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Technological core competencies: reality or myth? Felicia Fai University of Bath, UK

Technological core competencies: reality or myth?dimetic.dime-eu.org/dimetic_files/lec_2007-1_Fai1.pdfCharacteristics of core competencies ... 3M Core competences: substrates, coatings,

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Technological core

competencies: reality or myth?

Felicia Fai

University of Bath, UK

Fai DIMETIC March 2007 2

Background

What are core competencies?

Why should we be interested in them?

Core competence idea, hot managerial

topic in 1990‟s (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990)

1980‟s period of corporate de-layering,

flattening. Trying to establish more

coherent, efficient corporations.

Fai DIMETIC March 2007 3

Get rid of slack/ „stick to the knitting‟: get out of those operations not within the corporations key business areas.

However, product lifecycles are short. Firms focusing efforts on key businesses threatened.

Focussing on core competences better. Use of competence in 1 area, does not reduce that available to other areas. Sustainable resource.

It enables a firm to be inventive, flexible, responsive to changing environmental conditions.

Shift in emphasis from products to competences.

Fai DIMETIC March 2007 4

Prahalad & Hamel define them as:

“…the collective learning in the

organization, especially how to coordinate

diverse production skills and integrate

multiple streams of technologies...it is also

about the organization of work and the

delivery of value” p.82

Fai DIMETIC March 2007 5

Competencies: the roots of competitiveness(Prahalad & Hamel, 1990)

Competence

1

Competence

2

Competence

3

Competence

4

Core Product 1 Core Product 2

Business

1

Business

2

Business

3

Business

4

1 2 10 11 1273 4 5 6 8 9

Fai DIMETIC March 2007 6

Characteristics of core competencies

Provides potential access to wide variety of

markets (i.e. end products)

Makes a significant contribution to the perceived

customer benefits of the end product

Is difficult for others to imitate

World-leading companies will generally possess

no more than 5-6 core competences.

Fai DIMETIC March 2007 7

Examples: 3M

Core competences: substrates, coatings,

adhesives

Markets: post-it notes, magnetic tape,

photographic film, pressure sensitive

tapes, coated abrasives

Fai DIMETIC March 2007 8

Example: Chrysler vs Honda

Honda invests in engine-related technologies. Developed in motorcycle engines first, diversified into automotives. Has ability to develop more fuel efficient, cleaner engines.

Chrysler outsources engines and power trains to other firms (Mitsubishi, Hyundai). Limited ability to diversify products, constrained in ability to pursue „greener‟ car designs of current market trend.

Fai DIMETIC March 2007 9

Technological competence

Prahalad & Hamel‟s discussion of core competence, wider than technology alone but its characteristics apply to technology well:Enables firms to enter wide variety of markets

Has significant contribution to perceived customer benefits (better functionality/ features/design, price)

Is difficult to imitate – incremental, path-dependent, cumulative firm specificity.

Fai DIMETIC March 2007 10

Definition of technological competence

Technological competence: ability to

create and use a particular field of

technology effectively, which is gained

through extensive experimentation and

learning in its research, development and

employment in production (Fai & von

Tunzelmann, 2001).

Fai DIMETIC March 2007 11

Tushman & Anderson (1986)

Technological changes can alter industrial

composition & intra-industry structure.

How, depends on nature of technological

change.

Technology: “tools, devices and

knowledge that mediate between inputs

and outputs (process technology) and/or

create new products or services (product

technology). (Rosenberg, 1972)” p. 440

Fai DIMETIC March 2007 12

Technological progress generallyevolutionary & incremental. Enhance and extend existing technology. Reinforces status quo.

However, it is occasionally punctuated by more radical breakthroughs period of discontinuous change, establish new product class or substitutes for a pre-existing one.

Fai DIMETIC March 2007 13

US firms

Identify 3 product classes cement, minicomputers and domestic passenger airline transport.

Despite differences in product classes (low/hi tech, manufacturing services, relative age etc.) strong consistency in findings (although small numbers of cases in sample precludes conclusiveness of results).

Fai DIMETIC March 2007 14

Competence destroying discontinuities

Mastery of new technology fundamentally alters

set of relevant competences in a product class.

