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THREE SYMMETRIES BETWEEN TEXTUALIST AND PURPOSIVIST THEORIES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION—AND THE IRREDUCIBLE ROLES OF VALUES AND JUDGMENT WITHIN BOTH Richard H. Fallon, Jr.† This Article illuminates an important, ongoing debate between “textualist” and “purposivist” theories of statutory interpretation by identify- ing three separate stages of the interpretive process at which textualists, as much as purposivists, need to make value judgments. The Article’s analysis, which reveals previously unrecognized symmetries between the two theories, is consistent with, but does not depend upon, empirical studies indicating that judicial ideology matters more than methodology in determining interpretive outcomes. It rejects the frequent claim of textualists that their theory much more stringently restrains value-based decision making than does purposivism. Of the three interpretive stages at which textualists rely on value-based judgments as much as purposivists do, one stands at the threshold when “interpretive dissonance”—reflecting a partly value-based experience of dis- cordance between what a statute at first blush seems to mean and an inter- preter’s expectations concerning what well-written legislation would likely direct—triggers an initial resort to interpretive theory. Then, symmetrically, both textualists and purposivists need to specify the context within which a statute should be interpreted. Although textualists emphasize a statute’s “se- mantic context” and purposivists its “policy context, ” making specific deter- minations of what is contextually relevant and irrelevant frequently draws values into play. Finally, after an interpretive context is specified, textualist as much as purposivist interpreters must make judgments of “reasonable- ness.” Purposivists inquire what reasonable legislators would have in- tended. For textualists, the comparable question involves how a reasonable person would understand statutory language in context. The construct of a reasonable interpreter is inherently value laden. Because both textualist and purposivist theories require partly value-based decision making, there is no escaping the conclusion that good judging requires good judgment—even when reasonable disagreement exists † Ralph S. Tyler, Jr. Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School. I am grateful to Glenn Cohen, Ryan Doerfler, Einer Elhauge, Vicki Jackson, Duncan Kennedy, Dan Meltzer, Frank Michelman, Caleb Nelson, and Matthew Stephenson for insightful comments on an earlier draft. Special thanks go to John Manning, without whose exten- sive comments, guidance, and support this Article never would have taken shape. Thanks, too, to Charlie Griffin and Niko Bowie for outstanding research assistance. 685

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\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN402.txt unknown Seq:1 2-MAY-14 9:01THREESYMMETRIESBETWEENTEXTUALISTANDPURPOSIVISTTHEORIESOFSTATUTORY INTERPRETATIONANDTHEIRREDUCIBLEROLESOFVALUESANDJUDGMENTWITHINBOTHRichardH.Fallon,Jr.ThisArticleilluminatesanimportant,ongoingdebatebetweentextualist and purposivist theories of statutory interpretation by identify-ingthreeseparatestagesoftheinterpretiveprocessatwhichtextualists,asmuch as purposivists, need to make value judgments.The Articles analysis,which reveals previously unrecognized symmetries between the two theories, isconsistent with, but does not depend upon, empirical studies indicating thatjudicial ideology matters more than methodology in determining interpretiveoutcomes. Itrejectsthefrequentclaimoftextualiststhattheirtheorymuchmorestringentlyrestrainsvalue-baseddecisionmakingthandoespurposivism.Of the three interpretive stages at which textualists rely on value-basedjudgmentsasmuchaspurposivistsdo,onestandsatthethresholdwheninterpretivedissonancereflectingapartlyvalue-basedexperienceofdis-cordance between what a statute at first blush seems to mean and an inter-pretersexpectationsconcerningwhatwell-writtenlegislationwouldlikelydirecttriggers an initial resort to interpretive theory.Then, symmetrically,bothtextualistsandpurposivistsneedtospecifythecontextwithinwhichastatute should be interpreted.Although textualists emphasize a statutes se-manticcontextandpurposivistsitspolicycontext,makingspecificdeter-minationsofwhatiscontextuallyrelevantandirrelevantfrequentlydrawsvalues into play.Finally, after an interpretive context is specified, textualistasmuchaspurposivistinterpretersmustmakejudgmentsofreasonable-ness. Purposivistsinquirewhatreasonablelegislatorswouldhavein-tended. Fortextualists,thecomparablequestioninvolveshowareasonableperson would understand statutory language in context.The construct of areasonableinterpreterisinherentlyvalueladen.Becausebothtextualistandpurposivisttheoriesrequirepartlyvalue-baseddecisionmaking,thereisnoescapingtheconclusionthatgoodjudging requires good judgmenteven when reasonable disagreement exists RalphS.Tyler,Jr.ProfessorofConstitutionalLaw,HarvardLawSchool. Iamgrateful to Glenn Cohen, Ryan Doerfler, Einer Elhauge, Vicki Jackson, Duncan Kennedy,DanMeltzer,FrankMichelman,CalebNelson,andMatthewStephensonforinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft. SpecialthanksgotoJohnManning,withoutwhoseexten-sive comments, guidance, and support this Article never would have taken shape.Thanks,too,toCharlieGriffinandNikoBowieforoutstandingresearchassistance.685\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN402.txt unknown Seq:2 2-MAY-14 9:01686 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:685aboutwhatgoodjudgmentrequires. Normativedebatesabouttheoriesofstatutory interpretation will remain incomplete until textualists, in particu-lar,reckonadequatelywiththisreality.INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 686 RI. THEOCCASIONS OFINTERPRETATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 697 RII. TEXTUALISM ANDPURPOSIVISM:DEFINITIONS ANDCOMPARISONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 703 RA. Purposivism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 704 RB. Textualism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 707 RC. TwoParallelsFurtherIllustrated:InterpretiveContextsandJudgmentsofReasonableness . . . . . . . . . 719 RD. CorroboratingEmpiricalStudies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 724 RIII. CLARIFICATION ANDDEFENSE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 726 RA. SomeLimitsandQualifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 726 RB. MeetinganAnticipatedObjection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 727 RCONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 732 RINTRODUCTIONA central ambition of most theories of statutory interpretation1 isto ensure that judges act as faithful agents of the legislature2a rolethatrequirescourtstosubordinatetheirownvaluestothoseoftheirprincipals.Purposivist theories demand that judges do so by decid-ing statutory cases in accordance with the purpose or intent of the leg-islature.3Textualisttheoriesagree,andsometimesaffirm1Forabrisksurveyoftheleadingmoderntheories,seeRICHARDH.FALLON,JR.,JOHNF.MANNING,DANIELJ.MELTZER&DAVIDL.SHAPIRO,HART&WECHSLERSTHEFED-ERALCOURTS AND THEFEDERALSYSTEM62226(6thed.2009)[hereinafterHART&WECHSLER].2SeeJohnF.Manning,TheNewPurposivism,2011SUP.CT.REV.113,120. Butcf.RONALD DWORKIN, LAWS EMPIRE 313 (1986) (characterizing the judicial role as fundamen-tally the creative one of a partner continuing to develop, in what [the judge] believes is thebest way, the statutory scheme Congress began); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic StatutoryInterpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1482 (1987) (depicting judges as agents who mustoftenupdatetheirorderstomeetchangingcircumstances).3See,e.g.,StephenBreyer,OurDemocraticConstitution,77N.Y.U.L.REV.245,266(2002)(arguingthatpurposiveinterpretationremindsthejudge...thatitisinCongress, not the courts, where the Constitution places the authority to enact a statute);Peter L. Strauss, Essay, The Courts and the Congress: Should Judges Disdain Political History?, 98COLUM. L. REV. 242, 25253 (1998) (arguing that purposivism makes courts the most effec-tiveagentsofthelegislature). InusingthetermpurposivismasIdo,Ilinktwoap-proachesthatsometimeshavebeenseparatedbysubsumingwhatmightbecalledintentionalismundertherubricofpurposivism. Asaconceptualmatter,thereisun-doubtedly a clear difference between two varieties of statutory purpose: the specific inten-tionsofthestatutesenactinglegislatureandthemoregeneralaimorpolicywhichpervades a statute.Archibald Cox, Judge Learned Hand and the Interpretation of Statutes, 60HARV.L.REV.370,37071(1947);seeJohnF.Manning,TextualismasaNondelegationDoc-trine,97COLUM.L.REV.673,677&n.11(1997)(discussingthisdistinction). Foranap-proachcenteredontheformerkindofpurpose,orwhatmightbelabeledlegislative\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN402.txt unknown Seq:3 2-MAY-14 9:012014] TEXTUALISTANDPURPOSIVISTTHEORIES 687evenmoreardently,thatjudgesshouldstrivetoexcludetheirownvaluesfromtheinterpretiveprocess.4Accordingtotextualists,purpose-basedinquiriesinvitecourtstosmuggleintheirpersonalpreferencesbyimputingtheirviewstothelawmakingauthority.5Intextualistsestimation,courtsbestactasfaithfulagentsbyenforcingthefairmeaningofthewordsthatthelegislatureenacted.6Besides converging in their aspirations to make courts the faithfulagents of the legislature, modern or new textualists and purposivistsconcuronanotherpointofcentralimportance:themeaningofthewordsofastatute,asofothertexts,dependsoncontext.7Insoac-knowledging,newtextualistsbreakwithanolderplainmeaningschool,whichmaintainedthattheimplicationsofstatutorylanguageare often unmistakable to any competent speaker of English, with noneedforspecializedknowledgeaboutlegalhistoryortraditions.8Nevertheless,asJohnManninghasemphasized,textualistandpurposivist theories postulate that different kinds of contexts ought tointent, see Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretationin the Classroom and in the Courtroom,50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 817 (1983) (The judge should try to think his way as best he canintothemindsoftheenactinglegislatorsandimaginehowtheywouldhavewantedthestatuteappliedtothecaseatbar.). Fortheclassicstatementofthelatter,moregeneralapproach,seeHENRYM.HART,JR.&ALBERTM.SACKS,THELEGALPROCESS:BASICPROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1374, 1378 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. &PhilipP.Frickeyeds.,1994)(urginginterpretersto[d]ecidewhatpurposeoughttobeattributed to the statute and to any subordinate provision of it which may be involved ontheassumptionthatthelegislatureconsistedofreasonablepersonspursuingreasonablepurposes reasonably, and to [i]nterpret the words of the statute immediately in questionsoastocarryoutthepurposeaswellaspossible).4See,e.g.,FrankH.Easterbrook,Text,History,andStructureinStatutoryInterpretation,17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 61, 63 (1994) (arguing that judges are supposed to be faithfulagents, not independent principals); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Stat-ute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 18 (2001) (The root of the textualist position is . . . in straight-forwardfaithfulagenttheory.).5See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of UnitedStates Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION3, 1718 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (The practical threat is that, under the guise or eventheself-delusionofpursuingunexpressedlegislativeintents,common-lawjudgeswillinfactpursuetheirownobjectivesanddesires....).6SeeJohnF.Manning,TextualismandLegislativeIntent,91VA.L.REV.419,41920(2005).7See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists From Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV.70,73,7980(2006)(discussingtheimportanceofcontextfortextualismandpurposiv-ism);seealso ANTONINSCALIA&BRYANA.GARNER,READINGLAW:THEINTERPRETATION OFLEGALTEXTS16,3233(2012).8SeeJohnF.Manning,TheAbsurdityDoctrine,116HARV.L.REV.2387,2456(2003)[hereinafter Manning, Absurdity Doctrine] (In contrast with their literalist predecessors intheplainmeaningschool,moderntextualistsrejecttheideathatinterpretationcanoc-curwithinthefourcornersofastatute.