The 5 major tunnel fires in Norway ver270417 Tunnel AG2... · kilometre of tunnel on average in Norwegian road tunnels, i.e. 24 fires for every 1,134 road tunnels. Fires in HGVs were

Directorate of Public Roads Traffic Safety, Environment and Technology Department Traffic Safety

January 2017

The 5 major tunnel fires in Norway

NORWEGIAN PUBLIC ROADS ADMINISTRATION REPORTS No. 340

NPRA reports

Title

Subtitle

Author Finn Harald Amundsen

Department Traffic Safety, Environment and Technology

Department

Section Traffic Safety

Project number

Report number No. 340

Project manager

Approved by Guro Ranes

Keywords Tunnel fires

Summary There have been five major fires in three Norwegian road tunnels in the last five years. The fires have created a great deal of interest in professional circles both in Norway and elsewhere. The Directorate of Public Roads has therefore requested an overview of how the fires started, what the consequences were and what has been done to reduce the risk of similar fires in the future. The three tunnels are:

The Oslofjord tunnel (7 km) The Gudvanga tunnel (21 km) The Skatestraumen tunnel (2 km)

Statens vegvesens rapporter Statens vegvesen Tittel De fem store tunnelbrannene i Norge Undertittel Forfatter Finn Harald Amundsen

Avdeling Trafikksikkerhet, miljø- og teknologi- avdelingen

Seksjon Trafikksikkerhet

Prosjektnummer

Rapportnummer Nr. 340

Project manager Finn Harald Amundsen

Godkjent av Guro Ranes

Emneord Tunnelbrann

Sammendrag I løpet av de fem siste årene har det skjedd fem store branner i tre norske vegtunneler. Brannene har vakt stor interesse i fagkretser i Norge og ellers i verden. Vegdirektoratet har derfor ønsket å lage en oversikt som viser hvordan brannene har oppstått, hvilke konsekvenser de har hatt og hva som er gjort for å redusere faren for tilsvarende branner. De tre tunnelene det gjelder er: Oslofjordtunnelen, (7 km) Gudvangatunnelen, (21 km) Skatestraumtunnelen, (2 km)

No. of pages 32

Pages 32

1

Foreword

Norway has one of the highest numbers of tunnels in Europe. There is a great deal of national and international interest in road tunnels and serious incidents in these tunnels. The Directorate of Public Roads has therefore requested a brief summary of the five major fires in the Oslofjord tunnel (two fires), the Gudvanga tunnel (two fires) and the Skatestraumen tunnel.

This brief review of the five major fires, what happened and the consequences of the incidents are primarily based on public investigations of all the fires that were carried out by the Accident Investigation Board Norway (AIBN) and evaluations carried out by the Norwegian Public Roads Administration (NPRA) and the Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning (DSB). However, the first fire in the Oslofjord tunnel was not investigated by AIBN. The description of this fire is based on an evaluation report compiled by NPRA, Region East. The references on which this review is based are shown in the summary of references and before the descriptions of each tunnel. Please see the reports for details and further information.

The review has been carried out by Finn H Amundsen at the Traffic Safety Section at the request of the Tunnel and Concrete Section of the Traffic Safety, Environment and Technology Department at the Directorate of Public Roads. Harald Buvik has been our contact at the Tunnel and Concrete Section.

2

Contents

Summary ....................................................................................................................................................... 4

1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 7

2. The Oslofjord tunnel ................................................................................................................................. 8

Design, traffic and equipment .................................................................................................................. 9

The fire on 29 March 2011 ..................................................................................................................... 10

The fire on 23 June 2011 ........................................................................................................................ 11

Efforts of the emergency services .......................................................................................................... 11

Injuries .................................................................................................................................................... 12

Damaged vehicles ................................................................................................................................... 12

Damage to the tunnel ............................................................................................................................. 12

Traffic management ............................................................................................................................... 12

Safety recommendations from AIBN ...................................................................................................... 13

