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Editor's Note:

The 1989 staff of the Wittenberg History Journal would like to dedicate this volume toDr. Cynthia Behrman for her contributions and dedication to the Wittenberg History Department.Due to her commitment and determination, the History Journal is being published for the firsttime in three years. Without Dr. Behrman's support, this task would not have been feasible.Thank you.

We would also like to thank the rest of the Witienberg History Department: Dr. Ortquist,Dr. O'Connor, Dr. Celms, Dr. Hayden, Dr. Huffman, Dr. Taylor, Dr. Cutler, and Dr. Chatfield.

William EdwardsCarrie Lewis

Co-editors ............................................. William Edwards and Carrie Lewis

Assistant Editor ......................................................................... Jenny Robb

Typists ................................................ Laura Caplinger, Denise Bauschard

Cover .................................................................. Christopher Terrence Ryan

Address correspondence to:

EditorThe Wittenberg History JournalHistory DepartmentWittenberg UniversityPost Office Box 720Springfield, Ohio 45501

Table of Contents

Walter Gropius: Architect and Educator ........................................................................................................................ 1

Steve Smith

MacArthur and Truman; A Conflict of Interest .......................................................................................... 7

Jon Stewart

The World's Best Hope: Eleanor Roosevelt and her Struggle for Human Rights ....................................................... 11

Jennifer McConoughey

Poem: The Wall ............................................................................................................................................... : ........... 18

Virigiltia Mohlere

The Benefit of Hindsight .............................................................................................................................................. 21

William Edwards

The Progressive Era: An Overview .............................................................................................................................. 23

Denise Bauschard

Review: Splendid Isolation by Christopher Howard .................................................................................................... 27

Jenny Robb

Review: An Encore for Reform-The Old Progressives and the New DeN by Otis Graham ....................................... 29

Beckey Sittason

Waiter Gropius: Architee and Educator

Steve Smith, a senior History major, wrote thls paper for Dr. O' Connor's Historyof Europe in the Twentieth Century Fall term 1988.

The early twentieth century witnessed revolutions ofmany types; political, scientific, artistic, and literary.Most people are aware of Einstein's contributions tophysics, Freud's to psychology, and Picasso's to art,but the revolutionary fervor of the early twentiethcentury touched many other areas as well. Among themost visible yet underappreciated revolutionsoccurred in the field of architecture. Led by such menas Le Corbusier, Frank Lloyd Wright, and WaiterGropins, the revolutionary transformation ofarchitecture touched almost everyone and establishedtrends that still assert great influence over the field ofarchitecture today. Walter Gropins was a key figurein the new urban architecture and influenced thetraining that embodied itself in the Bauhaus school.In this paper, I will examine Gropius the architect,study his influence on architectural thought, analyzehis mark on modem architecture, and discuss hislegacy as an artist. Waiter Gropins was born in Berlinin 1883. Both his father and great uncle werearchitects, and early in life the young Gropius gaineda deep appreciation for the discipline. During Gro-pius's youth in the nineteenth century, Berlin wasundergoing massive impersonal urban growth.Gropius deplored this development and perceived theneed for a new style of architecture. His earlyimpression of Berlin influenced architectoral beliefslater in life. In 1903, Gropius studied architecture atthe University of Munich, and from 1905-1907, hestudied at Chariottenbarg. It was immediately afterhis university training in 1907 that he joined thefirm of Peter Behrens, an event that would maturehim as an architect and introduce him to a new maimof study shaping his artistic and intailectual future.

identification with the "Deutche Werkbund," PeterBehrens became known as a "one man Wcrkbund,"and it was under Behrens's tutelage that Gropiusbegan his professional career. [2] By 1910 he hadbecome Behrans's chief assistant, a major accom-

plishment considering that he was chosen over othersoon-to-be famous young architects such as Ludwig

Mies (the later Ludwig Mies van tier Rohe) and LeCorbusier who were also working in Behrens's officeat the time. Of Behrens, Gropins would later write; "I• owe him much, particularly the habit of thinking inprinciples.., moved more by reason than emotion."[3] In Behrens's office Gropius was ,also exposed tomany of the problems inherent in the new wave ofindustrial and urban architecture--problems hewould address, through education and writing, laterin his life. When he left Behrens's practice in 1910,Gropius had clearly begun to develop the intellectualand artistic ideals that would shape his career as wellas the architecture of the future.

In 1907 the Deutche Werkbund was foundedin Munich, Germany. This movmnent called for thecoordination of all artistic disciplines into large scaleenterprises. A revealing sentence in its constitutionstates: "The aim of the League is to raise the standardof manufactured products by the joint efforts of art,-industry, and craftsmanship." [1] Through his

Gropins's first major design of consequencecame in 1911, the year he actually joined the"Deutche Werkbund" and one year after he estab-lished his own private practice. In cooperation withAdolph Mayer, he designed the "Fagus Shoe LastFactory." This building was revolutionary for tworeasons. First, it made use of cantilevered construc-

tion which allowed the corners of the building tostand without the aid of structural columns. Second,Gropius.and Mayer made extensive use of a glassfacade which gave the building a sense of opennessfrom within and the appearance of modernity fromthe outside. This building was the first example of the"International Style," characterized by extensive useof glass and modern construction materials. Gropiusand Mayer followed the "Fagus" success in 1914with the "Dcutehe Werkbund Exposition" whichonce again made use of these new approaches.

As with most other emerging movements of theday, architecture fell victim to the First World War.

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Unlike some other movements, it reemergnd afterthe war as strong as it had been in 1914. WalterGropius, having survived a wound sustained whilefighting for Germany, was 'there to lead the way.World War I had a profound impact on Gropius. Herealized that a new age had dawned on Germany andthe world. As he would later say; "This is more thanjust a lost war. A world has come to an end. We mustseek a radical solution to oar problems." [4] Oro-pius's answer to his own call for radical new solu-tions was the Bauhaus.

Created in 1919 in Weimar, Germany, after themerger of Saxony's academy of art with its school forapplied arts, the Bauhaus was to be Gropius'sgreatest and most influential contribution to architec-ture. In the B aahaus Gropins integrated all of hisvalues into a school for aspiring designers. The basictenets of the Bauhaus called for the unification ofsculptor, painter, and architect "with the specificobject of realizing a modem architectonic art, whichlike human nature was meant to be all-embracing inits scope." [5] Testhnony to his commitment to totalintegration of the arts was his employment of suchfamous artists as Lyonel Falneger, Marchel Breuar,Wasilly Kandinsky, and Paul Klee to teach almostevery imaginable art form at the Bauhaus. Gropiusalso realized the importance of machinery to moderndesign and taught that while machines could beharmful, they were an inevitable consequence ofmodernization that had to be mastered by thearchitect. [6] The most important aspect of theBauhaus, however, was not the technical or artisticfields that were taught, but the intellectual and socialprinciples that Gropius formulated and passed on tohis students.

Gropius submitted an entry to the Chicago TribuneTower competition in 1922. Gropius designed abuilding that incorporated many of the moderntrends of design. Eventually he was rejected in favorof Howells and Hood, who designed a gothic-likestructure that incorporated an exterior facade reminis-cent of European architecture of several centuriescartier. By examining these two enta-ies, we can see

that Gropins was clearly looking towards thefuture wltile Howells and Hood were seekinginspiration from the past. It is clear that many clientswere not yet ready to accept Gropius's form ofarchitecture, but it would not be long before citieswere to be transformed by his modem style.

In 1925, under the growing conservative pressureof Weimar, Gropius moved the Bauhaus to Dessaninto the famous "Bauhaus" building which hedesigned. Employing the architectural techniques hehad perfected, "The Bauhaus" building in Dessauepitomized his commitment to modern architecture.The building made efficient use of space, was builtwith modem material, and was designed with anemphasis on contemporary techuiques. [9] TheDessan Bauhaus continued to serve as a school fordesign, still ignoring technical training in structuralarchitecture, but continuing to encompass thecreation of modern farnitrtre, lamps, and tableware, tomake modem living as pleasant and convenient for asmany people as possible. In 1927, an actual Bauhausschool of architecture was established in Dessauwhich finally gave Gropius the opportunity toeducate students in technical architecture as well asthe arts.

In keeping with his belief that quality architec-tare was the result of the coordination of all of thearts, Gropius required all of his students at theBauhaus to take introductory classes in ceramics anddesign in order to give them hands-on experiencewith the basic material of construction. Gropius alsostressed the importance of teamwork. While a verynon-political man at tile macro level of society,Gropius was a firm believer in true socialism at tilemicro or group level, to the extent of sharing ideasand perpetuating the attitudes of idealism andfraternity. He also saw the architect as a social leader,not a servant of his client, believing that only thearchitect had the discipline to design with the futurein mind, whereas most non-architects were "satisfiedwith duplicating the tastes of their parents." [7] Hefelt that the artist should ignore tradition and concen-trate on individual inspiration and original designwhen creating a work of art. [8] A good example ofthis ideological contrast with tradition came when

In 1928, as a result of rising German nationalismin Dessau that was becoming intolerant of theBanhans and its members, Gropius resigned as headof the school and reentered private practice in Berlin.[10] The Bauhaus continued to operate under theleadership of Hannes Mayer(1930-1933), until 1933when it was forced to close under pressure from theNazis. In 1934, a year after Hitler's rise to power,Gropius secretly left Germany for England as itbecame obvious to him that the Nazis would nottolerate his type of thinking. A major period ofGropins's life had drawn to a close. Unlike mostvictims of the Nazis, however, Gropius was tocontinue his brilliant career in architecture in othercountries, most notably the United States.

Immediately after leaving Germany, Gropiustook up residence in England for a brief time, and in1937 he set off for the United States where hebecame a professor of architecture at HarvardUniversity. Within a year he was chairman of thedepartment and exerting his direct influence on

Waiter Gropius: Architect and Educator o 3

American students for the first time. Despite the factthat he was teaching in an unfamiliar environment, hedid not "bring about any change in his methods ofapproach," but did respond m the "living and educa-tional patterns of the U.S.A." [11] For fifteen years,until his retirement from Harvard in 1952, Harvard'sstudents were treated to the finest in architecturaleducation from the master. Even as he taught atHarvard, Gropius continued to involve himself withoutside programs and projects that helped to shapethe face of advancing architecture both tectmicallyand intellectually.

