Thayer Vietnam People's Army Victory at Home (1975), Success in Cambodia (1989)

8/8/2019 Thayer Vietnam People's Army Victory at Home (1975), Success in Cambodia (1989)

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CHIEF OF ARMY HISTORY CONFERENCE 2010Victory or Defeat: Armies in the Mtermath of Conflict

DAY 1Thursday 30 September 20100900 Opening

Chief ofArmy, LTGEN Ken Gillespie AO, DSC, CSM0915 Keynote:

AGlorious Defeat?How the French Remembered the Armies of the Revolutionaryand Napoleonic WarsAlan Forrest (University of York)

1015 Book launch1030 Morning tea1100 Session 1:

Losing the Insurgent 20th Century: The United States Armyand Reform after the Philippine-American War, 1902-1916David Silbey (Alvernia College)Lessons of Defeat, Lessons for War: The Ottoman EmpireMustafa Aksakal (American University)

1245 Lunch1345 Session 2:

How Military Tradition Prevailed and Reform Failed to Preventthe Collapse of the Russian EmpireJohn Steinberg (Georgia Southern University)

1445 Afternoon tea

1515 War and Peace:The British Army after the Victories of 1918 and 1945George Peden (University of Stirling)

1615 Close and Networking Drinks

DAY 2Friday 1October 20100900 Session 3:

The German Army after the Great War: aCase Study inSelective Self-DeceptionGeoff Megargee (US Holocaust Museum)Liberating Australian New Guinea and British Borneo:the Directorate of Research and Post-HostilitiesPlanning 1943-45Graeme Sligo (Australian Army)

1030 Morning tea

1100 Session 4:Hiroshima Over Hanoi: the Atomic Battlefield in SEATOContingency Planning 1955-1965Damien Fenton (Ministry for Culture and Heritage,New Zealand)

1200 Lunch1300 Session 5:

The Vietnam People's Army: Victory at Home (1975),Success in Cambodia (1989)Carl Thayer (University College, ADFA)The US Army in the Aftermath of Conflict, 1968-77Henry Gale (US Army War College)

1430 Afternoon tea

1500 Session 6:The South African Military and Post-Conflict Integrations in theTwentieth CenturyIan van der Waag (University of Stellenbosch)

1600 Closing remarks


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The Vietnam Peoples Army:Victory at Home (1975), Success in

Cambodia (1989)

Carlyle A. Thayer

P A i i Vi d D f A i i h


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TheVietnamPeoplesArmy:VictoryatHome(1975),SuccessinCambodia(1989)

CarlyleA.ThayerIntroduction

On 22nd December 1944, the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) established a

guerilla unit known as the Vietnam Propaganda and Liberation Army. This force

comprised thirty-four men under the command of Vo Nguyen Giap. The

Vietnam Propaganda and Liberation Army quickly grew in size and by March

1945 it totaled 1,000 soldiers organised into thirteen companies. It was renamed

the Vietnam Liberation Army.

In August 1945 the VCP-led Viet Minh sized power and the military underwent

another phase of rapid expansion. Its numbers reached 100,000 main force

regulars in late 1946 when hostilities broke out with France. In February 1951,

communist-led military forces were given their present designation, the Vietnam

Peoples Army (VPA, Quan Doi Nhan Dan). As a result of internal mobilization

and assistance from Communist China the VPA not only grew in size but in

structure. By 1954 the VPA totaled 400,000. The VPA regular or main forces (Chu

Luc) were organised into seven divisions (Dai Doan), a number of independent

regiments (Trung Doan) and Battalion Combat Teams with a total strength of

80,000.

During its sixty-five years of existence the VPA fought and prevailed in four

major conflicts: the anti-French Resistance War (1946-54), the anti-American War

(1959 75) th B d W ith Chi (F b M h 1979) d th C b di


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Victory at Home (1975)

During the Vietnam War, the Vietnamese communists adopted the propaganda

fiction that southern political and military forces were independent entities.

Communist military forces in the south, for example, were called the Peoples

Liberation Armed Forces. Increasingly during the Vietnam War VPA main forces

came to dominate the southern battlefield. They were supported by southern

regular, regional and local forces. The VCP Politburo in Hanoi set military

strategy and the Central Office South Vietnam (COSVN; more accurately the

Central Committee Directorate for Southern Vietnam or Trung Uong Cuc Mien

Nam) consisting of high-level party officials and military officers, executed this

strategy. In the aftermath of military victory in 1975 there was no need toformally integrate southern communist military forces into the VPA because they

had been operating under a unified command since 1961.

The Vietnam War ended with unexpected suddenness. In the short space of fifty-

five days a communist military offensive centred on the highlands town of Ban

Me Thuot was expanded into a nationwide offensive, the Ho Chi Minh

Campaign, that resulted in the unconditional surrender of all civil and military

forces of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). The swiftness of victory was

unexpected even to the architects of the Ho Chi Minh Campaign. The attack on

Ban Me Thuot, for example, was originally planned as the opening shot in a

series of offensives designed to continue into 1976. According to Van Tien Dung

(1977:25):

The strategic resolution of the Political Bureau was put into effect through the197576 two-year strategic plan: in 1975 we would strike unexpectedly with


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surrendered its forces. According to the official party newspaper, the

Vietnamese revolution has entered a new stage. This change consists mainly ofour countrys shift from war to peace... and from simultaneously fulfilling two

strategic tasks to execution by the entire country of a common strategic task:

socialist revolution and construction (Nhan Dan, 5 September 1975).

The sections below examine the impact of victory on the VPA under three

headings: military rule, maintenance of public order and security;, and economic

construction.

Militaryrule. The Ho Chi Minh Campaign led to the disintegration of the Armyof the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). Soldiers broke rank and deserted. Some

took to looting and armed violence. The sudden evacuation of Americanpersonnel, the immediate cut in US assistance, and the collapse of central

authority, added to the chaos. In the confusion of this period tens of thousands of

civilians were internally displaced.

