Heidegger and the Properties of Being

Joshua Tepley | jtepley@nd.edu

University of Notre Dame

Draft (12/12/2011) | DO NOT QUOTE

***

Abstract: It is well known that the early Heidegger distinguishes between

different kinds of being, most notably between the kind of being possessed by

human beings and the kinds he calls “presence-at-hand” and “readiness-to-hand.”

Nevertheless, there has been very little discussion in the literature about what

exactly these kinds of being are. In this paper I provide an answer to this

question: I argue that the various “thick” kinds of being countenanced by the

early Heidegger are properties of the entities which have these kinds of being.

One exciting consequence of this position is that it creates a new opportunity for

dialogue between Heideggerians and analytic philosophers. If what Heidegger

refers to as “kinds of being” just are properties, then analytic philosophers should

have no trouble understanding a large part of what the early Heidegger is doing,

namely offering a novel account of which properties different kinds of entities—

especially human beings—have.

1. Introduction

The primary goal of Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time is to reopen the question of the

meaning of “being,” or what it means to say of something that it is or exists. One piece of his

answer to this question is that vastly different kinds of entities are or exist in different ways.1 In

his terms, vastly different kinds of entities have different kinds of being (Seinsarten).2 Most

importantly, human beings—the kind of entity Heidegger refers to as “Dasein”—have their own

distinctive kind of being, which is sharply distinguished from the kinds of being possessed by

1 Heidegger never provides a complete answer to this question: Being and Time is roughly the first third of a

much larger planned but unfinished project.

2 Because the word “being” is a mass noun, we cannot give it a plural form when we wish to refer distributively

to, for example, the being of two entities which are such that the being of one is of a different kind than the being of

the other. Heidegger uses the expression “kinds of being” to play this role, and I shall follow suit in this paper. In

other words, the expression “kinds of being” shall be used to refer, not to kinds of being, but to being of more than

one kind.

Tepley | 2

other kinds of entities (e.g., artifacts, animals, and abstracta). The bulk of Being and Time

consists of phenomenological descriptions of the various “structures” that make up this particular

kind of being.

Commentaries on Being and Time generally focus on explicating these descriptions, the

latter of which are frequently accused of being opaque. By contrast, relatively little attention has

been paid, either in these commentaries or in Heidegger scholarship more generally, to what

exactly these “structures” are, let alone the “kinds of being” of which they are structures. In this

paper I provide answers to these questions. More specifically, I argue that kinds of being and

their structures are properties of the entities which have these kinds of being.

One exciting consequence of this position is that it provides a new opportunity for

dialogue between Heideggerians and analytic philosophers. While many analytic philosophers

balk at talk of being (and all the more at different “kinds” and “structures” of it), they are

perfectly comfortable with talk about properties.3 If what Heidegger refers to as “kinds” and

“structures” of being just are properties, then this incredulity can be avoided, for on this view

Heidegger’s theory of being is (partly) just a novel account of which properties are had by

different kinds of entities—especially human beings.4 Once analytic philosophers are clear on

which properties Heidegger is talking about, there can be constructive engagement between them

and Heideggerians over whether or not entities really have these properties.

3 This is true even of analytic philosophers who are nominalists. Such philosophers are more likely to find talk

about “properties” intelligible than they are talk about “being,” even if they think that the former is ultimately false

or misleading.

4 Of course Heideggerians will insist that this account also concerns the being of these entities. Whether or not

this is true is an entirely separate issue. One can imagine some analytic philosophers agreeing with Heideggerians

that entities do indeed have the properties Heidegger ascribes to them while disagreeing that these properties have

anything to do with the “being” of these entities. A position of this sort is suggested (though not endorsed) by Peter

van Inwagen (see his “Being, Existence, and Ontological Commitment,” p. 475 fn. 4 and Ontology, Identity, and

Modality: Essays in Metaphysics, p. 4; cf. van Inwagen’s Metaphysics, pp. 287-289 and “Meta-ontology,” pp. 234-

235).

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The body of this paper is divided into four parts. In the first part (§2) I provide some

essential background about kinds of being and their structures which is necessary in order to

understand the arguments that follow. In the second part (§3) I argue that Dasein’s kind of being

is best understood as what I shall call a “complex property” of Dasein. In the third part (§4) I

argue that “thick” kinds of being other than Dasein’s (e.g., presence-at-hand and readiness-to-

hand) are also properties (though not necessarily complex properties) of the entities which have

these kinds of being. In the fourth part (§5) I consider and rebut four objections to these claims.

2. Kinds and Structures of Being

2.1 Kinds of Being

According to the early Heidegger, vastly different kinds of entities have different kinds of

being (Seinsarten). These kinds of being include, at the very least, care (Sorge),5 readiness-to-

hand (Zuhandenheit), and presence-at-hand (Vorhandenheit). While there is some debate over

which kinds of entities have these different kinds of being, a typical view is that care is possessed

by human beings (the kind of entity Heidegger refers to as “Dasein”), readiness-to-hand by

artifacts (e.g., tools, das Zeug), and presence-at-hand by concreta.6 There is evidence in Being

and Time and the contemporaneous lectures (e.g., The Basic Problems of Phenomenology) that

Heidegger countenanced other kinds of being in addition to these three, including life (Leben),

the kind of being possessed by living things;7 subsistence (Bestehen), the kind of being possessed

5 It is important to note that the word “care” (Sorge) means something very particular for Heidegger. It should

not be confused with the “care” of ordinary language. Also, some Heidegger scholars will prefer to say “existence”

(Existenz) rather than “care.” This terminological issue is irrelevant to what follows.