Measures implemented in the tunnel .................................................................................................... 13

3 The Gudvanga tunnel .............................................................................................................................. 16

Design, traffic and equipment ................................................................................................................ 17

The fire in 2013 ....................................................................................................................................... 18


Injuries .................................................................................................................................................... 19





Measures implemented in the tunnel .................................................................................................... 21

The fire in 2015 ....................................................................................................................................... 21


Injuries .................................................................................................................................................... 22





Measures implemented after the fire .................................................................................................... 24

3

4. The Skatestraumen tunnel ..................................................................................................................... 25

Design, traffic and equipment ................................................................................................................ 25

The fire .................................................................................................................................................... 28


Injuries .................................................................................................................................................... 30




Recommendations from AIBN ................................................................................................................ 32

Measures implemented after the fire .................................................................................................... 32

5 Lessons learned ....................................................................................................................................... 33

Self‐rescue and/or assisted rescue: ........................................................................................................ 33

Fire ventilation – predetermined or following assessment: .................................................................. 33

Communication between the emergency services: ............................................................................... 33

Recording and learning from events: ..................................................................................................... 33

Following up on people suffering from smoke inhalation: .................................................................... 34

Dynamic emergency response and other response plans: .................................................................... 34

Emergency response analysis ................................................................................................................. 34

Real‐time information and the use of social media: .............................................................................. 35

Construction of evacuation facilities in long, single bore tunnels ......................................................... 35

Risk analyses, risk acceptance and selection of effective measures: ..................................................... 35

References .............................................................................................................................................. 36

4

Summary

There have been five major fires in three Norwegian road tunnels in the last five years. The fires have created a great deal of interest in professional circles both in Norway and elsewhere. The Directorate of Public Roads has therefore requested an overview of how the fires started, what the consequences were and what has been done to reduce the risk of similar fires in future. The three tunnels are:

The Oslofjord tunnel, 29 March 2011

The Oslofjord tunnel, 23 June 2011

The Gudvanga tunnel, 5 August 2013

The Gudvanga tunnel, 11 August 2015

The Skatestraumen tunnel, 15 July 2015

The Oslofjord tunnel is a subsea bidirectional tunnel with three lanes. The tunnel is 7,250 m long and has a gradient of 7 per cent at both ends. There is an emergency tunnel in a crosscut located 1,900 m from the tunnel mouth on the Hurum side. The annual average daily traffic was approximately 7,100 at the time of the fires. On 29 March 2011, a fire started in a lorry registered in Poland which was carrying 30 tonnes of paper rolls. The fire started when the vehicle was near the low point of the tunnel. The fire did not progress in the same way as the later fire, and the tunnel was reopened the next morning.

In the second fire on 23 June 2011, another lorry registered in Poland caught fire while driving uphill in the tunnel, i.e. towards Drøbak. As agreed in the emergency response plan, fire ventilation commenced towards Hurum, i.e. from Drøbak, where the burning vehicle had stopped approx. 1,700 m from the tunnel portal. The vehicle was loaded with 22 tonnes of recycled paper, and the estimated fire energy was 70 – 90 MW. 32 people were taken to hospital for treatment after the fire. The tunnel was closed for a fairly long time as a result of the fire.

The Gudvanga tunnel is a single-tube, bidirectional tunnel 11,428 m long. The annual average daily traffic in 2012 was 2,050, with 25 per cent of this figure being accounted for by HGVs. Summer average daily traffic was 3,760 vehicles per day. On 5 August 2011, a fire started in a lorryregistered in Poland that was travelling together with another Polish lorry. After having driven approx. 8 km into the tunnel, the driver stopped due to a fire in the tractor unit. The fire started in the engine bay. The fire energy was estimated at between 25 and 45 MW. In total, there were 15 vehicles and 67 people in the tunnel blocked by smoke. The fire ventilation system was started quickly as agreed so that Aurland Fire Service could enter the tunnel with fresh air behind them. As a result, approx. 8 km of the tunnel was filled with smoke. 28 people were taken to hospital after having suffered from smoke inhalation. Of these, 5 were deemed to be very seriously injured and 23 were deemed to be seriously injured.