The first priority of VCP in establishing control over South Vietnam was to

ensure the maintenance of public order and security. The VPA was given

responsibility for this task. General administrative functions as well as security

was placed in the hands of Military Management Committees (MMCs) that were

set up in the cities and provinces of South Vietnam.

The MMCs, although mixed civil-military units, were under firm party control.

For example, the Saigon-Gia Dinh MMC, established on 3rd May 1975, was

headed by Colonel General Tran Van Tra, a member of the partys Central

Committee. The Saigon-Gia Dinh MMC quickly instituted the communist


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The MMCs were also set up at province level and below throughout South

Vietnam. As security conditions improved, they were replaced by civilian-dominated Peoples Revolutionary Committees (PRC). For example, the Saigon-

Gia Dinh MMC handed over power to the Ho Chi Minh City (as Saigon was

renamed) PRC on 21st January 1976. The transition from martial law to civilian

rule was competed by April 1976 when North and South were formally reunified

under the name Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The Peoples Liberation ArmedForces discarded southern nomenclature and symbols and were formally merged

into the VPA without public ceremony.

Maintenanceofpublicorderandsecurity. The sudden collapse of the RVN wasan unprecedented event for it left a majority of its military forces under arms. In

the interval between the occupation of urban and provincial centres by

communist-led military units and the imposition of martial law, thousands of

armed ARVN troops went into hiding. Some ARVN soldiers conducted diehard

resistance to communist rule. They operated in scattered and uncoordinatedgroups in isolated pockets mainly in provinces adjacent to the Cambodian

border. Anti-communist resistance activity was also carried out by ethnic

minority groups in the central highlands associated with the FULRO

movement1, by Hoa Hao militia located in An Giang province, and, to a lesser

extent, by armed Catholic dissidents. In 1976, it was estimated that the combined

strength of these anti-communist groups ranged between 12,000 and 50,000

(Douglas Pike 1977: 38).

I i h f i i h h fi i i d b h


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became apparent that the MMCs lacked adequate manpower to cope with such

an enormous task and deadlines had to be repeatedly extended. By late August1975 only one-third of ARVN personnel had registered. By December the figure

had risen to one million including RVN civil officials; perhaps 575,000 went

unregistered.

The VPA was tasked with setting up re-education camps for former enemy

personnel, including RVN officials, and ARVN officers and enlisted men, where

they were subject to political indoctrination. The vast majority of ARVN

personnel were released after a short period of confinement. The re-education

camps were quickly turned over the Ministry of the Interior which replicated the

northern system of detention centres in the south. Members of the ARVN officer

corps were subjected to prolonged periods of confinement often in harsh

conditions. According to one close observer, men who had been regarded as

prisoners of war became transformed into political criminals, needing to be

punished (Bui Tin 1995:90).

In the immediate aftermath of victory, in addition to maintaining domestic orderand security, the VPA was assigned various tasks that can be grouped under the

expression stabilizing the lives of the people. VPA personnel and party security

units were ordered to take charge of public utilities and vital industries. They

were aided by covert agents who had been placed in the RVN administration

during the course of the war. No major acts of sabotage were reported and water

and electricity continued to be provided for Saigon residents. Security details

were organized to protect each installation against sabotage. As conditions

stabilized, the military became involved in transporting refugees back to their


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Economic construction. After the formal reunification of Vietnam, the VCPdecided not to demobilize its large standing army but to engage it directly inrepairing war damage and undertake economic construction more generally. The

military therefore became involved in four main areas: agriculture, industry,

communications and transport, and capital construction.

Among the specific jobs assigned to the military were: building new economic

zones where displaced persons were resettled; taking part in capital construction

projects; such as building roads, railways (for example, the 365 km Vinh-Hue

section of the Thong Nhat north-south line), pipelines, industrial plants, airports,

ports, and civil installations; taking part in afforestation and forest exploitation

projects; and engaging in land cultivation and livestock breeding. The VPA

Navy helped to expand the nation's fishing fleet, repair freighters and assumed

responsibility for oil and gas exploration in addition to the transportation of

merchandise between north and south.

In order to accommodate the growing demand for manpower in civilian

reconstruction, military conscription was broadened to include service with'labour shock brigades'. The VPA was also assigned the additional responsibility

of socializing southern youths into the values of a socialist society and work

patterns of a relatively modern organization.

These developments provoked dissent within the military on the part of middle

and high ranking officers who objected to the diversion of the VPA from military

tasks. They argued that continued and increased VPA involvement in

reconstruction would degrade combat readiness, erode discipline and delay the

process of regularization and modernization According to one Hanoi based


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construction were interdependent (Vo Nguyen Giap 1976). In October of that

year the party's Political Bureau re-endorsed the military's involvement in

economic work by stressing that it was 'a fundamental and urgent demand of the

revolution' (Ray 1979:24. That month a General Directorate for Economic

Development was created within the Ministry of National Defence to oversee the

efforts of army units in economic reconstruction tasks.

The matter of the military's involvement in economic reconstruction was further

considered at the VCP's Fourth National Party Congress in late 1976. The

congress adopted a resolution that set out the VPAs tasks in the new stage.

According to this document:

our armed forces have two tasks: always to stand ready to fight and to defendthe fatherland and to actively participate in economic construction. In thisspirit, we must enforce the regime of military service and the army's duty tobuild the economy. We must strive to develop the national defence industry(Vietnam News Agency, 24 December 1976.

The role of the VPA was further elaborated in a speech given by Senior General

Van Tien Dung. He stated:

The army must play an important role in redistributing the work forcethroughout the country and building and consolidating strategic areas whichare important for both the economy and national defence. The entire armymust clearly display the sense of the need to perform labour, to economicallybuild the army, to bring the sense of socialist collective ownership into play in building the country; to increase its knowledge of economic laws, and of

production science and technique, and to implement systems and regulationsinsuring economic efficiency and managerial discipline. We are resolved tostrive to successfully carry out the economic construction task entrusted toour army by the party and state.

