June 2009 n ARMY 61

Tal Afar 2005: Laying the

CounterinsurgencyGroundwork

The battle for Tal Afar, which occurred

during the period from summer 2005

to winter 2006, was the first success-

ful counterinsurgency campaign for

American forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom

(OIF). The principal antagonists were the 3rd Ar-

mored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), also known as

the Brave Rifles, led by COL H.R. McMaster, and

the insurgency forces in Tal Afar. The campaign

emphasized principles of full spectrum opera-

tions, including initiative, mission command

and the simultaneous application of offensive,

defensive and stability operations.

A soldier from 2nd Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, 82ndAirborne Division, patrols the streets of Tal Afar, a city of some200,000 in northwestern Iraq’s Ninewah Province, in November 2005.U

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By MAJ Jay B. Baker

Strategic SettingTal Afar is an ancient city of approximately 200,000 peo-

ple in northwestern Iraq’s Ninewah Province, near the Syr-ian border. It figured prominently in Abu Musab al-Zar-qawi’s strategy of fomenting sectarian violence toundermine the American effort in Iraq due to its ethnicmakeup of 75 percent Sunni and 25 percent Shiite Turk-men. Tal Afar had been cleared of insurgents once before,in September 2004, but the United States did not leave anadequate force to maintain security. Insurgents reclaimedTal Afar within a month, besieging police stations and forc-ing terrified residents to flee the city or retreat into tribalcompounds. By November 2004, Tal Afar had replaced Fal-luja as a center of the insurgency.

Sunni nationalists and extremists known as Takfiri hadaligned to seize control of the city and use it as a base foroperations. They employed brutal violence to control thepopulace; methods included leaving headless corpses ly-ing on city streets for days. The Shiite police force was lit-tle better than a sectarian death squad, likewise leaving atrail of bodies as a vicious cycle of fear and sectarian vio-lence choked the life out of the city. Meanwhile, Tal Afarbecame a transit point for foreign fighters arriving fromSyria and a support base and sanctuary for insurgents toorganize, train and equip insurgent cells throughoutnorthern Iraq.

As a U.S. Central Command staff officer, COL McMasterobserved in 2003 that an insurgency was developing in

Iraq. Upon taking command of 3rd ACR in 2004 followingits redeployment from Operation Iraqi Freedom I, COLMcMaster implemented a training strategy based on clas-sic counterinsurgency doctrine, including cultural trainingand emphasis on intelligence, information operations andcivil affairs. Fortunately, two of the 3rd Armored CavalryRegiment’s squadron commanders, LTC Chris Hickey andLTC Greg Reilly, had previously commanded in OIF-I andapplied the lessons learned from their experiences with thetheoretical experience of COL McMaster to plan and im-plement a tough and realistic counterinsurgency trainingprogram. The Brave Rifles shed the force-on-force trainingscenarios of the National Training Center and trained in-stead in realistic scenarios with soldiers and Arab-Ameri-cans playing the roles of Iraqis. This training would paytremendous dividends during OIF-III.

Had American forces allowed insurgents to retain con-trol of Tal Afar, they would have ceded the initiative to theenemy in northern Iraq and handed them an importantpropaganda victory. The Brave Rifles did not anticipate or-ders to “clear and hold” in Tal Afar, but there was no unitbetter prepared to conduct a counterinsurgency campaignin Iraq in 2005.

Tactical SituationMission. At the time the 3rd ACR received its orders,

“clear and hold” was not a core doctrinal concept, and guid-ance from senior civilian and military leaders was lacking.Tal Afar was critical to the insurgents’ strategy to incite anethnic and sectarian civil war in Iraq. Having reclaimed thecity once before, the insurgents had the advantage.

Equipment/effects. The Brave Rifles carried nearly a full di-vision’s firepower: the M1A2 Abrams main battle tank, theM3A2 Bradley cavalry fighting vehicle, artillery includingM1064A3 self-propelled 120 mm mortars and six M109A6Paladin 155 mm self-propelled howitzers, M1114 Humveeswith mounted weapons, and organic aviation assets includ-ing AH-64D Apache Longbows, OH-58D Kiowas and UH-60Black Hawks. Dismounted cavalry troopers carried M4 orM16 rifles, M249 squad automatic weapons and M240B ma-

62 ARMY n June 2009

MAJ Jay B. Baker, M.D., U.S. Army, served as regimental sur-geon of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Tal Afar, Iraq,from 2005 to 2006. He is a board-certified emergency physiciancurrently serving as the chief of the Emergency Department atthe 121st Combat Support Hospital in Seoul, Republic of Ko-rea. He received his medical degree from the University ofSouthern California in 2000 and completed his emergencymedicine residency at Los Angeles County Medical Center in2004. An earlier version of this article won the LettermanAward for best battle analysis at the Army Medical Depart-ment’s Captain Career Course in September 2008.