Product discontinuity – new product class or

substitute for existing one: steam engines to

diesel

Process discontinuity – entirely new way of

making established product: float glass

Requires different skills & knowledge.

Changes distribution of power and control

among firms and industries.

Fai DIMETIC March 2007 15

Competence destroying discontinuities

Undermine existing industrial structures

Establish new industry, with new firms

Industrial „ferment‟

Shake-out

Remaining firms centre around established dominant design

Begin more incremental innovation and technological progress

Are rare – 8 instances in 190 years (total of years observed in all 3 industries)

Fai DIMETIC March 2007 16

Competence enhancing discontinuities

Order of magnitude improvement in

price/performance built on existing

knowledge in a product class.

Substitute for older technologies but not

the associated underlying skills.

Products e.g. jets fan jets

Process e.g. Computer-assisted design for

architecture

Fai DIMETIC March 2007 17

Competence enhancing discontinuities

New possibilities opened to established

firms

Extends their realm of possibilities

Re-enforces the position of incumbents

Difficult for new firms to enter market

Fai DIMETIC March 2007 18

Problem:

Some literature tells us that it is in firm‟s interests to focus on core technological competences (P&H)

Yet, the environment is changeable and ex-ante a firm never knows if a technological breakthrough is incremental/ radical. (T&A)

Firm doesn‟t know ex-ante whether it will benefit (competence-enhancing discontinuity) or suffer (competence-destroying discontinuity). (T&A)

=>To focus on a small number of core technological competences (P&H) can be high-risk.

Fai DIMETIC March 2007 19

What does empirical evidence tell us?

A number of firms date back to 19th

century.

Witnesses to several “discontinuities”,

some of which are more „radical‟/

disruptive yet they survive. Why?

What‟s going on in these firms?

Fai DIMETIC March 2007 20

Cantwell & Fai, 1999

Using patent stocks for 1930-1990 find evidence that among 30+ firms with longevity, there is persistence in their corporate technological profiles across 56 technological fields.

Same portfolio of competences held for at least 60 years in many cases

True across firms in 4 different, broadly defined industrial groups: Chemicals, Electrical/Electronics, Mechanical, Transport.

NB, ONLY true if there is institutional continuity i.e. mergers, acquisition divestments etc do not act to fundamentally shift the firm across industrial boundaries.

Fai DIMETIC March 2007 21

Also found that whilst persistence in corporate portfolios is strong, evidence that they are evolving.

Evolution is generally in the direction of diversifying their technological interests over time, not concentrating them/ maintaining them.

Moreover, evidence of diversification in 1930-60 is stronger than in 1960-90, not a recent „fashion‟.

Fai DIMETIC March 2007 22

Evidence of technological diversification questions notion of „core‟ technological competence, i.e. does not appear to be in just 5/6 key technologies, but more than this (P&H, 1990)

Evidence of longevity and survival in corporations questions the notion of competence-destroying discontinuities (T&A, 1986)

So…

Fai DIMETIC March 2007 23

Cantwell & Fai, 1999 In Tushman & Anderson, the source of technological

breakthrough is not really considered.

They acknowledge

Chance events driven by technological genius (accidents on inventors or scientists) exogenous shocks

Historical necessity

A result of economic demand (Schmookler‟s demand-pull)

But put technological evolution down to a “response to the interplay of history, individuals and market demand.” p.440. Seems very exogenous/ individualist.

Technological evolution however, surely has more systemic & endogenous features as well?

We believe, THE FIRM is the principle source of innovation and growth. Adopt a competence-based perspective.

