The 1906 Earthquake Scenario and Golden Guardian '06 Exercise

NEHRP Earthquake Scenario Planning Workshop September 17 and 18, 2008

The 1906 Earthquake Scenario and Golden Guardian ‘06 Exercise

Richard Eisner, FAIAFritz Institute

Two Objectives for the Two Objectives for the ScenarioScenario

2006 Centennial Commemoration of the San 2006 Centennial Commemoration of the San Francisco Earthquake Francisco Earthquake ---- Education & Education & AwarenessAwareness

Recurrence of 1906 Today Recurrence of 1906 Today ---- The Full MontyThe Full Monty19 Counties19 CountiesCurrent Built EnvironmentCurrent Built Environment

Golden Guardian 2006 Golden Guardian 2006 ---- Exercise ScenarioExercise ScenarioDHS/OHS Catastrophic Regional DisasterDHS/OHS Catastrophic Regional Disaster

Scenario Attributes

Multi-County Urban RegionUSGS Modeled Ground Motions From 1906Undated Building Inventory Where AvailableDetail Assessments Where Available (OSHPD)HAZUS Augmented by Narrative on Lifelines

PG&E, BARTD, Caltrans

Team Effort

The TeamThe Team

California State Warning Center (Data)California State Warning Center (Data)United States Geological Survey (Ground United States Geological Survey (Ground Motions and Time History, Aftershocks)Motions and Time History, Aftershocks)PBS&J Atlanta (HAZUS Estimates and PBS&J Atlanta (HAZUS Estimates and Graphics)Graphics)Charles Kircher & Associates (HAZUS Charles Kircher & Associates (HAZUS Estimates and Analysis)Estimates and Analysis)Hope Seligson (HAZUS Estimates and Hope Seligson (HAZUS Estimates and Analysis)Analysis)

Bay Area Regional Transit District (Narrative)Bay Area Regional Transit District (Narrative)California Department of Transportation California Department of Transportation (Narrative) (Narrative) Pacific Gas & Electric (Time History, Narrative)Pacific Gas & Electric (Time History, Narrative)OES, DHS, OHS, FEMA and HAZUS (Funding and OES, DHS, OHS, FEMA and HAZUS (Funding and Staff)Staff)West Coast Alaska Tsunami Warning Center West Coast Alaska Tsunami Warning Center (Graphics and Time History)(Graphics and Time History)

Multiple Objectives, Multiple Multiple Objectives, Multiple Funding SourcesFunding Sources

California Office Of Emergency ServicesCalifornia Office Of Emergency ServicesFederal Emergency Management AgencyFederal Emergency Management AgencyEERIEERIDHS Urban Area Security InitiativeDHS Urban Area Security InitiativeOHS Homeland Security Exercise and OHS Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation ProgramEvaluation Program

Multiple MastersMultiple Masters

Anniversary Commemoration Wanted Global Anniversary Commemoration Wanted Global Picture of Impact on RegionPicture of Impact on RegionState and Region Wanted Earthquake State and Region Wanted Earthquake Scenario for Exercise and Focus on Local to Scenario for Exercise and Focus on Local to State to Federal Communication and State to Federal Communication and Coordination of Response/LogisticsCoordination of Response/LogisticsDHS Required More Fatalities, IEDs*, DHS Required More Fatalities, IEDs*, Terrorists, Field Theater and Media AttentionTerrorists, Field Theater and Media Attention

*Improvised Explosive Devices*Improvised Explosive Devices

The Scenario Took on A Time The Scenario Took on A Time DimensionDimension

Recognize That Scenario Is Not a Static End Recognize That Scenario Is Not a Static End State PictureState PictureInformation Varies with Time and ScenarioInformation Varies with Time and ScenarioThere is Never Adequate Information for There is Never Adequate Information for Decision Making / Decision MakerDecision Making / Decision MakerNeed to Train as You Would Play Need to Train as You Would Play ---- In the In the Fog of WarFog of War

For GGEX06For GGEX06

Need to Disaggregate Data to Census Tracts Need to Disaggregate Data to Census Tracts and Provide Time Historyand Provide Time HistoryNeed to Develop Local Script of Damage and Need to Develop Local Script of Damage and SequenceSequenceNeed to Use Available Estimates to Make the Need to Use Available Estimates to Make the Best Decisions When Information InadequateBest Decisions When Information InadequateNeed to Think Strategically Need to Think Strategically

Exercise StructureExercise Structure

Regional Disaster Impacting 19 CountiesRegional Disaster Impacting 19 CountiesOne Year of Planning & PreparationOne Year of Planning & PreparationSudden Onset Event*Sudden Onset Event*Cold Start ResponseCold Start ResponseRamping Up of Response Capability in Real Ramping Up of Response Capability in Real TimeTimeReplicate Actual Information Flow From Locals Replicate Actual Information Flow From Locals Up to Region, State and Federal LevelsUp to Region, State and Federal Levels

