Asian Currents June 2014

o Asian Currents The Asian Studies Association of Australia Maximising Australia’s Asian knowledge

June 2014 ISSN 1449–4418

Anxiety persists over Modi government

Early signs are not promising that

India’s new prime minister, Narendra Modi, can deliver on his

promise to create a genuinely

inclusive sense of nationhood.

Read more

Judiciary shows true colours in Thailand coup

The ousting of Prime Minister

Yingluck Shinawatra reflects a judiciary that has

become politically interventionist and remarkably powerful. Read more

Greed the unseen peril on Myanmar’s road to democracy

The international surge in investments, and political

opportunism, are doing little to help Myanmar’s

already weak civil society evolve in the interest of all. Read more

China and Vietnam square off over disputed waters

China’s deployment of an oil rig in waters near the

strategically located Paracel Islands has severely

strained bilateral relations with Vietnam. Read more

Missing Sombath a test for ASEAN

ASEAN’s weak response to the disappearance of Lao community worker Sombath Somphone raises

questions about the strength of its

commitment to human rights. Read more

Indonesia guide to Islamic democracy

Long regarded as a peripheral to the mainstream

Islamic world, Indonesia could have much to teach the Middle East about Muslim democracy. Read more

Asian Currents

online

In coming months you will see changes in the way the ASAA communicates. The changes will include a new website and greater use of social media. Asian Currents

will be a prominent feature of the new website. In the meantime, you can access Asian Currents online

through our interim site.

Erdogan moves against ‘parallel

state’

The rift between the

Gülen movement and

Turkey’s ruling party is widening. Read more

Malaysia struggles to escape

income trap

Malaysia’s economic

reforms are under

question. Read more

Also in this issue

Activist filmmaker at ASAA 2014

New books on Asia

Bulletin board

Coming events

ASAA Thesis Prize

ASAA 20th Biennial

Conference.

11 Asian Currents June 2014

China and Vietnam square off in war of attrition over disputed waters China’s deployment of an oil

rig in waters near the

strategically located Paracel

Islands has severely strained

bilateral relations with

Vietnam.

By Carlyle A. Thayer

The Paracel Islands (Hoang Sa in Vietnamese and Xisha

in Chinese) are a group of

approximately 30 features (small

islands, rocks, reefs and sandbanks)

lying at the northern end of the semi-enclosed South China Sea. The

Paracels consist of two groups of

features, the Amphitrite group in the

northeast and the Crescent group in the southwest. The total land area is

estimated at roughly 8 square

kilometres embracing a maritime

zone of 15 000 square kilometres.

The People’s Republic of China

occupied the Amphitrite group in

1950 following the withdrawal of the

Nationalist Chinese. China attacked and seized the Crescent group from

the Republic of Vietnam (South

Vietnam) in January 1974.

Sovereignty over the Paracels is

contested by the Republic of China on Taiwan and Vietnam.

The Paracels Islands are important

for their strategic location and

possible oil and gas deposits in their surrounding waters.

On 1 May, the China National

Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC)

announced that it was placing the M/V Hai Yang Shi You 981 (HYSY

981) mega oil rig in waters to the

west of the Paracel Islands in order

to commence exploring for oil and

gas. CNOOC also announced an exclusion zone of one mile in radius

around the oil rig from 2 May to

15 August.

The HYSY 981 was escorted by an armada of nearly 70 ships, including

China Coast Guard vessels and

People’s Liberation Army Navy

warships. Vietnam responded by

despatching nearly 30 Coast Guard and Maritime Surveillance Force

vessels to the area to confront the

Chinese and order them to leave

Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone

(EEZ).

China’s

deployment of

the oil rig

immediately triggered non-

violent urban

protests by the

Vietnamese intelligentsia

and violent

rioting by

Vietnamese

workers in industrial

parks. These

riots not only

targeted Chinese

companies but quickly spilled over to

affect companies owned by Taiwan,

South Korea, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia and even privately owned

Vietnamese enterprises. China

immediately sent ships to evacuate

Chinese managers and workers from Vietnam. At least four Chinese were

killed in the riots.

The Vietnamese government

immediately stepped in to restore

law and order. Over one thousand Vietnamese workers were arrested.

Several were charged and put on

trial. Vietnam’s violent anti-China

riots put a severe strain on bilateral relations with Beijing.

Since 2 May an unequal war of

attrition has taken place on a daily

basis in the waters surrounding the HYSY 981. China has increased the

strength of its armada to over 110

ships, including steel-hulled fishing

boats. China has also deployed

Disputed islands: The Paracels are important

for their strategic location

and possible oil and gas deposits in their

surrounding waters.

12 Asian Currents June 2014

military and civilian enforcement

aircraft in an intimidating manner.

Vietnam has refrained from deploying its navy and air force.