Architects Collaborative was Gropins's way ofallowing architects to express individualism while atthe same time promoting the free exchange of ideas.TAC contracted to design buildings world-wide: TheHarvard Graduate Center, the U.S. Embassy inAthens, The University of Baghdad, and the Pan Ambuilding in New York. While drawing on a wide poolof talent, Gropius was the clear leader of TAC, buttypically, he never clahned or accepted the credit hedeserved. He remained a devoted member of TACuntil his death in 1969.

Throughout his life, Gropius had been concernedwith producing affordable housing for the masses. By1909 he had "grasped the essential principles of thefactory-prodaned house." [12] He saw these prefabri-cated houses as the answer to the masses' need for

quality living. Although he realized this problem atan early age and experimented with prefabricatedoptions for much of his life, in 1943 he took hisgreatest step in the advancement of this type ofproduction by becoming a member of a companyknown as "General Panel Construction." It may seem

that by advocating the development of prefabricatedhousing Gropius was contradicting his belief thateach man should have a unique home of his own.However, he was addressing a greater social needthat demanded good shelter for all people whilefollowing his belief that the architect must exertcontrol over technology, and not the other wayaround:

While clearly realizing the dangers of prefabrica-tion, Gropius also realized the importance of exploit-ing technology responsibly and not allowing this typeof housing to be built with no concern for theindividual or the community. Rather than creatingmassive communities of identical houses, he wantedaffordable choices of prefabricated housing thatwould promote diversity within individaal develop-ments.

In 1944, soon after joining "General Panel Con-struction" Gropius became a United States citizen.Two years later, in 1946, Gropins and six of hisformer students formed The Architects Collaborative(TAC). Talcing the principles of the Bauhaus andtransferring them to the professional level, The

The true aim of prefabrication is certainly not thednll multiplication of a house ad infinitum.... But in-dustrialization will not stop at the tltreshold ofbuilding. We have no choice but to accept thechallenge of the machine in all fields of productionuntil men finally adapt it fully to serve their biologi-cal needs. [13]

In his book Walter Gropius, James MarstonFitch summarizes Gropius's intellectual fife in threedistinct areas: as an educator, an architect/designer,and a social critic. [14] I can think of no better way toexamine his impact on society and architecture, inparticular, than by looking at these three areas and theinfluence Gropins exerted over them.

As an educator, Gropius was clearly at theforefront of twentieth century architecture. TheBauhaus school was his greatest contribution in thisarea. More than just the school, however, thenew style of education he promoted was revolution-ary for the time. Instead of encouraging strict artisticindividualism and exclusive service to the wealthyelite, he taught that cooperation and interaction wereimportant for the architect and that society demandedthat artists serve the masses. Many modem architectsattack Gropins for being "anti-individualist" and"soul-destroying." [15] In reality, though, he just sawgroup interaction as a way to promote fraternity andto draw the best talent out of the individual.Gropins also believed that artists should seek inspira-tion from within themselves and avoid looking at thepast or to teachers for ideas. Although few architec-tural students today appreciate the contributions ofGropius, everyone educated in that discipline hasbeen taught, at least in part, by professors who useelements of the Bauhaus idea.

As an architect, aside from his contributions toprefabricated housing, Gropius is most famous for hisunique designs of buildings such as the "Fagus ShoeFactory.," his Chicago Tribune submittal, the"Bauhaus building," and the Pan Am building. It is inhis work as an architect however, that his legacy ismost distorted. Gropins is often blamed for the "con-crete prisons" and "glass cages" that dominate mostcities today. [16] While he was among the firstarchitects to make extensive use of glass in modembuildings, he nonetheless hoped that future buildingsin urban areas would be sufficiently different fromone another so as to avoid the creation of identicallycrafted neighborhoods. [17] Unfortunately, in manycities this is exacdy what has happened. Gropins can

4 . The WittenbergtlistoryJournal

also be called a father of the modern,indistinguishable suburbia that developed outsidemost major American cities, but I disagree withthis accusation. While he did promote prefabricatedhousing, he never intended for entire communities,such as Levittown, N.Y., to be constructed with thesame fundamental design for every house. Herealized that in these types of communities "theindividual becomes a mere number." [18] This is notthe direction he intended mass-produced housing totake. Thus, while Gropius developed many revoin-tionary buildings and supported inexpensive housingfor the masses, he is often blamed unjustly for thecold, faceless cities and subm s that we live in today.These cities are the result of efficiancy-mimted orprofit-seeking developers who are not conscious ofthe social importance of urban deveIopment; not tileresilt of Gropins, whose belief it was that eachbuilding should be designed with its greater socialimplications in mind.

Through his architecture and teachings he promotedthe idea of designing all art with these ideals in mind.Gropius was also a critic of the societies lie lived in.Having been a victim of the Nazis in Germany, hespoke of the dangers of totalitarianism, and havinglived in the United States, he condemned racialsegregation. [21] He was a man who loved bothcountries despite their social problems and a manwho worked to improve both societies through archi-tecture and education.

This leads to the third legacy of Gropius'sintellectual life, that of social critic. The effect ofarchitecture on society is a major one. As thehistorian Peter Gay says, it is "the most emphaticallypublic of all the arts". [19] Gropius realized fltis factearly in life, and dedicated much of his professionalcareer to a commitment to the social principles ofarchitecture. He believed that the arts do more thanplease the senses of the viewer, they touch the personmorally. As he said, "the creation of love and beautynot only enrich man with a great measure of happi-ness, but also bring forth ethical powers." [20]

Waiter Gropius's architectural and intellectuallegacy is a continuing one. His buildings still occupymany major cities, and his beliefs still influence thestudy of architecture today. Students of architecturemust remember, however, that while Gropins wouldwant them to recognize his accomplishments, hewould not want them to copy his style of design. OfFrank Lloyd Wright's students he wrote that theirworks expressed "the vocabulary of their greatmaster," thus condemning Wright's method ofteaching where the students subordinated theircreative impulses to his. [22] Artists' inspirationshould come from within, not from the influence ofhistory or other great artists. He further stated, "Theautocratic approach cannot be called creative, for itinvites imitation; it results in training assistants, notindependent artists." [23] The architect's responsibil-ity is to himself and society, and that responsibility isto create with a blind-eye to the past and with theconcerns of society in mind. This is the legacy ofWalter Gropius.

Notes

(1) S.Giedion, Walter Gropius: Work andTeamwork (New York: Reinhold Publishing Corp.,1954), 21.

(2) Peter Gay, Art and Act (New York: Harperand Row, 1976), 115.

(3) Walter Gropius, Apollo in the Demoeracy(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), 166.

(4) Gay, Art andAct, 122.(5) Walter Gropius, Scope of TotalArchitec-

ture(New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers,1955), 7.

(6) Gideon, Walter Gropius, 25-26.(7) Gay, Art andAct, 111.(8) James M. Fitch, Walter Gropius (New

York: George Braziller, Inc., 1960), 13.

(9) Gideon, Walter Gropius, 54.(10) Ibid., 36.(11) Ibid., 56.(12) Ibid., 74.(13) Ibid., 76.(14) Fitch, Walter Gropius.(15) Gay, Art and Act, 134.(16) Ibid., 135.(17) Ibid.(18) Gropins, Apollo in the Democracy, 80.(19) Gay, Art and Act, 111.(20) Gropins, Apol!o in the Democracy, 4.(21) Fitch, Walter Gropius, 29.(22) Gropins, Apollo in the Democracy, 169.(23) Ibid.

Walter Gropius: Architect and Educator - 5

Bibliography

Fitch, James M. Walter Gropius. New York:George Br iller, Inc., 1960.

Gropius, Walter. Scope of Total Architecture. NewYork: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1955.

Gay, Peter. Art and Act. New York: Harper andRow, 1976.

• Apollo in the Democracy. New York:McGraw-HiU, 1968.

Giedion, S. Walter Gropius: Work and Teamwork.New York: ReinholdPublishing Corp., 1954.

The Men of Myers Hall; Formal and Casual Attire (1914)

Lhotos by Jenny Robb

MacArthur and Truman; A Conflict of interest

Jon Stewart is a senior History major. He wrote this essay inDr, ChatfieId's history of Amerlcan foreign policy.

On April 10, 1951, after a series of differences withDouglas MacArthur over how to conduct the politi-cally delicate war in Korea, President Harry Trumanfelt compelled to relieve the general of all of hiscommands. The array of commands MacArthurhanded over to Lt. General Matthew Ridgeway wereimpressive indeed: Supreme Commander, AlliedPowers; Commander in Chief, United NationsCommand; Commander in Chief, Far East; andCommanding General, US Army, Far East. Havingpresided as America's prominent military official inthe Pacific region for over fifteen years, MacArthurwas abruptly reintroduced to civilian life despite hisenonrmous popularity among citizens of the UnitedStates. The immediate reasons for MacArthur'sdismissal were many, but the nltimate cause of hisfall from power was the voicing of his opposition toHarry Trnman's Cold War tactics, which MacArthnrfelt were defeatist. In his desire to actively pursue themilitary defeat of communism in Asia, DouglasMacArthur failed to fully grasp the political implica-tions of his actions. As a result, he was removed fromthe scene of international politics.

had to regard Korea in a different fashion. Perhapsthe peninsula was not of signifigance in the militarysense, but politically there were a great manyfrightening implicatons to a communist defeat of aUS backed "democracy." There was to be consideredthe kind of message the free world would be sendingthe communist world if this act of aggression was notmet with force. There was recent historical precedentto draw from, as Spanier notes, "since PresidentTruman and his advisors saw in the North Koreanattack an uncomfortable resemblance to the Nazi andFascist aggression of twenty years earlier."[2] Therewas a great fear that if the commmunist challengewere not met with force, the nations of the free worldmight be assuring a third world war. Of equalimportance was the impact a failure to take actionmight have on America's Asian allies. In these daysof strict bi-polarity, what free nation in Asia andelsewhere would not be disheartened by an easycommunist victory so near to the American strong-hold of Japan. Such an eventuality would be a seriousblow to American prestige.