*Not a Hurricane or Flood*Not a Hurricane or Flood

What We Know and DonWhat We Know and Don’’t t KnowKnow

Only the Local Level Has Tactical KnowledgeOnly the Local Level Has Tactical KnowledgeLocals Do Not Understand Overall EventLocals Do Not Understand Overall EventHierarchy Aggregates Local DataHierarchy Aggregates Local Data

Sets Response Resource Allocation PrioritiesSets Response Resource Allocation PrioritiesPaints Comprehensive ImagePaints Comprehensive ImageDisseminates Comprehensive to All PlayersDisseminates Comprehensive to All Players

Others Play the ScenarioOthers Play the Scenario

Concepts of OperationConcepts of Operation

Local Governments Are In chargeLocal Governments Are In chargeState and Federal Levels Provide and Broker State and Federal Levels Provide and Broker ResourcesResources

Projected NeedProjected Need

OES SOC Provides Interface with Federal and OES SOC Provides Interface with Federal and InterInter--State ResourcesState ResourcesUse Information You Have Including ShakeMap Use Information You Have Including ShakeMap and HAZUS Estimatesand HAZUS EstimatesAll Play in Real Time for 36 HoursAll Play in Real Time for 36 Hours

Scenario PlayScenario Play

MSEL* Based on HAZUS Scenario and Time MSEL* Based on HAZUS Scenario and Time HistoryHistory3,000+ Messages Plus Additional Interventions3,000+ Messages Plus Additional InterventionsCounty Level Estimates and Graphic Distribution County Level Estimates and Graphic Distribution Disaggregated and LocalizedDisaggregated and LocalizedEach County Played Their Role With Their Own Each County Played Their Role With Their Own Piece of EventPiece of EventRegion/State Used Input from Counties and Region/State Used Input from Counties and Estimates from HAZUSEstimates from HAZUS

*Master Scenario Event List*Master Scenario Event List

Best Made PlansBest Made Plans……

Real Tsunami Advisory Issued by WCATWCReal Tsunami Advisory Issued by WCATWCPlayed Scenario and Real Tsunami ResponsePlayed Scenario and Real Tsunami Response

05:12:0005:12:00

05:12:0005:12:00 Earthquake NucleatesEarthquake Nucleates05:12:1005:12:10 Electric Circuits Near Epicenter Begin to Electric Circuits Near Epicenter Begin to Trip Off Trip Off 05:12:1005:12:10 PG&E and ISO OpPG&E and ISO Op--Centers Initiate Power Centers Initiate Power Shedding to Balance GridShedding to Balance Grid05:12:1005:12:10 Progressive Blackout of Region Initiated Progressive Blackout of Region Initiated to Prevent Cascading Failureto Prevent Cascading Failure05:12:3005:12:30 Strong Ground Motions Felt Throughout Strong Ground Motions Felt Throughout Bay RegionBay Region

05:12:3505:12:35

05:12:3505:12:35 State Warning Center State Warning Center Receives Receives Calls Calls from Coastal Counties on CALWAS from Coastal Counties on CALWAS –– ““ Expletive! Expletive! We are having an EarthquakeWe are having an Earthquake””05:12:4505:12:45 Earthquake Felt In SacramentoEarthquake Felt In Sacramento05:12:4505:12:45 Electrical Power Off in Most Electrical Power Off in Most of the Bay of the Bay RegionRegion05:13:0005:13:00 Earthquake Reported on Fox and CNNEarthquake Reported on Fox and CNN

05:13:0005:13:00

Strong Ground Motions Taper OffStrong Ground Motions Taper OffCoastal County 911 Centers are SaturatedCoastal County 911 Centers are SaturatedPhone Systems SaturatedPhone Systems SaturatedBART Issues Stop Order for All Trains. Trains BART Issues Stop Order for All Trains. Trains Already Stopped from Loss of Power. Two Trains Already Stopped from Loss of Power. Two Trains Stop in TubeStop in Tube

05:15:0005:15:00

CISN Posts Location of Earthquake EpicenterCISN Posts Location of Earthquake EpicenterLocal Governments Responding to What They Local Governments Responding to What They Can SeeCan SeeState Warning Center Initiates Activation of State Warning Center Initiates Activation of State Operations CenterState Operations CenterCalifornia Geological Survey Activates Key StaffCalifornia Geological Survey Activates Key StaffCalTrans Initiates Remote Video Inspections of CalTrans Initiates Remote Video Inspections of Bridges (If Operational)Bridges (If Operational)

05:15:0005:15:00

CalTrans Maintenance and Traffic Operations CalTrans Maintenance and Traffic Operations Personnel Mobilized to EOCs and Maintenance Personnel Mobilized to EOCs and Maintenance FacilitiesFacilitiesMedia Provides Initial Public Information on Media Provides Initial Public Information on Emergency Alert SystemEmergency Alert System

