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Abrahamic creation and Neoplatonic emanation in Greek, Arabic
and Latin.
Reflections on a recent paper by Richard Taylor
0.1 Introduction
One of the most important and most frequently occurring questions in both ancient and
modern philosophy is, of course, the following : has the world always existed, or did it come
into being at a specific moment of time ? The former was the position of Aristotle and,
following him, of most pagan philosophers down to the closing of the Platonic Academy in529AD. The latter was the view of a few renegade pagan philosophers in Antiquity
especially such Middle Platonists as Plutarch, Atticus and Galen who gave a literal
interpretation of the passages in Plato's Timaeusin which the Demiurge seems to create the
world in time and of some Christians such as John Philoponus, who were concerned to
defend the literal truth of the Biblical account of creation as narrated in theBook of Genesis.
In the controversies between Pagans and Christians at the end of Greco-Roman
Antiquity, as exemplified by the debate between Philoponus and the Neoplatonist philosopherSimplicius, these two positions were usually considered both exhaustive and mutually
exclusive1. On the one hand, one could agree with the pagans represented by Simplicius, and
maintain that the world comes into being through eternal emanation (in Greek, aei), usually
conceived as originating in the supreme principle (designated as the One, the Good, or God),
and continuing through the intermediaries of hypostasized Intellect and Soul until it reaches
the stage of Soul's insertion of forms into matter, thereby bringing about the formation of the
sensible world. Or else one could believe, with the Christians, that God created the world in
time or at a specific moment (Greekpote), including matter, out of nothing by a one-time act
of his benevolent will2. According to Philoponus at least, although this act took place at a
1 As they continued to be for Kant, in his first antinomy of pure reason ( Critique of Pure Reason,
Transcendental Doctrine of Elements, Transcendental Logic, 2nd division, Transcendental Dialectic, book two :
Dialectical Inferences of Pure Reason).
2Cf. Philoponus, Against Aristotle, fr. 115 Wildberg = Simplicius, In Phys., 1141, 22 : !!"!#"$#!$%%&&!''#()!"*+(),-!!"!%'".; Hierocles, De prov., apud Photius, Bibl. cod. 251, p. 461a-23 : !!"!*/#01('2
(...) !!"!#%&3$4)'2: Proclus, Investigation of Aristotle's objections to the Timaeus, ap. Philoponus, De aet.mundi, VI, 7, p. 138, 24-25 Rabe : "516#+)47!)')1+389,.#!:&*+ ;#
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specific moment it time (pote), it was nevetheless instantaneous in the sense that various
kinds of change were held to be so in Aristotelian natural philosophy : acts of intellection and
touching, the flash of a bolt of lightning, and the freezing of water, the curdling of milk and
other phase transitions as they're known to modern science, to mention just a few of the
standard examples3.
This debate had an important impact on Islamic philosopy, with al-Kindi, the
Plotiniana Arabica, al-Ghazali and the Kalam basically adopting the broad outlines of
Philoponus' approach to the question of creation, while Farabi, Ibn Bajja, Avicenna, and
Averroes (at least in some phases of his thought) maintained different variations of the
position defended by Simplicius.
Eternal emanation or temporal creation ex nihilo : the battle lines seem to have been
drawn, and all that's left is to choose one's camp.
Very recently, however, Richard Taylor4 has argued that these two seemingly
incompatible viewpoints can be reconciled, and that both can rightly be called instances of
creation. This view has a long and exemplary pedigree, including no less an authority that
Thomas Aquinas. In what follows I will try to contribute some elements toward an evaluation
of this claim.
1.0 Taylor on creation
In his article, Taylor, following Hasker, sets forth a definition of what he calls
creation1 or Abrahamic creation (I will henceforth call it the latter). This type of creation,
opposed to Neoplatonic-style emanation (which Taylor designates as creation2), is
characterized by the following features.
1. It is ex nihilo, rather than being either a fabrication out of pre-existing material or an
outflow from God's own nature.
2. It is a free act of God, who was not obliged to create but did so out of love and
generosity.
3. God not only creates the world in the beginning, but continues to sustain it at every
moment of its existence.
3On all this, see M. Chase 2011.4R. Taylor 2012.
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Summing up this notion of Abrahamic creation, Taylor writes5that it
involves a single primary cause or First Cause originating all reality other than itself by bringing forth allex nihilo as ontologically after absolute nothingness in an action somehow including freedom, will andchoice such that there is neither external nor internal necessity compelling creation1.
What Taylor calls creation2 or emanative origination, and I will henceforth simply call
Neoplatonic emanation, is, he claims, characteristic of such Medieval Arabic works as the
Plotiniana Arabica that is, the so-called Theology of Aristotle, the Sayings of the Greek
Sage, and other such works, which are based largely on extracts from the work of Plotinus
and the Liber de Causis, based mostly on propositions from Proclus' Elements of Theology.
Here, Taylor explains, the creation or origination of reality takes place from the First Cause,
or God, without any act of will or any other intermediary, but by the very being of that Cause(Greek auti ti einai, Arabic bi-ann!yati-hi). The existence of that Cause immediately and
automatically entails, by a process of emanation, the existence of all subsequent levels of
reality. This form of creation, Taylor writes6,
... entails the negation of will, choice, the necessity of nature characteristic of things having nature orform (which is necessity2), and also external compulsion (which is necessity3).
Taylor7 thus introduces a distinction between three kinds of necessity. Proceedingfrom the lower to the higher forms, we have (Table 1) :
Necessity3, which takes place by external compulsion.
Necessity2, which indicates what follows for a thing on the basis of its nature or form.
Finally, there is
Necessity1, or transcendent necessity, in which the effect follows immediately upon
the positing of the cause.
Now Neoplatonic emanation, Taylor wants to claim, is free from necessity3 (nothingexternal can force the First Cause to create) ; and from necessity2(the first cause has no form
or nature8 that might compel it to do something), but not from necessity 1, or transcendent
5Taylor 2012, 115.
6Taylor 2012, 130.
7Taylor 2012, 130 ff.
8This seems highly questionable in the case of Plotinus, for whom the first Cause, otherwise known as the
One or the Good, may have no form, but can be, and quite often is, said to have a nature. See the numerous
attestations in Sleeman-Pollet, Lexicon Plotinianum, s.v. ?@:+9 b6, col. 1095. Already in an early Christian
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necessity. Thus, in Neoplatonic creation, the emanation of all reality follows immediately
upon the being of the First Cause qua Good. This conceptual scheme, Taylor argues,
characterises the thought of Plotinus, Proclus, the PA, the LDC, al-Farabi, and Avicenna.
Abrahamic creation, by contrast, is free from all three types of necessity.
Basing himself on no less an authority than Thomas Aquinas9, Taylor now goes on to
make what might be deemed to be his most controversial move : both Abrahamic creation and
Neoplatonic emanation can, he claims, be considered as creation tout court. Let us recall that,
according to Taylor, the main difference between Abrahamic creation and Neoplatonic
emanation is that the former involves a free choice of will on God's part, and the latter does
not. In Taylor's words10:
It appears then that it is quite appropriate to consider creation to be of at least two sorts, creation2which isbased on the notion of primary causality involving necessity1 resulting from the First as the Good, andcreation1 which is also based on primary causality but adds the Abrahamic understanding that the Firstcreates without any sort of necessity, need not have created at all, and acts by will, in some understandingof that term.