6 Given the extensions of these kinds of being, one naturally wonders whether the very same entity can have

more than one of these kinds of being. Unfortunately, there is not enough space to take up this very interesting issue

here.

7 See Sein und Zeit (hereafter “SZ”), pp. 46, 50, and 241.

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by abstracta (e.g., numbers);8 a “thin” or generic kind of being (Seiendheit, beingness) possessed

by everything, regardless of whichever other “thick” kind (or kinds) of being it also possesses;9

and a “super-thick” kind of being (Sein überhaupt, being as such), the explication of which is the

ultimate goal of the unfinished project of which Being and Time is but the first part.10

(See Table

1 for a side-by-side comparison of these various kinds of being.) In light of this variety, it is

important to note at the outset that the thesis of this paper, that kinds and structures of being are

properties, is limited to thick kinds of being (e.g., care, readiness-to-hand, and presence-at-hand)

and their structures. I make no claim about whether the thin or super-thick kinds of being (i.e.,

beingness and being as such) should also be understood in this way.

Table 1

2.2 Structures of Being

The early Heidegger claims that different thick kinds of being have different “structures,”

which he calls “structures of being” (Seinsstrukturen). He divides these structures into two

kinds: existentials (Existenzialien) and categories (Kategorien).11

“Existentials” is his name for

8 See SZ 153 and 333; and Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (hereafter “GP”), pp. 37.

9 See GP 18 and 37. Heidegger uses the word “Seiendheit” (beingness) to refer to this generic kind of being

only well after the publication of Being and Time (see, for example, Einführung in die Metaphysik, pp. 23-24). I

owe the distinction between “thick” and “thin” conceptions of being to Peter van Inwagen, who in turn credits the

terms to Professor Wilfried VerEecke (see van Inwagen, Ontology, Identity, and Modality: Essays in Metaphysics,

p. 4 fn. 4).

10

See, for example, SZ 17, 27, and 436-437.

11

See SZ 44.

Kind of Being Extension Thickness Structures

Care Human beings (Dasein)

Thick

Existentials

Life Living things

Categories Readiness-to-hand Artifacts

Presence-at-hand Concreta

Subsistence Abstracta

Beingness Everything Thin ?

Being as such ? Super-thick ?

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the structures of Dasein’s being (care);12

“categories” is his name for the structures of every

other thick kind of being (e.g., presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand). We should not think,

however, that structures associated with latter kinds of being are all the same; the structures

associated with presence-at-hand may be different from the structures associated with readiness-

to-hand despite the fact that they are both categories.

Heidegger repeatedly refers to structures of being (Seinsstrukturen) as “characteristics of

being” (Seinscharaktere)13

and “determinations of being” (Seinsbestimmungen). Thus,

according to Heidegger, structures of being are characteristics or determinations.14

Since the

words “characteristic” and “determination” are synonymous with “property” (as well as “aspect,”

“attribute,” “feature,” “quality,” and “trait”), we can also say that Heidegger understands

structures of being as properties. In saying this, however, we do not mean to imply anything

substantive about the nature of these properties. In particular, we should not assume that

structures of being are properties of the very same sort as those paradigmatic of medium-sized

material things, such as redness and roundness. Structures of being may be fundamentally

different from properties of this sort while being properties nonetheless.15

12 Here and in what follows I will often speak of the “being” of Dasein rather than its “kind of being.” These

two expressions are meant to co-refer.

13

One might object that “character of being” is a more literal translation of “Seinscharaktere” than

“characteristic of being.” Nevertheless, “character” and “characteristic” are synonyms: if we say that a ball has a

shiny character, we can also say that it has a shiny characteristic (or the characteristic of being shiny). Macquarrie

and Robinson, the original English translators of Sein und Zeit, often translate “Charakter” as “characteristic” (see,

for example, their translations of SZ 42, 54, 63, and 64).

14

This inference assumes that Heidegger is not using “Seinscharaktere” and “Seinsbestimmungen” as technical

terms. I think this assumption is reasonable given that Heidegger nowhere introduces them as such as he does so

often with other technical terms of his.

15

I will also bracket the issue of whether structures of being are particulars or universals, i.e., whether they can

be instantiated by (at most) one thing or by (possibly) multiple things.

Tepley | 6

If structures of being are properties, as Heidegger suggests they are, then surely they are

properties of something or other; i.e., they are instantiated.16

What instantiates them? There are

two obvious possibilities: (a) the kind of being to which these structures belong, or (b) the

entities which have the kind of being to which these structures belong. While the expression

“characteristics of being” suggests the first of these, (a), this cannot be correct. Consider

“substantiality” (Substanzialität), a structure of presence-at-hand, the kind of being possessed by

substances and other concreta.17

If structures of being are properties of the kind of being to

which these structures belong, then substantiality is a property of presence-at-hand, in which

case presence-at-hand is a substance. But this is simply not the case: it is not presence-at-hand

which is a substance but rather (some of) the entities which have presence-at-hand as their kind

of being. Similar arguments can be made using other structures of being: if understanding

(Verstehen), a structure Dasein’s being,18

is a property, then surely it is a property of Dasein and

not of Dasein’s being, for it is Dasein and not Dasein’s being which understands (in Heidegger’s

very particular sense of this term). Thus, structures of being are not properties of the kinds of

being to which they belong, but rather of the entities which have those kinds of being.19

3. Dasein’s Kind of Being

Now that we have some idea of what structures of being are, let us turn our attention to

kinds of being. What exactly are they? For reasons that will become apparent later in the paper,

it is best if we split this question into two: (1) What is Dasein’s kind of being? And (2) what are

16 Of course this does not follow simply from the fact that structures of being are properties; there may very

well be uninstantiated properties. Rather, it follows from the extreme unlikelihood that uninstantiated properties

would play a central role in a theory of anything, let alone a theory of being.