In addition to the aforementioned tasks, the party entrusts the army with thed f h h l i h d d f h d f


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The decision of the 4th Party Congress to intensify the involvement of the VPA in

civilian-type economic tasks was a compromise between two tendencies. On the

one hand, the VCP leadership could not afford to pursue policies that maintained

a large unproductive standing army. On the other hand, neither could

Vietnamese leaders sanction a massive demobilization of VPA soldiers into the

civilian economy. Instead, a middle course was chosen. A Hanoi-based journalist

has written:

The case for participation by the armed forces in the economic recoveryprogram was strong. A generation of war had left the army with a nearmonopoly of resources for certain types of construction and it was by far thelargest single source of trained cadres. Disciplined, politicized and oftenpossessing important technical skills, the troops were best equipped to meetreconstruction needs on an emergency basis (Ray 1979:24).

In the months following the 4th Party Congress, 20,000 army officers and other

ranks were slated for specialized training as district-level economic managers

(Vietnam News Agency, 10 October 1977). Conscription was extended to take in

an estimated 25 per cent of all men aged between 18 and 25. Army units,

bolstered by this intake, were assigned a variety of specialized tasks includingthe upgrading of a strategic road network along the Ho Chi Minh Trail; running

state farms; construction of large-scale irrigation works; land reclamation and

other major projects.

Examples of the army's employment in civilian economic tasks include the 8th

Division, located in the Plain of Reeds, which was reported to have reclaimed

and ploughed more than 12,000 hectares of land. Similarly, the Hau Giang

Regiment in the 9th Military Region was said to have spent 'a year of painstaking

efforts digging canals reclaiming land from swampy mangroves and putting up


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Vietnam suffered between 35,000-50,000 casualties in addition to massive

destruction carried out on the economic infrastructure of the northern border

provinces by departing PLA troops. On 5 March 1979 the Vietnamese National

Assembly decreed a state of general mobilization. Vietnamese forces remained in

Cambodia for a decade. When the VPA withdrew in September 1989 they left

behind a Cambodian state that is still in power today. Vietnam could justifiably

claim success in Cambodia. A veteran of the Cambodian conflict, who now holdsthe rank of lieutenant general, told the author that Vietnams success was a

miracle (interview, Ho Chi Minh City, 5 August 2010).

Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea and China's attack on Vietnamese resulted

in the rapid expansion of the VPA. Main force strength jumped from 615,000 in

1978 to 1,023,000 in 1979; included in this increase were 400,000 soldiers and

8,000 airmen. This expansion was met by increased conscription and by the

diversion of economic construction units to combat duty.

This section is divided into seven parts. It begins with a brief overview setting

out the domestic and strategic environment in which Vietnam made the decisionto terminate its occupation of Cambodia, withdraw its military forces from that

country, and undertake a massive demobilization of its main forces. Next the

section provides details of the demobilization program and the problems faced

by returning veterans. It then looks at disciplinary and rear service problems

faced by the military during the period of down-sizing. The section then turns itsfocus to the employment of discharged soldiers in army-run enterprises and in

the national defense industry sector.

Withdrawal from Cambodia In 1985 Vietnam faced a domestic socio economic


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high. In response to Vietnams use of force against the Khmer Rouge state, most

regional states, including China, Japan and the members of the Association of

South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) declared an embargo on aid, trade and

investment with Vietnam. Vietnam was also subject to a long-standing embargo

by the United States first imposed on North Vietnam in 1964 and then extended

over the entire country following unification in 1975.

In 1984, Vietnam adopted a five-year strategic plan to end the conflict in

Cambodia (Thayer, 1994, p. 10). The first phase called for the destruction of

resistance camps along the Thai-Cambodian border. This was accomplished

during the 1984-85 dry season. The remaining phases included sealing off the

border, destruction of resistance guerrilla forces, population security and

building up a pro-Vietnamese Cambodian civilian administration and military

force. These military initiatives were also accompanied by diplomatic efforts

designed to bring the conflict to an end through negotiations.

In late 1986, responding to both domestic and external pressures, the VCPs Sixth

National Congress adopted a comprehensive economic reform program knownas doi moi. This program was designed to transform its Soviet-style socialist

economy into a multi-sector commodity economy under state direction. In other

words, Vietnam would abolish central planning, experiment with market forces

and invite foreign investment from capitalist countries.

In order to accomplish these bold objectives Vietnam first had to liquidate its

involvement in Cambodia by successfully carrying out its strategic plan. Pressure

from Moscow only reinforced Vietnams determination to speed up this process

and leave behind a politico-military structure in Cambodia capable of standing


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in the process of demobilizing one million men from its army. These

developments then set the stage for Vietnam to withdraw all its military forces

from Cambodia and initiate a massive reduction of its standing army.

Demobilisation. In 1987, the VPA was at peak strength. Its main force of 1.26

million regulars was the fifth largest standing army in the world. Only the Soviet

Union, China, the United States and India had larger military forces. To this

number must be added an additional 2.5 million reserves, paramilitary forces

and border guards totalling another 1.24 million. In sum Vietnams defence force

totalled 5 million.2 Included in this number were an estimated 180,000 troops

deployed in Cambodia and a further 40,000 assigned to Laos.

In the second quarter of 1987, following the landmark Sixth National Party

Congress, the VCP Politburo met in secret and adopted Resolution No. 2, On

Strengthening National Defence in the New Revolutionary Stage. This

resolution approved a plan to strategically readjust Vietnamese military forces.

Priority was placed on the withdrawal of Vietnamese combat units from

Cambodia beginning in June 1988 and concluding in September 1989.Vietnamese military forces were also withdrawn from Laos at the same time.

Resolution No. 2 also authorized a massive force reduction program and

approved a new defence doctrine known as peoples war and all peoples

national defence. The new doctrine redefined the roles of the main force,

reserves, and other paramilitary units and laid out plans for the construction of

defence zones, the armys role in the economy and the modernization of the

national defence industry.