Let me begin my critical discussion of Taylor's theses by saying that I find his paper
exceptionally dense, profound, and stimulating, so much so that I have been wrestling with it
since I first heard an initial version of it last Fall. My initial reaction was that there is
something wrong with the final conclusion, or at least missing in the argumentation leading
up to it. I must confess, however, that the more I think about the issues involved, the less sure
I am of my position. In what follows, therefore, is by no means intended as a definitive
refutation of Taylor's position, but more as a Confessioof the doubts I have had about it, and
continue to have to some degree.
I'll group these doubts under three headings.
context, Clement of Alexandria (Strom. I, 86, 3) speaks of doing good (to agathopoein) as as it were, the nature
(phusis) of God, as it is the nature of fire to heat and of light to illuminate. Cf. Drrie-Baltes 1998, 472 n. 47.
That the First Cause lacks a nature does not even seem to be true of the Liber de Causis, which, in proposition 8
as cited by Taylor (2012, n. 36) says of the Good or First Cause that its individual nature is the Pure Good
emanating all goodnesses upon the intellect and upon the rest of the things through the mediation of the
intellect. As in Plotinus, then, it is precisely because the One is good that it creates. Taylor seems to assume that
at least as far as the Neoplatonic One is concerned, having nature is equivalent to having a form. I do not believe
that is the case.
9Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard (1252-56), at Book 2 d. 1, q. 1, a. 2, resp. See below.10Taylor 2012, 132.
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1. How solid are Taylor's initial axioms and definitions ? Do his categories of creation1
(Abrahamic creation) and creation2(Neoplatonic emanation) accurately designate two clearly
identifiable positions, neither neglecting any essential element nor including anything
superfluous ?
2. Subsidiary to this first question : how cut-and-dried are the positions of the various
thinkers Taylor assigns to the two camps ? I will leave aside the case of the Plotiniana
Arabicaand theLiber De Causis, assuming that Taylor, one of the world's leading experts on
both works, knows what he's talking about and has given an unimpeachable account of their
doctrines. But is it really the case, as Taylor claims with regard to creation 2or Neoplatonic-
style emanationism, that Plotinus, Proclus, Farabi and Avicenna accept the causing by the
primary cause of the existence of something after nothing11 ? With regard to Abrahamic
creation : it is really so straightforwardly clear that God's creative act, for Thomas Aquinas, is
the result of a completely free act of will ? And as far as Neoplatonic emanation is
concerned : is it quite so certain as Taylor asserts that it involves noelement of will ?
3. Finally, with regard to Taylor's conclusion, if there really is not that much of a
difference between Abrahamic creation and Neoplatonic emanationism, a large chunk of the
history of philosophy, and of the Pagan-Christian debate of Late Antiquity in particular,
becomes incomprehensible. The Christian Church fathers virulently opposed the Neoplatonic
doctrine of emanation for centuries, as can be seen, for instance, in the 6th-century debate
between the Christian John Philoponus and the pagans Proclus and Simplicius in their debate
over the eternity of the world, while the pagans opposed, with equal violence, the Christian
doctrine of creation within time. Yet if these two views are really so close as to be ultimately
compatible, what was all the fuss about12?
1.2 Taylor's definitions
11Taylor 2012, 131. The key word here, is, of course, after : in what sense are we to understand it ? There
is, after all, a difference in Latin between ex nihiloandpost nihil, as Bonaventure points out (Commentary on the
Sentences, II, d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2, II, p. 19 ff. Quaracchi), and the formulas of Catholic orthodox enshrine the
formula ex nihilo,notpost nihil.
12 Likewise, on Taylor's hypothesis it becomes hard to understand the conflict between Avicenna and
Ghazali, and between the latter and Averroes, to say nothing of the debate between Bonaventure and Aquinas
himself on the question of creation, which is inseparable from the question of the eternity of the world ; cf.Michon et al. 2004, 35 f.
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goodness manifests itself in His creation, then it seems to follow that God can never not
create, on pain of acting contrary to His essence, and this seems to rule out, or at least render
problematic, the notion of a one-shot creation in time. This, at any rate, was the conclusion
Origen drew, and it led him and many of his correligionaries to be condemned for heresy19.
Such considerations would seem to shed at least some doubt on whether the Abrahamic God
really is unconditionally free to create or to refrain from creating.
Let us re-read Taylor's summarizing statement : Abrahamic creation, he writes,
involves a single primary cause or First Cause originating all reality other than itself by bringing forth all
ex nihilo as ontologically after absolute nothingness.
At first glance, this statement seems to come close to tautology : if divine creation isex nihilo, then it cannot help but be ontologically after absolute nothingness. Surely
everything that exists is automatically ontologically after absolute nothingness, since
absolute nothingness could be defined as that beneath which nothing is ontologically. But one
suspects the addition of the term ontologically is here to rule out another possible sense in
which created reality might be later than nothingness : the temporal sense.
I do not believe, however, that what Taylor describes is in fact the standard Abrahamic
position, although it may be the standard Thomistic position. For the former, the sense in
which creation is after nothingness is not, or not merely, ontological, but temporal. It is the
Abrahamic tradition, or at least the great majority of its representatives20, that argues
relentlessly for the temporal or chronological nature of the divine act of creation, and the
Neoplatonists who argue for a version of ontologicalposterity, in the sense that for them, as
19On this, cf. M. Chase, in press ; M. Wacht 1969.
20
Excluding Thomas Aquinas, of course. Cf. Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, 3rd ed. 1997,p. 429 : Though a doctrine of Creation does not as such require that the world took its beginning in or with
time, Christian theologians in general have decisively rejected the eternity of the universe. But they have
commonly held that its temporal origin is capable of being established only through revelation. This, of course,
was the position of Aquinas (Cont. Gent. 2, 38, etc.). See also First Vatican Council, Sess. 3, can. 1 : Hic solus
verus Deus bonitate sua et omnipotenti virtute non ad augendam suam beatitudinem, nec ad acquirendam, sed ad
manifestandam perfectionem suam per bona, qu creaturis impertitur, liberrimo consilio simul ab initio temporis
utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam, spiritualem et corporalem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam, ac deinde
humanam quasi communem ex spiritu et corpore constitutam. The formula ab initio temporisdates back at least
to the Fourth Council of the Lateran of 1215, according to which God is creator omnium visibilium et
invisibilium, spiritalium et corporalium : qui sua omnipotenti virtute simul ab initio temporisutramque de nihilo
condidit creaturam, spiritualem et corporalem (Denzinger, Enchiridion Symbolorum, no. 800). Michon et al.(2004, 353) translate ab initio temporisas au commencement du temps.
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we shall see, the world is created or generated (Greek genton) not temporally but in the sense
of causation (kat'aitian). This omission, or at least downplaying, of the temporal nature of
Abrahamic creation is, I believe, perhaps the most questionable element in Taylor's
argumentation21.
1.3 What iscreation, anyhow ? Taylor on St. Thomas
As good philosophers we ought, insofar as is possible, to define our terms at the
outset. Taylor does not fail to do so, of course : for him, the word creation primarily
translates the Arabic ibd", itself a rendering of the Latin creare. Taylor does not discuss the
Greek equivalent of creare/ibd", but I think there can be little doubt that these terms
correspond to the Greek verb gignesthai/genesthaiand to the verbal adjective genton, which
one could render either as generated or as generable, subject to generation. This will
prove to be of some importance as we proceed.