The Korean conflict began on June 25, 1950 asNorth Korean troops dashed across the thirty-eighthparallel in a well planned snrprise attack on theunsuspecting South Korean army. As the NorthKoreans rolled down the peninsula, the United Stateswas put in a difficult position. American strategy forthe containment of communism in the Pacific regionspecifically left Korea out of the defense perimeter,as it was generally considered wisest not to becomeembroiled in a conflict on the Asian continent.MacArthur himself had once stated that anyone whoadvocated such a conflict "should have his headexamined.'[1] The official US policy, stated bySecretary of State Acheson and supported byMacArthur, was that Korea was not vital to theinterests of the United States.

With these considerations in mind, Truman andhis advisors decided on June 30 to anthorize navaland air force bombings of suitable North Koreantargets and blockade the entire Korean coast. GeneralMacArthur was also authorized to commit a limitednumber of ground troops to assist the South Koreans.With a rapidity which must have even surprised thepolicy makers themselves, the United States hadreversed its strategy completely and committed allll ree branches of the armed services to acton inKorea.

With the invasion, however, President Truman

In a politically fortunate circumstance of history,the United States was able to legitimize its entry intoa conflict between two armies of an ardficiallydivided nation through the aid and support of theUnited Nations. The Soviet Union, whose delegationwas boycotting the UN over the issue of CommunistChina's denied entrance to the UN, missed its

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opportunity to veto a resolution on July 27 calling onall member nations to furnish assistance to SouthKorea in her effort to repel the North Korean inva-sion. The UN sanctioning of military aid to SouthKorea also elevated the reputation of Douglas Mac-Arthur. On July 14, he was officially named Com-mander of United Nations forces.

MacArthur's role in foreign affairs had alreadybeen quite political for some time as he presided overJapan's affairs, but his selection by both the US andthe UN to lead their combined military efforts in thetense Korean conflict made him even more popular.As rile New York Times editorialized, MacArthnr was"asked to be not only a great soldier, but a greatstatesman; not only to direct battle, but to satisfy thePentagon, the State Department, and the UnitedNations in the process."[3] MacArthur, realizing fullwell his political and military status, would voice hisopinions on the direction US foreign policy shouldproceed quite vigorously. In the end, his desire tomake opinions lmown would prove to be the undoingof his political as well as military career.

close to their important centers."[4] Secretary of StateAcheson and General Marshall supported crossingthe parallel, but only as a means of crushing theNorth Korean army, not for the purpose of uniting thepenisula.[5] There is no doubt as to MacArthur'sopinion on the matter. "I intend to destroy and notmerely drive back the North Korean forces...." he

declared, "I may have to occupy all of North Ko-rea.'[6] The final decision, however, rested withPresident Truman, and when he did declare policy onSeptember 11, he actually left the decision up to thecommunists. Significantly, Allied forces werepermitted to move into North Korean territory so longas neither the Chinese or the Soviets ritreatened thesituation. Truman did make clear that allied forceswere in no way to cross into or to bomb Chinese orSoviet territory. Along with this, only South Koreanforces were permitted to make the final approach tothe Yalu rivar.[7] Given conditional permission tocarry the fight into the North, however, MacArthurproceeded to take large segments of North Koreanterritory.

Upon his entry into the fray, the prospects for theallied forces looked dim. The North Koreans hadcontrol over all but a small portion of the Koreanpeninsula around Pusan. Not much progress wasmade in repelling the invaders until the early morninghours of September 15, 1950, when MaeArthurimplemented a daring landing at the port of Ichon.Within a week, Seoul was liberated, and by Septem-ber 30 nearly half of the North Korean army wastrapped while the rest were sent reeling in retreat.Even as MacArthur planned his invasion, onequestion weighed heavy on the minds of Americanpolicy makers - how far should the North Koreans bepursued? The initial intent of tile American commit-ment was to repel the North Korean invasion. Shouldthe US forces now pursue their retreating opponentsinto enemy territory? K not, how could South Koreabe gnarenteed safety from future attacks? If the Alliesdid continue the chase across the thirty-eighthparallel, should the North Koreans be pushed back tothe Chinese and Soviet borders? If so, would eitherbe likely to intervene? These were questions whichhad to be carefully considered before thePresidentmake his decision on the matter.

What happened next presented the US with itsmost difficult and sensitive situation since the Berlinblockade. On the night of November 25, approxi-mately 300,000 Chinese troops staged a counter-offensive against the approaching allied forces. Thistime it was the unprepared US forces who were sentreeling into retreat. Before the allies could regatherfrom the onslaught, riley had been pushed fight backto the area around the thirty-eighth parallel, fromwhere the war had begun and from where either sidewould make any more significant advances.

One prominent political advisor who wasopposed to crossing the thirty-eighth parallel wasGeorge Kennan, the author of containment. Kennan's

chief concern was that further advances would spreadallied forces too thin and might provoke interventionby either the Communist Chinese or the Soviets orboth. He pointed out that "the Russians are terriblyterribly sensitive where foreign territory comes very

With the Chinese intervention, the differencesbetween the intentions of MacArthur and the Trumanadmiulstration were blatantly exposed. This conflictin interest was but one of several disagreements thathad occured betweeen the two. Despite the achnini-stration's clearly stated policy that it did not wish toti 'ow its support behind Chiang Kal-Shek's ambi-tions of re-taking mainland China, MacArthur hadprepared and published a speech which was to beread at a VFW convention in which he glowinglypraised Chiang's anti-communism and criticizedthose who thought otherwise. Angry at MacArthurfor issuing a statement so completely contxary toofficial policy, Truman ordered MacAr thur to retractthe speech even though it had already been published.This contxoversy eventually passed. Later, Mac-Arthur complained incesstantly about Truman'srefusal to allow bombing the bridges over the Yaluriver. Citing the strategic importance of these bridges,MacArthur still was forced to find another means tocutting the North Korean arms supply. Now that theChinese had entered the Korean conflict, it was clear

MacArthur and Truman; A Conflict of Interest . 9

that MacArthur and Truman were once againinvolved in a struggle for power.

Douglas MacArthur was a soldier molded in thetradition of the "old school." War and conflict wereto be in absolute terms. Compromise was nottolerated. Believing America to be die greatestindustrial and economic country in the world, Mac-Ar tlmr asserted that the evil of international commu-nism had to be destroyed if tile United States wishedto enjoy future prosperity. Furthermore, the idea thatthe US was not the protector of tim free world wasbeyond MacArthur. As Spanier puts it, DouglasMacArthur firmly believed that "any policy whichadmitted that the United States could not defendevery place in the world was tantamount to appease-mont."[8] Thus America should fight commmfismeverywhere and anywhere, anytime. Moreover,MacArthur detested the idea that Europe should bethe prime concern of the United States. He com-plained on December 26, 1950 that "this group ofEurophiles just will not recognize that it is Asiawhich has been selected for the test of Communistpower and that if all Asia fails Europe would nothave a chance.'[9]

As the Allied forces were in the midst of aterrible pummelling at the hands of the Chinese in thewinter of 1950, MacArthur made crystal clear hisopinion that the time for taking the fight to theChinese had come. By entering the war, according toMacArthur, the Chinese had identified themselves asenemies of the United States and as such they couldnot be spared the fuli might of the American warmachine. The general proposed to the Joint Clfiefsthat the US commence bombing Chinese supplybases and other suitable targets. He "also called for anaval blockade to be imposed along her coast. Healso advocated assisting file Natonaiist Chinese in aninvasion of tile mainland in order to open a secondfront. To the argmnent that such actions on the alliedpart would bring the Soviets into the conflict and soinitiate a general war, MacArthur adopted a wait andsee policy. Who knew what the Soviets might do in

• any event, so why not go ahead and show them theUS wasn't afraid of them anyway? Besides, heargued, our nuclear capabilities far exceeded theirs,so we were in a better position to win a general war.Finally, to the argument that expanding the war wouddrive US allies from the battle, MacArthur repliedthat the US could not afford to subscribe to theirpolicies of appeasement. It was the Chinese whoattacked us, he insisted, and the time was now tofinish ttle fight.

more subtle and primarily political. First, theyasserted that a limited war could and should bepursued in the case of Korea. MacArthur complainedthat the idea of permitting the Chinese to maintainpriviliged sanctuary in China went against all logic.Yet, the administration reaiized that the US had apriviliged sanctuary in Japan. If the US began bom-bing bases in China, Japan would surley be subjectedto bombing as well. Second, MacArthur underesti-mated the importance of the allies to the interests ofthe Ualted States. Without the support of our allies inour most basic foreign policy, the US would beisolated and more vulnerable than ever to a Sovietattack. Third, ManArthur's insistence that Korea beunified as an example of rolling back communismwas not reasonable. Korea, which had lately beandeemed worhty of a limited war, was certainly notworth the risk of a third world war. Militarily,according to the Joint Chiefs, MacArthnr underesti-mated the effort which would have to go into aneffective war on China. A naval blockade on the longChinese coast would drain the US naval capacityworld wide, especially since the allies would almostcertainly not participate, and the airpower necessaryto inflict any meaningful damage on a country aslarge as China would significantly weaken US airpower in Europe and even in America.

The risk of war with the Soviet Union was awhole different argument unto itself. The Soviets andthe Chinese had only recently signed a pact of mutualdefense, and share a very long common border. Thus,the probability of the Soviets going provoked intoaction was much greater than MacArthar supposed.While it is true that the US possessed a far superiornuclear capacity, it was also tree that the Sovietsmaintained a superior conventional force in Europewhich, Atom bombs notwithstanding, could probablyoverrun Europe. Furthermore, US contingency plansfor war with the Soviet Union called for the completeevacuation of Korea, so why risk war with them overKorea?

Whereas MacArthur's strategy was out front andmilitary, the strategy of Truman and his advisors was

In terms of long range foreign policy, the lasttiring the US wanted to do was intensify the Chinesewar effort. Though a long, drawnout stalemate wasthe last tiling the US public wanted, it was also thelast thing the Chinese wanted since such a struggleonly increased their material dependence on theUSSR. This would be unpopular with China since itwas a nation seeking to establish an identity, and itwould be unpopular with the USSR because of thedrain on the already strained Soviet economy. Thecombinaton of these two factors could only serve USinterests in the long run since they could possiblyforge a split in the" monolithic" structure of interna-tionai communism. Yet, in reality, uniting the

10 The Wittenberg History Journal

two powers against the US would push the USSR andChina only closer together.