17

See SZ 68.

18

See SZ §31.

19

This point is further supported by the many passages in which Heidegger refers to structures of being as

characteristics of entities and not of being. For example, he describes existentiality, facticity, and being-fallen as

characteristics of Dasein (SZ 191).

Tepley | 7

kinds of being other than Dasein’s? The present section deals with the first of these questions;

the following section deals with the second.

What exactly is Dasein’s being? If the structures of Dasein’s being are properties of

Dasein, then perhaps we can answer this question if we can first determine how Dasein’s being is

related to its structures. Heidegger repeatedly refers to Dasein’s being as a whole (Ganze) of

which its structures are parts.20

Thus, it would seem that the relation that holds between Dasein’s

being and its structures is a whole-part relation—or at least close enough to such a relation to

warrant referring to its relata as wholes and parts.21

In that case, Dasein’s being is a whole which

some of Dasein’s properties are parts. What sort of whole could this be? More generally, what

sorts of wholes are there such that the parts of those wholes are properties (and only

properties)?22

There are two relevant possibilities: (i) properties are parts of concrete

particulars, and (ii) properties are parts of other properties.

3.1 Constituent Ontology

Advocates of wholes in the first of these senses are known as “constituent ontologists.”

They believe that in addition to whatever material parts a concrete particular may have, it also

has metaphysical parts. These parts are its properties. Thus, for example, a ball with the

properties being red and being spherical has these properties—at least according to the

constituent ontologist—among its (metaphysical) parts.

20 See, for example, SZ 181, 191, 192, 196, 200, 316, and 350.

21

In what follows I will often speak of the relation between kinds and structures of being as if it just is a whole-

part relation, but strictly speaking it is either a whole-part relation or something very similar to a whole-part relation.

This caveat will be especially important in §3.3.1.

22

The “and only properties” qualification is important, for there are a number of theories according to which

entities of some kind are wholes of which both properties and non-properties are parts, e.g., propositions (see, e.g.,

Russell 1912), states-of-affairs (see, e.g., Armstrong 1997), and events (see, e.g., Kim 1976). Since Dasein’s kind of

being is a whole of which only structures of being (existentials) are parts, none of these is relevant.

Tepley | 8

Whether or not constituent ontology is a plausible metaphysical position is an interesting

if well-worn issue. We needn’t go into any of the details of this debate, however, in order to see

that it won’t help us understand how Dasein’s being is composed of its structures. If existentials

are parts of Dasein’s being in the same way in which constituent ontologists think that properties

are (metaphysical) parts of the entities which instantiate these properties, then Dasein’s being

instantiates its existentials. And we have already seen that this is not the case: it is not kinds of

being which instantiate their structures but rather the entities which have these kinds being.

3.2 Complex Properties

This leaves (ii): Dasein’s being is a property of which other properties (its structures) are

parts. What kind of property can this be? What kinds of properties are wholes of which other

properties are parts?

Here’s one example of such a property: being round and red. The putative parts of this

property are the properties being round and being red. Properties of this sort are called

“conjunctive properties” and the properties which are their parts their “conjuncts.” Accordingly,

one possibility is that Dasein’s being is a conjunctive property of which its structures are

conjuncts.23

While this is one kind of property that can be understood as a whole of which other

properties are parts, it is not the only kind: Consider the property being knowledge. The

traditional definition of “knowledge” is “justified true belief” (hereafter “JTB”). Since the

publication of Gettier’s famous paper, a general consensus has emerged among philosophers that

these three conditions, though individually necessary, are not jointly sufficient for knowledge.

23 Of course not everyone believes that there are conjunctive properties or, if they do, that conjunctive properties

are wholes of which their conjuncts are parts. The first of these issues is relevant only if there is some better way of

understanding Dasein’s kind of being as a whole of which other properties are parts; I will address the second of

them below (see §3.3.1).

Tepley | 9

This has led to a nearly half-century-long hunt for the so-called “fourth condition” and inspired

innumerable interpretations of the justification condition.

While the jury is still out on whether or not “knowledge” can be defined, let us suppose,

for the sake of argument, that (1) knowledge does indeed require JTB, but (2) there is no fourth

condition such that JTB plus this condition yields knowledge. In other words, although

justification, truth, and belief are indeed necessary for knowledge, there is no fourth, non-trivial

necessary condition such that it together with JTB is sufficient for knowledge.

