Technical Committee on Ovens and Furnaces

Technical Committee on Ovens and Furnaces

Date: October 16, 2012 To: Technical Committee on Ovens and Furnaces From: Derek Duval, Staff Liaison/Fire Protection Engineer Re: Agenda Package – NFPA 86 A2014 First Draft Meeting – October 23-24, 2012 Enclosed is the agenda package for the October 23-24, 2012 meeting for the NFPA 86 First Draft Meeting. Please ensure that you have reviewed the public input and the other agenda items in advance to prepare for discussion. The agenda and public comment will be posted on the document information page (www.nfpa.org/86). Some items to have available during the meeting include:

Agenda package with public input A copy of NFPA 86 (visit the NFPA 86 Document information page for your free committee

copy) Any previous copies of 86 A laptop

Optional items that are sometimes useful include: Previous ROP/ROCs if handy Review of NFPA’a New Process, www.nfpa.org/newregs

If you have any questions or comments, please feel free to reach me at (617) 984-7434 or by e-mail at [email protected]. I look forward to our meeting to finish up the revision cycle!

Technical Committee on Ovens and Furnaces AGENDA

October 23-24, 2012 Zurich Services Corporation

http://nfpa.adobeconnect.com/nfpa86/ 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. (Central Time Zone)

1. Meeting opening, introduction and attendance

2. Chair's remarks, Rich Gallagher

3. Staff Liaison update:

a. A2014 Schedule (Attachment A, A2014 Revision Cycle)

b. Committee Membership Update (Attachment B, OVE-AAA Membership)

c. New Standards Process Review (Attachment C, New Process – Quick Reference Guide)

4. New Business

a. Public Input (Attachment D, NFPA 86 - A2014 Public Input)

i. Task Group’s Recommendations.

b. Development of First Revisions (Attachment C, New Process – Quick Reference Guide)

5. Other business

a. CSB

6. Date/Location of Next Meeting. (Second Draft Meeting between May 3 and Oct. 18, 2012)

7. Adjournment

Attachments:

A. A2014 – Revision Cycle

B. OVE-AAA Committee Membership

C. New Process – Quick Reference Guide

D. NFPA 86 - A2014 Public Input

Attachment A: A2014 Revision Cycle

Process Stage Process Step Dates for TC Dates for TCC

Public Input Closing Date ‐ Electronic 6/22/2012 6/22/2012Final date for TC First Draft Meeting 11/30/2012 8/31/2012Posting of First Draft and TC Ballot 1/18/2013 10/12/2012Final date for Receipt of TC First Draft ballot 2/8/2013 11/2/2012Final date for Receipt of TC First Draft ballot ‐ recirc 2/15/2013 11/9/2012Posting of First Draft for CC Meeting 11/16/2012Final date for CC First Draft Meeting 12/28/2012Posting of First Draft and CC Ballot 1/18/2013Final date for Receipt of CC First Draft ballot 2/8/2013Final date for Receipt of CC First Draft ballot ‐ recirc 2/15/2013Post Final First Draft for Public Comment 2/22/2013 2/22/2013

Public Comment closing date ‐ Electronic 5/3/2013 5/3/2013Final Date to Publish Notice of Consent Documents 5/10/2013 5/10/2013Appeal Closing Date for Consent Documents 5/24/2013 5/24/2013Final date for TC Second Draft Meeting 10/18/2013 7/12/2013Posting of Second Draft and TC Ballot 11/29/2013 8/23/2013Final date for Receipt of TC Second Draft Ballot 12/20/2013 9/13/2013Final date for receipt of TC Second Draft ballot ‐ recirc 12/27/2013 9/20/2013Posting of Second Draft for CC Mtg 9/27/2013Final date for CC Second Draft Meeting 11/8/2013Posting of Second Draft and CC Ballot 11/29/2013Final date for Receipt of CC Second Draft ballot 12/20/2013Final date for Receipt of CC Second Draft ballot ‐ recirc 12/27/2013Post Final Second Draft for NITMAM Review 1/3/2014 1/3/2014

Notice of Intent to Make a Motion (NITMAM) Closing Date 2/7/2014 2/7/2014Posting of Certified Amending Motions and Consent Documents 4/4/2014 4/4/2014Appeal Closing Date for Consent Documents 4/18/2014 4/18/2014SC Issuance Date for Consent Documents 5/9/2014 5/9/2014

Tech Session Association Meeting for Documents with CAMs 6/9‐12/2014 6/9‐12/2014

Appeal Closing Date for Documents with CAMs 6/24/2014 6/24/2014SC Issuance Dates for Documents with CAMs 8/12‐14/2014 8/12‐14/2014

Annual 2014 Revision Cycle (New Process)

Comment Stage

(Second Draft)

Tech Session

Preparation

(& Issuance)

Appeals and

Issuance

Public Input

Stage

(First Draft)

NFPA 86 Revision Cycle – KEY DATES Annual 2014

NFPA A2014 [OVE-AAA]

Important Dates For the Cycle:

Public Input Closing June 22, 2012 (DONE)

Posting of First Draft February 22, 2012

Public Comment Closing May 3, 2013

Posting of Section Draft January 3, 2014

Notice of Intent to Make Motion (NITMAM) February 7, 2014

Issuance of Consent Standard May 9, 2014 (published bit later)

NFPA Annual Meeting with CAMs June 9-12, 2014

Issuance of Standard – with CAMs August 14, 2014 (published bit later)

Attachment B: OVE-AAA Committee Membership

Address List No PhoneOvens and Furnaces OVE-AAA

Derek Duval10/17/2012

OVE-AAA

Richard A. Gallagher

ChairZurich Services Corporation5124 New Kent RoadWilmington, DE 19808Alternate: Glen R. Mortensen

I 1/1/1990OVE-AAA

Richard J. Martin

SecretaryMartin Thermal EngineeringPO Box 873Manhattan Beach, CA 90267

SE 7/20/2000

OVE-AAA

Gary S. Andress

PrincipalLiberty Mutual PropertyEngineering Services20 Riverside RoadWeston, MA 02493-2231Alternate: Brent D. Hill

I 1/1/1992OVE-AAA

Kevin J. Carlisle

PrincipalKarl Dungs, Inc.3890 Pheasant Ridge Drive, NEBlaine, MN 55449Industrial Heating Equipment Association

M 4/14/2005

OVE-AAA

Erik W. Christiansen

PrincipalExponent, Inc.5401 McConnell AvenueLos Angeles, CA 90066Alternate: Delmar R. “Trey” Morrison III

SE 9/30/2004OVE-AAA

Dan Curry

PrincipalEclipse, Inc.1665 Elmwood RoadRockford, IL 61103Alternate: Bryan R. Baesel

M 1/14/2005

OVE-AAA

Robert Daley

PrincipalSolar Atmospheres Manufacturing, Inc.1983 Clearview RoadSouderton, PA 18964

M 10/4/2007OVE-AAA

John Dauer

PrincipalSCC, Inc.1250 Lunt AvenueElk Grove Village, IL 60007Alternate: Peter S. Pinto

M 1/16/2003

OVE-AAA

Thomas B. George

PrincipalTokio Marine Management, Inc.800 East Colorado BoulevardPasadena, CA 91101

I 4/14/2005OVE-AAA

John E. Higginbotham

PrincipalAlcoa, Inc.GRP Engineering, Tennessee Operations300 North Hall Road - S029Alcoa, TN 37701

U 4/3/2003

OVE-AAA

Ted Jablkowski

PrincipalFives North American Combustion, Inc.287 Boston Post RoadPO Box 160East Lyme, CT 06333Alternate: William M. Rucki

M 7/22/1999OVE-AAA

Kai-Eric Jensen

PrincipalJensen Industries, Inc.10068 Industrial DriveWhitmore Lake, MI 48189

M 7/17/1998

OVE-AAA

Frank J. Kaczmarczyk

PrincipalCarpenter Technology Corporation101 West Bern StreetReading, PA 19601-1203

U 03/05/2012OVE-AAA

Gary D. Keil

PrincipalCaterpillar Incorporated901 West Washington, Bldg. MM-2East Peoria, IL 61630-7650Alternate: Randall Conklen

U 7/24/1997

1



OVE-AAA

William M. Keough

PrincipalAFC-Holcroft LLC49630 Pontiac TrailWixom, MI 48393-2009Alternate: Joseph A. (Jak) Kozma III

M 1/10/2002OVE-AAA

Scott D. Musser

PrincipalRPA Engineering101 West Bern StreetReading, PA 19601-1203

SE 03/05/2012

OVE-AAA

Raymond Ostrowski

PrincipalConsultant-Industrial Safety30642 North 41st WayCave Creek, AZ 85331Alternate: J. William Sheppard

SE 10/6/2000OVE-AAA

Douglas M. Perry

PrincipalMaxon/Honeywell Company201 East 18th StreetMuncie, IN 47302Alternate: Bruce L. Mickelson

M 08/09/2012

OVE-AAA

Michael C. Polagye

PrincipalFM GlobalEngineering Standards1151 Boston-Providence TurnpikePO Box 9102Norwood, MA 02062-9102

I 1/1/1990OVE-AAA

Raymond E. Serafini, Jr.

PrincipalLinde, LLCRR #2, Box 535Brockway, PA 15824

IM 4/5/2001

OVE-AAA

Jason Sroczynski

PrincipalJayco Enterprises Inc.27800 Lemoyne Road, Suite HMillbury, OH 43447

SE 03/05/2012OVE-AAA

Mark V. Stender

PrincipalSurface Combustion, Inc.1700 Indian Wood CirclePO Box 428Maumee, OH 43537-0428Alternate: Keith A. Hancock

M 1/15/1999

OVE-AAA

Franklin R. Switzer, Jr.

PrincipalS-afe, Inc.2405 West Sacramento DriveMuncie, IN 47303-9002Alternate: Clemens J. Schultz

SE 4/17/2002OVE-AAA

Grant F. Tiefenbruck

Principal3M Company3M Center, Building 518-1-01St. Paul, MN 55144Alternate: James J. Garmaker

U 1/1/1990

OVE-AAA

Jay D. Tindall

PrincipalParagon Risk Engineering105 Seneca Farm DriveHarmony, PA 16037Alternate: Lee M. Rebodos

I 4/1/1996OVE-AAA

Algirdas Underys

PrincipalA. Finkl & Sons Co.2011 Southport AvenueChicago, IL 60614Forging Industry Association

U 10/19/1988

OVE-AAA

Peter J. Willse

PrincipalXL Global Asset Protection Services100 Constitution Plaza, 12th FloorHartford, CT 06103

I 1/1/1988OVE-AAA

Bryan R. Baesel

AlternateEclipse/CEC Combustion Safety, Inc.11699 Brookpark RoadCleveland, OH 44130Principal: Dan Curry

M 1/16/2003

2



OVE-AAA

Randall Conklen

AlternateCaterpillar Incorporated901 West Washington St., Bldg. MM2East Peoria, IL 61630-7650Principal: Gary D. Keil

U 4/28/2000OVE-AAA

James J. Garmaker

Alternate3M Company3M Center, Building 275-6W-22St. Paul, MN 55144-1000Principal: Grant F. Tiefenbruck

U 1/10/2002

OVE-AAA

Keith A. Hancock

AlternateSurface Combustion, Inc.1700 Indian Wood CirclePO Box 428Maumee, OH 43537-0428Principal: Mark V. Stender

M 8/9/2011OVE-AAA

Brent D. Hill

AlternateLiberty Mutual Property8505 Pebblebrook DriveFrisco, TX 75034Principal: Gary S. Andress

I 10/4/2001

OVE-AAA

Joseph A. (Jak) Kozma III

AlternateAFC-Holcroft LLC49630 Pontiac TrailWixom, MI 48393-2009Principal: William M. Keough

M 8/5/2009OVE-AAA

Bruce L. Mickelson

AlternateHoneywell International, Inc.1985 Douglas Drive NorthMail Station: MN10-2497Golden Valley, MN 55422Principal: Douglas M. Perry

M 8/9/2011

OVE-AAA

Delmar R. “Trey” Morrison III

AlternateExponent, Inc.1011 Warrenville Road, Suite 215Lisle, IL 60532-0906Principal: Erik W. Christiansen

SE 8/2/2010OVE-AAA

Glen R. Mortensen

AlternateZurich Services CorporationRisk Engineering41 East Crescent DriveMundelein, IL 60060Principal: Richard A. Gallagher

I 1/1/1990

OVE-AAA

Peter S. Pinto

AlternateSCC, Inc.1250 Lunt AvenueElk Grove Village, IL 60007Principal: John Dauer

M 8/5/2009OVE-AAA

Lee M. Rebodos

AlternateParagon Risk Engineering1417 Doubletree TrailFlower Mound, TX 75028Principal: Jay D. Tindall

I 4/3/2003

OVE-AAA

William M. Rucki

AlternateFives North American Combustion, Inc.4455 East 71st StreetCleveland, OH 44105Principal: Ted Jablkowski

M 08/09/2012OVE-AAA

Clemens J. Schultz

AlternateCSS Contract Services LLCPO Box 3184598 Weston Falls AvenueNeillsville, WI 54456Principal: Franklin R. Switzer, Jr.

SE 8/5/2009

3



OVE-AAA

J. William Sheppard

AlternateSheppard & Associates, LLC24756 Tudor LaneFranklin, MI 48025Principal: Raymond Ostrowski

SE 1/1/1980OVE-AAA

Derek Duval

Staff LiaisonNational Fire Protection Association1 Batterymarch ParkQuincy, MA 02169-7471

4/29/2011

4

Wednesday 10 17, Wednesday

Ovens and FurnacesOVE-AAAName Representation Class Office

Distribution by %

Company

Richard A. Gallagher Zurich Services Corporation I Chair

Gary S. Andress Liberty Mutual Property I Principal

Thomas B. George Tokio Marine Management, Inc. I Principal

Michael C. Polagye FM Global FM I Principal

Jay D. Tindall Paragon Risk Engineering I Principal

Peter J. Willse XL Global Asset Protection Services XLGAPS I Principal

6Voting Number Percent 22%

Raymond E. Serafini, Jr. Linde, LLC IM Principal


Kevin J. Carlisle Karl Dungs, Inc. IHEA M Principal

Dan Curry Eclipse, Inc. M Principal

Robert Daley Solar Atmospheres Manufacturing,Inc.

M Principal

John Dauer SCC, Inc. M Principal

Ted Jablkowski Fives North American Combustion,Inc.

M Principal

Kai-Eric Jensen Jensen Industries, Inc. M Principal

William M. Keough AFC-Holcroft LLC M Principal

Douglas M. Perry Maxon/Honeywell Company M Principal

Mark V. Stender Surface Combustion, Inc. M Principal


Richard J. Martin Martin Thermal Engineering SE Secretary

Erik W. Christiansen Exponent, Inc. SE Principal

Scott D. Musser RPA Engineering SE Principal

Raymond Ostrowski Consultant-Industrial Safety SE Principal

Jason Sroczynski Jayco Enterprises Inc. SE Principal

Franklin R. Switzer, Jr. S-afe, Inc. SE Principal


Wednesday 10 17, Wednesday

Ovens and FurnacesOVE-AAAName Representation Class Office

Distribution by %

Company

John E. Higginbotham Alcoa, Inc. U Principal

Frank J. Kaczmarczyk Carpenter Technology Corporation U Principal

Gary D. Keil Caterpillar Incorporated U Principal

Grant F. Tiefenbruck 3M Company U Principal

Algirdas Underys A. Finkl & Sons Co. FIA U Principal


27Total Voting Number

Attachment C: New Process – Quick Reference Guide

New Process – Quick Reference Guide For additional information on the New Regulations visit: www.nfpa.org/NewRegs

There are only three actions a TC can take at the First Draft (ROP) meeting:

1. Resolve a Public Input (no change to the document) 2. Create a First Revision (change to the document) 3. Create Committee Input

Resolve Public Input (no change to the document)

TC must provide a response (Committee Statement/CS) to ALL Public Input (proposal).

CS for not doing what is suggested

Sample Motion: “I make a motion to resolve PI#_ with the following committee statement__.” Approval by meeting vote (simple majority). Not subject to Ballot.

Create a First Revision (change to the document)

TC must create a First Revision (FR) for each change they wish to make to the document, either using Public Input for the basis of the change or not using a Public Input for the basis. One or more Public Input can be considered for the FR.

All Public Input requires a response

TC can use a Public Input for basis i. Sample Motion: “I make a motion to revise section __ using PI#_ as the

basis for change.” Approval by meeting vote (simple majority) and final approval through ballot.

TC develops revision without a Public Input for basis i. Sample Motion: “I make a motion to revise section __ as follows___.”

Approval by meeting vote (simple majority) and final approval through ballot.

First Revisions require a committee statement Committee Input

TC may create a Committee Input (CI). This replaces the old system “rejected” Committee Proposals. CIs will get printed in the report but will not be balloted or shown as a change in the draft. CIs are used to solicit public comments and/or as a placeholder for the comment stage.

i. Sample Motion: “I make a motion to create a CI with a proposed revision to section__ as follows___.” Approval by meeting vote (simple majority). Not subject to ballot.

Requires a committee statement to explain the intent of making a CI.

Comparison to Previous Process:

PREVIOUS ACTIONS NEW PROCESS ACTIONS Sample Motion Accept or any variation of Accept (APA, APR, APP) on a public proposal

1) Committee generates a First Revision and Substantiation (CS) for change 2) Committee provides response (CS) to each PI that is associated with the revision

1) “I make a motion to revise section __ using PI#_ as the basis for change.”

2) “ I make a motion to resolve PIs#_ through ## with the following statement__”

Rejected Public Proposal Committee provides response (CS) to PI

“I make a motion to resolve PI#_ with the following committee statement__.”

Accepted Committee Proposal Committee generates a First Revision and Substantiation (CS) for change

“I make a motion to revise section __ as follows___.” Committee generates a statement for reason for change

Rejected Committee Proposal Committee generates a Committee Input (CI) and reason (CS) for proposed change

“I make a motion to create a CIwith a proposed revision to section__ as follows___.” Committee generates a statement for reason for CI.

Notes: 1) All meeting actions require a favorable vote of a simple majority of the members present. 2) All First Revisions will be contained in the ballot and will require a 2/3 affirmative vote to

confirm the meeting action. 3) Only the First Revisions will be balloted. PIs and CIs will be contained in the report but will

not be balloted. 4) Comments may be submitted on all PIs, FRs and CIs

New Terms:

NEW TERM OLD TERM

Input Stage ROP Stage

Public Input (PI) Proposal

First Draft Meeting ROP Meeting

Committee Input Committee Proposal that Fail

Ballot

Committee Statement (CS)

Committee Statement

First Revision (FR) Committee Proposal or Accepted

Public Proposal

First Draft Report ROP

First Draft ROP Draft

Comment Stage ROC Stage

Public Comment Public Comment

Second Draft Meeting ROC Meeting

Committee Comment Committee Comment that Fail

Ballot

Committee Action Committee Action

Second Revision Committee Comment or Accepted

Public Comment

Second Draft Report ROC

Second Draft ROC Draft

Note: The highlighted terms are the ones that will be most applicable at the First Draft Meeting.

Attachment D: NFPA 86 – A2014 Public Input

3/53

Public Input No. 141-NFPA 86-2012 [ Section No. 1.1.7 ]

1.1.7 This standard shall not apply to the following:

(1)

(2) Listed equipment with a heating system(s) that supplies a total input notexceeding 150,000 Btu/hr (44 kW)

(3) Fired heaters in petroleum refineries and petrochemical facilities that aredesigned and installed in accordance with API STD 560, Fired Heaters forGeneral Refinery Services, 2007; API RP 556, Instrumentation and ControlSystems for Fired Heaters and Steam Generators, 1997; and API RP 2001,Fire Protection in Refineries, 2005.

(4)

(5) Fluid is flowing under pressure in tubes or pipes and is indirectly heated bycombustion of liquid gas fuel or an electrical source.

Fluid is heated indirectly by products of combustion of liquid or gas fuel flowingthrough tubes (firetube) as defined in NFPA 87 Recommended Practice for FluidHeaters .

Statement of Problem and Substantiation for Public Input

NFPA 87 did not exist when the language in 1.1.7(4) was drafted for the 2011 Edition. Language currently in 1.1.7(4) precludes "wash tanks" from governance by either NFPA 86 or NPFA 87, since the fluid is not under pressure. The revised exception would categorize a "wash tank" as an NFPA 86 oven.

Submitter Information Verification

Submitter Full Name: Richard MartinOrganization: Martin Thermal Engineering, Inc.Affi l l iation: Secretary NFPA 86 Task Group on Introductory ChaptersSubmittal Date: Fri Jun 22 15:34:00 EDT 2012

Copyr ight Ass ignm ent

I, Richard Martin, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) all andfull rights in copyright in this Public Input (including both the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problem andSubstantiation). I understand and intend that I acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in anypublication of the NFPA in w hich this Public Input in this or another similar or derivative form is used. I herebyw arrant that I am the author of this Public Input and that I have full pow er and authority to enter into thiscopyright assignment.

By checking this box I aff irm that I am Richard Martin, and I agree to be legally bound by the above CopyrightAssignment and the terms and conditions contained therein. I understand and intend that, by checking this box, Iam creating an electronic signature that w ill, upon my submission of this form, have the same legal force andeffect as a handw ritten signature

* Coal or other solid fuel–firing systems

* Fluid heaters where either of the following conditions exists:

10/17/12 TerraView™

4/53submittals.nf pa.org/TerraViewWeb/ViewerPage.jsp

Public Input No. 32-NFPA 86-2012 [ New Section after 3.3.2.4 ]

3.3.2.5 Process Control AirAir introduced to a furnace containing a special atmosphere to establish acontrol led oxygen level or carbon potential.


Definition added for clarity in using the term in Class C furnaces.


Submitter Full Name: Fausta LyonsOrganization: Caterpillar IncAffi l l iation: NFPA 86 Class C Task GroupSubmittal Date: Fri Apr 27 09:38:38 EDT 2012


I, Fausta Lyons, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) all andfull rights in copyright in this Public Input (including both the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problem andSubstantiation). I understand and intend that I acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in anypublication of the NFPA in w hich this Public Input in this or another similar or derivative form is used. Except tothe extent that I may lack authority to make an assignment of content identif ied above, I hereby w arrant that I amthe author of this Public Input and that I have full pow er and authority to enter into this copyright assignment.

By checking this box I aff irm that I am Fausta Lyons, and I agree to be legally bound by the above CopyrightAssignment and the terms and conditions contained therein. I understand and intend that, by checking this box, Iam creating an electronic signature that w ill, upon my submission of this form, have the same legal force andeffect as a handw ritten signature

Or igin (from sources other than the subm itter )

Content provided by Gary Keil (Caterpillar) in Class C Task Group.


3.3.2.6 Burnout AirAir introduced into a furnace chamber for the purpose of burning out flammableatmospheres, residual soot or other carbonaceous material.


Definition to be added for clarity in using the term in Class C furnaces.











3.3.6Burner Management System. The field devices, logic system, and final control elementsdedicated to combustion safety and operator assistance in the starting and stopping of fuelpreparation and burning equipment and for preventing misoperation of and damage to fuelpreparation and burning equipment.