(quotingWhitev.UnitedStates,191U.S.545,551 (1903))); Manning, supra note 7, at 79 & n.28; Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction RandtheCoordinatingFunctionofPlainMeaning,1990SUP.CT.REV.231,252(Plainmean-ing...isablunt,frequentlycrude,andcertainlynarrowingdevice,cuttingoffaccesstomany features of some particular conversational or communicative or interpretive contextthatwouldotherwisebeavailabletotheinterpreterorconversationalparticipant.).\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN402.txt unknown Seq:4 2-MAY-14 9:01688 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:685matter.9 Textualists, he writes, give primacy to what he calls a stat-utes semantic context10 or to those features of context that give risetowhatphilosophersoflanguagerefertoaspragmaticmeaning11evidence about the way a reasonable person conversant with relevantsocialandlinguisticpracticeswouldhaveusedthewords.12Bycon-trast,Manningemphasizes,[p]urposivistsgiveprecedencetopolicycontextevidencethatgoestothewayareasonablepersonconver-santwiththecircumstancesunderlyingenactment[ofastatute]wouldsuppressthemischief[atwhichthestatuteaims]andadvancetheremedy.13In this Article I shall argue that textualists acknowledgment thatinterpretationnecessarilyoccursincontextgeneratesanimportantset of symmetries between textualist and purposivist theories that tex-tualists, in particular, have frequently failed to recognize.14 At each ofthreestagesofanunfoldinginterpretiveprocess,textualistandpurposivist interpreters both need to make value judgments of closelyparallelkinds,atleastinsomecases. AsIshalldiscuss,anumberofempirical studies have found that judicial ideology matters more thanmethodologyindetermininginterpretiveoutcomes.15ThisArticlesnoncynical analysis would help to explain, though it does not dependon,thosefindings.Of the three points at which both textualists and purposivists nec-essarily make value judgments, the first stands at the threshold of theinterpretive process.Many occasions for the application of theories ofstatutory interpretation involve a phenomenon that I shall refer to asinterpretive dissonance.16 Interpretive dissonance arises from a felt9SeeManning,supranote7,at9091. R10Seeid.at91;seealso SCALIA&GARNER,supranote7,at16. R11In standard usage within the philosophy of language, semantics is concerned withthe meaning of words and sentences in a language, without regard to complexities arisingfrom the context of their utterance. See PATRICK GRIFFITHS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISHSEMANTICS ANDPRAGMATICS21(2006)(Semanticsisthestudyofcontext-independentknowledge that users of a language have of word and sentence meaning.).Pragmatics, bycontrast, is concerned with the meaning of words and sentences in context. See id. at 153(Pragmaticsisabouttheuseofutterancesincontext,abouthowwemanagetoconveymorethanisliterallyencodedbythesemanticsofsentences.).12See Manning, supra note 7, at 91; see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 7, at 16 (In Rtheirfullcontext,wordsmeanwhattheyconveyedtoreasonablepeopleatthetimetheywerewritten....).13Manning,supranote7,at91. R14Foranimportantpreviousexplorationofconvergencesbetweentextualistandpurposivist theories, see Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L.REV.1,3443(2006).15Seeinfranotes20410andaccompanyingtext. R16There may be some similarities to the psychological theory of cognitive dissonance,accordingtowhichwehave,builtintotheworkingsofourmind[s],amechanismthatcreates an uncomfortable feeling of dissonance, or lack of harmony, when we become awareofsomeinconsistencyamongthevariousattitudes,beliefs,anditemsofknowledgethat\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN402.txt unknown Seq:5 2-MAY-14 9:012014] TEXTUALISTANDPURPOSIVISTTHEORIES 689experience of discordance between what might be thought of as a stat-utesfirst-blushmeaningwhatitswords,construedrelativelyacon-textually,17 would seem to require18and an interpreters immediate,equallyprovisionalexpectationsconcerningwhatwell-writtenlegisla-tionbyeitheranactualorareasonablelegislaturewouldlikelydi-rect.19 Looking at what a statute at first blush seems to prescribe, theinterpreter responds by wondering whether the first-blush meaning iscorrect.20The resulting question requires precise statement.At issue is notwhetherapurportedinterpretershouldcraftanexceptiontoaconstituteourmentalstore. PETERGRAY,PSYCHOLOGY520(4thed.2002). Thetheorytraces to LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 3 (1957) (The existence ofdissonance,beingpsychologicallyuncomfortable,willmotivatetheperson[experiencingit]totrytoreducethedissonanceandachieveconsonance.). Foroverviewsofresearchon cognitive dissonance, see, for example, COGNITIVE DISSONANCE: PROGRESS ON A PIVOTALTHEORY IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Eddie Harmon-Jones & Judson Mills eds., 1999) (evaluat-ingstudiesoncognitivedissonanceinvarioussettings);1DANIELT.GILBERT ET AL.,THEHANDBOOK OFSOCIALPSYCHOLOGY33537(4thed.1998)(surveyingstudiesoncognitivedissonance).17Acontextualitycouldneverbemorethanrelative. Cf.MarthaMinow&ElizabethV.Spelman,InContext,63S.CAL.L.REV.1597,1651(1990)([T]hecalltomakejudg-mentsincontext...seemsmisleadingifitimpliesthatwecouldevermakejudgmentsoutside of a context; the question is always what context matters or what context should wemakematterforthismoment.).18Ananalogyinvolveswhatphilosophersoflanguagesometimesrefertoasdefaultmeaning.[D]efault interpretation of the speakers utterance is normally understood tomeansalientmeaningintendedbythespeaker,orpresumedbytheaddresseetohavebeen intended, and recovered (a) without the help of inference from the speakers inten-tionsor(b)withoutconsciousinferentialprocessaltogether. KatarzynaM.Jaszczolt,De-faults in Semantics and Pragmatics, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (EdwardN.Zaltaed.,2010),http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/defaults-semantics-pragmatics.But the literature contains no one, unique default model of utter-anceinterpretation. Id.19SeeMarceloDascal&JerzyWroblewski,TransparencyandDoubt:UnderstandingandInterpretation in Pragmatics and in Law, 7 LAW & PHIL. 203, 220 (1988) (A legal text whichformulates legal rules is always understood in the context of the legal system to which theserules belong.It is usually assumed that such system hasor should havethe propertiesof consistency, coherence and eventually completeness and lack of redundancy.Wheneverthe direct reading of a legal text does not conform to such assumed properties, one can saythat the systemic context generates a doubt that prompts a search for a more appropriateinterpretation.); cf. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 35054 (arguing that an interpreters values Rfrequentlyplayaroleindeterminationsofwhetherastatuteisambiguous,vague,orun-clear);Eskridge,supranote2,at1483(observingthatanapparentlycleartextcanbe Rrenderedambiguousby...highlyunreasonableconsequences).20Generally, to resolve cognitive dissonance, a person will either alter one or more ofher beliefs so that they become consonant with one another, alter her belief to accord withher behavior, or alter her behavior to conform to her beliefs. See FESTINGER, supra note 16, Rat 6; GILBERT ET AL., supra note 16, at 336 (The most obvious solution to dissonance is to Rengage in cognitive work to modify one of the dissonant elements (i.e., self-generated atti-tudechange).).\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN402.txt unknown Seq:6 2-MAY-14 9:01690 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:685statutes plain meaning after having identified it,21 perhaps on the as-sumptionthatthestatute,ifaccordeditsactualmeaning,wouldpro-duceanabsurdresult.22Thequestioninsteadiswhethersomeonesinitial,provisional,andpossiblyunthinkingassumptionaboutastat-utesmeaningorimplicationwasinfactcorrectwhenthestatuteswordsareseenincontext. TwoexampleswillillustratethekindofresponsethatIassociatewithinterpretivedissonance. One,whichisnotorious in the literature on statutory interpretation, may encouragethe view that interpretive dissonancehowever real as a psychologicalphenomenoncouldandshouldbeaccordednosignificanceintheapplication of faithful agent, and especially textualist, theories of stat-utoryinterpretation. ButIexpectthesecondtopullinstinctstothemoreaccurate,nearlyoppositeview.ChurchoftheHolyTrinityv.UnitedStates23famouslyheldthattheAlienContractLaborAct,whichmadeitunlawfultoassisttheimmi-gration of an alien under contract to perform labor or service of anykind,24 did not apply to the efforts of Holy Trinity Church to engagea foreign clergyman as its minister.The face of the statute containednoobviousambiguityorvagueness.25Readwithoutfurtherinforma-tionaboutthebackgroundagainstwhichCongresshadactedoritslikely values and purposes, the law would have covered a contract forthe services provided by a clergyman.26 But that first-blush interpreta-tionprovokedinterpretivedissonance:theSupremeCourtfounditinconceivablethatreasonablelegislatorscouldhavemeanttointer-fere with a religious congregations choice of its minister.27 Interpre-tivedissonancethusmarkedthefirststageofaninterpretiveprocessresulting in the conclusion that the Alien Contract Labor Act did notapply. TextualistsroutinelydenounceHolyTrinity.2821As Professor Molot notes, textualist scholars often criticize purposivists for employ-ing context in order to adjust or even contradict a statutes clear textual meaning.Molot,supranote14,at37. R22Cf.Manning,AbsurdityDoctrine,supranote8,at2471(Theabsurditydoctrine Rcomesintoplayonlyafteracourtprovisionallyidentifiesthestatutesclearsocialmean-ing . . . .).To refuse to enforce a statutes actual meaning on the grounds that doing sowouldproduceanabsurdresultisnotsomuchtointerpretastorevise.23143U.S.457(1892).24Id.at458.25See Manning, Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 8, at 2424 (describing the Alien Contract RLaborActasbeingofunforgivingbreadth).26See Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 458 (It must be conceded that the act of the [church]is within the letter of this section, for the relation of rector to his church is one of service,andimplieslaborontheonesidewithcompensationontheother.).27See id. at 459 ([W]e cannot think Congress intended to denounce with penalties atransactionlikethatinthepresentcase.).28See,e.g.,ZuniPub.Sch.Dist.No.89v.DeptofEduc.,550U.S.81,116(2007)(Scalia, J., dissenting) (derisively describing the majority opinion as adopting the approachof that miraculous redeemer of lost causes, Church of the Holy Trinity); SCALIA &GARNER,supranote7,at1113,22223(scorningHolyTrinity);SCALIA,supranote5,at18 R\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN402.txt unknown Seq:7 2-MAY-14 9:012014] TEXTUALISTANDPURPOSIVISTTHEORIES 691Thesecondexampleofaresorttointerpretivetheorytriggeredbyinterpretivedissonance,whichhasreceivedlessdiscussionintheliterature on statutory interpretation but possesses greater contempo-raryimportance,comesfrom42U.S.C. 1983,aReconstruction-erastatute that creates a cause of action against state officials who violatefederalrights.29Readliterally, 