A U.S. Army OH-58D Kiowa

helicopter from the3rd Armored

Cavalry Regiment(ACR) conducts acombat air patrolover the ancientcity of Tal Afar inFebruary 2006.

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chine guns, M14 sniper rifles, M500 12-gauge shotguns, and60 mm and 80 mm mortars. The insurgents’ weapons in-cluded AK-47 Kalashnikov rifles, rocket-propelled grenades,mortars, rockets and various types of improvised explosivedevices (IEDs), including triple-stacked and shaped charges.The insurgents employed their weapons asymmetrically, ter-rorizing the local population into passive support throughkidnappings, beheadings and public executions as well asexploiting Tal Afar as a centerpiece of their propaganda cam-paign following the fall of Falluja. The 3rd ACR possessedsuperior equipment, but the insurgents held the advantagein effects.

Terrain and weather. The city of Tal Afar consisted of a con-founding variety of urban terrain, ranging from modernmultistory buildings, garages and small alleys to districts

with ancient caves and subterranean catacombs. The insur-gents held the advantage.

Troops available. The regiment’s 2nd (Sabre) Squadron re-ceived the primary mission for Tal Afar. Sabre Squadron tookwith it three Bradley troops, two Abrams troops, a howitzerbattery, a combat engineer company, a Kiowa troop and anoperationally controlled Special Forces team, and it waspaired with an Iraqi army brigade and the Iraqi police force.The unit requested additional combat forces and received 1stSquadron assets throughout operations in Tal Afar as well ascontrol of the 2nd Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regi-ment, 82nd Airborne Division, from September to December2005. The insurgents’ force was estimated as mustering be-tween 500 and 1,000 men. The magnitude of American andCoalition forces gave the 3rd ACR the advantage.

June 2009 n ARMY 63

SGT DavidSchafroth, 3rd ACR,conducts a combatpatrol in Tal Afar inFebruary 2006.Thecampaign to re-claim the city em-phasized principlesof full spectrum op-erations, includingthe simultaneousapplication of offen-sive, defensive andstability operations.

Crews and M1 Abrams tanks attached to the 3rd ACR, also known as the Brave Rifles,maneuver in the streets as they conduct a combat patrol in Tal Afar in February 2005.

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Time. Many local recruits grew up in the city and conse-quently knew its environs intimately. Having controlledthe city since November 2004, the insurgents had the ad-vantage of time.

Civil considerations. The 3rd ACR recognized the long-term importance of securing the civilian population andgaining their support for the Iraqi government. The insur-gents demonstrated their true intentions to the people ofTal Afar by their brutality but retained a powerful strangle-hold on the city through intimidation and fear. The 3rdACR had the advantage—if it could learn to leverage it.

The Battle for Tal AfarSabre Squadron moved north from Baghdad to western

Ninewah Province in April 2005, to be joined subsequentlyby the rest of the regiment the next month, and was struckby three IEDs on its first convoy into the area. Fortunatelythere were no casualties, but how fully the insurgents con-trolled the city was sobering.

Before transferring authority from the outgoing unit,Sabre Squadron suffered its first casualties when an IEDcomposed of six or more stacked 122 mm artillery roundsexploded beneath a Stryker, killing four soldiers. The insur-gents had welcomed the Brave Rifles to ancient Ninewah.

Early in May, Sabre Squadron began to improve securityby placing Iraqi army patrol bases along Alternate SupplyRoute Santa Fe, a vital artery between Syria and Mosul, toprovide overwatch and security. The result was an imme-diate decrease in IED attacks. Meanwhile, Sabre Squad-ron’s commander, LTC Hickey, began to study the localpower structure by spending most of his time each weekvisiting Tal Afar’s Sunni and Shiite sheikhs. By the end ofthe month, the unit developed a clearer picture of the situ-

ation in Tal Afar: The insurgent centers of gravity were theSarai and Qadisiyah Districts, including the city’s hospital.More fundamentally, LTC Hickey began to understand thereasons for the popular alienation that sustained the insur-gency, which included tacit local support, sectarian retalia-tion and persistent ill will from prior American operationsin Tal Afar. He also observed that low rates of educationand literacy and a 75 percent unemployment rate made thepopulation especially vulnerable to insurgent subversion.

