Technological Revolution and Its Moral and Political Consequences

7/28/2019 Technological Revolution and Its Moral and Political Consequences

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dcmption of humanity remains equally contemporary with what51. Paul calls the "mystery of iniquity". The historical progressof man in search of his essence, to the contrary, points in thedirection of an eternal humanity happily fulfilled, and to whatis the very negation of this. In this regard, humanity, yesterdayas today, is prey to this risk of going against its humanity. Inits ultimate form this is the risk of freedom, of the free will con-fronted even with the choice of accepting or rejecting grace, ofconsenting to the universe of the children of God or of search-ing, without God or against him, for some other humanity anda universe that is its reflection.

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The Technological Revolution andIts Moral and Political Consequences

IWHAT Is MEANT BY TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION?

The first problem lies in the precise meaning of the word"revolution". Contemporary books, articles and conferences onproblems of technology and of the technological world use theword incessantly, designating by it a wide variety of phenomena.It can mean, for example, an acceleration in the developmentof technological processes or of the opening up of the areas inwhich these could be applied; the word might also be used toindicate the basic fluidity of a particular situation that can leadas readily to the dissolution of structures as to their renewal;finally, it can mean an alteration in social and political struc-tures.

Whereas these different situations might well be the symptomsof a revolution, they are not yet in themselves revolutions assuch, for some phenomena can go through a calm and naturalbirth that does not need the prior impetus of a drive for freedomand justice to precipitate the process. There are other phenomenathat have perfectly rational links with one another and are there-fore to some extent foreseeable; they do not depend for theirevolution on an invasion of history by irrational forces.

Furthermore I would say that as far as the phenomenon oftechnology is concerned, there exists neither that which Marxists

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Ellul, Jacques. "The Technological Revolution and its Moral

and Political Consequences." In The Evolving World and Theology,

edited by Johannes Metz, 97-107. New York: Paulist Press, 1967.


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call an objective revolutionary situation nor what the liberalmind refers to as a revolution.

The truth is that we have here a term whose meaning hasbeen so distorted by passions and prejudices that it has beenrendered unserviceable in a scientific discussion. For the purposesof this article it seems to me that one can at best speak of anaccelerated evolution of technological progress.

nTH E POSSffiILITIES OF TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCE

Let it be said immediately that such possibilities are unlimited.There is almost nothing that man cannot make with the help oftechnology. It is a process that knows of no foreseeable end towhat is apparently an unlimited ability to construct every artifactof which man is able to conceive. Its nature knows of no checkto its developmental potential. Itis at the mercy only of externalfactors such as economic conditions, or the impossibility of producing the materials it needs, or the failure of scientific researchto keep pace with technology's appetite. As technological growthrequires the application of rational thought, the technologist isalways able to see what lies around the corner. Because technological advance is a process of causality, not finality (the developmental impulse lies in the organized manipulation of elements whose availability is foreseen and not in the achievementof a particular goal), one is the better able to know and estimatewhat will be possible, or already in operation, in the year 2,000or 2,100.

To state this is to note an important characteristic of technological development. The scientist or technologist does his jobby using known and available elements, not by feeding exclusively on visions of the future. Whereas prophesying aboutsome distant goal is a risky business, prophesying on the outcome of coordinating actual concrete factors is a good dealsafer. There are available, therefore, a considerable number of

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reports from scientists describing for us probable technologicaldevelopments that will take place within the next twenty, thirtyor fifty years.1

In contrast, it is extremely difficult to predict the consequences of technological growth for political events and processes, for society as a whole, for the individual and, to a lesserextent, in the economic sphere, because technological growthalters all the traditional life circumstances and so makes its consequences more problematic. Further development in all thesespheres depends upon technological advances in contrast towhich any other impetus can be granted only subsidiary significance.

The difficulty of making predictions about the consequencesof technology in the sphere of politics, economics and sociologyseems to me to have two causes. First, it is because we mustmake two types of prediction. One will be about the technological development itself and the other will be about its effects.Given that technological growth unfolds itself causally, a prediction is made on the basis of a grouping of data, each individualitem of which can be isolated and grasped with relative ease.But in the political, economic and social spheres, where a wholeseries of value judgments, hopes, plans and precedents have tobe considered, no such situation obtains. Development in thesefields is, therefore, never simply the result of introducing technology to a political or social situation, but the result of ideologies and technology acting upon one another. These developments, then, are never the result of an agglomeration ofshoit-term advances, but one must rather, in general, discern along-term development. The conclusion-that long-term predictions are more problematic than short-term ones-is obviousenough.