If (1) and (2) are true, then one can argue that being knowledge is a property which has

other properties as parts—namely being justified, being true, and being believed—but is not

identical to the mere conjunction of these parts.24

Moreover, there is no other property such that

its conjunction with being justified, being true, and being believed is identical to being

knowledge. Thus, although the property being knowledge has parts and these parts are

properties, it is not a conjunctive property of which its parts are conjuncts.

Let us call properties of this sort, if such there be, “irreducible complex properties.”25

Such properties are complex because they “involve” other properties in roughly the same way in

which conjunctive properties “involve” their conjuncts: the latter are parts of the former. They

are irreducible because the properties they involve, taken together, are not sufficient for

composing that property. In other words, an irreducible complex property is not identical to the

mere conjunction of its parts. One reason to think that there are irreducible complex properties is

that there are a number of properties—such as being knowledge—for which we can identify clear

24 The properties being justified, being true, being believed, and being knowledge are properties of propositions,

whatever they turn out to be. It is also worth noting that these are probably best understood as relational properties,

the relata of which are propositions and epistemic agents. This makes no difference to the point I am making here.

25

More formally: x is an irreducible complex property only if (i) x is a property, (ii) x is a whole of which

properties y1…yn are parts, (iii) the conjunction of y1…yn ≠ x, and (iv) there are no properties z1…zn such that the

conjunction of y1…yn and z1…zn = x.

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necessary conditions but not jointly sufficient conditions. The existence of irreducible complex

properties would explain this phenomenon.

There are, then, two ways of understanding how Dasein’s being is a property of which

other properties (its structures) are parts: it is either a conjunctive property or an irreducible

complex property.26

Let us call properties of either kind “complex properties.” Thus, on this

view, Dasein’s being is a complex property of Dasein.27

Whether it is a conjunctive property or

irreducible complex property is an open question that I will not try to decide here.28

3.3 Problems with Complex Properties

This view—that Dasein’s being is a complex property of Dasein—avoids the problem

engendered by understanding the relation that holds between Dasein’s being and its structures in

terms of constituent ontology: the properties that are parts of a complex property are not

instantiated by that complex property, but rather by any entity which instantiates that complex

property. Nevertheless, this position faces some other problems. These are of two sorts: some

stem from the notion that that Dasein’s being is a complex property and others from the notion

26 There is, in fact, a third way of understanding properties as wholes of which other properties are parts: D. M.

Armstrong’s theory of structural universals (Armstrong 1978; see David Lewis’s “Against Structural Universals” for

a critical discussion of Armstrong’s theory). Structural universals differ from conjunctive properties and irreducible

complex properties insofar as the parts of a structural universal are instantiated by proper parts of whatever entities

instantiate that universal whereas the parts of either a conjunctive property or an irreducible complex property are

instantiated by whatever entities instantiate that property (not those entities’ proper parts). For example, the

structural universal being an H2O molecule has the properties being a hydrogen molecule and being an oxygen

molecule among its parts, and these parts are instantiated by proper parts of whatever entities instantiate being an

H2O molecule (namely, hydrogen molecules and oxygen molecules, respectively). Since it is Dasein and not

Dasein’s proper parts (if it has proper parts) that instantiates the structures (existentials) making up its kind of being,

this kind of being cannot be a structural universal. Thanks to Alex Skiles for drawing my attention to this

possibility.

27

Strictly speaking, what I have shown is that Dasein’s being is a complex property (the parts of which are

structures of Dasein’s being), not that it is a complex property of Dasein. The latter follows from the former

together with the facts that (1) structures of being are instantiated by the entities that have the kind of being to which

those structures belong (e.g., existentials are instantiated by Dasein); and (2) a complex property is instantiated by

any entity that instantiates its parts (e.g., the conjunctive property being round and red is instantiated by any entity

that instantiates the properties being round and being red).

28

Nor will I try to decide what kind of property it is, e.g., whether it is a particular or a universal.

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that Dasein’s being is a property, simpliciter. I shall consider three problems of the first type

here and problems of the second type later in the paper (see §5).

3.3.1 Properties cannot be Wholes of which Other Properties are Parts

To start, one might object that properties cannot be wholes of which other properties are

parts. Consider, for example, platonic realism, the view according to which properties are

transcendent universals. Can properties of this sort really enter into part-whole relations with

other properties of the same sort?

There are at least three replies to this objection: First, even if understanding complex

properties as wholes of which other properties are parts is incompatible with some theories of

properties (e.g., platonic realism), it does not follow that this is incompatible with all theories of

properties. So long as Heidegger understands Dasein’s being in terms of one of the latter

theories, he can simply sidestep this problem.

Second, if the reason why properties understood in terms of a theory like platonic realism

cannot be wholes of which other properties are parts is that such properties are abstract and

abstract objects cannot enter into part-whole relations, then this reason is contentious. A number

of prominent contemporary philosophers maintain that abstracta can enter into part-whole

relations. For example, Kit Fine argues that members of a set are parts of that set (sets are

abstract and so are some members of sets),29

and Kris McDaniel suggests that certain abstract

types can be parts of other abstract types (e.g., a measure can be part of a song).30

If some

abstracta enter into part-whole relations, then we cannot deny that platonic universals enter into

part-whole relations simply on account of their being abstract.

29 Kit Fine, “Toward a Theory of Parts,” pp. 561-564.

30

Kris McDaniel, “Modal Realism with Overlap,” p. 141.