One of the texts on which Taylor bases his claim that Abrahamic creation and
Neoplatonic emanationism can both be called creation is a text from St. Thomas'
commentary on the Sentences22. Famously, Peter Lombard had written :creare proprie est de
nihilo alquid facere23. While Thomas sometimes seems to be willing to accept this
definition24, in the text quoted by Taylor he brings in important qualifications :
21In Taylor's paper, mentions of time as a factor in either Abrahamic creation or Neoplatonic emanation are
restricted to a couple of footnotes and a brief mention at the very end of the article. At p. 131 n. 38, we read that
al-Kindi's understanding of Divine creation as willed and as creation in time separates him from the others
listed above, where the others include the PA, LDC, al-Kindi and al-Farabi. One could deduce from this, I
suppose, that in Taylor's view these last-named philosophers do notview creation as taking place in time, but
Taylor has, at least here, no more to say on the subject. At n. 39, Taylor writes that The criterion of temporal
creation indicated in the third [variety of creation mentioned by Thomas] is shared with al-Kindi, though hereAquinas considers it something known only through Christian faith. Finally, in the very last parapraph of his
article (p. 136), Taylor again points out that al-Kindi embraced not an eternal emanative creation2 but a
doctrine of temporal creation by a divine willing in accord with Islamic religious teaching . This is, unless I'm
mistaken, the only explicit acknowledgement in the entire article that Neoplatonic creation2 or emanation is
eternal, while Abrahamic creation/creation1is temporal. Yet this point is of absolutely fundamental importance,
as I shall try to show.
22Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard (1252-56), Book 2, dist. 1, q. 1, a. 2, solutio.
23Sententiae lib. II, dist. 1, c. 2, vol. 1/2 p. 330.
24 Other Thomistic definitions of creation include producere simpliciter ens and producere totum ens
subsistens, nullo praesupposito (De pot. deiIII, I, c ; In VIII Phys. 974 f.). Yet the Angelic Doctor can also
simply identify creation with emanation (hanc quidem emanationem designamus nomine creationis [S. th. I, 45,
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the notion of creation involves two things. The first is that it presupposes nothing in the thing which is
said to be created . . . creation is said to be from nothing because there is nothing which preexists creation
as uncreated. The second is that in the thing which is said to be created non-being is prior to being, not by
a priority of time or duration . . . but by a priority of nature in such a way that, if the created thing is left
to itself, non-being would result. For it has being only from the influence of a superior cause.
Taylor goes on, somewhat rashly I'm afraid, to claim25that
These two criteria [ sc. that creation presupposes not-being and that the non-being of the created thing is
not temporal but ontological - MC] are precisely those found in the account of primary causality in the
LDC derived from Proclus and common to the teachings of Plotinus, Proclus, the PA, theLDC, al-Farabi,
and Avicenna.
I'm afraid that as far Plotinus and Proclus are concerned, this statement requires a good
deal of qualification. Quite apart from the question of whether or not these Neoplatonists had
a concept of creation at all this is of course the thesis that needs to be established it seems
at first glance false that they would assent to Thomas' assertion that creation nihil
praesupponat in re quae creari dicitur. Indeed, this seems to amount to imputing to them a
doctrine of creatio ex nihilowhich neither Greek philosopher would have accepted, although,
as Endress has shown, the Arabic adapter of Proclus' Elements of Theologydoes interpolate
the doctrine into his version of Proclus' Proposition 7626.
Thomas' notion that creation presupposes nothing in the thing which is said to be
created is, however, similar to one of the seven meanings of creation distinguished by Greek
Middle- and Neoplatonists, where it is attributed to Aristotle and denied of Plato. The second
sense of creation mentioned here by Thomas here, moreover, corresponds another of the
I, c] ; ...productio universalis entis a Deo non sit motus nec mutatio, sed sit quaedam simplex emanatio [In VIII
Phys.no. 974]). Cf. Kremer 19712, 419 n. 46 ; 421.25Taylor 2012, 132.
26Cf. Endress 1973 and Chase, in press, where I also suggest that Porphyry may have accepted some variety
of the doctrine of creationex nihilo. Another interpretation may be possible, however : perhaps by his use of the
verbpraesupponatThomas may be referring to the Greek idea that the Demiurge's creation of the world in time
in the Timaeus is merely kath'hupothesin (by hypothesis) or didaskalias heneka (for the sake of instruction).
That is, as the Neoplatonists held, Plato may have meant to present eternal realities as occurring within time
after all, Plotinus informs us that this is always the function of myth like geometers describe the construction
of geometrical figures although their existence is eternal, in order to show what great benefits the world receives
from the World Soul. See, for instance, Enn. IV 8 [6] 38-42 : B #
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seven senses in which Greek exegetes of Plato explained the gegonen at Timaeus28B7f. I
therefore propose a brief return to the land of Hellas, so that we may better understand the
background of Thomas' conception.
1.4 Calvisius Taurus and Porphyry on the meanings of genton
In commenting on the Timaeus, the Middle Platonist Calvinus Taurus27of Beirut (fl. c.
145AD) distinguished four meanings of the Greek word generated (gentos).
As we can see in Table 3, these meanings include (1) what is not generated but has the
same genus as generated things ; such things are gentain the sense that an object hidden in
the center of the earth can still be said to be visible (Greek horaton), even if it will never
actually be seen. The second meaning (2) covers what is notionally but not actually
composite : things, that is, that can be analysed in thought into their component parts. The
third meaning (3) of gentos concerns what's always in the process of becoming ; that is,
according to Platonic philosophy, the whole of the sublunar world, which is subject to
constant change. Finally (4), gentos can mean what derives its being from elsewhere ; in
other words from God. In a similar sense, the moon's light may be said to be generated by the
sun, although there has never been a time when this was not the case. Note that the important
feature here is that cause and effect are simultaneous and co-eternal (Greek sunaidios).
Slightly more than a century later, the Neoplatonist philosopher Porphyry (c. 234-c.
310) added additional meanings of gentos(Table 4) : these include (5) : what has the logos
of generation, i.e. what can be analysed in thought28. Meaning no. (6) covers sensible objects
like houses, ships, plants and animals, which obtain their being through a process of
generation. Finally, the seventh and last meaning (7) of gentosis what begins to exist in time
after not having existed. It's this last meaning of generated that Porphyry denies is
applicable to Plato's creation story in the Timaeus29.
27Cf. W. Baltes 1976, 105-121 ; M.-L. Lakmann 1995.
28 It must be admitted that it's not terribly clear what the difference is between this meaning and Taurus'
meaning no. 2, except that Porphyry adds the crucial example of what is composed out of matter and form.
29 If one can judge from the fragments cited by Philoponus, Porphyry himself believes that constituted
(suntheton) of form and matter is the most appropriate interpretation of gentosin Plato's Timaeus ; cf. Drrie-Baltes V, 1998, 440.
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It seems clear, then, that in the passage just cited, Thomas first takes up Porphyry's
definition no. 7 (What begins to exist in time, after having not existed), and then, when
discussing the second meaning of creation in the text cited above, he follows Calvisius
Taurus' meaning no. 4 : the world is created (Greek genton) in the sense that it derives its
being from elsewhere (Thomas : For it has being only from the influence of a superior
cause). According to Proclus, this sense is equivalent to being generated causally
(kat'aitian)30. This idea, originating in the interpretation of Timaeus 29E4-30A1 and
formulated by Plotinus31and then by Porphyry (see Text A below)32, amounts to claiming that
the world is not autonomous as far as its existence is concerned, but always implies a causal
principle superior to itself33. To say the word is generated kat'aitianis equivalent to saying it
has its being in becoming, as was held by a number of Middle Platonists 34, and by Plotinus
himself35. The kat'aitian interpretation is, moreover, equivalent to the interpretation of
gentonas designating that which is composite or at least analysable into its parts (Tauros'
meaning no. 2 = Porphyry's meaning no. 5), insofar as what is compound implies the
existence of a higher cause (aitia) that put it together36.