See substantiation for Public Input #102 at Section 8.3.

Related Public Inputs for This Document

Related Input RelationshipPublic Input No. 102-NFPA 86-2012[Section No. 8.3]

Section 8.3 heading and Definition 3.3.6 referto each other


Submitter Full Name: Richard MartinOrganization: Martin Thermal Engineering, Inc.Affi l l iation: Secretary, NFPA 86 Task Group on Introductory ChaptersSubmittal Date: Fri Jun 22 00:27:31 EDT 2012






Public Input No. 101-NFPA 86-2012 [ New Section after 3.3.18 ]

3.3.18 Flame Response Time (FRT). The period of time that starts with the loss of flame and endswith the de-energizing of the terminals of the safety shut-off valves.


See substantiation Public Input #99 at Section 8.5.2.1.


Related Input RelationshipPublic Input No. 99-NFPA 86-2012[New Section after 8.5.2.1]

Definition for Combustion Safeguard toaccompany new required text






10/17/12



3.3.21 Fresh AirAir uncontaminated by flammable or corrosive components other than moisture. Acolorless, odorless, tasteless, gaseous mixture, mainly nitrogen (approximately 78percent) and oxygen (approximately 21 percent) with lesser amounts of argon, carbondioxide, hydrogen, neon, helium, and other gases.


For purposes of purge and safety ventilation, the standard calls for the use of fresh air (3.3.53, 8.5.1.1, 10.6.3.1, 10.6.3.2, 11.6.1.10, 11.6.1.14,...). However, end users often debate what is an acceptable fresh air source. A definition is needed to clarify this question.


Submitter Full Name: Thomas GeorgeOrganization: Tokio Marine Management, Inc.Submittal Date: Fri Jun 22 09:43:28 EDT 2012


I, Thomas George, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) alland full rights in copyright in this Public Input (including both the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problemand Substantiation). I understand and intend that I acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in anypublication of the NFPA in w hich this Public Input in this or another similar or derivative form is used. I herebyw arrant that I am the author of this Public Input and that I have full pow er and authority to enter into thiscopyright assignment.

By checking this box I aff irm that I am Thomas George, and I agree to be legally bound by the aboveCopyright Assignment and the terms and conditions contained therein. I understand and intend that, by checkingthis box, I am creating an electronic signature that w ill, upon my submission of this form, have the same legalforce and effect as a handw ritten signature

Public Input No. 143-NFPA 86-2012 [ Section No. 3.3.25.4 ]

3.3.25.4 Class 4* Class B Furnace. An oven or furnace that has heat utilization equipment wherein there are noflammable volatiles or combustible materials being heated.


Add asterisk to cite new Annex material






10/53


3.3.30Hardwired. The method of interconnecting signals or interlocks to a logic system orbetween logic systems using a dedicated interconnection


Adds a new definition for a term that is used in the standard.









3.3.30.8 Radiant Tube Heating System. A heating system with tubular elements open at one or both ends in which eachtube has an inlet burner arrangement where combustion is initiated, a suitablelength where combustion occurs, and an outlet which discharges outside thecombustion chamber for the combustion products formed.


In a recent application a client had developed a Radiant tube heating system in which the products of combustion were released directly into the combustion chamber rather than outside or into a exhaust stack or header. Therefore if a burner were to have a leak, the gas could be discharge into the combustion chamber which is not normal to Radiant tube burners. Additionally, if you treat the system as a direct fired, becasue of a nearly 25 foot combustion sleeve, the flame is not present in the combustion chamber to provide an ignition source for unburned gases. So it really does not fall into either style of system and needs to have special considerations.


Submitter Full Name: Franklin SwitzerOrganization: S-afe, Inc.Submittal Date: Fri Jun 22 14:18:23 EDT 2012


I, Franklin Sw itzer, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) alland full rights in copyright in this Public Input (including both the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problemand Substantiation). I understand and intend that I acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in anypublication of the NFPA in w hich this Public Input in this or another similar or derivative form is used. I herebyw arrant that I am the author of this Public Input and that I have full pow er and authority to enter into thiscopyright assignment.

By checking this box I aff irm that I am Franklin Sw itzer, and I agree to be legally bound by the aboveCopyright Assignment and the terms and conditions contained therein. I understand and intend that, by checkingthis box, I am creating an electronic signature that w ill, upon my submission of this form, have the same legalforce and effect as a handw ritten signature




3.3.53 Proven Venti lation 53 Venti lation . A supply of fresh air to, and exhaust from, a furnace that provides a vigorous,distributed flow of air through all sections of the furnace, such that flammable vaporconcentrations in all parts of the furnace or furnace enclosure are maintained belowthe lower flammable limit at all times .


The term “proven ventilation” is not used in the standard. The term ventilation is used for both safety ventilation and pre-ignition purge. A definition is required for the term “Safety Ventilation”, which is used in the standard.The existing language “flammable vapor concentrations … are maintained below the lower flammable limit…” is more appropriately used as enforceable language (see related public input addressing Section 11.6.1.1) and not in a definition.


Submitter Full Name: Richard MartinOrganization: Martin Thermal Engineering, Inc.Affi l l iation: Secretary of NFPA 86 Task Group on Class A OvensSubmittal Date: Fri Apr 13 10:24:38 EDT 2012







3.3.53.1*Safety Venti lation. The ventilation necessary to dilute VOC’s within a Class A oven to therequired percent of the Lower Flammable Limit (LFL).


See substantiation provided for Public Input #24 at Section 3.3.53.


Related Input RelationshipPublic Input No. 24-NFPA 86-2012 [SectionNo. 3.3.53]

Definition of "ventilation" separated intotwo parts


Submitter Full Name: Richard MartinOrganization: Martin Thermal Engineering, Inc.Affi l l iation: Secretary of NFPA 86 Task Group on Class A OvensSubmittal Date: Tue Jun 19 14:49:19 EDT 2012






3.3.60 Safe-Start Check. A checking circuit incorporated in a safety-control circuit that prevents light-off if the flame-sensing relay of the combustion safeguard is in the unsafe (flame-present) position due tocomponent failure within the combustion safeguard or due to the presence of actual orsimulated flame.


Since PLC's may now implement the Safe-Start check, what additional features are included by the manufacturers of approved Burner Management systems which include Safe-Start Check. These items need to be listed so that any requirements can be met.









4.1.1.3 The furnace classification (A, B, C, D) shall be included.


By adding the requirement that the plans must include the furnace class, it helps ensure that the user has reviewed the requirements for that class of furnace.


Related Input RelationshipPublic Input No. 93-NFPA 86-2012 [Section No. 3.3.25.4]

Requirement to identify furnace class on plans added tohelp user select correct furnace class


Submitter Full Name: Richard MartinOrganization: Martin Thermal Engineering, Inc.Affi l l iation: Secretary NFPA 86 Task Group on Introductory ChaptersSubmittal Date: Thu Jun 21 23:00:44 EDT 2012







4.1.1.4 If a furnace is modified and/or its process load is changed from the original design, thefurnace Class shall be evaluated and either confirmed to remain as the original Class or thereassigned to a new Class.


See substantiation for Public Input #95


Related Input RelationshipPublic Input No. 95-NFPA 86-2012[New Section after 4.1.1.2]

Modification of a furnace requires assessment andpossible re-assignment of Class


Submitter Full Name: Richard MartinOrganization: Martin Thermal Engineering, Inc.Affi l l iation: Secretary of NFPA 86 Task Group on Introductory ChaptersSubmittal Date: Thu Jun 21 23:17:22 EDT 2012







5.4.3.6 No portions of the building shall be used as an integral part of the duct leading tothe approved a safe point of discharge.


Based on discussions at a recent NFPA 85 TC meeting and contents of the NFPA 85 document (e.g., 6.6.3.1.2.2), NFPA does not disallow use of the word “safe” in the context of “safe location” as being unenforceable language and that NFPA 85 uses “safe location” in mandatory text.









6.2.5.3* A gas filter or strainer shall be installed in the fuel gas piping and shall be locateddownstream of the equipment isolation valve and sediment trap and upstream of allother fuel gas system components. The mesh size shall be the minimum size toprotect downstream controls as prescribed by the component manufacturer.


Debris in the fuel gas is unpredictable, and many operated believe that the fuel gas is clean, when in fact is may not be. A more consistent approach would be to have the component manufacturers describe what type of gas filter/strainer is needed to properly protect the downstream controls.


Submitter Full Name: Kevin CarlisleOrganization: Karl Dungs, Inc.Submittal Date: Tue Aug 07 12:20:13 EDT 2012


I, Kevin Carlisle, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) all andfull rights in copyright in this Public Input (including both the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problem andSubstantiation). I understand and intend that I acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in anypublication of the NFPA in w hich this Public Input in this or another similar or derivative form is used. I herebyw arrant that I am the author of this Public Input and that I have full pow er and authority to enter into thiscopyright assignment.

By checking this box I aff irm that I am Kevin Carlisle, and I agree to be legally bound by the above CopyrightAssignment and the terms and conditions contained therein. I understand and intend that, by checking this box, Iam creating an electronic signature that w ill, upon my submission of this form, have the same legal force andeffect as a handw ritten signature




6.2.6.3* Regulators, relief valves, and switches shall be vented to an approved a safelocation, and the following criteria also shall be met:

(1) Heavier-than-air flammable gases shall be vented outside the building to alocation where the gas is diluted below its LFL before coming in contact withsources of ignition or re-entering the building.

(2) Vents shall be designed to prevent the entry of water and insects withoutrestricting the flow capacity of the vent.


See substantiation for Public Input #109 at Section 5.4.3.6.


Related Input RelationshipPublic Input No. 109-NFPA 86-2012 [Section No.5.4.3.6]

Related link for "safe" versus"approved"









6.2.6.4* Fuel gas regulators, ratio regulators, and zero governors shall not be required to bevented to an approved a safe location in the following situations:

(1) Where backloaded from combustion air lines, air–gas mixture lines, orcombustion chambers, provided that gas leakage through the backloadconnection does not create a hazard

(2) Where a listed regulator–vent limiter combination is used

(3) Where a regulator system is listed for use without vent piping




Related Input RelationshipPublic Input No. 109-NFPA 86-2012 [Section No.5.4.3.6] "Safe" versus "Approved"









6.2.6.4* Fuel gas regulators, ratio regulators, and zero governors shall not be required to bevented to an approved location in the following situations:

(1) Where backloaded from combustion air lines, air–gas mixture lines, orcombustion chambers, provided that gas leakage through the backloadconnection does not create a hazard

(2) Where a listed regulator–vent limiter combination is used

(3) Where a regulator system is listed for use without vent piping

(4) A regulator incorporating a leak limiting system, which permits not more than2.5 ft3/h (based on the maximum rated inlet pressure rating and a gas havinga specific gravity of 0.65) or less into the ambient if the atmosphericdiaphragm ruptures.


Recommending the use of listed regulator/vent limiter combinations essentially limits the use of the vent limiting devices to 5 PSI maximum, because the regulator standard for which such listings can be done has a limited scope of 5 PSI, 2PSI or 1/2 PSI. The proposal removes the listing combination barrier and directs the user's attention to specifically check the ratings of the limiter, and it codifies language for the use of other types of devices that limit the escape of gas into ambient if the atmospheric diaphragm ruptures. Examples of devices currently used today are safety diaphragms and ventilation valves. See also annex A.6.2.6.4 for the selection of the 2.5 ft3/h limit.









6.2.6.8.1Vents from systems operating at different pressure levels shall not be manifolded together.

6.2.6.8.2Vents from systems served from different pressure reducing stations shall not bemanifolded together.6.2.6.8.3Vents from systems using different fuel sources shall not be manifolded together.


NFPA 86 currently does not prohibit manifolding vent lines from different pressure sources, but it is good engineering practice to avoid doing this and NFPA 85 prohibits it. The proposed subparagraphs are extracted from NFPA 85 (2011), Section 4.9.3.


Submitter Full Name: Richard MartinOrganization: Martin Thermal EngineeringAffi l l iation: Secretary of NFPA 86 Task Group on Introductory ChaptersSubmittal Date: Wed Jun 06 19:34:24 EDT 2012







6.2.6.9 The

sizecross-sectional area of the

vent manifold specified in 6.2.6.8 shall be not less than themanifold line shall not be less than the greater of the following:

(1) The cross-sectional area of the largest vent

lineplus 50 percent of the sum of the cross-sectional areas of the additional vent

line arealines .

(2) The sum of the cross-sectional areas of the two largest vent lines.


NFPA 86 currently does not prohibit manifolding vent lines from different pressure sources, but it is good engineering practice to avoid doing this and NFPA 85 prohibits it. The proposed subparagraphs are extracted from NFPA 85 (2011), Section 4.9.3.


Submitter Full Name: Richard MartinOrganization: Martin Thermal EngineeringAffi l l iation: Secretary of NFPA 86 Task Group on Introductory ChaptersSubmittal Date: Wed Jun 06 19:53:26 EDT 2012







6.2.6.10* A vent between safety shutoff valves, where installed:

(1) Shall not be combined with other vents

(2)




Related Input RelationshipPublic Input No. 109-NFPA 86-2012 [Section No.5.4.3.6] "Approved" versus "Safe"






* Shall terminate to an approved location a safe location


submittals.nf pa.org/TerraViewWeb/ViewerPage.jsp


Add a new section to read as follows: For a burner equipped with vents between blocking valves on both the main gas line andthe pilot gas line, these two vents may be combined.


This would allow a less expensive installation for venting of all of the blocking valves on a burner. Since having a vent line on the pilot gas line is a rather unusual circumstance, it is not surprising that NFPA 86 is silent about the possibility of combining them.


Submitter Full Name: Kevin CarlisleOrganization: Karl Dungs, Inc.Submittal Date: Mon Jul 02 08:29:53 EDT 2012







Add a new section to read as follows: For a burner equipped with vents between blocking valves on both the main gas line andthe pilot gas line, these two vents may be combined.


This would allow a less expensive installation for venting of all of the blocking valves on a burner. Since having a vent line on the pilot gas line is a rather unusual circumstance, it is not surprising that NFPA 86 is silent about the possibility of combining them.


Submitter Full Name: Grant TiefenbruckOrganization: 3M CompanySubmittal Date: Mon Jul 02 12:40:49 EDT 2012


I, Grant Tiefenbruck, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) alland full rights in copyright in this Public Input (including both the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problemand Substantiation). I understand and intend that I acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in anypublication of the NFPA in w hich this Public Input in this or another similar or derivative form is used. I herebyw arrant that I am the author of this Public Input and that I have full pow er and authority to enter into thiscopyright assignment.

By checking this box I aff irm that I am Grant Tiefenbruck, and I agree to be legally bound by the aboveCopyright Assignment and the terms and conditions contained therein. I understand and intend that, by checkingthis box, I am creating an electronic signature that w ill, upon my submission of this form, have the same legalforce and effect as a handw ritten signature


6.3.8.3 Pilot burners shall be considered burners, and all provisions of Section 6.2 3 shallapply.


Reference should be to the oil fired section 6.3, not to the gas fired section 6.2. This was a copy-paste editing error, see 6.2.10.3 for the corresponding fuel gas requirement.


Submitter Full Name: Dan CurryOrganization: Eclipse, Inc.Submittal Date: Thu Jun 21 11:12:09 EDT 2012


I, Dan Curry, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) all and fullrights in copyright in this Public Input (including both the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problem andSubstantiation). I understand and intend that I acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in anypublication of the NFPA in w hich this Public Input in this or another similar or derivative form is used. I herebyw arrant that I am the author of this Public Input and that I have full pow er and authority to enter into thiscopyright assignment.

By checking this box I aff irm that I am Dan Curry, and I agree to be legally bound by the above CopyrightAssignment and the terms and conditions contained therein. I understand and intend that, by checking this box, Iam creating an electronic signature that w ill, upon my submission of this form, have the same legal force andeffect as a handw ritten signature




6.4.3.8* Oxygen from pressure relief devices and purge outlets shall be vented to anapproved a safe location by vents designed to prevent the entry of water andinsects.




Related Input RelationshipPublic Input No. 109-NFPA 86-2012 [Section No.5.4.3.6] "Approved" versus "Safe"









6.5.2 The following shall apply to collecting and venting systems for radiant tube–typeheating systems:

(1) The system shall be of a capacity to prevent an explosion or fire hazard due tothe flow of unburned fuel through the radiant tubes.

(2)

(3) A * A radiant tube–type heating system provided with two safety shutoffvalves interlocked with combustion safeguards shall be exempt from therequirements of 6.5.2.


See substantiation at Public Input #98 for Section A.6.5.2(3)







Add new text to read as follows:

7.1.7* A confirmed source of combustible gas shall be provided to the inlet of the

* The system shall be capable of dilution of the rated maximum inputcapacity of the system to a noncombustible state.

7.1.7* A confirmed source of combustible gas shall be provided to the inlet of theequipment isolation valve(s) (see 6.2.4.1 and 13.5.11.10.2.1) each time a combustible gassupply is placed into service or restored to service.


Note: This Proposal originates from Tentative Interim Amendment 86-11-3 (TIA 1010) issued by the Standards Council on March 1, 2011.The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) requested an appropriate action by NFPA 86 in response to the following fuel gas related explosion at ConAgra Foods, Garner, NC in 2009 The NFPA 86 task group elected to wait until NFPA 54 took action on this matter. NFPA 54 issued TIA 09-3 with an effective date of 08/25/10. Excerpt from NFPA 54-2009 3.3.105.1 Appliance Shutoff Valve. A valve located in the piping system used to shut off individual equipment. Excerpt from NFPA 86-2011 3.3.76.3 Equipment Isolation Valve. A manual shutoff valve for shutoff of the fuel to each piece of equipment. Note: This TIA does not address liquid fuel evacuation/purge, charging, and confirmation of liquid fuel supply. The emergency condition identified by the CSB for fuel gas discharges did not extend to liquid fuels, however, the management of liquid fuels should be considered in the next revision cycle. Emergency Nature: The proposed TIA intends to offer to the public a benefit that would lessen a recognized (known) hazard or ameliorate a continuing or dangerous condition or situation. The submitter has proposed this Tentative Interim Amendment to add sections 7.1.7*, A.7.1.7, 7.4.19* and A.7.4.19 on evacuation/purging, charging, and confirmation of the fuel or combustible gas supply in the supply piping because of the Technical Committee’s awareness of incidents including the investigation findings of the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB). The current requirements of the NFPA 86 Standard provide a performance approach to establishing safe conditions but does not provide any requirements for the evacuation/purging, charging, and confirmation of the fuel or combustible gas supply contained within the fuel or combustible gas supply piping nor any requirements defining the quality of the fuel or combustible gas being delivered by piping systems governed by NFPA 54 National Fuel Gas Code and other Codes and Standards. The submitter and members of the NFPA 86 Technical Committee wish to draw attention to this potential hazard by the addition of the proposed requirements and Annex referencing NFPA 54’s related requirements.


Submitter Full Name: Ted JablkowskiOrganization: Fives North American CombustioSubmittal Date: Fri Sep 14 12:08:58 EDT 2012


I, Ted Jablkow ski, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) all andfull rights in copyright in this Public Input (including both the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problem andSubstantiation). I understand and intend that I acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in anypublication of the NFPA in w hich this Public Input in this or another similar or derivative form is used. I herebyw arrant that I am the author of this Public Input and that I have full pow er and authority to enter into thiscopyright assignment.



By checking this box I aff irm that I am Ted Jablkow ski, and I agree to be legally bound by the aboveCopyright Assignment and the terms and conditions contained therein. I understand and intend that, by checkingthis box, I am creating an electronic signature that w ill, upon my submission of this form, have the same legalforce and effect as a handw ritten signature


7.3.2Furnaces shall not be operated unless there are personnel instructed and trained perSection 7.2.1 present within the operating facility to respond in a timely manner to furnacealarms or other situations requiring a trained operator response.


To clarify that the trained operators must be present when equipment is operated.


Submitter Full Name: Randall ConklenOrganization: Caterpillar IncorporatedSubmittal Date: Tue Jun 19 17:27:24 EDT 2012


I, Randall Conklen, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) alland full rights in copyright in this Public Input (including both the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problemand Substantiation). I understand and intend that I acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in anypublication of the NFPA in w hich this Public Input in this or another similar or derivative form is used. I herebyw arrant that I am the author of this Public Input and that I have full pow er and authority to enter into thiscopyright assignment.

By checking this box I aff irm that I am Randall Conklen, and I agree to be legally bound by the aboveCopyright Assignment and the terms and conditions contained therein. I understand and intend that, by checkingthis box, I am creating an electronic signature that w ill, upon my submission of this form, have the same legalforce and effect as a handw ritten signature




7.4.10 Safety Shutoff Valve Replacement. 7.4.10.1 Safety shutoff valves use for pulse fire applications shall be replaced before theyexceed their maximum allowable number of lifetime open–closed cycles.7.4.10.2* The number of safety shutoff valve cycles shall be determined in one of the followingways:

(1) By counting the number of actual safety shutoff valve open-closed cycles

(2) By estimating the time to reach 90 percent of lifetime total cycles based onnormal cycling rates

Subsection 7.4.10.2 was revised by a tentative interim amendment (TIA). Seepage 1.


The counting of cycles does not determine or define the safe or even usefull life of a safety shut-off valve under normal applications. It should be applied only during the extreme use such as is seen in Pulse Fired Applications. The mandatory seat leakage testing performed on a periodic basis of annually is much more usefull definition of safety.

A definition of Pulse fired or Rapid cycle may be required.









7.4.10.2 When the maximum allowable number of lifetime open–closed cycles for Safety shutoffvalves are not available from the Safety shutoff valves manufacturer, the user must replacethe Safety shutoff valves when their leak tightness tests indicate that the leakage rate hasincreased to any one of the following levels:

(1) the rate that is 100% greater than the previously required leak tightness test

(2) 44 bubbles per minute

(3) the leakage rate that would result in a condition where the heating zone concentrationof fuel gas is greater than 25% LFL under any possible circumstance.


It is difficult for a user to be in compliance with the requirements of this Standard when the SSOV manufacturer doesn't provide life cycle ratings. This proposal attempts to provide an alternate determination for SSOV replacement timing when life cycle ratings are not available.








Public Input No. 8-NFPA 86-2012 [ Chapter NFPA ]

Note: This Proposal originates from Tentative Interim Amendment 86-11-1 (TIA 987)issued by the Standards Council on August 5, 2010.

1. Revise tex t to read as fol lows:

7.4.10.2* The number of safety shutoff valve cycles shall be determined in one ofthe fol low ing ways:

(A) Counting of actual safety shutoff valve open-closed cycles.

(B) Estimated time to reach 90% of l i fetime total cycles based upon normal burnercycling rates.