In an effort to keep these ldnds of disagreementsfrom surfacing to the public, a directive was issuedon December 5 requiring arty statements of policy tobe cleared by the Department of State and Defense.MacArthur ignored this directive on March 24, 1951when he asserted that since he had stalemated a largerChinsese force despite being hampered by the admin-is'a-ation's policies, he had so far defeated theChinese. By essentially calling on the Chinese toadmit defeat, he assured that they would not do soany time soon, effectively sabotaging any peace talkswhich were being discussed. Then, on April 5,Republican Minority leader Joseph Martin read inCongress a letter from MacArthur expressing hisafore mentioned conviction that Asia should be thefirst concern of any American defense policy. Thiswas the last straw. Five days later, GeneralMacArthur was forced into retirement.

The tuhnultuous public acclaim to whichMacArthur returned to the United States is evidenceof the ldnd of popular support a get-tough-on-communism-policy engendered. MacArthur wasfeted and ticker taped and cheered all the way back toWashington where he bade an emotional farewell tohis public life. He then took part in a Congressionalinquiry concerning the circumstances surrounding hisdismissal. When this investigation was completed,MacArthur solidified his heroic image and Trumanretained his villainous aura. History has vindicatedTruman, however. South Korea remains an independ-ent nation to this day, the acceptance of limited warby both superpowers has prevented any large scalewars, and a rift was indeed created between theChinese and the Soviets. Yet, MacArtlurr's image isnot really tarnished. Fie retired with a fantasticrecord for victory, and he was relieved of his dutiesfighting for what he believed. Honor certainlybelonged to Douglas MacArthnr. It is comforting toknow, however, that the concept of civilian authorityover the military withstood this very trying test.

Notes

(l) JohnW. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthurControversy and the Korean War (New York:W.W. Norton and Company, 1965), 17.

(2) Ibid., 29.(3) James Reston, "As UN General, M'Arthur

Faces New Tasks," The New York Times, 9 July1950, p. 3(E).

(4) John Gaddis, The Long Peace (New York:Oxford University Press, 1987), 98.

(5) Spanier, 89.(6) Robert Donovan, Tumultuous Years (New

York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1967), 270.(7) Gaddis, 99.(8) Spanier, 225.(9) Gaddis, 9.

Bibliography

• Donovan, Robert J. Tumultuous Years. New York:

W.W. Norton and Company, 1967.

Manchester, William. American Caeser. Boston:

Little, Brown, and Company, 1978.

Ferrell, Robert H. The Autobiography of Harry S.Truman. Boulder: Colorado Asociated Univer-sity Press, 1980.

Reston, James. "As UN General, M'Arthur FacesNew Tasks." New York Times, 9 July 1950,3(a).

Gartdis, John Lewis. The Long Peace. New York:Oxford University Press, 1987.

Spanier, John W. The Truman-MacArthur Contro-

versy and the Korean War. New York: W.W.

Norton and Company, 1965.

Holler, Francis H. The Korean War; A 25 YearPerspective. Lawrence, KA: TheRegentsPress of Kansas, 1977.

Whimey, Courmey. MacArthur. Westport, CT:Greenwood Press Publishers, 1955.

The World's Best Hope:Eleanor Roosevelt and Her Struggle for Human Rights

Jennifer McConoughey, a senior History major, submitted thisessay as a candidate for the Distinguished Writing Award in Women's Studies.

What I can't understand is why so many newspa-pers and magazines and even the general public havebeen attacking the UN instead of boosting it. Doesn'teverybody know by now that the UN is our last bighope for peace in this world? [E.R. 1946][1]

This quotation by Eleanor Roosevelt captures theessence of her commitment to world peace. ER startsby expressing her dismay in the media and thegeneral public for neglecting the importance of theUnited Nations. She then states her belief that the UNis the necessary instrument for attaining world peace.Eleanor Roosevelt was not, however, a starry-eyedidealist. Nor were her words idle propaganda. She feltdeeply that world peace could only be obtainedthrough a realistic approach to global justice. Sheinitiated this pttilosophy by struggling for domesticharmony. Roosevelt stands as a twentieth-centurymodel for realistic application of the ideals of moralresponsibility for humankind.

to 1953. She served as US representative to Commit-tee 3 (the Human Rights Commission) for the six-year term and chaired the committee from 1946 to1948, during which time the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights was drafted. This shall be discussed indepth later. It is amazing to thhtk that a woman in themid-twentieth century came to achieve and anccess-fully use political power and have the ability toinfluence politics. It is even more amazing to thinkthat a woman out of the privileged upper-class wouldfeel compelled to not only have compassion for thedeprived but to devote her entire life to the cause ofsocial issues both in the United States and in theworld community. Eleanor Roosevelt's baulcgroundprovides valuable insight to why she was successfuland what motivated her toward the cause of human

rights.

The twentieth century has been a period ofmistakes, realizations, and learned lessons. Thiscentury marks the establishment of a truly interre-lated world. We have witnessed two world wars, thedevelopment of a new world system quartered intoNurth-South, East-West "spheres," and an increasingrealization of moral responsibility for our political,economic, and social actions. Through her work inthe area of social reform, Eleanor Roosevelt hasearned the title of"First Lady of theWorld." Thislabel, however complimentary, implies a lack ofindependent professionalism in ER's works. Yet, herrole as a diplomat in the United Nations, her influ-ence as an American internationalist, and herdevotion to educating and cultivating the public'sknowledge of political and social issues greatlyinfluenced American foreign policy.

ER's greatest contribution to the struggle forhmnan rights involved her position as one of the fiveAmerican delegates to the United Nations from 1946

Eleanor Roosevelt was born in 1884 in New "York into a traditional Victorian family. AlthoughER was born into a family of wealth and prestige, shesuffered a very painful and lonely childhood. Eleanorwas orphaned by the age of ten and spent herearly years being passed from relative to relative.She married her handsome and promisingly success-ful cousin, Franldin Delano Roosevelt, in March of1905. However, her life continued to be filled withhardship. She loved Franldin deeply, but her constantcompetition with a domineering mother-in-lawdampened their relationship. Eleanor coped withFranklin's crippling polio by nursing him andconstantly encouraging him to pursue a public life,often at great sacrifice to her own personal ambitions.She also raised her five clrildren only to have themexclude her from their lives. Eleanor's personal lifenever did reap great joy, but she found friends andactivities which filled her life with meaning andsatisfaction. Through ER's trials of loneliness anddisappointment, she became sympathetic andsensitive to the deprived people of the world. InTamara Hareven's biography of ER, she describesthis dichotomy in Eleanor's life by stating:

12 o The Wittenberg History Journal

The pressures under which she foundherself, the absence of love in her early life,and her sense of inferiority could have madeher into a retreating, introverted, hostile, andneurotic person. Instead, she transcended thepreoccupation with herself and focused herinterest on the needs of others. Self-pityturned into compassion, restlessness intoservice, a need to receive into a compulsionto give.[2]

whom, Elizabeth Read and Ester Lape for example,became lifelong friends. In this position, Eleanorstrengthened her skills as a leader and expanded herawareness of the domestic and international issues ofhuman justice to which she would eventually devoteher fife.

Eleanor developed her feelings of responsibilityto society early in her life through the teachings ofher uncle, Theodore Roosevelt. Her sense of publicservice and her belief that one should contribute tosociety emerged from her family background. In herlife, ER devoted much time toward the advancementof the less privileged in society. ER concerned herselflargely with struggling for human rights and saw thegreatest hopes for future peace in what she called"world understanding and the development of aglobal community." She viewed our youth as theforce for the future. Thus ER emphasized socialreform and education as the two greatest investmentsfor world peace.

With this historical background in mind, ER'scareer in politics comes out of the experiences shehad before FDR was elected President of the UnitedStates. As the first lady (1932-1945), ER served as aninfluential consultant to her husband and, throughthose years, increasingly enjoyed a political careerindependent of Mr. Roosevelt. "Through her trips,speeches, and writings, she developed the uniqueposition of a semi-official link between theadministration and the public.'[3] ER travelledaround the country campaigning New Dealideas and "feeling out" public opinions on variousissues. She was allowed to perform this job largelybecause of FDR's falling health and inability totravel. ER delved into many social issues, sharing thecompassionate ideals of reform held by her husband.She wrote a dally column, entitled "My Day," whichwas eventually syndicated to 135 newspapers. Thecolumn originated as a diary of ER's daily activitiesand was filled with trivial details which appealed tothe apoliticalreader. Yet, over the years it graduallybecame weighted with political and social issues. Sheused the column to voice her opinions and evenallowed her husband to use it upon occasion "tolaunch trial balloons for new political programs."[4]Another area of her political career began in 1920when Roosevelt earned the position of legislativecoordinator of the League of Women Voters. This notonly boosted her into a political and social arenadisconnected from FDR, but introduced her toinfluential social and political activists, many of

As ER became more and more interested in "'

international politics, she swiftly applied her hus-band's ideals of democratic social reform to thenewly developing world order. With the outbreak ofWorld War II, ER took the stand that fascism, andsuch leaders as HitIer and Mussolini, threatened theworld and had to be conqnered. So, even thoughEleanor opposed war, she believed the United Statescould not morally take an isolationalist stand.[5]Combining her work in the women's movement withher desire for world peace, she called for women tobecome more involved in the war effort. Here hercolumn "My Day" really began to inform the readersof the political issues of ER's choosing. She saw thegreatest hope for world peace in the estabhshment ofthe United Nations, but realistically viewed theeradication of the causes of war, poverty and hunger,as the ultimate solution for a lasting world peaee.[6]ER believed fascism rose out of wealmess anddesperation cansedby hunger and suppression. Shetherefore felt her greatest service to the goal of worldpeace was found in committing herself to the "im-provement of the human condition."[7] From thispoint on in her life, Eleanor's travels, in the US andabroad, became more focused on her own curiosityand desire to become well informed of the realities ofinequality and human injustice. Unique to this firstlady, Eleanor's career in domestic and internationalaffairs fully developed rather than abruptly endedupon the death of her husband in 1945.