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adopted (De Rienzo 1989:9). First, selected officers and other ranks were retired

early on modest pensions. During the period from mid-1987 to late 1990,

according to Defense Minister General Le Duc Anh, 600,000 soldiers, including

100,000 officers, were demobilized, reducing the VPA to 660,000 main force

regulars (Agence France-Presse, 23 December 1990). Included in this number

were 50,000 Cambodian veterans who were withdrawn in 1988-89 (Kyodo News

Service, 1 November 1990). According to the VPA Chief of Staff, General DaoDinh Luyen, Vietnams armed forced were reduced but not restructured

(Karniol, 1993b:32). Reductions were mainly made to infantry, engineering,

administration, logistic units and self-defence forces. The artillery corps,

communications, air force, and navy were not affected (Robinson 1990b:9).

Demobilized regulars were assigned to reserve units and were on call to be

mobilized in case of national emergency.

Vietnams large militia and self-defense forces, estimated at 12 percent of the

population, were also slated to be reduced to about 8 percent of the population

(Robinson 1989). However, according to one report, a number of localities have

gone overboard in reducing the size of the forces, with the militia and self-

defence forces accounting for only one to two percent of the population (Quan

Doi Nhan Dan, 20 December 1990, p. 2). In Military Region 9, for example, it was

reported in late 1990 that only 1.09 percent of the population are members of the

military regions coastal militia and self-defence forces (Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 20

December 1990, p. 2). Drastic cuts in the size of militia and self-defence forces

were also confirmed by an article in the army journal that stated [t]he size of the

military and self-defence forces has been reduced to the point where the forces


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The second approach to demobilization involved sending soldiers abroad to

Europe and the Middle East as civilian guest workers. Between 1987 and 1989,

Vietnams Ministry of National Defence dispatched more than 25,000

demobilized soldiers and defence industry workers to the Soviet Union, East

Germany, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria under labour cooperation programs

(Vietnam News Agency, 7 July 1989). In 1989, of the 150,000 Vietnamese working

abroad, mostly in socialist countries, forty percent were ex-soldiers (Hawksley,1989). The third approach to demobilization involved restructuring military

forces into economic units or engineering and labour teams and engaging them

in a variety of production and construction tasks.

Vietnamese officials provided contradictory information on the final targets of

the VPA force reductions. In April 1989, for example, Major General Tran Cong

Man indicated that the ideal size of the standing army should be set at one

percent of the total population (Hawksley 1989; Kyodo News Service, 12 April

1989). At the same time, Lt. Gen. Le Kha Phieu indicated that the VPA would be

reduced to 500,000 by 1994 (BBC World Service, Newsreel Program, 17 April

1989). Several months later General Man indicated that the ultimate goal was to

reduce the standing force to 500,000 by 1992 (Tai Ming Cheung and Hiebert

1989:24). In December 1990 it was disclosed that due to high unemployment in

the civilian sector, demobilization of regular forces had been halted (Agence

France-Presse, 18 December 1990). This marked the end of the strategic

readjustment of the VPA decreed by Politburo Resolution no. 2 issued four years

earlier.

Over the next eight years Vietnam allowed the size of its main forces to drop


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Luyen reported that further cuts in the size of the VPA would continue if the

political and economic climate permitted (Karniol 1993a:32). The cuts have all

been taken from the army, the navy and air force have not been affected.

Problems of returning veterans. Vietnams demobilized veterans entered asociety in transition from socialism to a market economy. State enterprises which

once relied of government subsidies were now forced to turn a profit in order to

survive. Under state regulations, soldiers were theoretically entitled to return to

their former employers, but under the new economic mechanism many

enterprises were in no shape to do so (Dang Vu Hiep 1989:71). Demobilised

soldiers who failed to find employment joined a labour market with

unemployment rates in urban areas as high as twenty to thirty percent, and high

under employment in the rural areas (Williams 1989).

According to Lt. Gen. Nguyen Thoi Bung, the vast majority of soldiers had

received only basic education before they were conscripted (Saigon Giai Phong, 5

August 1989, pp. 1-2). Government policy gave them priority in job training and

education. However, they were so poorly educated that a major effort wasnecessary to provide skills that would make them marketable.

The problem of demobilized army men in the south was particularly severe.

Most soldiers who fought in Cambodia had been conscripted from this region.

They were demobilized en masse over a relatively short period of time.

Government services at all levels were strained to the breaking point to cope

with such numbers. According to figures for Ho Chi Minh City for the 197689

period, only 7.2% of all demobilized soldiers were able to find full-time

employment 24 7% found part time work while the remaining 68 1% worked


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were the last to be hired because prospective employers feared they would be

difficult to supervise. Despite official policy, some employers did not give

priority in hiring to soldiers who had been officially recognized for exceptional

exploits on the battlefield. The same article reported that many well-connected

youths, who succeeded in evading the draft, used their influence to wangle

vocational training, work abroad or jobs in the state sector at the expense of

returning veterans (Williams 1989). In mid-1991, for example, twenty high-ranking officials in Hai Phong were charged with helping their sons evade the

draft.

As early as May 1986, in response to mounting socio-economic difficulties,

southern military veterans grouped together and formed a Club of Former

Resistance Fighters (Thayer, 1992:4546). The Club was initially a mutual aid

association dedicated to improving the lives of veterans but after the Sixth Party

Congress it began to play a more overtly political role. In 1988, after the death of

Premier Pham Hung, a southerner, the Club circulated a petition opposing the

partys official nominee. The Club began publishing its own newspaper that was

highly critical of government and party policies. The paper was suppressed.

The activities of the Club took on added political significance in 1989-90, as

socialism collapsed in Eastern Europe simultaneously with Vietnams military

withdrawal from Cambodia and massive demobilization program. Vietnams

veteran community, estimated at 4 million, was a sizeable constituency (Hiebert,1991a:28). In early 1990, the leader of the Club of Former Resistance Fighters,

Nguyen Ho, demanded that the VCP grant the Club the status of a legal mass

organization. Later in the year, veterans sent hundreds of letters to the party


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colonels whom they suspected as a threat to their power (Bui Tin 1991). Key club

leaders were detained while others were co-opted into a new party-approved

body, the Vietnam War Veterans Association. This association was then

affiliated to the Vietnam Fatherland Front, the control body for mass

organizations led by the party.