The proposed text of 7.4.10.2 part (B) was written to allow estimating of lifetime valve cycles for safety shutoff valves. This would normally be useful for safety shutoff valves that are not used in high-cycle-rate applications such as pulse-fire systems. The word "burner" in part (B) inadvertently left safety shutoff valves associated with special atmosphere control limited to the requirement of part (A) where a counter would be required to monitor valve cycles. That was not the intent of the committee, and this TIA is being submitted to avoid an inappropriate change affecting safety shutoff valves used in applications beyond just burners. Emergency Nature: This TIA is needed to correct an unintended impact of new wording.


Submitter Full Name: Randy BalOrganization: GM/Nexteer AutomotiveSubmittal Date: Wed Mar 28 12:51:05 EDT 2012


I, Randy Bal, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) all and fullrights in copyright in this Public Input (including both the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problem andSubstantiation). I understand and intend that I acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in anypublication of the NFPA in w hich this Public Input in this or another similar or derivative form is used. I herebyw arrant that I am the author of this Public Input and that I have full pow er and authority to enter into thiscopyright assignment.

By checking this box I aff irm that I am Randy Bal, and I agree to be legally bound by the above CopyrightAssignment and the terms and conditions contained therein. I understand and intend that, by checking this box, Iam creating an electronic signature that w ill, upon my submission of this form, have the same legal force andeffect as a handw ritten signature





7.4.10.1 Safety shutoff valves used to comply with 8.5.1.8 and are not proved closed shallbe replaced before they exceed their maximum allowable number of lifetime open–closed cycles.


The language inadvertently imposes requirements on systems that don't skip purge in any case, but rather include a pre-purge before lighting any burner system. It is those valves that are used to skip a pre-purge but are not monitored by a proof of closure switch or a valve proving systems, which necessitate the need for the replacing valves when the valves' cycle life has been exceeded.


Submitter Full Name: Kevin CarlisleOrganization: IHEA-Safety Codes and Standards CommitteeAffi l l iation: Industrial Heating Equipment AssociationSubmittal Date: Mon Jul 02 11:26:18 EDT 2012





Add new text to read as follows: 7.4.19* Whenever combustible gas piping is placed into service or removed from service,any release of combustible gas shall be vented to an approved location.








I, Ted Jablkow ski, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) all andfull rights in copyright in this Public Input (including both the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problem andSubstantiation). I understand and intend that I acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in anypublication of the NFPA in w hich this Public Input in this or another similar or derivative form is used. I herebyw arrant that I am the author of this Public Input and that I have full pow er and authority to enter into thiscopyright assignment.

By checking this box I aff irm that I am Ted Jablkow ski, and I agree to be legally bound by the aboveCopyright Assignment and the terms and conditions contained therein. I understand and intend that, by checkingthis box, I am creating an electronic signature that w ill, upon my submission of this form, have the same legalforce and effect as a handw ritten signature




8.2.1 All safety devices shall meet one of the following criteria:

(1) Be listed for the service the service intended

(2) Combustion safeguards, excess temperature limit interlocks, safety shutoffvalves listed for combustion safety service

(3) Be approved if listed devices are not available

(4) Be programmable controllers applied in accordance with Section 8.4


New text clarifies types of acceptable devices. Certain types (combustion safeguards, excess temperature limit interlocks and safety shutoff valves require separate listing for combustion safety service.


Submitter Full Name: Richard MartinOrganization: Martin Thermal EngineeringAffi l l iation: Secretary of NFPA 86 Task Group on Introductory ChaptersSubmittal Date: Thu Jun 07 10:11:30 EDT 2012







8.2.3 Electric relays and safety shutoff valves shall not be used as substitutes forelectrical disconnects and manual shutoff valves3.1 If the furnace heating system will not be used for a period more than 24 hours, thena manual device, such as the main disconnect, the emergency shut-off valve or theequipment isolation valve must be set to isolate the equipment from its fuel orelectrical supply .


Clarify intent. Equipment not in service is not regularly monitored by operators and other personnel may not be aware of the possible hazards with inoperative equipment. Other facility operations, fork lift activity, maintenance, or other incidents may lead to an exposed electrical or fuel leak hazard that may not be immediately detected.







8.2.7.2 The requirement in 8.2.7 shall not prohibit a time delay applied to the action ofpressure-proving, flow-proving, or proof-of-closure safety switch as used inaccordance with 8.8.1.3(3)(c a ), where the following conditions exist:

(1) There is an operational need demonstrated for the time delay.

(2) The use of a time delay is approved.

(3) The time delay feature is not adjustable beyond 5 seconds.

(4) A single time delay does not serve more than one pressure-proving or flow-proving safety device.

(5) The time from an abnormal pressure or flow condition until the holding mediumis removed from the safety shutoff valves does not exceed 5 seconds.


8.8.1.3(3)(a) deals with the application of proof.









8.2.8* A At least one manual emergency switch shall be provided to initiate a safetyshutdown.


The 2011 Edition implies there is to be a single manual emergency switch. Depending upon the type of furnace there maybe multiple manual emergency switches to address the multiple “safety” hazards of the furnace. All of the furnace’s safety hazards should be evaluated and a manual emergency “system” should be designed/incorporated into the furnace design.









8.2.9 Shutdown of the heating system by any safety feature or safety device shall requiremanual intervention of an operator for re-establishment of normal operation of thesystem.8.2.9.1 Recycling without manual intervention shall be permitted provided all of thefollowing are met:

(1) When using a listed combination combustion safeguard and burner safetysequence controller with recycle feature.

(2) The number of re-cycles shall not exceed 2.

(3) The recycling shall not cause the combustible concentration to exceed 25% ofthe LFL.


Recycling is a feature of a majority of combination combustion safeguard and burner safety sequence controllers that are listed by UL, CSA and FM. The proposal calls specific attention to this feature so that the user understands its relationship to 8.2.9 and how to apply it safely.


Submitter Full Name: John EleyOrganization: GN Electronics Inc.Submittal Date: Fri Jun 22 09:10:27 EDT 2012


I, John Eley, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) all and fullrights in copyright in this Public Input (including both the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problem andSubstantiation). I understand and intend that I acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in anypublication of the NFPA in w hich this Public Input in this or another similar or derivative form is used. I herebyw arrant that I am the author of this Public Input and that I have full pow er and authority to enter into thiscopyright assignment.

By checking this box I aff irm that I am John Eley, and I agree to be legally bound by the above CopyrightAssignment and the terms and conditions contained therein. I understand and intend that, by checking this box, Iam creating an electronic signature that w ill, upon my submission of this form, have the same legal force andeffect as a handw ritten signature




8.2.11

Where transmitters are used in place of switches for safety functions, the following shallapply:

(a) The transmitter shall possess a MTBF rating of 250,000 hours, or possess a safetyintegrity level (SIL) rating of 2.

(b) Transmitter failure shall be detected and initiate a safety shutdown.

(c) The transmitter shall be dedicated to safety service unless listed for simultaneousprocess and safety service.


Relocates and modifies requirement from PLC subsection and makes it generally applicable to all safety control systems (including hardwired). See also related Public Input that deletes this text from Section 8.4.4






Public Input No. 102-NFPA 86-2012 [ Section No. 8.3 ]



8.3* Logic Systems Burner Management System Logic . 8.3.1 General. 8.3.1.1 Purge, ignition trials, and other burner safety sequencing shall be performed usingeither devices listed for such service or programmable controllers used inaccordance with Section 8.4.8.3.1.2 The activation of any safety interlock required in Chapter 8 shall result in a safetyshutdown.8.3.2 Hardwired Logic Systems. 8.3.2.1 Safety interlocks shall meet one or more of the following criteria:

(1) Be hardwired without relays in series ahead of the controlled device

(2) Be connected to an input of a programmable controller logic systemcomplying with Section 8.4

(3) Be connected to a relay that represents a single safety interlock configured toinitiate safety shutdown in the event of power loss

(4) Be connected to a listed safety relay that represents one or more safetyinterlocks and initiates safety shutdown upon power loss

8.3.2.2* Electrical power for safety control circuits shall be dc or single-phase ac, 250 voltmaximum, one-side grounded, with all breaking contacts in the ungrounded, fuse-protected, or circuit breaker–protected line.


The term Burner Management System is used to describe the Logic Systems covered in section 8.3. The proposed definition for Section 3.3.6 is taken directly from NFPA 85-2011. The annex material proposed for A.3.3.6 is new for NFPA 86.





By checking this box I aff irm that I am Richard Martin, and I agree to be legally bound by the above CopyrightAssignment and the terms and conditions contained therein. I understand and intend that, by checking this box, Iam creating an electronic signature that w ill, upon my submission of this form, have the same legal force and

effect as a handw ritten signature


8.3.1.1 Purge , and ignition trials , and other burner safety sequencing shall be performedusing either devices listed for such service or programmable controllers used inaccordance with Section 8.4.




Related Input RelationshipPublic Input No. 99-NFPA 86-2012 [NewSection after 8.5.2.1]

Interrelated proposals for combustionsafeguards









8.4.2 PLCs , except those listed for combustion safety service, shall be used inaccordance with 8.4.2.1 through 8.4.2.3 . and associated I/O used to performsafety functions shall be certified to IEC 61508 for use in safety applications with asafety integrity level of 2 or greater. The safety functions shall be implementedaccording to the device’s safety manual requirements to achieve a safety integritylevel of 2 or greater. 8.4.2.1 General. (A) Before the PLC is placed in operation, documentation shall be provided thatconfirms that all related safety devices and safety logic are functional.(B) All changes to hardware or software shall be documented and maintained in a filethat is separate from the furnace programmable controller.(C) System operation shall be tested and verified for compliance with the design criteriawhen the PLC is replaced, repaired, or updated.(D) The control system shall have at least one manual emergency switch that initiatesa safety shutdown.(E) The PLC shall detect the following conditions:

(1) Failure to execute any program or task containing safety logic

(2) Failure to communicate with any safety input or output

(3) Changes in software set points of safety functions

(4) Failure of outputs related to safety functions

(5) Failure of timing related to safety functions

(F) A safety shutdown shall occur within 3 seconds of detecting any condition listed in

8.4.2.1(E).

(G) A dedicated PLC output shall initiate a safety shutdown for faults detected by thePLC.



(H) Unless allowed by 8.4.5 , the following devices and logic shall be hardwiredexternal to the PLC:

(1) Manual emergency switch

(2) Combustion safeguards

(3) Safe-start checks

(4) Ignition transformers

(5) Trial-for-ignition periods

(6) Excess temperature limit interlocks

(7) The 1400°F (760°C) bypass interlocks required by Section 8.17

(8) Continuous vapor concentration high limit controller

(9) Valve-proving systems

(I) Unless allowed by 8.4.5 , a combustion safeguard shall directly control at leastone safety shutoff valve between the fuel gas supply and the monitored burner.(J) Unless allowed by 8.4.5 , where two oxygen safety shutoff valves are required,combustion safeguards shall control at least one oxygen safety shutoff valve.(K) Where airflow-proving logic is performed in the PLC, the logic shall include thefollowing:

(1) Verification of a change of state in each airflow-proving device during thestartup of the related ventilation equipment

(2) Initiation of a safety shutdown if a change of state in an airflow-proving deviceis not detected

8.4.2.2 Hardware. (A) Memory that retains information on loss of system power shall be provided forsoftware.(B) The PLC shall have a minimum mean-time-between-failures (MTBF) rating of250,000 hours.(C) Only one safety device shall be connected to a PLC input or output.(D) Output checking shall be provided for PLC outputs controlling fuel safety shutoffvalves and oxygen safety shutoff valves.

8.4.2.



3 Software. (A) Access to the PLC and its logic shall be restricted to authorized personnel.(E) (B) The following power supplies shall be monitored:

(1) Power supplies used to power PLC inputs and outputs that control furnacesafety functions

(2) Power supplies used to power pressure and flow transmitters required by8.4.4

(C) When any power supply required by 8.4.2.3(B) (1) fails, the dedicated PLC outputrequired in 8.4.2.1(G) shall be deactivated.(D) When the voltage of any power supply required by 8.4.2.3(B) (2) is detectedoutside the manufacturer's recommended range, the dedicated PLC output requiredin 8.4.2.1(G) shall be deactivated. Software shall be documented as follows:

(1) Labeled to identify elements or group of elements containing safety software

(2) Labeled to describe the function of each element containing safety software

(F C ) A listing of the program with documentation shall be available.


Section 8.4 currently requires that developers or end-users who want to use a general purpose PLC in a combustion application to ensure that the general purpose PLC meets a list of performance criterion. Once those criteria are met, the general purpose PLC is still forbidden from performing most safety functions. In this proposed change, a simplification is made to require that all safety functions must be performed in a device that has been certified to IEC 61508 for use in safety applications with a safety integrity level of 2 or greater.Section 8.4.3 was kept because it is widely accepted that general purpose PLCs perform timing functions with very high reliability.Section 8.4.5(B) (3) was dropped from the list to be consistent with the new Siemens interpretation of the combustion safeguard (Public Input # at Section 8.10.1) to be a flame sensor. For consistency, safety PLCs should not be excluded from doing flame sensing.Section 8.4.5(B) (4) was dropped from the list because the safety PLC is permitted to do ignition timing, purge timing, safe start check, low temperature permissive, limits monitoring, the combustion sequence, and all associated logic so the excess temperature safety function should also be included.


Submitter Full Name: Richard Martin



Organization: Martin Thermal Engineering, Inc.Affi l l iation: Secretary NFPA 86 Task Group on Introductory ChaptersSubmittal Date: Fri Jun 22 04:27:10 EDT 2012




10/17/12



8.4.3 PLCs that do not comply with 8.4.1 or 8.4.2 shall comply with the following:

(1) The PLC shall not perform required safety functions.

(2) The PLC shall not interfere with or prevent the operation of the safetyinterlocks.

(3) Only isolated PLC contacts shall be used in the required safety circuits.

General purpose PLCs shall be permitted to perform the purge timing function.


See substantiation for Public Input #119 at Section 8.4.2.


Related Input RelationshipPublic Input No. 119-NFPA 86-2012 [Section No.8.4.2]

Several interrelated PLCproposals


Submitter Full Name: Richard MartinOrganization: Martin Thermal Engineering, Inc.Affi l l iation: Secretary of NFPA 86 Task Group on Introductory ChaptersSubmittal Date: Fri Jun 22 04:51:57 EDT 2012







8.4.4 Where PLC-based systems use flow transmitters in place of flow switches andpressure transmitters in place of pressure switches for safety functions, thefollowing shall apply:

(1) The transmitter shall be listed, possess a MTBF rating of 250,000 hours, orpossess a safety integrity level (SIL) rating of 2.

(2) Upon transmitter failure, the PLC shall detect the failure and initiate a safetyshutdown.

(3) The transmitter shall be dedicated to safety service unless listed forsimultaneous process and safety service.

(4) Each transmitter shall be used to replace only 1 safety component requiredwithin this code

A.8.4.4(4) When applying transmitters, each transmitter may replace only oneCombustion Safeguard. ie Low Gas Pressure switch and High Gas Pressure switchwould require 1 transmitter for each device or service.


While it may be practical to apply 1 transmitter to sense both high and low gas pressure, location becomes an issue and currently we require 2 switches because of location. Is this an acceptable substitution from a safety standpoint?









8.4.4 Where PLC-based systems use flow transmitters in place of flow switches andpressure transmitters in place of pressure switches for safety functions, thefollowing shall apply:

(1) The transmitter shall be listed, possess a MTBF rating of 250,000 hours, orpossess a safety integrity level (SIL) rating of 2.

(2) Upon transmitter failure, the PLC shall detect the failure and initiate a safetyshutdown.

(3) The transmitter shall be dedicated to safety service unless listed forsimultaneous process and safety service.


Relocates and modifies requirement from PLC subsection and makes it generally applicable to all safety control systems (including hardwired). See also related Public Input that adds this text to Section 8.2.11.


Related Input RelationshipPublic Input No. 51-NFPA 86-2012 [New Sectionafter 8.2.10]

Interrelated new section ontransmitters






10/17/12


Public Input No. 122-NFPA 86-2012 [ New Section after 8.4.5(B) ]

8.4.6PLCs shall not implement the following:

(1) Manual emergency switches

(2) Continuous vapor concentration high limit controllers


See substantiation for Public Input #119 at Section 8.4.2



Several interrelated PLCproposals








Public Input No. 114-NFPA 86-2012 [ Section No. 8.4.5(B) ]

(B) Safety PLCs shall not implement the following:

(1) Manual emergency switches

(2) Continuous vapor concentration high limit controllers

(3) Combustion safeguards

(4) Excess temperature limit interlocks


The "Siemens Interpretation" of the term combustion safeguard (Public Input # at Section 8.10.1, and linked sections) essentially redefines the term to be a flame sensor. As such, Safety PLCs should be able to perform flame sensing and it should not be excluded here. Similarly, Safety PLCs are permitted to do ignition timing, purge timing, safe start check, low temperature permissive, limits monitoring, the combustion sequence, and all associated logic so there is no logical reason to exclude the excess temperature safety function from Safety PLC functionality.








Public Input No. 160-NFPA 86-2012 [ Section No. 8.5.1.2(C) ]

(C) To begin the timed pre-ignition purge interval, both of the following conditions shallbe satisfied:

(1)

(2) The safety shutoff valve(s) is proved closed when proved closed is required in8 .8.2.


Clarifies that in order to begin the pre-ignition purge interval, the requirement to prove the safety shutoff valve closed only applies when proved close is required in 8.8.2, not on every burner system, especially those less than 400,000 btu/hr.






* The minimum required pre-ignition airflow is proved.



Public Input No. 43-NFPA 86-2012 [ Section No. 8.5.1.2(C) ]

(C) To begin the timed pre-ignition purge interval, both of the following conditions shallbe satisfied:

(1)

(2) The safety shutoff valve(s) is proved required by 8.8.2 are proved closed.


Clarifies that in order to begin the pre-ignition purge interval, the requirement for the safety shutoff valve to be "proved closed" only applies when a "proved closed" condition is required in 8.8.2. "Proved closed" is not required on every burner system, especially those less than 400,000 BTU/hr.


Submitter Full Name: Richard MartinOrganization: Martin Thermal EngineeringAffi l l iation: Submitted as Secretary of NFPA 86 Task Group on Introductory ChaptersSubmittal Date: Wed Jun 06 18:59:15 EDT 2012





* The minimum required pre-ignition airflow is proved.



8.5.1.8* Repeating the pre-ignition purge shall not be required where any one of the followingconditions is satisfied:

(1) The heating chamber temperature is proved above 1400°F (760°C).

(2) For a multiburner fuel-fired system not proved above 1400°F (760°C), all of thefollowing conditions are satisfied:

(a)

(b) The burner(s) remaining in operation shall provide ignition of anyunintended release of fuel through other burners that are not in operationwithout explosion.

(3)

(4) All of the following conditions are satisfied (does not apply to fuel oil systems):

(a) At least two safety shutoff valves are proved closed between a burnerThe number of safety shutoff valves required to close in 8.8.1.3 and8.8.2.1 will close between the burner system and the fuel gas supplywhen that burner burner system is off.

(b) Safety shutoff valve seat leak testing is performed on at least asemiannual basis.

(c) The burner system uses natural gas, butane, or propane fuel gas.

(d)

(e) The minimum airflow used in the LFL calculation in 8.5.1.8(4)(d) is provedand maintained during the period the burner(s) are off.


This proposal incorporates but changes TIA 11-4. It resolves a conflict and eliminates multiple-level referencing (a section that refers to another section). The conflict is that 8.5.1.8 (4) ‘does not apply to fuel oil systems’ but the original TIA 11-4 cites 8.8.1.2 which refers to 8.8.3.1 on Oil Safety Shutoff Valves. By deleting TIA 11-4's referral to 8.8.1.2 and replacing it with 8.8.2.1, the proposed language more directly points the user to the number of valves required for fuel gas.


Submitter Full Name: Dan CurryOrganization: Eclipse, Inc.Submittal Date: Fri Jun 22 16:21:42 EDT 2012


* At least one burner remains operating in the common combustionchamber of the burner to be re-ignited.

* For fuel gas–fired burner systems and assuming that all safety shutoffvalves fail in the full open position, it can be demonstrated that thecombustible concentration in the heating chamber and all other passages thathandle the recirculation and exhaust of products of combustion cannot exceed25 percent of the LFL.

* It can be demonstrated that the , based on the safety shutoff valveleakage rates, that the combustible concentration in the heatingchamber and all other passages that handle the recirculation andexhaust of products of combustion cannot exceed 25 percent of the LFL.






8.5.1.8*



Repeating the pre-ignition purge shall not be required where the oven idle (noprocessing and no maintenance supervision) period is not longer than 48 hours. theduration of all burners off has not exceeded 24 hours. and any one of the followingconditions is satisfied:



(a)


(3)


(a) At least two safety shutoff valves are proved closed between a burner andthe fuel gas supply when that burner is off.



(d)

(e) The minimum airflow used in the LFL calculation in 8.5.1.8(4)(d) is provedand maintained during the period the burner(s) are off.


The proposed change is to clarify that current language is not intended to permit leaving an oven in an idle state (no processing is occurring) and unattended over a weekend. Also, the proposal limits the length of the "all burners off- time" to 24 hours as the maximum permitted off-time. Permitting an infinite "all burners off-time" in 8.5.1.8(4)(d) is an unsafe practice because unforeseen conditions during the off-time can gradually change during the off-time, which can then lead to a hazardous condition. By limiting the burner off-time and forcing at least some burners to operate at least once every 24 hours increases the safety of the oven by resetting the parameters and conditions that are used to comply with 8.5.1.8(4)(d).





* It can be demonstrated that the combustible concentration in theheating chamber and all other passages that handle the recirculation andexhaust of products of combustion cannot exceed 25 percent of the LFL.







8.5.1.8*



Repeating the pre-ignition purge shall not be required where any one of the followingconditions is satisfied:



(a)


(3)


(a) At least two The number of safety shutoff valves are proved closedbetween a burner required to close in 8.8.1.2 and 8.8.1.3 will closebetween the burner system and the fuel gas supply when that burnersystem is off.



(d)

(e) The minimum airflow used in the LFL calculation in 8.5.1.8(4)(d) is provedand maintained during the period the burner(s) are off.T


Note: This Proposal originates from Tentative Interim Amendment 86-11-4 (TIA 1011) issued by the Standards Council on March 1, 2011.The revised NFPA 86 (2011) paragraph 8.5.1.8 has introduced a new requirement that will require new or renovated bakery ovens to add a proof-of-closure switch to each safety shutoff valve. Bakery ovens can have up to 300 or more burners. As such, the change represents: 1) Installing a large number of proof-of-closure switches. 2) Expanded testing, inspection, and maintenance to cover all of the added switches. 3) Considerable wiring to connect all of these added switches. 4) Complex logic to monitor and process signals from all of the added switches.Emergency Nature: The revised NFPA 86 (2011) paragraph 8.5.1.8 contains an omission that was overlooked during the last revision cycle. Guidance specific to burners firing at rates less than or equal to 400,000 Btu/hr were not addressed in the revised text. In addition, the revised NFPA 86 (2011) paragraph 8.5.1.8 contains guidance that is in conflict with Section 8.8.2.2 as discussed further here. Consider the requirements of NFPA 86 as they would apply to an oven with the following characteristics:

· Multiple burners



* It can be demonstrated that the combustible concentration in theheating chamber and all other passages that handle the recirculation andexhaust of products of combustion cannot exceed 25 percent of the LFL.