1983makesnoexceptionforsuitsseeking to enjoin state tax collection on the ground that a tax violatesthe Constitution.Nor would it leave room for the application of tradi-tionaldoctrinesofofficialimmunity30thatbarsuitsfordamagesagainst judges and prosecutors acting in those capacities and that alsopreclude recovery of money from most other state officials unless theyviolatedclearlyestablishedfederalrights.31Nevertheless, a 1983 suit to enjoin state tax collection producedevident interpretive dissonance among the Justices in National PrivateTruck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission32 that ultimately led tothe recognition of an implied statutory exception.Writing for a unan-imousCourt,JusticeClarenceThomas,arecognizedtextualist,33be-ganbynotingthattheCourthaslongrecognizedthatprinciplesof(characterizingHolyTrinityastheprototypicalcaseinvolvingthetriumphofsupposedlegislativeintent(ahandycoverforjudicialintent)overthetextofthelaw);ADRIANVERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETA-TION 93102 (2006) (arguing that the Court erred in both the framing and the executionofitsinquiry).29Thetextof 1983provides:Everypersonwho,undercolorofanystatute,ordinance,regulation,custom,orusage,ofanyState...subjects,orcausestobesubjected,anycitizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,orimmunitiessecuredbytheConstitutionandlaws,shallbeliabletotheparty injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedingforredress.42U.S.C. 1983(2006&Supp.V2011).Section 1983 has not been wholly ignored in the literature on statutory interpretation.See,e.g.,Eskridge,supranote2,at148488. Fordiscussionsofinterpretivemethodology Rfocusedspecificallyon 1983,seegenerallyHarryA.Blackmun,Section1983andFederalProtection of Individual RightsWill the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1(1985)(discussingtheproperscopeoffederalprotectionofindividualrightsunder 1983); Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67CORNELL L. REV. 482 (1982) (discussing the Courts contributions to current confusion ininterpreting 1983);SethF.Kreimer,TheSourceofLawinCivilRightsActions:SomeOldLight on Section 1983, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 601, 60411 (1985) (discussing how federal courtshavesketchedoutthedetailsof 1983).30SeeEisenberg,supranote29,at492(observingthatthestatuteaffordsnoexcep- Rtionsforspecialclassesofpersons).31SeeHarlowv.Fitzgerald,457U.S.800,818(1982). AlthoughHarlowwasacaseinvolving the immunities of federal officials sued directly under the Constitution in Bivensactions, see id. at 805, the Court, in crafting immunity rules for Bivens actions, announcedthatitwouldapplythesameimmunitystandardsinsuitsagainststateofficialsunder 1983,seeid.at818n.30.32515U.S.582(1995).33See,e.g.,JohnF.Manning,CompetingPresumptionsAboutStatutoryCoherence,74FORDHAML.REV.2009,2029(2006);Manning,supranote2,at114&n.7. R\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN402.txt unknown Seq:8 2-MAY-14 9:01692 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:685federalismandcomitygenerallycounselthatcourtsshouldadoptahands-off approach with respect to state tax administration and that[s]incethepassageof 1983,CongressandthisCourtrepeatedlyhave shown an aversion to federal interference with state tax adminis-tration.34TheCourtrespondedsimilarlyinTenneyv.Brandhove,a 1983caseinwhichtheplaintiffssoughtdamagesfromstatelegisla-tors who had allegedly violated the Constitution in their legislative ca-pacities.35Ineffectexplainingthebasisforitsinterpretivedissonance,theCourtbeganwitharecitationofthelongAmericantradition of protecting speech and action in the legislature and thepolicy reasons that support legislative immunity.36 Responding to theinterpretivedissonancethatthusarose,JusticeFelixFrankfurter,speakingfortheCourt,concludedthat[w]ecannotbelievethatCongressitself a staunch advocate of legislative freedomwould im-pinge on a tradition so well grounded in history and reason by covertinclusioninthegenerallanguagebeforeus.37JusticeHugoBlack,whoisoftenlabeledasatextualist,38concurredintheresult.39In identifying and explicating the role of interpretive dissonanceinfurnishingoccasionsforapplicationsoftheoriesofstatutoryinter-pretation, by purposivists and textualists alike, I shall argue that suchexperiences are frequently value driven, sometimes in a controversial,ideologically charged sense.In an important range of cases, differentinterpreters either will or will not experience interpretive dissonance,orwillexperienceitindifferentdegrees,duetodifferencesintheirvalues,40regardlessofwhethertheyaretextualistsorpurposivists.Sometimes an interpreters values will be engaged directly.At a mini-mum, an interpreters values will play a role in his or her ascription ofreasonable values to the legislature for purposes of assessing what thelegislatureplausiblycouldhavemeanttodirect.Although my claim that an interpreters values will prove relevantatthisthresholdstepmightappeartorepresentabanalrestatement34NatlPrivateTruckCouncil,515U.S.at586.35341U.S.367,369(1951).36Id.at37273.37Id.at376.38See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, A Tale of Two Textualists: A Critical Comparison of JusticesBlack and Scalia, 74 B.U. L. REV. 25, 26 (1994) (noting the intense and persistent procla-mationsoffidelitytotheconstitutionaltextofJusticesBlackandScalia).39See Tenney, 341 U.S. at 379 (Black, J., concurring) (invoking the long-standing andwise tradition that legislators are immune from legal responsibility for their intra-legislativestatementsandactivities). AccordingtoDavidAchtenberg,thelegislativehistoryof 1983isconsistentwiththerecognitionoflegislativeimmunity,thoughofanarrowerscope than the immunity that exists under modern doctrine. See David Achtenberg, Immu-nity Under 42 U.S.C. 1983: Interpretive Approach and the Search for the Legislative Will, 86 NW.U.L.REV.497,50211(1992).40Cf. DWORKIN, supranote2,at354(notingthatpeoplewithdifferentvalueswill Rsometimesdifferintheirjudgmentsofwhetherastatuteisunclear).\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN402.txt unknown Seq:9 2-MAY-14 9:012014] TEXTUALISTANDPURPOSIVISTTHEORIES 693ofafamiliarrealistinsight,moreisatstake. Whenfaithfulagenttheories emphasize that interpretation must occur in context, ideolog-icallyinflectedjudgmentsthatlanguagemaynotmeanwhatatfirstblushitmightappeartomeancannotbelabeledcategoricallyasre-grettable seepages of an interpreters values into a process that ideallywouldbevalueneutral. Instead,Ishallargue,theroleofvaluesisirreducible in triggering apprehensions that statutory language reallymaynotmeanwhatatfirstblushitmightappeartomeanasanytheorythatinsiststhatinterpretationnecessarilyoccursincontextmustacknowledge,eveniftextualistshaveoftenrefusedtodoso.41The second underappreciated role that interpreters values inevi-tably play in both textualist and purposivist theories of statutory inter-pretationemergesintheprocessthroughwhichuncertainties,including those created by interpretive dissonance, are resolved.Withallagreeingthatinterpretationmustoccurincontext,andwithProfessor Mannings distinction between semantic contexts and policycontexts having achieved broad acceptance,42 another, less frequentlynotedaspectofthedebateaboutappropriateinterpretivecontextshaslargelyescapedattention:bothsemanticandpolicycontextscanbe defined either relatively broadly or relatively narrowly.43 Viewed inanarrowsemanticcontextdefinedmostlybydictionariesandgram-mar books, the statute involved in Holy Trinity would have brooked no41SeeMolot,supranote14,at37(citingtextualistsources). R42The vocabulary may have some tendency to confuse.Although textualists say thattheyareconcernedwithsemanticcontext,whattheyseektoascertainisnotlimitedtoalegaltextssemanticmeaninginsofarasthesemanticcontentofanexpressionisfullydeterminedbythelexicalmeaningofthewordsusedandthesyntacticalstructureofthesentence.Andrei Marmor, Textualism in Context 6 (U.S.C. Gould Sch. of Law Legal StudiesResearchPaperSeries,PaperNo.12-13,2012),availableathttp://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2112384. Rather,textualistsseektoidentifyalegaltextsprag-maticorcontextual,ratherthanitspurelysemantic,meaning. Seesupranote11andac- Rcompanyingtext;seealsoMarmor,supra,at7([T]herearemanycasesinwhichthespeakerassertssomethingdifferentfromthesemanticcontentoftheexpressionused(e.g.,adoctorintheemergencyroomtellingapatientwithagunshotwound,Dontworry, you are not going to die.The doctor is not promising the patient eternal life; she isjustsayingthatthisparticularwoundisnotlife-threatening).).43See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Why Abstention Is Not Illegitimate: An Essay on the DistinctionBetween Legitimate and Illegitimate Statutory Interpretation and Judicial Lawmaking, 107 NW.U. L. REV. 847, 87879 (2013); cf. David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Struc-ture of Contract Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1830 (1991) (Nothing about the neces-sary contexts that provide the basis for interpretation can tell one how far one should go ingetting information about that context.).Issues arising from the need to frame the con-textwithinwhichstatutoryinterpretationproperlyoccursmayexemplifythemoreprofound claim that in continuous relationships played out over time, such as those involv-ing the government and its citizens or Congress and the courts, constitutional law has nocriteria for isolating transactions from . . . background relationship[s] and that the fram-ing of transactions or contexts for analysis is therefore frequently outcome determinativeinlegalcontroversies. DarylJ.Levinson,FramingTransactionsinConstitutionalLaw,111YALEL.J.1311,1313(2002).\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN402.txt unknown Seq:10 2-MAY-14 9:01694 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:685ministerialexception,44norwouldthelanguageof 1983haveexcluded suits to enjoin state tax collection or actions to recover dam-ages from state legislators.Nor could such exceptions plausibly haveemerged if the statutes were viewed in a narrow policy context, charac-terizedbyarough-and-readyidentificationoftheprimaryproblemthatthelegislaturesoughttoaddress,withoutattentiontoother,leaveningconcernsthatreasonablelegislatorslikelywouldalsohavehad.In order to reach the conclusions that it did, the Supreme CourtneededtobroadentheinterpretivecontextasIshallexplainmorefully belowto include a richer informational background includinghistoricpatternsofrespectforreligiousautonomy,federalnoninter-ference with state taxes, and recognition of official immunity.Only inlightofthatexpandedbackgrounddiditbecomeplausibletocon-clude that reasonable legislators would have wanted exceptions to thestatutes literal language and that reasonable interpreters should con-struethestatutesasincludingexceptions.If both textualists and purposivists need to specify the breadth ofthecontextwithinwhichstatutesshouldbeinterpreted,andifthejudgmentsastoappropriatebreadthwillsometimesdeterminetheoutcome of cases, then issues bearing on the specification of semanticand policy contexts assume vital importance.45 As I shall explain, thespecificationoftheappropriatesemanticorpolicycontextforinter-pretingstatutesisoftendriven,andindeedinevitablyso,bypartlyvalue-based judgments.In the case of 1983, for example, the broad-ening of the interpretive context to recognize that Congress legislatedagainstabackgroundinwhichofficialssuedatcommonlawsome-timesenjoyedimmunitydefenseswasalmostcertainlyinfluencedbyrecognitionthatsuchdefensesserveimportantpolicygoals.4644Seesupranotes2426andaccompanyingtext. R45See Abner S. Greene, The Missing Step of Textualism, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1913, 