ER's career in international relations began as adiplomat under President Harry Truman, FDR'ssuccessor. President Truman realized the significanceof ER's dedication to the struggle for human rightsand her faith in the United Nations as the agent forthe ultimate goal of world peace. He appointedher as one of the five American delegates to the firstUnited Nations conference in 1946. In this positionshe represented the United States in Committee 3which dent with humanitarian, social, and culturalissues.

ER's success as an international leader ofdiplomacy earned her great respect throughout theUN and the international community. She took herassignment seriously and "was one of the hardestworking and best informed UN delegates.'[8]Her worst critics were fellow American delegateswho treated her with "lofty condescansion."[9]

The World's Best Hope: Eleanor Roosevelt and Her Struggle for Human Rights 13

Originally, her appointment to the Human RightsCommittee was viewed as insignificant by theTruman Administration because this committee wasthought to be fairly insignificant and thus safelyrepresented by ER. However, the Hmnan RightsCommission became increasingly controversial andimportant; it developed the human rights issue into adiscussion of fundamental freedoms, social progress,and world development. Ironically, it was the poorjudgement of our country's leaders which permittedER's work in the UN, and specifically the HumanRights Commission, to prove her ability as a diplo-mat. Chafe states that "her name became synonymouswith the efforts to compose a declaration of humanrights embodying standards that civilized humankindwould accept as sacred and inalienable."[10]

UN.[17] It consists of a preamble and thirty articles.The declaration encompasses both fundamentalfreedoms and economic and social rights. The firsttwanty-two articles deal with political and civil rightssuch as: freedom of thought, freedom of conscience,freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom oflegal representation, freedom of marriage, freedom ofpeaceful assembly, freedom of social security,freedom from discrimination, freedom from tortureand freedom from arbitrary arrest. Articles 23through 30 incorporate the "obligations of the humancommunity to ensure the free and full development ofpersonality'[18] and are expressed as freedoms ofemployment, standards of riving, education, sociali-zation, and cultural expression.[19]

ER proved her leadership qualities as wall as hersensitivity to cultural issues when she was unani-mously elected into the position of chair for theHmnan Rights Commission from 1946 through I948,after which she resigned in order to allow othercountries the opportunity to lead.[ll] ER's role aschair demanded of her what Ralph Martin called"diplomatic fencing,"[12] wherein she impartiallyguided the committee through the drafting of theUniversal Declaration of Hmnan Rights amid therepresentation of moral, ideological, and culturaldiversities. ER has been described as the "supermother" of the committee and ran meetings effi-ciently with a firm, yet tactful, manner.[13] Shereached her personally set goal, the completion of theUniversal Declaration of Human Rights before theend of 1948. The Declaration was, subsequently,approved by the UN General Assembly on December10, 1948. To show their acknowledgement of herleadership, the UN gave ERa standing ovationin 1948.[14]* Whether the ovation was in recognitionof ER or the work of the committee, it neverthelessdemonstrates the public recognition that she receivedfor her work on the Universal Declaration of HumanRights. This declaration stands as Secretary GeneralU Thant put it a "Magna Carta" for all mmkind.[16]It states a common standard for hmnan rightscrossing all national borders. The document waspurposefully worded in a simple fashion to facilitateits translation into the five official languages of the

The Human Rights Commission was originallyset up with three goals for the International Bill ofHuman Rights. The first, the International Declara-tion of Human Rights, states the fundamentalprinciples of human rights. The declaration is notlegally binding and serves only as a moral ideal forall nations.J20] The second document was to he acovenant viewed as an international treaty andratified by each of the member nations of the UN;this covenant would act as an international law. Thethird document was to deal with the "machinery forenforcement" and methods of implementation.J21]Although the initial declaration was approved in1948, the covenants were not completed until 1961.As they stand, the covenants are divided betweencivic/political freedoms and social/economic free-doms. The United States has yet to ratify either.

*Some sources attribute the final approval of theUniversal Declaration of Human Rights as theintended recipient of the standing ovation,not ER (Cook, 113). Young does not directly connectthe standing ovation with the Declaration; he ac-claims it to ER (Youngs, 218). Further, WilliamChafe notes that the standing ovation was directly forER sometime after the Deciaration was passed(Chafe, 23).

ER's role as chair of the Human Rights Commis-sion dealt mostly with drafting the Universal Declara-tion of Human Rights. Her most difficult task wassteering the many texts into a compromising andagreeable final draft.J22] The major conflicts withinthe commission were East-West ideological differ-ences, semantics (being clear about the meanings andnot just translations of words), and cultural differ-ences which created rifts not only in communication,but also in definitions of fundamental human rightsas seen threugh different religions. ER's skills ofdiplomacy successfully curbed the many argumentswhich afose in the committee meetings. Often shewould bridge gaps through informal gatherings at herhouse with only a few delegates at a time. [23] ERhad an innate ability to bring the intellectual abstractideas down to a simple concrete discussion and toharness those abstract ideas into coherent andmeaningful statements. Her desire to achieve successin her "crusade for human fights," as so many havecalled it, guided her through the constant strugglewithin the Human Rights Commission. This allowedher to be, as Youngs states, "exceedingly practical,

14 ° The Wittenberg History Yournal

and even tough, though in an outwardly dreamy andidealistic way."[24] She demonstrated qualifies oftrue leadership in the commission, but her "crusade"was not only on the international level. As statedbefore, ER's greatest difficulties, worst criticism, andhardest work were domestic in origin.

During ER's tenure as US delegate to the UN,the United States experienced waves of strongisolationist and anti-communist sentiments. Thepressures of the Cold War also fed into a general fearof binding fire US into a UN-based world system. Inher frustration at the country's hesitance towardsupporting the UN, ER proclaimed that without theUN:

our country would walk alone, ruled by fearinstead of confidence or hope. To weakenor hamstring the UN, through lack of faithand lack of vision, would be to condemnourselves to endless struggle for survival ina jungle world.[25]

Union at his villa in Yalka in 1957, and at Hyde Park(ER's home) in New York in 1959 and 1960.[30] Inaddition, ER accepted numerous invitations fromother world leaders. Prime Minister Nehru invited ERin 1952 to visit India. Along the way, she travelled inLebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Israel. This experienceexposed her to Eastern culture. Through these travels,she obtained a greater understanding of their peopleand culture. In her lifetime, ER traveled the worldover several times. ER broadcasted both in the UnitedStates and in Europe, conducting interviews andspeaking in French, German, Spanish and It,qlian. In1959, she accepted the position of visiting professorof international issues at Brandeis University. ERtruly devoted her energy to the cause of human rightsby informing the public through the media and byeducatingthe youth of the world.

Because of ER's commitment to human rightsduring the period of McCardiyism, she was accusedof being a communist. Some of her closest colleagueswere actually detained by the US government. [26]Amid all of this criticism, however, ER pushed on.She refused to be stopped by the foolish insensitivityto reality which was, in her eyes, based on ignorance.In order to combat this ignorance, she Iectored, wrotearticles, and started a second syndicated articleentitled "Turn Towards Peace."[27] Even though shedevoted limitless energy and time, ER's vision ofglobal equality and human rights never achievedacceptance in the Senate during her lifetime. With theelection of Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1952, ER wasnot reappointed to the UN. Thus, her official careeras a US diplomat ended in 1953. The value she sawin global equality did not end, however. In 1953 ERmoved into the next stage in her struggle for humanrights. This stage focused on domestic policy andinternational awareness.

In retrospect, although ER never actually madeforeign policy, she did mold the ideals of universalhuman rights and practically applied them as no otherin the twentieth century. ER believed strongly in thepossibility, and necessity, of world peace. Althoughworld peace is, at least at present, an ideal notrealistically attainable, ER placed faith in the UN ashaving the greatest potential of achieving worldpeace through a new world order. She maintainedthat a person could mal<e a difference and took tiffs asa personal philosophy as well as direction in life. Sheunderstood power and knew how to use it to obtainher goals of peace through the struggle for humanrights.

In 1953, at the age of 69, ER became a full-timevolunteer at the American Association for the UN inNew York. This position allowed her speaking andwriting income to support her.[28] The organizationalso provided her with connections to continue hercommitment to human rights. ER travelled in the USand around the world in support of peace and humanrights[29], continuing personal diplomacy. One ofher most notable achievements during this period washer establishment as an internationally acclaimedjournalist. This allowed her to meet by invitationsuch political leaders as Marshal Josip Broz Tito ofYugoslavia in 1953 and Khrushchev of the Soviet

ER acted in society with sensitivity and intuition.She saw voids ha the system and realistically wentafter the voids she could affect. When she saw anignorant American public, she strove to inform andeducate them with newspaper articles, broadcasts,and lecture tours. This, in turn, shaped the leaders'policies in Washington. They felt the impact of ER asshe hosted important guests at her house and as shelobbied through the newspapers and in Washingtonfor improvements in the system. ER shaped Ameri-can social reforms and led America to a new globalview of respect for other cultures and ways of life. Inthis way, Roosevelt affected our American govern-ment's foreign policy toward emerging developingcountries.

We must keep in mind that it is impossible tojudge ER's impact on society and government bytoday's standards. Forty and fifty years ago, womendid not enjoy the right to choose careers and were notconsidered equals to men. With this in mind, ER'srole especially in the UN as chair of the HumanRights Commission is only now being fully realizedand appreciated. In addition, her personal efforts in

The World's Best Hope: Eleanor Roosevelt and Her Struggle for Human Rights o 15

meeting with top world leaders as an independentinternational diplomat, informing the public, andeducating the youth all exemplify how she devotedher life to the improvement of the human condition.Roosevelt's many accomplishments prove that she

(1) Ralph G. Martin, "Number One Citizen,"The New Republic (August 5, 1946): 139-40.

(2) Tamara K. Hareven, ER: An American Con

succeeded in obtaining the goals that she set forherself. Moreover, her work continues to influenceindividuals and governmentS through the UniversalDeclaration of Hmnan Rights and through herthought-provoking writings proclaiming a newworld system. Eleanor Roosevelt rightfully stands asan example of the joining of human rights to humanresponsibility.

Endnotes

science (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, Inc., 1968):262.

(3) Ibid., 43.(4) Ibid., 44.(5) Blanche Wiesan Cook, "'Turn toward

Peace:' ER and Foreign Affairs," Joan Hoff-Wilsonand Marjorio Lightman, eds., Without Precedent:The Life and Career of Eleanor Roosevelt (Bloom-ington: Indiana University Press, 1984): 111.