In the second fire on 11 August 2015, a tourist bus carrying 32 Chinese tourists caught fire. The bus was approx. 360 m into the tunnel when it stopped. The fire energy was estimated at

5

30 MW. 5 people in total were trapped by smoke, and four were sent to hospital.

The Skatestraumen tunnel is a bidirectional subsea road tunnel 1,920 km long, a gradient of approx. 10 per cent. The annual average daily traffic was approx. 400, with HGVs accounting for approx. 9 per cent of this. The fire started on 15 July 2015 and was caused by failure of the lorry’s drawbar between the tractor and the trailer. The trailer, which was loaded with 16,500 litres of petrol, collided with the wall of the tunnel and the petrol began to leak out. The tanker was loaded with 19,000 litres of petrol, and the driver managed to drive the tanker out of the tunnel. The petrol vapour was most probably ignited in the engine bay of a motor home that had stopped behind the trailer, resulting in a severe fire. The petrol that leaked out onto the carriageway burned up quickly, while the petrol that had not escaped from the tanker burned for more than 40 minutes. Petrol that had leaked into the drains also caught fire. Entering the tunnel was recommended only after 6 days, due to uncertainty with regard to the fire and the damage caused. The fire energy was estimated at approximately 440 MW in the first 7 minutes or so, and at 220 MW for the next 40 minutes or thereabouts. The temperature at the roof of the tunnel was estimated to be approximately 1,350 degrees Celsius. There were 17 people in four cars and a camper van in the tunnel. Five people suffered minor injuries.

6

Map showing the three tunnels

7

1.Introduction

There were around 1,130 road tunnels in Norway in October 2016. Of these, 530 were more than 500 m long. There are several fires in these road tunnels each year, but there was no official register of fires in Norwegian road tunnels previously. Since 2016, the Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning (DSB) has established a register of all incidents where a local fire service has been called out. Therefore, the Norwegian Public Roads Administration (NPRA) and the Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning (DSB) commissioned the Institute for Transport Economics (TØI) to chart tunnel fires between 2008 and 2015 (TØI report 1542/2016). This indicated that there are 0.02 fires per kilometre of tunnel on average in Norwegian road tunnels, i.e. 24 fires for every 1,134 road tunnels. Fires in HGVs were overrepresented in tunnels with gradients steeper than 5 per cent. 42 per cent of the fires occurred in the 5 per cent of tunnels with gradients steeper than 5 per cent. Technical problems in HGVs caused twice as many fires as problems in cars, while single vehicle accidents and collisions caused twice as many fires as HGVs.

There have been five major fires in tunnels in Norway over the past few years. These fires have attracted a lot of attention both in the media and among experts, both nationally and internationally. These fires are well documented in public reports from the Accident Investigation Board Norway (AIBN) and evaluation reports by the Norwegian Public Roads Administration (NPRA) and the Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning (DSB). Conditions surrounding the fires have also been studied by SINTEF and IRIS in Stavanger. The SP Technical Research Institute of Sweden and Oslo University Hospital have also assisted with AIBN’s investigations.

The purpose of this review is to summarise the experience gained and see whether there are any factors that could influence efforts to make the tunnels even safer. It will also be possible to use this report at an international level to explain what actually happened and also to provide ideas for international work. Essentially, there are many lessons to be learned from analysing the conditions relating to these fires.