Fai DIMETIC March 2007 24

Demand side (market pull):

Classical approach:

new markets firm growth capital

accumulation, which via division of

labour specialisation learning

better skills inventiveness

CAPITAL ACCUMLATIONTECHNOLOGICAL ACCUMULATION

Fai DIMETIC March 2007 25

Supply side (science/technology push)

In 19th century, science mechanisation

innovation improved productivity in

established products

Fai DIMETIC March 2007 26

Put the emphasis on the firm

Increasingly in 19th century, organisational routines & team learning Collective build up of tacit capability better skilled workers new capital revenues, rising wages & incomes

TECHNOLOGICAL ACCUMULATION CAPITAL ACCUMLATION

Scientific advance requires transformation in production systems to have an impact. This requires locally-specific knowledge e.g. as embedded in corporate capabilities of large companies which in turn, are largely nation-specific

Production systems based on national- & firm-specific competences

Fai DIMETIC March 2007 27

Combining perspectives & shifting

emphasis on the sources of innovation

Science

Base

Corporate

R&D

Learning in

production

Complementary

assets/

distribution

networks

Markets

Fai DIMETIC March 2007 28

Firms as the source of innovation &

growth Production is not just technology-dependent, but is also

technology-producing

Need specialised technological competence to produce goods & services, but by learning in production, they generate FIRM-SPECIFIC competences

Firm-specific learning in production via cumulative and incremental problem-solving can Technological innovation

This may be within the firm but also takes place on organisational boundaries i.e. between firms (competition and cooperation), institutions, universities etc. Upstream & Downstream entities.

Fai DIMETIC March 2007 29

distinct corporate technological

specialisation patterns over time.

Leads to increases in productivity, firm &

economic growth.

Competence has the potential to generate

longevity of the firm unlike products/

processes (agree with P&H, 1990).

Fai DIMETIC March 2007 30

Corporate learning is incremental, path dependent; provide basis for institutional stability & continuity in evolution even what markets & products change.

Corporation becomes a repository of competence and a device for learning and accumulating further competences.

They are able to synthesise new emergent fields with their established technologies.

Firms have to consider their current competences, the fields in which they are learning and how this interaction new/ improved competences

Fai DIMETIC March 2007 31

So firms have to organise the learning process

that leads to innovation. They coordinate the

dual stimuli of science-push and demand-pull

factors but do so conscious of what the firm

itself already knows.

Innovative learning, at the firm level, gathers a

cumulative and incremental logic of its own.

Firm interacts with its environment, it is not

driven by it.

Fai DIMETIC March 2007 32

Technological change may disrupt the external

spheres dramatically – new scientific areas,

potential new product classes and markets, but

beneath this, lies the steadier learning process

of firms.

Does not mean competence in firms does not

evolve, it can and does, firms will diversify their

technological activities, generate new

competences but its technological origins will

remain obvious for a long time in subsequent

trajectories (with institutional continuity).

Fai DIMETIC March 2007 33

So firms have a wider set of technological

competences than P&H suggest,

But these competences do enable firms to be

flexible and ride-out the more destructive

changes in products and markets

By managing broad portfolios of technological

competences, they can mitigate the threat of

competence-destroying discontinuities which

would be disastrous if firms only focussed on 5/6

“core” technological competences.

Fai DIMETIC March 2007 34

Corporate technological diversification

and industry level considerations

Firms portfolio of technological

competences persistent, but evolving

towards greater diversity

What are the areas they are diversifying

into?

Are these industrially bound or cross-

industry?

Fai DIMETIC March 2007 35

Fai & von Tunzelmann (2001)

Industries identified by the types of products they make.

Products/ processes tend to be technologically complex ie. draw upon multiple technologies

Some technologies are strongly associated with particular industries e.g. Distillation processes, a technology associated with the Chemical industry (path-dependency view)

But with increasingly complex products and processes, does this imply a blurring of the technological boundaries between industries/convergence? (long-waves view –some technological paradigms pervade across several industries over time)

Fai DIMETIC March 2007 36

Dreggs

Notion of „core‟ technology is not clear.

a) that which one might most closely associate

with a particular industry e.g. distillation

processes may be core to chemical-related

industries.

b)that which is lies at the heart of a firms‟

competitiveness

Fai DIMETIC March 2007 37

Problem

For all firms in a particular industry, we would expect to see the same „core‟ technologies (definition a) present e.g. we‟d expect distillation processes to be present as a technology in all chemical firms.

Does not mean the technology distinguishes one chemical firm from another in a competitive market – it may be a necessary technology to have to operate in a particular industry, but not sufficient to yield firm-specific competitive advantage.