift?8
UNCFs solution was necessarily pragmatic. Seemingly accepting the
inevitability of desegregated higher education in the South, they argued that,given the southern states historic opposition to desegregation, the transition
would take an indefinite period of time to complete, echoing the Warren
Courts ambiguous call in 1955 for the states to use all deliberate speed to
carry out desegregation of the schools.9 This tactic worked for a while.
Corporate donations to UNCF held steady and few blacks successfully
enrolled in southern public PWIs. But in the 1960s conditions dramatically
changed in U.S. race relations. Under the leadership of Lyndon Johnson,
Congress responded to southern states resistance and delaying tactics to civil
rights reforms by passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Higher Education
Act of 1965, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.10
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 gave the executive branch tools needed to
enforce the Brown decision, including Title VI, which allowed the
government to withhold federal funds from colleges and universities that
were resisting desegregation. The Higher Education Act of 1965 provided
federal funds to help economically disadvantaged students attend college.During the same period, the slow rate of social change brought major race
riots; the emergence of radical black groups like the Nation of Islam and
Black Panthers demanding black power; and students on HBCU campuses,
like North Carolina A & T, Fisk, and Jackson State, staging protests against
Jim Crow laws and the Vietnam War, but also demanding more of a voice on
8Mary Beth Gasman, Rhetoric vs. Reality: The Fundraising Messages of the United Negro College Fundin the Immediate Aftermath of the Brown Decision, History of Education Quarterly 44, no. 1 (Spring
2004): 70 94
330 Avery
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campuses and in black communities. Even the Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee, founded in 1960 mostly by black students from
many HBCUs in support of Dr. Martin Luther Kings non-violent civil rights
movement, eventually turned to greater militancy and public protest beyondtactics supported by Dr. Kings Southern Christian Leadership Conference.
Many HBCU presidents followed their students lead and became more
militant, supporting black studies courses and demanding greater equity in
funding for black colleges from state legislatures and the federal government.
In support of these financial demands, black scholars began to publish research
on conditions at HBCUs, especially on how black HBCU students fared in
comparison to black PWI students. Their research generally found that in mostquantitative and qualitative outcomes (e.g., retention and graduation rates,
transfers to graduate and professional schools, positive interaction with
students and faculty) black students seemed to be doing better at HBCUs
despite insufficient financial support from southern state legislatures.11
During the stormy late 1960s and early 1970s the issue of desegregat-
ing HBCUs seemed to fade into the background. The federal government
was not pressuring southern PWIs to do more than introduce race-neutral
admission standards, and allow a small number of high-achieving black
students to desegregate PWIs. But HBCUs were experiencing another
threat to their survival. A series of actions by the federal government was
dramatically altering black enrollments in higher education and at
HBCUs. Black higher education enrollments significantly increased when
black war veterans took advantage of the G.I. Bill and others joined the
second black migration from the South to northern cities for better paying
jobs and escape from southern-style racism. Outside the South publicPWIs were integrated and generally welcomed qualified black students
even before affirmative action took root. In parts of the South public
PWIs were beginning to accept more black students. As a result, although
black enrollments in higher education grew, the percentage of blacks at
11See, Harold Wenglinsky, The Educational Justification for Historically Black Colleges and Universities:
A Policy Response to the U.S. Supreme Court, Educational Evaluation and Policy Analyses 181 (Spring1996): 91103; Laura W. Perna et. al., The Status of Equity for Black Undergraduates in Public Higher
Education in the South: Still Separate and Unequal, Research in Higher Education 47, no. 2 (March
Taking the Pulse of Historically Black Colleges 331
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HBCUs dropped dramatically. In the early 1960s, more than 70 percent of
all black students attended HBCUs; by 1968 that number dropped to 36
percent, and by 1976 to just 18 percent.12
In addition to declining enrollments, a number of the smaller HBCUs,those averaging less than one thousand students, were suffering from
administrative mismanagement, aging facilities, and accreditation problems.
