Tallahassee Police Department · The Tallahassee Police Department (TPD) is a full-service law enforcement agency with an authorized strength of 355 sworn officers and approximately

Tallahassee Police Department

Review and Assessment

June 2015

Police Executive Research Forum 1120 Connecticut Avenue NW, Suite 930 Washington, DC 20036

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..............................................................................................................5

NATIONAL CONTEXT .......................................................................................................................6

METHODOLOGY ..............................................................................................................................6

REPORT STRUCTURE......................................................................................................................7

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................................................7

IMPLEMENTATION ...............................................................................................................................7 USE OF FORCE...................................................................................................................................8 REPORT WRITING.............................................................................................................................12 FIELD TRAINING PROGRAM ...............................................................................................................13 INTERNAL AFFAIRS INVESTIGATIONS AND COMPLAINT RESOLUTION.....................................................14 HIGH-RISK OPERATIONS...................................................................................................................15 SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS................................................................16

ADDITIONAL ISSUES......................................................................................................................16

PATROL TIME ...................................................................................................................................16 EARLY INTERVENTION SYSTEM..........................................................................................................17

USE OF FORCE ISSUES: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE .......................................................19

OBJECTIVE REASONABLENESS.....................................................................................................19

DE-ESCALATION...........................................................................................................................21

USE OF FORCE REPORTING ..........................................................................................................21

ECW USE ....................................................................................................................................22

TRANSPARENCY ...........................................................................................................................22

INTERACTING WITH PERSONS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS ....................................................................22

SHOOTING AT VEHICLES...............................................................................................................23

SCENARIO-BASED FIREARMS TRAINING ........................................................................................23

BODY-WORN CAMERAS................................................................................................................23

PROCEDURAL JUSTICE .................................................................................................................24

TALLAHASSEE USE OF FORCE POLICY..........................................................................................25

DEFINITIONS.................................................................................................................................25

CONTINUUM OF FORCE .................................................................................................................27

THE IMPORTANCE OF DE-ESCALATION IN TPD USE OF FORCE POLICY AND TRAINING..........................29

ENHANCED VASCULAR NECK RESTRAINT......................................................................................30

RESTRICTIONS ON SHOOTING AT MOVING VEHICLES .....................................................................30

USE OF FORCE REPORTING—DRAWN FIREARM SITUATIONS .........................................................31

USE-OF-FORCE REPORT WRITING.................................................................................................31

USE-OF-FORCE MEDICAL AID .......................................................................................................33

USE-OF-FORCE INTERNAL AFFAIRS INVESTIGATIONS.....................................................................33

ELECTRONIC CONTROL WEAPONS ................................................................................................34

OVERALL POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS ..............................................................................................34 SECTION I: TRAINING AND CARRYING REQUIREMENTS........................................................................35 SECTION II: APPLICATION PROTOCOLS ..............................................................................................35 SECTION IV: MEDICAL AID PROCEDURES...........................................................................................38

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS REGARDING DEPARTMENT USE-OF-FORCE POLICY...........................38

UTILIZING THE DEPARTMENT WEBSITE TO INCREASE TRANSPARENCY ...........................................39

CRISIS INTERVENTION...................................................................................................................39

BODY-WORN CAMERAS................................................................................................................40

REPORT-WRITING ....................................................................................................................42

TEMPLATE AND NARRATIVE STYLE REPORTS................................................................................42

REPORT REVIEW PROCESS AND ACCOUNTABILITY ........................................................................43

RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY..............................................................................................43 TIME FACTOR...................................................................................................................................43

REPORT WRITING TRAINING..........................................................................................................44

REPORT WRITING TRAINING FOR INVESTIGATIONS.........................................................................45

FIELD TRAINING PROGRAM ...................................................................................................46

FIELD TRAINING SCHEDULE ..........................................................................................................47

EXTENDING FIELD TRAINING .........................................................................................................47

RECRUIT OFFICER RETENTION......................................................................................................48

SELECTION OF FIELD TRAINING OFFICERS ....................................................................................49

INCENTIVES FOR FIELD TRAINING OFFICERS..................................................................................50

INVESTIGATION FIELD TRAINING....................................................................................................51

INTERNAL AFFAIRS .................................................................................................................52

CONDUCTING INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS......................................................................................52

COMPLIANCE REVIEWS.................................................................................................................57

IMPROVED ACCESS ON WEBSITE...................................................................................................58

IA RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING SERIOUS INJURY OR DEATH......................................................58

HIGH-RISK OPERATIONS ........................................................................................................60

GENERAL ORDER 26, HIGH RISK INCIDENT ...................................................................................60

FIRST OFFICER AND SUPERVISOR RESPONSIBILITIES .........................................................................60 WATCH COMMANDER/INCIDENT COMMANDER....................................................................................61 INTERNAL AFFAIRS RESPONSIBILITIES ...............................................................................................61

GENERAL ORDER 75, TACTICAL APPREHENSION AND CONTROL TEAM ..........................................62

TAC TEAM TRAINING........................................................................................................................62 OPERATIONAL PLANS AND CHECKLISTS .............................................................................................62 THREAT MATRIX ...............................................................................................................................63 APPROVAL PROCESS........................................................................................................................63

OTHER FINDINGS REGARDING ARRESTS AND SEARCH WARRANT REVIEW.....................................64

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS........................................65

DE-CONFLICTION OF NARCOTICS INVESTIGATIONS ........................................................................68

CURRENT IN-SERVICE TRAINING ..........................................................................................69

FAIR AND IMPARTIAL POLICING .....................................................................................................71

CONCLUSION............................................................................................................................74

THE BIGGER PICTURE: RE-ENGINEERING POLICE TRAINING..........................................................76

NEXT STEPS FOR THE TALLAHASSEE POLICE DEPARTMENT ..........................................................79

Tallahassee Police Department Review and Assessment June 2015

Police Executive Research Forum Page 5

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The City of Tallahassee, Florida contracted with the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) to provide a review and assessment of the Tallahassee Police Department’s (TPD) policies and procedures in six areas:

• Use of force; • Incident report writing; • The department’s field training program; • Internal affairs investigations and complaint resolution; • High-risk operations; and • Special investigations and confidential informants.

The study was requested by the Chief of Police to ensure that the policies of the Tallahassee Police Department reflect best practices, following several high-profile police incidents over the last several years. The department is accredited1 through the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) and has policies in each of the areas listed above. However, although accreditation standards mandate that the agency have a policy, CALEA does not generally provide detailed guidance on the content of the policy. Therefore, PERF’s review focused on policy content to ensure that it represents best policing practices. As a part of this assessment process, PERF conducted on-site visits in October 2014 and January 2015. More than 70 interviews were conducted. These interviews included the police chief, command staff, unit supervisors, and focus groups of officers, sergeants, lieutenants, and civilian personnel. The TPD provided numerous documents for review including the agency’s General Orders (GO). The City of Tallahassee is located in Leon County in the panhandle of Florida. It is the state capital and home to Florida State University, Florida A&M University and Tallahassee Community College. The city had an estimated 2013 population of 186,411.2

The Tallahassee Police Department (TPD) is a full-service law enforcement agency with an authorized strength of 355 sworn officers and approximately 69 civilian personnel. Sworn officers at the rank of officer, sergeant, and lieutenant are all represented by the Police Benevolent Association, but are employed under two separate union contracts. 1 The TPD was initially accredited in March 1986 and was last reaccredited in March 2014. 2 http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/12/1270600.html



National Context Controversial national events involving police departments in the latter half of 2014 are encouraging many agencies to take a careful look at their policies, training and practices regarding use of force and other high-risk operations. The Tallahassee Chief of Police and his command staff initiated this review prior to these high-profile police use-of-force incidents, based in part on TPD’s own recent history. TPD should be recognized for seeking an independent review and assessment of the department. As agency leaders review each particular recommendation in this report, they should consider them in a larger context of ensuring that effective communication skills and de-escalation are crucial components of officers’ tactical training. Across the country, officers are being trained to better understand individuals suffering from mental illness or disabilities, post-traumatic stress disorder, alcohol and drug addiction, and other conditions such as autism that can cause individuals to behave in erratic manners. Officers must learn to recognize these issues and de-escalate the encounter whenever possible. In 2012, PERF published “An Integrated Approach to De-Escalation and Minimizing Use of Force3.” The publication discusses the best practices employed by many police departments for responding to incidents involving mentally ill persons or other conditions. And in 2015, PERF published “Defining Moments for Police Chiefs,” which discusses more general de-escalation strategies designed to prevent minor incidents from escalating to the point where police use of force is required.4

Methodology PERF’s assessment of the TPD was targeted on use of force and high-risk and sensitive issues. Three primary methodologies were used for the collection of information: data collection, review and analysis; interviews; and personal on-site observations. Documents provided by the department and reviewed by PERF included:

• UCR crime records; • TPD position allocations;

3 http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Series/an%20integrated%20approach%20to%20de-escalation%20and%20minimizing%20use%20of%20force%202012.pdf 4 http://www.policeforum.org/assets/definingmoments.pdf



• Agreements with employee organizations; • Contracts, memorandums of understanding, mutual aid agreements, etc. between the TPD

and other justice or law enforcement agencies which have an impact on city police services;

• Use-of-force reports and internal affairs investigations; • TPD statements of mission, vision and values; • Department policies and procedures; • Department training course documents and curricula; and • Department reports, including strategic plans and annual reports.

PERF’s analysis of information was both quantitative and qualitative. PERF identified current conditions and business practices, then compared them to progressive practices in policing, taking into consideration TPD’s policing environment. Interviews conducted with stakeholders examined previous high-profile police incidents, current department practices, departmental policy, training, and community views and expectations.

Report Structure In this report, recommendations are highlighted and italicized. Where specific policy language is recommended, it is indented, identified in a different font, and preceded by “Suggested Language.”

Summary of Recommendations The following section provides a brief summary of the recommendations for best practices in the areas that were reviewed.

Implementation

PERF recommends that TPD conduct department-wide in-service training for all sworn personnel regarding the changes to use-of-force policy and practice that are put in place as a result of this assessment. The recommendations in this study cannot be institutionalized merely by making policy changes and distributing the new policies to department members. Rather, the department must provide a special one-time training on the changes in use-of-force policies and practices, followed up with annual in-service training that provides a comprehensive, integrated approach to use-of-force issues. It must include discussion of de-escalation strategies, both as a general practice and with respect to police encounters with persons who have a mental illness, mental disability, or other conditions that can limit their understanding or cause them to behave erratically. Furthermore, the department should expand its training using scenario-based exercises, and provide additional training on Electronic Control Weapons (ECWs) and tactical and firearms training that is designed to combine different topics



and to mirror the types of situations that officers encounter in the field. Use-of-force training should not be fragmented, with different aspects addressed days or weeks apart from each other. This retraining and subsequent annual in-service training should also be supported with frequent reminders in roll-call briefings. Revised use-of-force policies, such as imposing strict new limits on shooting at vehicles, eliminating the Enhanced Vascular Neck Restraint as a force tool, and changes in the use of ECWs, need discussion, illustration and practice. In addition, the TPD should seek to integrate into a single training course Defensive Tactics, Verbal Defense and Influence (stressing de-escalation), Procedural Justice and Police Legitimacy, and Fair and Impartial Policing. An integrated course would allow TPD to substantially re-engineer its approach to use of force. The TPD should brief community leaders on these changes and involve them in the implementation process. The department’s involvement of community members in its recent Fair and Impartial Policing training is an excellent step in this regard. Both internal and external implementation challenges must be addressed. By continually expanding and improving its meetings with the public and involving community leaders in the change process, the TPD will advance the concepts of transparency and legitimacy.

Use of Force

PERF recommends that the TPD shift from a policy based only a use-of-force matrix, or continuum, to a system based on the concept of “objective reasonableness,” as defined in the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark 1989 case Graham v. Connor. Objective reasonableness requires officers to gauge the level of a subject’s resistance and respond with the appropriate level of force based on the totality of circumstances. (This shift to an objective reasonableness model should also be reflected in TPD policies that are not covered in this assessment, to ensure that all training and policy documents are consistent with this approach.) PERF recommends that the TPD continue to mandate a second yearly firearm qualification course as currently mandated in General Order 70 (Firearms) Section III, A. At least one of the two yearly courses should expand the department’s use of scenario-based and tactically oriented training. Scenario-based tactical training has been well received by officers and is critical to ensuring that the department will continually review its use-of-force policy and prepare officers for critical incidents, including active shooter situations, potential cross-fire situations, and use of concealment and cover. During this training, de-escalation strategies and tactics should be emphasized, and the training scenarios should include situations where the use of no force is a desirable outcome. In other words, officers should be taught that in some minor, low-stakes encounters, the safest outcome may be for the officer to disengage and do nothing



more, or to decide that further action at a later time is a better option. For example, “in the case of a suspect whose identity is known to the police, if the person flees from a confrontation and is not considered a threat, police can consider whether to arrest the person later at his home, rather than engaging in a potentially dangerous pursuit.” 5 This course should also expand the use of scenarios involving dealing with special populations, including persons with mental illness or disabilities, homeless persons, emotionally distressed persons, and persons under the influence of drugs or alcohol. PERF recommends that the TPD improve General Order 60, Use of Force, by clarifying or adding more precise definitions of key terms. For example, the TPD should add the definition of Objectively Reasonable Force to its use of force policy. References to “non-deadly force” should be replaced with “less-lethal force,” because less-lethal options sometimes can result in death. (For example, an Electronic Control Weapon or less-lethal projectile may cause a person to fall and suffer a fatal head injury.) PERF’s recommendations with regard to these clarifications or additions are accompanied by suggested language where applicable. Similarly, PERF recommends that the TPD improve its definitions of the types of resistance that people use against officers, and the different levels of control tactics that may be employed for each type of resistance. Suggested language is included in the report. PERF recommends that the TPD prohibit choke holds and neck restraints (Enhanced Vascular Neck Restraint) as use-of-force options. The TPD’s use of force policy should include an absolute prohibition against shooting from a moving vehicle, or shooting at a moving vehicle when the vehicle itself is the only “weapon” being utilized by a suspect. This is a national best practice which has been in place in the New York City Police Department since 1972. PERF recommends that the use-of-force reporting policy regarding the display of a firearm be modified so that reporting is required when an officer points a firearm at a subject as a threat or a show of force.

5 See “Critical Issues in Policing Series: Defining Moments for Police Chiefs.” Police Executive Research Forum. 2015. Page 58. http://www.policeforum.org/assets/definingmoments.pdf



PERF recommends that the TPD modify General Order 60 Section VII, F regarding Use-of-Force Report to require that all officers involved in a use-of-force incident complete their own use-of-force report. The option currently exists for one officer to complete the report for all involved officers. This change will help to ensure a more complete review of use-of-force incidents by supervisors. PERF recommends that the TPD modify General Order 60 Section VII, E regarding Use-of-Force Report to reflect that the captain is the final level of the review process in the officer’s chain of command. Current language indicates that it is the officer’s watch commander or division lieutenant who completes the review. Currently, use-of-force report review ends at the captain level in practice, but this has not formally been reflected in General Order 60. PERF recommends the TPD modify General Order 60 Section VIII. B. to state: “The Internal Affairs Unit and the Training Section will produce quarterly reports that compile use-of-force incidents to ascertain policy and/or training needs and to determine trends. The quarterly report will be sent to the Chief of Police.” This will ensure that the department stays abreast of changes in officers’ use of force, so that prompt action can be taken if necessary. The TPD should require that sergeants respond on-scene to all use of force incidents where the suspect is injured or complains of an injury or where there is injury to the officer or another person. The sergeant should interview witnesses and secure any video recordings of the incident. This information will provide the sergeant with a fuller picture of the incident when he or she reviews the use-of-force report. PERF recommends that the TPD revise General Order 60, VI regarding Use of Force to state: “Officers should summon E.M.S. (Emergency Medical System) after a use of force encounter when the officer is injured, when the suspect is injured or complains of injury, and when a third party is injured or complains of injury as a result of the use of force.” This change will help to ensure that any injuries are diagnosed and treated by medical professionals promptly. PERF recommends that the TPD revise General Order 60, VIII, D regarding Use of Force to be more specific about how a policy violation will be investigated. The policy should reflect that complaints of excessive or inappropriate use of force will be investigated by the Internal Affairs Unit. When training inadequacies are discovered as a result of such investigations, the Training Coordinator should be immediately notified to revise and implement



the correct training to the individual officer or to all sworn personnel as needed. In all cases of policy violations or training inadequacies, the Chief of Police should be promptly informed. PERF recommends a number of enhancements to the TPD’s Electronic Control Weapon (ECW) policy, General Order 7, Electronic Control Device.

