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TAMÁS NOVÁK International Economics IV. The Political Economy of Trade Policy The Instruments of Trade Policy

TAMÁS NOVÁK International Economics IV. The Political Economy of Trade Policy The Instruments of Trade Policy

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Page 1: TAMÁS NOVÁK International Economics IV. The Political Economy of Trade Policy The Instruments of Trade Policy

TAMÁS NOVÁK International Economics IV.

The Political Economy of Trade Policy

The Instruments of Trade Policy

Page 2: TAMÁS NOVÁK International Economics IV. The Political Economy of Trade Policy The Instruments of Trade Policy

Readings

– PAUL KRUGMAN – MAURICE OBSFELD: International Economics. Theory and Practice. Chapter 8.

Page 3: TAMÁS NOVÁK International Economics IV. The Political Economy of Trade Policy The Instruments of Trade Policy

The Cases for Free Trade

The first case for free trade is the argument that producers and consumers allocate resources most efficiently when governments do not distort market prices through trade policy.

– National welfare of a small country is highest with free trade.

– With restricted trade, consumers pay higher prices.

– With restricted trade, distorted prices cause overproduction either by existing firms producing more or by more firms entering the industry.

Page 4: TAMÁS NOVÁK International Economics IV. The Political Economy of Trade Policy The Instruments of Trade Policy

The Cases for Free Trade (cont.)

However, because tariff rates are already low for most countries, estimated benefits of moving to free trade are only a small fraction of national income for most countries.

Yet for some countries in some time periods, the estimated cost of protection was substantial.

Page 5: TAMÁS NOVÁK International Economics IV. The Political Economy of Trade Policy The Instruments of Trade Policy

The Cases for Free Trade

A second argument for free trade is that allows firms or industry to take advantage of economies of scale.

A third argument for free trade is that it provides competition and opportunities for innovation.

Page 6: TAMÁS NOVÁK International Economics IV. The Political Economy of Trade Policy The Instruments of Trade Policy

The Cases for Free Trade

A fourth argument, called the political argument for free trade, says that free trade is the best feasible political policy, even though there may be better policies in principle.

– Any policy that deviates from free trade would be quickly manipulated by special interests, leading to decreased national welfare.

Page 7: TAMÁS NOVÁK International Economics IV. The Political Economy of Trade Policy The Instruments of Trade Policy

The Cases Against Free Trade

A tariff rate that completely prohibits imports leaves a country worse off, but tariff rate t0 may exist that maximizes national welfare: an optimum tariff.

An export tax (a negative export subsidy) that completely prohibits exports leaves a country worse off, but an export tax rate may exist that maximizes national welfare through the terms of trade.

Page 8: TAMÁS NOVÁK International Economics IV. The Political Economy of Trade Policy The Instruments of Trade Policy

Which Industries Are Protected?

Agriculture: in the US, Europe and Japan farmers make up a small fraction of the electorate but receive generous subsidies and trade protection.

– Examples: European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy, Japan’s 1000% tariff on imported rice, America’s sugar quota.

Page 9: TAMÁS NOVÁK International Economics IV. The Political Economy of Trade Policy The Instruments of Trade Policy

Which Industries Are Protected?

Clothing: textiles (fabrication of cloth) and apparel (assembly of cloth into clothing).

– Import licenses for textile and apparel exporters are specified in the Multi-Fiber Agreement between the US and many other nations.

Page 10: TAMÁS NOVÁK International Economics IV. The Political Economy of Trade Policy The Instruments of Trade Policy

Types of Tariffs

A specific tariff is levied as a fixed charge for each unit of imported goods.

– For example, $1 per kg of cheese

An ad valorem tariff is levied as a fraction of the value of imported goods.

– For example, 25% tariff on the value of imported cars.

Let’s now analyze how tariffs affect the economy.

Page 11: TAMÁS NOVÁK International Economics IV. The Political Economy of Trade Policy The Instruments of Trade Policy

Supply, Demand and Trade in a Single Industry

Let’s construct a model measuring how a tariff affects a single market, say that of wheat.

Suppose that in the absence of trade the price of wheat in the foreign country is lower than that in the domestic country.

– With trade the foreign country will export: construct an export supply curve

– With trade the domestic country will import: construct an import demand curve

Page 12: TAMÁS NOVÁK International Economics IV. The Political Economy of Trade Policy The Instruments of Trade Policy

Supply, Demand and Trade in a Single Industry

An export supply curve is the difference between the quantity that foreign producers supply minus the quantity that foreign consumers demand, at each price.

An import demand curve is the difference between the quantity that domestic consumers demand minus the quantity that domestic producers supply, at each price.