There was still reason to fear that federal courts would use Brown to force
HBCUs to merge with nearby public PWIs or be closed down to speed up the
desegregation process. For example, even before the Brown decision, the
University of Kentucky had in 1951 opened all its programs to qualified
blacks, and Louisville Municipal College, a black college nearby, was shutdown and all but one of its eighteen black faculty dismissed.13
Frustrated with the slow pace of school desegregation in the South, the
Supreme Court ruled in Green School Board v. New Kent County in 1968
that the countys freedom of choice planwhereby parents could send their
children to either the black or white elementary and high school in that rural
eastern Virginia countywas ineffective in ending segregation because no
white parents had chosen the black schools and very few blacks had chosen the
white schools. The Court was now demanding that school boards do their
affirmative duty to desegregate their dual school systems. In Green, the Court
made clear that freedom of choice plans satisfied Brown and Brown II only if
they did not produce a white or a black school, but just a school.14 HBCU
supporters were concerned that the Court would apply Greens endorsement of
full integration to higher education and insist that southern states merge their
public colleges and universities, possibly resulting in the loss of many HBCUs.
In 1969 the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) notifiedten southern and border states that they were still in violation of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and called for each to submit desegregation plans.
Because newly elected president Richard Nixon dropped use of the threat to
suspend federal funds to states that did not comply, most of the ten states
ignored HEWs request. In 1970 the Legal Defense and Education Fund
(LDF), which had become independent of the NAACP in 1957, forced the
12Kenneth E. Redd, Historically Black Colleges and Universities: Making a Comeback, New Directions
f Hi h Ed ti 102 (S 1998) 33 43
332 Avery
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issue by suing HEW for failing to enforce Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. In
Adams v. Richardson (19701973), a class action suit against HEW for
permitting a dual racial system of higher education in the states,15 the LDF
was joined by the National Association for Equal Educational Opportunity inHigher Education (NAFEO), formed in 1969 by black public and private
college presidents working together for the first time to lobby for greater state
and federal funding for HBCUs.16
The Adams cases did not resolve any of the outstanding legal issues but were
important for two reasons. First, it revealed deep differences about integration
within the black community, which the conflicting positions taken by the LDF
and NAFEO briefs in theAdams cases reflect. Second, it became clear in Adamsthat the federal courts were treating desegregation in higher education differently
from elementary and secondary schools, partly because a students choice of
school was more a factor in higher education. On the first matter, the underlying
difference between the positions of the LDF/NAACP and the NAFEO was that
the former were committed to full integration while the latter was more
interested in protecting HBCUs and preserving a viable black culture. The
NAACP/LDF leadership did not believe HBCUs would ever get the funding
necessary to compete with white colleges. NAFEO leaders feared integration
would lead to the demise of HBCUs.
The Adams cases were dismissed when the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Washington, DC, ordered the states to submit desegregation plans
to HEW. In 1974 HEW accepted most of the plans. In 1975, a group of black
Mississippians dissatisfied with the inconclusive outcome of Adams filed a
class action suit against the Office of Civil Rights of the federal Department
of Education. Over time, Adams evolved into United States v. Fordice, alandmark case in desegregating higher education that took more than two
decades to be resolved.17
Mississippi was one of ten states challenged by Adams to present HEW
with a workable desegregation plan for higher education. The state had
the worst record of response to Brown. Although by 1870 Mississippi had
two private black colleges (Shaw University, later renamed Rust College,
and Tougaloo Normal and Manual Training School) and was the first
Taking the Pulse of Historically Black Colleges 333
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southern state to create a black public land grant college (Alcorn
University in 1871), when whites regained political control after
Reconstruction in 1877 Mississippi reduced Alcorns status to a
vocational college and drastically cut its funding. By 1900 blacksrepresented 60 percent of Mississippis students at all levels, but received
only 19 percent of state funding.
Alcorn was Mississippis only black public college until the World War II era,
when Jackson State University (1940) and Mississippi Valley State University
(1946) were established. After the Brown decision in 1954 Mississippi became
the first state to create a segregationist Citizens Council and use interposition, a
modern form of state nullification of federal law, to resist school integration.Mississippis five public white universities resisted accepting any black students
until James Meredith won access to the University of Mississippi in 1961.
Meredith had to be escorted to campus by 16,000 federal troops, and ensuing
riots led to several deaths and hundreds wounded.18
When HEW accepted Mississippis desegregation plan in 1974, a group of
Mississippis black leaders in the Black Mississippians Council for Higher
Education were greatly dissatisfied with the states limited reforms. They
filed a class action suit, Ayers v. Waller, in January 1975.19 The plaintiffs in
Ayers were primarily interested in two legal issues raised by Brown not yet
resolved by the courts: Were Mississippis HBCUs legal, and if so could they
demand major financial enhancements from the state and federal government
to catch up with the states PWIs? The answers to these questions would
likely affect black higher education throughout the South.