• The TPD should amend the term used to describe the “Taser” from the currently used “Electronic Control Device” to “Electronic Control Weapon” (ECW). “Electronic Control Weapon” is becoming the preferred term in police departments nationwide because it more accurately describes the nature of this less-lethal weapon.

• The TPD should consider merging General Order 7 regarding the ECW into General Order 60, the department’s overall Use-of-Force policy, to maintain consistency by having all use-of-force weapon directives contained in one use-of-force policy.

• The TPD should adopt brightly colored (e.g., yellow) ECWs for all patrol officers to decrease the possibility that a secondary unit will mistake a black ECW for a firearm.

• Policy should clarify that ECWs generally should not be used against elderly persons, young children, visibly frail persons, and handcuffed subjects.

• Policy should be strengthened to reflect the risks of repeated ECW applications. • Policy should be changed to reflect, from Taser’s website: “Legal: Product Warnings:

Law Enforcement Warnings.” https://taser.cdn.prismic.io/taser%2F9127899a-ad40-4bd8-a474-4f525fcd46cc_law-enforcement-warnings.pdf, regarding “preferred target areas” to “reduce cardiac risks.” (Page 3.)

• Other recommendations are made in the body of the report to bring the TPD policy in line with national ECW guidelines produced by PERF and the Justice Department’s COPS Office in 2011.6

PERF recommends that the TPD reorganize its various use-of-force General Orders, departmental memos governing force, and Standard Operating Procedures into one Use-of-Force policy. This would create one master document that officers can refer to. Subsections should be numbered consecutively within General Order 60, Use of Force. For example, would be General Order 70, Firearms, would become General Order 6.1. General Order 7, Electronic Control Device, would become General Order 6.2, etc. As required by CALEA, an agency’s

6http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Free_Online_Documents/Use_of_Force/electronic%20control%20weapon%20guidelines%202011.pdf



written directive system should permit rapid access to department policy. This recommendation should assist in that approach. PERF recommends that the TPD generally post its General Orders online, in order to increase transparency to the community. In cases where making this information available could jeopardize public safety, such as detailed tactical response procedures, policy could be excluded or redacted where necessary. While TPD has trained approximately half its officers in crisis intervention, PERF recommends that the TPD continue CIT training for the remaining officers. At a minimum, all officers should attend “Mental Health First Aid” training to learn the signs of mental health illness and/or addiction.7 This training also teaches officers how to assess a mental crisis situation and what resources can be used to help persons with mental illness. Based on the number of mental health and alcohol-related incidents TPD responds to, CIT training is a necessary and practical tool, and providing it to all officers would greatly benefit the department.

PERF also recommends that the city and the TPD establish plans to form crisis intervention teams, which pair police officers with mental health care providers. Such teams in other jurisdictions are often available seven days a week and can be dispatched by 911 operators. The teams are most often used in police encounters with mentally ill persons, suicidal threats, emergency commitments, drug- and alcohol-related crisis, and other crisis situations. Incorporating a combination of officer and mental health providers specially trained to handle crisis intervention events would serve as an asset to the city. Efforts should be made to also provide this critical training to Communications Center 911 staff. A model to be examined is in place in the Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office8.

Report Writing

PERF recommends that the TPD use an all-narrative report style that contains the elements for report writing, including the basic approach of covering “who, what, when, where, how, and (if known) why.” This will make reports more uniform and easier to read, and will often save detectives the time they currently spend gathering information that responding officers had access to, but failed to include in their reports.

7 “Mental Health First Aid.” National Council for Behavioral Health. http://www.mentalhealthfirstaid.org/cs/ 8 “Palm Beach County CIT.” http://www.citinfo.org/



PERF recommends that the TPD promote consistency among supervisors so that all supervisors will hold their subordinates accountable for providing clear, concise and accurate reports that are free of errors. With close supervision and accountability, officers will learn what is and is not acceptable in their reports, and their report writing will improve over time. PERF recommends that the TPD provide all officers with report-writing training during in-service training. This training should cover the basic elements required in a report, and should show examples of acceptable and unacceptable reports. Officers identified as consistently poor report writers should be sent to remedial training. Supervisors should also receive training in this area so that they have consistent and fair expectations and will hold officers to the same standards for error-free reports. Additionally, report-writing training should coincide with the 2015 implementation of the TPD’s new automated reporting software program, to ensure that every part of report-writing is covered appropriately. Consideration should be given to creating an interactive software-driven report-writing manual, keyed to the new system. PERF recommends the TPD add advanced report-writing training to the CID training program for new detectives. Current training can provide more instruction on the skills needed for well-written investigative reports.

Field Training Program

PERF recommends that the TPD recruit and hire potential officers prior to their entry into the Police Academy. Because most of those attending the academy pay their own way, local departments are left with competing for graduates from a self-selected pool. By recruiting, selecting and hiring candidates before the academy starts, TPD can enhance diversity and focus on recruits who exhibit the potential to be the best officers in the Tallahassee community. PERF recommends that the TPD enhance the existing TPD Recruit Mentor Program to include mentoring the recruit officer throughout the academy, (not just when a recruit is hired at the end of an Academy class). The mentoring program would coincide with academy sponsorship. Mentors should be veteran officers with no disciplinary issues. They should reflect the diversity of recruits in race, gender and/or ethnicity. The mentor should stay in touch with the recruit throughout training and provide the recruit with guidance and support to ensure



completion of all training. The mentor should not be a part of the recruit officer’s training staff, so that the recruit will have someone outside the training process for information sharing. PERF recommends that the TPD consider enhancing and adding incentives for Field Training Officers (FTO). This will help encourage more experienced officers to apply for the position. One incentive could be adding points to the promotional process and /or specialized unit selection process for officers with FTO experience. Another incentive may be using the FTO experience as a prerequisite or priority qualification for various training programs. As incentives to become an FTO are added to the program, the applicant pool will increase and allow TPD to select the best officers to serve as FTOs. PERF recommends that the TPD develop and implement a stand-alone “Fair and Impartial Policing” policy, strictly prohibiting biased-based policing in addition to the training the department has been delivering. TPD has provided Fair and Impartial Policing training to patrol officers, and the training should be reinforced by policy. The TPD has biased-based policing prohibitions throughout many of its general orders. Suggested language is included in the body of this report.

Internal Affairs Investigations and Complaint Resolution

PERF recommends that TPD rename “Internal Investigations” as “Category 1 Investigations” and “Contact Reports” as “Category 2 Investigations.” Category 1 investigations (such as an allegation of excessive use of force) would be more serious in nature and handled by Internal Affairs. Category 2 investigations (such as an allegation of rudeness or discourtesy) would be handled by field or investigative supervisors or watch commanders. A new process to assess a citizen service dissatisfaction complaint should be added and categorized as an “Inquiry.” An Inquiry might be a question about whether a traffic citation was valid and typically be handled by a supervisor. Each of these changes is described in the report. PERF recommends that TPD assemble a comprehensive policy and procedure manual that includes specific directives to address the steps required for a patrol or investigative supervisor or watch commander to complete a thorough Category 2 Investigation. Topics that should be covered include: the documentation required (with examples), state laws and regulations, locating and interviewing witnesses, prohibiting leading or hostile questions, judging witness credibility, probing inconsistencies in witness/officer statements, and other investigative tasks.



PERF recommends that the TPD Internal Affairs (IA) unit enhance its compliance review, as cited in policy, by creating a process where the IA lieutenant meets quarterly with the department majors and training section supervisors to discuss trends in vehicle pursuits and use of force. This group should be briefed on vehicle pursuits and use-of-force cases to determine if any police tactics, training, or equipment needs further evaluation. If concerns are identified, the IA lieutenant is responsible for briefing the Chief of Police immediately and ensuring that follow-up is conducted and documented as part of the compliance review process. PERF recommends that the TPD should make the links on the department’s homepage to file a complaint (or to compliment an officer) more intuitive. Wording such as “File a complaint” and “Compliment an officer” are easier for the public to understand than currently used terms. PERF recommends that the TPD make its complaint and compliment forms—both online and paper versions—available through a variety of channels (such as community centers, libraries, local advocacy group offices, government offices, and businesses), and make the forms available in English and Spanish versions. To increase transparency with the community, PERF recommends that TPD make its IA annual report readily available to the public on the department’s website.

High-Risk Operations

PERF recommends that TPD add language to General Order 26, II, A and General Order 26, III, A, to describe the responsibilities of the first officer and supervisor on scene respectively regarding confirmation of a high-risk incident, that the first responding officer and supervisor MUST ensure the agency has the legal authority to remain involved in the incident. PERF recommends that TPD add language to General Order 26, IV, regarding the responsibilities of the watch/incident commander to include establishing a staging area for responding officers and establishing a news media area. PERF recommends that TPD add a section at the end of General Order 26 requiring a immediate debriefing to be held by the watch/incident commander at the end of any high-risk operation, followed by a more thorough review and report to be forwarded through the chain of command to the chief of police. An after-action report is identified in General



Order 75 which identifies the role of the TPD’s Tactical Apprehension and Control Team, but it should be included as well in General Order 26. PERF recommends that TPD add language regarding the role, responsibility, and selection of Crisis Negotiations Team members in General Order 75, since it is identified in the policy as part of the TAC Team. CALEA standard 46.2.4 requires that the selection of these positions be described in a department policy.

Special Investigations and Confidential Informants

PERF recommends that the TPD add the specific wording from Florida Statute 914.28.3.a to General Order 62, Management of Confidential Informants and Criminal Investigation Division Standard Operating Procedure 36. This Florida law states that a law enforcement agency that uses confidential informants shall inform each person who is requested to serve as a confidential informant that the agency cannot promise inducements such as a grant of immunity, dropped or reduced charges, or reduced sentences or placement on probation in exchange for serving as a confidential informant. General Order 62.VI.A. and Standard Operating Procedure 36.V.A. have language similar to this, but do not specifically tell an officer to make this notification to the person. PERF also recommends that the TPD add specific wording from Florida Statute 914.28.3.b to both General Order 62, V.B and Standard Operating Procedure CID 36, requiring the agency to inform the potential confidential informant that the value of his or her assistance as a confidential informant and any effect that assistance may have on the confidential informant’s pending criminal matters can be determined only by the appropriate legal authority.

Additional Issues Two areas outside the scope of this study came to PERF’s attention as important aspects of TPD operations, with respect to patrol time and the department’s Early Intervention System:

Patrol Time

While conducting this assessment, PERF staff heard multiple concerns from those interviewed that patrol personnel had little time for proactive policing efforts, including community policing and problem–solving policing. In addition, this was observed first hand when PERF staff conducted ride-alongs in various areas of the city.



Calls for service response and self-initiated work are both vital parts of patrol operations. A major difference between the two is that a police agency has little say over when calls for service are received. Members of the public call the police when they need the police, and they usually expect the prompt arrival of a uniformed officer. Although some departments are able to influence this workload to some extent – for example, by separating urgent calls necessitating an immediate high-priority response from non-urgent calls that may permit a delayed response – the times of day when calls originate cannot be controlled by the police. Self-initiated work is undertaken by patrol officers when they are not responding to calls. The more time that is spent responding to calls for service, the less time there will be for important self-initiated work, such as developing problem-solving strategies with the community to respond to crime and disorder problems. Moving forward, the TPD should conduct a workload analysis study to review current demand for police service and to create additional time for proactive policing.

Early Intervention System

TPD uses an Early Intervention System (EIS) (called the “Early Intervention Program”) to review trends and conduct audits of officers’ behavior, such as use-of-force reports, sick leave, and numbers of cases in which subjects’ most serious charge was resisting arrest. The TPD’s EIS uses the IAPro software system, which is used by many law enforcement agencies across the United States and is generally accepted as a highly effective product. Early Intervention Systems are considered a best practice by the U.S. Department of Justice; the DOJ Civil Rights Division, which has the authority to investigate local police agencies for patterns or practices of federal civil rights violations, often requires departments to develop an EIS with certain specific features, as part of consent decrees. Interviewees indicated that TPD is in the early stages of fully utilizing all the features of the software system. Although not part of the scope of this study, PERF recommends that the TPD review a number of publications regarding early intervention systems to make sure their system is fully compliant with what is being required in consent decrees. This review would provide the department with an understanding of how to enhance the agency’s current EIS capabilities. Examples of these publications include Sam Walker’s book on EIS, a U.S.



Department of Justice Community Oriented Policing Services publication on EIS, and a 2006 PERF publication.9

This concludes the Executive Summary of this report.

9 Walker, Samuel, Stacy Osnick Milligan, Anna Berke. 2005. Supervision and Intervention Within Early Intervention Systems: A Guide for Law Enforcement Chief Executives. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum. http://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p105-pub.pdf Also by the same authors: Strategies for Intervening with Officers through Early Intervention Systems: A Guide for Front-Line Supervisors. http://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p093-pub.pdf Gibbs, Mike and Carolyn Kendrick. 2011. Enhancing Cultures of Integrity -- Technical Assistance Guide: Building Law Enforcement Early Intervention Systems. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. http://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p052-pub.pdf Police Executive Research Forum. Civil Rights Investigations of Local Police: Lessons Learned. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum. 2013. http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Series/civil%20rights%20investigations%20of%20local%20police%20-%20lessons%20learned%202013.pdf



USE OF FORCE ISSUES: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE PERF’s assessment makes a number of recommendations regarding TPD’s use-of-force policy contained in General Order 60, Use of Force. PERF’s recommendations are based on a national perspective regarding changes in thinking within the policing profession regarding best policies and practices for use of force. Some of these changes go back decades, while others have been emerging over the past year, as a result of major incidents of police use of force in the United States that have generated headlines around the world. Following is a background discussion of national use-of-force issues:

Objective Reasonableness A review of a police department’s use of force typically begin with an assessment of an agency’s current policy to determine the extent to which it embraces the concept of “objective reasonableness.” This term was used by the U.S. Supreme Court in its landmark ruling on police use of force, Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). In the past, police policies and practices on use of force often were based on concepts of “continuums” or “matrices,” in which particular actions by a criminal suspect were matched, step for step, with different tactics by officers. For example, an officer encountering “active resistance” by a suspect would use empty-hand tactics or chemical agents, and if the suspect’s actions rose to the level of “active aggression,” the officer would respond with impact weapons or an Electronic Control Weapon. 10 However, these models proved problematic, for several reasons. A rigid use-of-force continuum does not allow for consideration of all of the factors that an officer might reasonably consider in making choices about force options, such as the number of officers at the scene, and the size and strength of the officer compared to the size and strength of the suspect. Furthermore, a use-of-force continuum “seems to imply that an officer must exhaust all efforts at one level on the continuum before proceeding to the next,” and continuums can be “complex and difficult to remember, potentially leading to dangerous moments of delay by an officer during a critical incident.”11

10 Police Executive Research Forum. “Exploring the Challenges of Police Use of Force.” 2005. Page 48. http://www.policeforum.org/assets/chiefconcernsuseofforce.pdf 11 Ibid.



In its Graham ruling, the Supreme Court itself suggested that a “mechanical” approach (such as a step-by-step continuum) is not appropriate, and that an individualized approach in which officers consider all of the factors of a situation is what is needed. The key language in the Graham12

decision states the following (emphasis added):

Claims that law enforcement officials have used excessive force in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other “seizure” of a free citizen are Post properly characterized as invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees citizens the right “to be secure in their persons … against unreasonable seizures,” and must be judged by reference to the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness” standard. The Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” inquiry is whether the officers’ actions are “objectively reasonable” in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to [officers’] underlying intent or motivation. The “reasonableness” of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene, and its calculus must embody an allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second decisions about the amount of force necessary in a particular situation…rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight…. Because the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application,…its proper application requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.

Thus, officers should assess situational factors, such as (1) the size, ability, and defensive tactics expertise of the officer, (2) the number of officers present during the encounter, (3) the presence of innocent persons, (4) the weapons or other restraint devices that are available to the officer such as pepper spray and ECWs, and (5) whether the subject’s identity is known and he or she can be arrested more safely at a later time. Officers must also assess legal requirements and department policies when deciding what type of force, if any, may be used to effect an arrest or protect bystanders.