(6) Eleanor Roosevelt, Tomorrow Is Now(NewYork: Harper and Row, 1963): 46.

(7) EdnaP. Gurewitsch, "Remembering Mrs.Roosevelt: An Intimate Memoir," American

IIeritage, vol.33, no.1 (December 1981): 16.(8) J. William T. Youngs. ER: A Personal and

Public Life (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1985):210.

(9) Cook, "ER and Human Rights: The Battlefor Peace and Planetary Decency," Edward P.Crapol, ed., Women and American Foreign Policy(New York: GreenwoodPmss, 1987): 107.

(10) William H. Chafe, "Biographical Sketch,"Without Precedent, 22.

(11) Hareven, 232.(12) Martin, 139.(13) Youngs, 216.(14) Joseph P. Lash, Eleanor: The YearsAlone

(New York: WW Norton and Company, 1972):79.

(15) Cook, Women andForeignPolicy, 99.(16) Youngs, 220.(17) Clark M. Eiclielberger, UN: The First 15

Years (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960):58.(18) Cook, Women and Foreign Policy, 100.(19) Eleanor Roosevelt and William DeWitt,

UN: Today and Tomorrow (New York: Harper andBrothers, 1953): 217-223.

(20) Youngs, 219.(21) Eiehelberger, 57.(22) Haroven, 232.(23) Ibid., 233.(24) Youngs, 214.(25) Hareven, 246.(26) Maurlne H. Beasley, ER and the Media: A

Public Quest for Self-Fulfillment (Chicago: Uaiver-sity of Illinois Press, 1987): 177.

(27) Hareven, 243.(28) Beasley, 179.(29) Cook, Women and Foreign Policy, 114.(30) Beasley, 181.

Bibliography

Beasley, Maurine H. ER and the Media: A PublicQuest for Self-Fulfilhnent. Chicago: Universityof Illinois Press, 1987.

Gurewitsch, Edna. "Remembering Mrs. Roosevelt:An Intimate MemoirY American Heritage,vol.33, no.1. (December 1981) pp.10-19.

Crapol, Edward P. Women and American ForeignPolicy. New York: Gleeawood Press, 1987.

Hamven,Tamara K. ER : An American Conscience.

Chicago: Quadrangle Books, Inc., 1968.

Eichelberger, Clark M. UN: The First Fifteen Years.New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960.

16 ° The Wittenberg History Journal

Hoff-Wilson, Joan and Lightman, Mmjorie, eds.Without Precedent: The Life and Career ofEleanor Roosevelt. Bloomington: IndianaUniversity Press, 1984.

• Tomorrow ls Now. New York: Harper and

Row, 1963.

• Eleanor and DeWitt, William. UN: Today andTomorrow. New York: Harper and Brothers,1953.Lash, Joseph P. Eleanor: The Years Alone. New

York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1972.Young, William T. ER : A Personal and Public Life.

Roosevelt, Eleanor. !t Seems To Me. New York:W.W Norton and Company, 1954.

Martin, Ralph T. "Number One Citizen." The NewRepublic (August 5, 1946) pp.139-140.

Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1985.

Myers Hall - 1914

ourtesy Wittenberg Archives

|

4

The Wall

st ing through metal eyesat the names of your dead

brothers of war

faces desperate,hopeless,

i. an groups of old men with old eyesstand before you

photo aphs

of nameson and on and ......

so many sons...

lost in a useless war,

make rubbingswith ragged, desperate strokes

crying over scraps of paperbearing their nmnes

, "'Crazy"

crazy it was ....

still is ....

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The Benefit of HindsightWilliam Edwards, a senior History major, wrote this paper for Dr. Huffman's

History of Modern China.

On the morning of March 26, 1926, New York Citywas preparing for yet another high-pressured wolMngday. If you were to have purchased a newspaper froma local vendor, the headlines that Wednesday wouldhave related the death of John Calvin Coolidge,father of the acting President. Central Park renova-tions were to begin the following Friday, and a localpatrofinan had foiled an attempted robbery in lowerManhattan. For the serious reader, Wayne B. Wheelerwould describe the "inside story" of the Prohibitionfight.[1] These were the top stories in the New YorkTimes on March 20, 1926.

These were the stories that would sell news-

papers.

Severn thousand miles away in Guangzhou,China, a key power struggle was taking place withinthe Guomindang political party. Forced to worktogether as a result of recent Japanese hostilities, theGuomindang and the Chinese Communists co-existedin an aura of continual tension. This uneasy atmos-phere exploded into open conflict on March 19, 1926when Chiang Kal-shek staged a successful coup inGnangzhou. Suspicious of the comings and goings ofthe gunboat Chnng-shan, Chiang seized the boat,accusing the Communists of formulating an assassi-nation plot against his life. Chiang than proceeded todeclare martial law in Guangzhou, disarming theCommunist-directed workers militia, and detaining• several top Communists. By acting without theconsent of his superior, Wang Jing-wei, CbJang Kai-shek had aggl ssively expressed his desire for power.

March 26, 1926, the New York Times printed aneight-line AP wire report describing the possibility ofa minor coup d'etat in the city of Guangzhou. Theemphasis of the report (four fines) centered upon thefact that eight Russians had been killed in theprocess.J4] Faced with the pressure to sell newspa-pers, the editors of the New York Times most likelyfelt that a "minor coup" in southeast Asia would notbe appealing to an isolationist America. Moreover, byreporting on the death of John Calvin Coolidgeinstead of the Chang-shan gunboat incident, a higherprofit could be expected for the newspaper. TheJapan Times makes no mention of the March 19coup. Preoccupied with Chinese problems in Pekingand Tienstin, the Japanese must also have viewed theChung-shan incident as miniscule. Furthermore, theeditors of The Japan Times were careful not to placetoo much emphasis on Chinese affairs for the reasonthat China was Japan's main rival in Asia. To coverthe Chinese extensively might suggest a state ofinferiority on the part of the Japanese. Consequently,China would only be covered by The Japan Timeswhen Japan was involved.

Historians point to the Chung-shan gunboatincident as a very important event in Chiang Kal-shek's quest to control China. While Ranbir Volgadescribes the event as "notorious,'[2] C, MartinWilbur emphasizes the fact that many people do notappreciate the implications of the March 19 coup.[3]These "many people" included the Soviets, theJapanese, and the entire Western world. On

Unlike the journalist who is motivated by theexpectation of high profit, the historian is guided bythe rules and regulations of high scholarship. As aresult, each student of history must adhere to theprescribed guidelines of proper historianship. Theseguidelines reduce the threat of sensationalism whichoften occurs in newspaper reporting. Furthermore, thehistorian is forced to view an issue from everypossible angle available. While the journalist canafford to report from a biased perspective, thehistorian must strive to explore all sides of an issuebefore establishing his personal interpretation.

By analyzing the Chung-shan gunboat incident,one can see the great advantage that hindsight offersto the historian. Although the editors of the New YorkTimes and The Japan Times measured the appealingnature of a story for profit, one could assert that the

22 o The Wittenberg ltistory Journal

importance of the Chung-shan incident could not beimmediately realized by any journalist. As a result,Chiang Kai-shek's coup was placed under thecategory of "local disturbances" in China by manywriters in 1926. Sixty-three years after the Chung-shan incident, historians can look into the past with a

better understanding of the vital importance ofChiang Kai-shek's seizure of power in Guangzhou.Although March 20, 1926 was just another day forthe reporters of the New York Times and The JapanTimes, it is a day that would help determine theguidelines for future Chinese domestic conflict.

NGtGs

(1) New York Times, March 26, 1926, 1.(2) Ranbir Vohra, China' s Path to Moderniza-

tion: A Historical Review from 1800 to the Present(Now York: Prentice Hall, 1987), 131.

(3) Martin Wilbur, The Nationalist Revolutionin China, 1923-1945 Boston: Cambridge Press,1983), 123.

(4) New York Times, March 26, 1926, 4.

The Japan Times.

The New York Times.

Bibliography

Vohra, Ranbir. China's Path to Modernization: AHistorical Review from 1800 to the Present. NewYork: Prentice Hall, 1987.

Wilbur, Martin. The Nationalist Revolution in China,1923-1945. Boston: Cambridge Press, 1983.

The Progressive Era: An OverviewDenise Bausehard, a senior History Major, wrote this paper for Dr. Chatfiehl's History

of the Progressive Era during Fall term ]988.

Eric Goldman's Rendezvous with Destiny, alongwith the writings of many progressive reformers,presented the view that the major American reformsof the Progressive Era (as was well as those takingplace before and after the period) were brought aboutby the efforts of the reformers, including file so-called "muchzakurs." These people were interested inun-covering corruption and correcting it in theinterests of the common people, and one of theirfavorite targets was business, including the trusts.Prom this perspective, Progressive Era reform cameessentially from and for the people, aimed againstbusiness and the special interests. It sought justiceand relief for the suffering and the poor, and to giveeveryone in society a fair chance. Govarmnentreform, thorough organization and legislation, wasperceived as liberal and irmovative--and again, in theinterests of the people.

Gabriel Kolko's book, The l"riumph of Conser-vatism, presents an extremely different point of view.He acknowledges that changes took place during theProgressive Era, but feels that they were broughtabout largely through the work of business interests,which were in reality the beneficiaries of the newlegislation. Rather than a group of angry reformersforcing through new laws to protect the downtrodden,businessmen encouraged new laws that actuallyprotected, not threatened, their interests, by helpingto give them a more positive image and preventingwhat would have been much stricter state legislation.Kolko argues that since Progessive reforms actuallyhelped to protect the businesses and the system inwhich they functioned, it was actually a period ofconservative action.

much would destroy the work incentive and thefuture possibility of self-improvement in Americansociety, the socialists presented yet another view.They went beyond most reformers' hopes for govern-ment protection and regulation to argue for govern-ment ownership of the means of production in thecountry. This was an extension of the concept ofcooperation for the good of all which most reformersencouraged. Instead of seeking to reform the capital-ist system, the socialists sought to abolish it. More-over, rather than perceiving the Presidents as support-ers of these goals seeking a better society for all, theSocialist Party declared the Democrats and Republi-cans to be in the service of the capitalists (a viewKolko also holds). Although the socialists wereopposed to the views of such ttfiulcers as Sumner andCarnegie, they all agreed that the actions of the"muclcraking" type of reformer, seeking a limitedamount of government action for the sake of thepeople, dirl not provide a good solution to the prob-lems of America.