· Multiple burners · Each burner has a firing rate under 400,000 Btu/hr · Each burner has two safety shutoff valves · Each burner has a direct spark ignition with separate ignition electrode and separate flame sensing electrode. 1) NFPA 86 (2011) paragraph 8.8.2.2 would not require proof-of-closure on any of the safety shutoff valves. 2) NFPA 86 (2011) would not prohibit the shutdown of one or more burners (by closing the two burner safety shutoff valves) while maintaining other burners in service.Overall, if it is safe to operate this oven with any number of burners (fired under 400,000 Btu/hr) turned off by closing two safety shutoff valves, it should be equally safe to allow a restart of any or all burners without a repurge of the oven as long as the airflow rate needed to keep the oven atmosphere below 25% of LFL (based upon a valve seat leakage rate of 1 scfh) is maintain at all times that any burners are turned off. Overall, the basis of safety for the burners rated less than or equal to 400,000 Btu/hr is the use of two safety shutoff valves. The basis of safety does not expand to include proving valves closed until the burner rate exceeds 400,000 Btu/hr or a burner is taken out of service by closing one safety shutoff valve.


Submitter Full Name: PHILIP DOMENICUCCIOrganization: American Society of BakersSubmittal Date: Fri Sep 14 12:25:01 EDT 2012


I, PHILIP DOMENICUCCI, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)all and full rights in copyright in this Public Input (including both the Proposed Change and the Statement ofProblem and Substantiation). I understand and intend that I acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, inany publication of the NFPA in w hich this Public Input in this or another similar or derivative form is used. Ihereby w arrant that I am the author of this Public Input and that I have full pow er and authority to enter into thiscopyright assignment.

By checking this box I aff irm that I am PHILIP DOMENICUCCI, and I agree to be legally bound by the aboveCopyright Assignment and the terms and conditions contained therein. I understand and intend that, by checkingthis box, I am creating an electronic signature that w ill, upon my submission of this form, have the same legalforce and effect as a handw ritten signature




8.5.2.1Prior to the trial for ignition the logic solver in conjunction with the flame safeguard shallperform a safe start check.


The original definition of the combustion safeguard included a flame relay and all of the associated logic and the new definition is just a flame sensor. The flame sensor cannot perform a safe start check as that is a logic function. The intent of this requirement is to limit the maximum time between loss of flame and de-energization of SSOVs to be 4 seconds, and as such, the flame scanner cannot consume all of the allotted 4.0 seconds. Time must also remain for the interfacing logic, logic solver, and valve actuation. Or, on the other hand, If the intent is to permit the flame sensor to take up to 4 seconds by itself, then we must decide what is a reasonable time for the logic solver to actuate the valves and for the valves to close.


Submitter Full Name: Richard MartinOrganization: Martin Thermal Engineering, Inc.Affi l l iation: Secretary NFPA 86 Task Group on Introductory ChaptersSubmittal Date: Thu Jun 21 23:59:23 EDT 2012





9/31

8.5.2.1 The trial-for-ignition period of the pilot burner shall not exceed 15 seconds unless itcan be proven that an extension beyond 15 seconds is beneficial and can not resultin the furnace reaching 25% LFL .

Examples of beneficial extensions may include extension to allow maintenanceadjustment of pilot burners, or to accomodate gas travel time delays associatedwith location of pilot burner components to facilitate safe access. Safety of furnaceoperations and maintenance personell shall not be compromised in order to reducethe pilot trial for ignition period.


Particularly on large furnaces with multiple burners and a common combustion chamber, reliable operation of burner pilots is a common maintenance issue. On many of these furnaces it can be proven that constant operation of all pilot gas solenoids even with no flame detected can not allow 25% lfl to be reached regardless of elasped time due to contribution of pilot air and low fire setting burner air flows. On other furnaces the safe trial for pilot ignition interval may be minutes or hours instead of 15 seconds.Historic restrictions to 15 second trial for ignition intervals for pilots have created unneccessary complications to pilot maintenance and adjustment and have encouraged the practice of installing pilot control devices in close proximity to pilot burners. The combination of increased time required to address pilot issues, increased difficulty required to access pilot components, and installation of pilot components where most exposed to dirt and heat and mechanical damage, creates or exacerbates exposure by maintenance personell to fall and burn and heat stress hazards. In addition to increased risk to personell, the 15 second limitation creates additional downtime and loss of revenue. It is assumed, but not known, that 15 seconds came about historically due to convenience of commonality in regulation and to limitations of customization capabilities of older listed safeguard components.


Submitter Full Name: Jeff JonesOrganization: FlandersSubmittal Date: Wed Apr 11 15:26:58 EDT 2012


I, Jeff Jones, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) all and fullrights in copyright in this Public Input (including both the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problem andSubstantiation). I understand and intend that I acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in anypublication of the NFPA in w hich this Public Input in this or another similar or derivative form is used. I herebyw arrant that I am the author of this Public Input and that I have full pow er and authority to enter into thiscopyright assignment.

By checking this box I aff irm that I am Jeff Jones, and I agree to be legally bound by the above CopyrightAssignment and the terms and conditions contained therein. I understand and intend that, by checking this box, Iam creating an electronic signature that w ill, upon my submission of this form, have the same legal force andeffect as a handw ritten signature




8.5.2.4 Electrical ignition energy for direct Where spark ignition systems cause a falseflame signal in required combustion safeguards, the electrical spark shall beterminated after the main burner trial-for-ignition period.Exception : Continuous operation of direct spark igniters shall be permitted forexplosion-resistant radiant tube–type heating systems, which do not requirecombustion safeguards.


Clarifies intent and removes violation of NFPA’s “manual of style” concerning exceptions. Note that the exception still exists with the phrase “in required combustion safeguards”. Intent needed clarification because common understanding of direct spark burners versus piloted burners confuses the meaning of “direct spark ignition systems”. A user may assume that the spark can remain on throughout the pilot flame establishing period and then terminate after the main TFI period. Also, the user may assume that a piloted burner can have a spark that never terminates since this requirement applies to direct spark.


Submitter Full Name: Richard MartinOrganization: Martin Thermal Engineering, Inc.Affi l l iation: NFPA 86 Task Group on Introductory ChaptersSubmittal Date: Fri Jun 22 10:38:52 EDT 2012







8.6.1 1* Where a fan is essential to the operation of the oven or allied equipment, fanoperation shall be proved and interlocked into the safety circuitry.8.6.1.1 Electrical interlocks and flow switches shall be arranged in the safety control circuitso that loss of ventilation or airflow shuts down the heating system of the affectedsection, or, if necessary, loss of ventilation shall shut down the entire heatingsystem as well as the conveyor.8.6.1.2 Air pressure switches shall not be used to prove airflow where dampers downstreamof the pressure switch can be closed to the point of reducing airflow below theminimum required.8.6.1.3 Air suction switches shall not be used to prove airflow where dampers upstream ofthe pressure switch can be closed to the point of reducing airflow below theminimum required.8.6.1.4 Switches used to prove airflow on systems where the air is contaminated with anysubstance that might condense or otherwise create a deposit shall be selected andinstalled to prevent interference with the performance of the switch.


See related substantiation for 8.6.1.


Related Input RelationshipPublic Input No. 54-NFPA 86-2012 [Section No. 8.6.1[Excluding any Sub-Sections]]

Indicates new Annex materialaffecting 8.6.1








Public Input No. 54-NFPA 86-2012 [ Section No. 8.6.1 [Excluding any

Sub-Sections] ]

Where a fan or airflow is essential to the operation of the purge or safety ventilationof an oven or allied equipment, fan operation and/or airflow shall be proved andinterlocked into the safety circuitry.


The proposed change clarifies the breadth of the requirement and helps ensure consistency with other parts of the Standard. • The existing wording only focused on proving a device (a fan), but fans are are only one means of creating the flows necessary for purge or safety ventilation. • The context of section 8.6 provides a basis for both purge and safety ventilation language in Chapters 8 and 11. However, there is a natural bias in Chapter 8 toward purge (since safety ventilation is only applicable to Class A ovens) so it is important to use more inclusive language to ensure the reader considers safety ventilation needs when determining if a fan or airflow is essential.• The existing wording “essential to the operation” was imprecise because it could be construed to pertain to concerns beyond the scope of NFPA 86, for example “essential for quality control”Annex material is also added in response to industry questions regarding acceptable methods for monitoring operation of non-ducted fans or fans not enclosed in a dedicated housing.









8.6.3In any combustion system where the combustion air supply can be diverted to an alternateflow path than a burner (such as to a regenerative burner system’s exhaust path), thatburner’s associated combustion air flow path valve(s) must be proven open, and its alternateair flow path valve(s) proven closed, before that burner’s fuel Safety Shutoff Valve(s) areenergized.


In a regenerative combustion system, independent combustion air and exhaust cycle valves may be used to correctly establish the simultaneous flow paths of combustion air and exhaust during each regenerative cycle. With an exhaust cycle valve incorrectly positioned during a firing cycle, fuel will be introduced into the burner without combustion air available. Even though the combustion chamber may be proven above 1400F, the exhaust system would be expected to be well below 1400F. Fuel passing to the exhaust system creates a potential hazard. This proposal seeks to add requirements to ensure combustion air and exhaust cycle valves are in the correct position prior to energizing the fuel SSOV’s.






10/17/12



8.7.1 Where air from the exhaust or recirculating fans is required for combustion of thefuel, the minimum required airflow shall be proved prior to an ignition attempt.interlocked according to 8.7.5.


The requirements in 8.7.5 permit either airflow or air pressure interlocks. The requirements in 8.7.1 only identify airflow requirements. The revised language eliminates any possible conflict between the current requirements in 8.7.1 and those in 8.7.5. The requirement in 8.7.2 is redundant to the requirement in 8.7.5 which is to interlock airflow or pressure into the combustion safety circuitry which will result in the closure of the safety shutoff valves if the interlock is not proven.









8.7.2 Reduction of airflow to a level below the minimum required level shall result inclosure of the safety shutoff valves.




Related Input RelationshipPublic Input No. 131-NFPA 86-2012[Section No. 8.7.1]

Interrelated proposals about minimum airflowinterlocks






16/31


8.7.7In any combustion system where the combustion air supply can be diverted to an alternateflow path than a burner (such as to a regenerative burner system’s exhaust path), thatburner’s associated combustion air flow path valve(s) must be proven open, and its alternateair flow path valve(s) proven closed, before that burner’s fuel Safety Shutoff Valve(s) areenergized.




Related Input RelationshipPublic Input No. 115-NFPA 86-2012 [NewSection after 8.6.2]

Regenerative burner SSOV proposals areinterrelated


Submitter Full Name: Richard MartinOrganization: Martin Thermal Engineering, Inc.Affi l l iation: Secretary of NFPA 86 Task Group on Introductory ChaptersSubmittal Date: Fri Jun 22 04:13:00 EDT 2012







8.8.1.3* In fuel gas burner systems or oil burner systems where multiple burners or pilotsoperate as a burner system firing main or pilot fuel gas burners systems fire into acommon or individual heating chamber, the loss of flame signal at one or moreburners burner systems either shall comply with 8.8.1.2 or shall shut off those theburner system (s) by closing a single safety shutoff valve as long as a secondsafety shutoff valve between the fuel supply, and the burners burner systems(s)shall close when any of the following conditions occurs:

(1) Upon activation of any safety interlock common to the burner system

(2)

(3) Where individual burner system safety shutoff valves have proof of closure andany of the following conditions occurs:

(a) Where flame supervision is used, the individual burner safety shutoff valvenot proved closed after loss of flame signal

(b) Where flame supervision is not used, the individual burner safety shutoffvalve not proved closed when the furnace is not proved to be above1400°F (760°C)

(c) Upon loss of flame signal at all burners in the burner system


The current language permits one burner on a multiple burner oven to shutoff only in cases when the combustion chamber has more than one burner. It does not permit the case of a multiple burner oven where one burner system may shut off and other burner systems may have their own combustion chamber. Adding language to permit 8.8.1.3 to also apply to individual heating chambers does not reduce the level of safety since there are no other burners operating in the same heating chamber. The safety issue is relighting the burner system, which is handled in 8.5.1.8. Use the term "burner system" for consistency and because burner system is defined AS "One or more burners operated as a unit by a common safety shutoff valve(s)." It can be ambiguous if burner is used in lieu of burner system and vice versa. Other changes to the language are made to make it consistent with 8.8.2.1 and 8.8.2.2.




I, Kevin Carlisle, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) all andfull rights in copyright in this Public Input (including both the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problem andSubstantiation). I understand and intend that I acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in anypublication of the NFPA in w hich this Public Input in this or another similar or derivative form is used. I hereby

w arrant that I am the author of this Public Input and that I have full pow er and authority to enter into this

* Where the individual burner system safety shutoff valves do not have proofof closure and it is demonstrated, based on available airflow, that the numberof failed burners burner systems will result in the furnace being above 25percent of the LFL, assuming the single burner safety shutoff valve(s) fails inthe open position



w arrant that I am the author of this Public Input and that I have full pow er and authority to enter into thiscopyright assignment.



8.8.1.3* In fuel gas systems or oil systems where multiple burners or pilots operate as aburner system firing into a common heating chamber, the loss of flame signal atshut off of fuel at one or more burners either shall comply with 8.8.1.2 or shall shutoff those burner(s) by closing a single safety shutoff valve as long as a secondsafety shutoff valve between the fuel supply, and the burners shall close when anyof the following conditions occurs:

(1) Upon activation of any safety interlock common to the burner system

(2)

(3) Where individual burner safety shutoff valves have proof of closure and any ofthe following conditions occurs:

(a) Where flame supervision is used, the individual burner safety shutoff valvenot proved closed after loss of flame signal

(b) Where flame supervision is not used, the individual burner safety shutoffvalve not proved closed when the furnace is not proved to be above1400°F (760°C)

(c) Upon loss of flame signal at all burners in the burner system


The phrase "loss of flame signal" restricts the subsequent allowance for closing of one valve to only a combustion safeguard function. Shut off of fuel by a single valve from a temperature control function should also be allowed (where all requirements of this section are met). The annex Figure A.8.8.1.3 supports the idea of allowing "burner shutdown", i.e. controlled shut-off.



* Where the individual burner safety shutoff valves do not have proof of closureand it is demonstrated, based on available airflow, that the number of failedburners will result in the furnace being above 25 percent of the LFL, assumingthe single burner safety shutoff valve(s) fails in the open position







8 7 .8 4 .1 10 .6 3 Safety shutoff valves shall applied in pulse fired applications (rapid cycleapplications) shall not be open-close cycled at a rate that exceeds that specifiedby its manufacturer.


This issue should only apply to rapid cycling of valves like that which occur during Pulse Fired burner applications. On a temporary basis such as during testing, rapid open and closing is sometimes used to clean the seat of the valve to clear debris.









8.8.2.2* Where the capacity of the main or pilot fuel gas burner system oven exceeds400,000 Btu/hr (117 kW), at least one of the safety shutoff valves between eachburner system and the fuel supply shall be proved closed and interlocked with thepre-ignition purge interval. A safety shutoff valve with poc on the main header shallbe permitted to be considered the poc valve to all burners to the oven for the pureeinterlock.(A) A proved closed condition shall be accomplished by either of the following means:

(1) A proof-of-closure switch incorporated in a listed safety shutoff value assemblyin accordance with the terms of the listing

(2) A valve proving system

(B) Auxiliary and closed position indicator switches shall not satisfy the proved closedrequirement of 8.8.2.2(A).


The intent of the proved closed interlock in 8.8.2.2 is to verify that during the pre-purge interval at least one valve between the fuel supply and the chamber to be purged is proven in the closed position before the pre-purge starts, so as to minimize the risk of gas flowing into the chamber(s) while purge is taking place. The current language has two ambiguities. 1) It falls short of the level of safety needed for large ovens in cases when the oven would have a total capacity of 10,000,000 btu/hr, but each individual burner system flows less than 400,000 btu/hr. There would be safety valve arrangements when 8.8.2.2 would not require that any safety valve to be proven closed before the pre-purge. 2) It does not permit having one safety valve proven closed at the header and then two safety valves at each burner system having a capacity greater than 400,000 btu/hr, which should be a permitted valve arrangement that complies with the intent of 8.8.2. 2 for the pre-purge. The proposed language, including "system" after burner, clarifies these ambiguities and addresses the intent of proved closed for pre-purge.


Submitter Full Name: Kevin CarlisleOrganization: IHEA-SAFETY Codes and Standards CommitteeAffi l l iation: Industrial Heating Equipment AssociationSubmittal Date: Mon Jul 02 11:21:08 EDT 2012


I, Kevin Carlisle, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) all andfull rights in copyright in this Public Input (including both the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problem andSubstantiation). I understand and intend that I acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in anypublication of the NFPA in w hich this Public Input in this or another similar or derivative form is used. I herebyw arrant that I am the author of this Public Input and that I have full pow er and authority to enter into this

copyright assignment.

21/31

copyright assignment.



8.10.1* Each burner flame shall have a combustion safeguard that has a maximum flamefailure response time of 4 seconds or less less than 3.9 seconds , that performs asafe-start check, and that is interlocked into the combustion safety circuitry inaccordance with the following:

(1) The flame supervision shall not be required in the combustion safety circuitryof a furnace zone where that zone temperature is greater than 1400°F (760°C)and the following criteria are met:

(a) When the zone temperature drops to less than 1400°F (760°C), theburner is interlocked to allow its operation only if flame supervision hasbeen re-established.

(b) A 1400°F (760°C) bypass interlock is used to meet the requirement of8.10.1(1)(a).

(2) The flame response time shall not exceed 4 seconds.

(3) Combustion safeguards on radiant tube–type heating systems are not requiredwhere a means of ignition is provided and the systems are arranged anddesigned such that either of the following conditions is satisfied:

(a) The tubes are of metal construction and open at one or both ends. If heatrecovery systems are used, they shall be of explosion-resistantconstruction.

(b) The entire radiant tube heating system, including any associated heatrecovery system, is of explosion-resistant construction.

(4) Burners without flame supervision are interlocked to prevent their operationwhen the zone temperature is less than 1400°F (760°C) by use of a 1400°F(760°C) bypass interlock.


See Public Input #99 at Section 8.5.2.1


Related Input Relationship

10/17/12


Public Input No. 99-NFPA 86-2012 [NewSection after 8.5.2.1]

Required text to accompany new definition ofcombustion safeguard









8.10.1* Each burner flame shall have a combustion safeguard that has a maximum flamefailure response time of 4 seconds or less, that performs a safe-start check, andthat is interlocked into the combustion safety circuitry in accordance with thefollowing:

(1) The flame supervision shall not be required in the combustion safety circuitryof a furnace zone where that zone temperature is greater than 1400°F (760°C)and the following criteria are met:

(2) When the zone temperature drops to less than 1400°F (760°C), theburner is interlocked to allow its operation only if flame supervision hasbeen re-established.

(3) A 1400°F (760°C) bypass interlock is used to meet the requirement of8.10.1 (1)(a).

(4) Combustion safeguards on radiant tube–type heating systems are notrequired where a means of ignition is provided and the systems are arrangedand designed such that either of the following conditions is satisfied:

(5) The tubes are of metal construction and open at one or both ends. Ifheat recovery systems are used, they shall be of explosion-resistantconstruction.

(6) The entire radiant tube heating system, including any associated heatrecovery system, is of explosion-resistant construction.

(7) Burners without flame supervision are interlocked to prevent their operationwhen the zone temperature is less than 1400°F (760°C) by use of a 1400°F(760°C) bypass interlock.

< see attached revised text >

Additional Proposed Changes

File Name Description ApprovedClean Competing Draft Proposal Section 8-10.1.pdf

Clean proposal for new 8.10.1


Major revision to combustion safeguards. Competes with Public Input #100, which contains additional substantiation.





Related Input RelationshipPublic Input No. 100-NFPA 86-2012 [Section No.8.10.1] Competing text for linked item






8.10 Combustion Safeguards and Flame Supervision. (accepted 06/22/12) 8.10.1 Combustion Safeguards 8.10.1.1 Each burner flame shall have a combustion safeguard in the combustion safety circuitry unless otherwise permitted in 8.10.1.2. 8.10.1.2 The following burner flames shall not require a combustion safeguard: (1)Burner flames for radiant tube–type heating systems where a means of ignition is provided and the systems are arranged and designed such that either of the following conditions is satisfied:

(a)The tubes are of metal construction and open at one or both ends. If heat recovery systems are used, they shall be of explosion-resistant construction. (b)The entire radiant tube heating system, including any associated heat recovery system, is of explosion-resistant construction.

(2)Burner flames at burners interlocked with a 1400°F (760°C) bypass interlock that prevents burner operation when the temperature in the zone where the burner is located is less than 1400°F (760°C). 8.10.1.3* Where a combustion safeguard is required, the logic system shall: (1) Have a maximum flame failure response time of 4 seconds or less (2) Perform a safe-start check A.8.10.1.3 Subsections 8.2.2 and 8.2.5 require that the flame detector and the combustion safeguard be applied and installed according to the manufacturer’s instructions. Where flame detectors (scanners) with combustion safeguards that continuously operate without a shutdown beyond the maximum interval recommended by the combustion safeguard and flame detector manufacturer's instructions, continuous operation without a shutdown and safe-start check would not be compliant. 8.10.2* Flame Supervision. A.8.10.2 Ultraviolet detectors can fail in such a manner that the loss of flame is not detected. Where these detectors are placed in continuous service, failures can be detected by a self-checking ultraviolet detector or by periodic testing of the detector for proper operation. 8.10.2.1 Where a combustion safeguard is required for a burner flame, each pilot and main burner flame shall be equipped with flame supervision in one of the following ways:

(1)Main and pilot flames supervised with independent flame sensors (2)Main and interrupted pilot flames supervised with a single flame sensor (3)*Self-piloted burner supervised with a single flame sensor A.8.10.2.1(3) The term self-piloted burner is defined in 3.3.5.14. 8.10.2.2* Line burners, pipe burners, and radiant burners, where installed adjacent to one another or connected with flame-propagating devices, shall be considered to be a single burner and shall have at least one flame safeguard installed to sense burner flame at the end of the assembly farthest from the source of ignition. A.8.10.2.2 Two examples of burner arrangements considered to be a single burner with one flame safeguard installed at the end of the assembly are shown in Figure A.8.10.2.2(a) and Figure A.8.10.2.2(b).

FIGURE A.8.10.2.2(a) Example of a Combustion Safeguard Supervising a Pilot for a Continuous Line Burner During Light-Off and the Main Flame Alone During Firing.