By adopting meanings no. 4 and 7, Thomas Aquinas is thus picking up on the tradition
of the Late Antique Neoplatonic commentators, as exemplified by Simplicius. According to
the latter in his Commentary on the Physics37, by generated (genton) Aristotle means what
previously does not exist, but later comes into existence or is generated (i.e., meaning no. 7).
30 Proclus, apud Philop., De aet. mundi, VI, 8, p. 148, 5-7 'G"D9#*H"49?-:+) "5)I,F"D)*#!)-"5),.#!+)"5)E4:7') ... E*>J"+#!)-"5)K9L%5&!'M#!)47!)')E*>'HE*H"5)N*2"O"'M!P)*+*Q"+')R)"*, #$%&'()*+),-.) ./)0.+1%+2),+%3+.4. Proclus is probably, here as often, following Porphyry,who declares in his Sentence 14 that everything generated has its the cause of its generation from something
else (IS)#!)-"5)=% T,,'2"U)*V"(*)"W9#!).:!D9J3!+).
31EnneadsII 4 [12], 5, 25 ff. ; IV 3 [27] 8, 30 ff. ; V 2 [11], 1, 5 ff. ; V 6 [24], 5, 5 ff. Cf. W. Baltes 1976,126 ff. ; Drrie-Baltes V, 1998, 428.
32Ap. Philop.,De aet. mundi6, 17, p. 172, 5 ff. Rabe ; ap. Proclus,In Tim., I, 277, 10 ff. Diehl. Cf. Porphyry,
Sent. 14 ; fr. 459 Smith ; Baltes 1976, 143 ff.
33On this view, which goes back to Xenocrates' student Crantor of Soli, see Drrie-Baltes V, 1998, 437 ff.
34 Philo, Plutarch, Tauros, Alcinoos, the anonymous Plationists cited by Alexander of Aphrodisias and
Philoponus. For references cf. Drrie-Baltes V, 1998, 438 and notes.
35E.g., VI 7 [38] 3, 1 ff.
36 Baltes 1976, 144, who points out the Middle Platonic antecedents to this view (Albinus, Tauros,
Hippolytus).37Simpl.,In Phys., 1154, 2 ff.
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Plato, in contrast, means by generated what has its being in becoming (meaning no. 6) and
derives its being from another cause (meaning no. 4).
What follows from these considerations, then, as far as the legitimacy of the
conclusion reached by Taylor, following Thomas, is concerned, viz. that both Abrahamic
creationism and Neoplatonic emanation can legitimately be considered forms of creation ?
I think we can say that Simplicius would not have been impressed. He would have
objected against T&T that they are committing the same error, or tactical ruse, as Philoponus.
By playing on the ambiguity of the term created/genton, they are conflating two quite
different meanings of the term and claiming that these meanings are, caeteris paribus, the
same thing. In a sense, of course, they arethe same thing, or rather they are closely related.
The two meanings of genton : coming into existence after not having existed (Aristotle)
and owing its existence to a higher causal principle (Plato) do in fact bear a kind of
Wittgensteinian family resemblance, which is why they can both be designated by the same
term. But to go on to deduce from this that the two phenomena have anything substantial in
common besides their name is to commit a fallacy of equivocation. Plato and Aristotle do
*not* mean the same thing by genton, Simplicius would say, and it is *not* the same thing
for a thing (a) to exist after having not existed (Latin post nihil), and for it (b) to owe its
existence to a higher causal principle. Pagan Neoplatonists would assert (b) and deny (a) ;
orthodox Christians, such as Thomas, might very well assert both (a) and (b) conjointly.
Finally, before leaving the passage from Thomas cited and analysed by Taylor, it is
worthwhile returning to the continuation of the passage quoted above :
However, if we take a third to be required for the notion of creation so that in duration
the thing created has non-being before being so that it is said to be from nothing because it is temporally
after nothing, creation cannot be demonstrated in this way nor is this conceded by the philosophers, but is
supposed by faith.
I take it that Thomas is acknowledging here that there is a third definition of creation
in addition to the two he has just enumerated. This one insists that the sense in which created
things are after nothing is temporal, and this meaning, as Thomas acknowledges, rejected
by the philosophers. Yet this third definition, which Thomas mentions almost in passing, is
surely the standard Abrahamic position : it is the one Philoponus defended at great length,
first against Proclus, then against Aristotle, and which Simplicius in turn attempted to refute
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in his commentaries on the De Caeloand the Physics. It is also the position of Bonaventure,
against whom Thomas may well be reacting here.
Thomas' position, then, seems to amount to saying that Christian creation and
Neoplatonic emanation are compatible if we leave the question of time out of consideration.
This also seems to be Taylor's position. Whether or not such a bracketing is legitimate is,
however, quite another question38.
2. 1 Free will and necessity
We have not yet dealt with the question of free will and necessity ; yet we must, for
we recall that according to Taylor, although both Abrahamic creation and Neoplatonic
emanationism are forms of creation, they are distinguished, presumably exclusively, by the
fact that Abrahamic creation is a free act of divine will, free of every kind of necessity, while
Neoplatonic emanationism involves no act of will at all, and is subject to at least one of
Taylor's three kinds of necessity.
As far as Neoplatonist creation is concerned, Taylor stresses, as we have seen, that
created reality emanates directly from the First Principle without any act of will or any other
intermediary, but by the very being of that Cause (Greek auti ti einai, Arabic bi-ann!yati-
hi) . He concludes from this that the very existence of the first cause immediately and
automatically entails, by a process of emanation, the existence of all subsequent levels of
reality.
We are on very slippery territory here, for there are clearly tensions within the
Neoplatonism itself, and especially Plotinus, as far as the question of will is concerned, so my
discussion will make even less claim here than elsewhere to be definitive. On the one hand, it
cannot be denied that creation auti ti einaiis a key element in post-Plotinian Neoplatonic
thought, not just since Proclus and the Pseudo-Dionysius, as Cristina D'Ancona has often
38The Taylor/Aquinas position would seem to amount to one of the doctrines identified as heretical, or at
least dangerous, by tienne Tempier and condemned in 1277 (vol. I, p. 549, no. 99 Denifle/Chatelain = 83
Mandonnet/Hissette) : Quod mundus, licet sit factus de nichilo, non tamen est factus de novo ; et quamvis de
non esse exierit in esse, tamen non esse non precessit esse duratione sed natura tantum (The world, although
created out of nothing, was nevertheless not originated ; and although it emerged from not-being to being, yetnot-being did not precede being with regard to duration, but only with regard to nature.
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argued, but since Porphyry39. Plotinus does indeed sometimes speak as if the One, the Good,
or the First lacked will40. It is just as undeniable, however, that the Neoplatonists, following
Plato himself in the Timaeus, devote a great deal of discussion to the role of the Demiurge's
will in the process of the world's creation41.
At this juncture, it is perhaps worthwile studying in detail a couple of very densely
argued pages of Taylor's paper42, which I believe are key to his entire thesis. In what follows I
will quote selections from these passages and intersperse them with my responses.
Transcendental necessity or necessity1, argues Taylor, is beyond the nature of will
where will might denote deliberation, choice, or weighing of alternatives, characteristics of
human will and action. It then does not involve a selection between alternatives.