The state of Mississippi claimed it had come into compliance with Brown by
increasing funding for the HBCUs, introducing race-neutral student admissionstandards at all public universities by using American College Test (ACT)
scores, and raising mission designation for Jackson State to allow it almost as
many masters and doctorate programs as the three PWIs. The U.S. Department
of Justice, which had joined the private plaintiffs in negotiating with state
authorities, agreed that the Mississippi plan did not meet HEWs criteria for
desegregating higher education. In 1987 the case came to trial and the federal
district court ruled that Mississippi was in compliance. On appeal to a full FifthCircuit Appeals Court in 1990, the district court decision was upheld, but in
334 Avery
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April 1991 the Supreme Court agreed to hear appeals to the Ayers case, now
named United States v. Fordice.20
In 1992, thirty-six years after Brown, the Rehnquist Supreme Court
overturned the Appeals Court and ruled that Mississippi had not taken adequatemeasures to desegregate higher education in the state and sent the case back to
the federal district court with suggestions for what had to be done to be in
compliance. In his majority opinion, Judge Byron White said, [A] State does
not discharge its constitutional obligations until it eradicates policies and
practices traceable to its prior de jure dual system that continue to foster
segregation.21 White pointed out that neither the ACT race-neutral admissions
standard nor the revised mission designation resulted in significant desegrega-tion of Mississippis eight public universities. He suggested the state facilitate
desegregation by merging or closing some of the schools.
Although the High Court had not ruled that desegregation of higher
education required the full integration of colleges, the Black Mississippians
Council was very disturbed by Judge Whites merger suggestion. They were
reminded again of HBCUs insecure status after Brown. Judge Clarence
Thomas, the only black member of the Supreme Court, was also concerned
by Judge Whites remark. In a concurring opinion, he emphasized the
positive impact HBCUs had on blacks through more than a century since the
Civil War. It would be ironic, to say the least, he added, if the institutions
that sustained blacks during segregation were themselves destroyed in an
effort to combat its vestiges.22
Judge Thomas did not join the Black Mississippians Council in criticizing
the Court for rejecting the plaintiffs demand for financial enhancements.
Judge White had made clear that if the plaintiffs demand for upgrading thethree black universities was so that they may be publicly financed,
exclusively black enclaves by private choice, we reject that request.23
Whether such an increase in funding is necessary to achieve a full
dismantlement under the standards we have outlined he added, is a
different question, and one that needs to be addressed on remand. Judge
20
Samuels, Is Separate Unequal? 98
102. United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992); the Ayers caselasted so long that its name changed several times. When it finally reached the Supreme Court, Kirk
Fordice was governor of Mississippi.
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Thomas agreed with Judge White, but made the important point that the
states could provide greater financial enhancements if they wished.
Although many supporters of civil rights celebrated Fordice as a landmark
victory in the struggle to desegregate higher education because it put greaterpressure on the states to comply with affirmative reform, black educators and
their supporters were disappointed with three aspects of the decision. First,
the Court had sent the case back to the federal district court without very
specific instructions. Second, the Court had not made clear that HBCUs were
constitutional and had hinted at the need for merging or closing some of them
to move desegregation forward. Third and most important to the private
plaintiffs, the Court had rejected the argument for requiring financialenhancements, or reparations, to compensate HBCUs for generations of
underfunding. HBCU supporters were not optimistic about the long-range
impact of Fordice on black higher education.
The High Courts that dealt with Brown and Fordice thirty years apart had
very different personnel and perspectivesthe Warren Court more liberal on
social issues, the Rehnquist Court more conservative but both shared an
important view of the Courts role in the legal and political life of the country.
Both Brown and Fordice decisions broke new ground in responding to
deeply rooted racial beliefs and attitudes, and both refrained from pushing the
changes they had wrought too quickly. The Warren Court called for all
deliberate speed, knowing that the South would resist strongly and possibly
violently and that the federal government would have to move forward
cautiously to bring improvement in race relations. The Rehnquist Court made
the same decision in sending the case back to the district court. Knowing that
what happened in Mississippi would influence other southern states and thatthe High Court could not impose a uniform list of desegregation criteria for
all noncompliant states, the district judge working with state officials and
leaders of the black community would be in a better position to reach
agreement on how to bring about desegregation and improved race relations.