FIGURE A.8.10.2.2(b) Example of a Combustion Safeguard Supervising a Group of Radiant Cup Burners Having Reliable Flame-Propagation Characteristics from One to the Other by Means of Flame-Propagation Devices. 8.10.2.3 [old 8.10.1(1)] Where a combustion safeguard is required for a burner flame, flame supervision shall not be required in the combustion safety circuitry of a furnace zone when that zone temperature is greater than 1400°F (760°C) and the following criteria are met: (1)When the zone temperature drops to less than 1400°F (760°C), the burner is interlocked to allow its operation only if flame supervision has been re-established. (2)A 1400°F (760°C) bypass interlock is used to meet the requirement of 8.10.3(1)

25/31


8.11.2.1The low pressure switch used to supervise the atomizing medium shall be permitted to belocated upstream of atomizing media balancing orifices and balancing valves provided thebalancing devices are equipped with a locking device to prevent an unintentional change inthe setting.


Previously, A.8.11.2 included a requirement which should have been in the mandatory text. This proposal moves the prior Annex text here and augments it.









8.16.10 The Except as allowed in 8.4, the operating temperature controller and itstemperature-sensing element shall not be used as the excess temperature limitinterlock.


Resolves potential conflict with 8.4


Related Input RelationshipPublic Input No. 119-NFPA 86-2012 [Section No.8.4.2] Interrelated sections?






27/31


Add a new section to read as follows: 9.1.3* Written procedures shall be established or interlocks provided for each action to betaken in response to a fire in an oven.


Existing requirements in Chapter 11 do not address what action should be taken in the event of a fire in an oven or furnace. While such actions are not "one-size-fits-all", where fire protection is needed it is important it be a coordinated system and, where manual actions are required, written procedures exist and operator training (addressed in Section 7.2) is done.


Submitter Full Name: Michael PolagyeOrganization: FM GlobalSubmittal Date: Mon Jul 02 12:43:21 EDT 2012


I, Michael Polagye, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) alland full rights in copyright in this Public Input (including both the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problemand Substantiation). I understand and intend that I acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in anypublication of the NFPA in w hich this Public Input in this or another similar or derivative form is used. I herebyw arrant that I am the author of this Public Input and that I have full pow er and authority to enter into thiscopyright assignment.

By checking this box I aff irm that I am Michael Polagye, and I agree to be legally bound by the aboveCopyright Assignment and the terms and conditions contained therein. I understand and intend that, by checkingthis box, I am creating an electronic signature that w ill, upon my submission of this form, have the same legalforce and effect as a handw ritten signature




10.6.3.3 3* Where direct heat recovery systems are employed and portions of the incineratorexhaust gases are utilized as the heat source for one or more of the zones of thefume-generating oven, special one of the following precautions shall be taken toprevent recycling unburned solvent vapors:

(1) Mechanical means such as fixed dampers shall be used to ensure that theratio of fresh air to recycled exhaust cannot reduce the efficiency of theincinerator below specification or 90%, whichever is higher .

(2) Oxygen sensors in the air stream to the incinerator are interlocked to divertrecyled exhaust gases to atmosphere if levels drop below specifications forthe incinerator.

(3) A continuous vapor concentration high limit controller is provided inaccordance with 11.6.10


The term "special precautions" is imprecise and unenforceable language. The goal of this paragraph is to prevent the exhaust from the incinerator increasing the concentration of flammable vapors within the heated ovens to above 25% LFL (or 50% if a continuous vapor concentration controller is used).

When exhaust is recycled, it can reduce the oxygen content supplied to the incinerator (reducing efficiency) and allow concentrations of flammable vapors to build over time. System design should have inherent physical characteristics or control and interlocks to prevent this from occuring.

Annex material is proposed separately to provide more guidance to the reader of the standard.










10.6.3.3 Where direct heat recovery systems are employed and portions of the incineratorexhaust gases are utilized as the heat source for one or more of the zones of thefume-generating oven, special precautions shall be taken to prevent recyclingunburned solvent vapors vapors and unburned primary burner fuel .


The existing requirements unnecessarily prohibit the recovery of chemical energy available in solvent vapors driven off in a drying oven to be used as a direct source of heat for the oven itself, after those vapors are incinerated in a thermal oxidizer. Oven systems that enhance energy efficiency without posing safety hazards should not be prohibited. - New text at 10.6.3.3 adds "unburned primary fuel" to the set of flammable gases/vapors that should not be recycled to the drying oven. - New text at 11.6.6.3 clarifies that products of combustion are not flammable and should be excluded from the gases that are prohibited from being recycled to the drying oven.If all of the conditions of Chapter 10 Thermal Oxidizer are met then the vast majority of the solvent vapor and primary burner fuel are oxidized to inert compounds which may be used effectively as a source of heat in the drying oven.Annex text and figure also provided to accompany the new requirements. This public input should be evaluated in the context of cross-referenced public input addressing 8.6.1 and 11.6.1.10.


Related Input RelationshipPublic Input No. 54-NFPA 86-2012 [Section No.8.6.1 [Excluding any Sub-Sections]]

Several related public inputs alldealing with safety ventilation.

Public Input No. 82-NFPA 86-2012 [New Sectionafter 11.6.1.10]

Several related public inputs alldealing with safety ventilation.





By checking this box I aff irm that I am Richard Martin, and I agree to be legally bound by the above CopyrightAssignment and the terms and conditions contained therein. I understand and intend that, by checking this box, I



am creating an electronic signature that w ill, upon my submission of this form, have the same legal force andeffect as a handw ritten signature

Public Input No. 75-NFPA 86-2012 [ Section No. 11.5 ]

11.5 Fire Protection. (Reserved) 11.5.1 Upon detection of a fire by an automated fire detection or suppressionsystem, the system design shall incorporate the following automated interlocks:

(1) A safety shutdown of the oven shall be initiated.

(2) Conveyors or sources of flammable or combustible material shall shutdown.

(3) Fans shall remain in operation to maintain the required safetyventilation or it shall be demonstrated by calculation that the combustibleconcentration in the work chamber cannot exceed 25 percent of the lowerflammable limit (LFL) under any conditions.

(4) Dampers positions shall maintain the minimum airflow through alloven passages to provide the required safety ventilation or it shall bedemonstrated by calculation that the combustible concentration in the workchamber cannot exceed 25 percent of the lower flammable limit (LFL) underany conditions.


Two different types of hazards may develop when an emergency shutdown of the oven is required. (1) In cases where a fire involving combustible solids or liquids in the oven has been initiated, but hasn't grown very large, allowing more air into the oven will “fan the flames”.(2) In cases where excess temperature might cause the buildup of flammable gases and an approach to LFL, shutting off the source of air to the oven could create an explosive atmosphere.The goal of the shutdown logic should be:- Distinguish between overtemperature situation and internal fire.- Initiate action that is consistent with the type of problem discerned and the nature of fire detection and suppression systems present in the oven.




I, Richard Martin, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) all and

full rights in copyright in this Public Input (including both the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problem and



full rights in copyright in this Public Input (including both the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problem andSubstantiation). I understand and intend that I acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in anypublication of the NFPA in w hich this Public Input in this or another similar or derivative form is used. I herebyw arrant that I am the author of this Public Input and that I have full pow er and authority to enter into thiscopyright assignment.





11.6.1.1 Air circulation shall be used to minimize the to achieve the following:

(1) Minimize the volume of flammable concentration regions that are present at the

point

points of evaporation within the oven.

(2) Maintain flammable vapor concentrations in all other regions of the furnace orfurnace enclosure below the applicable safety limits with respect to percent of LFL.


See substantiation for Public Input #24 (Section 3.3.53). The new text clarifies that there are two types of regions in many Class A ovens - (1) near surfaces where flammable liquids are being evaporated and it is impossible to dilute the concentration below 25% of the LFL and (2) all other regions where concentrations should be kept below 25% of LFL.


Related Input RelationshipPublic Input No. 24-NFPA 86-2012[Section No. 3.3.53]

Enforceable language moved from definition to a newrequirement in 11.6.1.1







11.6.1.11*Safety ventilation shall be arranged to meet the following design characteristics:

(a) Reduction of air flow below the minimum required by 11.6.1 shall activate theventilation safety devices provided in accordance with section 8.6.

(b) The physical arrangement of dampers, fans, ducts, chambers, and passages shallensure that a short-circuited airflow cannot occur without activating the ventilationsafety devices provided in accordance with section 8.6.


New requirements are added to clarify the functionality of ventilation safety devices and the dual objectives of (1) monitoring for insufficient ventilation air flow and (2) ensuring that short-circuiting around necessary ventilation flow pathways does not occur.


Related Input RelationshipPublic Input No. 78-NFPA 86-2012[Section No. 11.6.1.10]

New requirements added in proposed revision to11.6.1.10

Public Input No. 54-NFPA 86-2012[Section No. 8.6.1 [Excluding anySub-Sections]]

New safety ventilation requirements in Chapter 11should be reviewed in context of interlocks requiredin 8.6.






3/28


11.6.1.10* Required safety Safety ventilation shall be proved by one of the following:

(1) A dedicated exhaust fan proved in accordance with Section 8.6

(2) The presence of at least the required fresh air flow into the system proven inaccordance with Section 8 11 .6 .1.11

(3) The presence of at least the required exhaust flow out of the system proven inaccordance with Section 8 11 .6 .1.11

(4) A continuous vapor concentration high limit controller in accordance with11.6.10


Complex systems with multiple airflow paths, multiple heating zones, and other variations are not adequately encompassed by the current 11.6.1.10, which simply provides a generic reference to requirements in Section 8.6. The new 11.6.1.11 language is necessary to ensure that the designer, AHJ, and end user are able to apply the requirements for safety ventilation to these complex systems.The solution presented in this Public Input is an alternative to the solution presented in a cross-referenced Public Input that alters requirements in 11.6.6.3 and 10.6.3.3.









11.6.2.1 1* Interlocks for exhaust and recirculation fans shall be installed in accordance withSections 8.6 and 8.7.


Adds reference to Annex A.8.6.1 where new content was added to clarify the need for interlocking the operation of non-ducted fans into the safety circuitry.


Related Input RelationshipPublic Input No. 56-NFPA 86-2012 [NewSection after A.8.5.2]

Asterisk added to indicated presence of newAnnex content.









11.6.6.3When the conditions of 10.6.3.3 have been met, the products of combustion exiting thethermal oxidizer shall be permitted to be excluded from the requirements for safetyventilation in 11.6.6.


File Name Description ApprovedExample 8 - newfigure for11.6.6.3.png

One of several examples considered by Class A Task Group where combustion products from a thermal oxidizer may be safely recycled to a drying oven.


See substantiation provided with new public input at 10.6.3.3.


Related Input RelationshipPublic Input No. 84-NFPA 86-2012[Section No. 10.6.3.3]

Several related public inputs addressing safetyventilation and energy efficiency









11.6.8.3* LFL Correction Factor. (A) The LFL value for continuous process ovens shall be corrected for the ovenoperating temperature in accordance with one of the following formulas or by usingTable 11.6.8.3(A) :

In the equation below delete 436 and replace with 401. Also delete 784 and replacewith 721.

where:t = oven temperatureTable 11.6.8.3(A) Oven Temperature Correction Factors

Oven Temperature LFL Correction

Factor°F °C

77 25 1.00212 100 0.94 95300 149 0.90 91400 204 0.86 87500 260 0.81 83

(B) For batch process ovens, the temperature multiplier specified in 11.6.9.2 shall beused.


The formulas come from the Bureau of Mines 627 [see A.11.6.8.3 and A.6.5.2(2)] but the cited reference formula uses 0.000721 instead of 0.000784. The Fahrenheit formula is corrected by multiplying 0.000721 by 5 and dividing by 9. The table correction factors must be adjusted to agree with the corrected formulas.


Submitter Full Name: Kevin CarlisleOrganization: Karl Dungs, Inc.Affi l l iation: Industrial Heating Equipment AssociationSubmittal Date: Mon Jul 02 11:29:04 EDT 2012






11.6.8.7 The products of combustion in direct-fired process ovens shall be accounted for byimplementing one of the following approaches:

(1) The safety ventilation shall be increased

for direct-fired process ovens

(1) to include the products of combustion ventilation rate determined in 11.6.6 .

(2) A continuous vapor concentration high limit controller has been provided inaccordance with 11.6.10


The text desired could not be created by TerraView:"11.6.8.7 The products of combustion in direct-fired process ovens shall be accounted for by implementing one of the following approaches:(1) The safety ventilation shall be increased to include the products of combustion ventilation rate determined in 11.6.6.(2) A continuous vapor concentration high limit controller has been provided in accordance with 11.6.10"

In cases where a continuous vapor concentration high limit controller has been provided, the products of combustion will be addressed by the system without the need for an additional calculated safety ventilation rate. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that the inert components of the products of combustion are effective in diluting flammable vapors as required by the standard.

Combustible components such as CO and those resulting from incomplete combustion will be monitored by the continuous vapor concentration high limit controller.




Submitter FullName: Thomas George

Organization: Tokio Marine Management, Inc.

Affi l l iation: Developed as a result of work with the NFPA 86 Class A Oven TaskForce

Submittal Date: Fri Jun 22 09:28:27 EDT 2012







Pre-ignition PurgeFailure to maintain the minimum required pre-ignition purge airflow shall permit stopping andholding the pre-ignition purge timer without reset and resuming the remaining purge timewhen the minimum purge airflow is re-established. The timer shall be reset when the holdtime exceeds 15 minutes.


This proposal allows systems with long purge times to perform additional functions during the pre-ignition purge that may momentarily affect the air flow. It also reduces the temptation to defeat the purge timer. When the minimum air flow drops below the monitoring switch, the concentration of combustibles in the heating chambers will not increase. The safety shut off valves have been proven closed and there is no other source that would increase flammable vapors and gases in Class B systems. There is no risk in holding the purge timer within the limitation of 15 minutes.


Submitter Full Name: Dan CurryOrganization: Eclipse, Inc.Submittal Date: Fri Jun 22 12:48:41 EDT 2012




Public Input No. 106-NFPA 86-2012 [ Section No. 12.5.2.5(A) ]



(A) The main furnace structure tilt system shall be interlocked where the arc furnaceoperation includes tilting of with the main power to prevent tilting the furnace toremove molten metal at the end of the furnace heat, and the following criteria alsoshall be met:

The furnace shall not be tilted during the melt operation, and interlocks shall beprovided to prevent furnace tilting until furnace controls have been proved in thecorrect position.Interlocks shall be fitted to prevent tilting of the furnace unless both of the followingconditions are satisfied:

The roof is down.The limit switches are at forward and backward limits of travel heat if there is powerat the electrode(s) .


• Electric Arc furnace operation does require tilting the furnace during the normal operation of the furnace. One of reasons an electric arc furnace is tilted is to facilitate slag removal from the furnace during the refining process. Therefore, the old (A)(1) is not correct and should be deleted. • Power to the electrodes should not be present when the furnace is tilted into the pouring (tapping) position• The old (A)(2) now becomes the new (B)• The old (B) becomes the new (C)


Submitter Full Name: Richard MartinOrganization: Martin Thermal Engineering, Inc.Affi l l iation: Secretary NFPA 86 Task Group on Class B FurnacesSubmittal Date: Fri Jun 22 01:19:11 EDT 2012






Public Input No. 108-NFPA 86-2012 [ New Section after 12.5.2.5(B) ]

(C)Interlocks shall be fitted to prevent swinging of the roof and electrodes unless the followingthree conditions are satisfied:

(a) The electrode arms are up and clear of shell.

(b) The furnace tilt platform is normal and locked (if fitted).

(c) The roof is raised.




Related Input RelationshipPublic Input No. 107-NFPA 86-2012[Section No. 12.5.2.5(B)]

Revisions to several sections of 12.5.2.5 areall interconnected

Public Input No. 106-NFPA 86-2012[Section No. 12.5.2.5(A)]

Revisions to several sections of 12.5.2.5 areall interconnected






Public Input No. 107-NFPA 86-2012 [ Section No. 12.5.2.5(B) ]

(B) Interlocks shall be fitted to prevent

swingingtilting of the

roof and electrodes unlessfurnace for normal furnace operation unless both of the following

threeconditions are satisfied:

The electrode arms are up and clear of shell.

The furnace tilt platform is normal and locked (if fitted).

The roof is raised.(A) The roof is down.

(B) the furnace is within the forward and backward limits of tilt.


See substantiation for Public Input #106 at Section 12.5.2.5


Related Input RelationshipPublic Input No. 106-NFPA 86-2012 [SectionNo. 12.5.2.5(A)]

Several revisions to 12.5.2.5 are allinterconnected






13/28


13.5.1.5 Nonflammable and nontoxic fluids nontoxic gases shall be vented to an approvedlocation outside the building at a rate that does not pose a hazard of asphyxiation.


We believe that at this point we are specifically addressing gases. "Fluids" applies to both liquids and gases (liquids can not be "vented")


Submitter Full Name: Fausta LyonsOrganization: Caterpillar IncAffi l l iation: NFPA 86 Class C Task GroupSubmittal Date: Thu Apr 26 16:11:35 EDT 2012





This information w as provided by Mark Stender (Surface Combustion) as part of the Class C Task Group.

10/17/12


Public Input No. 41-NFPA 86-2012 [ Section No. 13.5.2.1(B) ]

(B) Copper and copper alloy components or materials shall not be used in exothermicatmosphere gas generators, cooling systems, heat exchangers, and distributionsystems where they will be exposed to makeup, reacting, or final productexothermic atmosphere gas.


Duplicate statement from 13.5.2.1 (A)


Submitter Full Name: Fausta LyonsOrganization: Caterpillar IncAffi l l iation: NFPA 86 Task Group Class CSubmittal Date: Thu May 10 13:38:52 EDT 2012





Content provided by Jak Kozma (Holcroft) in NFPA 86 Class C Task Group.




13.5.3.5* Protective equipment for the reaction section of endothermic generators shallinclude the following:

(1) Safety shutoff valve(s) in the reaction gas supply piping requiring manualoperation for opening shall close under any of the following conditions:

(a) Low reaction gas pressure

(b) High reaction gas pressure

(c) Loss of reaction air supply

(d) Low generator temperature

(e) Power failure

(2) A low pressure switch in the reaction gas supply piping shall close the safetyshutoff valve and shut off the reaction air supply in case of abnormally lowreaction gas pressure at the mixer.

(3) Where the system is subject to abnormally high reaction gas pressure, ahigh pressure switch shall be installed in the reaction gas supply piping thatoperates as follows when the gas reaction pressure exceeds a predeterminedupper value:

(a) The device closes the safety shutoff valve.

(b) The device shuts off the reaction air supply.

(4) A When an air blower or compressed air line is used to supply the reaction aira low pressure switch in the reaction air supply piping connected to an airblower or compressed air line shall piping shall close the safety shutoff valveand shut off the reaction air supply in case of abnormally low reaction airpressure.

(5) A device that shuts off reaction air in case of power failure or abnormally lowor abnormally high reaction gas pressure at the mixer shall be included.

(6) A means for making tightness checks of all reaction gas safety shutoff valvesshall be included.

(7) A valve shall be designated the main shutoff valve and shall be locatedupstream of the safety shutoff valve and shall be accessible for normal andemergency shutdown.

(8) A generator temperature control to prevent the flow of reaction air and reactiongas unless the generator is at the minimum generator temperature specifiedby the generator manufacturer shall be included.

(9) Automatic fire check protection shall be included.

(10) A visual and audible alarm when the reaction gas safety shutoff valve isclosed shall be included.


The way the intro is worded could imply that either an air blower or a compressed air line is required to provide the reaction air. One industry design does not use an air blower or compressed air line for the reaction air.









Changes provided by Mark Stender (Surface Combustion) as part of Class C Task Group.



Public Input No. 74-NFPA 86-2012 [ New Section after 13.5.7.4(C) ]

13.5.7.5It shall not be permissible to manifold flammable special atmospheres and process controlair or admit both via a common inlet when flow rates and piping arrangements create a riskof flame strike back and burning within the furnace piping.


Flammable gas and air admitted to a furnace via a common inlet pipe may create a rick of flame strike back and burning within the furnace piping.


Submitter Full Name: Fausta LyonsOrganization: Caterpillar IncSubmittal Date: Tue Jun 19 15:34:56 EDT 2012


I, Fausta Lyons, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) all andfull rights in copyright in this Public Input (including both the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problem andSubstantiation). I understand and intend that I acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in anypublication of the NFPA in w hich this Public Input in this or another similar or derivative form is used. I herebyw arrant that I am the author of this Public Input and that I have full pow er and authority to enter into thiscopyright assignment.





13.5.8.3* A safety When a flammable liquid is used as a carrier gas and introduced in theliquid state, a second low termperature interlock shall be provided to if flow of theliquid is continued at less than 1400F(760C). This second interlock shall interruptthe flow of methanol (methyl alcohol) or other the flammable liquid atmospheresatmosphere into a the furnace when the temperature inside drops below aminimum dissociation temperature required to maintain a positive furnacepressure furnace temperature is less than the temperature needed to reliablydissociated the liquid special atmosphere used .


The modified wording unifies the requirement in a single location.









13.5.8.12Automatic excess flow shutoff protection shall be provided for each liquid specialatmosphere. (A) The excess flow sensor shall be located immediately downstream of the filterrequired in 13.5.11.10.5. (B) Upon detection of liquid special atmosphere excess flow, the liquid specialatmosphere safety shutoff valve shall close.


Relocated from 13.5.11.11.11









13.5.10.3 Furnace Type (Class C) . The type of furnace shall be determined in accordance with Table 13.5.10.3.Table 13.5.10.3 Types of Class C Furnaces

FurnaceType Feature

OperatingTemperature Example

Type I

The chamber(s)<1400°F areseparated by doorsfrom those operatingat > 1400°F

One or more zonesalways >1400°F

Pusher tray (coldchambers at each end,inner and outer doorswith and without integralquench)

Type IICan be <1400°F afterintroduction of a coldload

Batch integral quench (1or more cold chambers,integral quench)

Type III

Both inlet and outletends of furnace areopen and no externaldoors or covers

At least one zone>1400°F and have noinner doors separatingzones > and <1400°F

Belt (both ends open)

Type IV

Only one end of thefurnace is open andthere are no externaldoors or covers

Belt (with integralquench, entry end open)

Type V Outer doors orcovers are provided Box (exterior door)

Type VI

>1400°F beforeintroduction and removalof special atmospheregas

Type VII Never >1400°F

Type VIIIA heating coverfurnace with an innercover A heating cover and inner

cover are separated froma base that supports thework being processed

Bell (with or withoutretort)

Type IX

A heating coverfurnace without aninner cover or with anonsealed innercover

Car tip-up

For SI units, 1400°F =760°C.


With its current title, users may inadvertently think that Table 13.5.10.3 provides guidance for distinguishing between different classes of furnaces, when in fact the table is only applicable to Class C furnaces.


Submitter Full Name: Richard MartinOrganization: Martin Thermal Engineering

Submittal Date: Fri Mar 30 23:50:25 EDT 2012



Submittal Date: Fri Mar 30 23:50:25 EDT 2012






Public Input No. 37-NFPA 86-2012 [ New Section No. after 13.5.11.1(E) ]

13.5.11.1 (F)Process Control Air or Burnout Air shall be supplied from an air blower.


Often plant airlines can become slugged with water. Regulator failures could result in high-pressure air admission to furnace.