(\ The other difficulty springs from what one might call theambivalence of technological progress, which in my view isi Cf., for example, the Rand Corporation's 1965 report and the reportfrom the U.S.S.R. by Coutchev and Vassiliev on forecasting technologicaldevelopment (1964).


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neither exclusively positive Dor totally negative. Its absoluteambivalenge consists not in the fact that its fruits can be turnedto good or evil according to our judgment and discretion, butin the existence within itself of good and bad elements.It would not be difficult to show that every technological advance, while it solves a few of our problems, also gives rise toothers, usually different in type, which are most unlikely to beany more easy of solution than the first lot. It could also beshown that all technological progress brings with it some totallyunforeseen and unintentional results that, after an interval haselapsed, burden us with further problems.

How does the Christian stand with regard to this problemof the scope of technological progress? One can safely say thatthere can be no such thing as a Christian influence on techI'ology itsdf. Further development in technology is simply a partof technology's nature. Arguing about a fact such as that wouldbe a waste of time. We should take good care not to start applying immaterial moral value judgments to technological growth.To t h ~ t it is good or bad would be as senseless as to sayof a flowing river that its motion is good or bad. When all issaid and done, we have just one factual situation to grasp: tech.nology i n c ~ e a s e s and it is up to us to steer it, alter it or frustrate it., The first question we must ask ourselves, therefore, is howwe pursue life in our new technological environment. The queslion needs subdividing. What are the probable transformationsof social, political find economic life one can most readily pre4ict through one's knowledge of technology? And the secondpart of the question is: Which of these changes can be to someextent controlled? Ready answers are not there for the asking.

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THE TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 101

II IPREDICTABLE AND DESIRABLE EcoNo),nc AND SOCIAl.

CHANGES IN THE HUMAN ENVlR.oNM.NT

Taking first things first: What is predictable? We are alwaystempted to search for long-term plans. For instance, we aretempted to make statements such as: When automation hasreached its point of highest development, we shall possess moregoods than we can use, shall no longer need to work, and so on.Such specuhitions were better avoided.It seems to me that no trUly scientific predictions can be made

about what could happen when automation has developed toits fullest extent; it is simply impossible to estimate what alterations to life as we now know it might then occur.In this respect there seem to be two lines we could pursue.The first of these is short-term prognostication. As Christians

this concerns us directly. The questions we ~ h o u l d ask are: Whatform will the transformation take? How will the change from anon-technological to a technological society complete itself? Inwhat way will the change from a society l a c k i n ~ the fully extended resources and applications of automated processes toone possessing these to the full come about?

This, it seems to me, is a Christian concern, for here we arenot speculating about an ideology or about preparations for distant eventualities, but about the life situation of contemporaryman. It is a question, therefore, of asking what setbacks wemight encounter. Automation breeds them readily and the im-mediate future holds n u ~ e r o U ; & Qpes: appalling unemploymentproblems; industrial delays caused Py disparity in delivery intervals (not all industrial processes or sectors of industry areequally open to the introduction of automation); the psychological problems of machine-minders predicted by many psycho-sociologists, wage calculations &Dd settlements in a semiautomated economy.

These are but a handful of weightier problems. Althoughit might be contended that I aIlJ c i t i H ~ i ~ o l a t cases, the accu

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sation would not be wholly just. There are 5,000,000 unemployed in the United States alone. These are the problems weought to be solving rather than worrying ourselves unduly aboutv/hat life will be like in 2,000 A.D.

Our second ILJe of enquiry, having first evaluated short-termpredictions, would be to consider how we wish the long-termfuture to look. What we can foresee is not necessarily what wewant. In fact they usually stand in direct contrast to one another.In other words, when we see before us a desirable future, thisis only because the future is in fact unforeseeable. For Christiansto attempt to establish what is desirable, to build up a pictureof what can or could be, is a proper and important activity.Nothing is more disappointing than the sight of Christiansswallowing theories about society's future without themselvescontributing anything specific to such theories. I f as Christianswe propose as the long-term ideal no more than democracy, ornational independence, or a society that knows no poverty, wemight just as well keep quiet, for we are contributing nothing.