Desertion and disciplinary problems. In the post-Cambodia period, Vietnamsgeneral socio-economic malaise, coupled with the difficulties engendered by

demobilization, led to the outbreak of disciplinary problems such as draft-

dodging and desertion. In late 1989, Defence Minister Le Duc Anh noted that

there have been indications of youths balking at joining the army and afraid of

becoming an officer (Hanoi Domestic Service, 4 December 1989). In 1991, it was

reported that half of those of military age failed to report for the compulsory

medical exam (Hiebert 1991b:24).

The following year an investigation into the causes of desertion by new

recruits in the Ta Xanh Division in central Vietnam revealed that they were

poorly educated, had low political knowledge, and feared what they consideredwould be a life of hardship and privation. The manner in which conscription was

carried out did little to relieve the anxieties of new recruits. In some areas force

was used. After arrival at their unit, according to the investigation report, the

new recruits were herded into confined areas surrounded by barbed wire fences

and guarded by military and civil police (Voice of Vietnam, 28 May 1992).

The report on Ta Xanh Division also noted that wealthy families in one district

used their influence to gain exemptions for their children. Influential families

used their positions to ensure that their children were not given hardship


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In late 1990 the National Assembly adopted amendments to the 1981 Law on

Military Service. The length of service for ordinary conscripts was lowered from

three to two years and the number of deferment categories was increased (Nhan

Dan, 5 January 1991 pp. 3-4 and Tuoi Tre, 11 January 1992, p. 7).

Nevertheless problems of desertion continued to be severe in 1991. A review of

the situation in Military Region 2 stated bluntly that the desertion rate has not

declined (Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 28 February 1991, p. 2). Even in the Hanoi Capital

Military Region unauthorized absences continued to be a problem, especially by

conscripts who had criminal records and incited others to desert. A study of

twenty-eight deserters from the Capital Military Region noted that 25 percent

said they had deserted because of the harsh discipline meted out by superiors.

Soldiers also deserted in order to provide an income for their poor families (Quan

Doi Nhan Dan, 26 February 1991, p. 2).

A report on the Tay Nguyen Corps noted that the average desertion rate for the

past five years stood at 14 percent (Voice of Vietnam, 12 September 1991). A

study of the causes of desertion in Military Region 9 provided the following

figures: 45 percent due to harsh treatment by superiors, 25 percent due to

difficult living conditions and restrictions on behaviour, 25 percent due to

homesickness and 5 percent due to family pressures (Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 19

September 1991, p. 2).

In 1992, Military Region 1 issued instructions to subordinate echelons to make

strenuous efforts to determine the causes of desertion and to formulate effective

policies to retain conscripts in military service. As a result of new policies, during

the second half of the year desertion rates in Military Region 1 were reduced by


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Vietnam, 5 August 1993). The problem of desertion was reduced but not

eliminated entirely.

The same factors that contributed to the rise of desertion as a major problem also

contributed to the rise of other disciplinary problems. In answer to the question

why troops still violated discipline, Major General Le Toan noted that army

discipline was affected by negative trends taking place in general society (Quan

Doi Nhan Dan, 19 March 1992, p. 2). The most common problems were theft and

the illegal sale of weapons and ammunition (Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 11 February

1991, p. 2). The VPA responded to these actions by stepping up political

indoctrination and, where necessary, applying punitive measures. Draft-eligible

young men who engaged in three oppositions opposition to the registration,

opposition to medical check up, and opposition to induction orders were

punished in three stages: public criticism in their residential areas, coercive

labour, and finally, prosecution (Tuoi Tre, 11 January 1992, p. 7). Major General

Nguyen Van Phiet reported in early 1992 that these measures were having a

remedial effect and the number of disciplinary violations was generally on the

decline (Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 17 March 1992, p. 2).

Rear service. In 1987, when the Politburo decided to conduct a strategicreadjustment of military forces by carrying out a large-scale program of troop

reduction, it was agreed to fund this program by setting aside a fixed portion of

the national budget. Two years later it was revealed that the Ministry of Financecould only come up with two-thirds of the amount of money that had been

allocated (Le Duc Anh 1989). This resulted in a generalized shortage of all

manner of goods and a marked deterioration in the standard of living for


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subsidies and poor management techniques which also impacted negatively on

the families of disabled soldiers and war dead and retirees.

According to Senior Lt. General Dang Vu Hiep, a major review of rear service

policy noted that efforts at reform had failed because the basic regulations were

thirty years out of date and they had not been modified to suit the new situation

(Dang Vu Hiep 1989:70). This was particularly true of the system of salaries,

wages, incentives, special allowances and long service benefits. The review

quoted by Hiep also noted the general failure of the system to deliver set

amounts of supplies in sufficient quantity and quality, at a set price, on the date

agreed upon. Conditions along Vietnams borders with China and Cambodia

and in the Central Highlands were very grim as a graphic account by Lt. Gen.

Nguyen Trong Xuyen revealed. In these remote areas daily rations, medicine,

clothing and equipment were all in extremely short supply. Mess halls, sleeping

quarters and recreational facilities were also lacking (Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 7

January 1991, p. 2).