It would take another fourteen years for that consensus to develop.
In October 1992, four months after the Fordice ruling, the Mississippi higher
education Board of Trustees filed a report with the federal district court listing anumber of ways the state could comply with the desegregation order. One of the
336 Avery
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Mississippi State, and by merging two white institutions, Mississippi University
for Women and the University of Southern Mississippi. Black educators saw this
as a move to eliminate all public black colleges in Mississippi except for Jackson
State, or as a scare tactic to get blacks to drop their demands for financialenhancements, open admissions enrollment, and other changes in the
desegregation plan being considered by the district court. In 1994 the district
judge rejected the merger idea and ordered Mississippi to create new programs
for Jackson State and Alcorn State and provide both with five million dollars for
educational advancement and racial diversity, including providing nonblack
scholarships to recruit white students. The court rejected open admissions but
ordered that high school grade point averages be added to ACT scores for race-neutral admissions to all eight universities.
Relieved that the immediate threat of shutting down two HBCUs was
removed, the black plaintiffs appealed the district courts plan to the Fifth Circuit,
claiming the money was insufficient and that without open admissions 40 percent
of academically disadvantaged black applicants would be denied access to higher
education. The appeals court upheld the lower courts plan and, in January 1998,
the Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs petition for writ of certiorari.
Since the 1980s, Mississippi, like most of the deep southern states, was
being slowly forced to accept the end of the most obvious vestiges of
segregation. Many white businessmen saw the unresolved Fordice case as a
barrier to economic expansion. In June 2000 newly elected governor Ronnie
Musgrove brought together blacks and whites involved in the case to work
on a settlement. In April 2001 an agreement was reached, which, if the
district court approved, would give the HBCUs most of what they had
demanded, including more than $500 million over seventeen years infinancial enhancements, making it the most expensive higher education
desegregation in American history.24 Specifically, the state would commit to
give Mississippis three HCUs $246 million for new programs, $75 million
for new facilities, a $70 million endowment (if the three schools achieved 10
percent nonblack enrollment for three consecutive years), and a $6.25 million
scholarship fund for low-income families. Jackson State would receive
several new Ph.D. programs and would join Mississippis three predomi-
nantly white universities as a top-tier comprehensive institution.25
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Some black plaintiffs, alumni, faculty, and students were not satisfied.
They said the financial enhancements were not enough to compete with the
white universities, did not remove inequities in black faculty salaries, did not
protect the academically disadvantaged students who needed open admissionto have higher education access, and that the three HBCUs would have
difficulty reaching 10 percent nonblack enrollment for three consecutive
years. The district court denied their motion to reconsider the agreement and
sent it to the state legislature to confirm its acceptance of the terms. Both
houses overwhelmingly approved the agreement and the district court judge
signed the compliance decree on February 15, 2002, thirty-seven years after
the case was first heard.Although some HBCUs are still in danger of closing, it will not likely be
because of a radical interpretation ofBrown. The High Court, Congress, and
the executive branch have all accepted that higher education, public as well
as private, involves a variety of institutions and student choice, and cannot be
treated the same as public elementary and secondary schools. Like some
PWIs forced to close in recent years, however, a number of HBCUs are in
trouble because of low endowments, low enrollments, administrative and
financial mismanagement, heavy debt, and/or loss of accreditation. Between
1996 and 2002 almost half of private HBCUs have received sanctions from
the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools, the regional accrediting
agency for HBCUs and PWIs since 1931.26 Nevertheless, in recent years,
regardless of which party occupies the White House, the federal government
has clearly shown support for HBCUs. In 1980 Jimmy Carter signed
Executive Order 12232, establishing a program to overcome the effects of
discriminatory treatment and expand the capacity of historically blackcolleges and universities to provide quality education.27 Since then every
president from Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush has issued similar
executive orders in support of HBCUs. For example, in 1986 the Higher
Education Act was amended to give HBCUs $170 million from 1987 to 1992
for infrastructure, enhancing program development, and research grants.
Between 1993 and 2003, federal support for HBCUs increased $639 million,
or 60 percent. Presidential executive orders have also created a Presidents
338 Avery
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Board of Advisors for HBCUs, which submit an annual report to the White
House, advise on policy matters concerning HBCUs, and monitor federal
agency compliance.28 Barak Obama, the first black president of the United
States, did not attend a black college, but he is likely to continue federalsupport for HBCUs.
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