05:17:0005:17:00

CISN Posts Location, MagnitudeCISN Posts Location, MagnitudeUC Berkeley Confirms Magnitude, Location to UC Berkeley Confirms Magnitude, Location to State Warning CenterState Warning CenterWCATWC Issues Tsunami Warning BulletinWCATWC Issues Tsunami Warning BulletinOES Schedules Conference Call with California OES Schedules Conference Call with California Earthquake Prediction Evaluation Council Earthquake Prediction Evaluation Council (CEPEC)(CEPEC)

05:20:0005:20:00

CISN Posts First ShakeMap From UC BerkeleyCISN Posts First ShakeMap From UC BerkeleyShakeMap Downloaded to Federal, State and ShakeMap Downloaded to Federal, State and County AgenciesCounty AgenciesShakeMap is the First ShakeMap is the First ““ImageImage”” of the Eventof the Event

How Big?How Big?How Bad?How Bad?Where?Where?

05:32:0005:32:00

USGS Issues Automated Aftershock Forecast USGS Issues Automated Aftershock Forecast (90% Probability of M5 and Larger Aftershocks (90% Probability of M5 and Larger Aftershocks in Next 7 days)in Next 7 days)

5% to 10% Probability of Larger Event5% to 10% Probability of Larger Event

USGS Aftershock AssessmentUSGS Aftershock Assessment

7 Day Interval Calculated 20 Minutes After the Quake

Magnitude Probability Number--------------- -----------------------------5+ 100 46 (33-59)6+ 100 6 (1-10)7+ 50 1 (0-2)

05:35:0005:35:00

OES GIS Staff are Recalled to Run HAZUS Loss OES GIS Staff are Recalled to Run HAZUS Loss EstimateEstimateBART Imports ShakeMap into Risk Assessment BART Imports ShakeMap into Risk Assessment Program (SERA) to Set Inspection Priorities Program (SERA) to Set Inspection Priorities BART on Manual Operations Where Power BART on Manual Operations Where Power AvailableAvailable

07:00:0007:00:00

Initial HAZUS Damage Estimates AvailableInitial HAZUS Damage Estimates Available

Damage to Damage to BridgesBridges

000000000 101010101010101010

milesmilesmilesmilesmilesmilesmilesmilesmiles

202020202020202020

Area of PotentialGround Failure

San San San San San San San San San BenitoBenitoBenitoBenitoBenitoBenitoBenitoBenitoBenito

San MateoSan MateoSan MateoSan MateoSan MateoSan MateoSan MateoSan MateoSan Mateo

MontereyMontereyMontereyMontereyMontereyMontereyMontereyMontereyMonterey

Santa Santa Santa Santa Santa Santa Santa Santa Santa CruzCruzCruzCruzCruzCruzCruzCruzCruz

San FranciscoSan FranciscoSan FranciscoSan FranciscoSan FranciscoSan FranciscoSan FranciscoSan FranciscoSan Francisco

Contra Contra Contra Contra Contra Contra Contra Contra Contra CostaCostaCostaCostaCostaCostaCostaCostaCosta

MarinMarinMarinMarinMarinMarinMarinMarinMarin

SonomaSonomaSonomaSonomaSonomaSonomaSonomaSonomaSonoma NapaNapaNapaNapaNapaNapaNapaNapaNapa

AlamedaAlamedaAlamedaAlamedaAlamedaAlamedaAlamedaAlamedaAlameda

Santa Santa Santa Santa Santa Santa Santa Santa Santa ClaraClaraClaraClaraClaraClaraClaraClaraClara

SolanoSolanoSolanoSolanoSolanoSolanoSolanoSolanoSolano

Probability ofBridge Damage

0.7 to 10.4 to 0.70.2 to 0.40.1 to 0.20.05 to 0.10.01 to 0.050 to 0.01

Fire Fire IgnitionsIgnitions

500 to 600 500 to 600 Fires in RegionFires in Region100 Fires in 100 Fires in San FranciscoSan Francisco

000000000 101010101010101010


202020202020202020












Predicted Numberof Ignitions

10 or more8 to 96 to 74 to 52 to 3

Less than 2

Utility Utility DisruptionDisruption

.5 Million .5 Million Household Household Without Power Without Power (2400, Day 1)(2400, Day 1)Over 1 Million Over 1 Million Households Households without water without water (2400, Day 1)(2400, Day 1)

miles

0 10 20

6,000

1,700

39,400

524,200

426,000

322,100

248,800

65,300

87,500

6,5006,700

136,000

145,000

143,000

34,000

21,900


M ontereyM ontereyM ontereyM ontereyM ontereyM ontereyM ontereyM ontereyM onterey