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Third, as we noted earlier, strictly speaking, Heidegger understands the relation between

Dasein’s being and its structures as either a whole-part relation or a relation close enough to a

whole-part relation that it makes sense for Heidegger to talk of Dasein’s being as a “whole” of

which its structures are “parts.” Even if the relation that holds between complex properties and

the properties “involved” in them is not, strictly speaking, a whole-part relation, surely it is close

enough to warrant referring to its relata as “wholes” and “parts.” Surely it is natural to refer to

being unmarried as a “part” of being a bachelor even if, strictly speaking, this isn’t true. In

short, our reason for thinking that Dasein’s being is a complex property of which its structures

are “parts” does not require that such properties be literal wholes of which the properties

involved in them are parts, and thus our proposal is consistent with any theories of properties that

are incompatible with this.

3.3.2 Irreducible Complex Properties are Impossible

One might also object to our proposal on the ground that irreducible complex properties

are impossible. If there are irreducible complex properties, as I have defined them, then it is

possible for there to be two non-identical wholes which have exactly the same parts. For

example, the irreducible complex property being knowledge and the conjunctive property being

justified, being true, and being believed, though they share exactly the same parts, are not

identical. This arguably violates common sense and is clearly inconsistent with classical

extensional mereology.31

Moreover, it is doubtful that this problem can be solved by simply

pointing out that the relation that holds between a complex property and the properties

“involved” in it needn’t be a literal whole-part relation, for if the relation that does hold between

31 According to classical extensional mereology, any two things which have exactly the same parts are identical.

For a detailed discussion of classical extensional mereology see Chapter 1 of Peter Simons Parts: A Study in

Ontology.

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Dasein’s being and its structures is similar enough to a whole-part relation to warrant referring to

Dasein’s being as a “whole” of which its structures are “parts,” then it should be governed by the

same rules as literal whole-part relations; and these rules are putatively those of classical

extensional mereology.

Classical extensional mereology, as intuitive as it may be, no longer enjoys the currency

it once did. A number of prominent philosophers have advanced sophisticated philosophical

theories (e.g., of material constitution) that are inconsistent with it.32

And even if classical

extensional mereology is true, it does not follow that Dasein’s being is not a complex property.

All that follows is that it is not an irreducible complex property, and this is consistent with it

being a conjunctive property.

3.3.3 Dasein’s Being is not “Pieced Together” from its Structures

Finally, one might object that this position runs afoul of Heidegger’s repeated claims that

Dasein’s being (care) cannot be “pieced together” from its structures.33

As he puts it one place:

“it is beyond question that the totality of the structural whole [of Dasein’s being] cannot be

reached by building it up out of elements.”34

And elsewhere: “The fundamental ontological

characteristics of [Dasein]…are not pieces belonging to something composite, one of which

might sometimes be missing.”35

If complex properties are, at least in some sense, “pieced

together” or “built up” from their parts, then Dasein’s being is not a complex property of which

its structures are parts.

To begin, even if there is a sense in which conjunctive properties are “pieced together” or

“built up” from their conjuncts, it is not at all clear that this is true of irreducible complex

32 See, for example, Lynne Rudder Baker’s “Why Constitution is not Identity.”

33

SZ 328.

34

SZ 181.

35

SZ 191.

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properties. An irreducible complex property is not identical to the mere conjunction of its parts.

Accordingly, if what you get from “piecing together” properties are conjunctive properties, then

you cannot get an irreducible complex property from “piecing together” its parts. This is

precisely why they are called “irreducible.” Whereas conjunctive properties may be understood

as nothing “over and above” their conjuncts, irreducible complex properties are by definition

something “over and above” their parts.

Of course this solution works only if we admit that Dasein’s being is an irreducible

complex property and not a conjunctive property. Since understanding Dasein’s being as a

conjunctive property seems to be the only way of being able to avoid denying classical

extensional mereology, we can adopt this solution only if we are willing to accept such a denial.

There is, however, one other way of solving this problem. It is possible to understand these

sentences of Heidegger’s as saying, not that Dasein’s being is something “over and above” its

parts, but rather that these parts cannot, in some sense, exist separately from the whole of which

they are parts.36

The second of these quotations is especially suggestive of this reading, for

Heidegger writes that the structures of Dasein’s being “are not pieces belonging to something

composite, one of which might sometimes be missing.”37

And if “building [something] up out of

elements” implies that these elements can exist prior to and so independently of the thing built up

out of them, then the first quotation can be understood in similar fashion. This reading finds

further support in the work of Einar Øverenget, who makes a compelling case that Heidegger

models the relation between the structures and being of Dasein on Husserl’s notion of

“dependent parthood” as articulated in the third of his Logical Investigations.38

36 Better: these parts cannot be instantiated unless the whole is co-instantiated with it.

37

Ibid. My emphasis.

38

Seeing the Self: Heidegger on Subjectivity, Chapter 1. See also Husserl’s Logical Investigations, Volume II,

Investigation III.

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4. Other Kinds of Being

Having argued for and defended the position that Dasein’s being is a complex property of

which its structures (existentials) are parts, let us turn our attention to the other thick kinds of

being Heidegger countenances, such as presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand. Are these also

properties? More specifically, are these also complex properties of which their structures

(categories) are parts?