To me it seems more important to proceed to a critical studyof what is desirable in relation to what we can predict about thetechnological potential of the near future. Having formulatedthe desired developments, we would have to examine them critically to ensure that we were not striving after utopian dreams orgoals that short-term technological developments would frustrate.

Notice that I do not say goals that technology pursues. Takedemocracy as an example of what I mean. It seems to me mostimportant to ask if a fully developed technological society wouldnot make democratic processes much more complicated thanthey already are, and that a fully extended technology wouldin any event imply a total transformation of the structures andforms which are nom1ally said to constitute democracy.

. In other words, we ought to proceed to critical analysis, andin this field Christians can playa decisive role in society, looking to the long term b4t ensuring that our vision is not out of

. Q H c h with the predictable consequences of short-term tech

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TIre TECHNOLOGJCAL REVOLUTION 103

nological developments. We shall then be in a position to contribute a revolutionary development to the developmental processof contemporary society.

From what has been said about the problems posed by atechnological society, it should now be clear, provided that Ihave said it adequately, that long-term thinking is by and largenecessary, that this must include a calculation of the consequences of technological developments in the short tenn, andthat we must try to see how one proceeds from short-termpredictions to a long-term concept.

You will no doubt be thinking by now that the problem ismerely an abstract one and that the French still have nothing better to do than split hairs. However, I take the view that the situation in which we find ourselves calls first of all for the clearrecognition of what is at stake and an exact understanding of it.Lack of clarity is unacceptable because in the circumstances itis inexcusable. At present we are obliged to compromise between what we know and what we want. When our world wasbut a world in which nature was rampant and over which wetherefore exercised no control, where traditional values and proced!lres were hardly questioned, we adapted ourselves to it moreor less spontaneously and instinctively. Formerly man was himself little more than a part of nature; his attempt to distancehimself from it, to control it, led to his becoming truly man.

But nowadays no instinct or spontaneity helps us to live inour technological world. Far from being able to make anyspontaneous adjustments, we have to do so through will power,knowledge and organization. And to the extent that we appreciate our obligations in this respect, we acquire the means to makethe necessary adjustments. Necessity and potential go hand inhand. It is possible and necessary for oc r consciousness of tllesituation created by technology to increase. The object is notthat the individual should feel that his own private knowledge,and therefore his control, is increasing, but that the group orsociety in which he lives should be aware of such increase. Generally speaking, society is now more ready to reason with itself,


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' ~ ~ . lQ4 JACQUES ELLUL 11IE TEalNOLOOlCAL kEVOLUTION 105lto reflect upon itself. Both the individual and the class towhich he belongs have become more conscious of their situation, their limitations, hopes,. needs and responsibilities.Increased consciousness, however, does not automaticallyproduce fruits that are necessarily applicable to our actual situation. We are quite capable of interpreting all the factors underdiscussion incorrectly. Consequently, a clear view of reality inevelY life situation is our primary objective, for without it weshall achieve nothing. Realism should be one of the characteristics of Christian thinking.. An increase in consciousness does not necessarily mean anincrease in the ease and ability with which we adapt ourselvesto our technological world. We are, and shall continue to be,perpetually aware of our lack of adaptability, but an increasein our awareness does presuppose a will to succeed in what weundertake. Decisiveness in this respect is vital and much moredifficult to achieve than the following of instinct, for we shallbe in the position of having to bring judgment and decision tobear in countless different situations.We must also remember that every phenomenon in the fieldof instinct has now become to some extent a moral or ethicalphenomenon. In the world of technology the apparent area of

.decision ~ d the need for awareness has led to the emergenceof an apparent ethical alternative for every question. And onthese two planes, that of what is wanted and what ethically mustbe chosen, Christians would appear to have their proper function, provided they do not view the matter in question solelyfrom the $tandpoint of the society in which they live.

IVDIFFICULTIES AND DUTIES

At this. stage of our investigation we encounter certain diffi-C;l,1ltit:s of ~ intellectual and ideological nature. I shall outline at9wPf t h ~ p 1 in brief.