Public Input No. 149-NFPA 86-2012 [ Section No. 13.5.11.2(G) ]

(G)* Burn-off pilot gas shall not shut off in the event of power failure except for thefollowing case .

(1) Burn-off pilot gas for a Type II batch integral quench furnace vestibule outerdoor burn-off pilot shall be allowed to be shut-off where each of the followingconditions is met:



(a) The burn-off pilot is equipped with flame supervision.

(b) The burn-off pilot gas is shut-off by a fuel gas safety shutoff valve.

(c) The burn-off pilot is interlocked to prevent automatic door opening in theevent of a flame failure.

(d) The furnace is designed to follow purge-in for the introduction of flammablespecial atmosphere gas per 13.5.11.6.

(e) The furnace is designed to follow purge-out for the removal of flammablespecial atmosphere gas per 13.5.11.8.

(f) Written instructions are provided stating that the door shall not be openedby manual means unless the door burn-off pilot is lit or an alternate source ofignition is provided.


The proposed change would reduce the potential for an explosive gas mixture to develope inside the furnace in the event of a power failure or when the furnace is being shut-down. This condition could develop should the door burn-off pilot be unexpectedly extinguished and the operator fails to close the manual burn-off pilot gas valve.

Vestibules on Type II furnaces have large internal volumes in which a considerable volume of explosive gas mixture could develop should the outer vestibule door remain open when a burn-off pilot is extinguished and the burn-off pilot gas is not manually shut off by the operator. Further, most if not all Type II furnace outer doors open vertically upward such that the required location of the door burn-off pilot is at the bottom of the door opening. Fuel gas is bouyant in air so it will tend to rise and therefore can readily flow into and accumulate in a vestibule whose outer door is open.

A secondary benefit is the reduction of outer door burn-off pilot fuel gas consumption during long furnace cycles.


Submitter Full Name: Joseph Kozma IIIOrganization: AFC-Holcroft LLCSubmittal Date: Fri Jun 22 17:27:53 EDT 2012


I, Joseph Kozma III, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) alland full rights in copyright in this Public Input (including both the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problemand Substantiation). I understand and intend that I acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in anypublication of the NFPA in w hich this Public Input in this or another similar or derivative form is used. I herebyw arrant that I am the author of this Public Input and that I have full pow er and authority to enter into thiscopyright assignment.

By checking this box I aff irm that I am Joseph Kozma III, and I agree to be legally bound by the aboveCopyright Assignment and the terms and conditions contained therein. I understand and intend that, by checkingthis box, I am creating an electronic signature that w ill, upon my submission of this form, have the same legalforce and effect as a handw ritten signature



Public Input No. 34-NFPA 86-2012 [ New Section after 13.5.11.9.4 ]

13.5.11.9.5Burnout air shall be admitted by any of the fol low ing arrangements:(A) Through furnace doors.(B) Through independent piping and furnace gas inlets.(C) Through sections of piping and furance inlets that are common to bothflammable special atmosphere and burnout air when the systems are designedto prevent the flow of air and flammable special atmosphere at the same time.


Flammable gas and air admitted to a furnace via a common inlet pipe creates a risk of flame strike back and burning within the furnace piping.


Submitter Full Name: Fausta LyonsOrganization: Caterpillar IncAffi l l iation: NFPA Class C Task GroupSubmittal Date: Fri Apr 27 09:44:01 EDT 2012





Content provided by Gary Keil (Caterpillar) as part of Class C Task Group.



Public Input No. 77-NFPA 86-2012 [ Section No. 13.5.11.10.2.3 ]

13.5.11.10.2.3 A bypass manual shutoff valve shall be provided to bypass each normally openemergency inert gas purge valve. The bypass manual shutoff valve shall bearranged as follows:


This unifies the requirement into a single item.









13.5.11.10.2.4 The bypass manual shutoff valve shall be arranged as follows:

(1) Be accessible to the operator for use in accordance with written operatinginstructions

(2) Have a port area equal to or larger than the bypassed normally openemergency inert gas purge valve


This unifies the requirement into a single item.









13.5.11.10.2.6 The operating instructions required by 7.3.2 shall reference the valve tagidentifications required by 13.5.11.10.2.5 4 .


Corrects the references.









13.5.11.10.2.8 Manual valves that are not used for shutoff shall not be required to comply with13.5.11.10.2 other than 13.5.11.10.2.5 4 .


Corrects the references.







1/53submittals.nfpa.org/TerraViewWeb/ViewerPage.jsp

Public Input No. 30-NFPA 86-2012 [ New Section after 13.5.11.10.7 ]

13.5.11.10.8 Atmosphere InletsAtmosphere inlets shall not be located in such a way that atmosphere flow w il l directly impinge on temperature controlor over temperature control thermocouples.


Atmosphere impingement on the temperature control thermocouple can result in overheating of the furance: impingement on the over temperature thermocouple can cause erroneous control readings.




I, Fausta Lyons, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) all and full rights in copyright in this Public Input (including boththe Proposed Change and the Statement of Problem and Substantiation). I understand and intend that I acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in anypublication of the NFPA in w hich this Public Input in this or another similar or derivative form is used. Except to the extent that I may lack authority to make anassignment of content identif ied above, I hereby w arrant that I am the author of this Public Input and that I have full pow er and authority to enter into this copyrightassignment.

By checking this box I aff irm that I am Fausta Lyons, and I agree to be legally bound by the above Copyright Assignment and the terms and conditions containedtherein. I understand and intend that, by checking this box, I am creating an electronic signature that w ill, upon my submission of this form, have the same legal forceand effect as a handw ritten signature


Content provided by Gary Keil (Caterpillar) as part of Class C Task Group.



Public Input No. 71-NFPA 86-2012 [ Section No. 13.5.11.11.11 ]

13.5.11.11.11 Liquid Excess Flow Control. (A) * Automatic, excess flow, and shutoff protection shall be provided for each liquid special atmosphere.(B) The excess flow sensor shall be located immediately downstream of the filter required in 13.5.11.10.5 .(C) Upon detection of liquid special atmosphere excess flow, the liquid special atmosphere safety shutoff valve shall close.


Relocated to section 13.5.8.12




I, Fausta Lyons, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) all and full rights in copyright in this Public Input (including boththe Proposed Change and the Statement of Problem and Substantiation). I understand and intend that I acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in anypublication of the NFPA in w hich this Public Input in this or another similar or derivative form is used. I hereby w arrant that I am the author of this Public Input and that Ihave full pow er and authority to enter into this copyright assignment.




Public Input No. 59-NFPA 86-2012 [ Section No. 13.5.11.11.13(A) ]

(A) For furnaces using burn-in procedures for introducing flammable special atmosphere carrier gases, the flammable it shall bepermissible to admit flammable special atmosphere carrier gas safety shutoff valves shall open only when one of gas when thefollowing conditions exists exist :

(1) The furnace temperature exceeds 1400°F (760°C) at the point where the flammable special atmosphere carrier gas isintroduced.

(2) If the furnace is designed to operate with an automatic inert gas purge, the presence of the required inert gas pressureshall be verified manually or automatically.

(3) Operator action opens the valve.


During the last cycle when reorganizing the document the intent of the language was inadvertently changed. The language has been changed to establish the original intent.








Public Input No. 60-NFPA 86-2012 [ Section No. 13.5.11.11.13(B) ]

(B) For furnaces using purge-in procedures for introducing flammable special atmospheres carrier gases, the flammable it shall bepermissible to admit flammable special atmosphere carrier gas safety shutoff valves shall open only when one of the followingexists conditions exist :

(1) The inert gas purge is complete.

(2) If the furnace is designed to operate with an automatic inert gas purge, the presence of the required inert gas pressureshall be verified manually or automatically.

(3) Operator action opens the valve.








Public Input No. 61-NFPA 86-2012 [ Section No. 13.5.11.11.13(C) ]

(C) For furnaces using burn-in or purge-in procedures for introducing flammable special atmosphere gases that are not carrier gases, thesafety shutoff valves for the noncarrier gases shall open only when the carrier gas flow has been established.










Public Input No. 28-NFPA 86-2012 [ Section No. 13.5.11.11.13(D) ]

(D)* Safety shutoff valves shall be de-energized automatically close upon occurrence of the following conditions:

(1) Normal furnace atmosphere burn-out initiated

(2) Normal furnace atmosphere purge-out initiated

(3) Low flow of carrier gas(es) that will not maintain a positive pressure in chambers below 1400°F (760°C) and positivepressure not restored by the automatic transfer to another source of gas

(4) A furnace temperature below which any liquid carrier gas used will not reliably dissociate

(5) Automatic emergency inert gas purge initiated

(6) Manual operator emergency inert gas purge initiated

(7) Power failure

(8) Liquid carrier gas excess flow


Ultimately it is the closure of the safety shutoff valve what we desire, so lets just say it. Adding item 8 completes the list of conditions that require closing of the safety shutoff valve.







Information provided by Mark Stender (Surface Combustion) as part of the Class C Task Group.



Public Input No. 63-NFPA 86-2012 [ Sections 13.5.11.11.15(A), 13.5.11.11.15(B), 13.5.11.11.15(... ]

Sections 13.5.11.11.15(A), 13.5.11.11.15(B), 13.5.11.11.15(C), 13.5.11.11.15(D)(A) A flow interlock shall be provided on the equipment piping Minimum carrier gas flow(s) required by standard shall be proved byeither:

(1) A flow switch for each special atmosphere that is considered a carrier gas

.

( 2) Furnace Pressure switch(s)

(D( B) Carrier gas flow shall be interlocked to initiate the actions If minimum carrier gas flow is not proven:

(1) Actions listed in 13.5.11.11.10(

B) if the total carrier gas flow from gas or liquid sources falls below the minimum required to keep a furnace chamber underpositive pressure.(C) Furnace pressure interlock(s) shall be permitted as an alternative to the flow interlock(s) in 13.5.11.11.15(A) .b) shall be initiated.

(2) Visual and audible alarms shall alert the operator of loss of minimum carrier gas flow.

(C )

Inert purge gas equipment piping shall be equipped with :

(1) A pressure switch that will audibly and visually alert the operator of a low

gas pressure switch interlocked to initiate audible and visual alarms topurge pressure condition.

(2) A flow switch that will audibly and visually alert the operator of

thea low

pressurepurge flow condition.


This defines the actions of the carrier gas flow interlocks. The inert purge flow switch requirement was required in previous sections but was inadvertently omitted from the 2011 edition.


Submitter Full Name: Fausta LyonsOrganization: Caterpillar Inc

Submittal Date: Tue Jun 19 14:43:19 EDT 2012





13.5.11.11.17* The flow of noncarrier special atmosphere gases that are nonflammable shall not be permitted until minimum carrier gas flowhas been established proven .


New wording clarifies that a carrier gas flow interlock is required.







13.5.11.11.19 Liquids Atmosphere Low Furnace Dissociation Temperature Interlock. (A) Where a flammable liquid is used as a carrier gas and introduced in the liquid state, a second low temperature safety interlockshall be provided if flow of the liquid is continued at less than 1400°F (760°C).(B) The liquids atmosphere low furnace dissociation temperature interlock set point temperature shall not be less than thetemperature needed to reliably dissociate the liquid special atmosphere used.


Content has been moved to 13.5.8.3.








Public Input No. 9-NFPA 86-2012 [ Chapter NFPA ]

Note: This Proposal originates from Tentative Interim Amendment 86-11-2 (TIA 988)issued by the Standards Council on August 5, 2010.

1. Revise tex t to read as fol lows:

14.5.1.7.4 Means shall be provided for metering and control l ing the flow rates of al lfluids comprising the special atmosphere for a furnace.

(A) Devices w ith visible indication of flow shall be used to meter the flows of carriergases, carrier gas component fluids, inert purge gases, enrichment gases, or air.

(B)* Devices that meter the flow of inert purge gases shall meter and visibly indicatethe flow rate by mechanical means.

A.14.5.1.7.4(B) The indication of flow is intended to be provided by a device that w il lindicate flow any time a flow is occurring including during power outage. Amechanical device that indicates the flow rate w ithout using any source of powerexcept the physical flow of the inert purge gas meets this requirement. Where an inertpurge gas flow is metered and displayed using electrical means, a rel iable backuppower supply, such as back-up batteries or an uninterruptible power supply, is neededto meet this requirement.

Where back-up power sources are used, such as batteries and uninterruptible powersupplies, the power source should be designed to supply power for the durationneeded to purge-out the complete furnace system. In addition, appropriatemaintenance procedures should be provided to inspect, test, and maintain the back-uppower supply on a regular basis to reduce the possibi l i ty of i ts unavailabil i ty during aprimary power interruption.

(C) The instal lation of flow control equipment shall meet the fol low ing criteria:

(1) It shall be instal led either at the furnace, at the generator, or in a separate flowcontrol unit.

(2) It shall be accessible and located in an i l luminated area so that i ts operation can bemonitored."


The text of 14.5.1.7.4 does not clearly express that the visible indication of flow for inert purge gases are to be provided by a direct mechanical indication of flow as opposed to an indirect electrical indication of flow. This revision and the added annex clarifies that the visual indication of flow is to be provided by mechanical means and not solely by electrical means. Emergency Nature: This TIA is needed to clarify committee intent.


Submitter Full Name: Randy BalOrganization: GM/Nexteer AutomotiveSubmittal Date: Wed Mar 28 13:38:34 EDT 2012




I, Randy Bal, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) all and full rightsin copyright in this Public Input (including both the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problem andSubstantiation). I understand and intend that I acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in any publication ofthe NFPA in w hich this Public Input in this or another similar or derivative form is used. I hereby w arrant that I am theauthor of this Public Input and that I have full pow er and authority to enter into this copyright assignment.

By checking this box I aff irm that I am Randy Bal, and I agree to be legally bound by the above CopyrightAssignment and the terms and conditions contained therein. I understand and intend that, by checking this box, I amcreating an electronic signature that w ill, upon my submission of this form, have the same legal force and effect as ahandw ritten signature



Public Input No. 142-NFPA 86-2012 [ Section No. A.1.1.7(4) ]

A.1.1.7(4) For information on fluid heaters, refer to NFPA 87, Recommended Practice for Fluid Heaters .


See substantiation for Public Input #142 at Section 1.1.7(4)


Related Input RelationshipPublic Input No. 141-NFPA 86-2012 [Section No.1.1.7] Removed annex and moved to required text




I, Richard Martin, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) all and full rights in copyright in this Public Input (including boththe Proposed Change and the Statement of Problem and Substantiation). I understand and intend that I acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in anypublication of the NFPA in w hich this Public Input in this or another similar or derivative form is used. I hereby w arrant that I am the author of this Public Input and that Ihave full pow er and authority to enter into this copyright assignment.

By checking this box I aff irm that I am Richard Martin, and I agree to be legally bound by the above Copyright Assignment and the terms and conditions containedtherein. I understand and intend that, by checking this box, I am creating an electronic signature that w ill, upon my submission of this form, have the same legal forceand effect as a handw ritten signature



Public Input No. 104-NFPA 86-2012 [ New Section after A.3.2.4 ]

A.3.3.6 The burner management system logic can include the following functions safety interlocks, pre-purge, trial for ignition, and safe-startcheck.


See substantiation for Public Input #102 at Section 8.3.


Related Input RelationshipPublic Input No. 102-NFPA 86-2012 [Section No. 8.3] Definition, Annex, and Mandatory Text are interrelatedPublic Input No. 103-NFPA 86-2012 [New Section after3.3.5.14] Definition and Annex are interrelated








Public Input No. 94-NFPA 86-2012 [ New Section after A.3.3.25.3 ]

A.3.3.25.4 It is important to note that the loads processed in a Class B furnaces typically do not contain any flammable volatiles or combustiblematerials. However, when small amounts of flammable volatiles or combustible materials are present, it may be appropriate not to addsafety ventilation, as would be required for a Class A furnace, when doing so would be detrimental to the process and would notincrease the level of safety. See A.3.3.25.3 for additional information..


See substantiation at Public Input #93


Related Input RelationshipPublic Input No. 93-NFPA 86-2012 [Section No. 3.3.25.4] Annex material for new Class B definitionPublic Input No. 143-NFPA 86-2012 [Section No.3.3.25.4] Annex linked to new asterisk at definition








Public Input No. 53-NFPA 86-2012 [ Section No. A.3.3.25.3 ]

A.3.3.25.3 Class A Furnace. Flammable volatiles or combustible materials can include, but are not limited to, any of the following:

(1) Paints, powders, inks, and adhesives from finishing processes, such as dipped, coated, sprayed, and impregnatedmaterials

(2) Substrate material

(3) Wood, paper, and plastic pallets, spacers, or packaging materials

(4) Polymerization or other molecular rearrangements

In addition, potentially flammable materials, such as quench oil, waterborne finishes, cooling oil, or cooking oils, that present ahazard are should be ventilated according to Class A standards.


"Potentially flammable" materials such as quench oil, waterborne finishes, cutting oil, and cooking oils may present a hazard if they are heated to a temperature approaching their flash points. When these materials are cool enough or present in negligibly small amounts so they don't present a hazard in a heated enclosure, Class B requirements are sufficient. The proposed change adds a "should" recommendation so users are cognizant of a potential hazard that might necessitate Class A treatment (e.g., ensuring adequate safety ventilation).









A.3.3.53.1The required percent of the Lower Flammable Limit will be 25% when the safety ventilation rate is based upon the calculation methodsprovided in this standard for Class A ovens. As permitted by this standard, the required percent of the Lower Flammable Limit mayrange from 25% to 50% where Continuous Vapor Concentration High Limit Controllers are used.


New Annex text added to assist users interpret the new definition of "Safety Ventilation" at 3.3.53.1 that refers to "the required percent of the Lower Flammable Limit (LFL)".


Related Input RelationshipPublic Input No. 64-NFPA 86-2012 [New Section after3.3.53] Annex material for new definition









A.6.2.6.4 See NFPA 54, National Fuel Gas Code, for exception to vent requirements.

Vent limiters are used to limit the escape of gas into the ambient atmosphere if a vented device (e.g., regulator, zero governor,pressure switch) requiring access to the atmosphere for operation has an internal component failure. When a vent limiter isused, there might not be a need to vent the device to an approved location. Following are some general guidelines andprinciples on the use of vented devices incorporating vent limiters:

(1) The listing requirements for vent limiters are covered in ANSI Z21.18/CSA 6.3, Standard for Gas Appliance PressureRegulators, for regulators and in ANSI/UL 353, Standard for Limit Controls, for pressure switches and limit controls. ANSIZ21.18/CSA 6.3 requires a maximum allowable leakage rate of 2.5 ft3/hr (0.071 m3/hr) for natural gas and 1.0 ft3/hr (0.028m3/hr) for LP-Gas at the device's maximum rated pressure. ANSI/UL 353 allows 1.0 ft3/hr (0.028 m3/hr) for natural gasand 1.53 ft3/hr (0.043 m3/hr) for LP-Gas at the device's maximum rated pressure. Since a field-installable vent limiter maybe rated less than the device itself and may be a field-installable device, a , or it may de-rate the device to a lowerpressure rating a combination listed device–vent limiter should be used.

(2) Where a vent limiter is used, there should be adequate airflow through the room or enclosure in which the equipment isinstalled. In reality, conditions can be less ideal, and care should be exercised for the following reasons:

(a) The relative density of the gas influences its ability to disperse in air. The higher the relative density, the more difficultit is for the gas to disperse (e.g., propane disperses more slowly than natural gas).

(b) Airflow patterns through a room or enclosure, especially in the vicinity of the gas leak, affect the ability of the air todilute that gas. The greater the local air movement, the greater the ease with which the gas is able to disperse.

(c) The vent limiter may not prevent the formation of a localized flammable air–gas concentration for the precedingreasons.

(3) Below is a table of various gases and equivalent leakage rates through a vent limiter. Leakage rates are based on themaximum pressure rating for the device.

Gas Type s.g. (based on air = 1.0 Leakage rate (ft 3 /hr)

Natural gas 0.65 2.5

Propane 1.50 1.0

Butane 1.95 0.80

(4) The standard ANSI Z21.18/CSA 6.3, Standard for Gas Appliance Pressure Regulators, to which vent limiting/regulatorcombinations are listed, has a limited scope of ½ PSI, 2 PSI, and 5 PSI. A limiting system is typically a type of leak limitingdevice that is rated for a pressure higher than 5 PSI without exceeding the allowable leakage rates of ANSI Z21.18/CSA 6.3,Standard for Gas Appliance Pressure Regulators. An example of such a device is a safety diaphragm using a fixed orifice typevent limiter, both of which are factory installed and housed within the regulator dome.


File Name Description Approved86_L32_R.docx Changes made in Terra


New annex material added to provide information for the use of vent limiters with other gases, it adds some information on a leak limiting systems, and draws special attention to field installable vent limiters.




I, Kevin Carlisle, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) all and full rights in copyright in this Public Input (including boththe Proposed Change and the Statement of Problem and Substantiation). I understand and intend that I acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in anypublication of the NFPA in w hich this Public Input in this or another similar or derivative form is used. I hereby w arrant that I am the author of this Public Input and that Ihave full pow er and authority to enter into this copyright assignment.

By checking this box I aff irm that I am Kevin Carlisle, and I agree to be legally bound by the above Copyright Assignment and the terms and conditions containedtherein. I understand and intend that, by checking this box, I am creating an electronic signature that w ill, upon my submission of this form, have the same legal forceand effect as a handw ritten signature

NFPA 86 Log #32 Rec A2014 ROP

Revise text to read as follows:

(1) The listing requirements for vent limiters are covered in ANSI Z21.18/CSA 6.3, Standard for Gas Appliance Pressure Regulators, for regulators and in ANSI/UL 353, Standard for Limit Controls, for pressure switches and limit controls. ANSI Z21.18/CSA 6.3 requires a maximum allowable leakage rate of 2.5 ft3/hr (0.071 m3/hr (0.023m3/hr) for natural gas and 1.0 ft3/hr (0.028 m3/hr) for LP-Gas at the device’s maximum rated pressure. ANSI/UL 353 allows 1.0 ft3/hr (0.0283/hr) for natural gas and 1.53 ft3/hr (0.043m3/hr) for LP-Gas at the device’s maximum rated pressure. Since a field-installable vent limiter may be rated less than the device itself, or it may de-rate the device to a lower pressure rating and may be a field installable device, a combination listed device vent limiter should be used.

(2) Where a vent limiter is used, there should be adequate airflow through the room or enclosure in which the equipment is installed. In reality, conditions can be less ideal, and care should be exercised for the following reasons:

(a) The relative density of the gas influences its ability to disperse in air. The higher the relative density, the more difficult it is for the gas to disperse (e.g., propane disperses more slowly than natural gas).

(b) Airflow patterns through a room or enclosure, especially in the vicinity of the gas leak, affect the ability of the air to dilute that gas. The greater the local air movement, the greater the ease with which the gas is able to disperse.

(c) The vent limiter may not prevent the formation of a localized flammable air-gas concentration for the preceding reasons.

(3) Below is a table of various gases and equivalent leakage rates through a vent limiter. Leakage rates are based on the maximum pressure rating for the device.