12 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)



De-Escalation Another key element of police use of force is the concept of de-escalation,13 a tactic that many police agencies are incorporating into their use-of-force policies, training and practice. In some situations, de-escalation techniques are designed to prevent unnecessary conflicts from occurring between officers and persons they encounter – for example, by teaching officers to recognize signs of mental illness or other conditions that may prevent a person from understanding what an officer is saying or ordering the person to do. In other situations, de-escalation involves ratcheting down tensions with hostile or noncompliant persons, in order to prevent them from becoming violent in ways that will require the officer to respond with physical force. Recently, there has been increasing discussion in the policing profession about teaching officers that in some low-stakes encounters, the safest outcome may be for the officer to disengage and do nothing more, or to decide that further action at a later time is a better option, rather than escalating minor conflicts until they reach a point where police use of force is necessary.14

Forward-thinking police chiefs note that many encounters are dynamic in nature, and that police use of force may be justified at one moment but not justified a few seconds later, because a situation may escalate and then de-escalate. Most de-escalation techniques are verbal in nature and seek to gain suspect compliance. In some cases, de-escalation focuses on teaching officers to reduce the amount of force they are using as the suspect’s resistance decreases.

Use of Force Reporting As agencies review their use of force policies, the process by which officers file reports on force incidents must be reviewed as well. Special attention is given to policy that facilitates accurate and authentic reporting, requiring that officers thoroughly articulate the facts of an incident in a narrative format, without the use of generic or boilerplate language and wording. Similarly, use-of-force review and investigation processes are being reviewed to ensure that each use-of-force report is examined for thoroughness and accuracy at all levels in the review process, and is not being “rubber stamped” for expediency’s sake. Deadly force investigations are also being given

13 See “Critical Issues in Policing Series: An Integrated Approach to De-Escalation and Minimizing the Use of Force”, the Police Executive Research Forum, August 2012. http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Series/an%20integrated%20approach%20to%20de-escalation%20and%20minimizing%20use%20of%20force%202012.pdf 14 “Critical Issues in Policing Series: Defining Moments for Police Chiefs.” Police Executive Research Forum. 2015. Page 58. http://www.policeforum.org/assets/definingmoments.pdf



renewed focus to ensure that they receive the same rigorous assessment, regardless of the outcome of the incident (for example, all officer involved shooting investigations should focus on the officer’s intention to use deadly force, not on whether the officer actually shot the suspect as opposed to shooting and missing, or on whether the suspect was killed or only suffered a minor injury.)

ECW Use Many police agencies are continuing to assess their policies, training and practices regarding Electronic Control Weapons (ECWs), such as Tasers™. Reviews frequently involve comparing agency policy against best practices described in “2011 Electronic Control Weapons Guidelines,” produced by the Police Executive Research Forum and the U.S. Justice Department’s Office of Community Oriented Police Services.15 PERF compared TPD’s electronic control weapons policies to these guidelines.

Transparency Police departments are working to make their use-of-force policies and practices more open and transparent to the communities they serve. Typically, many agencies elect to make their General Orders, such as the use-of-force policies, available online in their entirety.

Interacting with Persons with Mental Illness Another area of review when examining use-of-force policies is the practices and training regarding police interactions with persons who are mentally ill or have other conditions that cause them to behave erratically or to have difficulty understanding or acting on what an officer might say to them. Many departments are providing their officers with Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) training—a comprehensive block of training, typically 40 hours long, that provides officers with training on how to identify those having a mental health crisis, how to intervene in incidents involving the mentally ill, and how to provide mentally ill persons with referrals to local treatment services and other resources in order to help manage the underlying problem instead of merely responding again and again to similar incidents involving a mentally ill person. In some agencies, officers volunteer to undergo CIT training and are placed on special teams that

15http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Free_Online_Documents/Use_of_Force/electronic%20control%20weapon%20guidelines%202011.pdf



respond to such incidents, while some agencies mandate that every officer be trained in crisis intervention. CIT was another area of TPD policies assessed by PERF.

Shooting At Vehicles Increasingly, police agencies are reviewing their policies regarding shooting at moving vehicles or from moving vehicles. PERF has long called for strict policies that officers should not shoot from a patrol car or other moving vehicle, and should not shoot at a moving vehicle if the vehicle is the only “weapon” being used against the officers. (This policy does not apply to situations where a suspect is firing a gun from a moving vehicle.) If a suspect is driving directly toward an officer, the officer may be able to step aside and out of danger, but in any case, shooting the driver will not offer a greater degree of safety to the officer or to bystanders. A dead or incapacitated driver at the wheel of a speeding vehicle is no less dangerous. This is a national best practice which has been in place in the New York City Police Department since 1972. PERF makes recommendations for the TPD in this area.

Scenario-Based Firearms Training Another area of review in PERF’s assessment is an emphasis on firearms training that moves beyond traditional training in marksmanship and shooting at still targets from a fixed distance in a low-stress environment. Police departments are increasingly ensuring that both recruits and in-service officers receive realistic, scenario-based training through computer-based firearms training simulators, simunitions16 training, or paint ball exercises. These exercises are generally well received by officers, because they allow department trainers to provide a wide variety of situations that more closely replicate the complex, quickly changing, high-risk situations that officers encounter in the field. TPD’s firearms training was assessed by PERF.

Body-Worn Cameras Many police agencies also are increasingly examining the implementation of body-worn camera programs for patrol officers. Body-worn cameras offer great potential for providing video and audio evidence of what exactly happened in policing incidents, revealing any misconduct by officers while also protecting officers against false accusations of misconduct, and demonstrating transparency to the communities served by the police. At the same time, departments that deploy 16 Simunition is a trademark name for frequently used “paintball” type ammunition used in police training, see http://simunition.com/en/.



body-worn cameras must carefully consider a number of issues, such as situations in which officers should be given discretion to turn cameras off (for example, interviewing crime victims who do not wish to be recorded in a video that police may later be required to release to the public under Freedom of Information laws). PERF describes these issues in its 2014 publication “Implementing a Body-Worn Camera Program: Recommendations and Lessons Learned.”17 PERF makes recommendations on this issue for TPD.

Procedural Justice Much of the effort that police agencies are taking with regard to use-of-force policies, practices, and training relates to issues of police legitimacy and procedural justice. The degree to which residents of a community believe their police department treats them in a fair and even-handed manner—especially with regard to police use of force—greatly influences the degree to which they consider police actions to be “legitimate.” If there is a widely held perception in the community (or in certain neighborhoods) that the police use excessive force, the police will be viewed as illegitimate. Conversely, if the police are viewed as using force only when necessary, then the police will be viewed as legitimate. Perceptions of legitimacy affect whether the police can be successful in achieving their mission, because crime reduction and other police goals require cooperation from community members, such as a willingness to give police information about what is happening in a neighborhood and who is committing crimes.18

17 Implementing a Body-Worn Camera Program: Recommendations and Lessons Learned. Police Executive Research Forum and the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. (2014) http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Free_Online_Documents/Technology/implementing%20a%20body-worn%20camera%20program.pdf 18 For details, see “Legitimacy and Procedural Justice: A New Element of Police Leadership.” Police Executive Research Forum, 2014. http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Free_Online_Documents/Leadership/legitimacy%20and%20procedural%20justice%20-%20a%20new%20element%20of%20police%20leadership.pdf



Tallahassee Use of Force Policy The Tallahassee Police Department’s use of force policy is contained in General Order 60, Use of Force, last revised on 9/30/2010. The current TPD use-of-force standard in General Order 60 is contained in “Section V: Continuum of Force,” which provides a continuum of force model with six levels of resistance by a suspect and six levels of officer response. The sections below detail PERF’s recommendations regarding improvements to the department’s use-of-force policy.

Definitions Use of force definitions are identified in General Order 60, Use of Force. The TPD can improve General Order 60 by adding more precise definitions of key terms. The following recommendations are provided to enhance existing policy language.

Recommendation: The TPD should replace the current definition of Force with more substantive language. Force is currently defined as “the amount of ‘active power, strength or energy’ necessary to overcome a suspect’s physical resistance.”

Suggested Language19: Force means the following actions by a member of the department: any physical strike or instrumental contact with a person, or any significant physical contact that restricts the movement of a person. The term includes, but is not limited to, the use of firearms, electronic control weapons20 (ECW), chemical spray, bean bag shotgun, pepper ball gun, hard empty hands, the taking of a person to the ground, or the deployment of a canine. The term does not include escorting or handcuffing a person with no or minimal resistance.

19 This language is derived from definitions PERF has found in a variety of agencies where PERF has reviewed use of force policies 20 In 2011, PERF and the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Community Oriented Policing Services released “2011 Electronic Control Weapons Guidelines.” This book serves as a guideline for all agencies regarding policy, training, use, medical considerations, reporting and accountability, and public information and community relations. The publication specifies the change in terminology from Conducted Energy Device and other terms to Electronic Control Weapon (ECW). http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Free_Online_Documents/Use_of_Force/electronic%20control%20weapon%20guidelines%202011.pdf



Recommendation: The TPD should add the definition of Objectively Reasonable Force to its use-of-force policy in the definitions section of General Order 60 to reflect the department’s shift away from a use-of-force continuum to a philosophy of objective reasonableness as defined by the U.S. Supreme Court.

Suggested Language: Objectively Reasonable Force is that level of force that is appropriate when analyzed from the perspective of a reasonable officer possessing the same information and facing the same circumstances as the officer who actually used force. Objective reasonableness is not analyzed with hindsight, but rather will take into account, where appropriate, the fact that officers must make rapid decisions regarding the amount of force to use in tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving situations. This policy guideline applies to all uses of force, not only the use of deadly force. See U.S. Supreme Court, Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).

Recommendation: The TPD should remove the definition of “Non-Deadly Force” from the department’s use of force policy. All applications of force carry a potential risk, however infrequent, for serious injury or harm. The department should substitute the term “Less-Lethal Force,” which is any use of force other than that which is considered deadly force. The department should also change all references to Non-Deadly Force in General Order 60 and related policies to Less-Lethal Force.

Suggested Language: Less-Lethal Force is any use of force other than that which is considered deadly force. Less-lethal force is not intended or reasonably likely to result in death or serious injury, but all applications of force carry a potential risk of serious injury. Less-lethal devices include OC pepper spray, ECW, pepper ball gun, bean bag shotgun, and the baton.

Recommendation: The TPD should amend the definition of Less-Lethal Force as currently stands in the policy. The department’s definition of less-lethal force currently states “Any force utilizing a firearm loaded with less lethal munitions.” This definition of Less-Lethal Force should be replaced with the suggested language in the previous recommendation. References to current Less-Lethal Force in General Order 60 and related policies should be replaced with the verbiage “Less-Lethal Munitions.” Recommendation: The TPD should include “Unnecessary Use of Force” and “Excessive Use of Force” in the definitions section of General Order 60.

Suggested Language: Unnecessary use of force is the application of force where there is no justification for its use. Excessive use of force is the application of more force than required in situations where some use of force is necessary.



Continuum of Force General Order 60, V, Use of Force explains the TPD’s procedures regarding a continuum of force. The following recommendations are provided to enhance the TPD policy.

Recommendation: The TPD should replace its description of physical resistance in “Section V, Continuum of Force (A) Levels of Resistance by a Suspect” with the following definitions and suggested language.21

Suggested Language: Types of Resistance: It is important that officers are aware that there may be many reasons a suspect may resist arrest. The individual may not be capable of understanding the gravity of the situation as a result of a medical, mental, physical, language or hearing impairment. Although this may not make the individual any less dangerous, it may require officers to change tactics that may be more effective in various situations without jeopardizing officer safety. Various types of resistance are identified below:

Compliant: A person who follows lawful orders and offers no passive/active resistance, aggressive resistance, or aggravated aggressive resistance. Passive Resistance: A person who is not complying with an officer’s commands and is uncooperative, but is only taking minimal physical action to prevent an officer from placing the subject in custody and taking control. Examples include standing stationary and not moving when directed to move, refusing to move under their own power, and locking arms to another during a protest or demonstration. Active Resistance: A person whose verbal or physical actions are intended to prevent an officer from placing the subject under control and in custody, but are not intended to harm the officer. Examples include walking or running away and breaking away from the officer’s grip to flee. Aggressive Resistance: A person who displays the intent to harm the officer, himself or herself, or another person and prevent an officer from placing that person under control and in custody. Examples include a person taking a fighting stance, punching, kicking, striking, and attacking with weapons or other actions which present an imminent threat of physical harm to the officer or another. Aggravated Aggressive Resistance: A person whose actions are likely to result in death or serious bodily harm to the officer, to the

21 This language is similar to language that can be found in the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department’s use-of-force policy, which was updated as part of a collaborative reform effort between the department and the Justice Department’s COPS Office in 2014.



person himself or herself, or to another. Examples include the use of a firearm, use of blunt or bladed weapon, and extreme physical force.

Recommendation: The TPD should replace its description of control levels in “Section V, Continuum of Force (B) Levels of Response by Officers” with the following definitions and suggested language. The suggested language simplifies the current six responses to three levels, and changes the focus from a continuum approach to a “response to resistance” approach based on all relevant factors, in keeping with Graham v. Connor.

Suggested Language:22

Levels of Control in Response to Resistance When use of force is necessary, officers will assess each incident, based on policy, training and experience, to determine which use of force options are believed to be appropriate for the situation and bring it under control in a safe and prudent manner. Officers must only use the amount of force that is objectively reasonable to overcome resistance in order to take lawful action. Levels of control include: Low Level Control: The level of control necessary to interact with a person who is compliant or displaying Passive or Active resistance. This level of control is not intended to cause injury and has a low probability of causing injury. Examples include handcuffing a compliant arrestee or having a suspect assume a prone position during a high-risk vehicle stop. This level of control does not traditionally require use-of-force reporting. This level of control includes but is not limited to: 1. Officer presence, 2. Verbal communication, 3. Handcuffs or other approved restraint device.

Less-lethal Force: The level of force necessary to compel compliance by a subject displaying Aggressive Resistance, which is neither likely to cause death nor intended to cause death. This level of force does require use-of-force reporting. This level of force includes but is not limited to: 1. Empty-hand tactics such as strikes, kicks, or takedowns, 2. Impact weapons such as the baton, 3. OC spray,

22 Comparable police agencies often define examples of suspect resistance. The suggested language for the recommendation mirrors closely that of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department. The department’s policy became effective in 2013 following an extensive collaborative effort with the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. The policy can be reviewed at the link below: http://www.lvmpd.com/Portals/0/OIO/GO-021-12%20Use%20of%20Force%20Signed%20Copy.pdf



4. Electronic Control Weapon, and 5. Bean-bag shotgun.

Deadly Force: Deadly force is that degree of force which is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury. Deadly force can also result from a force option being improperly applied. Deadly force is not limited to the use of a firearm. This level of force includes but is not limited to: 1. Use of a firearm, and 2. Impact weapon such as the baton, striking in the head, neck,

spine, groin, kidneys, etc.

Use of force incidents require the officer to transition to differing degrees or types of force, including attempts to de-escalate the situation, based on the suspect’s actions and responses. Officers must modify and control their level of control and force in relation to the amount of resistance offered by the subject.

The Importance of De-escalation in TPD Use of Force Policy and Training

A 2013 PERF publication titled Civil Rights Investigations of Local Police: Lessons Learned

23reveals that police use of force has been one of the primary issues involved in U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) investigations of local police departments for civil rights violations. One of the key aspects identified by the DOJ as it works with these local police departments on use-of-force reform measures is the use of de-escalation techniques by officers in order to minimize uses of force.

De-escalation techniques include the use of verbal skills to bring a peaceful conclusion to a potentially confrontational event. Such skills are critical when dealing with subjects exhibiting erratic or dangerous behavior due to medical impairment, mental illness or disability, or the influence of alcohol or drugs.

TPD policy articulates de-escalation techniques as an important element when officers are faced with the potential of using force. In December 2013, a memorandum was distributed to TPD staff with respect to General Order 60 which advised, “Based upon the totality of the circumstances, officers, when practical, should attempt to gain control of the situation by using verbal de-escalation, verbal commands, or other verbal distraction techniques. By de-escalating a subject, officers can give the subject the opportunity to comply with lawful commands or distract the subject from the focus of his/her anger and non-compliance.”

23 Civil Rights Investigations of Local Police: Lessons Learned. Police Executive Research Forum, July 2013. http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Series/civil%20rights%20investigations%20of%20local%20police%20-%20lessons%20learned%202013.pdf



Following this memorandum, staff received training in verbal judo, a technique that stresses the use of oral communications skills to de-escalate volatile situations and therefore reduce the likelihood that force will be required to end the incident. Verbal judo techniques are incorporated into the department’s defensive tactics training, using scenarios where de-escalation can be used instead of physical force. In addition, de-escalation is discussed during annual firearms training, which occurs twice a year. Also, newly hired officers were given a one-hour block of instruction on use-of-force issues and communicating with citizens.