Page 13: TAMÁS NOVÁK International Economics IV. The Political Economy of Trade Policy The Instruments of Trade Policy

Supply, Demand and Trade in a Single Industry

In equilibrium,

import demand = export supply

domestic demand – domestic supply =

foreign supply – foreign demand

In equilibrium,

world demand = world supply

Page 14: TAMÁS NOVÁK International Economics IV. The Political Economy of Trade Policy The Instruments of Trade Policy

The Effects of a Tariff

A tariff acts as an added cost of transportation, making shippers unwilling to ship goods unless the price difference between the domestic and foreign markets exceeds the tariff.

If shippers are unwilling to ship wheat, there is excess demand for wheat in the domestic market and excess supply in the foreign market.

– The price of wheat will tend to rise in the domestic market.

– The price of wheat will tend to fall in the foreign market.

Page 15: TAMÁS NOVÁK International Economics IV. The Political Economy of Trade Policy The Instruments of Trade Policy

The Effects of a Tariff

Thus, a tariff will make the price of a good rise in the domestic market and will make the price of a good fall in the foreign market, until the price difference equals the tariff. The price of the good in foreign (world) markets

should fall if there is a significant drop in the quantity demanded of the good caused by the domestic tariff.

Page 16: TAMÁS NOVÁK International Economics IV. The Political Economy of Trade Policy The Instruments of Trade Policy

The Effects of a Tariff in a Small Country

When a country is “small”, it has no effect on the foreign (world) price of a good, because its demand for the good is an insignificant part of world demand.

– Therefore, the foreign price will not fall, but will remain at Pw

– The price in the domestic market, however, will rise to PT = Pw + t

Page 17: TAMÁS NOVÁK International Economics IV. The Political Economy of Trade Policy The Instruments of Trade Policy

Costs and Benefits of Tariffs

A tariff raises the price of a good in the importing country, so we expect it to hurt consumers and benefit producers there.

In addition, the government gains tariff revenue from a tariff.

How to measure these costs and benefits?

We use the concepts of consumer surplus and producer surplus.

Page 18: TAMÁS NOVÁK International Economics IV. The Political Economy of Trade Policy The Instruments of Trade Policy

Consumer Surplus

Consumer surplus measures the amount that a consumer gains from a purchase by the difference in the price he pays from the price he would have been willing to pay.

– The price he would have been willing to pay is determined by a demand (willingness to buy) curve.

– When the price increases, the quantity demanded decreases as well as the consumer surplus.

Page 19: TAMÁS NOVÁK International Economics IV. The Political Economy of Trade Policy The Instruments of Trade Policy

Producer Surplus

Producer surplus measures the amount that a producer gains from a sale by the difference in the price he receives from the price he would have been willing to sell at.

– The price he would have been willing to sell at is determined by a supply (willingness to sell) curve.

– When price increases, the quantity supplied increases as well as the producer surplus.

Page 20: TAMÁS NOVÁK International Economics IV. The Political Economy of Trade Policy The Instruments of Trade Policy

Costs and Benefits of Tariffs

A tariff raises the price of a good in the importing country, making its consumer surplus decrease (making its consumers worse off) and making its producer surplus increase (making its producers better off).

Also, government revenue will increase.

Page 21: TAMÁS NOVÁK International Economics IV. The Political Economy of Trade Policy The Instruments of Trade Policy

Export Subsidy

An export subsidy can also be specific or ad valorem

– A specific subsidy is a payment per unit exported.

– An ad valorem subsidy is a payment as a proportion of the value exported.

An export subsidy raises the price of a good in the exporting country, making its consumer surplus decrease (making its consumers worse off) and making its producer surplus increase (making its producers better off).

Also, government revenue will decrease.

Page 22: TAMÁS NOVÁK International Economics IV. The Political Economy of Trade Policy The Instruments of Trade Policy

Export Subsidy

An export subsidy raises the price of a good in the exporting country, while lowering it in foreign countries.

In contrast to a tariff, an export subsidy worsens the terms of trade by lowering the price of domestic products in world markets.

Page 23: TAMÁS NOVÁK International Economics IV. The Political Economy of Trade Policy The Instruments of Trade Policy

Export Subsidy in Europe

The European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy sets high prices for agricultural products and subsidizes exports to dispose of excess production.

– The subsidized exports reduce world prices of agricultural products.

The direct cost of this policy for European taxpayers is almost $50 billion.

– But the EU has proposed that farmers receive direct payments independent of the amount of production to help lower EU prices and reduce production.

Page 24: TAMÁS NOVÁK International Economics IV. The Political Economy of Trade Policy The Instruments of Trade Policy

Import Quota

An import quota is a restriction on the quantity of a good that may be imported.

This restriction is usually enforced by issuing licenses to domestic firms that import, or in some cases to foreign governments of exporting countries.

A binding import quota will push up the price of the import because the quantity demanded will exceed the quantity supplied by domestic producers and from imports.

Page 25: TAMÁS NOVÁK International Economics IV. The Political Economy of Trade Policy The Instruments of Trade Policy

Import Quota

When a quota instead of a tariff is used to restrict imports, the government receives no revenue.