Gas Type s.g. (based on air = 1.0 Leakage rate (ft3/hr) Natural gas 0.65 2.5 Propane 1.50 1.0 Butane 1.95 0.80

(4) The standard ANSI Z21.18/CSA 6.3, Standard for Gas Appliance Pressure Regulators, to which vent limiting/regulator combinations are listed, has a limited scope of ½ PSI, 2 PSI, and 5 PSI. A limiting system is typically a type of leak limiting device that is rated for a pressure higher than 5 PSI without exceeding the allowable leakage rates of ANSI Z21.18/CSA 6.3, Standard for Gas Appliance Pressure Regulators. An example of such a device is a safety diaphragm using a fixed orifice type vent limiter, both of which are factory installed and housed within the regulator dome.



Public Input No. 98-NFPA 86-2012 [ New Section after A.6.5.2(2) ]

A.6.5.2(3) The designer and user are cautioned that hazard conditions can result in common exhaust systems even when the radiant tube burnersconnected to the common exhaust system are equipped with flame supervision.


Off ratio conditions in radiant tube systems sharing a common exhaust system can create hazardous conditions even when the burners are equipped with flame supervision.


Related Input RelationshipPublic Input No. 97-NFPA 86-2012 [Section No.6.5.2] Asterisk added to item (3) in mandatory text






Public Input No. 156-NFPA 86-2012 [ Section No. A.6.5.2(2) ]

A.6.5.2(2) The following sample calculation is provided to demonstrate a method of determining the required exhaust flow moving throughthe collecting and venting system for unsupervised radiant tube burners such that the atmosphere in the collecting and ventingsystem is less than 100 percent LFL equals noncombustible state requirement. The sample calculation is based on thefollowing assumptions:

(1) The fuel is methane gas.

(2) All burners are not firing.

(3) All burner fuel valves are open.

(4) The main safety shutoff valve is open.

Overall, the sample calculation is based on the following conservative conditions:

(1) Use of the maximum fuel input rate for each burner

(2) Assumption that all burner fuel valves are open

(3) The design limit of <100% of LFL = noncombustible state

(4) Inclusion of the effects of elevated furnace temperature on the LFL

(5) The use of ambient air to dilute the products of combustions exiting the radiant tubes and being conveyed in the collectingand venting system

The effects of temperature on fuel gas LFL were obtained from Bureau of Mines Bulletin 680, “Investigation of Fire and ExplosionAccidents in the Chemical, Mining, and Fuel-Related Industries – A Manual.” Figure 34 in that bulletin, “Temperature effect onlower limits of flammability of 10 normal paraffins in air at atmospheric pressure,” shows temperature (°C) versus combustibles(volume percent) and includes curves for methane, butane, and propane. It also includes a formula for computing LFL atelevated temperature. The formula, from Bureau of Mines Bulletin 627, “Flammability Characteristics of Combustible Gases andVapors,” is as follows:



Vapors,” is as follows:

where:LT = LFL at the desired elevated temperature T (°C)

L 25= LFL at 25°C

T = Desired elevated temperature (°C)

Sample Problem — U.S. Customary Units

Objective. Calculate the exhaust flow moving through the collecting and venting system for unsupervised radiant tube burnersso as to maintain the collecting and venting system atmosphere below 100% LFL (i.e., noncombustible state).

Given the following information:

(1) Furnace type: Continuous

(2) Fuel: Methane

(3) Number of burners: 10

(4) Maximum fuel input per burner: 600 scfh

(5) Furnace temperature: 1200°F

(6) Radiant tube exhaust temperature: 2000°F

(7) Collecting and venting system temperature: 500°F, or 260°C

Step 1. Determine LFL at 500°F (which will be the same as the LFL at 260°C) using the formula from above.

Step 2. Determine exhaust flow at 70°F to control fuel input to <100% LFL. This formula follows an approach similar to thatgiven in 11.6.8.3(A) .

Step 3. Determine the temperature correction factor for volume. This formula is similar to the temperature correction factorformula used in 11.6.5.1.

Step 4. Determine exhaust flow at collection and venting system operating temperature to limit fuel input rate to 100% LFL at TFCE TEMP. This formula follows an approach similar to that given in Chapter 9.

In the equation below delete 2.7.2 and replace with 2272. Delete 2.3.8 and replace with 1.81. Delete 4.115 and replace with4112.

Conclusion. The calculated exhaust rate of > 4.115 cfm @ 500°F is required to keep the collecting and venting system <100%LFL at its operating temperature with all burners off and fuel gas flowing at the maximum input rate.

Sample Problem — SI Units

Objective. Calculate the exhaust flow moving through the collecting and venting system for unsupervised radiant tube burnersso as to maintain the collecting and venting system atmosphere below 100% LFL (i.e., noncombustible state).


(1) Oven type: Continuous

(2) Fuel: Methane

(3) Number of burners: 10



(4) Maximum fuel input per burner: 16.99 m3/hr @ 21°C

(5) Furnace temperature: 649°C

(6) Radiant tube exhaust temperature: 1093°C

(7) Collecting and venting system temperature: 500°F (260°C)

Step 1. Determine LFL at 260°C using the formula from above:

Step 2. Determine exhaust airflow at 21°C to control fuel input to <100% LFL. This formula follows an approach similar to thatgiven in Chapter 11.

Step 3. Determine the temperature correction factor for volume. This formula is similar to temperature correction factor formulaused in Chapter 11.

Step 4. Determine exhaust flow at oven operating temperature to limit fuel input rate to 100% LFL at T FCE TEMP. This formulafollows an approach similar to that given in Chapter 11:

Conclusion. The calculated exhaust rate of >116.63 cfm m3/min @ 260°C is required to keep the collecting and ventingsystem <100% LFL at its operating temperature with all burners off and fuel gas flowing at the maximum input rate.


The referenced section shows formulas for temperature correction of the LFL and does not relate to the formula of Step 2. The decimal in the resulting value 2.272 is not correct and the actual calculation equals 2272. The referenced section is Fire Protection and has no formulas or methods relating to the formula of Step 4. The correct value for QEXH 70°F & 100% LFL is 2272 instead of 2.72. The correct value of TCF VOL in Step 3 was 1.81 instead of 2.38. The correct final result is 4112 instead of 4.115. The cfm units are incorrect for this section and should be m3 / min as shown in the preceding text line.









Add new text to read as follows: A.7.1.7 The evacuation/purging, charging, and confirmation of the fuel or combustible gas supply in the piping upstream of theequipment isolation valve is governed by other codes, standards, and recommended practices. One example is NFPA 54, NationalFuel Gas Code, 2009 edition, Section 8.3 (ref: TIA 09-3 effective 08/25/10), which requires charging to be stopped upon detection ofcombustible gas at the point of discharge. Careful consideration should be given to the potential hazards that may be created in thesurrounding area for any fuel or combustible gas discharge. In NFPA 54, the term Appliance Shutoff Valve is analogous to the term Equipment Isolation Valve in NFPA 86.






I, Ted Jablkow ski, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) all and full rights in copyright in this Public Input (includingboth the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problem and Substantiation). I understand and intend that I acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in anypublication of the NFPA in w hich this Public Input in this or another similar or derivative form is used. I hereby w arrant that I am the author of this Public Input and that Ihave full pow er and authority to enter into this copyright assignment.

By checking this box I aff irm that I am Ted Jablkow ski, and I agree to be legally bound by the above Copyright Assignment and the terms and conditions containedtherein. I understand and intend that, by checking this box, I am creating an electronic signature that w ill, upon my submission of this form, have the same legal forceand effect as a handw ritten signature




Add new text to read as follows: Another methods to perform a leak test of the valve. Leakage of valve seat can be determined by knowing the following: 1. Initial test pressure (ps(v2)) 2. Final test pressure (ps(v2)) 3. Test Time 4. Test volume

******Insert Equation Here******

Below is a sample calculation of the measured leakage on a valve seat based on measured values and known quantities (note: actualvalues are measured in metric units). 1. Test Time is 10 seconds 2. Test volume is 0.226 liters 3. Measured Initial test pressure is 27.7"WC (1 PSI) 4. Measured Final test pressure is 25.7"WC

******Insert Table Here******

This test method below is solving for Lv2 (leakage on V2) since the leakage rate on V2 is measuring using the pressure decay leaktest method.


File Name Description Approved86_L23_Tb_R.docx Table Log 23 PI #152 86_L23_Eq_R.docx Equation Log 23 PI #152


The proposal describes an alternative means to leak test a safety shutoff valve.






ROP / A2014 / NFPA 86/ Log # 23 / Table /Rec

V(test) Test Volume between both

valves (liters) 0.226

p(atm) atmospheric pressure (mbar) 1000 (14.7 PSI)

p(test v1) Measured Final test pressure 64 mbar (25.7"WC)

p(test pressure) Measured Initial test pressure 69 mbar (27.7"WC)

T(test) Test time (seconds) 10s

L(v2 leakage) in cc/hr Calculated 406 cc/hr




Add new text to read as follows: A.7.4.19 See A.6.2.6.3.






I, Ted Jablkow ski, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) all and full rights in copyright in this Public Input (includingboth the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problem and Substantiation). I understand and intend that I acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in anypublication of the NFPA in w hich this Public Input in this or another similar or derivative form is used. I hereby w arrant that I am the author of this Public Input and that Ihave full pow er and authority to enter into this copyright assignment.

By checking this box I aff irm that I am Ted Jablkow ski, and I agree to be legally bound by the above Copyright Assignment and the terms and conditions containedtherein. I understand and intend that, by checking this box, I am creating an electronic signature that w ill, upon my submission of this form, have the same legal forceand effect as a handw ritten signature



Public Input No. 118-NFPA 86-2012 [ Section No. A.8.2.8 ]

A.8.2.8 The actions resulting from a manual emergency switch action take into account the individual system design and the hazards(e.g., mechanical, combustion system, special atmosphere, etc.) associated with changing the existing state to another stateand initiates actions to cause the system to revert to a safe condition.

For some applications, additional manual action may be required to bring the process to a safe condition.





Annex material for revised requirement of at least one manual emergencyswitch








Public Input No. 123-NFPA 86-2012 [ Section No. A.8.3 ]

A.8.3 Furnace controls that meet the performance-based requirements of standards such as ANSI/ISA 84.00.01, Application ofSafety Instrumented Systems for the Process Industries Industries and IEC 61511 Functional Safety: Safety InstrumentsSystems for the Process Industry Sector , can be considered equivalent. The determination of equivalency will involve completeconformance to the safety life cycle including risk analysis, safety integrity level selection, and safety integrity level verification,which should be submitted to the authority having jurisdiction.


The requirements are identical in the two cited standards.


Submitter Full Name: Richard MartinOrganization: Martin Thermal Engineering, Inc.Affi l l iation: Secretary NFPA 86 Task Group Introductory ChaptersSubmittal Date: Fri Jun 22 05:51:19 EDT 2012






Public Input No. 134-NFPA 86-2012 [ New Section after A.8.4 ]

A.8.4.4A single pressure transmitter with associated logic may be used to provide both of the required low and high pressure interlockfunctions. A single flow transmitter with associated logic may be used to provide both of the required low and high flow interlockfunctions.


Add clarification that 8.4.4 does not specifically require a one for one replacement of one transmitter for the low gas pressure switch and a separate transmitter for the high gas pressure switch. With advances in diagnostics of transmitters for the detection of internal failures as well as diagnostic capabilities afforded by monitoring an analog variable, the replacement of two discrete switches by a single transmitter does not reduce the level of safety. The function being monitored by a transmitter is viewed as a single function, “in safe range”.


Related Input RelationshipPublic Input No. 52-NFPA 86-2012 [Section No.8.4.4] Annex material for modification to pressure transmitter requirement


Submitter Full Name: Richard MartinOrganization: Martin Thermal Engineering, Inc.Affi l l iation: Secretary NPFA 86 Task Group on Introductory ChaptersSubmittal Date: Fri Jun 22 10:47:23 EDT 2012




Public Input No. 148-NFPA 86-2012 [ Section No. A.8.5.1.8(4)(d) ]

A.8.5.1.8(4)(d) In accordance with 8.5.1.8(4)(c), fuels other than natural gas, butane, or propane may require additional consideration. Theseadditional considerations would be addressed using Section 1.5. The concern with other fuel gases is the variability of fuel gascontent being delivered over time. Specific examples include landfill gas and bio gas.

The following sample calculation illustrating the use of 8.5.1.8(4)(d) is provided to demonstrate a method of determining the25% LFL requirement.

The sample calculation is based upon the following assumptions:


(2) All burners are turned off for the control purposes. All safety shutoff valves are de-energized.

(3) Two safety shutoff valves are closed at each burner.

(4) All safety shutoff valves are

proven closed.All safety shutoff valves are

(1) tested for seat leakage at least semiannually.

(1) Safety shutoff valve seat leakage is assumed to be 1 scfh (0.0283 m 3 /hr @ 21°C).

The following thoughts are offered regarding the selection of the 1 scfh (0.0283 m3/hr @ 21°C) safety shutoff valve seat leakagerate.

Limited data reviewed by the committee indicates that valve seat leakage rates over 1 scfh (0.0283 m3/hr @ 21°C) are not



anticipated unless the safety shutoff valve seats are exposed to extremely unusual conditions such as corrosives in the fuel gasor furnace heat allowed to back up the fuel line and burn the safety shutoff valve seat. The former condition is the basis forlimiting the use of 8.5.1.8(4) to furnaces using natural gas, butane, or propane fuel gases. The latter condition occurred in acase where a fuel line was inappropriately opened by maintenance staff while the furnace was in operation. The furnace waspromptly shut down, and the safety shutoff valves were replaced.

Under operating conditions expected by this standard, it is anticipated that debris from internal fuel gas line oxidation (rust),pipe thread shavings not removed before fuel line assembly, or similar exposures can subject one safety shutoff valve to seatdamage that can lead to seat leakage of one safety shutoff valve; however, it is not expected that both safety shutoff valveswould experience similar seat leakage. The selected safety shutoff valve seat leakage rate of 1 scfh (0.0283 m3/hr @ 21°C)isconsidered conservative.

Overall, this sample calculation is based upon the following conservative conditions:

(1) The use of a 1 scfh (0.0283 m3/hr @ 21°C) safety shutoff valve seat leakage rate.

(2) Providing two safety shutoff valves for each fuel path.

(3) Using valve proving to prove each safety shutoff valve closed.

(4) Assuming safety shutoff valve leakage at each burner fuel path.

(5) Using a design limit of 25 percent of LFL.

(6) Including the effects of elevated furnace temperature on the LFL.

(7) Assuming no fuel exits the furnace.

The effects of temperature on fuel gas LFL were obtained from a United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of MinesBulletin 680, “Investigation of Fire and Explosion Accidents in the Chemical, Mining, and Fuel-Related Industries — A Manual.”Figure 34 in that bulletin, “Temperature effect on lower limits of flammability of 10 normal paraffins in air at atmosphericpressure,” shows temperature (°C) versus combustibles (volume percent) and includes curves for methane, butane, andpropane. It also includes a formula for computing LFL at elevated temperature. That formula, based on Bureau of Mines Bulletin627, “Flammability Characteristics of Combustible Gases and Vapors,” is as follows:

where:LT = LFL at the desired elevated temperature, T (°C)

L 25= LFL at 25°C


Sample Problem — U. S. Customary Units

Objective. Calculate the amount of time that all burners can be turned off before the furnace atmosphere will reach 25% of LFL.

Assumptions. Furnace contains no combustibles when the burners are turned off. Furnace is under positive pressure with no airinfiltration.


Furnace type: Batch

Furnace size: 8 ft wide × 6 ft deep × 8 ft tall

Number of burners: 5

Burner design rate: 0.8 MM Btu/hr

Burner design excess air: 10.0%

Burner design air capacity: 8800 scfh

Burner air minimum design flow: 100 scfh

Maximum leak rate each flow path*: 1 scfh

Number of burner flow paths**: 5

Furnace temperature: 900°F or 482°C

Oxygen in furnace atmosphere: 18%

Fuel: Methane

*The flow path is across one set of safety shutoff valves proven closed.

**The number of flow paths is the number of sets of safety shutoff valves proven closed that may leak into the furnaceenclosure.

Step 1. Determine LFL at 900°F using the formula from above:

Step 2. Determine the furnace volume:



Step 3. Determine the methane leak rate into the furnace with all burners off:

Step 4. Determine the airflow into the furnace with all burners off:

Step 5. Determine the percent volume methane to air through all burners:

Step 6. Determine the percent LFL resulting from the methane flow through all burner fuel paths at 900°F:

Step 7. Determine the time in minutes to reach 25% LFL with all burners off:

Conclusions. Where the value of % LFL 900°F exceeds 25 percent, the burner safety shutoff valves can remain closed andburners be reignited without a repurge within a period of time not exceeding t FCE 25% LFL. After t FCE 25% LFL is exceeded,a repurge of the furnace is required.

Where the value of % LFL 900°F equals or is less than 25 percent, burners can be reignited at any time as long as the airflowrate Q AIR is proven and interlocked in the combustion safety system such that loss of this proven airflow rate will require arepurge of the furnace before burner reignition is permitted.





Furnace type: Batch

Furnace size: 2.438 m wide × 1.828 m deep × 2.428 m tall


Burner design rate: 234.2 kW


Burner design air capacity: 249.2 m3/hr @ 21°C

Burner air minimum design flow: 2.83 m3/hr @ 21°C

Maximum leak rate each flow path*: 0.0283 m3/hr @ 21°C




Fuel: Methane


**The number of flow paths is the number of sets of safety shutoff valves proven closed that may leak into the furnaceenclosure.








Step 6. Determine the percent LFL resulting from the methane flow through all burner fuel paths at 482°C:

Step 7. Determine the time in minutes to reach 25 percent LFL with all burners off:

Conclusions. Where the value of % LFL 482°C exceeds 25 percent, the burner safety shutoff valves can remain closed andburners be reignited without a repurge within a period of time not exceeding t FCE 25% LFL. After t FCE 25% LFL is exceeded,a repurge of the furnace is required.

Where the value of % LFL 482°C equals or is less than 25 percent, burners can be reignited at any time as long as the airflowrate Q AIR is proven and interlocked in the combustion safety system such that loss of this proven airflow rate will require arepurge of the furnace before burner reignition is permitted.


This proposal fixes a discrepancy from adopting TIA86-11-4. The TIA changed the original A.8.5.1.8(4)(a) condition and replaced the “At least two safety shutoff valves are proved closed…” requirement with “The number of safety shutoff valves required to close in 8.8.1.2 and 8.8.1.3 will close…”. The Annex assumption condition of A.8.5.1.8(4)(d)(4) which refers to the original condition for “proved close” does not apply when TIA11-4 is incorporated. All use of “proven” for this annex example do not apply and should be deleted. NOTE TO EDITOR: the online software did not properly handle and show the deletion of the numbered list item (4) and renumber (5) to (4) and renumber (6) to (5).


Related Input RelationshipPublic Input No. 147-NFPA 86-2012 [Section No.8.5.1.8] If TIA 11-4 accepted, this should be incorporated into the annex.


Submitter Full Name: Dan CurryOrganization: Eclipse, Inc.

Submittal Date: Fri Jun 22 16:33:40 EDT 2012


I, Dan Curry, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) all and full rights in copyright in this Public Input (including both theProposed Change and the Statement of Problem and Substantiation). I understand and intend that I acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in any publicationof the NFPA in w hich this Public Input in this or another similar or derivative form is used. I hereby w arrant that I am the author of this Public Input and that I have fullpow er and authority to enter into this copyright assignment.

By checking this box I aff irm that I am Dan Curry, and I agree to be legally bound by the above Copyright Assignment and the terms and conditions contained



therein. I understand and intend that, by checking this box, I am creating an electronic signature that w ill, upon my submission of this form, have the same legal forceand effect as a handw ritten signature








(4) All safety shutoff valves are proven closed.

(5) All safety shutoff valves are tested for seat leakage at least semiannually.

(6) Safety shutoff valve seat leakage is assumed to be 1 scfh (0.0283 m3/hr @ 21°C).


Limited data reviewed by the committee indicates that valve seat leakage rates over 1 scfh (0.0283 m3/hr @ 21°C) are notanticipated unless the safety shutoff valve seats are exposed to extremely unusual conditions such as corrosives in the fuel gasor furnace heat allowed to back up the fuel line and burn the safety shutoff valve seat. The former condition is the basis forlimiting the use of 8.5.1.8(4) to furnaces using natural gas, butane, or propane fuel gases. The latter condition occurred in acase where a fuel line was inappropriately opened by maintenance staff while the furnace was in operation. The furnace waspromptly shut down, and the safety shutoff valves were replaced.












L 25= LFL at 25°C




Assumptions. Furnace contains no combustibles when the burners are turned off. Furnace is under positive pressure with no air



infiltration.


Furnace type: Batch











Fuel: Methane


**The number of flow paths is the number of sets of safety shutoff valves proven closed that may leak into the furnace enclosure.


Revise this part of the equation:

L 900F = L 482FC =















Furnace type: Batch











Fuel: Methane











Where the value of % LFL 482°C equals or is less than 25 percent, burners can be reignited at any time as long as the airflow



rate Q AIR is proven and interlocked in the combustion safety system such that loss of this proven airflow rate will require arepurge of the furnace before burner reignition is permitted.


The formula is below rather than above, and 482F should be 482C.







A.8.5.1.8(4)(d) In accordance with 8.5.1.8 (4)(c), fuels other than natural gas, butane, or propane may require additional consideration. Theseadditional considerations would be addressed using Section 1.5. The concern with other fuel gases is the variability of fuel gascontent being delivered over time. Specific examples include landfill gas and bio gas.

The following sample calculation illustrating the use of 8.5.1.8 (4)(d) is provided to demonstrate a method of determining the25% LFL requirement.





(4) All safety shutoff valves are proven proved closed, when required .




Limited data reviewed by the committee indicates that valve seat leakage rates over 1 scfh (0.0283 m3/hr @ 21°C) are notanticipated unless the safety shutoff valve seats are exposed to extremely unusual conditions such as corrosives in the fuel gasor furnace heat allowed to back up the fuel line and burn the safety shutoff valve seat. The former condition is the basis forlimiting the use of 8.5.1.8 (4) to furnaces using natural gas, butane, or propane fuel gases. The latter condition occurred in acase where a fuel line was inappropriately opened by maintenance staff while the furnace was in operation. The furnace waspromptly shut down, and the safety shutoff valves were replaced.