Recommendation: The TPD currently mandates two yearly firearm qualification courses as cited in General Order 70, Firearms Section III, A. During at least one of the two yearly firearms courses, the TPD should continue to expand its use of the scenario-based and tactically oriented approach. During this training, it is critical that de-escalation continue to be emphasized, and that some of the training scenarios involve de-escalation and situations in which the use of no force is the most desirable outcome. The course should expand the scenarios involving dealing with special populations, including mentally ill or mentally disabled persons, homeless persons, emotionally distressed persons, and persons under the influence of drugs and alcohol.

Enhanced Vascular Neck Restraint The Enhanced Vascular Neck Restraint is currently placed at the level of deadly force in General Order 60, V, B, 6 Use of Force. PERF recommends that this technique be prohibited.

Recommendation: The TPD should prohibit choke holds and neck restraints (Enhanced Vascular Neck Restraint) as use of force options sanctioned by the department. Precise application of neck restraints is very difficult to control. It's a fine line between unconsciousness and death.

Restrictions on Shooting at Moving Vehicles As TPD policy currently reads in General Order 60 Use of Force, the only guidance to officers regarding shooting at moving vehicles is that “Gunshots at or from moving vehicles are strongly discouraged.” There is no language about the potential consequences of hitting the driver of a moving vehicle and other likely outcomes. If an officer is afraid that he/she is about to be run down, shooting the driver will not offer a greater degree of safety. A dead or incapacitated driver at the wheel of a vehicle speeding at the officer is no less dangerous. A ban on such shootings has been in place in the New York City Police Department since 1972, with no known harmful consequences to the officers.



Recommendation: The TPD use of force policy should include an absolute prohibition of shooting from a moving vehicle, or shooting at a moving vehicle if the vehicle is the only “weapon” targeting the officer. This prohibition is a best practice in American policing.

Suggested Language: Officers shall not discharge their firearms from a moving vehicle, or at a moving vehicle or its occupants, unless the occupants are using deadly physical force against the officer or another person present, by means other than the vehicle itself.

Recommendation: The TPD should change policies that are not covered in this assessment to ensure all appropriate training and policy documents reflect the department’s move from using a use of force matrix, or continuum, to a system of objective reasonableness. Objective reasonableness requires officers to gauge the level of a subject’s resistance and respond with the appropriate level of force based on the totality of circumstances.

Use of Force Reporting—Drawn Firearm Situations Current TPD policy in “General Order 60, VII, A, 5 Use of Force” states that a use-of-force report is to be completed when officers “remove their handgun from the holster or their shoulder firearm is deployed for use, and there is a subsequent citizen/suspect encounter or confrontation.” This means that if a citizen is on the scene and observes the officer’s weapon drawn (for example, the officer is responding to a break-in and unholsters his or her handgun to conduct a sweep of the premises, and a citizen observes the officer in doing so), the officer is required to complete a use-of-force report. This policy should be amended so that reporting is required when the firearm is pointed at a subject and is being used as a threat or show of force.

Recommendation: The TPD should replace the wording in General Order 60, VII, A, 5 Use of Force with the suggested language below.

Suggested language: “A use-of-force report is required when an officer points any firearm at a subject when the firearm is being used as a threat of force.”

Use-of-Force Report Writing Incidents of use of force by TPD officers must be documented by the involved officers into the IAPro Blue Team software system.24 These reports are completed using a drop-down list and are

24 IA Pro is a software based internal affairs management tool used by many law enforcement agencies.



often cut and pasted directly from the incident report. Currently, the primary officer involved in a use-of-force episode completes the report for him/herself and for any other officers who also used force during the incident. (Other officers may elect to complete a report themselves, but currently it is not mandatory). The officer’s sergeant, followed by his or her lieutenant and captain, then reviews the report. The TPD training staff also reviews the report. Review of the use-of-force reports is sometimes inconsistent, as the sergeant or supervisor who reviews the offense report is not always the supervisor up the chain-of-command who reviews the use-of-force report. It is important to note that while the TPD chief has implemented report review at the level of captains (a best practice), this practice has yet to be formally incorporated into TPD policy. Once the officer’s captain reviews the report, it is then sent to Internal Affairs for an additional review. At this stage, use-of-force reports are reviewed for completeness, not necessarily justification of the force used. If the use of force led to suspect injury, the department’s legal advisor will review the report as well. Electronic Control Weapon instructors review use-of-force reports for all ECW deployments.

Recommendation: The TPD should modify “General Order 60, VII, F, Use of Force Report” to require that all officers involved in a use-of-force incident complete a use-of-force report. This will provide a more complete picture of use-of-force incidents, as supervisors will hear the perspective of each involved officer, rather than relying on one officer to complete a report detailing the entire use of force, including actions taken by other officers.

Recommendation: The TPD should modify “General Order 60, VII, E, Use of Force Report” to reflect that the captain is the final level of the review process in the officer’s chain of command. Current language indicates that it is the officer’s watch commander or division lieutenant. Currently, use-of-force report review ends at the captain level in practice, but this has not formally been reflected in General Order 60.

“General Order 60, VIII, B, Use of Force” states that “The Internal Affairs Unit and the Training Section will conduct regular reviews of use-of-force incidents to ascertain policy and training needs.”

Recommendation: The TPD should modify “General Order 60, VIII, B, Use of Force,” with the following suggested language:



Suggested Language: “The Internal Affairs Unit and the Training Section will produce quarterly reports that compile use-of-force incidents to ascertain policy and/or training needs and to determine trends. The quarterly report will be sent to the Chief of Police.” (This will ensure that the department stays abreast of changes in officers’ use of force, so that prompt action can be taken if necessary.)

It was stated in interviews that, generally, sergeants review use-of-force reports as they are completed, but there are minimal efforts by sergeants to arrive on-scene to interview witnesses and suspects or otherwise collect information that could serve to check the officer’s report. It was also stated that video recordings from security cameras or other sources near the scene are not retrieved, even though such video could allow supervisors to review uses of force against use-of-force reports to check for consistency and accuracy.

Recommendation: TPD should require that sergeants respond on-scene to use-of-force incidents where the suspect is injured or complains of an injury or where there is injury to the officer or another person. The sergeant should interview witnesses and secure any video recordings of the incident. This information will provide the sergeant with a fuller picture of the incident when he or she reviews the use-of-force report.

Use-of-Force Medical Aid “General Order 60, VI, Use of Force” states that “Officers shall provide appropriate medical aid after use of force encounters, to include assessment, first aid, or summoning of E.M.S. (Emergency Medical Services), for the officer, arrestee or other persons in need.” This language can be made more specific.

Recommendation: “General Order 60, VI” should be revised to state that officers shall provide appropriate medical aid after use of force encounters, to include assessment, first aid, and summoning of E.M.S. (Emergency Medical Services) when the officer is injured, when the suspect is injured or complains of injury, and when a third party is injured or complains of injury as a result of the use of force. This change will help to ensure that any injuries are diagnosed and treated by medical professionals promptly.

Use-of-Force Internal Affairs Investigations “General Order 60, VIII,D, Use of Force” states: “All findings of policy violations or training inadequacies shall be reported to the appropriate unit for resolution or discipline.”



Recommendation: The TPD should revise “General Order 60, VIII, D, Use of Force” to be more specific about how a policy violation will be investigated. The policy should reflect that if the preliminary review called for in VIII, C by the Internal Affairs Unit indicates possible excessive or inappropriate use of force a full investigation will be conducted by the Internal Affairs Unit. When training inadequacies are discovered, the Training Coordinator should be immediately notified to revise and implement the correct training to the individual officer or all sworn personnel as needed. In all cases of policy violations or training inadequacies, the Chief of Police should be promptly informed.

Electronic Control Weapons The department’s Electronic Control Weapon (ECW) policy is contained in “General Order 7: Electronic Control Device.” The department’s policy goes substantively beyond what is required according Florida statute 943.1717(1)(a)(b). However, to bring General Order 7 up to the level of best policing practices, PERF compared the department’s policy to guidelines contained in the PERF/COPS Office publication “2011 Electronic Control Weapons Guidelines.”25 This document provides guidance for all agencies regarding ECW policy, training, use, medical considerations, reporting, accountability, public information, and community relations.

Overall Policy Recommendations

Recommendation: The TPD should merge “General Order 7, Electronic Control Device” into “General Order 60, Use of Force” to maintain consistency by having all use-of-force weapons directives contained in the department’s overall use-of-force policy. Recommendation: The TPD should amend the term used to describe the “Taser” from the currently used Electronic Control Device to Electronic Control Weapon (ECW). This terminology is recommended by the PERF/COPS report in order to emphasize the fact that ECWs are less-lethal weapons that must be handled and deployed with care.

25 “2011 Electronic Control Weapon Guidelines.” Police Executive Research Forum and the COPS Office, U.S. Department of Justice. http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Free_Online_Documents/Use_of_Force/electronic%20control%20weapon%20guidelines%202011.pdf



From this point forward, the report will utilize the term Electronic Control Weapon (ECW) unless specifically quoting portions of the department’s current policy.

Section I: Training and Carrying Requirements

Recommendation: The TPD should consider adopting the brightly colored (e.g., yellow) ECWs for all patrol officers. Police executives have noted that brightly colored ECWs sometimes seem to de-escalate encounters because they are a plainly visible deterrent to persons who might otherwise behave confrontationally. Brightly colored ECWs also decrease the possibility that a secondary unit will mistake the ECW for a firearm.

Section II: Application Protocols

Recommendation: The TPD should replace the department’s description of Drive Stun Application in Section A, 2. Current wording states that the purpose of a drive stun application is to result in pain compliance.

Suggested language: “The drive stun mode should be used only to supplement the probe mode to complete the incapacitation circuit, or as a countermeasure to gain separation between officers and the subject so that officers can consider another force option.” The drive stun mode should not be used as a pain compliance technique.

In addition, the department needs to change the definition of Drive Stun Application contained under the Definitions section of General Order 7 to reflect the above recommendation. Recommendation: The TPD should remove the language in Section C, 1 and C, 2 and replace it with the following suggested language. Current factors listed in TPD’s policy for ECW application are too general. The policy currently states that “factors include, but are not limited to: 1) the person’s age, size, and weight, and 2) the person’s likelihood of causing imminent physical harm to themselves or others.”

Suggested language: ECWs should not generally be used against pregnant women, elderly persons, young children, and visibly frail persons. Personnel should evaluate whether the use of the ECW is reasonable, based upon all the circumstances, including the subject’s age and physical condition. In some cases, other control techniques may be more appropriate as determined by the subject’s threat level to others.



Recommendation: Existing language in Section D states, “Absent a deadly force situation, members shall not target a person’s head, face, neck, or groin with an ECD.” The phrase “Absent a deadly force situation” should be deleted.

• The remainder of section D, 1 should remain as is. • Section D, 2, which prohibits ECW use on pregnant females, should also be

removed, as it is addressed in the prior recommendation. Recommendation: The TPD should add the following language to clarify the current language in Section F. Current language requires, when reasonable, that a verbal warning should be given prior to ECW use, but is unclear as to whether the warning should be given to the suspect (to encourage compliance with officers) or to officers (to warn them that the device is going to be deployed and prevent multiple applications by more than one officer).

Suggested language: “When feasible, verbal warnings should be given to both the subject as well as other police personnel on the scene prior to ECW use.”

Recommendation: The TPD should insert the following language into ECW policy after Section F, to become the new Section G.

Suggested language: “Personnel should use an ECW for one standard cycle (five seconds) and then evaluate the situation to determine if subsequent cycles are necessary. Any subsequent applications should be independently justifiable, and the risks should be weighed against other force options.”

The current Section G now becomes Section H, with each subsequent section re-lettered.

Recommendation: The TPD should remove “absent a deadly force situation” in Section II.I. The section now reads “Absent a deadly force situation, members shall not apply an ECD in the known presence of combustible vapors and liquids, or other flammable substances.” The following language should be used.

Suggested language: “Members shall not apply an ECW in the known presence of combustible vapors and liquids, including alcohol-based Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) spray or other flammable substances.”

Recommendation: The TPD should insert the following language into Section J, which governs the securing of subjects of ECW applications, to become Section J3.



Suggested language: “ECWs should not be used on handcuffed subjects unless doing so is necessary to prevent them from causing serious bodily harm to themselves or others and if lesser attempts of control have been ineffective.”

Recommendation: The TPD should indicate in its policy if ECWs are permitted to be deployed on animals. ECWs can be effective against aggressive animals, so TPD policy should indicate whether such use is permitted26.

Recommendation: The department’s ECW policy should include instructions regarding preferred target areas, in order to comply with Taser’s “Product Warning” document, “TASER Handheld CEW Warnings, Instructions, and Information: Law Enforcement.” On pages 1-3 of that document, the following is stated:27

“CEW exposure causes certain effects, including physiologic and metabolic changes, stress, and pain. In some individuals, the risk of death or serious injury may increase with cumulative CEW exposure. Repeated, prolonged, or continuous CEW applications may contribute to cumulative exhaustion, stress, cardiac, physiologic, metabolic, respiratory, and associated medical risks which could increase the risk of death or serious injury. Minimize repeated, continuous, or simultaneous exposures…. To reduce the risk of injury: 1. Use preferred target areas. The preferred target areas … are below the neck area for back shots and the lower center mass (below chest) for front shots. The preferred target areas increase dart-to-heart distance and reduce cardiac risks. Back shots are preferable to front shots when practicable. 2. Avoid sensitive areas. When practicable, avoid intentionally targeting the CEW on sensitive areas of the body such as the face, eyes, head, throat, chest area (area of the heart), breast, groin, genitals, or known pre-existing injury areas.”

26 “2011 Electronic Control Weapon Guidelines.” Police Executive Research Forum and the COPS Office, U.S. Department of Justice. Guideline No. 33, page 21. http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Free_Online_Documents/Use_of_Force/electronic%20control%20weapon%20guidelines%202011.pdf 27 TASER website: “Legal: Product Warnings: Law Enforcement Warnings.” https://taser.cdn.prismic.io/taser%2F9127899a-ad40-4bd8-a474-4f525fcd46cc_law-enforcement-warnings.pdf Accessed April 13, 2015.



Section IV: Medical Aid Procedures

Recommendation: The TPD should add the following language into Section IV: Medical Aid Procedures.

Suggested language: “Personnel should be aware that there is a higher risk of sudden death in subjects under the influence of drugs and/or exhibiting symptoms associated with excited delirium.”

Recommendation: When information acquired by communications and relayed to responding officers indicates a high potential that an ECW application may be used against a subject, the TPD should request that emergency medical personnel be notified and asked to respond. Recommendation: The TPD should add language at the beginning of Section B requiring the use of gloves prior to probe removal, to avoid contamination by possible blood-borne pathogens. Recommendation: The TPD should add the following language to Section C regarding medical aid following an ECW deployment.

Suggested language: Subjects who have been exposed to prolonged application (i.e., more than 15 seconds) should be transported to an emergency medical facility for evaluation. Personnel conducting the medical evaluation should be made aware that the suspect has experienced ECW activation, so they can better evaluate the need for further medical treatment.

Recommendation: The TPD should add the following language to become the new Section D.

Suggested language: All subjects who have received an ECW application should be monitored regularly while in police custody even if they received medical care. Documentation of the ECW exposure should accompany the subject when transferred to jail personnel or until the subject is released from police custody.

Additional Observations Regarding Department Use-of-Force Policy Currently, guidance on the use of force and use-of-force tools can be found in several types of documents: The department’s General Orders (with separate General Orders for the department’s use-of-force policy and use-of-force tools), departmental memos, and Standard



Operating Procedures. This method is unorganized and can lead to confusion when officers need to reference specific policies and guidelines.

Recommendation: The TPD should reorganize its various Use of Force General Orders, departmental memos governing force, and Standard Operating Procedures. The preferred method would be to create one master document that officers can refer to.

The department should combine all relevant use of force General Orders, departmental memos and Standard Operating Procedures into General Order 60, Use of Force, thereby creating one master document. Subsections could be number sequentially with, for example, “General Order 70, Firearms” becoming General Order 6.1; and “General Order 7, Electronic Control Device” becoming General Order 6.2.

Utilizing the Department Website to Increase Transparency In order to increase transparency with regard to the use of force and the use-of-force investigation and review process, many progressive law enforcement agencies are making their use-of-force policies, internal investigations protocols (and in many instances, their entire set of General Orders) available for view online. This is regarded as a best practice in policing. Three agencies that have posted their policies online are the Seattle, Los Angeles and Anne Arundel County (MD) Police Departments.