1923(2006)(characterizingtheabsenceofaprincipledmethodfordistinguishingrelevantfromirrelevantaspectsofbackgroundknowledgeasthemissingstepoftextualism);Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1023,102932 (1998) (emphasizing the importance of the question of what constitutes relevantcontextforadministrativelawadjudicationandcallingattentiontobackgroundprinciples).46JudgeLearnedHandgaveaclassicexplanationoftenquotedbytheSupremeCourt:It does indeed go without saying that an official, who is in fact guilty ofusing his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any other personalmotive not connected with the public good, should not escape liability forthe injuries he may so cause; and, if it were possible in practice to confinesuch complaints to the guilty, it would be monstrous to deny recovery.Thejustification for doing so is that it is impossible to know whether the claim iswell founded until the case has been tried, and that to submit all officials,the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the inevita-bledangerofitsoutcome,woulddampentheardorofallbutthemostresolute,orthemostirresponsible,intheunflinchingdischargeoftheir\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN402.txt unknown Seq:11 2-MAY-14 9:012014] TEXTUALISTANDPURPOSIVISTTHEORIES 695Again,Iwanttoemphasize,myargumentisnotthattextualistsareunfaithfultotheirowntheorieswhenevertheyallowtheirviewsaboutsoundpolicytoinfluencetheirjudgmentsabouttheappropri-atebreadthofaninterpretivecontext. Thereis,andcouldbe,nopurelynon-normativecriterionpreciselymarkingwhatshouldbedeemedrelevantorirrelevant.Thethirdoccasionforjudgesvaluestoaffecttheirinterpretivedecisionsthencomestothefore. Havingspecifiedtheappropriateinterpretivecontext,bothpurposivistsandtextualistsmustmakede-terminationsofreasonableness. Purposivistsinquirewhatreasona-ble legislators would have intended.47 For textualists, the comparablequestioninvolveshowareasonablepersonwouldunderstandstatu-tory language within an interpretive context that makes it plausible tothink that that language should not be given its relatively acontextualsemantic meaning.48 As I shall explain, the reasonable interpreter is aconstruct,49anditcannotbeavalue-freeconstruct. Asthephiloso-pherDonaldDavidsonputit,whenanyone,scientistorlayman,as-cribesthoughtstoothers,henecessarilyemployshisownnormsinmaking the ascriptions.50 Under these circumstances, I shall argue, ahypotheticalreasonablepersonsdeterminationabouthowastatutethat occasions interpretive dissonance ought to be interpreted will in-evitablyreflectjudgmentsaboutwhatwouldbemorally,politically,andpracticallyprovidentorimprovident.duties.Again and again the public interest calls for action which may turnouttobefoundedonamistake,inthefaceofwhichanofficialmaylaterfindhimselfhardputtoittosatisfyajuryofhisgoodfaith. Theremustindeed be means of punishing public officers who have been truant to theirduties;butthatisquiteanothermatterfromexposingsuchashavebeenhonestly mistaken to suit by anyone who has suffered from their errors.Asissooftenthecase,theanswermustbefoundinabalancebetweentheevils inevitable in either alternative.In this instance it has been thought inthe end better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officersthantosubjectthosewhotrytodotheirdutytotheconstantdreadofretaliation. Judgedasresnova,weshouldnothesitatetofollowthepathlaiddowninthebooks.Gregoirev.Biddle,177F.2d579,581(2dCir.1949).47See,e.g.,Manning,supranote7,at102(Inbrief,LegalProcess-stylepurposivism Rrests on the assumption that interpretation should proceed as if a reasonable person wereframingcoherentlegislativepolicy.).48See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 59, 65 (1988) (We should look at the statutory structure and hearthewordsastheywouldsoundinthemindofaskilled,objectivelyreasonableuserofwords.); Manning, Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 8, at 239293 ([Textualism] ask[s] how a Rreasonableperson,conversantwiththerelevantsocialandlinguisticconventions,wouldreadthetextincontext.).49SeeManning,supranote7,at83(acknowledgingthatthereasonablereader Rwhose understanding of a statute is the touchstone of textualism is a hypothetical, ideal-izedconstruct).50DONALD DAVIDSON, Representation and Interpretation, in PROBLEMS OF RATIONALITY 87,97(2004).\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN402.txt unknown Seq:12 2-MAY-14 9:01696 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:685In arguing that values affect the application of both textualist andpurposivisttheoriesofstatutoryinterpretationinwaysthatparticipantsindebatesaboutthosetheoriesandespeciallytextual-istshaveoftenfailedtograsp,mypurposesareneithercynicalnordebunking.Throughout, I assume that the choice of either a textual-ist or a purposivist theory can have consequences.51 Yet I do not seekto defend one in preference to the other,52 even though I argue thattextualism lacks some of the comparative, value-excluding advantagesthat its proponents have sometimes claimed for it.The sole aspirationofthisArticleistopromoteanenrichedunderstandingofhowtheparallel structures of textualism and purposivism result in symmetricalrolesforvaluejudgmentsintheapplicationofthetwotheories.The remainder of this Article develops as follows.Part I discussesthecircumstancesthatprovokeappealstotheoriesofstatutoryinter-pretation and gives a fuller exposition of the role of interpretive disso-nance as a triggering phenomenon.Part II, which forms the Articlesheart,describesthebasictenetsoftextualistandpurposivisttheoriesofstatutoryinterpretation,explainsthesignificancethattheyrespec-tivelyassigntostatutesinterpretivecontext,anddiscusseshowboththeoriesrequirejudgmentsofreasonableness. PartIIalsodemon-strates that the breadth with which the relevant interpretive context isspecifiedthe semantic context for textualists and the policy contextforpurposivistsinconjunctionwithvalue-ladenjudgmentsofrea-sonableness, will often prove decisive in determining a statutes mean-ing. PartIIIseekstoavoidmisunderstandingbyclarifyingsomelimitations on the relatively bold theses that Parts I and II advance.Italso anticipates and rebuffs the objection that the judicial opinions onwhich I rely in revealing the necessary role of value judgments within51Cf.AbbeR.Gluck,TheStatesAsLaboratoriesofStatutoryInterpretation:MethodologicalConsensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1768 (2010) (conceding thatone cannot prove that methodology dictates outcomes in cases but emphasizing that itsurely affects opinion writing). But cf. James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Con-struction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 5860 (2005) (con-cluding that Justices reliance on either substantive or language canons of construction isdrivenbyideology,notmethodology);FrankB.Cross,TheSignificanceofStatutoryInterpre-tive Methodologies, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1971, 199195 (2007) (finding that convergenceupontextualistandpurposivistmethodologiesdoesnotproduceconsensusamongtheJusticeswithrespecttoresults).52I also make no effort to compare the relative merits of either textualism or purposi-vismwiththeoriesthatcallforstatutoryinterpreterstoplayrolesotherthanthatofafaithful agent of the enacting legislature.In the domain of constitutional interpretation, Ihaveelsewheredefendedanapproachinwhichprecedent,amongotherfactors,some-times calls for interpretive conclusions other than those that a faithful agent of the framersandratifiersofrelevantconstitutionalprovisionsmighthavereached. See RICHARDH.FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 11126 (2001); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Con-stitutional Precedent Viewed Through the Lens of Hartian Positivist Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. REV.1107, 1116 (2008) (arguing that overturning some settled but mistaken precedents wouldexceed[theCourts]lawfulauthority).\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN402.txt unknown Seq:13 2-MAY-14 9:012014] TEXTUALISTANDPURPOSIVISTTHEORIES 697textualistaswellaspurposivisttheoriesrepresentbetrayals,ratherthanapplications,oftextualistprinciples.ITHEOCCASIONS OFINTERPRETATIONThe term interpretation can be used in either of two senses.Inthemorecapacious,everyapplicationofaruleisalsoaninterpreta-tion,53asiseverysuccessfulgraspingofthemeaningofanotherswords.54Butthisisseldomthesenseinwhichthewordinterpreta-tionfiguresinlegaldebates.Inlegaldiscourse,theterminterpretationtypicallyreferstoareflective, problem-solving process triggered by an uncertainty or puz-zle.55 Most of the time, we understand perfectly well what laws mean,or how they apply to particular facts, without need for what we wouldnormally think of as interpretation56 and certainly without applying aprescriptive theory such as textualism or purposivism.Someone whodrivesthroughastopsigncannotordinarilypresentarecognizablequestionofinterpretationbysayingthatshehadnotinterpretedthestop sign to mean stop.Similarly, if a statute imposes a tax of 15%,therewillordinarilybenointerpretivequestionofwhetheritmightmean10%. Weneedprescriptivetheoriesofinterpretation,andde-batethem,onlyasmeansofresolvinguncertaintiesinourtypicallyun-self-conscious,largelyatheoreticaleffortstoachievelinguisticun-derstanding.(Indeed, if we needed a prescriptive theory of interpre-tationtoknowthatastopsignmeantstop,wewouldpresumablyalsoneedaprescriptivetheoryofinterpretationtointerpretthatfirst-order theory of interpretation, and it would be, so to speak, pre-scriptivetheoriesofinterpretationallthewaydowninanendlessregress.57)Recognizing that we need prescriptive theories of statutory inter-pretation only when our ordinary, typically un-self-conscious means of53FREDERICKSCHAUER,PLAYING BY THERULES:APHILOSOPHICALEXAMINATION OFRULE-BASEDDECISION-MAKING INLAW AND INLIFE207(1991).54See,e.g.,DONALDDAVIDSON,RadicalInterpretation,in INQUIRIES INTOTRUTH ANDIN-TERPRETATION125,125(2ded.2001)[hereinafterDAVIDSON,RadicalInterpretation](Allunderstandingofthespeechofanotherinvolvesradicalinterpretation.);DONALDDAVIDSON,BeliefandtheBasisofMeaning,in INQUIRIES INTOTRUTH ANDINTERPRETATION,supra, at 141, 141 (We interpret a bit of linguistic behaviour when we say what a speakerswordsmeanonanoccasionofuse.).55See SCHAUER, supra note 53, at 207 (recognizing that we ordinarily do not think of Rmostapplicationsasinterpretationsforthereisasenseinwhichtointerpretatextoraruleistodealwithaquandary).56See DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH 8688 (1996) (criticizing Dworkin as mak-ingfartoomuchoftheworkofinterpretation).57See RONALD BEINER, POLITICAL JUDGMENT 131 (1983); PATTERSON, supra note 56, at R88;Charny,supranote43,at1819. R\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN402.txt unknown Seq:14 2-MAY-14 9:01698 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:685understandingleaveusuncertainorpuzzled,58Iwoulddistinguishthree characteristic, but partly overlapping and not necessarily exclu-sive, occasions for resort to such theories.59 The first involves ambigu-ity. Ambiguityexistswhenlanguagemighthaveeitheroftworelativelyclearlyspecifiablemeanings,butweareunsurewhichap-plies.60Forexample,doesaregulationofbanksrefertopropertythatabutsriversortofinancialinstitutions?61Asecondtypeofoccasionforpuzzlementinvolvesvagueness.Many terms or linguistic usages include a fringe of uncertain applica-tions.62Awell-wornexampleinvolvesanordinancedictatingnove-hiclesinthepark.63Althoughitplainlyappliestocarsandtrucks,doubtmayariseaboutwhetheritencompassesbabycarriagesorbicycles.Athirdkindoftriggerforappealstotheoriesofstatutoryinter-pretation involves what I have called interpretive dissonance betweenfirst-blush statutory meaning and implicit assumptions about what thelegislature would have wished to