L 25= LFL at 25°C






Furnace type: Batch











Fuel: Methane


















Furnace type: Batch











Fuel: Methane















Note: This ProposaThe revised NFPA 86 (2011) paragraph 8.5.1.8 has introduced a new requirement that will require new or renovated bakery ovens to add a proof-of-closure switch to each safety shutoff valve. Bakery ovens can have up to 300 or more burners. As such, the change represents: 1) Installing a large number of proof-of-closure switches. 2) Expanded testing, inspection, and maintenance to cover all of the added switches. 3) Considerable wiring to connect all of these added switches. 4) Complex logic to monitor and process signals from all of the added switches.Emergency Nature: The revised NFPA 86 (2011) paragraph 8.5.1.8 contains an omission that was overlooked during the last revision cycle. Guidance specific to burners firing at rates less than or equal to 400,000 Btu/hr were not addressed in the revised text. In addition, the revised NFPA 86 (2011) paragraph 8.5.1.8 contains guidance that is in conflict with Section 8.8.2.2 as discussed further here. Consider the requirements of NFPA 86 as they would apply to an oven with the following characteristics: · Multiple burners · Each burner has a firing rate under 400,000 Btu/hr · Each burner has two safety shutoff valves · Each burner has a direct spark ignition with separate ignition electrode and separate flame sensing electrode. 1) NFPA 86 (2011) paragraph 8.8.2.2 would not require proof-of-closure on any of the safety shutoff valves. 2) NFPA 86 (2011) would not prohibit the shutdown of one or more burners (by closing the two burner safety shutoff valves) while maintaining other burners in service.Overall, if it is safe to operate this oven with any number of burners (fired under 400,000 Btu/hr) turned off by closing two safety shutoff valves, it should be equally safe to allow a restart of any or all burners without a repurge of the oven as long as the airflow rate needed to keep the oven atmosphere below 25% of LFL (based upon a valve seat leakage rate of 1 scfh) is maintain at all times that any burners are turned off. Overall, the basis of safety for the burners rated less than or equal to 400,000 Btu/hr is the use of two safety shutoff valves. The basis of safety does not expand to include proving valves closed until the burner rate exceeds 400,000 Btu/hr or a burner is taken out of service by closing one safety shutoff valve.l originates from Tentative Interim Amendment 86-11-4 (TIA 1011) issued by the Standards Council on March 1, 2011.


Submitter Full Name: PHILIP DOMENICUCCIOrganization: American Society of BakersSubmittal Date: Fri Sep 14 12:28:07 EDT 2012


I, PHILIP DOMENICUCCI, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) all and full rights in copyright in this Public Input(including both the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problem and Substantiation). I understand and intend that I acquire no rights, including rights as a jointauthor, in any publication of the NFPA in w hich this Public Input in this or another similar or derivative form is used. I hereby w arrant that I am the author of this PublicInput and that I have full pow er and authority to enter into this copyright assignment.

By checking this box I aff irm that I am PHILIP DOMENICUCCI, and I agree to be legally bound by the above Copyright Assignment and the terms and conditionscontained therein. I understand and intend that, by checking this box, I am creating an electronic signature that w ill, upon my submission of this form, have the samelegal force and effect as a handw ritten signature








(4) All safety shutoff valves are proven closed.




Limited data reviewed by the committee indicates that valve seat leakage rates over 1 scfh (0.0283 m3/hr @ 21°C) are notanticipated unless the safety shutoff valve seats are exposed to extremely unusual conditions such as corrosives in the fuel gasor furnace heat allowed to back up the fuel line and burn the safety shutoff valve seat. The former condition is the basis forlimiting the use of 8.5.1.8(4) to furnaces using natural gas, butane, or propane fuel gases. The latter condition occurred in acase where a fuel line was inappropriately opened by maintenance staff while the furnace was in operation. The furnace waspromptly shut down, and the safety shutoff valves were replaced.












L 25= LFL at 25°C






Furnace type: Batch













Fuel: Methane







Step 5. Determine the percent volume methane to air through all burners: formula with example flows is incorrect - should be: =(5 scfh / 500 scfh)(100%)









Furnace type: Batch













Fuel: Methane













The submitted change will correct the application of the formula presented in the Sample Problem - U.S. Customary Units of A.8.5.1.8(4)(d) Step 5.




Submitter Full Name: Joseph Kozma IIIOrganization: AFC-Holcroft LLCSubmittal Date: Thu May 10 10:55:11 EDT 2012


I, Joseph Kozma III, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) all and full rights in copyright in this Public Input (includingboth the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problem and Substantiation). I understand and intend that I acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in anypublication of the NFPA in w hich this Public Input in this or another similar or derivative form is used. I hereby w arrant that I am the author of this Public Input and that Ihave full pow er and authority to enter into this copyright assignment.

By checking this box I aff irm that I am Joseph Kozma III, and I agree to be legally bound by the above Copyright Assignment and the terms and conditions containedtherein. I understand and intend that, by checking this box, I am creating an electronic signature that w ill, upon my submission of this form, have the same legal forceand effect as a handw ritten signature


A.8.6.1Use of a rotational switch is an acceptable means of proving operation of a fan where the impeller is not located in a dedicated housing(non-ducted). A Hall Effect sensor is one example of a device that can be used to prove fan shaft rotation.

Regular inspection of the impeller may be required to ensure original performance is maintained (i.e. blades still attached, angles onblades correct, etc.).


See substantiation for Public Input #54 at Section 8.6.1.


Related Input RelationshipPublic Input No. 55-NFPA 86-2012 [Section No. 8.6.1] Asterisk added to indicated presence of new Annex content.Public Input No. 54-NFPA 86-2012 [Section No. 8.6.1 [Excluding anySub-Sections]]

Revision to required text that motivated the need for newAnnex content.









A.8.7.5 In industrial combustion applications with modulating flow control valves downstream of the combustion air blower, it is mostcommon to interlock the constant combustion air source pressure on single and multiburner systems to meet the requirementsof 8.7.3 and 8.7.5.

Because the combustion airflow is proved during each purge cycle along with the combustion air source pressure, the mostcommon convention is to prove the combustion air source pressure during burner operation following purge. In a multiburnersystem, the proof of combustion airflow during purge proves that any manual valves in the combustion air system are in anadequately open position. These manual air valves are provided for maintenance and combustion airflow balancing amongburners in a temperature control zone. In combustion air supply systems that use either an inlet damper or a speed control, thecombustion air pressure can fall below reliably repeatable levels with listed pressure switch interlocks at low fire. For thesesystems, the proof of minimum airflow can be a more reliable interlock.

A pressure switch on the inlet (suction) side of an Induced Draft (I.D.) fan can be used to prove that the minimum requiredsuction pressure is available.

For combustion systems that use high pressure gas/air to induce (inspirate) air locally at each burner, it is impractical tomonitor and prove the availability of combustion air.

For combustion systems that use Natural (stack) Draft to induce air into the burners or combustion chamber, it is impractical tomonitor and prove the availability of combustion air.


Adds clarifying content to the Annex to help users differentiate between sources of combustion air for which minimum flow or pressure can be proven and sources for which it cannot, practically speaking.









A.8.8.1.3 Paragraph 8.8.1.3 addresses conditions under which only one safety shutoff valve is to close to isolate a burner from its fuelgas supply. Figure A.8.8.1.3 provides a summary of 8.8.1.3 in the form of a decision tree. See 8.5.1. 7 and 8.5.1.8 forguidance regarding conditions that are needed to allow that burner to be placed back in service. The requirements of 8.5.1.8might not allow a burner shut off by closing a single safety shutoff valve to be placed back in service without repeating a pre-ignition purge.

The requirements of 8.8.1.3 do not preclude opening of the safety shutoff valve located upstream of the individual burners usingsingle safety shutoff valves during the trial for ignition for the first burner being lighted.

Figure A.8.8.1.3 Safety Shutoff Decision Tree.


8.5.1.7 is also a condition (repeating pre-purge) needed to allow a burner placed back into service. Both 8.5.1.7 and 8.5.1.8 work together and should be referenced together.





By checking this box I aff irm that I am Dan Curry, and I agree to be legally bound by the above Copyright Assignment and the terms and conditions containedtherein. I understand and intend that, by checking this box, I am creating an electronic signature that w ill, upon my submission of this form, have the same legal forceand effect as a handw ritten signature



Public Input No. 171-NFPA 86-2012 [ Section No. A.8.8.1.3(2) ]

A.8.8.1.3(2) See A.8.8 5 .1.3 8 (3) for a sample calculation to demonstrate a method of determining the 25 percent LFL requirement.


Incorrect section is referenced.






Public Input No. 90-NFPA 86-2012 [ Section No. A.8.8.1.3(2) ]

A.8.8.1.3(2) See A.8.8 5 .1.3 8 (3) for a sample calculation to demonstrate a method of determining the 25 percent LFL requirement.


The reference to A.8.8.1.3(3) does not exist. Section A.8.5.1.8(3) covers the case where the valve is wide open which is the subject of 8.8.1.3(2).





By checking this box I aff irm that I am Dan Curry, and I agree to be legally bound by the above Copyright Assignment and the terms and conditions containedtherein. I understand and intend that, by checking this box, I am creating an electronic signature that w ill, upon my submission of this form, have the same legal forceand effect as a handw ritten signature




A.8.8.2.2 An additional safety shutoff valve located to be common to the furnace system and proved closed and interlocked with the pre-ignitionpurge circuit can be used to meet the requirements of 8.8.2.2.


File Name Description Approveditem 5.a. old 3.d NFPA 86 proposal for A.8.8.2.2 final draft 3 tj120608.pdf Word version of figure A.8.8.2.2 item 5.a. old 3.d NFPA 86 proposal for A.8.8.2.2 final draft 3 tj120608.pdf PDF version of A.8.8.2.2


Modifies the drawing to be consistent with NFPA 86 (2011) symbols. Clarifies that 8.8.2.2 does not require more than one proved closed interlock for pre-purge in a multi-burner system.







A.8.8.3.2 An additional safety shutoff valve located to be common to the furnace system and proved closed and interlocked with the pre-ignition purge circuit can be used to meet the requirements of 8.8.2 3 .2.


8.8.2.2 deals with gas valves.






NFPA86-2011 draft 3 proposal for piping sketch for A.8.8.2.2 (with existing piping symbols tj06/08/12 – accepted 06/08/12)

Existing requirement:

A.8.8.2.2 An additional safety shutoff valve located to be common to the furnace system and proved

closed and interlocked with the pre-ignition purge circuit can be used to meet the requirements of 8.8.2.2.

Proposed language: Add new Figure:

To burner 1

To burner 2

To burner 3

To other burners

** Individual burner safety shutoff

valves

Leak test

valve Leak test

valves

Manual shutoff valves

*Common safety shutoff

valve

Figure A.8.8.2.2 Example for Multiple Burner System with independently operated burners using a Common SSOV with single Proved Closed Interlock for Pre-purge

* Indicates a Proof of Closure switch. A Valve Proving system may also be an option.

** Indicates Position Indication. Where the individual burner inputs are under 150,000 Btu/h, Position Indication is not required.

Note: Figure will be re-drawn to use symbols consistent with those used in NFPA 86-2011.

Substantiation:

Add clarification that 8.8.2.2 does not require more than one proved closed interlock for pre-purge in a

multi-burner system.

http://codesonline.nfpa.org/a/c.ref/2011_ID02008606510/sec



Public Input No. 158-NFPA 86-2012 [ Section No. A.8.9 ]

A.8.9 A system designer may choose to use pressure switches in a pilot. However. gas pressure switches on a pilot may bedesirable. Below are list of design factors. or any combination thereof. that may need to be considered in whether or notswitches should be used.

1. If it's a continuous pilot. If a reliable pilot after light off is still a desirable part of the safety during operation of the burner, theswitches help prove the reliability of the pilot so that the gas pressure to the pilot is proven to be within designed parameters.

2. If the pilot burner capacity is above 400,000 btu/hr. Direct sparking a burner in excess of 400,000 btu/hr could introduceadded risks jf a delayed ignition occurs due to too much or too little gas pressure.

3. If the inlet pressure to the pilot regulator exceeds 1/2 PSI. The higher the pressure to the pilot burner, the greater the risk ofa problem due incorrect gas pressure. The failure or overloading of a pilot regulator may be a significantly higher risk when inletpressures to the pilot regulator exceed 1/2 PSI.


The intent of this proposal is to provide some guidance on when high and low gas pressure switches for pilots are desirable.









A.8.11.2 Atomizing media balancing orifices and balancing valves that can be securely locked in position by means of pinning or othertamper-resistant means are allowed.


A.8.11.2 included a requirement which should be in the mandatory text. See related public comment that adds new requirement at 8.11.2.1.







A.8.17.8An auxiliary contact in the Excess Temperature Limit Interlock device can be used as a 1400F Bypass Interlock providing therequirements of 8.17.2 are satisfied.


Clarifies that the standard permits the 1400F Bypass Interlock function and the Excess Temperature Limit Interlock function may be incorporated into the same physical device.








Public Input No. 166-NFPA 86-2012 [ New Section after A.9.1 ]

Add new text to read as follows: A.9.1.3 Where fire protection is determined to be necessary, a documented study should be conducted to determine the correctresponse to a fire to achieve a safe shutdown of the oven and an effective response of the fire protection system. Automatic interlocksshould be provided where actions do not require operator evaluation. Specific actions will depend on the oven design, type of fireprotection system, the characteristics of the combustible material(s), the source(s) of combustibles, the ability to isolate combustiblesources, and the effects of fresh air. Items to be considered should include but not be limited to: • The means for detecting a fire • Type(s) of fire protection system(s) effective at controlling the fire • Manual vs. automatic operation of the fire protection system • Shutting down the fuel supply (heating system) where such action does not increase the fire hazard • Stopping the conveyor system vs. diverting or stopping entering product and running conveyor at high speed to empty oven • Shutting down fans and closing dampers to block fresh air entry and contain the fire suppression medium vs. maintaining fans inoperations and dampers open to ensure an explosive atmosphere does not develop


Existing requirements in Chapter 11 do not address what action should be taken in the event of a fire in an oven or furnace. While such actions are not "one-size-fits-all", where fire protection is needed it is important it be a coordinated system and, where manual actions are required, written procedures exist and operator training (addressed in Section 7.2) is done.


Submitter Full Name: Michael PolagyeOrganization: FM GlobalSubmittal Date: Mon Jul 02 12:45:00 EDT 2012


I, Michael Polagye, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) all and full rights in copyright in this Public Input (includingboth the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problem and Substantiation). I understand and intend that I acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in anypublication of the NFPA in w hich this Public Input in this or another similar or derivative form is used. I hereby w arrant that I am the author of this Public Input and that Ihave full pow er and authority to enter into this copyright assignment.

By checking this box I aff irm that I am Michael Polagye, and I agree to be legally bound by the above Copyright Assignment and the terms and conditions containedtherein. I understand and intend that, by checking this box, I am creating an electronic signature that w ill, upon my submission of this form, have the same legal forceand effect as a handw ritten signature




A.10.6.3.3When exhaust is recycled, it can reduce the oxygen content supplied to the incinerator (reducing efficiency). This in turn will result inincreased levels of flammable vapors being exhausted into the oven(s) for heat recovery purposes.

The system design should have inherent physical characteristics to ensure that the ratio of heat recovery gases is limited to preventunsafe conditions or use a combination of telemetry controls and interlocks to prevent this from occuring.


The new text for 10.6.3.3 requires explanatory text to assist the reader in understanding the purpose in providing "special precautions".


Related Input RelationshipPublic Input No. 124-NFPA 86-2012 [Section No.10.6.3.3] Annex material




I, Thomas George, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) all and full rights in copyright in this Public Input (includingboth the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problem and Substantiation). I understand and intend that I acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in anypublication of the NFPA in w hich this Public Input in this or another similar or derivative form is used. I hereby w arrant that I am the author of this Public Input and that Ihave full pow er and authority to enter into this copyright assignment.

By checking this box I aff irm that I am Thomas George, and I agree to be legally bound by the above Copyright Assignment and the terms and conditions containedtherein. I understand and intend that, by checking this box, I am creating an electronic signature that w ill, upon my submission of this form, have the same legal forceand effect as a handw ritten signature




A.11.6.1.10 Ovens using a single fan for both recirculation and exhaust are currently in use and manufactured. These dual-purpose faninstallations have a long history of fire and explosion incidents. Figure A.11.6.1.10 shows examples of unacceptable safetyventilation systems.Figure A.11.6.1.10 Unacceptable 10 Examples of Safety Venti lation Systems Using a Single Fan that can Result inShort-Circuited Airflows (Recirculation Combined w ith Spil l Exhaust).


Clarifies title of figure to identify the figure's content as "examples" and to inform readers that "short-circuited airflow" is the problem being addressed in the examples.


Related Input RelationshipPublic Input No. 78-NFPA 86-2012 [Section No.11.6.1.10] Annex modification that is related to proposed change in mandatory text









A.11.6.2.1See A.8.6.1.


Provides cross-reference to new annex material added at A.8.6.1 which may be instructive to users of Class A ovens.



Public Input No. 57-NFPA 86-2012 [Section No. 11.6.2.1] New Annex content added to be linked with new asterisk added at11.6.2.1

Public Input No. 56-NFPA 86-2012 [New Section afterA.8.5.2] Cross referenced section cited in Public Input #58 (A.11.6.2.1)









A.11.6.1.15 The vapors of most volatile solvents and thinners commonly used in finishing materials are heavier than air; consequently,bottom ventilation is of prime importance (see the tables in A.11.6.8.4). Liquefied petroleum gases are heavier than air, andother fuel gases are lighter than air. See NFPA 325, Guide to Fire Hazard Properties of Flammable Liquids, Gases, andVolatile Solids. (Note: Although NFPA 325 has been officially withdrawn from the National Fire Codes, the information is stillavailable in NFPA's Fire Protection Guide to Hazardous Materials.)

In areas outside the oven where volatiles are given off by material prior to entering the oven, adequate provisions should be madeto exhaust vapors to the atmosphere in accordance with applicable local, state, and federal regulations.

See Figure A.11.6.1.15.


File Name Description ApprovedExample 9 - new figure forA.11.6.1.15.png

New Figure A.11.6.1.15 - 86TC to consider if this is the right place for this figure or if other figures are preferred


New figure helps add clarity to flow arrangements that may introduce safety concerns related to poor ventilation.


Related Input RelationshipPublic Input No. 83-NFPA 86-2012 [Section No.A.11.6.1.10] One of several related public inputs addressing safety ventilation.








Public Input No. 39-NFPA 86-2012 [ New Section after A.13.5.7.4(B) ]

A13.5.7.4 (B)The indication of flow is intended to be provided by a device that w il l indicate flow any time a flow is occurring includingduring power outage. A mechanical device that indicates the flow rate w ithout using any source of power except thephysical flow of the inert purge gas meets this requirement. The uncertainty of a rel iable backup power supply, such asback-up batteries or an uninterruptible power supply, during a primary power interruption precludes the use of"electronic" monitoring of flow.


The rewording in the annex material emphasizes the requirement of monitoring emergency inert purge flow is to be by "mechanical" means, not "electronic" means.


Submitter Full Name: Fausta LyonsOrganization: Caterpillar IncAffi l l iation: NFPA 86 Class C Task GroupSubmittal Date: Wed May 02 15:00:57 EDT 2012





Content provided by Mark Stender (Surface Combustion) as part of the Class C Task Group.




A.13.5.8.12(A) This paragraph addresses excess flow in the equipment piping for an individual furnace. This would involve a device atthe special atmosphere control panel, such as an electronic sensor, along w ith logic to close an automatic shutoff valveupon detection of excess flow. This paragraph does not preclude operational high flow set points at thresholds below theshutoff excess flow set point. The operational high flow set points can be provided to initiate alarms that prompt operatorintervention to restore appropriate flow levels before the shutoff excess flow level is reached.


Relocated annex material with text.






Public Input No. 36-NFPA 86-2012 [ New Section after A.13.5.11.1(E) ]

A 13.5.11.1 (F)The use of plant air w ith reducing regulators is prohibited. Plant airl ines may become slugged w ith water passing intothe heated furnace resulting in abnormally high furnace pressures. Plant airl ines may experience regulator fai luresresulting in high-pressure air admission into furnace that contains a flammable atmosphere.


Plant airline failures result in unsafe operating conditions.







Content provided by Gary Keil (Caterpillar) Class C Task Group.



Public Input No. 76-NFPA 86-2012 [ New Section after A.13.5.11.1(E) ]

A.13.5.11.1(F)The use of plant air with reducing regulators is prohibited. Often plant airlines become slugged with water with the water passing intothe heated furnace resulting in abnormally high furnace pressures. Often plant airlines experience regulator failures resulting in highpressure air admission into furnaces that contain a flammable atmosphere.


Plant airline failures result in unsafe operating conditions.









A.13.5.11.10 See Figure A.13.5.11.10.Figure A.13.5.11.10 Examples of Special Atmosphere Equipment Piping.

(Insert New Figure)


File Name Description Approved86FCfA-13-5-11-10 REV. B.pdf Updated figure for A 13.5.11.10


Revising annex material to match the text that it supports.

Flow meters changed to flow switches.







Figure provided by Surface Combustion in Class C Task Group. (Mark Stender and Keith Hancock)

Public Input No. 35-NFPA 86-2012 [ New Section after A.13.5.11.10.4(C) ]

A13.5.11.10.8Atmosphere imingement on the temperature control thermocouple can result in overheating of the furnace or erroneouscontrol readings on the over temperature thermocouple.


Atmosphere impingement on the temperature control thermocouple can result in overheating of the furnace: impingement on the over temperature thermocouple can cause erroneous control readings.







Content provided by Gary Keil ( Caterpillar) Class C Task Group.

Public Input No. 72-NFPA 86-2012 [ Section No. A.13.5.11.11.11(A) ]

A.13.5.11.11.11(A) This paragraph addresses excess flow in the equipment piping for an individual furnace. This would involve a device at thespecial atmosphere control panel, such as an electronic sensor, along with logic to close an automatic shutoff valve upondetection of excess flow. This paragraph does not preclude operational high flow set points at thresholds below the shutoffexcess flow set point. The operational high flow set points can be provided to initiate alarms that prompt operator intervention torestore appropriate flow levels before the shutoff excess flow level is reached.


Relocated to A13.5.8.12.








Public Input No. 25-NFPA 86-2012 [ Section No. M.1.2.12 ]

M.1.2.12 UL Publications. Underwriters Laboratories Inc., 333 Pfingsten Road, Northbrook, IL 60062-2096.

Bulletin of Research No. 43, “The Lower Limit of Flammability and the Autogenous Ignition Temperature of Certain CommonSolvent Vapors Encountered in Ovens,” January 1950.

ANSI/UL 353, Standard for Limit Controls, 1994, revised 2001 2011 .

UL 429, Standard for Electrically Operated Valves for Gas Appliances, 2006.


Update referenced standard to most recent edition as indicated.


Submitter Full Name: John BenderOrganization: Underwriters Laboratories Inc.Submittal Date: Wed Apr 18 13:31:54 EDT 2012


I, John Bender, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) all and full rights in copyright in this Public Input (including boththe Proposed Change and the Statement of Problem and Substantiation). I understand and intend that I acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in anypublication of the NFPA in w hich this Public Input in this or another similar or derivative form is used. I hereby w arrant that I am the author of this Public Input and that Ihave full pow er and authority to enter into this copyright assignment.

By checking this box I aff irm that I am John Bender, and I agree to be legally bound by the above Copyright Assignment and the terms and conditions containedtherein. I understand and intend that, by checking this box, I am creating an electronic signature that w ill, upon my submission of this form, have the same legal forceand effect as a handw ritten signature