• http://www.seattle.gov/police/publications/manual/default.htm • http://www.lapdonline.org/lapd_manual/ • http://www.aacounty.org/Police/RulesRegs/Index.cfm

Crisis Intervention Most police agencies provide broad training in crisis intervention, and some have successfully implemented crisis intervention teams (CIT), made up of specially trained police officers and mental health care providers, that can be called upon when police respond to calls involving persons with behavioral health issues arising from mental crisis or drug and alcohol abuse. The Florida Department of Law Enforcement requires that all certified police officers undergo crisis intervention training as part of the recruit academy. The state does not provide additional specialized training beyond the recruit level. Additional CIT training must be provided by individual police departments that choose to do so.



Recommendation: The TPD has trained approximately half its officers in crisis intervention. The TPD should continue CIT training for the remaining officers. At a minimum, all officers should attend “Mental Health First Aid” training to learn the signs of mental health illness and/or addiction.28 This training also teaches officers how to assess a mental crisis situation and what resources can be provided to help the person with a mental illness. Based on the number of mental health and alcohol-related incidents TPD responds to, CIT training is a necessary and practical tool and would greatly benefit the department. Additionally, all officers should go through annual mental health and de-escalation training as part of in-service training.

Recommendation: The city of Tallahassee and the TPD should plan to establish crisis intervention teams, with a combination of law enforcement officers and mental health providers. Such teams in other jurisdictions are often available seven days a week and can be dispatched by 911 operators. The teams are most often used in police encounters with mentally ill persons, suicidal threats, emergency commitments, drug- and alcohol-related crises, and other crisis situations. Incorporating a working team of officers or a combination of officer and mental health providers specially trained to handle crisis intervention events would serve as an asset to the city. Efforts should be made to provide this critical training to Communications Center 911 staff. A model to be examined, based on the well-known “Memphis Model,” is in place in the Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office.29

Body-Worn Cameras Body-worn camera technology has improved significantly in the last few years, and adoption of this equipment is widely seen as an important element in the future of policing. When used properly, these systems provide audio and visual recordings of incidents where an officer has taken action in response to a call for service or other police activity. There is some evidence that recordings can help an agency resolve complaints; reduce complaints by encouraging officers and community members to behave more politely; prevent false complaints; identify, collect, and preserve evidence; enhance training; reduce use-of-force incidents and assaults on officers; and

28 http://www.mentalhealthfirstaid.org/cs/ 29 “Palm Beach County CIT.” http://www.citinfo.org/



improve first-line supervision. Digital evidence management systems are also available which may assist the agency in maintaining the integrity of its investigations. The TPD does not use body-worn cameras at this time. Many agencies at the local, state and national level are in the process of studying, piloting and implementing body-worn camera programs as a method of maintaining and restoring the public trust. For this reason, the TPD should consider deploying body worn cameras. A careful and diligent review should be conducted prior to implementing the use of this technology, because there are many practical considerations and complex policy issues that must be addressed, such as the privacy rights of crime victims, witnesses, and others who may not wish to have their interactions with police posted online for everyone to see. The Police Executive Research Forum, with support from the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, (COPS Office) published a report in 2014 titled “Implementing a Body-Worn Camera Program: Recommendations and Lessons Learned.”30 This report was completed with the help of the more than 200 police chiefs, sheriffs, scholars, and other professionals who participated in an executive session on this critical topic. The report discusses the perceived benefits of body-work cameras as well as the issues that must be carefully considered, and provides recommendations.

Recommendation: TPD should give consideration to implementing an officer body-worn camera program.

30 Implementing a Body-Worn Camera Program: Recommendations and Lessons Learned. PERF and the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. (2014) http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Free_Online_Documents/Technology/implementing%20a%20body-worn%20camera%20program.pdf



REPORT-WRITING As part of PERF’s review of the TPD with regard to report-writing, several members of the TPD were interviewed to understand the process for submitting reports. Samples of reports were evaluated, and the report-writing training curriculum was studied. TPD’s reports are completed on an automated reporting system, and supervisors then approve them or send them back to the officer for correction. A common complaint is that reports often lack important information, contain grammatical errors, and are unorganized. Officers and sergeants said there is little time to focus on writing and reviewing reports because of the heavy workload. There is a belief that some sergeants conduct superficial reviews in order to save time.

Template and Narrative Style Reports A “template” system was recently deployed to help officers include certain types of information correctly in the body of the report. It features a series of drop-down lists that officers select from, depending on the type of report they are writing. The template became a substitute for the traditional narrative style report. While most required information is found in the template style reports, they are difficult to read and can be confusing. Template style reports reviewed by PERF lacked substantial content, which make it difficult for a detective to conduct a proper follow-up. PERF’s review of sample narrative reports revealed that most had the basic information required, but many had typos and grammatical errors, which sometimes make it impossible to know the intended meaning. Reports must be written with the “customer” in mind. Although the primary customer is the detective performing a follow-up investigation, other people also read police reports, including police managers, court personnel, prosecutors, defense attorneys, insurance companies, the news media, and citizens. It is important that everyone should be able to read police reports and know exactly what occurred for any incident.

Recommendation: The TPD should revert back to an all-narrative style report that contains the basic elements for report writing. These elements are “who, what, when, where, how, and (if known) why.” Reports will become uniform and easier for “customers” to read. It is especially important that reports are thorough, so detectives do not waste investigative time gathering information that the responding officer had access to but did not include in the report.



Report Review Process and Accountability The following sections describe TPD’s report review process and make recommendations for improvements.

Responsibility and Accountability

PERF interviews of TPD employees suggest that some supervisors may not be holding officers accountable for errors in report writing. The numerous errors in some reports suggests that some supervisors approve reports without reading them. There are also many supervisors who are very diligent in requiring officers to correct their errors. The result is a mixed quality of reports ranging from poor to excellent. Supervisors may need further training on reviewing reports for accuracy and grammatical errors.

Recommendation: The TPD should require all supervisors to hold their subordinates accountable for clear, concise, and accurate reports that are free of errors. As supervisors demonstrate a lack of tolerance for poorly written reports, subordinates will improve in this area. In turn, supervisors are responsible and should be held accountable themselves for making sure reports are in line with TPD standards.

Time Factor

One common issue raised regarding report writing was lack of time. Officers feel there is not enough time to write reports, and sergeants say they have very little time to properly review reports. Some sergeants review reports during off-duty hours. TPD officers frequently spend their work hours going from call to call, and at times are unable to stop long enough to write their reports. It was found that many sergeants also respond to handle calls when officers are busy and no one is available to handle a call for service. If the majority of officers are not completing their reports until the end of their shift, a backlog of reports for the supervisor to review will occur. Having a significant backlog may prompt supervisors to quickly approve reports and not give them the attention they deserve.

Recommendation: The TPD should direct watch commanders to review work flow processes regarding report writing to ensure that officers are given enough time during their shift to complete reports.



Report Writing Training Report writing is first taught in Basic Recruit Training Programs certified by the state during the “Communications” portion of training.31 Upon graduation from the Academy, Tallahassee recruit officers receive an additional 30 hours of report-writing training during TPD’s eight-week in-house training program. Subsequently, during field training, officers write reports of the calls they respond to, when needed. These reports are critiqued by their Field Training Officer, who provides immediate feedback. These represent multiple opportunities to provide instruction and guidance on proper report-writing skills. PERF reviewed the post-academy in-house “Report Writing” lesson plan. The lesson plan is five pages long and outlines goals and objectives for the class. The stated goal is to “prepare the newly hired officer to document incidents in a format that meets agency standards.” Lesson plans should be constructed according to the SMART principle (i.e, stated goals should be specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, and time-bound)32 . One current objective states, “The student will know when to write a report and why to write a report.” A more specific instruction would say, “The student will list the circumstances under which he/she is required to write a report, and articulate the reasons why reports have to be written.” The organization of the lesson plan could be improved. Each learning objective should be the heading of a section. Each section should contain information for the instructor on how the objective will be achieved. Sub-sections can contain specific teaching points that will help structure the lesson plan in blocks of instruction to build the recruits’ knowledge in a planned sequence.

Recommendation: The TPD should revise the current “Report Writing” lesson plan. The objectives in the lesson plan need to be written so they are measurable and attainable. Goals should be specific so the officer can understand what is expected of her/ him to achieve the objective. The lesson plan also needs to be organized by block of instruction. It should be sequenced to teach recruits when they need to write a report, and why reports are needed. It should then teach recruits how to interview those involved and what questions need to be asked. Recruits need to know how to check state

31 file:///E:/PERF/Tallahassee/Basic%20Recruit%20Training%20Lesson%20Plan%20for%20Florida.pdf 32 topachievement.com/smart.html



statutes to determine the elements of the crime they are investigating, and how to include them in the report. They need to be taught how to ensure that the report is comprehensive, thorough and yet concise. Practical exercises should be the dominant method of instruction so that recruits will become more competent in providing the proper content, structure and grammar. Recommendation: The TPD should provide officers with report-writing training during in-service training that covers the basic elements required in a report. Officers should be given samples of acceptable and unacceptable reports, so they understand what is expected of them. If an officer is identified as a consistently poor report writer, he or she should be sent to remedial training. Supervisors should also be provided with training in this area so they have consistent and fair expectations, and so that all officers are held accountable to the same standards for error-free reports. Recommendation: TPD is implementing an improved automated reporting software program in 2015. Report writing training should coincide with the new software training to ensure that the training is consistent with the new system. Consideration should be given to creating an interactive software-driven report-writing manual keyed to the new system.

Report Writing Training for Investigations Concern was expressed at varying levels that follow-up investigative reports written by detectives need to be improved. The department offers a one-week training program for newly assigned detectives.

Recommendation: The department should add advanced report-writing training to the Criminal Investigation Division training program for new detectives. Instruction is currently provided in how to prepare a subpoena, a search warrant, and an arrest warrant, but the skills needed for well-written investigative reports are not conveyed.



FIELD TRAINING PROGRAM Florida law enforcement officers are certified through a six-month state-approved academy. Students are not TPD recruits/employees when at the academy. The department hires from the pool of state-approved academy graduates, competing with other law enforcement agencies. In the 1990s, TPD sponsored recruit officers while in the Police Academy. The practice was discontinued, because at the time, the TPD felt it was not worth the additional cost. Hiring only academy graduates has a primary drawback. The pool of candidates is self-selected – it is composed of only those who decided they want to become police officers. A department that aggressively recruits and sponsors candidates can have higher standards and can also work to increase the diversity of its work force. The costs involved in paying recruits through the academy are worthwhile, since they allow the department to better shape its workforce.

Recommendation: The TPD should recruit and hire potential officers prior to their entry into the Police Academy. The TPD can be more selective in the hiring process with active recruitment, rather than hiring only from the Police Academy Basic Recruit class. When there is a greater selection of applicants, diversity can be enhanced, and the potential to hire officers who will do well and complete all the training programs will improve.

Recommendation: The TPD should enhance its existing TPD Recruit Mentor Program to include mentoring the recruit officer throughout the academy (not just when hiring at the end of an Academy class). The mentoring program would coincide with academy sponsorship. Mentors should be veteran officers with no disciplinary issues and should reflect the diversity the diversity of recruits in race, gender and/or ethnicity. The mentor should stay in touch with the recruit throughout training and provide the recruit with guidance and support to ensure completion of all training. The mentor should not be a part of the recruit officer’s training staff, so that the recruit will have someone outside the training process for information sharing.

Police Academy training is followed by an eight-week TPD in-house program for new hires/recruits. A significant amount of in-house program time is spent on firearms training. Portions of the in-house training are scenario-based. Once recruits have completed the in-house course, they enter Field Training.



The department’s Field Training program is generally well–respected, according to the range of persons interviewed by PERF. PERF’s assessment of the Tallahassee Police Department’s field training and evaluation program included reviewing field training officer (FTO) selection criteria, field training policy and procedures, Automated Observation Report and Evaluation (ADORE) field training software, the Field Training and Evaluation Program Guide, and discussion with field training officers. TPD uses what it calls a “modified San Jose” field training model33, which involves daily training objectives, daily observation reports by the FTO, and exposing the recruit to several FTOs. A lieutenant serves as the full-time field training coordinator (FTC). Each shift has a field training squad made up of all field training officers and a field training sergeant (FTS).

Field Training Schedule Field training is scheduled for 14 weeks. The training is done in five phases. Each phase gets progressively more difficult, as the recruit is exposed to increasingly complex situations. After successful completion of the first four phases, the recruit advances to Phase V, during which she/he acts as the primary officer; the field training officer is attired in civilian clothing. This generally prompts citizens to recognize the recruit officer as the primary officer on a call for service, and allows the field training officer to evaluate the recruit as a solo officer. Once a recruit has completed all tasks and all performance is acceptable, the recruit graduates from field training and is assigned to a patrol squad.

Extending Field Training If a recruit is experiencing problems mastering various tasks during a particular phase of training, extensions may be granted if the field training officer, field training sergeant, and field training coordinator feel the recruit can be successful with more training time. Remedial training may also be provided as part of field training if the recruit is experiencing difficulty with a task. TPD also allows recruits to become “unplugged” if they fail to respond to remedial efforts and more individualized training becomes necessary. In TPD policy, the term “unplugged” means that remedial efforts with a recruit are not working, the recruit continues to display unacceptable 33 The “San Jose” field training model consists of a set of daily objectives for the recruit to accomplish documented in daily observation reports. Recruits are rotated through different field training officers during the course of the program. TPD has made adjustments to the objectives to reflect specific procedures the department uses.



performance levels, and individualized training is necessary. The term “unplugged” means they are removed from regular training for this individualized attention. The “unplugged” training time does not count against the recruit. The unplugged days missed in field training are added to the recruit’s overall field training time. This option must be approved by the field training coordinator upon recommendation from the field training sergeant and field training officer.

Recruit Officer Retention A major concern of the TPD is the retention rate of recruit officers during field training. The previous 10 recruit officer classes (2011-2014) were reviewed to determine retention rates and reasons for separation. The attrition rate for all classes combined was 18.5%. The primary reason cited for the majority of recruits who did not finish field training was performance related. Others who left cited their reason as a “career change.” This rate appears high, considering that the recruits have already completed a basic recruit training academy and are now being exposed only to TPD-specific policy and training, followed by the field training program. An effective basic recruit academy program usually identifies and removes recruits who are struggling in the program. As described in a previous recommendation, recruiting, screening, hiring and sponsoring the recruit through the basic police academy should reduce this attrition rate.



The following chart presents information provided by TPD containing statistical information for the last nine classes.

Tallahassee Police Department Recruit Officer Attrition Analysis (2011 – 2014)

Hiregroup (Start Date)

Group Starting

Size

Completed Did Not

Finish

Attrition Reason for Separation

11-1 (4/11/11)

11 10 1 9% Change of career

11-2 (10/10/11)

12 10 2 17% Performance Performance

12-1 (1/3/12)

12 9 3 25% Performance Performance Performance

12-2 (6/25/12)

10 9 1 10% Performance

12-3 (11/5/12)

9 8 1 11% Performance

13-1 (3/4/13)

9 7 2 22% Performance Performance

13-2 (10/28/13)

12 9 3 25% Change of career Performance Performance

14-1 (04/21/14)

9 6 3 33% Change of career Change of career Change of career

14-2 (09/13/14)

8 7 1 13% Medical condition

TOTALS 92 75 17 19%

Selection of Field Training Officers The minimum requirements to be selected as a field training officer (FTO) are as follows:

• Two years of service as a sworn law enforcement officer. • A work history that indicates above-average initiative and self-motivation, which

includes a peer review by the officer’s current squad and members of the Field Training and Evaluation Program (FTEP).

• No sustained Internal Affairs or citizens’ complaints for one year prior to application and appointment to the FTEP Program.

• A knowledge and understanding of the FTO’s basic responsibilities as indicated through a written test.

• Positive recommendation(s) by present and/or prior supervisors at time of application and appointment to the FTEP Program.



• A positive review of applicant’s Personnel, Internal Affairs and absentee records. Absentee records pertain to injury and sick leave usage.

• A demonstrated ability to write clear and complete reports (crash and incident reports). Examples are to be submitted at the time of application. The reports are evaluated per the Standard Evaluation Guidelines.

• Ability to work the assigned district, shift and beat. • The ability to pass the selection review process outlined above by the FTEP Coordinator. • Final approval by the Chief of Police.

Recommendation: The department should increase the time required to be a field training officer to three years. The current requirement of a minimum of two years of law enforcement service to become a field training officer is problematic. Although recruiting experienced field training officers is a challenge for many agencies, special consideration should be given when selecting an officer with only two years of law enforcement experience. These officers are still learning the intricacies of the profession themselves and may not be the best choice to train new officers. Any officer selected to be a FTO with only two years of law enforcement experience should receive enhanced scrutiny to ensure he/she is versed in all legal aspects of policing, as well as the policies and procedures of the TPD. If the department is able to provide incentives, it may increase the number of potential FTO (see next section).