achieve.Frequently, a sense of inter-pretivedissonancemayariserelativelydirectlyfromajudgesownconvictions if a first-blush meaning yields what she would regard as atroublingoutcomeandifsheassumesthatsheandthelegislaturehaveasignificantcoreofsharedvalues. Insomecases,ofcourse,ajudge might recognize a sharp divergence on some issues between her58AsDuncanKennedyemphasizes,theremaybeoccasionsonwhichasenseofun-certaintyorpuzzlementemergesfromaprior,instrumentallyorideologicallymotivatedefforttodiscovervaguenessorambiguitythatafirst-blushmeaningwouldnototherwisehavedisplayed. SeeDuncanKennedy,FreedomandConstraintinAdjudication:ACriticalPhenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518, 54748 (1986).It is, for example, a familiar role oflawyerstoattempttogeneratedoubtswherejudgeswouldnototherwisehavefeltthem.ProfessorKennedypointsoutthatjudges,spurredbyideologicalcommitment,mightas-sumeasimilarrole. Seeid.59Forasimilarcategorization,seeDWORKIN, supranote2,at351. R60Assodefined,ambiguityisdifferentfrom,anddoesnotsubsumeallcasesof,vagueness. See Ralf Poscher, Ambiguity and Vagueness in Legal Interpretation, in THE OXFORDHANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND LAW 128, 129 (Peter M. Tiersma & Lawrence M. Solan eds.,2012)(Ambiguousexpressionshavemultiplemeanings,asinthecaseofthehomonymbankwhichcanmeanbothriverbankandcommercialbank....Incontrast,anexpressionisvagueifithasborderlinecases.);LawrenceB.Solum,TheInterpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 9798 (2010) (In the techni-cal sense, ambiguity refers to the multiplicity of sense: a term is ambiguous if it has morethan one sense. . . .The technical sense of vagueness refers to the existence of borderlinecases:atermisvagueiftherearecaseswherethetermmightormightnotapply.).61SeeManning,supranote2,at171;Poscher,supranote60,at129. R62See TIMOTHYA.O.ENDICOTT,VAGUENESS INLAW9(2000)(describingalawasvague if the boundaries of the area affected by [it] are unclear); see also H.L.A. HART, THECONCEPT OF LAW 126 (3d ed. 2012) (There will indeed be plain cases . . . to which generalexpressionsareclearlyapplicable...buttherewillalsobecaseswhereitisnotclearwhethertheyapplyornot.).63Thismuch-discussedexampleapparentlyoriginatedwithH.L.A.Hart,PositivismandtheSeparationofLawandMorals,71HARV.L.REV.593,607(1958). Formorerecentdiscussion,seeSCALIA&GARNER, supranote7,at3639. R\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN402.txt unknown Seq:15 2-MAY-14 9:012014] TEXTUALISTANDPURPOSIVISTTHEORIES 699moralandpolicyviewsandthoseofthelegislature. Ifso,shemightexperiencenojoltofsurpriseattheappearancethatthelegislaturehaddirectedanoutcomethatshefindsrepugnant. Yetevenanalienatedjudgewillexperiencesomefirst-blushmeaningsthatseemto her to prescribe unreasonable results as a trigger for further inter-pretiveinquiry.LikethecasesthatIdiscussedintheIntroduction,manyofthemostcontroversialcasesintheliteratureonstatutoryinterpretationinvolvereadilyidentifiableinterpretivedissonance. Thisistrue,forexample,ofRiggsv.Palmer,inwhichthecourtheldthatagrandsonwho had murdered his grandfather64 should not receive the grandfa-thersestateunderastatuteprescribinginheritanceinaccordancewithformallyvalidwills.65Interpretivedissonancealsoprovokedaninterpretiveanalysisthoughonethatultimatelyresultedinthestat-utes literal, exceptionless applicationin a case involving the habitatoftheendangeredsnaildarter,TennesseeValleyAuthorityv.Hill.66There, though the jarring implications led to a showdown about statu-tory interpretation methodology, a majority of the Justices held that astatutebarringgovernmentfundingofprojectsthatthreateneden-dangeredspeciesbarredthecompletionofalargeandimportantdam.67What deserves emphasis, however, is that interpretive dissonanceplays a central role in many cases that have excited little controversy.As I have noted, the Supreme Court agreed unanimously that 1983includesanunwrittenexceptionforsuitstoenjoinstatetaxcollec-tion,68anditsinitialdecisiontoupholdanimmunitydefensein 1983casescameby81.69Manycasesthatcourtsresolvebyapply-ing well-accepted canons of statutory interpretationincluding thoseestablishing presumptions that criminal statutes should not be read toimpose liability for serious offenses in the absence of mens rea70 andthat limitations periods are subject to equitable tolling71exhibit asimilarlogic. Anyfirst-blushappearancethatthelegislaturehadim-posedcriminalliabilityintheabsenceofmensrea,particularlywithregard to a serious offense, or established a statute of limitations that6422N.E.188,189(N.Y.1889).65Id.at191.66437U.S.153(1978).67Seeid.at172.68Seesupranotes3234andaccompanyingtext. R69SeeTenneyv.Brandhove,341U.S.367(1951).70See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 (1994); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note7,at303. R71Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49 (2002) (quoting Irwin v. Dept of VeteransAffairs,498U.S.89,95(1990)).\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN402.txt unknown Seq:16 2-MAY-14 9:01700 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:685countenancednoequitableexceptions,wouldprovokesurpriseandthusinterpretiveuncertainty.Thatexperiencesofinterpretivedissonancenumberamongtheoccasionsfortheapplicationofinterpretivetheoryshouldelicitnoresistance. Legalinterpretationalmostnecessarilyreflectsanassumptionsimilartowhatphilosophershavelabeledtheprincipleofcharity,72whichsaysthat,otherthingsbeingequal,weoughttointerpretapersonashavingreasonablebeliefs.73Inencounteringutterancesinnearlyalllinguisticcontexts,wecharacteristicallypro-ceedonthebasisofassumptionsabouttheintelligence,goodfaith,andlikelyinterests,values,andconcernsofthespeaker.74Withoutsuchassumptions,someofwhichinvolvetheascriptionofvalues,wecould not communicate with each other nearly as effectively as we do.Althoughlegislaturesareofcoursemultimemberbodies,lackingthementalattributesandpreferencesofnaturalpersons,textualistsaswellaspurposivistspostulatethatlegislationisthecoherentexpres-sion of a rational lawmaker and reflects what some textualists describeas an objective or objectified even if not a subjective legislative in-tent.75 As Professor Manning puts it, textualists have sought to devisea constructive intent that satisfies the minimum conditions for mean-ingfullytracingstatutorymeaningtothelegislativeprocess.76Whenstatutorylanguagesfirst-blushmeaningappearsdiscor-dantwithwhatwewouldexpectreasonablelegislatorstohavedi-rected,orwhatwewouldexpectthelawtoprescribeinlightofculturally based understandings and what we take to be widely shared72Dascal&Wroblewski,supranote19,at205. R73Christopher Gauker, The Principle of Charity, 69 SYNTHESE 1, 1 (1986).For two influ-ential and heavily cited works on the principle of charity, see DAVIDSON, Radical Interpreta-tion,supranote54,at13637;WILLARDVANORMANQUINE,WORD ANDOBJECT59&n.2 R(1960).74In a particularly well-known example, H.P. Grice identifies a number of normativemaxims that are conventionally at work in human conversation and that function to facil-itatecooperationinthecommunicationofthoughtandinformation,including[m]akeyour contribution as informative as is required, [t]ry to make your contribution one thatis true, [b]e relevant, and [a]void obscurity of expression. PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THEWAY OFWORDS2628(1989). AccordingtoGrice,wenormallytrustotherstoobservethese maxims and feel entitled to draw inferences about the meaning of their utterances inreliance on them. See id.For the argument that Grices theory functions better as a theoryof communication than as a theory of meaning, see Heidi M. Hurd, Sovereignty in Silence, 99YALE L.J. 945, 965 & n.52 (1990) (Contrary to what Grice contended, we must look to theconventionswhichgovernthemeaningofsentencestodeterminewhataspeakermeansratherthanlooktowhatthespeakermeanstodeterminewhathisorhersentencesmean.).75See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 5, at 17 (We look for a sort of objectified intentthe Rintent that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside theremainderofthecorpusjuris.);CalebNelson,WhatisTextualism?,91VA.L.REV.347,35357(2005)(discussingtextualistssearchforstatutesobjectifiedintent).76Manning,supranote6,at423. R\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN402.txt unknown Seq:17 2-MAY-14 9:012014] TEXTUALISTANDPURPOSIVISTTHEORIES 701values, the deepest implicit assumptions underlying linguistic commu-nicationwhichinvolvetheattributionofmassiveagreement77about many matters of fact and valuethus cause mental alarm bellstosound.78Asnotedabove,theresultwillproveuncontroversialinmany cases.For example, nearly every informed observer might regis-ter surprise at any first-blush appearance that Congress had enacted astatutethatpurportedtoregulatetheconductofnon-AmericansoutsidetheUnitedStates,79notwithstandinglanguagethatincludedno explicit limitations.Even in uncontroversial cases, however, an in-terpretersvaluesinescapablyplayaroleintheascriptionofassump-tionsorpurposesoranobjectiveintenttoCongress. Allelseequal,the principle of charity calls for ascribing reasonable beliefs, purposes,or intents;80 and the idea of reasonableness, as I shall explain shortly,hasanirreduciblynormativeaspect.81Ifitshouldnotbecontroversialthatexperiencesofinterpretivedissonance will occasion interpretive inquiries into possible disparitiesbetween statutes first-blush and actual meanings, neither should it besurprisingthatpeoplewithdifferentideologicalviewswillsometimesexperiencedifferentfirst-blushinterpretationsasjarring. Forexam-ple,conservativesmaintainthatfirst-blushinterpretationsthatwouldstripthestatesoftheirsovereignimmunityfromsuitoraltertradi-tionalpatternsofstate-federalrelationsrequirefurtherinterpretiveexamination within a broader interpretive context than that suppliedbydictionaries,grammarbooks,andotherwisebarestatutorylanguage.82Reflectingtheirsomewhatdifferentideological77JonathanE.Adler,Charity,Interpretation,Fallacy,29PHIL.&RHETORIC329,330(1996). AdlernotonlyascribesthisviewtoDavidsonbutalsoultimatelydefendsit.78SeeDascal&Wroblewski,supranote19,at205(Themeaningofalegaltextis Rusually described as the will . . . of the historical law-maker.Therefore, the search for themeaning in question ought to use all means relevant for reconstructing that will.On thisview, however, the law-maker is not only the alleged historical agent, but also a normativeconstruct, for he is endowed with the properties of a rational agent.This means that theinterpretationmustfollowaprincipleofcharity[,]i.e.,itmustascribetothetextthatmeaningthatmaximizesitsrationality. (citationomitted)).79SeeBroganv.UnitedStates,522U.S.398,406(1998)(citingUnitedStatesv.Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 631 (1818)) (invoking interpretive presumption that stat-utes do not apply extraterritorially); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 7, at 26872 (describing Randdefendinganinterpretivecanonpresumingthatstatutesdonotapplyextraterritorially).80Seesupranotes7273andaccompanyingtext. R81Seeinfranotes10509andaccompanyingtext. R82See,e.g.,SeminoleTribeofFla.v.Florida,517U.S.44,5556(1996)(quotingBlatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 786 (1991)) (stating that, as a result ofthe important role played by the Eleventh Amendment and the broader principles that itreflects,acongressionalintenttoabrogatestatesovereignimmunitymustbeobviousfrom a clear legislative statement ); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (quot-ing Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 242 (1985)) (relying on a presump-tion that if Congress intends to alter the usual constitutional balance between the Statesand the Federal Government, it must make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN402.txt unknown Seq:18 2-MAY-14 9:01702 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:685predispositions, liberals are more likely to see the need for a broader-gaugedinterpretiveprocesswhenfirst-blushinterpretationswouldstripfederaljurisdictionoversuitsallegingconstitutionalviolations83or classify affirmative action as a forbidden species of race discrimina-tion.84InBrownv.Plata,85JusticesAntoninScaliaandClarenceThomasconcludedindissentthataninterpretationofthePrisonLitigationReformActthatauthorizedalowercourttomandatethereleaseof46,000stateprisonersifthestatedidnotendunconstitu-tional prison overcrowding entailed such absurd consequences thatthe Court should bend every effort to read the law in such a way as toavoid that outrageous result.86 Given the indignities to which prison-ersweresubjected,themajorityopinionwrittenbyJusticeAnthonyKennedyandjoinedbyfourmoreliberalJusticessawnoabsurditywhatsoever.87My point, I emphasize, is analytical, not critical.It arises not fromany feature peculiar either to textualism or purposivism, which mightbederidedorembraced,butfromacharacteristicwayinwhichlan-guagefunctionsasamechanismofhumancommunicationandinlaw.Indeed, I do not mean to characterize interpretive dissonance asa constitutive element of either textualism or purposivism.Rather, itisaphenomenonintrinsictohumanpsychologyandlinguisticcom-municationthatformspartofthecontextwithinwhichtextualismandpurposivismbothoperate. Toputthepointslightlydifferently,everyprescriptivetheoryofstatutoryinterpretationpresupposestheexistence of a triggering mechanism or mechanisms even if it does notsupplyone. Andinterpretivedissonanceisonesuchmechanism.Againstthisclaim,itdoesnotsufficetoassertastextualistssome-times dothat judges should never appeal to context to contradict alanguage of the statute in concluding that a federal statute barring age discrimination byemployers,includingStates,didnotapplytostatejudges(internalquotationmarksomitted)).83See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (demanding a heightened show-ing of congressional intent to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims in light oftheseriousconstitutionalquestionthatadenialofreviewwouldraise).84See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 20008 (1979) (hold-ingthataprovisionofTitleVIImakingracialdiscriminationunlawfuldidnotforbidpri-vate affirmative action plans because the background of the legislative history of Title VIIand the historical context from which the Act arose revealed an intent to benefit histori-callydisadvantagedgroups).85131S.Ct.1910(2011).86Id.at195051(Scalia,J.,dissenting). JusticeScaliaacknowledgedthathispre-ferredinterpretationwouldseverelylimitthecircumstancesunderwhichacourtcouldissuestructuralinjunctionstoremedyallegedlyunconstitutionalprisonconditions,al-thoughitwouldnoteliminatethementirely. Id.at1958.87Seeid.at1947(describingtheresultasconstitutionallyandstatutorilymandatedunderthecircumstances).\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN402.txt unknown Seq:19 2-MAY-14 9:012014] TEXTUALISTANDPURPOSIVISTTHEORIES 703plaintext.88Onceagain,interpretivedissonanceoccasionsaconsid-erationofcontexttodeterminewhetheratextreallydoesplainlymeanwhatatfirstblushitappearstomean.IITEXTUALISM ANDPURPOSIVISM:DEFINITIONSANDCOMPARISONSOverthepasttwenty-fiveyears,scholarshavelaboredtodistin-guishpurpose-basedandtext-basedtheoriesofstatutoryinterpreta-tion.89 As the Introduction emphasized, however, modern textualistsconcurwithpurposivistsinassigningacrucialroletothecontextinwhichthelegislatureenactedastatute.90Thisagreementhighlightsthecommonchallengethattextualistsandpurposivistsfaceinneed-ingtospecify,ordefineprecisely,thecontextwithinwhichtogaugestatutorymeanings. Theyalsoshareanotherchallenge. Onceanin-terpretivecontextisspecified,bothrelyonalargelyunanalyzedno-tionofreasonablenesstodetermineultimatemeaning. Forpurposivists,thetouchstoneforidentifyingstatutorymeaningistheconstruct of a reasonable legislator.91 For textualists, the relevant ac-torisanimaginedreasonablepersonwhomustdeterminenotwhatthelegislatureintended,butwhatitswordsmean,incontext.92Behindthesestructuralparallelsliedeepercommonalities.Neither purposivism nor textualism possesses the resources to specify,inadvance,theappropriatebreadthoftherelevantinterpretivecon-textforresolvingallissuesofstatutorymeaning. Inmakingthatde-terminationinparticularcases,interpreterscannotbevalueneutral.Similarly, for both purposivists and textualists, ascriptions of reasona-blenessrequirenormativejudgments.Intalkingabouttextualistsandpurposivists,Inecessarilypaintwithabroadbrush. Disagreementsundoubtedlyexistwithinbothcamps.93Moreover,theremaybepurerversionsofthosetheories88See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 5, at 16 ([W]hen the text of a statute is clear, that is the Rendofthematter.).89Ontheawakeningofinterestintheoriesofstatutoryinterpretation,seePhilipP.Frickey,FromtheBigSleeptotheBigHeat:TheRevivalofTheoryinStatutoryInterpretation,77MINN.L.REV.241,24849(1992).90Seesupranote7andaccompanyingtext. R91See, e.g., HART & SACKS, supra note 3, at 1378 (urging interpreters to presume that Rthe legislature consists of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably);FelixFrankfurter,SomeReflectionsontheReadingofStatutes,47COLUM.L.REV.527,539(1947)(arguingthatthejudgemustseekandeffectuateastatutesaimorpolicy).92See,e.g.,Manning,supranote7,at75. R93Amongtextualists,forexample,JusticeScaliaacceptsthetraditionalcanonthatcourts will not read statutes to dictate plainly absurd results, see SCALIA & GARNER, supranote 7, at 234, while Professor Manning argues on textualist grounds for abandoning the Rabsurditycanon,seeManning,AbsurdityDoctrine,supranote8,at2391. R\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN402.txt unknown Seq:20 2-MAY-14 9:01704 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:685than the practice of judges, Justices, and commentators who are famil-iarly associated with them reflects.94 In Part III.B, I shall discuss ques-tionsframedbyclaimsthatavowedlypurposivistandespeciallytextualistJusticeshavebetrayedratherthanappliedtheirmethodologiesinparticularcases. Here,temporarilyputtingthosequestions to one side, I assume that the decisions reached in practicebytextualistandpurposivistjudges,likethepositionsadoptedbyscholars who align themselves with textualist or purposivist methodol-ogies,illustrateplausibleapplicationsofthosetheories.A. PurposivismForpurposivists,therelevantcontextfortheinterpretationofstatutes is what Professor Manning calls their policy context, involv-ing evidence of the demonstrable and likely aims of the presumptivelyreasonablelegislatorswhoenactedaprovisioninthefirstplace.95Modernpurposivistscharacteristicallydrawtheirinspirationfrom,andseektorefine,anapproachinitiallydevelopedbyProfessorsHenry Hart and Albert Sacks.96 In Hart and Sackss approach, judgesshould begin by reading statutes carefully and then conjure up plau-sibleorganizingpurposesforthem,97predicatedontheassumptionthat the legislature was made up of reasonable persons pursuing rea-sonablepurposesreasonably.98Incasesinvolvinginterpretivedissonance,purposivistsfaceobvi-ous questions about the appropriate breadth of the relevant interpre-tivecontext. Asiswellknown,manypurposivistswillsometimesexamine legislative history to find evidence of what the legislators whoenacted a statute sought to achieve.99 Even in the absence of specifi-callyon-pointlegislativehistory,moreover,purposivistscanbroaden94See Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REV.117, 121 (2009) (arguing that a pure version of textualism would allow absurd results).95SeeManning,supranote7,at91. R96See HART&SACKS,supranote3. R97Frickey,supranote89,at249. R98HART&SACKS, supranote3,at1378. R99See,e.g.,ZuniPub.Sch.Dist.No.89v.DeptofEduc.,550U.S.81,106(2007)(Stevens, J., concurring) (Analysis of legislative history is . . . a traditional tool of statutoryconstruction.There is no reason why we must confine ourselves to, or begin our analysiswith,thestatutorytextifothertoolsofstatutoryconstructionprovidebetterevidenceofcongressionalintentwithrespecttotheprecisepointatissue.(footnoteomitted));Wis.Pub.Intervenorv.Mortier,501U.S.597,611n.4(1991)(Asfortheproprietyofusinglegislative history[,] . . . common sense suggests that inquiry benefits from reviewing addi-tionalinformationratherthanignoringit. AsChiefJusticeMarshallputit,[w]herethemind labours to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes every thing from which aidcanbederived. (alterationinoriginal)(quotingUnitedStatesv.Fisher,6U.S.(2Cranch)358,386(1805)));StephenBreyer,OntheUsesofLegislativeHistoryinInterpretingStatutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 848 (1992) (arguing that [l]egislative history helps a courtunderstandthecontextandpurposeofastatute).\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN402.txt unknown Seq:21 2-MAY-14 9:012014] TEXTUALISTANDPURPOSIVISTTHEORIES 705the information base that defines a statutes policy context to encom-pass the entire range of valuessome of which might stand in tensionwith one anotherthat reasonable legislators presumably would haveheld.In Riggs v. Palmer, for example, the court acknowledged the leg-islaturesaimofgivingeffecttotestatorsexpressedwishesbutsurmisedthatreasonablelawmakerswouldalsohavewantedtoex-cludemurderersfromprofitingfromtheircrimes.100TheRiggscourtsdecisiontolooktoarelativelybroadinterpre-tivecontextreflectedavaluejudgment. AsProfessorManninghasrecentlyemphasized,however,modernpurposivists,orwhathecallsnew purposivists, begin with a strong presumption in favor of a nar-rowlydefinedinterpretivecontext.101PhilipFrickeyhascautionedthatifIaskwhatreasonablepeoplepursuingreasonablepurposesreasonablywouldhavewantedinagivencontext,amInotlikelytoassume that those reasonable people are similar to the reasonable per-sonIknowbestmyselfand,thus,wouldwantwhatIthinkistherightanswer?102Many,ifnotmost,modernpurposivistshavetakenthis concern to heart by emphasizing that a statutes language almostinvariablyfurnishesthebestevidenceofitspurpose,103includingsometimesapurposetodictatetheappropriatemeansforpursuingpolicy goals.104 Nevertheless, appeal to a broader context remains anoption when normatively inflected considerations militate sufficientlypowerfullyinfavorofdoingso.When, as in Riggs v. Palmer, the interpretive context is broadenedto encompass multiple values, some potentially in conflict with others,theconceptofreasonablenessassumescentralimportanceinpurposivist inquiries.The notion of reasonableness has psychologicalandsociologicalaspectsbutalsoanormativecomponent.105Soem-phasizing,moralphilosophersfrequentlydrawadistinctionbetweentherational,whichcanbeunderstoodinpurelyinstrumental,self-interestedterms,andthereasonable,whichimportsadisposi-tiontobehaveinwaysthatgivedueconsiderationtotheinterestsofothers.106Especiallyinlightofthewell-recognizedphenomenonof100See22N.E.188,18990(N.Y.1889).101See Manning, supra note 2, at 15265 ([T]he new purposivism takes a crucial cue RaboutpurposemoredirectlyfromCongressschoiceofwords.).102Frickey,supranote89,at251. R103SeeManning,supranote2,at13031&nn.8386(collectingexamples). R104See,e.g.,id.at140(discussingacasewheretheCourtunderstood[a]keyprovi-sionsopen-endedness...toinvitedevelopmentof...commonlaw).105See, e.g., Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323,391 (2012) (maintaining that a positive definition of reasonableness is a logical impossibil-itybecausenopositivedefinitioncansatisfyalloftheaxiomsthatapositivedefinitionwouldneedtoembrace).106See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 49 n.1 (1993) ([K]nowing that peoplearerationalwedonotknowtheendstheywillpursue,onlythattheywillpursuethem\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN402.txt