The writings of other thinkers during this period,including businessmen and the socialists, shed furtherlight on the varying perceptions of reform. Whilesome leaders, such as Andrew Carnegie and WilliamSumner, rejected the reformers' views (at least to anextent) in so far as they felt that giving the people too

John D. Hicks noted the Populist reforms thatwere actually carried out and Lincoln Steffenspointed out that the people could actually fight graftand corruption in their cities, creating an image ofreform by and for the people. However, the opposingargument holds that little was accomplished by thepeople (certainly, if anything was, it was not in theeconomic sphere). The fmuous "trust-busting"

approanh of Henry D. Lloyd, Walter E. Weyl, andothers can be seen in contrast to both Kolko's pictureof businessmen seeking federal regulation thatactually supported their goals and to the socialistswho viewed trusts as a natural and unavoidable stepin the development of an economic system andsimply sought to replace them with popular owner-ship.

Kolko focuses, of course, on an economic inter-pretation of the Progressive Era, and is not clearwhether or not he would feel that there was some

24 o The Wittenberg History Journal

social reform that benefitted the common man (oreven whether the people may have gained somethingfrom business legislation, despite the fact thatbusiness itself encouraged it). In any case, he refutesthe belief that government legislation was pushedthrough by reformers to put limits on business againstthe will of the businessmen.

and that the national government was sought as amore friendly source of regulation (rather than themost efficient means of controlling huge corpora-tions, as many Progressive reformers believed).Regulation also could help prevent excessivecompetition. The Triumph of Conservatism notes thatbusiness benefitted in a variety of ways:

In The Triumph of Conservatism, Kolko analyzesin detail the various business mid banking reformscarried out under Theodore Roosevelt, WilliamHoward Taft, and Woodrow Wilson. He goes beyonda simple discussion of the legislation that wasactually passed and considers the legislation thatmight have been passed, the various individuals andgroups who supported or opposed it, and the effectthe new laws and organizations really had onAmerica.

Big business wished to have federal incorpora-tion or a commission, or both, to escape fromburdensome state regulation, tO stabilize conditionswithin an industry..., to create a buffer against ahostile public and opportunistic pofiticians, and tosecure those conditions of stability and predictabil-ity.... Small businesses ...sought the right to create andenforce price and output Agreement--to end the

burden of competition [2].

Kolko also covers a variety of bills and laws con-sidered during the 1900-1916 period. He creates animage of the government, including the Presideats, asshowing little tendency to attack the foundations ofbusiness or the trusts. Indeed, Kolko declares that thecontrary was true: "The views and desires of Wilsonand business were virtually idantical.'[1]A conserva-tive desire to preserve the basic status qan of theeconomic system prevented any radical changes. AsKolko describes it, the Presidents tended to view thebusiness leaders as admirable and trustworthy, seeingtheir goals as essentially honorable and believingtheir claims of just action.

Government legislated banking reform wasanother business triumph. Kolko describes the ineffi-cient system of banking daring tile Progressive Erawhich made financing in large amounts difficult forbusinesses. However; batfldng reform helped to makethe system more efficient and wassupperted by thebankers.

Kolko also frequently notes that the individualstates were often quite hostile to business and trusts,

Many of the big business interests, Kolko notes,*were under a variety of pressures. For exaarple, meat

packers were not forced to clean things up shnplybecause of public outrage. Rather, they facedfinancial loss from European bans on their unheNthymeat; furthermore, Americans could look for the bestand healthiest produce. Meat inspection laws, Kolkoargues, were supported, not hindered, by the mem-bers of the industry. The inspection laws, instead ofhindering business, actually helped the meat industry

• by ensuring that the packers turned out a healthyproduct that would be masted and accelSted by theconsumers.

Federal detentes, Kolko farther notes, allowedcompanies to avoid some of the potential dangers thatlegislation might bring. As already stated, thePresidential attitudes tended to be more trusting thannot, and business was generally given warnings andassumed innocent in many instances.

Again, this all contradicts the picture of govern-ment legislation concerned with "trust-busting" andprotecting tile public interest from the evils of thegiant corpomtions. Theodore Roosevelt, of course,

stated his opposition to excessive governmentassistance directed at the poorer elements of societyin such writings as, "How Not to Help Our PoorerBrother" and "The Strenuous Life." Even if govern-

ment did get involved in legislation and regulation, itshould not yield too much to the people or make lifeso easy that the incentive to work would be lost.

A number of other writers shared Roosevelt'sfear on this point. Andrew Carnegie saw opportuni-ties open to the young people of America if theyworked hard. He also argued that starting mlt poorwas the best way to begin the children of the richwould be lazy, with no incentive to work hard.William Graham Sumner seemed even more opposedto giving too much to the people. In "The ForgottenMan" he praises the ordinary hard-working individualand disclaims responsibility for the unproductivemembers of society, noting that drunks in the gutterbelong there Those who worked hard should map thebenefits, while those who did not, should not.

These views, while maldng sense in relation toKolko's book, which advocates that the bas!c capital-istic economic system is conserved, join that work inopposing the policy of "Progressive" reform whichurged the need for greater compassion and aid to the

The Progressive Era: An Overview o 25

poor who were victims of a corrupt system, unable tomake it through their own efforts.

This view(supported by Henry George, Henry D.Lloyd, and many others)was expressed forcibly bythe socialist thittkers of tile period. The SocialistParty saw itself as the representativ thc ONLYrepresentative party of the people. As already stated,they extended the view of power and relief for tilepeople, and the concept of a cooperative effort. Thesocialists aimed at the nationalization of all means ofproduction under the control of the government- r,

in actuality, under the control of the people.

Although much of their platform was radical, manyof the reforms sought in the 1912 platform, advocat-ing an end to child labor, women's suffrage, and tilereferendum, were enacted into law eventually.

As already stated, the socialists had a somewhatdifferent view of the trusts as ,,veil. Some argued thatthe lrusts were a natural step in the movement towarda socialistic economy, but that ownership of trustsshould pass from the hands of a few individuals intothe hands of the people. This was one aspect of theway society would be organized as a whole unitrather than as a mass of competing individuals. Onthe other hand, Monis Hillquit argued that it wouldbe socialism and not capitalism that would leacl totrue democracy and individualism, since tile capitalistsystem tnmed the working class into one homogene-ous mass.

An important theme in Socialist thiit!dng,expressed in the "Socialist Party Platform of 1912"and in Eugene V. Debs's "Speech at Indianapolis,"• was the idea that both the Republican zind the De-mocratic Parties (actually, any political party exceptthe Socialist Party) were working to keep the capital-ist system strong and were thus opposed to the trueinterests of the working people. This attitude, ofcourse, is directly in harmony with Kolko's views ofthe situation. He states at one point, "Roosevelt wasconsciously using government regulation to save thecapitalist system...." [3] For men like Debs, the work-ing man and woman's only hope lay in file SocialistParty, which represented their true interests. TheSociafist Pm'ty declared, that this class would gainpower and economic control, which was its right.

omy.

For the Socialists, the efforts at mild reformtaking place within the government were not enough.Even William Graham Sumner, in "Legislationby Clamor," stated that many of the reforms passedby the government had not actually had any effect, inpractice, they merely created the impression thatsomething was being done to solve the problems andthus gave the people a sense of having accomplishedsomething. The Socialists, too, felt that the currentsystem, and the established parties, were not theanswer to the real problems of the American ccon-

Edward Bellmny's novel, Looking Backward,seemed to project a very optimistic view of futureprogress. Thc sense that socialistic reforms were theonly answer, and that change was not only desirablebut inevitable, was brought out in a novel that lookedback on a disorderly, suffering world of i888 withamazement and some disbelief. The question of whythe people had not used their votes to bring aboutchange beneficial to themselves meant asking whythey were not doing sc and saying that there was nogood reason why not. The novel furthermore pre-sented a world free of strife and economic suffer-ing ALL of the people had reached a very highstandard of living and of culture as well. Thisargument--that socialism would in fact bringbenefits to ALL members of society, including thebusiness interests was an important element broughtout by William English Walling. To these thinkers, itwas merely a matter of time before socialism,obviously a positive and reasonable system, arrived.

All in all, the question of the Progressive Eraappears increasingly complex and multi-sided. WhileGoldman and many reformers viewed the period as atime for liberal legislation, government regulation ofthe economic system for the benefit of the commonpeople, and as an era that achieved many positivereforms Kolko and the businessmen, as well as thesocialists, viewed things quite differently. WhileKolko saw it as a conservative period, with businessactually influencing and coordinating economiclegislation to their own advantage, the socialistsnoted and despised this trend, hoping for governmentinfluence and nationalization of business whichwould lead to collective ownership of the means ofproduction. While each side (business and socialism)had very different goals, they both presented animage of a system that was NOT, in fact, givinggreater power and justice to the ordinary people.Rather, it displayed a conservatism that the business-men approved and the socialists resented not theliberalism that so many would-be reformers saw andapplauded.

26 o The Wittenberg History Journa!

Notes

(1) Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conserva-tism (New York: The Free Press, 1963), 278.

(2) ibid., 179.

(3) Ibid., 130.

Bibliography• Bellamy, Edward. "Equality." (1897) Chap. in

Socialism in America: From the Shakers to theThird International, ed. Albert Fried, pp. 289-319. Garden City, New Yoric Doubleday andCompany, Inc., 1970.

Lloyd, Henry Demerest. Wealth Against Common-wealth. New York: Harper and BrothersPublishers, 1894.

Bellamy, Edward. Looking Backward, ed. John L.Thomas. Cambridge, Massachusetts: TheBelknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967

[1888].

Roosevelt, Theodore. The [collected] Works.(National Edition) New Yorlc CharlesScribner's Sons, 1926.

Bellamy, Edward. "'Looking Forward.'" (1889)Chap. in Socialism in America, pp. 320-323.

George, Henry. Progress and Poverty. New York:Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, 1954 [1897].

Debs, Eugene V. "Speech at Indianapolis." (1904)Chap. in Socialism in America, pp. 398-404.