Defense Minister Le Duc Anh noted other rear service problems in an address to

National Assembly in late 1989. During 1988, Anh noted, because of the shortage

of funds, it was not possible to build needed storage facilities or pay the costs of

maintaining and repairing weapons and other technical equipment. In his words,

rare and valuable items were left in a state of disrepair. Minister Anh warned

that if funds were not forthcoming in 1990 literally billions of dollars worth ofvaluable equipment could not be repaired or regularly serviced and would have

to be discarded. Some of the equipment was so scarce that it could not be

replaced even if funds were available. A shortage of funds would also lead to


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22

The plight of Vietnams military was also raised by General Doan Khue in a

speech to the Seventh Party Congress in mid-1991. Khue proposed that existing

welfare policies which covered the army and its rear echelons be revised in order

to ensure that the minimum standards were available so soldiers could

satisfactorily fulfil their duties and so that youths were would be attracted by a

career in the army (Voice of Vietnam, 25 June 1991). General Khue also

highlighted the negative effects that budget cuts were having on proper

maintenance. In his view it was necessary to immediately collect a large quantity

of weapons, ammunition and equipment in need of maintenance and repair and

store for future use (Voice of Vietnam, 25 June 1991). Doans views were

seconded by Lt. Gen. Le Kha Phieu who estimated that 70 percent of weapons

and ammunition in storage was deteriorating rapidly or already damagedconsiderably (Bekaert 1992:4).

Vietnams deteriorating conditions contributed to the rise of theft of state

property and other unsanctioned activities. Individual soldiers stole weapons

and supplies for resale. Military vehicles were used illegally to transport civilian

goods, using the protection afforded their officials license plates. In one notable

case air plane frames were undervalued and sold. Police raids in mid-1989

uncovered military units in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City that raised funds by

showing pornographic videos (Hiebert 1989: 23). In sum, military life became

less and less attractive when compared with civilian life (Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 14

August 1991, p. 2). Young officers sought transfers or early discharge.

The VPA found it difficult to recruit candidates for its officer training schools

(Nguyen Te Nhi 1991:3536). For example, the Army Infantry Academy in Son


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23

lacked the desire to study (Nguyen Te Nhi 1991:35). Indeed, concern over the

future was a burning social issue for VPA officers who were slated for

discharge or who had been passed over for promotion at a time of force

reduction (Voice of Vietnam, 21 September 1990).

In February 1990, the Ministry for National Defence took the decision to renovate

the logistics system by commercializing it. The new system gave greater

flexibility to the units involved, helped to alleviate the situation of chronic

shortages, and resulted in somewhat better material conditions. Over three years

later, however, medical facilities for army veterans were still under financed

(Branigin 1993a). According to Major General Dang Huyen Phuong, in the past

military units were provided supplies in kind according to set norms. These

units had little or no control over delivery schedules, quantity received or even

quality. Once the policy of commercialization was adopted, however, units could

take the initiative to purchase grain, foodstuffs and fuel in the open market

under contract to suppliers (Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 21 September 1992, p. 2). Lt.

Gen. Le Hoa argued that the new decentralized commercial system had marked

benefits which led to immediate improvements. Army units now purchased their

supplies in accord with their actual needs. This resulted in better quality supplies

and a reduction in waste and losses. Transport and storage costs declined and

corruption was reduced as well as fewer layers of administration were involved

(Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 23 March 1992, p. 2).

While Vietnams new rear service policy has helped to improve the material

conditions of active duty units, Vietnams cash strapped economy placed severe

constraints on its maintenance program. According to one defence analyst,


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24

Economic construction. Vietnamese military units have been engaged inbuilding socialism and economic construction tasks since unification. In the

decade up to 1986 Army units of corps (binh doan) size were assigned to new

economic zones, state farms and forests, hydroelectric and water conservancy

projects, building roads, and oil and gas exploration. The scope and nature of the

militarys involvement in production activities underwent a fundamental change

after the adoption economic reforms and the promulgation of PolitburoResolution no. 2 (Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 12 May 1991, p. 1). In addition to the

militarys traditional involvement in economic production activities, now

military forces were converted wholesale into economic construction units or

engineering and labour brigades. This was largely a paper exercise in which

military construction units were a legal status under new legislation. By 1989,there were sixteen specialized economic construction divisions in the VPAs table

of organization. One unit, of roughly 12,000 men, was given responsibility for

completing the massive Hoa Binh hydro-electric project northwest of Hanoi.

Brigades and smaller sized units planted rubber, coffee and tea. Some

demobilised units retained their officers and became in effect reserve units

engaged in economic work.

The armys involvement in economic activities aroused debate as to its efficacy.

One school of thought argued that the army had achieved satisfactory results

because it had attained a degree of self-sufficiency and was able to make

financial contributions to the state thereby contributing to national defence

(Hanoi Home Service, 13 August 1989). Another school argued that the army

was inefficient as an economic producer and was a drain on the state budget.


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25

areas, he argued (Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 12 August 1991, p. 3). A commentator

using the pen name Quang Dau argued that recent reforms, which resulted in the

reorganization of military construction units and enterprises, forced these

organizations to adopt business accounting practices while at the same time

arguing for a continuation of their state subsidies for the next couple of years.

This was so these enterprises could move towards self-reliance and learn how to

attract capital.

According to Quang Dau, Resolution No. 33 of the partys Central Committee

Military Commission made it quite explicit that military units would have to

participate in economic-building tasks in order to raise their standards of living

and contribute to national development. These units were expected to become

partially self-sufficient and make contributions to the state budget. Units

assigned to remote areas were expected to engage in various tasks such as water

conservancy, communications, agriculture, forestry and fisheries. Those

volunteering or enlisting to serve with economic construction units could

complete their military service and labour duty at the same time.

During the two-year period ending in August 1989 so many military enterprises

became involved in economic production activities that the table of organization

of the Economic General Department had to be changed four times. Nearly all

the enterprises and factories under the VPAs Technical General Department

engaged in producing goods for the market. This accounted for between 4050percent of total production output (Hanoi Home Service, 13 August 1989). Senior

General Le Trong Tan estimated that the army raised 20 percent of its revenue

from internal sources (Hiebert 1991b:24).

26


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26

there were seventeen such organizations, including enterprises, state farms and

state forestry groups (Nhan Dan, 10 April 1989, p. 3). These units operated under

the same government regulations for state enterprises. They were required to

take responsibility for proper accounting procedures, accumulating investment

capital, making payments to Military Regions 9 defence budget, and ensuring

that basic living standards were met. The second type of economic work

involved regular units engaging in small-scale agricultural production in areas

around their camps, as well as limited cooperation with units engaged in full-

time work.