unknown Seq:22 2-MAY-14 9:01706 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:685reasonabledisagreementaboutmanymattersoffactandvalue,107acourtdetermininghowareasonablepersonwouldresolvesuchdisa-greementmustascertainwhatwouldbemostreasonableunderthecircumstancesaninherentlyvalue-ladendetermination. Thedoc-trineassociatedwithChevronU.S.A.Inc.v.NaturalResourcesDefenseCouncil,Inc.,whichcallsforcourtstodefertoanyreasonableagencydetermination of a vague or ambiguous statute,108 implicitly so recog-nizes.In the absence of an administrative agency, a court would needto determine which reasonable interpretation was best or most reason-able.Even with perfect empirical knowledge, no purely statistical ag-gregationofwhatthepeoplewithinasocietyactuallythinkcouldresolvethenormativeissue.109Modern purposivists seldom deny that the construct of a reasona-blelegislatorisnecessarilyvalueladen. AharonBarakhaspromi-nently argued that statutes have objective purposes inhering in theinterests,values,objectives,policy,andfunctionsthatthelawshouldrealizeinademocracy.110Yettheconceptsthatheinvokesaresoplainlycontestableastobetrayanypretensionofvalueneutrality.111Justice Stephen Breyer, a leading modern purposivist, comes close toacknowledgingthepointexplicitly:Instead of deriving an artificial meaning through the use of generalcanons, the [purposivist] judge will ask instead how a (hypothetical)reasonable member of Congress, given the statutory language, struc-ture, history, and purpose, would have answered the question, had itbeenpresented.... Whyrefertoahypotheticalcongressionalde-sire? Whyproducethecomplexandfictionalstatement,itseemsunlikely Congress would have wanted courts to defer here?The rea-son is that the fiction provides guidance of a kind roughly similar tothat offered by Professor Corbins reasonable contracting party inintelligently. Knowingthatpeoplearereasonablewhereothersareconcerned,weknowthat they are willing to govern their conduct by a principle from which they and others canreasonincommon;andreasonablepeopletakeintoaccounttheconsequencesoftheiractionsonotherswell-being.(citingW.M.Sibley,TheRationalVersustheReasonable,62PHIL. REV. 554, 560 (1953)); T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 19192 (1998)(suggesting that rationality entails a simple capacity for means-ends analysis while reasona-blenessinvolvestak[ing]othersinterestsintoaccount).107Issuesarisingfromreasonabledisagreementareendemicbothtolaw,see,e.g.,JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 46 (1999) (Law . . . represents the aspirationtojusticeofacommunity...notofthosewhothinksimilarly,butofthosewhothinkdifferently,aboutmattersofcommonconcern.(emphasisomitted)),andtomoralandpolitical philosophy, see, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 106, at 5458 (discussing possible sources Rofreasonabledisagreementinpoliticallife).108467U.S.837,84344(1984).109SeeMiller&Perry,supranote105,at32627. R110AharonBarak,AJudgeonJudging:TheRoleofaSupremeCourtinaDemocracy,116HARV.L.REV.19,75(2002).111See Stanley Fish, Intention Is All There Is: A Critical Analysis of Aharon Baraks PurposiveInterpretationinLaw,29CARDOZOL.REV.1109,113536(2008).\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN402.txt unknown Seq:23 2-MAY-14 9:012014] TEXTUALISTANDPURPOSIVISTTHEORIES 707contract cases.It focuses the judges attention on the fact that dem-ocraticallyelectedindividualswrotethestatuteinordertosatisfycertainhumanpurposes. Anditconsequentlyincreasesthelikeli-hood that courts will ask what those individuals would have wantedinlightofthosepurposes.112B. TextualismIn contrast with their predecessors in the plain meaning school,moderntextualistsemphasizethatCongressinvariablylegislatesagainst the background of a number of linguistic and cultural under-standingsthatinfluence,andindeeddetermine,whatalinguisticallycompetentpersonwouldunderstandastatutetosay.113Inanexem-plification of the new textualist position, Judge Frank H. Easterbrookmaintainsthatstatutesdefiningcriminaloffensesandprescribingpenaltiestraditionallyhavebeen,andtodayshouldcontinuetobe,readaspresupposingtheavailabilityofdefensessuchasinsanityandnecessity:For thousands of years, and in many jurisdictions, criminal stat-utes have been understood to operate only when the acts were un-justified. Theagentwhokillsawould-beassassinoftheChiefExecutiveisjustified,thoughthekillingbewillful;sotoowiththepersonwhokillstosavehisownlife....Theprocess[bywhichcourts interpret statutes in light of historical context] is cooperative:normsofinterpretationanddefense,likeagreementongrammarand diction, make it easier to legislate at the same time as they pro-motethestatutoryaimofsavinglife.114JusticeScaliahassimilarlymaintainedthatCongressmustbepresumed to draft . . . in light of . . . background principle[s].115 Hestronglydefendsjudicialrelianceonavarietyofcanonsofstatutoryinterpretation.116Hisfavoritesincludethosethatcallforcriminalstatutestoretainthecommonlawrequirementofmensrea,117forstatutesnottoapplyextraterritoriallytononcitizens,118andfor112Breyer,supranote3,at26667(footnoteomitted). R113See SCALIA&GARNER, supranote7,at3334;Manning,supranote7,at9293, R10001.114FrankH.Easterbrook,TheCaseoftheSpelunceanExplorers:Revisited,112HARV.L.REV. 1876, 191314 (1997). But cf. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers Coop., 532U.S.483,490(2001)(describingasanopenquestionwhetherfederalcourtseverhaveauthoritytorecognizeanecessitydefensenotprovidedbystatute).115Youngv.UnitedStates,535U.S.43,4950(2002).116See SCALIA&GARNER, supranote7,at69339(discussinginterpretivecanonsand Rtheirproperapplication).117See Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 406 (1998); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note7,at303. R118SeeBrogan,522U.S.at406;SCALIA&GARNER, supranote7,at26872. R\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN402.txt unknown Seq:24 2-MAY-14 9:01708 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:685limitations periods to be subject to equitable tolling. 119 Like JudgeEasterbrook, moreover, Justice Scalia sometimes views legal traditionsandbackgroundunderstandingsthathavenotbeendistilledintoca-nonsofinterpretationascrucialelementsofthecontextfromwhichstatutesderivetheirmeaning. Forexample,asIhavenoted,hehasreliedonatraditionoffederalnoninterferencewithstatetaxcollection to justify an exception to the 1983 cause of action.120 Hehas similarly assumed that 1983 incorporates doctrines of official im-munity, apparently because at least some state officials enjoyed immu-nityfromdamagesliabilityinsuitsatcommonlaw.121InGregoryv.Ashcroft,JusticeScaliajoinedanopinionthatreliedontraditionalle-gal understandings to conclude that a federal statute barring age dis-criminationbyemployers,specificallyincludingstates,didnotapplyto state judges.122 According to the Court, traditional understandingssupportedapresumptionthatifCongressintendstoaltertheusualconstitutionalbalancebetweentheStatesandtheFederalGovernment, it must make its intention to do so unmistakably clear inthelanguageofthestatute.123With Congress presumed to legislate in light of background socialand legal practices, and with reasonable interpreters determining stat-utorymeaninginlightofthesamepracticesandunderstandings,itbecomes important to specify what a reasonable interpreter should bedeemedtoknowandtoregardasrelevant. Inponderingthisques-tion,onemightwonderwhetherthereareconceptuallimitstothekindsofbackgroundinformationthattextualistscouldconsistentwith the logic of their own theoryclassify as part of a statutes seman-ticcontext.AsInotedearlier,whentextualistsrecognizethatmeaningde-pendsoncontext,theymovefromthedomainofwhatphilosophersoflanguagecallsemanticswhichislargelyconcernedwithdiction-arymeaningsandrulesofgrammartothatofpragmatics,which119Young, 535 U.S. at 4950 (quoting Irwin v. Dept of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95(1990)).120SeeNatlPrivateTruckCouncil,Inc.v.Okla.TaxCommn,515U.S.582,589(1995)([W]emustinterpret 1983inlightofthestrongbackgroundprincipleagainstfederalinterferencewithstatetaxation.). JusticeScaliajoinedJusticeThomassopinionfortheCourt. Id.at582.121See, e.g., Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 497 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judg-mentinpartanddissentinginpart).122501U.S.452,473(1991).123Id.at460(quotingAtascaderoStateHosp.v.Scanlon,473U.S.234,242(1985))(internal quotation marks omitted).In a concurring opinion in Nixon v. Missouri Munici-palLeague,JusticeScalia,joinedbyJusticeThomas,reliedontheGregorypresumptiontoconclude that a federal statute did not limit the power of States to restrict the delivery oftelecommunicationsservicesbytheirpoliticalsubdivisions. 541U.S.125,141(2004)(Scalia,J.,concurring).\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN402.txt unknown Seq:25 2-MAY-14 9:012014] TEXTUALISTANDPURPOSIVISTTHEORIES 709deals with issues of meaning that depend on further considerations.124Withinthatdomain,textualistsalmostinvariablyinsistthatinforma-tion about legislators psychological intentions and expectations is ir-relevant.125Forthem,whatmattersisthewayareasonablepersonconversantwithrelevantsocialandlinguisticpracticeswouldhaveusedthewords.126Butapartfromtextualistsexclusionofinforma-tion about speakers or legislators intentions, the very point of refer-ence to a legal texts semantic context is frequently to explain that itswords do not mean what someone equipped only with dictionary defi-nitions and knowledge of the rules of grammar could well take themto meanfor example, that a statute making it unlawful to engage inspecifiedactivitiesshouldnotapplyextraterritoriallyorthatthestat-ute of limitations does not apply because of the doctrine of equitabletolling.Once the notion of semantic context is expanded to includemoreinformationthandictionariesandgrammarbookscansupplyandtoauthorizerejectionsofwhatotherwisewouldappeartobestatutesplainmeanings,127itbecomesdifficulttoformulateevenmoderatelydeterminaterulesforsayinginadvancewhichbitsofin-formationaboutthecontextofastatutesenactmentshouldbedeemedcontextuallyrelevantandirrelevant.128ProfessorManningsuggestsotherwiseinanarticleinwhichhecriticizestheabsurditydoctrine.129Inthatarticle,Manningmain-tainsthatitwouldbeobjectionableforcourts,inspecifyingtherele-vantsemanticcontextforinterpretingastatute,torelyonsocialvalueswhosecontentandmethodofderivationarebothunspecifiedex ante.130 He distinguishes, and defends, judicial reliance on con-ventionsthathavecongealedintopreviouslyrecognizedcanonsof124Seesupranote11andaccompanyingtext. R125See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 48, at 61 (What any member of Congress thought Rhis words would do is irrelevant.We do not care about his mental processes.); William N.Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623 (1990) (The new textualismposits that once the Court has ascertained a statutes plain meaning, consideration of legis-lativehistorybecomesirrelevant. Legislativehistoryshouldnotevenbeconsultedtoconfirm the apparent meaning of a statutory text.); Manning, supra note 7, at 84 (noting Rthat textualists generally forgo reliance on legislative history as an authoritative source of[statutory] purpose).Occasionally, textualists are willing to consult legislative history forcertainnarrowpurposes. See,e.g.,Greenv.BockLaundryMach.Co.,490U.S.504,527(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (relying on legislative history to verify thatwhat seems to us an unthinkable disposition . . . was indeed unthought of); Nelson, supranote75,at360nn.3738(citingexamples). R126Manning,supranote7,at91. R127Seesupranote8andaccompanyingtext(discussingnewtextualistsdivergence Rfromanolderplainmeaningschool).128See Greene, supra note 45, at 1923 (asserting that textualists combination of reli- Rance on unexamined background knowledge plus the cutting off of additional knowledgeisanerror).129Manning,AbsurdityDoctrine,supranote8. R130Id.at2471.