– Instead, the revenue from selling imports at high prices goes to quota license holders: either domestic firms or foreign governments.

– These extra revenues are called quota rents.

Page 26: TAMÁS NOVÁK International Economics IV. The Political Economy of Trade Policy The Instruments of Trade Policy

Voluntary Export Restraint

A voluntary export restraint works like an import quota, except that the quota is imposed by the exporting country rather than the importing country.

However, these restraints are usually requested by the importing country.

The profits or rents from this policy are earned by foreign governments or foreign producers.

– Foreigners sell a restricted quantity at an increased price.

Page 27: TAMÁS NOVÁK International Economics IV. The Political Economy of Trade Policy The Instruments of Trade Policy

Local Content Requirement

A local content requirement is a regulation that requires a specified fraction of a final good to be produced domestically.

It may be specified in value terms, by requiring that some minimum share of the value of a good represent domestic valued added, or in physical units.

Page 28: TAMÁS NOVÁK International Economics IV. The Political Economy of Trade Policy The Instruments of Trade Policy

Local Content Requirement

From the viewpoint of domestic producers of inputs, a local content requirement provides protection in the same way that an import quota would.

From the viewpoint of firms that must buy domestic inputs, however, the requirement does not place a strict limit on imports, but allows firms to import more if they also use more domestic parts.

Page 29: TAMÁS NOVÁK International Economics IV. The Political Economy of Trade Policy The Instruments of Trade Policy

Local Content Requirement

Local content requirement provides neither government revenue (as a tariff would) nor quota rents.

Instead the difference between the prices of domestic goods and imports is averaged into the price of the final good and is passed on to consumers.

Page 30: TAMÁS NOVÁK International Economics IV. The Political Economy of Trade Policy The Instruments of Trade Policy

Other Trade Policies

Export credit subsidies– A subsidized loan to exporters– US Export-Import Bank subsidizes loans to US exporters.

Government procurement– Government agencies are obligated to purchase from

domestic suppliers, even when they charge higher prices (or have inferior quality) compared to foreign suppliers.

Bureaucratic regulations– Safety, health, quality or customs regulations can act as

a form of protection and trade restriction.

Page 31: TAMÁS NOVÁK International Economics IV. The Political Economy of Trade Policy The Instruments of Trade Policy

Summary

Tariff Export subsidy Import quota Voluntary export restraint

Producer surplus

Consumer surplus

Government net revenue

National welfare

Increases IncreasesIncreases Increases

No change:rents to license holders

Increases Decreases

DecreasesDecreases Decreases Decreases

No change:rents to foreigners

Ambiguous,falls for smallcountry

Ambiguous,falls for smallcountry

DecreasesDecreases

Page 32: TAMÁS NOVÁK International Economics IV. The Political Economy of Trade Policy The Instruments of Trade Policy

International Negotiations of Trade Policy

Multilateral negotiations help avoid a trade war between countries, where each country enacts trade restrictions.

If each country has a political interest (due to political pressure) to protect domestic producers, regardless of what other countries do,

– then all countries could enact trade restrictions, even if it is in the interest of all countries to have free trade.

Page 33: TAMÁS NOVÁK International Economics IV. The Political Economy of Trade Policy The Instruments of Trade Policy

World Trade Organization

The GATT/WTO multilateral negotiations ratified in 1994 (called the Uruguay Round),

– agreed that all quantitative restrictions (e.g., quotas) on trade in textiles and clothing as previously specified in the Multi-Fiber Agreement were to be eliminated by 2005.

But as the restrictions were eliminated (mostly in 2005), political pressure to again restrict trade in textiles and clothing has grown.

Page 34: TAMÁS NOVÁK International Economics IV. The Political Economy of Trade Policy The Instruments of Trade Policy

Summary

1. The cases for free trade are that– It allows consumers and producers to allocate their

resources freely and efficiently, without price distortions.

– It may allow for economies of scale.– It increases competition and innovation.

2. The cases against free trade are that trade restrictions may allow

– terms of trade gains– a government to address a market failure when better

policies are not feasible

Page 35: TAMÁS NOVÁK International Economics IV. The Political Economy of Trade Policy The Instruments of Trade Policy

Summary

3. Models of policy making for trade policy consider incentives to adopt popular policies as well as incentives to adopt unpopular policies if these policies are advocated by groups that make political contributions.

4. Agricultural and clothing industries are the most protected industries in many countries.

Page 36: TAMÁS NOVÁK International Economics IV. The Political Economy of Trade Policy The Instruments of Trade Policy

Summary

5. Multilateral negotiations of free trade may mobilize domestic political support for free trade, as well as make countries agree not to engage in a trade war.

6. The WTO and its predecessor have reduced tariffs substantially in the last 50 years, and the WTO has a dispute settlement procedure for trade disputes.

7. A preferential trading agreement is beneficial for a country if it creates new trade but is harmful if it diverts existing trade to higher cost alternatives.