Safety recommendations from AIBN are reproduced verbatim in the review. After reviewing the fires, AIBN will be submitting its safety recommendations to the Ministry of Transport and Communications. For its part, the Ministry of Transport and Communications will give NPRA responsibility for promoting measures to allow the recommendations to be closed. NPRA has this responsibility for recommendations aimed at NPRA, other agencies and private enterprises. The Ministry of Transport and Communications will close recommendations according to proposals from NPRA when they accept the individual proposals and deem them to be appropriate for closing the recommendation. A number of the safety recommendations reproduced in this report have already been closed. This is not described in this report as increasing numbers of recommendations are being closed and the report would quickly provide an incorrect impression of the status of efforts to close the recommendations.

8

2.TheOslofjordtunnel

The description of the tunnel, the equipment and the two fires is taken from the following references:

NPRA, Region East, Report dated 13 July 2011

NPRA, Region East, Report dated 4 April 2012

Søndre Follo Fire Service, Report dated 24 August 2013

AIBN, Report VEI 2013/05

IRIS, Report 2014/250

Map showing the Oslofjordtunnel

9

Design,trafficandequipment

The Oslofjord tunnel links the counties of Buskerud and Akershus beneath the Oslofjord. It therefore provides an opportunity to reduce through traffic in Oslo from the west side of the fjord to the east side, i.e. towards Sweden.

Photo 1 Tunnel mouth and entry to the Oslofjord tunnel at Verpen in Buskerud, photo: Kjell Voll, Norwegian Public Roads Administration

The Oslofjord tunnel was opened to traffic on 29 June 2000. It links Måna in the county of Akershus (municipality of Frogn) with Verpen in the county of Buskerud (municipality of Hurum). RV23 (National Road 23) is a TEN-T road. The tunnel is 7,250 m long. The lowest point in the tunnel is located 2,700 m from Buskerud and is 130 m below sea level; see the figure showing the vertical and horizontal curvature. The subsea tunnel has a single tube with three lanes, i.e. tunnel profile T11. The annual average daily traffic was 7,100 vehicles per day in 2010.

Heavy goods vehicles accounted for 15% in the same year. The speed limit before the fire on 23 June 2011 was 80 km/h. There are 16 breakdown refuges for cars and 6 for HGVs. As shown in the figure, the vertical curvature is 7%. Waterproofing and frostproofing are provided by PE foam sprayed on 6 cm of concrete. Diversion routes use the E6 and E18 through Oslo. There is an emergency exit in a crosscut tunnel 1,900 m from the west tunnel mouth in Buskerud. This can be used by pedestrians and the emergency services travelling from the Buskerud side. The door is not locked, and it is signposted with an illuminated sign (a running green man).

10

Figure 1 Vertical and horizontal curvature

Thefireon29March2011

At 13:05 on Tuesday, 29 March 2011, VTS (the Road Traffic Management Centre) in Oslo received a phone call from the toll station in Måna, stating that a lorry was on fire in the low part of the tunnel. The lorry was a semitrailer registered in Poland, carrying 30 tonnes of paper to be transported from Hurum to Sweden. When the operator checked the camera in position 946, he saw flames emerging from the bottom of the vehicle. According to procedures in the emergency response plan, the fans in the fire ventilation system and all the lights in the tunnel were switched on. The police and the fire service were alerted at 13:06. The fire service arrived at 13:15 and the police and ambulance service arrived at 13:21. The fire service team was met by the driver, who had made a number of attempts to put out the fire using fire extinguishers in the tunnel. By that time, the fire had spread to the cab and the cargo. This caused a lot of smoke in the tunnel. The fire was quickly put out by the fire service. Searching of the tunnel was completed at 14:27.

Four people were sent to hospital for treatment, and two others were checked by ambulance personnel at the location. The tunnel was reopened at 06:00 on the following day. In the later briefing, it was stated that a number of vehicles had passed the fire and other vehicles had driven passed the red lights.

After the fire, an internal workgroup was appointed in order to propose measures. The group had a number of proposals, most of which were implemented after the fire on 23 June 2011.