San San San San San San San San San FranciscoFranciscoFranciscoFranciscoFranciscoFranciscoFranciscoFranciscoFrancisco

San San San San San San San San San M ateoM ateoM ateoM ateoM ateoM ateoM ateoM ateoM ateo


M arinM arinM arinM arinM arinM arinM arinM arinM arin


SonomaSonomaSonomaSonomaSonomaSonomaSonomaSonomaSonoma NapaNapaNapaNapaNapaNapaNapaNapaNapaSolanoSolanoSolanoSolanoSolanoSolanoSolanoSolanoSolano

San San San San San San San San San JoaquinJoaquinJoaquinJoaquinJoaquinJoaquinJoaquinJoaquinJoaquin

Affected Households100,000

No WaterNo Power

Daytime Daytime CasualtiesCasualties

13,000 Injuries 13,000 Injuries Requiring Requiring HospitalizationHospitalization3,400 Deaths3,400 Deaths

000000000 101010101010101010


202020202020202020












Fatality Densityat 2 PM [per sq.mi.]

Over 5020 to 5010 to 20

5 to 102 to 51 to 2

Less than 1

Hospital Hospital PerformancePerformance

OSHPD Survey DataOSHPD Survey Data35% Region Hospitals are 35% Region Hospitals are

SPC 1SPC 1Only 7/105 Peninsula Only 7/105 Peninsula

Hospitals are SPC 5Hospitals are SPC 5

000000000 101010101010101010


202020202020202020

Area of PotentialGround Failure

Area of PotentialShaking Damage












Number ofBeds

Over 1,000500 to 1,000200 to 500100 to 20050 to 100

Less than 50

Displaced Displaced HouseholdsHouseholds

200,000 to 200,000 to 300,000 300,000 Displaced Displaced HouseholdsHouseholds

000000000 101010101010101010


202020202020202020












Displaced Households[# per sq.mi.]

Over 5,0001,000 to 5,000

500 to 1,000100 to 500

50 to 10010 to 50

Less than 10

Shelter Shelter DemandDemand

60,000 to 60,000 to 120,000 120,000 Persons Persons Requiring Requiring ShortShort--term term ShelterShelter

000000000 101010101010101010


202020202020202020












Shelter Needs[# per sq.mi.]

5,000 to 10,0001,000 to 5,000

500 to 1,000100 to 500

50 to 10010 to 50

0 to 10

Debris Debris GeneratedGenerated

25 to 40 25 to 40 Million Tons Million Tons of Debris of Debris GeneratedGenerated

000000000 101010101010101010


202020202020202020












Debris Generated[x1,000 tons / sq.mi.]

Over 500100 to 500

50 to 10010 to 50

5 to 101 to 5

Less than 1

Economic Economic ImpactImpact

Over $120 Over $120 Billion of Billion of Building LossesBuilding LossesDirect and Direct and Indirect Losses Indirect Losses will Exceed will Exceed $150 Billion$150 Billion

000000000 101010101010101010


202020202020202020












Loss Density[$M per sq.mi.]

Over 25050 to 25010 to 50

5 to 101 to 50.2 to 1

Less than 0.2

Lessons LearnedLessons Learned

Multipurpose Scenario Is ComplexMultipurpose Scenario Is ComplexMedia Scenario is GlobalMedia Scenario is GlobalExercise Scenario is DetailedExercise Scenario is Detailed

Regional Scenario Required a Significant Regional Scenario Required a Significant Commitment From Many PlayersCommitment From Many Players

Emergency ManagersEmergency ManagersUtilities and LifelinesUtilities and LifelinesSecurity is an Excuse to Not PlaySecurity is an Excuse to Not PlayHAZUS Support Critical HAZUS Support Critical

For a Regional Exercise

Need to Localize Regional Scenario (3,000+ Need to Localize Regional Scenario (3,000+ Injects) Injects) Be Able to Make a Major Commitment of Time Be Able to Make a Major Commitment of Time and Resources (2 Years, Broad Participation and Resources (2 Years, Broad Participation From Bay Region Counties and $3 MillionFrom Bay Region Counties and $3 MillionNeed to Build Trust in Estimates to Need to Build Trust in Estimates to ““Play the Play the ScenarioScenario”” Until There is Ground TruthUntil There is Ground Truth

Scenario and HAZUS Scenario and HAZUS EstimatesEstimates

For, Rapid Onset Events, We Have No Choice For, Rapid Onset Events, We Have No Choice But But ““Play the ScenarioPlay the Scenario””Need to Build Inventory and Redundant Need to Build Inventory and Redundant OperabilityOperabilityWe need to Exercise the Way We Will Have to Play, Because We Will Play the Way We ExerciseTime History Critical to Scenario EffectivenessTime History Critical to Scenario Effectiveness

Documents

The 1906 Earthquake Scenario and Golden Guardian '06 Exercise