4.1 Are they Properties?

Nowhere does Heidegger claim that thick kinds of being other than Dasein’s are wholes

of which their structures (categories) are parts. Accordingly, we cannot use an argument

analogous to the one given above to show that these kinds of being are properties. There is,

however, some other evidence in Being and Time that Heidegger understands these thick kinds

of being—in particular presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand—as properties (though not

necessarily as complex properties):

First, Heidegger describes presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand each as a

“characteristic” (Charakter).39

If “characteristic” and “property” are synonyms, then Heidegger

himself says that presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand are properties.

Second, without saying anything substantial about the nature of properties, we can say

that they characterize the entities of which they are properties. After all, “properties” is just

another word for “characteristics,” and it is perfectly trivial to say that characteristics

characterize, just as it is to say that runners run and swimmers swim. Since Heidegger states that

39 See SZ 74 for presence-at-hand and SZ 73 for readiness-to-hand.

Tepley | 16

presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand “characterize” (charakterisieren) other entities,40

it

seems to follow that these kinds of being are characteristics, i.e., properties, of those entities.

Third, Heidegger refers to readiness-to-hand as a “determination” (Bestimmung).41

Since

“determination,” like “characteristic,” is synonymous with “property,” it follows that Heidegger

understands readiness-to-hand as a property.

And fourth, just as characteristics can be innocently understood as characterizing the

entities of which they are characteristics, so too can determinations be understood as determining

the entities of which they are determinations. Since Heidegger writes that presence-at-hand and

readiness-to-hand “determine” (bestimmen) entities, he seems to think of them as determinations,

i.e., properties, of entities.42

In sum, keeping in mind the synonymy of “characteristic,” “determination,” and

“property” as well as the truisms that characteristics characterize and determinations determine,

there is some evidence in Being and Time that Heidegger understands presence-at-hand and

readiness-to-hand as properties of the entities which have these kinds of being. Since Dasein’s

being and these two kinds of being are properties, we can reasonably infer that all thick kinds of

being are properties.

4.2 Are they Complex Properties?

While the foregoing gives us a reason to think that thick kinds of being other than

Dasein’s are properties, it does not give a reason to think that they are complex properties. In

fact, we have one reason to believe that at least one of them—namely, presence-at-hand—is not:

According to Heidegger, substantiality is a structure (category) of presence-at-hand. If presence-

40 SZ 230.

41

SZ 71.

42

See SZ 183. It is worth noting that Macquarie and Robinson translate this sentence as saying that presence-

at-hand and readiness-to-hand are “aspects” of entities; “aspects” is just another word for “properties.”

Tepley | 17

at-hand is a complex property the structures of which are parts, then all present-at-hand entities

are substances. But this is doubtful, for Heidegger frequently speaks of “present-at-hand

properties,”43

and if this expression refers to properties which are present-at-hand, then some

present-at-hand entities are not substances.44

One response is simply to deny that the expression “present-at-hand properties” refers to

entities which are present-at-hand. Consider, by way of analogy, the expression “material

properties.” This does not refer to properties that are material, but rather to properties that are

distinctive of material entities (e.g., being extended, being located, having mass, etc.). In other

words, something is a “material property,” not in virtue of being a material entity, but in virtue of

being a certain kind of property of material entities. Likewise, Heidegger’s uses of the

expression “presence-at-hand properties” might refer, not to properties that are present-at-hand,

but rather to properties that are in some way distinctive of present-at-hand entities.

The main problem with this line of reasoning is that it leaves us completely in the dark as

to what kind of being these “present-at-hand properties” have. If they are not present-at-hand,

then what are they? One might suggest that they subsist (bestehen), i.e., have the kind of being

of abstracta (subsistence, Bestehen). But this is plausible only if Heidegger understands these

properties as platonic universals or the like, and this is doubtful. He claims, for example, that

some present-at-hand properties can be sensed, which clearly places them in concrete world.45

Alternatively, one might suggest that these properties have some other thick kind of being not

mentioned by the early Heidegger. After all, nowhere does Heidegger provide a systematic list

of which thick kinds of being he thinks there are. While this is admittedly possible, it does not

43 See, for example, SZ 42.

44

I am assuming, of course, that no properties are substances (and vice versa).

45

Ibid.

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seem very likely. Given how often he identifies the kinds of being of different kinds of entities,

it would be very strange for him to never mention this particular kind of being.46

To sum up, although we have a good reason to think that all thick kinds of being are

properties, we have a least one reason to think that some of them, unlike Dasein’s being, are not

complex properties. This should not surprise us, for Heidegger suggests that there are important

differences between Dasein’s being and other kinds of being.47

What relation holds between

such kinds of being and their structures is an open question that I will not pursue here.48

5. Objections

Despite the reasons given above, the claim that Heidegger understands thick kinds of

being as properties will almost certainly meet opposition from Heidegger scholars. Regarding

Heidegger’s theory of being, Taylor Carman writes that “being is not a property of entities,”49

and Stephen Mulhall writes that it is not a “property of beings.”50

Hubert Dreyfus argues that

what Heidegger means by the “being” of entities is their “intelligibility” and goes on to say that

“[i]intelligibility is not a property of things.”51

Kris McDaniel argues that it is “inappropriate” to

represent the various kinds (he calls them “ways”) of being countenanced by Heidegger in first-

order logic by means of predicate letters, for “this procedure assimilates attributing a way of

being of a thing to predicating a property of that thing,” and “[w]ays of being are not merely

special properties that some entities have and other entities lack.”52

Frederick Olafson writes

46 A third possibility is that such properties have no thick kind of being. This also seems very unlikely, given

the fact that even abstracta have a thick kind of being.