COL McMaster and LTC Hickey reasoned that changingthe environment in Tal Afar would be more productive

and enduring than continuing a search-and-destroy mis-sion against “whack-a-mole” bands of insurgents. The 3rdACR sought to drive a wedge between the Sunni national-ists and the Takfiris by adjusting its information operationsto emphasize that they were intended to help the Sunnis—not punish them. Fair and respectful treatment of de-tainees as well as rigorous adherence to detainee process-ing standards persuaded fence-sitters to join the Coalitioninstead of the insurgents. Sabre Squadron also exploitedintelligence from new informants—for instance, conduct-ing an operation in June that killed 20 insurgents and de-tained 23 high-value targets.

The 3rd ACR established joint operations from the startwith its counterpart, the Iraqi army 3rd Division, and mu-tually determined how to deploy forces throughout thearea of operations. A strong team was chosen from the reg-iment to facilitate this vital partnership and was placed atthe Iraqi 3rd Division headquarters. This included opera-tions, intelligence, communications and logistics as well asliaison staff functions. In addition to the already embeddedmilitary training teams, this was essential to executing the

64 ARMY n June 2009

Soldiers with the3rd ACR conduct a

combat patrol inTal Afar in Febru-ary 2006. The in-

surgents’ brutalityand intimidation ofthe civilian popula-

tion complicatedthe Brave Rifles’

mission.

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scale of coordination that the regiment intended.By the close of August, conditions were right to flush the

main body of insurgents from Tal Afar. Sabre Squadronhad executed more than 1,500 reconnaissance patrols, 111cordon and searches, and 46 raids, resulting in the destruc-tion of more than 900 enemy weapons, including artillerypieces, and captured more than 200 insurgents whilekilling more than 130. Simultaneously, 1st Squadron se-cured the border with the Iraqi border defense forces bysuch measures as destroying a chain of safe-house loca-tions stretching from Syria to Tal Afar. American forcesalso constructed a 12-kilometer berm around the city tocontrol traffic in and out of the population center and denymaneuverability to the insurgents. Most critically, perhaps,the constant diplomacy of LTC Hickey with the local tribaland city leaders and COL McMaster with Tal Afar’s mayor,Najim Abdullah al-Jabouri, and the Iraqi army 3rd Divi-sion’s MG Khorsheed Saleem al-Dosekey had convincedthe local leaders that the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regimentwould remain in Tal Afar following the operation to buildsecurity forces and infrastructure and help the local gov-ernment navigate the bureaucracy of the Iraqi government.

More than 3,000 American and 5,500 Iraqi soldiers andpolicemen amassed outside the city in preparation for theassault, while the coming offensive was publicly an-nounced and thousands of people vacated the city. Thelargest single operation in the battle for Tal Afar, OperationRestoring Rights, kicked off with a three-day assault on theSarai neighborhood as Sabre Squadron descended uponthe insurgents’ stronghold from both north and southwhile 1st Squadron formed an anvil of force on the city’swest side. Fighting was occasionally fierce and manybuildings were damaged, but it wasn’t close to the destruc-tion of Falluja nearly a year earlier. By the end of the com-bat phase, the 3rd ACR had lost only two troopers com-pared to insurgent losses of 150 killed and more than 600detained.

The efforts of both the Iraqi army and the Iraqi policewere essential to the success of Operation Restoring Rights.The Iraqi army provided two brigades of combat power, re-ceived the full attention of division assets and leadership,and executed the same mission and tasks as U.S. forces. The

Mosul chief of police participated in planning and assignedan effective leader as Tal Afar chief of police. During theclear phase, the police conducted population control, de-tainee operations, intelligence gathering and checkpointoperations. A primary reason the Iraqi army and Iraqi po-lice were successful was that they had strong leaders whocooperated with one another and did not let sectarian dif-ferences or parochial concerns interfere with the mission.U.S. forces fostered this cooperation through combined re-hearsals and situation updates, intelligence sharing andregular meetings. Sabre Squadron’s leadership was highlyeffective in promoting information sharing and regularface-to-face contact that helped the Iraqi army and Iraqi po-lice work together.