MC : So far, so good. For Plotinus and Proclus, the One clearly does not deliberate or
hesitate. Yet all we are entitled to conclude from this, I would argue, is that if the One has a
will, it does not resemble human will, any more than human intellection resembles the
hypernosis (EnneadsVI 8, 16, 32) of the Good43. This does not, however, prove that the
One/Good/First lacks any and everykind of will.
Rather, Taylor continues,
reality under necessity1involves what cannot be otherwisethan the overflowing of reality from the Firstas the Good (...) This form of origination or ibd"(creatio) then, does not allow for the possibility of astopping or denialof the emanation of reality from the First.
39See Chase 2011 ; in press ; Drrie-Baltes 1998, 472 and n. 46. Creating through being what a thing is is
characteristic of entities whose being is pure actuality (energeia).
40V 1, 6, 15-27 ; VI 9, 6, 40. With regard to the latter passage, however, Georges Leorux (1990, 57) specifiesthat ce n'est donc qu'une volont de besoin et de dsir, volont de fins particulires, qui est nie. For Leroux,
the will that can be attributed to the One, in a positive theology that provides the necessary counterpart to the
negative theology that denies it, is a will that is intransitive, i.e. that has itself as its primary object.
41The role of the will of the Demiurge is accentuated even more in Plotinus's successors that it is in Plotinus.
Porphyry and Iamblichus (ap. Proclum,In Tim., 1, 382, 18 ff. Diehl) reject the doctrine of Atticus and Plutarch
because, among other reasons, it completely eliminates the Demiurge's benevolent will ( tn agathoeid boulsin
autou to parapan anairousan).
42Taylor 2012, 129-130.
43 According to Iamblichus, De Myst. I, 12, the divine will of the Good surpasses the life of ordinary
deliberation and choice (h t'agathou theia boulsis ts proairetiks huperekhei zs), translationClarke/Dillon/Hershbell, who remark (p. 51 n. 76) on the difficulty of translating this phrase.
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MC: Cannot, does not allow, and possibility are the key terms here ; we shall
investigate their possible meanings more closely below.
After adding that the First Cause, since it lacks form, does not act through the
necessity of a nature or form44, Taylors goes on to add :
To this extent, then, it [sc. causal activity under necessity1, and hence Neoplatonic-style emanation] does
not fit under Hasker's conception of creation1, which he characterizes as common to the monotheistic
religions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam [...] a free act on God's part ; he has no need to create but
has done so out of love and generosity.
M.C. A couple of remarks seem in order here. Hasker, whom Taylor is following here,
seems to be presupposing that eitherGod has a need to create orhe does so out of love and
generosity ; only in the latter case would God's act be free. Now, for Taylor, the fact that ittakes place auti ti einaiexcludes Neoplatonic emanation from this category of creation1.
This must be because he considers that such emanation is not free, or, in Hasker's
terminology, that it implies or entails a needto create on the part of the First Principle.
For Plotinus, however, there can be no question of the First Principle's having any
need to create. As perfect and self-sufficient, the One has no needs at all, not even the need
to reveal or manifest itself, and not even to create. Plotinus consistently describes the
One/Good as anendeswithout need45. Indeed, the One can be described as that which is
most without need (anendeestaton)46. And as Augustine reminds us, where there is no need,
there can be no necessity47. Perhaps, then, the dichotomy free act of creation vs. necessitated
act of creation is more complex that Hasker thought.
As far as the alleged absence of divine will in Neoplatonic emanation is concerned, for
Plotinus, God's boulsis is the cause of the eternal world48, or of the nous49. The difficult
paradox that creation occurs automatically and at the same time through the will of the First
Principle is, of course, the subject of Plotinus' EnneadVI.8, and the role of the Demiurge's
44See my objections to this claim, above n. 00.
45I 8, 2, 4 ; III 8, 11, 42 ; V 6, 4, 1 ; VI 7, 23, 8 ; VI 9, 6, 35 ; VI 8, 6, 35.
46VI 9, 6, 18
47Aug.De div. quaest. 83, quaest. 22, p. 26 Mutzenbecher : Ubi nulla indigentia, nulla necessitas : ubi nullus
defectus, nulla indigentia. Nullus autem defectus in Deo ; nulla ergo necessitas.
48II 1, 1 (40), II 1, 1, 2-4 ; II 1, 1, 34-37 ; III 8, 9, 16 ff.49VI 8, 17, 20 ff. ; VI 8, 18, 38-43.
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will as a factor in creation is stressed even more in such fifth-century pagan Neoplatonists as
Hierocles and Proclus50. For Plotinus, in a word and here one cannot avoid betraying the
subtlety and complexity of a truly profound work the will of God or the One is identical to
his substance, essence, and freedom51. The One does not exist just any old way, but as it
wills ; likewise, it produces not randomly, but as it wills52.
The role of divine will in Neoplatonic emanation can probably not be stated with more
clarity than it was by the late Matthias Baltes :
The Will of God is nothing other than the fulfillment [teleisis, one might also translate by perfection or
completion - MC] of his essence (ousia), that is, his goodness (agathots), which realizes itself
(energei) in willing (boulsis) and creation (poisis). For God is goodness that wills to communicate
itself, and does so53.
As far as the Abrahamic tradition is concerned, although God creates through a free
decision of his will, uninfluenced by any kind of necessity, he must still, like every rational
being, have a motive for his actions. Thomas' master Albertus Magnus makes this clear 54:
when something is produced not by natural necessity, but through freedom of will, the knowledge and
power of the agent do not suffice for production (...) but it is necessary that the appetitite of the will be
inclined toward the production of the thing (...) but that by which the will is inclined to action is the
goodness of the first agent ; and therefore it is proper to his goodness to educe things by creation.
For Thomas Aquinas as well, as for the Neoplatonists, it is of the nature of the Good to
communicate itself55. Ultimately, for Plotinus, God wished to produce the world precisely
50Already for Plotinus' assistant Amelius (ap. Proclus, In Tim., I, 361, 25), one of the three Demiurges acts
by will alone (boulsei monon) ; Proclus corrects him by affirming that one and the same Demiurge makes
everything through his goodness by means of his will (X#
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because he was good and was without any kind of need, and this motivation is ultimately not
terribly far removed from that adduced by Thomas56. It is true that Plotinus often says that
creation takes place by the nature of necessity57but he may be referring58by this only to the
law that all that is perfect produces an image similar to itself : natural things necessarily,
spiritual beings consciously and deliberately on the basis of purely moral necessity.
2.2 Leibniz on free will and necessity
We recall that for Richard Taylor, Abrahamic creation is free of all the three kinds of
necessity, while Neoplatonic emanation, although free from the necessity of external
compulsion (necessity3) and the necessity characteristic of things having a nature or form
(necessity2), is still subject to transcendent necessity (necessity1), in the sense that no
possibility exists of stopping or denying the emanation of reality from the First.
Klaus Kremer has an alternative discussion of necessity, which he takes from Leibniz.