47

See, for example, SZ 181.

48

Though I will say that I think it plausible that they are disjunctive properties of which their structures are

disjuncts.

49

Heidegger’s Analytic, p. 200; cf. p. 124.

50

Heidegger and Being and Time, p. 9; cf. p. 10.

51

Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I, pp. xi and 257.

52

“Ways of Being,” p. 302.

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that “Heidegger makes it clear…that [being] is not a property or attribute of entities.”53

In light

of these quotations, one might even say that there is a consensus among Heidegger scholars that

Heidegger does not understand kinds of being as properties.

This view is not entirely groundless. A number of reasons can be given for thinking that

Heidegger doesn’t think that kinds of being are properties. I will examine four of these reasons

here. As we will see, none of them is conclusive.

5.1 Being is not a Being

One might object to the position defended in this paper on the basis of what we might call

the “Thesis of Ontological Difference,” the claim that the being (Sein) of an entity is not itself a

being (Seiende).54

Heidegger endorses this claim repeatedly throughout Being and Time and the

contemporaneous lectures.55

If being is not a being, then clearly it is not a property, for all

properties are beings.

The reply to this objection is simple: If Heidegger can consistently say that being is not a

being, then he can also consistently say that certain properties are not beings.56

Whatever

reasons we can give for thinking that (all) properties are themselves beings can also, mutatis

mutandis, be given for thinking that being is itself a being. Since Heidegger will reject the latter

reasons, he will also reject the former reasons. Of course it might turn out that Heidegger’s

53 Heidegger and the Philosophy of Mind, pp. 135-136.

54

This name derives from the “Ontological Difference,” Heidegger’s name for the difference between being and

beings. Though I translate “Seiende” as “entity” elsewhere in this paper, I shall give it the more literal translation of

“being” in this section and the next. (An even more literal translation of “Seiende” would be “that which is” or “that

which has being.”)

55

See SZ 4, 6, 38, 230; GP 22.

56

It is worth pointing out that Heidegger would not have been the first to believe that some entities are not

beings (or at least do not have being): Alexius Meinong held this view at the turn of the century (see his “The

Theory of Objects”; for a more recent explication of this view, see Roderick M. Chisholm’s “Beyond Being and

Nonbeing”). Heidegger was aware of Meinong’s work (see Heidegger’s “Neuere Forschungen über Logik,”

published in 1912).

Tepley | 20

rejection of these reasons is unjustified, but this would be a problem, not with our interpretation

of Heidegger’s theory of being, but with this theory itself.57

5.2 Being is not a Property

A second objection to the proposal defended in this paper is that Heidegger himself

apparently denies that being is a property. In Being and Time, Heidegger writes that “Being and

the structure of being lie beyond every being (Seiende) and every possible existent property

(seiende Bestimmtheit) which a being may possess.”58

The point is repeated in his “Postscript to

‘What is Metaphysics?’,” where he states that “Being is not an existent property (seiende

Beschaffenheit) of beings.”59

To start, each of these quotations appears in a context in which it is natural to understand

“being” as referring, not to thick kinds of being, but rather to the super thick kind of being, i.e.,

being in general (Sein überhaupt). Since the thesis of this paper is limited to thick kinds of

being, the claims made in these quotations are, on this interpretation, irrelevant.

But even if we allow that these quotations do concern thick kinds of being, a careful

examination of them reveals an important ambiguity: Heidegger writes in both cases that being

is not an existent (seiende) property of beings.60

This is perfectly consistent with it being a

property of beings, so long as it’s a non-existent (nicht-seiende) property of them. Since we have

57 This reply gives us the grounds to quickly rebut another possible objection to our interpretation of Heidegger,

namely that we are treating him as engaged in an ontic rather than an ontological enterprise: if ontic inquiries are

concerned with beings and ontological ones with being, then our interpretation treats Heidegger as engaged in the

former, for (all) properties are beings. The flaw in this objection is obvious: it presupposes that Heidegger thinks

that all properties are beings. He need not think this, and if kinds of being are properties then he does not think this.

58

SZ 38. “Determination” is probably a better translation of “Bestimmtheit” than property, but what are

determinations if not properties?

59

Wegmarken, p. 101. It is worth noting that this quotation comes from a text published in 1949 and so is

arguably irrelevant to the present discussion, being well beyond the scope of what reasonably counts as the “early

Heidegger.”

60

The word “seiende” is translated here as “existent” because there is no verbal adjective of the English verb

“to be.” Instances of the word “existent” in the following discussion should be understood as having the meaning of

such an adjective, if there were one.

Tepley | 21

already seen that Heidegger can countenance properties which are not beings (nicht Seiende),

surely he can countenance properties which are non-existent (nicht-seiende). Assuming that

these quotations are indeed about thick kinds of being and not merely the super-thick kind of

being, Heidegger is expressing essentially same point as the Thesis of Ontological Difference,

namely that the being of an entity is not itself a being—including, of course, any being which is a

property. But this is consistent with it being a property, so long as it’s not one of the properties

which is also a being.61

5.3 Structures of Being are not Properties

One might also draw our attention to the many places in which Heidegger appears to say

that structures of being—in particular, the structures of Dasein’s being—are not properties.