True to their promise, 2nd Squadron remained in Tal Afarto maintain security following combat operations. Thenewly arrived 2nd Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regi-ment (White Falcons), 82nd Airborne Division, received re-sponsibility for the Sarai and Hassan Qoi Districts for thenext four months. Both Sabre Squadron and the White Fal-cons established company-sized patrol bases in the city, nolonger commuting to the fight, and became neighbors withthe people they were tasked to protect. LTC Hickey colo-cated his squadron headquarters with those of the Tal Afarcity police and Sabre’s partner Iraqi army brigade in the oldOttoman fortress in the city’s center. A joint operations cen-ter was established there that included civil, military, po-lice, fire and other representatives, offering improved ac-cess for citizens willing to share information.

With security more firmly established, rebuilding TalAfar could begin in earnest. Initiatives included develop-ment of essential services, education projects, police sta-tions, parks and other reconstruction projects. LTC Hickeystated in Military Review:

Restoring the community’s faith in the hospital was one of thekeys to our strategy of restoring confidence in the Iraqi govern-ment. The other keys were restoring confidence in the city gov-ernment, getting the judicial system operating, improving theschools, getting markets reopened and people to work, im-proving the food distribution system, improving power andwater services, and restoring trust in the Iraqi security forces.

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Soldiers from the 3rd ACR conduct cordon and search operations in Bi’aj, Iraq, once a rest stopfor Sunni Arab insurgents traveling to the northern cities of Tal Afar and Mosul in January 2006.

Civil Affairs teams managed more than $4 million inprojects designed to restore normal life to the city while se-curity continued to improve. Early warnings of attacks be-came common as the people of Tal Afar grew confident inthe Iraqi security forces and the Coalition’s commitment toensure their security.

The Iraqi army and Iraqi police played critical roles in se-curing the victory after major combat operations in Opera-tion Restoring Rights. They participated in humanitarianassistance operations, controlled key routes in and out ofthe city, secured important infrastructure and constructionassets, recruited police candidates, deterred crime, and co-operated with local government and tribal infrastructure.They conducted regular foot patrols of markets andarranged support contracts with localbusinesses. In all, more than 1,000 newpolice officers were added to the TalAfar police force, and four police sta-tions were rehabilitated. The Iraqiarmy and Iraqi police were acceptedby the vast majority of the populationbecause of their demonstrated actionsfor the benefit of Tal Afar’s citizens.

Sabre Squadron continued to per-form combat missions, albeit in re-duced form. Prior to the October 2005constitutional referendum, insurgentsunleashed three devastating attacks inTal Afar, killing scores of Iraqis andwounding many more. Tal Afar’s citi-zens refused to buckle—more than17,000 citizens voted in Iraq’s constitu-tional referendum in October, and morethan 40,000 cast ballots in December’snational elections. By the time the 3rdACR redeployed in February 2006, at-tacks in Tal Afar had dropped from 170to fewer than 20 per month, most of

which were ineffective. Challenges re-mained, but the fear and terror thatgripped the city upon the 3rd ACR’s ar-rival were no longer present. Normallife was returning to the city.

Overt achievements were the key tovictory in Tal Afar for the Iraqi peopleand their government. The partner-ship between the Iraqi army, Iraqi po-lice and the 3rd ACR created synergythat afforded Tal Afar and its environsa period of security and stability that

was unimaginable prior to Operation Restoring Rights.

SignificanceIn the short term, the battle for Tal Afar severely dis-

rupted al-Zarqawi’s ability to use the city as the center forinsurgent operations in northern Iraq. The improved secu-rity conditions allowed the people of Tal Afar as a majorityto reject the Takfiri’s brand of hatred and violence and to en-joy life and peace in their city once again. They also voteden masse in the October constitutional referendum and theDecember national elections. In February 2006, as the 3rdACR redeployed, al Qaeda in Iraq bombed the Samarramosque, abruptly shifting the war in Iraq into a new phaseof civil war.

June 2009 n ARMY 67

U.S. and Iraqi soldiers, their mission to disrupt insurgentsafe havens and clear weapons caches, cross an intersec-tion during a security patrol in Tal Afar in September 2005.