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~ t . , . , ...>j,' ", First of all, we are inclined to reject traditional ethics andh ~ ~ ' for that matter almost everything else history has handed downto us. I t has frequently been maintained that what really hindersus from coming to temls with the technological advances of ourage is our relationship with the past. There is a tendency todestroy everything connected with it. Such prejudices are extremely dangerous, for, faced with the precarious adventuremodem life has become, and acknowledging the enormousstore of information man is offered in a technological world,the attempt to abolish his intellectual, ideological and ethicalnorms could result in an ever more deleterious rupture of hispersonality. unless one simultaneously furnishes him with a newthought system, a new ideology and a new ethic that lle is readyto accept, that permit him to survive and that enable him tocoordinate all the knowledge that comes to him.Everyone has minimum requirements as regards his view oflife without which he will be unable to collect and collate theinfoIlJlation ~ v a i 1 a b l e to him. He needs reality-related life concepts Which, nevertheless, sufficiently differentiate themselvesfrom reality to guarantee his distinctiveness in relation to technological realities, and at the same time maintain and perpetually renew the distinctiveness that differentiated him from thenatural reality that was his previous environment.I have already said that for the man whose liie was little morethan a part of wild nature, his environment was at once anintimate part of him anef yet different from him. He had adaptedhimself to it and so attempted to alter his environment in orderto adapt it to himself. This was what his brain was for. Facedwith a new environment, it is our job to reenact the originaladventure in precise detail. To do this man needs a weIl-anchored thought system (that science will not provide) whichwill enable him both to adapt himself to the world he findsand to preserve a certain distance from it.

In this respect it seems to me that it is the function of theChurch and of Christian thought to strive on mankind's behalfnot simply to facilitate the adaptation process, but to provide, as


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points of contact, starting points, the well-grounded generalconcepts so badly needed-and by concepts I do not mean antiquated reactionary opinions. The Church should give this matterfurther thought.

But this is another area in which considerable difficulty a ..ises.This exists less in our obligation to change our ideas and concepts than it does in our duty to refashion our method of interpreting facts and events. Mankind, and that includes Christians,has traditionally judged from action, via its bearing, to intention. In reality, this method of assessing intention has been absolutely debased by the phenomenon of technology. It is simplyinadequate to select an action and give it Christian motives.

I f the basis of the foregoing analysis of the growth of consciousness-the recognition of choice and the problem of therelationship of the short to the long term-is correct, thenjudgments of events and actions according to their intention areno longer appropriate. The criterion should be their foreseeableconsequences, and within the limits I mentioned one shouldmake every effort to foresee them.

Some consequences will look dangerous, but these, too,should be clearly displayed. Others will appear to be as newas they are unacceptable, and yet others might conjure up visions of the extreme insecurity of our future. But the more dangerous and disquieting these consequences appear to be, themore they represent a challenge, in the sense that it is then upto man to master them. The larger the area of the unforeseenbecomes, the more it is mankind's job to try mightily to reduce

'." it. I t is clear, then, that the extent of the unknown and the dis--:::::=.quieting in what we can foresee is precisely the condition fortrue progress, insofar as such is at all possible in any partiCUlarcase.

It would seem the one fundamental evil in contemporarysocial ,ethics is that by contending that all is well and will remain

.i ' so, that technological progress is in itself a good thing, that'technological development cap. be equated with ethical and

s p i r i t q . ~ growth, man is given a false sense of security. The lack

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of tension this type of euphoric state induces can be utterly debilitating, killing any likelihood that man will come to gripswith his real s.ituation.

I f things really were as this view would have it, what reasonwouid there be to look any further than the end of one's nose.Just give things their head and rest in the knowledge tllat "we'venever had it so good". In fact, of course, to summon a man toassume full responsibility means to highlight the underlying ambiguity of the situation technology brings with it. Though Iwould certainly never wish to maintain that technology was tobe deplored, I would insist t h ~ t of itself it cunstitutes not progress but the opportunity for progress.

There is evidently a lot of thinking still to be done, a lot ofresearch to get on with. This is not simply an area in whichChristians can contribute, but one in which they are duty-boundto take the lead. This they will do with a thoroughness, anastuteness and a feeling for reality that human nature can command only through the guidance ()f the Spirit.

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Technological Revolution and Its Moral and Political Consequences