Chinese Coast Guard ships, two to

four times heavier than their

Vietnamese counterparts, continue to deliberately ram Vietnamese civilian

vessels. At least one Vietnamese

fishing boat has been sunk. Chinese

ships have also used high powered water cannons to dismast

communications antennae from the

bridges of Vietnamese vessels to

force them to retire back to port. Armed Chinese ships have

unsheathed their weapons and

directly aimed them at Vietnamese

Coast Guard and Fishery Surveillance

vessels. Vietnamese vessels have kept their weapons covered.

China charges that Vietnam has

dropped fishing nets and other debris

into the waters around the HYUSY 981 and sent in frogmen to disrupt

the operations of the oil rig. On

8 June an official Chinese Foreign

Ministry statement accused Vietnam of ramming Chinese ships 1416

times. Given Chinese estimates that

69 Vietnamese vessels and boats

were present, this means that on

average each Vietnamese boat conducted 20 separate rammings

each. This figure seems incredulous.

What accounts for this violent

confrontation? From the Chinese perspective, its deployment of the

HYSY 981 to Chinese waters was an

entirely normal commercial

operation. Chinese officials argue that they conducted exploration

activities in this area for the past

decade without any protest by

Vietnam. China views Vietnam as the provocateur.

China also argues that the Northern

Song Dynasty (960–1126 AD)

discovered the islets and rocks that

make up the Paracel Islands and, through naval patrols, established

jurisdiction over them. Bill Hayton, in

a book to be published by Yale

University Press in September (South China Sea: dangerous ground)

argues, to the contrary, that the

Chinese state only showed interest in

the Paracels in 1909 when the Qing

Dynasty dispatched a naval flotilla to

the area and raised the Chinese flag on Woody Island.

Initially Chinese spokespersons

claimed that the HYSY 981 was

situated 17 nautical miles from Triton Island, in the Paracels, and was

within China’s territorial waters. The

use of the term territorial waters was

ambiguous because under the United Nations Convention on Law of the

Sea (UNCLOS) territorial waters

extend for only 12 nautical miles

from coastal baselines. This raised

the possibility that China was claiming waters within its u-shaped

nine-dash line—the demarcation line

used by the governments of both the

People's Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan) for their

island claims of part of the South

China Sea—as territorial waters.

China later amended its position and

claimed that the oil rig was within its contiguous zone, that is, the band of

water extending seaward for

12 nautical miles from the boundary

of its territorial sea. China further argued that the oil rig was closer to

Triton Island than the Vietnamese

coastline.

According to UNCLOS, a contiguous

zone only entitles a coastal state to ‘exercise the control necessary to:

(a) prevent infringement of its

customs, fiscal, immigration or

sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea; (b)

punish infringement of the above

laws and regulations committed

within its territory or territorial sea’. Vietnam argues that the Chinese oil

rig is operating within its EEZ and

Chinese Coast Guard ships, two to

four times heavier than their

Vietnamese counterparts, continue to

deliberately ram Vietnamese civilian

vessels.

13 Asian Currents June 2014

continental shelf and therefore is a

violation of its sovereign rights.

Vietnamese officials dispute China’s claim that Vietnam acquiesced in

Chinese exploration activities over

the past 10 years. Vietnamese

officials argue that they were not aware of all activities conducted by

China on the outer limits of its EEZ.

These officials further argue that

when they became aware of Chinese activities they lodged diplomatic

notes in protest.

What is the legal position under

international law? China and Vietnam are entitled to maritime zones based

on land features under the UN

Convention on Law of the Sea. Both

countries have promulgated EEZs

from their baselines. These overlap. Under international law the two sides

are enjoined to undertake provisional

measures until the overlapping area

is delimited. Until a final determination is made, both parties

are not permitted to upset the status

quo or use force or the threat of

force.

Vietnam has not attempted to

develop this area where the HYSY

981 is currently operating. China, on

the other hand, unilaterally placed

the HYSY 981 in waters that have not been delimited, in violation of the

above legal principles. Chinese

officials concede that the disputed

area has never been delimited. But they reject international law as a

basis for a settlement. For example,

China’s Ambassador to Australia, in

an article published in The Australian (13 June) argued, ‘no matter which

principle [of international law] is

applied these waters concerned will

never become Vietnam’s part of EEZ and continental shelf’.

From the outset Vietnam has

adopted a conciliatory diplomatic

posture. Vietnam has called

repeatedly for the activation of the hot line between high-level leaders

or, failing that, for China’s

agreement to receive a special

envoy. Vietnam claims that China has not responded positively to any

of these approaches. On 8 June China’s Foreign Ministry stated,

’China wants good relations with

Vietnam, but there are principles that

China cannot abandon. The channel of communication between China and

Vietnam is open…’ but Vietnam must

‘respect China’s sovereignty,

sovereign rights and jurisdiction’.

The current war of attrition

surrounding the HYSY 981 can be

expected to continue at least until 15

August when the rig is scheduled to cease operations. China and Vietnam

have both lodged claims with the UN

Secretary General raising the

possibility of face-saving mediation.

Carlyle A. Thayer is emeritus professor at the University of New South Wales,

Canberra.

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Until a final determination is made

both parties are not permitted to upset

the status quo or use force or the

threat of force.