Carnegie, Andrew. The Empire of Business. NowYork: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1902.

"Socialist Party Platform of 1912." Chap• in Social-ism in America, pp. 391-397.

Steffens, Lincoln. The Shame of the Cities. Introduc-tion by Louis Joughin. New York: Hill andWang, 1957.

Albert Galloway Keller. New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 1914.

• The Forgotten Man and Other Essays, ed.Albert Galloway Kellar. New Haven: YaleUniversity Press, 1919 [1915].

Goldman, Eric F. Rendezvous With Destiny. NewYork: Vintage Books, 1977•

Hicks, John D. The Populist Revolt. Minneapolis:The University of Minnesota Press, 1931.

Hillqnit, Morris. "Socialism in Theory and Practice."(1909) Chap. in Socialism in America, pp. 430-440.

Walling, William English. Socialism As It Is: ASurvey of the World-Wide RevolutionaryMovement. New York: The Macmillan Com-pany, 1912.

Weyl, Walter E. The New Democracy. New York:The Macmillan Company, 1912; Harper andRow, 1964.

Kolko, Gabriel. The Triumph of Conservatism. NewYork: The Free Press, 1963.

Review of Splendid IsolationJenny Robb, a sophomore History major, wrote this review for Dr. Hayden's History

of England H during Winter term 1989.

Splendid isolation, in reference to Great BrlUan sforeign policy from 1890-1914, has been the subjectof much debate among historians. Many maintainthat Britain followed a policy of "isolation" fromother countries, especially other European counlIies,particularly under the leadership of the 3rd Marquisof Salisbury(1886-92 and 1895-1902). ChristopherHoward, confirms file view held by other historiansthat the phrase had many meanings and that it doesnot accurately describe Britain's or Salisbar'y'sforeign policy.

affairs. Although the book is short, Howard'sdedication to the thorough examination of availableevidence is reflected throngbout his study. Unfortu-nately, his conclusions, especially with regard toSalisbnry, are sometimes ambiguous. In Howard'sdefense, his ambiguous conclusions seem to comefrom the evidence. As Howard points Ollt, it ispossible to ,arrive at several different conclusionsdepending on what one consirlers an alliance or apolicy of "isolation."

Howard points out that the term "isolation"generally had a negative connotation in the 19thcentury. It implied weakness and "an embarrassinglack of tSiends among other powers on whmn reliancecould be placed for support in case of need."[1]According to Howard, the phrase "splendid isolation"originated in Canada and was not used by Salisburyor the foreign office to describe their policies. It wasused primarily by politicians and the press whoreflected a popular attitude in the last few years of the19th century. He offers evidence that Britain wasbound by alliances that had been made in the past,showing that she was not completely "isolated." I-Iesuggests that Salisbury's reputation for following apolicy of "isolation" was a result of his last two ad-ministxations during wtlich he often declared hisinability to make alliances on constitutional grounds.Moreover, Howard also cites other evidence showingthat this was not a strict policy followed by Salisburyand that his contemporaries would not have singledhim out in this way.

Howard's critics have differing opinions of hisbook. Bernard Semmel, of the State University ofNew York concludes in a brief review of Howard'sbook, that Howard "does not attempt to come toserious grips with the questions or to suggest whythey might be important ones to ask; the result, con-seqanntly, is less an analysis than a lengthy foot-note.'[2] Max Beloff of All Souls College and ZaraSteiner of New Hall, Cambridge give the study morecredit. Beioff states that even though the conclusionsare not startling, tile book will help in bringingpeople to realize that British administrations shouldnot be given credit for a policy which was not eventheirs. All unsigned review in The Economist is themost complimcntary of all, saying that the surveywas "impeccably conducted" and that Howard "dis-

plays a heartening regard for ascertainable facts.'[3]

Howard makes use of substantial evidence forhis conclusions. The use of many primary sources,both archival and printed, serves as the basis ofHoward's discussion. Howard also makes extensiveuse of dispatches and minutes from the foreign office,Parliamentary debates, public speeches, and the dailypress during the period under discussion. He relies onsecondary sources that deal with the issues of foreign

I am in agreement with Beloff: Howard's studyis important in so far as it carefully examines theevidence and shows that the many myths surroundingBritain's so-calIed "splendid isolation" can no longerbe accepted as fact. The idea that "splendid isolation"was not the policy of Britain or Salisbury is notoriginal to Howard, but he shows its validity throughextensive research into documents of the time.

28 o The Wittenberg History Journal

Notes

(1) Christopher Hovard, SpIendidlsolation(New York: St. Martin's Press, I967), 1.

(2) Bernard Semmel, review of SplendidIsolation, by Chritopher Howard, in Political ScienceQuarterly 85 (September 1970): 513.

(3) Review of Splendid Isolation, by Christo-pher Howard,in The Economist 226 (30 March 1968):53.

Bibliography

Beloff, Max. Review of Splendidlsolation, byChristopher Howard, in American HistoricalReview 73 (June 1968): 1534-1535.

Review Of Splendid Isolation, by ChristopherHoward. In The Economist 226 (30 March1968): 52-53.

Howard, Christopher. Splendidlsolation. NewYork: St. Mardn's Press, 1967.

Semmel, Bernard. Review of Splendidlsolation, byChristopher Hewed. In Political ScienceQuarterly 85 (September 1970): 512-514.

Review of An Encore for Reform--The Old Progressives and the New Deal

Becky Slttason, a semor History major, WlOtu thas revrew for Dr. Ortqmst s Read g Colloqnium:Franklin D. Roosevelt and tim New Deal during Fall term 1987.

An Encore for Reform is the first of five books OtisGraham has written concerning reform and Americanpolitical history. Graliam was a professor of history atthe University of California Santa Barbara when AnEncore for Reform was written and published• He ispresently a professor of history at the University ofNorth Carolina, Chapel Itill. Graham received hisB.A. at Yale(1957) and both his M.A.(1961) and Ph.D.(1966) at Columbia University. Born in 1935 inLittle Rock, Arkansas, Graham associates himselfwith the Democratic party.[1]

and at least into the first part of the New Deal. Heanalyzed and systematically categurizetl the attitudesand actions of the progressives into supporters of fireNew Deal and opponents of the New Deal. Theremaining two categories involve progressives whowithdrew from the political arena and those that heldbeliefs more radical than the New Deal. Within thesecategories Graham researched fire topics of family})ackgound, age, and education to assimilate hisassumptions and conclusions about the progressivebehavior.

An Encore for Reform was written in the latesixties during a time, according to Graham, when theLeft was dealing with problems that the progressiveseither ignored or could not chaugn such as racism andpoverty. Graham suggests that at this time a welcomenew perspective of the progressives was beginning toform. The left no longer ignored the shortcomingsand conservatism of the progressive movement.However, Graham does emphasize that one cannotdeny the difficult struggle that the progressives had toovercome to gain each bit of reform.

Graham concluded that those who opposed theNew Deal did not agree with its national interests andeconomic policies. The opposition generally fearedFranklin Roosevelt's power and the unintelligibledisorganization of the New Deal. The progressiveswere men who were more intellectually organizedthan Roosevelt and accustomed to the logical ex-amination of issues and the synthesizing of set goalsto accomplish reform.

Graham did not take a direct stand for or againstthe New Deal, but examines the discontinuity be-tween the progressive reform and the New Deal. He

• also used criteria to analyze why the majority of theprogress, ire reformers opposed the New Deal eventhough these movements shared common goals ofsocial justice and anti-uurestrained economicpower.

Overall, there were less progressive supporters ofthe New Deal than opponents(Graham's data was 40to 60). Graham found that pro-New Dealers usuallyhad some sort of urban background and were mostlikely involved in social or municipal reform. Hecharacterized them as most likely either flexible orpugnacious. Graham believed that some supporterswere liberals who saw the New Deal as their lastchance for reform.

The progressive party was heterogeneous andindividualistic; therefore, attempts to make generali-zations concerning progressive beliefs are futile. Theprogressive movement fragmented between the yearsof 1912 and 1933 especially in light of the New Deal.Graham examined a sample of one hundred andsixty-eight progressive men and women wholived through the turn of the century, World War I,

Graham also examined five progressive menwho Theodore Roosevelt refelTed to as on the"lunatic fringe" of the progressive movement.[2]These men were primarily writers and intellectualswho dedicated themselves to social justice. These"radicals" were skeptical of the New Deal liberalismand did not take it seriously.

Of the ten men who completely secluded

30 * The Wittenberg History Journal

themselves from political concerns after the miniprogressive movement and the New Deal years,Graham suggested that the intellectual, psychologi-cal, and financial strain of reform severely drainedthese men. Most were disillusioned and disappointed,feeling like George Norris that nothing riley wantedfor America would ever be.J3]

Graham conducted an admirable amount ofresearch to write An Encore for Reform. He presentedthe habits, thoughts, and behaviors of the progres-sives in a human and captivating way. Althoughone's previous knowledge of the progressives may belimited, it will be easy to follow Graham's analysisand to learn a great deal about the movement and itsaftermath. I found it intriguing to read how New Dealcontemporaries, who were not direetIy involved in it,criticized or supported a reform that was not their

own. Graham encourages the reader to sympathizewith the progressive reformers who more or lesslost their progressive identity at the onset of the NewDeal. Perhaps this impression arises from Graham'sown affinity towards tile progressives--which oftenresults after intense research on anyparticular subject. I did not detect any other biases inGraham's writing. However, I was expecting to find aliberal sh'mt due to his democratic affiliation and tothe time the book was written.

Overall, I consider An Encore for Reform an ex-ceptional educational book in so far as Grahamexplains the topic in an organized manner. I tlfinkthat one who reads this book will gain a clearunderstanding of the various positive and negativeassociations of the progessive reformers to the NewDeal.

Notes

(1) Who's Who, 1986-87 ed., s.v. "Graham,Otis."

(2) Otis Livingston Graham, Jr., An Encore forReform-The Old Progressives and the New Deal(New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 129.

(3)Ibid., 164.

Bibliography

Graham, Otis Livingston, Jr. An Encore for Reform- Who's Who, 1986o87 ed., s.v. "Graham, Otis."The Old Progressives and the New Deal. NewYork: Oxford University Press, 1967.