Incentives for Field Training Officers FTOs are paid one hour of overtime per shift when training recruit officers. There is no specialized pay for FTOs when they are not assigned a recruit. The only other incentive TPD provides is Field Training and Evaluation Program awards. These awards include the Sergeant Dale Green FTO of the Year Award, the Field Training Coordinator’s Award, and the Field Training Excellence Award.

Recommendation: The TPD should consider enhancing and adding incentives for FTOs. This will encourage more experienced officers to apply for the position. One incentive could be points added to the promotional process and /or specialized unit selection process. Another incentive may be using the FTO experience as a prerequisite or priority qualification for various training programs. As incentives to become an FTO are added to the program, the applicant pool will increase and help the TPD to select the best officers to serve as FTOs.



Investigation Field Training New detectives receive one week of orientation and training after they are assigned to the Criminal Investigations Division (CID). The purpose is to introduce them to CID, explain what will be expected of them, and provide them with the basic skills that a new/incoming investigator should have. Topics covered include how to prepare subpoenas, search warrants, arrest warrants and related paperwork, and photo lineups; basic skills for interviewing suspects; and knowledge of investigative resources from Tech-Ops, Forensics, and Crime Analysis. Training includes practical exercises and examination of case studies from each CID unit. Few departments have a formalized investigation field training program. Interviewees from the TPD investigations division, both detectives and supervisors, said that the orientation and training they received helped to speed their immersion into the investigations function. TPD detectives attend annual in-service training along with all other officers.



INTERNAL AFFAIRS The Internal Affairs (IA) unit is part of the Office of Professional Standards (OPS). OPS reports directly to the Chief of Police. The purpose of the Internal Affairs Unit is to “conduct compliance reviews and maintain records of various high-liability police actions, coordinate and assess secondary employment opportunities, and process, investigate, and maintain managerial oversight of citizen complaints (and any subsequent investigations) to ensure Police Department personnel comply with professional standards.” 34

The Internal Affairs Unit is responsible for the following:

• Internal Investigations (Formal Complaints) • Contact Reports (Informal Complaints) • Special Investigations (Firearm Discharges) • Tactical Apprehension and Control (TAC) Team Call-Out Compliance Reviews • Vehicle Pursuit Compliance Reviews • Use of Force Compliance Reviews • Employee Traffic Crash Compliance Reviews • Secondary Employment Coordination and Compliance Reviews • Employee Early Intervention Program.

Conducting Internal Investigations Internal Affairs has administrative control over all internal investigations. Until recently, IA had a two-year backlog of cases to review. Investigative staff has been increased from four to six to address the backlog. Currently it is estimated that about 90% of all complaints stay in IA. Interviews indicated that senior command wants to send more complaints to patrol supervisors and other non-IA personnel. According to General Order 29, “Internal Affairs and Administrative Investigations,” complaints are classified in several ways. “Internal Investigations” are defined as “a comprehensive and documented investigation into an allegation of member misconduct of a more serious nature, either conducted or managed by the Internal Affairs Unit.” “Contact Reports” refer to “the process of complaint inquiry into a specific policy violation allegation, resolved by a supervisor or an Internal Affairs review, requiring documentation. Contact reports may also be used for complaint inquiries into allegations of member actions which are not policy violations, but where

34 http://www.talgov.com/tpd/tpd-internal.aspx



a supervisor or IAU member feels it is necessary to document the complaint and the steps taken to resolve.” Both Internal Investigations and Contact Reports are investigations by police personal of alleged misconduct by a member of the TPD. The label “Contact Report” tends to understate the importance of investigations of allegations that, while less serious than those in “Internal Investigations,” must also be given a thorough and credible review. Police departments in the United States often receive what can be termed “Inquiries.” Inquiries are complaints related to a citizen’s dissatisfaction with the outcome of a minor interaction with an officer, such as receiving a traffic ticket. This type of complaint is typically handled by first-line supervisors or watch commanders. Flexibility for identifying and handling complaints regarding the outcome of a routine interaction that, at least on an initial review, appears to have been lawful is common in most police departments. However, such interactions need to be recorded and assessed at the watch command level, to make sure that the department is made aware of any trend or patterns that might point to larger issues.

Recommendation: In the definitions section of “General Order 29, Internal Affairs and Administrative Investigations,” the department should rename “Internal Investigations” as “Category 1 Investigations” and “Contact Reports” as “Category 2 Investigations.” A new process to assess citizen service dissatisfaction complaints should be added and categorized as an “Inquiry.” The definitions should be as follows: Category 1 Investigation: A comprehensive and documented investigation into an allegation of member misconduct of a more serious nature including allegations that if proven would result in termination or substantial suspension, either conducted or managed by the Internal Affairs Unit. Category 2 Investigation: The process of complaint inquiry into a specific policy violation allegation of a less serious nature, resolved by a supervisor or an Internal Affairs review, requiring documentation. Inquiry: A review of a citizen’s dissatisfaction with the outcome of a recent interaction with an officer, such as an objection to receiving a traffic ticket, usually conducted by a watch commander and recorded in a watch commander’s log file.



Changes should be made through General Order 29 to replace “Contact Report” with “Category 2 Investigation.”

Section IV of General Order 29 states that all complaints will be received by the Internal Affairs Unit (IA). General Order 29 Section VI. describes the investigation process for Internal Investigations (or “Category 1 Investigations” under PERF’s recommendation above). There is much less direction provided for Contact Report Investigations (Category 2 Investigations under PERF’s recommendation). PERF recommends additional policy to ensure that even the less serious allegations receive formal, orderly investigations that ensure accountability while also protecting officers’ legitimate interests.

Recommendation: The department should add a section to General Order 29 titled “Category 2 Investigation Process.” This could be added as section VII (with existing sections after that re-numbered,. The new section VII could have language as suggested below, which is adapted from TPD’s current language regarding the internal investigation process. The suggested language provides enhanced guidance to ensure that Category 2 investigations are performed thoroughly and completely.

Suggested Language:

XI. CATEGORY 2 INVESTIGATION PROCESS A. When the review of a complaint leads to the initiation of a Category 2

investigation, IA generally shall refer the investigation to the subject member’s immediate supervisor. The supervisor shall conduct the investigation in an impartial manner, and shall: 1. Notify the complainant of the initiation of the Category 2

investigation: a. If the complainant is a Department member, the notification

may be by electronic mail, letter, or in person. b. If the complainant is a non-Department member, the

notification shall be by a letter on Department letterhead. 2. Notify the subject member (by letter) of the initiation of the

Category 2 investigation, and the letter shall include: a. A statement about the allegation (date, involved incident

type, and complaint classification) b. The complainant’s name c. The Category 2 Investigation number d. The name of the supervisor assigned to conduct the

investigation e. Information about the subject member’s rights and

responsibilities relative to the Category 2 investigation 3. Complete the investigation within 90 days of the date the subject

member is notified by IA of the Category 2 investigation. a. The IA Commander may grant an extension as requested by

the investigating supervisor’s superior officer. b. For the purposes of the 90 day completion deadline, the



investigation is regarded as complete, but still active, when the investigating supervisor signs the investigative report.

c. The findings review, appeal process, and IA Commander’s approval are not part of the investigation.

d. Nothing in this subsection negates the provisions of § 112.533, FS exempting information from ”Inquiry” investigations from the provisions of § 119.07, FS (public records law) until the investigation ceases to be active, or until the Chief of Police or designee informs the subject member of the conclusion of the ”Inquiry” investigation.

e. Provide periodic status reports to the complainant and the IA Commander.

4. Notify the subject member and the complainant if the IA Commander grants an extension. a. The notification shall be made by letter. b. The letter shall state both the reason for the extension, and

the anticipated completion date of the investigation. B. Notifications to a subject member’s chain of command concerning the

initiation of a Category 2 Investigation shall be made by the IA Commander, or designee.

C. At the conclusion of a Category 2 investigation, the assigned supervisor shall complete an investigative report, in a format approved by the IA Commander, to include the following sections: 1. List of relevant evidence 2. Summary of the allegation(s) 3. Synopsis of the interviews and investigative tasks 4. List of investigative findings 5. Conclusion of fact (recommended disposition) for each allegation,

using one of the following classifications: a. Exonerated b. Not sustained c. Sustained d. Unfounded e. Withdrawn

6. As warranted, areas for policy improvement (administrative findings)

D. The completed investigation shall be forwarded through the chain of command by the investigating supervisor for review and approval to the Bureau Commander.

E. If a superior officer does not concur with any portion of the investigating supervisor’s report, he or she shall complete a memorandum articulating the facts and reasons why (e.g., disagreement over the analysis, disposition or conclusion recommended, or the policy violations cited in the investigative report). The memorandum will be forwarded with the investigative report through the chain of command to the IA Commander.

F. The captain and the IA Commander shall meet to discuss and review any non-concurrence of an investigation. Each will submit an addendum to the non-concurring supervisor’s memorandum. 1. The memorandum and the addendums shall be included as part

of the report. 2. The memorandum shall be forwarded to the Bureau Major with

the investigative report.



3. The memorandum shall become an addendum to the report and be a part of the complete investigative file.

G. FINAL DISPOSITION OF A CATEGORY 2 INVESTIGATION 1. After approval by the Bureau Major, the IA Commander shall

promptly submit the investigative report to the Deputy Chief of Police for final disposition.

2. Upon the return of the signed investigative report, the IA shall ensure the report becomes part of the case file.

3. In all completed Category 2 investigations, the IA shall ensure the following persons receive notifications: a. Subject member (by letter) b. Complainant (by letter if a non-Department member) c. Subject member’s chain of command

H. In all completed Category 2 investigations with a sustained disposition, the IA shall ensure the following persons receive notifications: 1. Subject member (by letter) 2. Complainant (by letter if a non-Department member) 3. Subject member’s chain of command 4. Employee Resources Director, or designee

I. In Category 2 investigations with a sustained disposition, it is the responsibility of the subject member’s chain of command to issue corrective action.

General Order 29 permits Contact Report investigations (labeled Category 2 Investigations under PERF’s recommendation) by supervisors. The biggest barrier to moving the majority of these investigations to non-IA supervisors has been concern that such investigations will not be of consistently high quality with use of standardized protocols because supervisors have not been trained to conduct Contact Report investigations. The suggested policy above is designed to address that concern.

Recommendation: In order to have staff outside of IA investigate complaints, the TPD should assemble a comprehensive policy and procedure manual that includes specific directives that address the steps required to complete a fair and unbiased Category 2 Investigation. Topics that should be covered include: documentation required, with examples; state laws and regulations; locating and interviewing witnesses; prohibiting leading or hostile questions; judging witness credibility; probing inconsistencies in witness/officer statements; and other investigative tasks.

It is imperative that training be provided to all supervisors who may conduct complaint investigations, both Category 2 and Inquiries. This is critical to maintain the integrity of the complaint investigative process for all stakeholders. The training should cover the topics outlined in the procedural manual for conducting complaint investigations. Case studies and



scenarios may prove beneficial. The class should contain some type of quiz or testing for certification purposes.

Recommendation: Language should be added to General Order 29 regarding the new complaint assessment process called “Inquiries.” Suggested language developed by PERF is included below.

Suggested Language: INQUIRIES Watch commanders have the authority to handle an Inquiry. An Inquiry is a complaint or concern posed by a citizen about police service, such as the legitimacy of a traffic citation. If the citizen is satisfied by the watch commander’s resolution, the WC shall enter the date, time and location of the incident, the involved officer(s), contact information for the citizen, and an explanation of how the inquiry was resolved. The Inquiry log shall be on a department system accessible to all supervisors. If the citizen is not satisfied with the watch commander’s resolution of the complaint, she/he should be referred to IA.

Compliance Reviews An additional responsibility of IA is to conduct compliance reviews of all member-involved vehicle pursuits and use-of-force incidents. This policy is described in TPD’s Internal Affairs Standard Operating Procedures, IAU-1. IA’s compliance review specifically focuses on whether department policy was adhered to. Although this is a necessary process, this type of review should also look at police tactics, training and equipment. In addition, TPDs General Order 60, section VIII, B, regarding Internal Affairs Investigations, requires IA and the Training Section to review use-of-force incidents to ascertain policy and training needs. The recommendation below should improve the entire process.

Recommendation: The TPD should enhance its compliance review by creating a process where the IA lieutenant meets quarterly with the department majors and training section supervisors to discuss vehicle pursuit and use-of-force trends. This group should be briefed on vehicle pursuits and use-of-force cases to determine whether police tactics, training, or equipment should be further improved. If potential problems are identified, the IA lieutenant is responsible for briefing the Chief of Police immediately and ensuring that follow-up is conducted and documented as part of the compliance review process.



Improved Access on Website Like many police departments across the country, the Tallahassee Police Department puts its citizen complaint and compliment forms on its website. However, links to these forms on the department’s homepage are titled “complaint survey” and “satisfaction survey.” This wording is confusing, as it implies that these links lead to surveys, instead of forms that permit the public to file a complaint or compliment an officer.

Recommendation: The TPD should make the links on the department’s homepage to file a complaint or compliment an officer more intuitive. Subject headings such as “File a complaint” and “Compliment an officer” are easier to understand.

While the current complaint and compliment forms are available online and may be obtained in person at TPD facilities, many police departments also make their complaint and compliment forms available at other locations, such as community centers, chamber of commerce offices, libraries, home offices of local advocacy groups, and other centers for public gatherings. Often, they are also available in additional languages reflective of the jurisdiction’s population.

Recommendation: The TPD should make its complaint and compliment forms—both online and paper versions—available through a variety of channels (such as community centers, libraries, local advocacy group offices, government offices, and businesses), and the documents should be available in both English and Spanish versions.

Internal Affairs Annual Reports The department’s website states that “The Tallahassee Police Department compiles annual statistical summaries, based upon records of internal affairs investigations and other compliance reviews, which are available to the public and agency employees. Interested parties may contact the Internal Affairs Unit at 891-4321.

Recommendation: The annual IA report should be made available online. This can have a positive impact on perceptions of legitimacy, procedural justice, transparency, and openness to the public.

IA Responsibilities Regarding Serious Injury or Death The Internal Affairs unit’s responsibilities regarding an officer-involved action resulting in serious injury or death are cited in “General Order 63, XII, Internal Affairs Unit Responsibilities.” Section XII, D states: “Unless otherwise directed by the Chief of Police, the



Internal Affairs Unit shall conduct an administrative investigation once the VCU (Violent Crimes Unit) or THU (Traffic Homicide Unit) investigation is complete, and after any grand jury proceedings have concluded.” Although some law enforcement agencies across the nation wait until the completion of a criminal investigation before initiating an internal administrative review or investigation, this is not required. This practice can unnecessarily delay the department in discharging an employee who in an administrative investigation clearly would be shown to have violated departmental rules seriously enough to justify dismissal. Many other departments recognize that with a proper “firewall” in place, administrative and criminal investigations can be conducted concurrently. This permits the department to complete the administrative process and, if termination is recommended, to act on the recommendation promptly. The criminal investigation and court process, including appeals, typically takes much longer and can continue long after the administrative outcome is final.

Recommendation: The TPD should routinely conduct concurrent criminal and administrative investigations. The administrative investigation is conducted by Internal Affairs and the criminal investigation by VCU or THU. IA policy should be very clear that there must be a one-way firewall to protect the integrity of the criminal case. The implications of Garrity and Miranda warnings, along with the potential for a lost criminal case against an employee due to mishandling of information, should be addressed in IA policy. For example, a “Garrity warning,” given to the employee at the beginning of an interview in an administrative investigation, can protect the employee’s constitutional right against self-incrimination by advising the employee that statements made in the administrative investigation will not be used in any criminal proceeding.



HIGH-RISK OPERATIONS Many situations can be considered high-risk operations in policing, including major criminal incidents, shootings, search warrants, barricade situations, and riots or civil disturbances. The initial response by police patrol officers can significantly impact the outcome of these incidents. Strong policies and training, along with effective command and control, are critical elements of an effective response.

General Order 26, High Risk Incident “General Order (GO) 26, High Risk Incidents” specifically addresses many of the department’s protocols. The policy was first issued in 2001 and last updated in August 2013. The 2013 change included the addition of the definition and responsibility of the Tallahassee Consolidated Dispatch Center. The center receives and dispatches all calls for the TPD, the Leon County Sheriff’s Office, the Tallahassee Fire Department, and Leon County Emergency Medical Services. Based on PERF’s experience evaluating such policies in departments across the country, we can state that General Order 26 is well written and informative. The order identifies a high-risk incident as:

Any incident involving an actual violent act in progress or one that has a higher potential for violence than those typically encountered by officers. They represent events where it is predicted [that] responding or initiating officers are, or would be, subject to extreme danger. These incidents include, but are not limited to, armed robberies in progress, hostage takings, bombings or explosions due to criminal act, threats, barricaded criminal or suicidal subjects, sniper incidents, active shootings, certain crowd control incidents, and some preplanned arrest/search/surveillance operations.