\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN402.txt unknown Seq:26 2-MAY-14 9:01710 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:685statutoryinterpretation131butsaysthatiftextualistsaretofollowtheir premises to a logical conclusion, then they must . . . treat[ ] theexistingsetofbackgroundconventionsasaclosedset.132Manningssuggestionthattheappropriatesemanticcontextforinterpreting statutes consists entirely of conventions specified ex anteisnotonlyinconsistentwiththepracticeoftextualistjudgessuchasJudgeEasterbrookandJusticesScaliaandThomaswhohavenotmaintainedthatthesubstantivebackgroundunderstandingsrelevanttostatutoryinterpretationresideexclusivelyinpreviouslyrecognizedinterpretiveconventions133butalsounworkable. Consider,forex-ample,howatextualistshouldaddresstheinterpretiveissuesthatwouldariseunderanordinancebarringvehiclesfromapark. Indiscussing whether baby strollers would come within that prohibition,thetextualistJusticeScaliasortsthrougharangeofdefinitionsfromdifferent dictionaries before concluding that [t]he proper colloquialmeaning...issimplyasizablewheeledconveyanceandthatbabystrollersdonotcomewithintheexclusion.134Thisanalysismaybedefensible,135 but it surely does not rely solely on conventions or otherprecepts that the defender of a particular theory of statutory interpre-tation could sensibly be asked to include, ex ante, in an exclusive com-pilationofavailable,reasonablydeterminateinterpretivepremises.Onemight,Isuppose,maintainthatJusticeScaliasanalysissimplyapplies the ordinary-meaning canon, which posits that [w]ords aretobeunderstoodintheirordinary,everydaymeaningsunlessthecontext indicates that they bear a technical sense.136 But this maneu-ver would postpone the problem, not solve it.In law as elsewhere, thefunctioning of language in producing ordinary, everyday meanings istoo complex, fluid, and intuitive to be reduced to a determinate list ofrulessetoutinadvance.Anillustrationoftheneedforcontext-by-contextjudgmentcomes from the recent case of Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona,Inc.,137whichpresentedthequestionofwhetherafederalstatutemandatingthatstatesacceptanduseafederalforminregistering131Seeid.at247374&n.317.132Id.at2474.133Theydidnot,forexample,takethispositionineithertheNationalPrivateTruckCouncil case, discussed in supra notes 3234 and accompanying text, nor did Justice Scalia RdosoinGregoryv.Ashcroft,describedinsupranotes12223andaccompanyingtext. R134SeeSCALIA&GARNER, supranote7,at3738. R135ButseeWilliamN.Eskridge,Jr.,TheNewTextualismandNormativeCanons,113COLUM. L. REV. 531, 561 (2013) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READINGLAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012)) (characterizing Justice Scalias purport-edly purely textual analysis as crazy insofar as it purported to exclude the purpose of thestatute).136SCALIA&GARNER, supranote7,at69. R137133S.Ct.2247(2013).\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN402.txt unknown Seq:27 2-MAY-14 9:012014] TEXTUALISTANDPURPOSIVISTTHEORIES 711votersprecludedArizonafromdemandingmorethanthatformre-quired.138 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia concluded that theimplicationoftheacceptanduserequirementwasthatthestatemust treat satisfaction of the forms demands as sufficient for registra-tion.139Dissenting,JusticeSamuelAlitothoughtthatthestatehadcomplied with the federal statute as long as it had use[d] the form asameaningfulpartoftheregistrationprocess.140Regardlessofhowone judges this argument, surely no one could have thought that theJustices,inresolvingthedispute,werelimitedtoconsultingasettledlistofconventionsoflanguageusethattheycouldhavestatedinad-vance.When Manning says that if textualists are to follow their prem-ises to a logical conclusion, then they must . . . treat[ ] the existing setof background conventions as a closed set,141 he asks for more thananytheorycouldpossiblydeliver.142Indeed,ifatheory(suchastextualism)triedtoincorporatewithin itself rules for its own application, then someone could alwaysdemandtoseetheprinciplesspecifyinghowthoseprescriptionsshould in turn be interpreted143and could further ask for a specifi-cation of the relevant semantic or policy context for interpreting therulespurportedlydictatinghowthetheorysfirst-orderinterpretiveprinciples should be applied.At this point, the demand for prescrip-tiveinterpretiverulesandrulesforthespecificationofrelevantinterpretivecontextswouldposeathreatofinfiniteregress.144138Seeid.at2251.139Id.at2254.140Id.at2274(Alito,J.,dissenting).141Manning,AbsurdityDoctrine,supranote8,at2474. R142Cf. JOSEPH RAZ, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION 11820 (2009) (assertingthe dependence of theories of legal interpretation on moral theory and denying the possi-bilityofageneraltheoryoflegalinterpretationoranoperationalmoraltheorythatwouldprescribecorrectconclusionstosomeonewhodidnotalreadyhavegoodmoraljudgment).143Seesupranote57andaccompanyingtext. R144In order to determine how precepts and theories apply to particular cases, we ordi-narily count not on proliferating layers of interpretive rules but, instead, on the availabilityofafoundationalhumancapacitysuchasthatofunderstandingwithrespecttoutter-ances that require no clarification, see ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY22 (1992); PATTERSON, supra note 56, at 8687, or to a faculty such as that of judgment, RseeBEINER,supranote57,at13031. AccordingtoProfessorRonaldBeinersaccount, R[j]udgment is a natural capacity of human beings that . . . enables us to appraise particu-lars without dependence upon rules or rule-governed technique . . . . BEINER, supra, at 8.A large, complex philosophical literature on judgment aims to explain both the possibilityconditionsfortheexistenceandapplicationofsuchafacultyandtheempiricalconstitu-ents of sound practical decision making. See id. at 12952 (discussing theories of judgmentincluding those of Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, Hannah Arendt, and Hans-Georg Gadamer).Putting the metaphysics of judgment to one side, I would emphasize that conclusions con-cerning how prescriptive rules or principles are best applied in particular cases depend notonlyontheapprehensionoffactsbutalsoondeterminationsoftherelativepriorityofsometimes competing values in particular contexts. See id. at 95 (noting that for Aristotle,\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN402.txt unknown Seq:28 2-MAY-14 9:01712 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:685Insum,lackingtheresourcestoofferalgorithmicprescriptionsregardingthecontentofinterpretivecontexts,textualists,likepurposivists, face choices about how narrowly or broadly to define theinterpretive context for the resolution of particular puzzles about stat-utorymeaning. Anditisafairgeneralization,Ithink,thattheyinparallel with purposiviststend to broaden the context to admit moreinformationaboutbackgroundunderstandingsandexpectationswhenfailuretodosowouldproducenormativelyjarringconse-quences. AlthoughIcannotprovethispoint,suggestiveevidencecomes from the cases that I discussed earlier in which textualist judgeshaveinvokedbackgroundunderstandingstojustifytheirreadingsofstatutesasincludingnontextualexceptions.145Insosaying,Idonotmean to imply that textualist interpreters routinely admit just enoughinformation into the interpretive context to reach the result that theywould have preferred if they occupied the capacity of legislators.Fre-quently, I assume, they could not plausibly do so, even if they wished.Sometimes,however,abroadeningoftheinterpretivecontextwillmake it plausible to reach interpretive conclusions that would not oth-erwisehavebeenplausible. Whenthisisso,textualistshavenobasisfordecidingwhatisinandwhatisoutwithoutmakingsomesortofnormativejudgment. Ishallsaymoreaboutthispointbelow.A second challenge for textualists emerges when decisions abouthowtointerpretastatutehingeonthejudgmentsofareasonableinterpreter.Textualists then must determine what a reasonable inter-preterwhen apprised, for example, that 1983 was enacted againstabackgroundofhistoricnoninterferencewithstatetaxcollectionorofofficialimmunityinsuitsfordamageswouldmakeofthispractical judgment is geared to determination of the proper ends); id. at 106 (pointingoutthatAristotleandKantagreeontheelusivenessofprinciplesuponwhichtojudgeparticularsbecausetherearenofixeduniversalsforthesubsumptionofsuchparticu-lars).Accordingly, appeals to the existence of a shared capacity of judgment leave us farshortofadeterminateformulaforhowinterpretivecontextsshouldbespecifiedorwhatconsiderationsshouldinfluencethedetermination.Another problem with assuming that a shared faculty of human judgment could solvetheproblemofdetermininghowbroadlyornarrowlyastatutesinterpretivecontextshould be definedwithout need for interpreters to make contestable value judgmentsinvolvesthepsychologicalphenomenonofmotivatedreasoning. SeeDanM.Kahan,Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L.REV. 1, 19 (2011) (defining motivated reasoning as the unconscious tendency of individ-uals to process information in a manner that suits some end or goal extrinsic to the forma-tionofaccuratebeliefs). Modernpsychologicalresearchhasconfirmedwhatcommonsense has always suggested: human beings have a powerful psychological propensity to de-termine facts and appraise arguments in ways that accord with their preexisting, ideologi-callyinflectedbeliefsandpreferences. Seeid.at1926. Ifaskedwhetheranarrowsemantic or policy context was too narrow to yield the proper answer to a particular inter-pretivequestion,mostpeoplewouldprobablysayyesif,butonlyif,theyhopedthatabroadercontextwouldlicenseaconclusionthattheyadjudgedmoreattractive.145Seesupranotes3239andaccompanyingtext. R\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN402.txt unknown Seq:29 2-MAY-14 9:012014] TEXTUALISTANDPURPOSIVISTTHEORIES 713information.This inquiry may be partly sociological, but it is also, as Ihave said, partly normative.It requires the ascription to the reasona-bleinterpreterofnormativebeliefsaswellasfactualknowledge.146Moreover,inordertomakesenseofastatuteastheutteranceofalegislature, the reasonable textualist interpreter will need, in turn, toascribe at least an objective intentand presumably a reasonable ob-jectiveintenttotheenactingbody.147The search for such an objective intent presents formidable chal-lenges. H.P.Gricesinfluentialtheory148holdsthatinordinarycon-versation,thecontentassertedbyaspeakerjustisthecontentthatthespeakerintendedtoconveytothehearerbyexpressingtheutter-anceintheparticularcontextthatshedid.149Buttextualistsofcourse reject any account of statutory meaning that depends straight-forwardlyoneithertheactualintentionsofthelegislatureorthehy-pothesizedintentionsorpurposesofreasonablelegislators(beyondthe minimal purpose or intent of enacting meaningful legislation writ-ten, in the United States, in English).150 When textualists instead di-rect attention to the alternative construct of a reasonable listener, thedifficultyisthatareasonablelistenernormallyseekstounderstandaspeakersutterancesbasedpartlyonassumptionsaboutthespeaker.Whentextualisminsiststhatonlythemostminimalassumptionscanbemade,itmaythreatentodeprivethereasonablelistenerofinfor-mation or assumptions about the speaker that the reasonable listenermay need in order to grasp the meaning of the speakers words in thecontext of their utterance.When textualists, at the same time, main-tain that the words of a statute reflect an objective intent, it is not cle


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