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SSG Len Danhouse, 3rd ACR, conductsa combat patrol in Tal Afar in February2006. Attacks in the city were reducedfrom 170 to fewer than 20 per month bythe time the Brave Rifles redeployed.

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In the long term, the 3rd ACR’s successful application ofthe principles of full spectrum operations and counterin-surgency—before new field manuals (FM) were written—showed the rest of the U.S. Army, joint forces and Coalitionforces how to successfully conduct counterinsurgency inthe current conflict. The surge of American troops in Iraqwas successful not only because combat troops were in-creased in Baghdad, but also because those combat troopswere employed according to principles of success in coun-terinsurgency warfare, demonstrated first in Iraq by the 3rdArmored Cavalry Regiment in Tal Afar.

AnalysisThe 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment successfully applied

principles of full spectrum operations in Tal Afar, which, ac-cording to FM 3-0 Operations, “combine offensive, defensiveand stability or civil support operations simultaneously … toseize, retain and exploit the initiative … informed by a thor-ough understanding of all variables of the operational envi-ronment.” Full spectrum operations emphasize the impor-tance of initiative, which the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regimentseized in Tal Afar by steady persistence born of preparationthat shaped the operating environment and created opportu-nities. In September, initiative was decisively wrenchedaway from the insurgents when Operation Restoring Rightsswept away the insurgent infrastructure and created a vastlymore secure environment, enabling stability operations to ac-celerate exponentially.

The U.S. Army’s preferred method of command and con-

trol in full spectrum operations is mission command, whichexpresses the commander’s intent and then gives subordi-nates the greatest possible freedom of action. For example,one of the regimental lines of operation was civil-military op-erations. Without specific guidance, the regimental surgeonled a regimental medical civil-military operation that en-gaged frequently with the Tal Afar hospital, offering assis-tance, collaborating in problem solving and improving thecapability of the Iraqi government to care for its people. Asthis operation developed and was implemented over severalmonths, it was fully supported and resourced by the regi-mental commander and staff, enabling its success.

Full spectrum operations require simultaneous applicationof offensive, defensive and stability operations, which the3rd ACR demonstrated successfully. Offensive operationsthroughout deployment, and particularly during OperationRestoring Rights, demonstrated the importance of intelli-gence-driven operations to precisely target attacks on insur-gents and their strongholds, avoiding further antagonizingthe population through overuse of force. The enemy was dis-rupted and dislocated from its physical bases, American andCoalition forces safely occupied the city in progressivelygreater depth, and the insurgents were further isolated fromthe population by increased human intelligence.

An important role of defensive operations in full spec-trum operations is to establish a shield behind which stabil-ity operations can progress. This was the case in Tal Afar asstrategic terrain, such as the castle and the hospital, was se-cured and occupied, creating safe locations for the localpopulace to meet with 3rd ACR leaders to discuss and planstability operations.

The 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment’s achievements in sta-bility operations, particularly after Operation RestoringRights, were the key to its success in Tal Afar. Primary stabil-ity tasks include civil security, civil control, restoration of es-sential services, support to governance, and support to eco-nomic and infrastructure development. The 3rd ACRworked with Coalition units to establish civil security in TalAfar by limiting the insurgents’ influence and isolating theinsurgents from the people. Essential services and infrastruc-ture were vastly improved after Operation Restoring Rights:More than $60 million was pumped into the city by Civil Af-fairs and the Iraqi government. When the 3rd Armored Cav-alry Regiment redeployed in February 2006, more than 95percent of the city enjoyed electricity for 20 hours or moreeach day. Local governance was improved as the judicial sys-tem was reestablished, and the city government had begunto meet regularly to address local grievances.

The 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment achieved the firstcampaign victory in Operation Iraqi Freedom in Tal Afar in2005–06. New field manuals—including FM 3-24 Coun-terinsurgency, FM 3-0 Operations and FM 3-07 Stability Oper-ations—formally established as core Army doctrine theprinciples employed successfully by COL McMaster andLTC Hickey in Tal Afar. The counterinsurgency campaignof the Brave Rifles in Tal Afar helped shape how the Armyand joint forces will fight for at least a generation. M

68 ARMY n June 2009

SPC Antoine Davis, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Bat-talion, 37th Armored Regiment, 1st Armored Division,patrols a residential street in Tal Afar in August 2006.

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