The TPD policy provides sound definitions of terms used throughout the policy including the establishment of a command post, consolidated dispatch needs, inner and outer perimeters for containment, and Tactical Apprehension and Control team (TAC Team) terms and responsibilities. The TAC Team is the department’s term for what is commonly called a SWAT team.

First Officer and Supervisor Responsibilities

In the procedures section of the policy, it identifies the role of responding officers, supervisors, and incident commanders. Although this section identifies most important aspects of officer and supervisor responsibilities, it should be enhanced by adding specific language regarding the



responsibilities of first responding officers and supervisors to thoroughly review the circumstances of the incident and ensure that the agency has legal authority to remain involved.

Recommendation: The TPD should add language to both General Order 26, II, A and III, A, which describes the responsibilities of the first officer and supervisor on scene, respectively, regarding confirmation of a high-risk incident. The first responding officer and supervisor MUST ensure that the agency has the legal authority to remain involved in the incident. Verifying this legal authority is critical when deploying police assets such as the TAC Team. Unless emergency action is immediately necessary for lifesaving efforts, first responding officers and supervisors must obtain all available information regarding victims, the suspect(s), and any criminal action or mental health crisis that created the incident.

Watch Commander/Incident Commander

The procedures section further explains the responsibilities of the watch commander, who would serve as the incident commander for high-risk incidents. The listing of responsibilities is thorough and includes the use of an effective checklist, to ensure that tasks are identified and addressed as needed. The watch commander is responsible for ensuring that news media relations are maintained, for determining the need for specialized units and equipment such as the TAC Team, and for establishing plans for staffing needs.

Recommendation: The TPD should add language to General Order 26, IV, regarding the responsibilities of the watch/incident commander, to include establishing a staging area for responding officers, and establishing a news media area for the potential response of media personnel. The watch/incident commander should ensure that a department PIO responds to any high-risk incident and assists in managing media relations. Definitions of officer staging areas and media staging areas should be added to the definitions section.

Internal Affairs Responsibilities

To ensure accountability, the TPD policy mandates that designated Internal Affairs members respond to the scene of any critical police incident where the TAC Team is deployed. The Internal Affairs unit’s responsibility includes documenting the events that occurred and identifying any procedural deficiencies. The unit prepares a written report for the Chief of Police. This practice, not commonly found in other police agencies, provides a high level of accountability and oversight for high-risk incidents. No change to this practice is necessary.



One additional policy recommendation for General Order 26 is identified below.

Recommendation: The TPD should add a section at the end of General Order 26 requiring that a quick debriefing be held by the watch/incident commander at the end of any high-risk operation, followed by a more thorough review and report forwarded through the chain of command to the chief of police. This review should evaluate police response, tactics, training, equipment, supervision and command. An after-action report is identified in General Order 75, which identifies the role of the TPD’s Tactical Apprehension and Control Team, but it should be included as well in General Order 26.

General Order 75, Tactical Apprehension and Control Team General Order 75, Tactical Apprehension and Control Team (TAC Team), establishes procedures regarding the training, equipping and deploying of the TAC Team. This policy is in accordance with CALEA standard 46.2 regarding special operations. The TAC Team is the TPD’s primary officer response capability for dealing with high-risk incidents. The team, which is a voluntary position comprised of TPD officers assigned full-time to other areas of the department, is specially trained in tactical operations. This team is commonly referred to as a Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team in many law enforcement discussions.

TAC Team Training

Training for the TAC Team consists of practical training scenarios and team and commander exercises. TAC Team snipers and crisis negotiators (negotiators are specially trained officers who have been taught to communicate with suspects in high-risk situations such as a barricade) conduct task-specific training one day per month. The full TAC Team trains two additional days per month, each a 10-hour day. The TAC Team’s training was reviewed and found to be effective and comparable to other law enforcement tactical teams, including those with officers assigned full-time to a TAC Team.

Operational Plans and Checklists

On all high-risk operations, a checklist is used by officers in command of the operation. Additionally, a department operational plan is developed. TPD’s operational plan form was reviewed and found to be thorough and effective. The TAC Team devises its own tactical specific plan, separate from the operational plan.



Threat Matrix

Like most tactical police teams in other cities, TPD uses a “Threat Matrix” when determining when to use the team. A threat matrix is a strategic and informational planning and evaluation tool designed to assist police managers, investigators, and others with decision-making in preparation for a high-risk or tactical operation. The TPD Threat Matrix, which is based on a point system, helps to determine whether the department will use the TAC Team for high-risk operations, such as search warrants, or will let other officers/detectives conduct the operation. The scoring system is based on a number of factors, including the crime involved, criminal history of suspects, and location of the operation. The greater the number of likely threats, the higher the score. The TAC Team is used any time the score exceeds 25 points on TPD’s Threat Matrix.

Approval Process

The Chief of Police approves all use or callouts of the TAC Team. In addition, there is an Operational Planning Matrix which provides direction on the level of approval required for different enforcement activities. The Chief and Deputy Chief are listed as the final level of command approval on high-risk activities, involving search warrants and the use of confidential informants. Overall, General Order 75 thoroughly describes the department’s tactical response. It includes definitions, team structure, team selection process, training, equipment, and call-out protocols. Although it describes an after-action report, it does not identify the need for a quick debriefing immediately following the incident. In addition, General Order 75 should include additional information regarding the Crisis Negotiation Team in the policy. Recommendations are provided below.

Recommendation: The TPD should add a section at the end of “General Order 75, VIII, TAC Call-Outs Protocols,” that requires a team debriefing immediately following a high-risk incident. The TAC commander should coordinate this debriefing with the incident commander, and it should include all involved personnel.

Recommendation: The TPD should add additional language regarding the role, responsibility, and selection of Crisis Negotiations Team members in General Order 75, since it is identified in the policy as part of the TAC Team. CALEA standard 46.2.4 requires the selection of these positions to be described in a department policy.



Other Findings Regarding Arrests and Search Warrant Review Criminal Investigation Division Standard Operation Procedure 37, Search Warrant Procedures, governs arrests and search warrants. Arrest warrants are reviewed and approved by the sergeant and the prosecutor’s office. This process provides a check and balance system, and is viewed as a favorable policy and practice, as new officers have benefited from this assistance. Approval can be given by phone, email or in person. The prosecutor approves all probable cause for arrest warrants, regardless of the charge. Detectives must also obtain review and approval for arrest warrants. If an officer makes an arrest after witnessing a criminal act, no prosecutorial review is required. For all search warrants, the unit sergeant and lieutenant must review the search warrant application and forward it to the department’s legal advisor. If after normal business hours, it will be reviewed the next day. During the execution of all search warrants, a sergeant must be on scene. The procedures cited above are found in other police agencies and should assist the department in ensuring that arrest and search warrants are thoroughly reviewed and vetted. The TPD should continue these practices as part of its accountability processes.



SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS In 2008, in a case that garnered national attention, Rachel Hoffman, a 23 year old Florida State University graduate, was murdered while acting as a confidential informant (CI) for the TPD. A TPD internal investigation of the incident revealed several department policy violations. The TPD conducted a comprehensive review of its policies regarding drug investigations and the use of confidential informants. The TPD implemented changes to 11 TPD policies following this incident. These included protocols for recruiting and handling confidential informants and policies for handling drug purchases and CI payment cash funds. In response to this incident, Florida adopted “Rachel's Law” in 200935. The law establishes guidelines for Florida law enforcement agencies in the use of a CI. The law mandates that Florida law enforcement agencies who use confidential informants:

• Must inform each person who is requested to serve as a confidential informant that the agency cannot promise inducements such as a grant of immunity, dropped or reduced charges, or reduced sentences or placement on probation in exchange for serving as a confidential informant.

• Shall establish policies and procedures addressing the recruitment, control, and use of confidential informants.

• Shall establish policies and procedures to assess the suitability of using a person as a confidential informant.

• Shall provide written security procedures. • Shall perform a periodic review of actual agency confidential informant practices to

ensure conformity with the agency’s policies and procedures and the law. The Tallahassee Police Department has several core directives that govern special investigations and the use of confidential informants. They include:

• General Order 14, Confidential/Investigative Expense/Cash Payments • General Order 62, Management of Confidential Informants • Criminal Investigations Division Standard Operating Procedure 35, Cash Management • Criminal Investigations Division Standard Operating Procedure 36, Management of

Confidential Informants

35 Florida Statutes, Title XLVII, Chapter 914, Section 28



• Criminal Investigations Division Standard Operating Procedure 41, Undercover Investigations

• Criminal Investigations Division Standard Operating Procedure 46, Investigative Operations and Plans

Recommendation: The TPD should consider merging Criminal Investigations Division Standard Operating Procedure 36 into General Order 62, both of which are titled “Management of Confidential Informants,” into one complete document. Both directives contain very similar information. As required as a CALEA standard for accreditation, section 12.2, Written Directives, a “written directive system should permit rapid access to individual policies, procedures, rules and regulations…” Maintaining two separate policies on informants could create confusion and policy inconsistency. Merging the documents into one General Order should eliminate this potential risk.

These directives establish a number of stringent requirements that include:

• TPD detectives must attend a CI training program before they can use a CI. • Detectives must go through a set of documents and forms (the “CI Packet”) with a

potential CI that establishes protocols for CI use and operations. The session is videotaped.

• The Special Investigation sergeant and lieutenant must review and approve the person as a CI. Any problems that surface are to be resolved by not using the person.

• Upon approval, a CI number is assigned and a file is established. The file is kept in a locked file cabinet with only the lieutenant and the unit sergeant having access. Paper files may be better that electronic files in this situation because it's less likely they will get leaked or forwarded

• All file access must be logged including the reason for the review of the file. • No juveniles may be used as a CI.

During the review of “General Order 62, Management of Confidential Informants” and “Criminal Investigations Division Standard Operating Procedure 36, Management of Confidential Informants,” PERF found that the majority of the requirements of Florida Statute 914.28 (Rachel’s Law) were included in both policies. However, some minor verbiage needs to be added to both policies to clarify the officer’s role when utilizing a CI. In addition, one specific requirement from Florida Statute 914.28.3.b. was not listed in either policy. Below are recommendations for bringing both policies into compliance with Florida Statute 914.28.

Recommendation: The TPD should add the specific wording from Florida Statute 914.28.3.a to both General Order 62 and Criminal Investigations Division Standard



Operating Procedure 36. Florida Statute 914.28.3.a states that a law enforcement agency that uses confidential informants shall inform each person who is requested to serve as confidential informant that the agency cannot promise inducements such as a grant of immunity, dropped or reduced charges, or reduced sentences or placement on probation in exchange for serving as a confidential informant. General Order 62.VI.A. and Criminal Investigations Division Standard Operating Procedure 36.V.A. both have language similar to this, but do not specifically tell an officer to inform the person who is requested to serve as a confidential informant this information.

Recommendation: The TPD should add the specific wording from Florida Statute 914.28.3.b to both General Order 62 and Criminal Investigations Division Standard Operating Procedure 36. Florida Statute 914.28.3.b. states that a law enforcement agency that uses confidential informants shall inform each person who is requested to serve as confidential informant that the value of his or her assistance as a confidential informant and any effect that assistance may have on pending criminal matters can be determined only by the appropriate legal authority. General Order 62.VI.B. and Criminal Investigations Division Standard Operating Procedure 36.V.A. have language similar to this, but do not specifically tell an officer to “inform” the person who is requested to serve as a confidential informant this information. Recommendation: The TPD should add the section from Florida Statute 914.28.5.c to both General Order 62 and Criminal Investigations Division Standard Operating Procedure 36. The section requires the agency to assess the suitability of using a person as a confidential informant by considering minimum factors. The factor in Florida Statute 914.285.c. is the effect upon agency efforts that the disclosure of the person’s cooperation in the community may have. This is not listed in either General Order 62 or Criminal Investigations Division Standard Operating Procedure 36.

Recommendation: The TPD should add the section from Florida Statute 914.28.5.g to both General Order 62 and Criminal Investigations Division Standard Operating Procedure 36. The section requires the agency to assess the suitability of using a person as a confidential informant by considering minimum factors. The factor in Florida Statute 914.28.5.g. is the person’s criminal history or prior criminal record. This is not listed in either General Order 62 or Criminal Investigations Division Standard Operating Procedure 36.



Interviews with department staff identified other important training and processes in place that ensure accountability:

• Special Investigations (SI) detectives receive online training regarding CIs from the Florida Division of Law Enforcement.

• SI detectives attend the basic Drug Enforcement Administration two-week investigator school.

• The SI lieutenant conducts routine inspections of detectives CI files, drug purchase funds, and CI payments.

• SI detectives obtain a fingerprint as proof of payment on all CI payment forms. • CI payments require two detectives to be present.

In summation, the TPD’s policies and practices regarding the use of CIs were found effective, although as recommended above, enhancements can be made. The agency has a number of safeguards in place that include training, proper supervision, and internal audits.

De-Confliction of Narcotics Investigations A review of TPD General Orders and Standard Operating Procedures was completed for narcotics related cases. No written policy was found on de-confliction with other agencies to ensure that no other law enforcement entity is investigating the same narcotics cases as the TPD. De-confliction is necessary for officer safety and investigative integrity. Further, interviews conducted with TPD personnel found that although there is no specific requirement for de-confliction, it does informally occur between the TPD and the Leon County Sheriff’s Office. TPD does contact the Leon County Sheriff’s Department about narcotics cases, but there is no formal method for notifications or documentation, and there does not appear to be a formal database or “clearinghouse” for narcotics investigations.

Recommendation: The TPD should work with all law enforcement agencies in Leon County to ensure that a database housing records of complaints and information on vice, drug and organized crime activities is maintained. The database should track both internal and external data. The main functions of this system will be to determine whether specific organizations or individuals are or have been investigated for violations of vice or drug laws by TPD or other law enforcement agencies and to inform other law enforcement agencies of the identities of organizations and individuals who are the subjects of drug/vice investigations by TPD.



CURRENT IN-SERVICE TRAINING Over the last year, the Tallahassee Police Department has offered a number of in-service training programs specifically related to topics identified in this report. Some have been delivered by the department’s internal training staff, other by outside contractors. The courses include the following:

• The “2014 In-Service Response to Resistance Training.” According to TPD, the goal of this training session was “to help the student learn not simply what to think, but how to think, and to provide the student with the basic physical skills that are sometimes required to overcome a subject’s resistance.”

• The Response to Resistance Course was based on the Training Section’s

Lesson Plan for “In-Service 2014 Defensive Tactics.” Its goals were “To provide instruction in the areas of response to resistance, force reporting, and a review of the physical techniques that allow us to control subjects in order to effect arrests, as well as protect ourselves and citizens. To renew the officer’s annual Taser certification.”

Another recent course was “Verbal Defense & Influence” delivered by an outside contractor. The course’s primary emphasis is on de-escalation. The course provides substantial instruction on communication under pressure, by focusing on tactics such as: developing a universal greeting that is non-judgmental and non-aggressive; going beyond active listening; developing a persuasion sequence; and concluding with a review and report. Its stated goals were:

• Personal Safety; • Enhanced Professionalism; • Decreased Citizen Complainants; • Decreased Citizen Complaints; • Decreased Vicarious Liability; • Less Stress; • Court Power and Articulation; • Increased Staff Morale.

A course on Procedural Justice and Police Legitimacy was also presented to the department. Its objectives were:

• Define Legitimacy and state how to increase police legitimacy. • Define Procedural Justice and discuss the benefits. • Review the relationship between the police and the community. • Understand the role history has played in hindering legitimacy in some communities.



The department also had an outside contractor deliver a course for patrol officers on Fair and Impartial Policing. Its goals were to teach officers to:

• Recognize their own human biases; • Understand how implicit biases can affect your perceptions and behavior; • Understand how biased policing impacts community members and the department; • Understand how Fair and Impartial Policing supports procedural justice and thus police

legitimacy; • Develop skills and tactics to reduce the influence of bias on police practice and allow you

to be safe, effective and just police professionals. Finally, the department developed an assessment tool model (styled after the “Jeopardy” quiz program with questions and answers) that sought to have department members show their degree of retention of key aspects of all the courses. Overall, this training shows a commitment to providing members of the department with training that not only provides enhanced skill in using force, but also enhanced skill in avoiding the use of force. This latter outcome is achieved through de-escalation, providing procedural justice (and thereby increasing police legitimacy), and policing in a fair and impartial manner. There has been some integration of these courses. For example, throughout the lesson plan for In-Service 2014 Defensive Tactics instruction, there are references to Verbal Defense and Influence (VDI) techniques taught in the Verbal Defense and Influence de-escalation course.