Army units in the first category or full-time production, produced lumber,

bricks, tiles and nails for domestic use and coconut fibre rugs for export. They

also re-worked sheet metal, provided transportation services and engaged in

various other projects. Of total earnings received, nearly one-third was

transferred to the military region. These funds were used to purchase tire tubes,

fuel, iron and steel, and service vehicles. Military Region 9 also set aside funds

for social welfare and for the construction of new headquarters and barracks.

Military units that engaged in agricultural activities produced grain, meat, fish

sauce, vegetables, fruit, sugar cane, and coconuts, gathered firewood, and raised

fish, farm animals and poultry.

Major General Cao Van Dom, Chief of the Military Region 9s Rear Services

Department, stated that such economic activity was necessary in order tocompensate for food shortages (Nhan Dan, 10 April 1989, p. 3). In 1988, according

to General Dom, Military Region 9 itself received only one-fifth to one-quarter of

the prescribed food ration for its troops, while troops on duty in Cambodia

27


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27

of barracks, vehicles and artillery sheds and warehouses, upgrading hospitals

and dispensaries, 6.5% for maintenance, supplies and replacement parts, 7% as a

liquid asset fund, and 4.5% for welfare support, bonuses and labour protection

(Nhan Dan, 10 April 1989, p. 3).

The debate over the efficacy of the armys involvement in the economy was

debated at a national army-wide conference on production and economic work.

The conference resolved it is unnecessary now to argue whether the armyshould engage in economic work or not but primarily on how to produce

effective results (Hanoi Home Service, 13 August 1989). The conference also

concluded that in accordance with Politburo Resolution no. 2 the army had

sanction to use its manpower, equipment and machinery and official duty time

to engage in production and economic work.

There were basically three different ways that a military unit could become

involved in economic activities: as a national defence production enterprise that

produced military goods as its first priority and then produced civilian products

for the domestic market; as a specialized economic unit, such as a corporation or

general corporation; and as a regular army production installation whose output

was designed to improve the living conditions of the troops (Phan Thu 1991:33).

In March 1989 the Council of Ministers issued Directive No. 46, a major new

policy regarding the militarys role in economic construction. This directive

required that all VPA production and economic building units and defence

enterprises conduct their affairs under the independent economic accounting

system (Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 12 August 1991, p. 3). At the same time, the VPAs

General Economic and Technical Department (Tong Cuc Kinh Te va Ky Thuat) was

28


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28

same state laws as civilian enterprises (Hanoi Home Service, 13 August 1989). In

other words, they were given legal status and were now able to open bank

accounts, including foreign currency accounts, to form legal associations, or enter

into joint ventures with Vietnamese or foreign partners. At the end of 1989

additional army units were engaged in economic activities and transformed into

corporations, general corporations or other types of legal enterprises (Tran Duc

Nghia 1990:36).

One survey of the armys activities in economic production over the period 1986

90 described them as still modest but already encouraging (QuanDoi Nhan Dan,

12 August 1991, p. 3). This survey noted, however, the diversity of activities

undertaken by army units: planting vegetables, cajuput (a plant which produces

aromatic oil), tea and rubber for production purposes; opening virgin land;

establishing forestry zones; land reclamation; apatite, coal and tin mining; cattle

breeding; ship repair; sea food production; and myriad construction activities

such as sea dikes, fresh water canals, new economic zones, roads and highways,

housing, and major state infrastructure development projects.

In 1993 it was reported that 70,000 soldiers or twelve percent of the entire

standing army were employed full-time in various commercial enterprises

(Hiebert 1993:40 and Branigin 1993b). In other words, there has been over an 11

percent increase in the number of soldiers employed in commercial activities

since the adoption of the 1989 reforms. Local militia units were reported to haveset up at least 160 enterprises, while the VPA main force had nearly sixty

organizations, converted into legal entities, engaged in economic activities

involving more than two hundred primary level enterprises (Quan Doi Nhan Dan,


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30


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30

VPA gave preference in its hiring policies not only to the family members of

active duty personnel but to skilled veterans and their families. Thus national

defence industries served as another outlet to absorb discharged service

personnel.

The long period of Soviet and Eastern European military assistance to Vietnam

resulted in a situation where the Vietnamese army had more modern equipment,

especially construction equipment, than the civilian sector (Dang Vu Hiep1990:54). Vietnams low level of economic development also meant that its

industrial capacity, including national defence industry, was rather primitive.

Vietnam could only manufacture small arms, including machine guns and rocket

launchers, ammunition such as 82mm mortar shells, and a few spare parts but

little else. The major priorities of the national defence industry were to achieve

self-sufficiency in the production of certain medical supplies, manufacture

equipment and weapons for the armys use, provide the technical support

necessary to maintain military equipment and meet the logistics and other needs

of the Vietnam Peoples Army (Voice of Vietnam, 11 March 1991, Nhan Dan, 4

November 1991, p. 3).

In late 1989, General Le Duc Anh announced that the existing structure of

military technology research institutes would be reorganized to focus on

production technology of use to both the military and civilian sectors of the

economy. Vietnams national defence industry quickly took to productionactivities related to the civilian economy. As one writer noted in 1991, defence

factories produced an ever larger amount of civilian goods. Consumer goods

production in military enterprises comprised about half of the production

31


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national defence industries would be developed gradually and Vietnam would

continue to purchase abroad needed defence equipment and weapons to meet

future needs (Voice of Vietnam, 27 December 1991). In the meantime, in order to

curtail wastage, breakdowns and losses, stress was placed on stock piling,

storing and maintaining military equipment and on standardization of weapons.

The subject of Vietnams national defence industry was a controversial one as the

VCP began preparations for its Seventh National Congress. One radio broadcaststated bluntly that the party draft Strategy for Socio-Economic Stabilization and

Development Up to the Year 2000 has failed to come up with a precise solution,

particularly an investment solution, for the national defence industry (Voice of

Vietnam, 11 March 1991). At the congress the military increased its

representation on the Central Committee for the first time since 1960. This

quickly translated into a larger defence budget in which priority was given to

developing a national defence industry and a modest program of force

modernization.