While this is not tantamount to denying that Dasein’s being is a property, it would undermine our

reason for thinking that this is true, one premise of which is that Heidegger understands

structures of being as properties.

Here is a paradigmatic statement of this sort: “those characteristics (Charaktere) which

can be exhibited in [Dasein] are not present-at-hand ‘properties’ (vorhandene ‘Eigenschaften’) of

a…present-at-hand entity (vorhandenen Seienden)”62

While at first glance this sentence seems

to say that the characteristics (structures) of Dasein’s being are not properties of Dasein, a careful

examination reveals another crucial ambiguity: it says that the characteristics (structures) of

Dasein’s being are not “present-at-hand properties.” If this refers to properties that are present-

at-hand (i.e., have presence-at-hand as their kind of being), then Heidegger’s statement is

consistent with the claim that the characteristics (structures) of Dasein’s being are properties, so

61 I want to emphasize once again that whether this position is ultimately justifiable is a separate issue from

whether it is an accurate representation of Heidegger’s thought. My primary interest in this paper is the latter not the

former.

62

SZ 42.

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long as they are not properties which are present-at-hand.63

In fact, on the plausible assumption

that “characteristic” and “property” are synonyms, something like this had better be what

Heidegger is saying, for otherwise he straightforwardly contradicts himself by saying that certain

characteristics are not properties. The other places in which Heidegger appears to deny that the

structures of Dasein’s being are properties contain similar ambiguities: all of them can be

understood as denying, not that the structures of Dasein’s being are properties, but that they are

properties of a certain kind.64

5.4 Being Depends on Dasein

Finally, one might object that the account defended in this paper is at odds with

Heidegger’s repeated claims that the being of entities other than Dasein depends upon Dasein

(or, as he sometimes puts it, upon the understanding of Dasein). As Heidegger writes: “Of

course only as long as Dasein is (that is, only as long as an understanding of being is ontically

possible), ‘is there’ being.”65

And later on the same page: “Being (not entities) is dependent

upon [Dasein’s] understanding of being.”66

Since the properties of entities other than Dasein do

not depend upon the existence of Dasein, let alone its understanding (whatever Heidegger might

mean by this term), it follows that the being of entities must be something other than some of

their properties.

Granting the prima facie plausibility that some properties of entities other than Dasein do

not depend upon the existence of Dasein, it is hardly plausible that none of them do. Consider,

for example, the relational property being loved by a Dasein. Surely nothing has this property if

63 This is also true if “present-at-hand properties” refers to properties of present-at-hand entities in the same way

that “material properties” refers to properties of material entities.

64

See, for example, SZ 133. The same is also true of those passages in which Heidegger appears to deny that

specific structures of Dasein’s being are properties of Dasein. See, for example, SZ 56-57, 176, and 179.

65

SZ 212.

66

Ibid.; cf. SZ 183, 226 and 230.

Tepley | 23

there are no Daseins. Accordingly, if the kinds of being other than Dasein’s are properties like

this one, i.e., relational properties one relata of which is necessarily a Dasein, then there is no

problem in both understanding these kinds of being as properties and insisting that they depend

on Dasein (in the sense that they are instantiated only if Dasein exists).

One might object that some structures of kinds of being other than Dasein’s are not easily

understood in this way. Recall substantiality, a structure of presence-at-hand. If kinds of

being—and their structures—depend on Dasein in the sense that none of them are instantiated

unless Dasein exists, then there are no substances unless Dasein exists. And this is surely false.

Here is a quick reply (there may be others): What Heidegger means by “substantiality” is

not “being a substance” but rather “being understood as a substance,” in Heidegger’s particular

sense of the word “understood.” In this case, it makes perfect sense that this structure depends

on Dasein (in the sense that it is instantiated only if a Dasein exists), and this can be true even if

there are substances that exist independently of Dasein. More generally, we can say that

structures of being (of kinds of being other than Dasein’s) are all properties of the form “being

understood as such and such.” If Dasein is the only kind of entity that can “understand” in the

relevant sense, then nothing has these properties unless Dasein exists. This interpretation is

supported by—and even makes sense of—Heidegger’s claims that being depends, not just on

Dasein, but on Dasein’s understanding.

6. Conclusion

This paper provides a partial account of the early Heidegger’s theory of being. As

partial, it leaves unanswered a number of questions, including: Which thick kinds of being are

there? Which kinds of entities have these different kinds of being? Which structures do these

Tepley | 24

different kinds of being possess? And what is the relation that holds between each of these kinds

of being (except care) and its structures?

If kinds and structures of being are properties, then the answers to these questions should

be of interest, not just to Heidegger scholars, but also to contemporary analytic philosophers who

are interested in the truth about the most fundamental properties of entities in the world,

especially human beings. Moreover, since the answers to these questions can be put in terms of

“properties” and not in terms of “being,” analytic philosophers can engage with Heideggerians

over the truth of these answers even if they are convinced that talk about “kinds” and

“structures” of “being” is fundamentally misguided. Whether or not the properties Heidegger

identifies and describes make up the being of entities is an entirely separate issue from whether

or not anything instantiates these properties.67

67 Thanks very much to Robert Audi, Gary Gutting, and especially Alex Skiles for comments on earlier drafts of

this paper.

Tepley | 25

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