Recommendation: The TPD should continue its work to integrate into a single training course Defensive Tactics, Verbal Defense and Influence (stressing de-escalation), Procedural Justice and Police Legitimacy, and Fair and Impartial Policing. On-going development of an integrated course will allow TPD to substantially re-engineer its approach to use of force. Such a course should be offered immediately after graduation to new TPD hires who have completed a state certified academy, and on a periodic in-service basis to all members of the department.

Recommendation: In the TPD’s 2014 In-Service Defensive Tactics lesson plan beginning on page 3, considerable time is given to instruction in Enhanced Vascular Neck Restraint (EVNR). The 2015 In-Service Synopsis includes “EVNR Review.” The department should stop training on this technique. The prelude to the material states “The Tallahassee Police Department treats this technique as deadly force, but recognizes it will likely result in a non-lethal outcome.” The extent of the instruction demonstrates the great difficulty in applying the technique so a non-lethal result is achieved. PERF has recommended that the department change its use of force policy to eliminate the



EVNR as a force tool. This should be part of the department wide training recommended on page 7. Recommendation: In the TPD’s 2014 In-Service Defensive Tactics lesson plan on page 24, instruction is provided on the use of the Taser,™ stating that “The first target will consist of the hanging hose-man [training dummy] target. It is to simulate a response to resistance situation in which the officer is left with no other option than the use of force and must apply the Taser in dart firing mode to a subject’s front from 7 to 15 feet away.” The department should change the instruction regarding firing at a subject’s front to comply with Taser’s “Product Warning” document, “TASER Handheld CEW Warnings, Instructions, and Information: Law Enforcement.” On pages 1-3 of that document, TASER recommends that officers aim Tasers so that the ECW darts will not penetrate areas of the body near the subject’s heart:36 “CEW exposure causes certain effects, including physiologic and metabolic changes, stress, and pain… To reduce the risk of injury: 1. Use preferred target areas. The preferred target areas … are below the neck area for back shots and the lower center mass (below chest) for front shots. The preferred target areas increase dart-to-heart distance and reduce cardiac risks. Back shots are preferable to front shots when practicable.

Fair and Impartial Policing Law enforcement agencies today have increasingly diverse workforces and are serving increasingly diverse communities. Racial bias or other improper bias in policing damages the relationship a police agency has with the community it serves. Enhancing relationships between the agency and diverse communities, and complying with constitutional and legal requirements while providing essential police services, are fundamental values within progressive police departments. “Fair and Impartial Policing” is a perspective that is becoming essential to fostering a positive relationship with the community. It is a recognized best practice in law enforcement. Fair and Impartial policing is based on research indicating that biased policing is not usually caused by 36 TASER website: “Legal: Product Warnings: Law Enforcement Warnings.” https://taser.cdn.prismic.io/taser%2F9127899a-ad40-4bd8-a474-4f525fcd46cc_law-enforcement-warnings.pdf Accessed April 13, 2015.



overt racism, but is more commonly the result of subconscious or “implicit” bias by people who on a conscious level do not believe they are prejudiced. Training of police officers regarding Fair and Impartial Policing is designed to teach officers to understand and control these unconscious biases.37 The TPD has begun to provide Fair and Impartial Policing training to officers, and has involved community members in the training, but has no specific policy addressing fair and impartial policing.

Recommendation: The TPD should develop and implement a stand-alone “Fair and Impartial Policing” policy strictly prohibiting biased based policing. TPD has biased-based policing prohibitions throughout many of its general orders. Below is suggested language that was developed by PERF in conjunction with the COPS Office38.

Suggested language:

Purpose: This policy is intended to reaffirm this department’s commitment to unbiased policing, to clarify the circumstances in which officers can consider race/ethnicity when making law enforcement decisions, and to reinforce procedures that serve to assure the public that we are providing service and enforcing laws in an equitable way.

Policy:

A) Policing Impartially

Investigative detentions, traffic stops, arrests, searches and property seizures by officers will be based on a standard of reasonable suspicion or probable cause in accordance with the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Officers must be able to articulate specific facts and circumstances that support reasonable suspicion or probable cause for investigative detentions, traffic stops, arrests, nonconsensual searches and property seizures.

Except as provided below, officers shall not consider race/ethnicity in establishing either reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Similarly, except as provided below, officers shall not consider race/ethnicity in deciding to initiate nonconsensual encounters that do not amount to legal detentions or to request consent to search.

Officers may take into account the reported race or ethnicity of a specific suspect or suspects based on trustworthy, locally relevant information that links a person or persons of a specific race/ethnicity to a particular unlawful

37 See, for example, http://www.fairimpartialpolicing.com/ 38 Fridell, Lorie, et.al., “Racially Biased Policing: A Principled Response” Police Executive Research Forum, 2001.



incident(s). Race/ethnicity can never be used as the sole basis for probable cause or reasonable suspicion.

Except as provided above, race/ethnicity shall not be motivating factors in making law enforcement decisions.

B) Preventing Perceptions of Biased Policing

In an effort to prevent inappropriate perceptions of biased law enforcement, each officer shall do the following when conducting pedestrian and vehicle stops:

• Be courteous and professional.

• Introduce him or herself to the citizen (providing name and agency affiliation) and state the reason for the stop as soon as practical, unless providing this information will compromise officer or public safety. In vehicle stops, the officer shall provide this information before asking the driver for his or her license and registration.

• Ensure that the detention is no longer than necessary to take appropriate action for the known or suspected offense and that the citizen understands the purpose for any delays.

• Answer any questions the citizen may have, including explaining options for traffic citation disposition, if relevant.

• Provide his or her name and badge number when requested, in writing or on a business card.

• Apologize and/or explain if the officer determines that the reasonable suspicion was unfounded (e.g., after an investigatory stop).

Compliance: Violations of this policy shall result in disciplinary action as set forth in the department’s rules and regulations.

Supervision and Accountability: Supervisors shall ensure that all personnel in their command are familiar with the content of this policy and are operating in compliance with it.



CONCLUSION The recommendations in this report call for a number of changes to the Tallahassee Police Department’s policies and practices. Some of the recommendations are relatively minor and technical, while others are quite significant. The more important recommendations include the following: Use-of-force policy and training: The Tallahassee Police Department should bring its overall use-of-force policy into line with current best practices, which are derived from a landmark Supreme Court decision in 1989, Graham v. Connor, stating that police use of force must be judged by its “objective reasonableness.” Specifically, the Supreme Court said, “[T]he ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, and its calculus must embody an allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second decisions about the amount of force necessary in a particular situation.” The Supreme Court provided some guidance for police agencies as they strive to apply the “reasonableness” standard to the wide range of situations that officers encounter. The Court said that careful attention must be given to “the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” And the court said that “the ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Aside from those suggestions, the Supreme Court did not provide many specifics about how its decision should guide police departments. In fact, the court acknowledged that its test of reasonableness is “not capable of precise definition or mechanical application.” As a result, there has been a shift away from police use-of-force polices that are built on a “continuum of force” or “use-of-force matrix,” in which the seriousness of various types of threats and resistance by a suspect are matched, step for step, with increasing levels of force by the police. This approach is now seen by some experts as too “mechanical,” and thus not in keeping with the Supreme Court’s more general guidance to assess each incident based on the facts and circumstances of the case. Rather, the current thinking is that police should be trained to thoroughly understand the fundamental meaning of Graham v. Connor, so they can assess the need for different levels of force in a situation.



The TPD should integrate into all of its use-of-force policies and training the objective reasonableness standard, replacing its use-of-force continuum. Specific new limits on use of force: The TPD should make a number of specific changes in TPD policies, including a ban on choke holds and a general prohibition against shooting at or from a moving vehicle. These changes will align the department more closely with other progressive U.S. police agencies. Terminology: The TPD should remove the term “non-deadly force” from its policies, and should instead use the term “less-lethal force.” All applications of force carry a potential risk, however infrequent, for serious injury. For example, Electronic Control Weapon have caused people to fall and hit their head, with fatal results. Report-writing: The TPD should require all officers involved in a use-of-force incident to complete a use-of-force report, rather than allowing one officer to complete a report on the entire incident, including actions taken by other officers. This will provide supervisors with a more complete picture of what happened. And quarterly reports should be produced on use-of-force incidents department-wide, in order to continually identify trends or changes that might need to be made in policy or training. PERF made a number of additional recommendations to ensure that officers have sufficient time to write their reports, that supervisors have time to read the reports carefully, and that the reports are written clearly and completely. This will help to ensure that detectives can follow up on reports without wasting time gathering information that should have been included in the reports. Electronic control weapons: PERF made a number of recommendations to bring TPD’s polices on Electronic Control Weapons, such as Tasers™, consistent with national best practices and guidelines. Transparency: The TPD should post its General Orders online in order to increase transparency, with exceptions for cases in which release of policies on specific tactics could jeopardize officer safety. Crisis Intervention training: The TPD has trained approximately half of its officers in crisis intervention, and should continue this training for the remaining officers. This training helps officers respond to incidents involving persons with a mental illness, disability, or other condition that may cause them to behave erratically and dangerously.



Recruiting: The TPD should recruit and hire potential officers prior to their entry into the state-approved Police Academy, rather than what has been the practice of competing with other law enforcement agencies to hire academy graduates after their training is completed. This will allow TPD to be more selective in its hiring process. TPD mentoring of recruits during their time at the academy should be included in this process. Fair and impartial policing: The TPD currently has language in many of its General Orders prohibiting biased policing, but the department should develop a stand-alone “Fair and Impartial Policing” policy strictly prohibiting biased policing, to reaffirm this commitment. This will help to institutionalize the training that the department is delivering. Internal affairs investigations: The department should make changes to its complaint policies to ensure that all complaints about the police, including relatively minor complaints, are investigated in a thorough manner according to specific rules and procedures. Relatively minor complaints should be investigated by first-line supervisors, who should receive in-depth training on how to conduct fair and impartial investigations of allegations of minor misconduct. High-risk incidents: The TPD should add language to its General Orders describing the responsibilities of the first officer and supervisor at the scene of high-risk incidents, such as armed robberies in progress, hostage-takings, and active shooter incidents. Additional language should be provided regarding the establishment of staging areas for responding officers and for the news media, and regarding debriefings and after-action reports following a high-risk incident. Confidential informants: The TPD should consider merging its policies on confidential informants into one document, and should include language from a Florida statute requiring that confidential informants be told that police cannot promise them inducements, such as a grant of immunity or dropped or reduced charges, in exchange for serving as a confidential informant.

The Bigger Picture: Re-engineering Police Training PERF has conducted hundreds of studies of individual police departments similar to the review conducted for the City of Tallahassee. In most cases, these studies have been fairly straightforward: PERF reviews a department’s policies, practices, training, organizational structure, and “culture,” and makes a series of recommendations to address those issues. However, 2014 was a year of upheaval in the world of policing, stemming from the events in Ferguson, Staten Island, Cleveland, and other cities, followed by a tidal wave of public



demonstrations and protests about American policing. A similar crisis of confidence had occurred earlier in Tallahassee, as many community members lost faith in the police because of several incidents involving use of informants in drug investigations, excessive force, and sexual assault investigations. In this environment, PERF has begun to see its management reviews of individual police departments in a broader perspective. In this report and future reports, PERF will encourage local officials to look beyond the specific recommendations in our reports, and to view all of the recommendations in terms of how they can help a police department win the trust of the community. These considerations are closely connected to another development in the policing profession: the growing attention to the concepts of legitimacy and procedural justice. In just the last few years, leading police executives have embraced the idea that it is not enough to ensure that police officers act within the law and in ways that the police consider appropriate and effective. Rather, the police must also work to ensure that community members believe that police actions are morally justified, appropriate, fair and neutral, and deserving of trust and support. For a police department, being perceived as “legitimate” by the public is not only important for justice’s sake; it is also important because police cannot achieve their mission and goals, such as reducing crime, if they lack support in the community. These issues were addressed at a national conference of police leaders convened by PERF in September 2014, as the nation was experiencing a storm of protests following the controversial use of force in Ferguson.39 PERF is following up on that conference with a new project designed to operationalize these lessons we have been learning, particularly with regard to police use of force. More specifically, PERF is working to re-engineer the process by which police recruits and experienced officers are trained in the use of force. This overhaul of use-of-force training should include several concepts: Integration of training: Police training on use of force involves many different elements, and too often, officers are trained separately on each element. In many departments, one of the first 39 See “Defining Moments for Police Chiefs.” Police Executive Research Forum, 2014. http://www.policeforum.org/assets/definingmoments.pdf



elements of new recruit training is the technical aspects of how to use a firearm, including marksmanship. But it may be weeks later that the recruits learn about the legal standards that must be met for an officer to use a firearm. At yet another training session days or weeks after that, the officer may learn about strategies for de-escalating encounters and using less-lethal force or avoiding use of force entirely. Finally, Crisis Intervention training, aimed at preventing unnecessary uses of force against mentally ill persons, may be provided sometime after that. This is not an effective approach to training officers on one of the most critically important aspects of their job. Officers’ decisions about whether to use force, and if so, which type of force to use, are the most difficult decisions they make. In many cases, these decisions must be made quickly, and the factors in the decision, such as the level of threat against the officer or bystanders, may be difficult to assess and can change second by second. It is expecting too much to think that in the heat of the moment, officers will be able to synthesize what they learned at three or four different training sessions, and will reliably be able to make the best choices. Scenario-based training: Instead, there is a growing recognition that the best way to train officers is with integrated, scenario-based, role-playing exercises, in which all of the considerations come together, and officers practice making the types of real-world decisions that they will be called upon to make on the job. Many officers are familiar with “shoot/don’t shoot” simulators in which they must make quick decisions about whether a person is a threat or an innocent bystander. This concept should be expanded to the entire range of use-of-force issues. Officers must be presented with the infinitely complex range of scenarios in which they must try to assess whether a person they encounter on the street holding a knife, for example, is mentally ill, mentally disabled, or perhaps under the influence of drugs, whether the person is hostile, whether the person is dangerous, whether the person may be suicidal, whether the person can comprehend what the officer says, how the officer can speak in ways that de-escalate the tension, how the officer might disarm the person, how the officer might protect bystanders by directing them to leave the scene, how the officer can try to “slow the situation down” and call for assistance, and so on. De-escalation issues: For many years, police departments have implemented increasingly sophisticated programs to de-escalate encounters with persons who behave erratically or dangerously because of mental illness or other mental conditions. At PERF’s national conference following the Ferguson protests, a number of police chiefs broadened this concept to include police interactions with persons who behave in a confrontational way, but not because of mental illness. In some cases, people provoke police officers or create a minor confrontation in a



situation that does not involve any serious crime. And if the officer escalates the situation, it sometimes ends in a serious use of force that is completely out of proportion to the low-stakes incident that started it. To prevent these types of incidents, forward-thinking police chiefs are looking for ways to change a fundamental mindset that is common in police departments, namely, that officers should never just step away from a confrontation. In some cases where the stakes are not high, the best approach is to de-escalate. In the coming months, PERF will be convening a national meeting of police chiefs and will conduct research to develop a new model for training police officers regarding the complete range of use-of-force issues. The new system will be integrated, comprehensive, and scenario-based.

Next Steps for the Tallahassee Police Department PERF urges the City of Tallahassee and the Tallahassee Police Department, as they consider the specific recommendations in this report, to also consider undertaking a broader, system-wide reform of use-of-force training of the type that PERF will be developing. The challenge for the Tallahassee Police Department is not just making the internal changes that have been recommended in this report. Making changes to policies is not enough. The TPD should consider developing an implementation plan that seeks to integrate the recommendations of this report with training of first-line officers as well as supervisors and others. To some extent the department has started this process with its 2015 In-Service Training schedule. The policy issues and recommendations in this report should be seen as a starting point for a comprehensive new training initiative that not only incorporates these changes, but also addresses the “big picture” issues described above. Furthermore, the TPD should continue to brief community leaders on these changes and involve them in the implementation process. Both internal and external implementation challenges must be addressed. By meeting with and involving community leaders in the change process the TPD will further transparency and legitimacy. By undertaking this comprehensive overhaul of training as well as policy, the TPD can be a national leader in developing new “post-Ferguson” approaches to policing that not only are firmly aligned with the letter and the spirit of the Constitution, but also enjoy strong support and perceptions of legitimacy in the Tallahassee community.