For Leibniz, there is logical or metaphysical necessity in the fact that the angles of a triangle
are equal to two right angles, and this is the way God produces the world according to
Spinoza59. Unlike such absolute necessity, physical necessity, the kind by which fire warms
and ice cools, does allow its contrary. Finally, moral necessity does not eliminate freedom,
but presupposes it. It is this kind of necessity according to which the most perfect beings,
since they act in the most perfect way, must choose what is best, and wise, virtuous people
must act in accordance with their wisdom and virtue. Such necessity, although it
presupposes knowledge and will, is not opposed to freedom. If what is contrary to God's
choice implied a contradiction, then this would imply metaphysical necessity and eliminate
His freedom. In the words of Leibniz :
55Cf. Kremer 1965, 262-263, citing In DN nr. 136 ; 36 ; nnr. 213 ; 227 ; 229 ; 269 ; S. th. 1 11 1, 4 ad 1um ;
2 II 117, 6 ad 2um; I 106, 4, c. l C.G. II ; I 37 (fin.) ; III 24 ; I Sent. IV 1, 1, so. ; II 1, 4 contra ; S. th. III 1, 1, c.
56Kremer 1965, 264, citingDe pot. DeiI 5 ad 14 um : Optima ratio, qua Deus omnia facit, est sua bonitas et
sua sapientia, quae manerent, etiam si alia vel alio modo faceret. Cf. Kremer 1987, 1029, citing S. th. I 19, 4 ad
3um : bonitas est ei ratio volendi omnia alia.
57phuses anankiIII 2, 2, 8 ff. ; III, 2, 3, 35 ; II 9, 8, 20-29 ; II 9, 8, 3.
58Kremer 1987, 1015.59Spiniza,Ethics, note to prop. 17.
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Il y a donc en Dieu une libert, exemte non seulement de la contrainte, mais encore de la ncessit. Jel'entends de la ncessit mtaphysique ; car c'est une ncessit morale, que le plus sage soit oblig dechoisir le meilleur60.
(...) c'est la bont qui porte Dieu crer, afin de se communiquer ; et cette mme bont jointe la sagesse
le porte crer le meilleur : cela comprend toute la suite, l'effect et les voyes. Elle l'y porte sans lenecessiter, car elle ne rend point impossible ce qu'elle ne fait point choisir.
Applied to Plotinus, then, Leibniz's thesis would mean that the One, as highest good,
mut communicate its goodness to other things in a way analogous to that in which a moral
person must behave morally, but this must does not mean absolute necessity or
necessitation, since there would be no contradiction in supposing that God did not choose to
communicate himself61. Plotinus' One, argues Kremer, is free in the same sense as Thomas'
God : since it is already perfect and without no need, it creates non-necessarily.
3.0 Conclusion : Porphyrian Neoplatosism on temporal vs. causal creation
Finally, since I've often stressed, throughout this presentation, that Taylor
underestimates the importance of the distinction between temporal and timeless creation, I'd
like to briefly discuss a few Neoplatonic texts to back up my claim. They all interpret Plato's
account of the Demiurge's creation in the Timaeusas occurring in a causal, not a temporalsense. The first one is explicitly attributed to Porphyry, and Matthias Baltes 62 has argued
persuasively that the others go back to him, too. In Text A, Porphyry denies that Plato gives
the world a temporal origin. In things that are causally dependent (i.e., presumably,
everything except the First Cause, and therefore including the world), existence need not
presuppose a temporally pre-existent state of nothingness ; note the direction contradiction
here with the claim of Thomas Aquinas as cited by Taylor). This is another way of asserting,
as in our texts from Augustine and Philoponus, that in the sensible world some effects co-exist eternally with their causes. In turn, this amounts to claiming that the world is generated
in a causal, not a temporal sense (kat' aitian, all' ou kata khronon).
60Leibniz, Thodice, 230.
61 Indeed, in at least one passage (Ennead IV 8 [6] 6, 1-8), Plotinus, says not that the procession of beings
cannotbe stopped, but that it ought notto be stopped (ouk edei stsai), as if it were circumscribed by jealousy.
Again, the impossibility of stopping or refraining from creation is moral, not logical or metaphysical in nature.62Baltes 1976, 163 ff.
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In Text B, taken from the same book of the City of God in which he summarizes
Porphyry'sLetter to Anebo, Augustine affirms that some Platonists interpret Plato as saying
that the creation of the world takes place not in time, but from eternity, just as an eternal foot
might leave an eternal footprint : both would exist simultaneously, and yet it would be clear
that one was a cause, the other an effect. It is thus quite possible for a cause to be co-eternal
with its effect63.
In our Text C, Philoponus, who believes God did create the world in time, explains
how God can always be good even if he does not always create. If he does not do so, it is not
because of God's unwillingness or inability, but because the very nature of creation requires it
to come into existence after not having existed. He attests the Neoplatonic image of sun
emitting light and bodies casting a shadow, an image, probably deriving from Porphyry,
intended to illustrate the simultaneity or co-eternity of cause and effect64.
This analogy also shows an important difference from Christian notions of creation, as
we see in Text D. Here, Aeneas of Gaza confirms, that the Platonists hold the world is
generated causally (genton kat'aitian). They deny, however, that the Demiurge made
(pepoiken) the world, any more that my body makes its shadow : on the contrary, as a
shadow follows upon or accompanies (sunakolouthsen) my body, so the sensible world
follows upon the Demiurge65. Here, at any rate, Abrahamic creationism and Neoplatonic
emanationism seem far apart, so much so that it does not seem licit to speak of the latter as
creation at all.
63Origen also held that God's creation was sunaidioswith him, a position that was duly anathematized. See
Chase, in press.
64This analogy of divine emanation or creation to such natural processes as the sun emitting light or bodies
casting shadows was dangerous for the Neoplatonists, in that it could tend to imply the kind of automatic andnecessary nature of emanation with which the Christians reproached them. On the Neoplatonic use of this image,
see M. Wacht 1969, 73-74. W. Theiler 1966 traces it back to Porphyry.
65Basil of Caesarea comes dangerously close to this view when he speaks (Homiliae in hexaemeron, I, 6-7)
of how the world comes into existence timelessly, together with the will of God (X7'M "\Y'2,Z:!+ "'M]!'M=3$4)D9:2)2?!:"F)*+"5)E4:7')). Yet Basil comes down hard on those who refuse to concede thatthe world was generated by Him, but came into existence as a kind of shadow of his power, as it were
automatically (^*>E*&4"+%',,'>"8)?*)"*:&.)"D):2)2%F$3!+)C/=01('2"O]!O"5)E4:7'), 'H3>#!#!)W:&*+%*$ *H"'M:2)!3_$-:*), =,, '`')!>=%':E(*:7*"W912)F7!D9*H"'MR)"**H"'7F"D9%*$2%':"W)*+). Basil's text was translated more or less word for word in Ambrose's Hexaemeron (I, 1, 5, 18),
whence it was no doubt known to Augustine.
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Our Text E, from the dialogue Ammonios by Zacharias of Mytilene, gives reasons
why God's creation cannot be co-eternal with Him : if it were, it would be equally worthy of
worship (homotimos).
Finally, our Text F, from a lost work On Providenceby the Alexandrian Neoplatonist
Hierocles, a contemporary of Proclus, is interesting in that Hierocles raises against the Middle
Platonists who gave a literal interpretation of the creation story in the Timaeusthe same, or at
least very similar, arguments that Proclus and Simplicius raised against the Christine doctrine
of creation within time. If the Demiurge, according to Timaeus42E, remains in his customary
state (en ti heautou thei kata tropon menn), then he must remain unchanging66, which rules
out any temporal act of creation, since this would imply a change or shift on his part from
non-creation to creation67. If it was better not to create, then how could could the Demiurge
shift (metabainein), as it were, into creation mode ? If it were better to create, why didn't he
create from perpetuity68?