Conclusion

What has been the impact on victory in the Vietnam War and success in

Cambodia on the VPA? Can these two events be compared?

During the Vietnam War the VPA grew in size and developed into a modern

ground force with specialised corps for armour, artillery, engineering, sappers

and special forces, air defence etc. The VPA became dependent on the Soviet

Union for big ticket military equipment, spare parts, and military assistance.

The Vietnam War arguably was not a conventional interstate war but an

32


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therefore, was assigned major roles not only in maintaining domestic security,

but also in post-war reconstruction and economic development. These missions

reinforced the dual role of the Vietnamese military national defence and

socialist construction and the continued involvement of the military in political

and economic affairs.

The damage caused by the war, coupled with the poor state of Vietnams

economy, prohibited the full scale demobilisation of the army. The VCP directedthe VPA to play a major role in economic development. This laid the seeds for

the VPAs later involvement in commercial enterprises. The armys assignment

to economic construction precipitated a debate with the VPA about the role

military professionalism. Did peacetime economic roles detract from the mission

of national defence?

This debate became moot when the Khmer Rouge regime stepped up its armed

attacks on Vietnam as soon as the anti-American War came to an end. Vietnam

had to mobilise for war on its southwest and northern borders. VPA units that

had been diverted to economic tasks had to be redirected back to their prime

function.

The end of the conflict in Cambodia resulted in different outcomes than the end

of the Vietnam War. Vietnam intervened in Cambodia to halt aggression but

overstretched itself by occupying the country. Vietnam was isolated by the

international community and fell into deeper dependency on the Soviet Union.

The costs of prolonged conflict, a deteriorating domestic economy, and external

pressures, led to one inescapable conclusion: the VPA had to be withdrawn from

Cambodia and rapidly demobilised so Vietnam could pursue a domestic policy

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majority of soldiers who fought in Cambodia were conscripted in the south.

When they were demobilised they entered an economy driven by market forces.

They found it difficult to readjust. Jobs with their former employers were no

longer guaranteed and for many veterans their lot was not a very happy one.

It was during this period that a group of southern veterans became active and

organised themselves to improve their social welfare. This endeavour quickly

turned to political activism which took on a regional tinge. Security authoritiesquickly repressed the Club of Former Resistance Fighters, but permitted the

veterans to organise an official association and join the list of party-approved

mass organisations.

Within a year of the VPAs withdrawal from Cambodia the Soviet empire

collapsed and exposed Vietnams dependency. Vietnam could no longer afford

to maintain the billions of dollars of military equipment it had been given by the

Soviet Union over the last quarter century. The VPA fell into a parlous state

when the grand bargain of 1987 (demobilisation in exchange for a set defence

budget) came unstuck. The VPA moved to make up budget shortfalls by

commercialising the operations of its enterprises and national defence industries.

Today the VPA faces the same issues but in a different form. The VPA must still

carry out two main missions national defence and national construction. VPA

units have responsibility for economic-defence zones in remote areas, for

example. The VCP has ordered the VPA to divest itself of its commercialenterprises. Nonetheless, the VPA will continue to operate national defence

industries and other enterprises that contribute to national security. But in the

new strategic situation greater stress now is being given to military

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The Vietnam P

Success in Ca

Professor CaThe University of Ne

Australian Defen

oples Army:

,bodia 1989

lyle A. ThayerSouth Wales at the

e Force Academy, .


43/58

Outline of

Background

Victory at HoSuccess in CConclusions

resentation

e (1975)mbodia 1989


44/58

. ac

NVA, PAVN or V

military and e

Anti-AmericanCambodian conf

groun

A?

conomic

ar (1959-75)ict (1977-89)


45/58

2. Victor

Peoples Liberation A

VPA regulars dominat

1975 victory unexpe epu c o etnam u

at Home

med Forces

d battlefield

tedcon t ona surren er


46/58

Militar

Ho Chi Minh Campaig s n egra onInternally displaced peMilitary Management

Household re istration

Rule

(March-April 1975)

rsonsommittees (1975-76)

s stem


47/58


48/58

conom c

Repair war-time damNew Economic Zone

Capital construction Debate: reconstructi ar on wo ron s

ons ruc on

ge

n v defenceam o a an na


49/58

3. Success i

International isolat -

5-Year Strategic Pl

Doi Moi Renovati o t uro eso ut

n Cambodia

ion

n (1984-89)

onn o. 7


50/58

Demo

From 1.2 million (19

Guest workers in

economic units ter attr t on

ilisation

7) to 660,000 (1990)

East Europe

= 4 4,


51/58

Problems of Ret

From socialist to

Discrimination an u o ormer e

Vietnam War Veter

urning Veterans

arket economy

corruptions ance g ers

ns Assocation


52/58

vas on o conscrDifficulties in recru

Exemptions given t Desertion rife

oniting officers

o wealthy


53/58

Rear

Grand bargain de

Budget shortfalls =

Theft and sale of stLog st cs commerc

ervice

mobilisation and

privation

ate propertya ze


54/58

Economic

Traditional economicMilitary units convert

1989 corporations an

Extra budgetary sourContinued internal de

onstruction

missiond into 16 economic

general corporations

e of incomebate


55/58

ro uc on or eEmployment for v

families Gradual NDI mode

nce an mar eterans and

rnization


56/58

Conclusion

VPA transformed intarmy

Resources poured i o pos -war emo

VPA assigned post-economic roles

ictory at Home

conventional land

to militaryza on

ar construction and


57/58

rawa an emSoutherners face a

Political activism by dependency

Beginnings of force

za onarket economy

eterans

odernisation


58/58

Victory at Home (

975), Success in

Documents

Thayer Vietnam People's Army Victory at Home (1975), Success in Cambodia (1989)