In conclusion, then, I have to say that I disagree with Taylor's assertion that both
Christian creation and Neoplatonic emanation and usefully and legitimately be called
creation. Creation, as it is usually understood in the Abrahamic world, is usually understood
as ex nihilo and temporal. For the Neoplatonists in contrast, as for virtually the entire
millenium-long Greek philosophical tradition, ex nihilo nihilfit, and emanation neither takes
place within time nor does it begin from a temporal starting-point. Finally, the role Taylor and
many others assign to divine will in creation as a specific difference between Abrahamic
creation and Neoplatonic emanation is a bit of a red herring. It is doubtful that God's will is
entirely free for thinkers like Thomas Aquinas, and it is false that will plays no role in
Neoplatonic emanation. It does indeed seem paradoxical to maintain, as does Plotinus, that
the First Principle creates both by free will and by its own being or essence. In fact, however,
as long as we recall that we are not talking about the same kindof will in the case of the First
as in the case of human beings, this paradox can be understood : for in the case of the One or
the Good, will and being are simply identical69.
66 For this doctrine in Plotinus, cf. Kremer 19712 4-5, with references n. 18. Only the soul is altered as it
creates.
67Drrie-Baltes 1998, 470 ; Baltes 1996.
68Cf., with Drrie-Baltes ad loc., Augustine, Conf. 11, 10, 12, probably following Porphyry.69Drrie-Baltes 1998, 472 n. 46.
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Tables
Table 1 : Taylor on types of necessity
Type of necessity characteristics applicability to
Abrahamic creation
applicability to
Neoplatonicemanation
3 external compulsion no no
2 necessity of nature,
characteristic of
things that possess a
nature or form
no no
1 transcendent ; effectfollows necessarily
upon positing ofcause
no yes
Table 2: Athanasius on the generation of the Son and the creation of the world
Type of creation relation to God'sessence
relation to God's will relation to time
poima(world) outside divine
essence
dependent in time
gennma(Son) idion ts ousias
gennma/ex autou
phusei gennmemon
not dependent eternal
Table 3
Calvinus Taurus apud Philoponum aet. mundi, p. 145, 13-147, 25 Rabe on the
meanings of genton :
Meanings of gentos examples
1. what was not generated, but
belongs to same genus as generated things
body in center of the earth (visible,
but will never actually be seen)
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2. what is composite by virtue of a
thought experiment, even if not composite in
actuality
middle note of the musical scale from
the highest and the lowest, flowers, animals
3. what is always in a process of
becoming
sublunar elements
4. what derives its being from
elsewhere (viz., from God)
moon derives its light from the sun
(although there's never been a time when it
did not do so)
Table 4
Porphyry apud Philoponum aet. mundi, VI, 8, p. 148, 7 ff. Rabe on the meanings of
gentos :
meanings of gentos examples
5. That which has the logos of
generation
(= Taurus meaning 2?)
words, syllables (decomposable into
letters) ; geometrical figures (rectilinear
figures decomposable into triangles),
compounds of matter and form
6. What receives its being through
generation and becoming
house, ship, plant, animal (snap of
fingers, flash of lightning : come into
existence without any process of generation)
7. What begins to exist in time, after
having not existed
most familiar meaning, but Plato
didn't apply it to the world
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Chase, Abrahamic creation and Neoplatonic emanation
in Greek, Arabic and Latin.
Texts
Text A
Porphyry ap. Sharastani p. 492 = t. II,
p. 357-358 Jolivet-Monnot
Porphyry, fr. 459, p. 529-351 Smith70.
wa yadaa anna allaai yubkc an
AflAden min al-qawl bi-budefal-Alam ghayr
gabcbqAl fcrisAla ilAAnAbAne: wa-ammAmA
faraqa bihi AflAden71 indakum min annahu
yahau li-l-Alam ibtidA zamAniyyan72 fa-
dawAkAaiba. wa-aalika anna AflAden laysa
(yarA) anna li-l-Alam ibtidA zamAniyyan
lakinna ibtidA alAjiha al-alla, wa yazamu
anna alla kawnihi ibtidAuhi73, wa-qad raa
anna al-mutawahhim alayhi fcqawlihi anna
al-Alam maileq wa-innahu badafa lA min
jay, wa-innahu iaraja min lA nikAm ilA
nikAm fa-qad aida wa lalida, wa-aAlika
annahu lAyagabbu dAimAn, anna kull adam
And he claimed that the statement
attributed to Plato concerning the world's
coming into being is not correct. He said in
his letter to Anebo76 : what separates Plato
from you, viz. that he gives the world a
temporal beginning, is a mendacious
assertion. This is because Plato did not think
that the world has a temporal origination77,
but an origination with regard to a cause ;
and he claimed that the cause of its existence
is its origination78. He was of the opinion that
whoever had the illusion that his view was
that the world was created and that it had
come into being ex nihilo, and that it had
70I have considerably modified the translation by Wasserstein (in Smith, Porphyrius Fragmenta), in the light
of the alternative versions by Jolivet-Monnot (Livre des religions et des sectes, trad. avec introd. et notes par
Daniel Gimaret, Jean Jolivet et Guy Monnot, 2. vols., Leuven : Peeters Paris : Unesco, 1986-1993 [Collection
Unesco d'oeuvres reprsentatives. Srie arabe, vol.1]) (J/L) and by Gabrieli (in A. R. Sodano, ed., Porphyrii in
Platonis Timaeum commentariorum fragmenta, Napoli 1964) (G).
71 Ce dont on accuse Platon chez vous (J/L), quanto a ci di cui presso di voi si a torto accusato
Platone (G)
72 commencement temporel (J/L).
73 la cause de son existence est son commencement (J/L), e che la causa del suo nascere debbaconsiderarsi come suo principio (G)
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aqdamu min al-wujed fc-mA alla wujedihi
jay Aiar layrihi74 wa lA kull se nikAm
aqdam min al-nikAm wa-innamA yanc
AflAden anna al-iAliq akhara al-Alam min al-
adam ilA-l-wujed, wajada75 innahu lam
yakun min /493/ aAtihi lakinna sabab
wujedihi min al-iAliq.
emerged from disorder into order79 - such a
person has erred and been deluded. That is
because it is not always true that all non-
existence precedes existence in that which
has the cause of its existence in something
else80; nor is all lack of order prior to order.
But by saying that the creator revealed the
world from non-existence into existence,
Plato merely meant that it does not exist by
itself, but the cause of its existence is from
the creator.
Text B
74 il n'est pas vrai toujours que toute sorte de non-tre prcde l'existence en ce qui a sa cause en une autre
chose que lui (J/L).
75 s'il est patent que... (J/L) ; Platone col dire che il Creatore trasse il mondo dal non essere all'essere
volle solo intendere che il suo essere non fu di per s stesso (G). The latter is the interpretation I have followed.
76 Sodano believed this reference was incorrect, and that the quotation in fact comes from Porphyry's
Commentary on the Timaeus. Yet there seems to be no good reason to doubt mahrastAnc's express testimony. TheLetter to Anebowas well known in the Arabic-speaking world, as it was to Augustine, who gives an account of it
in civ. Dei10, 11.
77For the translation of ibtid"by origination I follow Zimmermann 1986, 198, who remarks on the term's
frequency in the Theology of Aristotle. Cf. also al-Kindi, Epistle on the quantity of Aristotle's books, p. 410 f.
Guidi-Walzer, who translate the term by creare dal nulla. Lizzini 2009 prefers far iniziare. Compare the
Latin factum esse de novo, above, n. 00
78 By this phrase, Porphyry may have meant something analogous to Augustine's non esse hoc videlicet
temporis, sed substitutionis initium (see text B) : in the Timaeus, Plato depicts not a temporal origin for the
world, but the origin of its hypostasis/substitutio : that is, its concrete existence. On this meaning of hypostasis,
cf. Chase 2009-2010.79 A reference to Timaeus 30A, where Plato depicts the Demiurge's imposition of order on the disorderly
motion of the khra. In Porphyry's preserved comments on this passage, Porphyry denies that what appears to be
described as preceding and subsequent stages in Demiurge's creative activity can be understood as temporal :
this is merely a pedagogical tactic on Plato's part to enhance the clarity of the exposition. As Baltes comments
(1976, 152) : Es folgt daraus nichts fr ein reales Frher oder Spter im Schpfungs-geschehen : alles ist
vielmehr immer zusammen.
80In things that are causally dependent (i.e., presumably, everything except the First Cause), existence need
notpresuppose a temporally pre-existent state of nothingness. This is another way of asserting, as in our texts
from Augustine and Philoponus, that in the sensible world some effects co-exist eternally with their causes. In
turn, this amounts to claiming that the world is generated in a causal, not a temporal sense (kat' aitian, all' oukata khronon).
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Aug., civ. dei 10, 31.
Cur ergo non potius divinitati
credimus de his rebus, quas humano ingenio
pervestigare non possumus, quae animam
quoque ipsam non Deo coaeternam81, sed
creatam dicit esse, quae non erat ? Ut enim
hoc Platonici nollent credere, hanc utique
causam idoneam sibi videbantur adferre,
quia, nisi quod semper ante fuisset,
sempiternum deinceps esse non posset ;
quamquam et de mundo et de his, quos in
mundo deos a Deos factos scribit Plato,
apertissime dicat eos esse coepisse et habere
initium82, finem tamen non habituros, sed per
conditoris potentissimam voluntatem in
aeternum mansuros esse perhibeat83. Verum
id quo modo intellegant invenerunt, non esse
hoc videlicet temporis, sed substitutionis
initium84. Sicut enim, inquiunt, si pes ex
aeternitate semper fuisset in pulvere, semper
Why, then, should we not rather
believe the divinity about these things which
we cannot investigate with human ingenuity,
that divinity which tells us the soul itself is
not co-eternal with God, but that it was
created after having not existed ? In order for
the Platonists to refuse to believe this, they
thought they adduced this adequate cause :
unless something has always existed
previously, it cannot be perpetual
subsequently. However, Plato openly says
both of the world and of what he writes as
the gods in the world made by God, that they
began to exist and have a beginning, but by
the most powerful will of the creator he
testifies they will remain for eternity. Yet
they found a way to understand this, i.e. that
this is not a beginning of time, but of
subsistence85. Just as, they say, if a foot was
81sunaidios.
82Plato, Timaeus28B7 ff.
83Ibid., 41B 2.
84 A difficult phrase. Some translations : Combs : Les platoniciens, il est vrai, ont leur manire de
comprendre : il s'agit videmment, disent-ils, non pas d'un commencement d'un temps, mais d'un
commencement d'un tre sous-jacent un autre . Madec : Les platoniciens, il est vrai, ont leur manire de
comprendre : il s'agit videmment, disent-ils, non pas d'un commencement temporel, mais d'un commencement
constitutif . Allerdings haben sie einen Weg gefunden, wie sie das Gesagte verstehen : damit sei natrlich
nicht ein Anfang der Zeit gemeint (initium temporis = arkh khronik), sondern das Prinzip der Existenz (initium
substitutionis = arkh hupostases.
85Cf. Augustine, civ. dei XI 4, I, p. 515, 18-24 Hoffmann (quoted by J. Ppin 1964, 90-91 n. 6) : Qui autem
a deo quidem factum fatentur, non tamen eum temporis volunt habere sed suae creationis initium, ut modo
quodam vix intellegibili semper sit factus, dicunt quidem aliquid, unde sibi deum videntur velut a fortuita
temeritate defendere, ne subito illi venisse credatur in mentem, quod numquam ante venisset, facere mundum, etaccidisse illi novam voluntatem, cum in nullo sit omnino mutabilis.
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ei subesset vestigium, quod tamen vestigium
a calcante factum nemo dubitaret, nec
alterum altero prius esset : sic, inquiunt, et
mundus atque in illo dii creati et semper
fuerunt, semper existente qui fecit, et tamen
facti sunt.
in dust from eternity, a footprint would
always be under it86, yet no one would doubt
that the footprint was made by someone
treading, so, they say, both the world and the
gods created within it always existed, since
He who made them always exists, and yet
they were made.
Text C
Philop.,De aet mundi, 4, p. 13, 12 ff.
Rabe
1n. ^*> T,,D9. !V X &!59 =#*&49,
=#*&O16'H1!>9%!$>'H1!)59'H1.%'"!
C##()!"*+ X ?&4)'9, K9 X :'?49 ?-:+
I,F"D), E*>1+=#*&5)=?*+$'@7!&*
'p"!=:&.)!+*)"W91-7+'2$-
(5)
#+EW9 *H"'M E*"-#'$'M7!)
12)F7!D9, =,,
8/13/2019 Taylor.talk.Paris.may.2012.as Given
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28
?@:+)'HEJ3!+
(...) B9#'p"!
(25)
"'Mo,('2"5?89'p"!"'M?D"59
X v,+'9 'p"! %$4"!$49 C:"+) 'p&
G:"!$'9 E*>"
8/13/2019 Taylor.talk.Paris.may.2012.as Given
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29
"'H75):87*, =,, 'HE%!%'(-E!)*H"Z),
=,, CE!()-"'@"z:2)-E','@&-:!).
(kat'aitian), as my body is the cause of my
shadow87, but it did not make the latter, but
the latter followed from the former.
Text E
Zacharias Mytilenaeus Rhet.,
Ammonius sive De mundi opificio disputatio,
ed. M. Minniti Colonna, Zacaria Scolastico.
Ammonio. Introduzione, testo critico,
traduzione, commentario. Naples, 1973, sect.
2, 508 ff. = p. 105 Boissonade
{|}~. V :2)*s1+') "O &!O
"5) E4:7') !P)*+ ?Z:'7!), J:"*+ %'2
%F)"D9 E*"F #! "'M"' E*> X74"+7'9
*H"O. ' "( ) #.)'+"' %$59 =:.Y!+*)
7![u'), !V "5) %!$+#!#$*77.)') E*>
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=%!$+,Z%"z E*> ='$F"z E*> =)D"F"z
%*:8)=)*#F#D7!)?@:!+;
Christian: If we are to say that the
world is co-eternal with God, it will
necessarily, in that respect, be somehow
equal in value to Him. [And what could be
more impious], than if we were to raise what
is circumscribed, visible, tangible, and
possesses a material body to the same degree
of glory and honor as the uncircumscribed,
invisible nature which is above all natures ?
Text F
Hierocles, De prov., apud Photius,
Bibl. cod. 251, p. 461a-23
^*> 7S,,') ) !Q- "W9 =,-&!(*9
=?!:"_9, !V %$59 "O C)1!![ "W9 L,+EW9
And it would be even farther from the
truth if, in addition to making him needy of
87Bonaventure (loc. cit.) uses the same image of God's production of creatures as the body's projection of ashadow, once again on the presupposition of the eternity of matter.
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30
C)!$#!(*9E*>=%5 3$4)'2 "+)59E':7![)
$/*"', q%!$'HEC7.)!+)*H"5)C)"O
*L"'M &!+88. V #
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31
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