11

Thefireon23June2011At 14:36 on Thursday, 23 June 2011, a lorry registered in Poland caught fire as it drove through the Oslofjord tunnel. The fire was caused by engine failure. The vehicle had driven through the tunnel and stopped approximately 1.7 km from the tunnel mouth on the Drøbak side. At that point, it had driven approximately 5.5 km before stopping. The driver attempted to put the fire out, but he had to leave the vehicle due to heat and smoke. He then walked/ran towards Måna/Drøbak. The fire ventilation system was started approximately 4 minutes after VTS (the Road Traffic Management Centre) in Oslo had been made aware of the fire. The direction of the fire ventilation was intended to provide Follo Fire Service with access through a smoke-free tunnel. As a result, approx. 5.5 km of the tunnel was gradually filled with smoke.

The lorry was carrying 22 – 23 tonnes of recycled paper loaded in Hurum. The vehicle weighed approximately 40 tonnes in total. SINTEF estimated the fire energy to be between 110 and 130 MW, although this was later corrected to between 70 and 90 MW when the fact that not all the cargo was burnt out had been taken into account.

The fire service from Follo arrived at the location at approximately 14:49 and immediately started extinguishing the fire. They had the fire under control after approximately 45 minutes. They used approximately 20 – 30 m3 of water that had been brought in by tanker in order to extinguish the fire.

EffortsoftheemergencyservicesThe Oslofjord tunnel covers the emergency response area of three municipal fire services; Røyken, Hurum and Søndre Follo. A triple alert was triggered as agreed when the fire was reported. The watch manager at Søndre Follo was designated as the leader of the fire service effort. This is also why the fire ventilation system guided the smoke towards Hurum/Røyken.

The fire service emergency call centre in Moss was notified by the Road Traffic Management Centre in Oslo (VTS), which then notified the fire service emergency call centre in Drammen. This was logged at 14:42.

Røyken Fire Service arrived at the tunnel approximately 10 minutes after receiving the alert. As there was no smoke in the tunnel on the Hurum, they entered the tunnel with two smoke diving teams. They got approximately 600 m into the tunnel before encountering the smoke, and at that point they decided to withdraw from the tunnel.

Smoke diving teams from Hurum Fire Service arrived at the evacuation tunnel approximately 20 minutes after receiving the alert. They were unable to enter the evacuation tunnel due to dense smoke in the main tunnel.

From the fire service, 2 watch managers, 4 emergency response managers and 38 members of smoke diving teams were involved. From the police, 4 response managers, 16 police officers and 3 crime technicians were involved.

A number of ambulances (approximately 20) and rescue helicopters (3) worked on both sides of the tunnel. Two patient transport buses were also diverted to the tunnel. A total

12

of around 60 health personnel were on site.

Around 120 people were involved in the operational rescue work on site. The police had a total of 30 people on site, the fire service 44 people and the health service around 57 people.

The digital emergency communication appears to have worked well among rescue personnel. Separate work channels were also used.

InjuriesThere were 34 people in the tunnel when the fire started. Of these, 25 managed to escape from the tunnel independently, and of these 21 people went towards Hurum. Rescue personnel helped to rescue 9 people. 8 out of 9 people sought refuge in the “SOS box” and entered the area between the concrete vault and the rock face. VTS had an overview of where these people were. Everyone had been evacuated from the tunnel after two hours.

32 people were taken to hospital for treatment. The extent of their injuries is not known.

DamagedvehiclesBoth the tractor unit and the semitrailer were completely burnt out. Besides this, 7 trucks and lorries, 7 cars and vans and one camper van sustained smoke damage and collision damage.

DamagetothetunnelThe damage to the structure of the tunnel was relatively light considering the extent of the fire. The damage was largely limited to concrete spalling on the wall elements and joint seals between the elements. Consultancy Aas-Jacobsen has attended the site on behalf of the Norwegian Public Roads Administration and recorded the damage. Concrete spalling has been found at 5 – 6 cm in the vicinity of the fire. Spalling has also been recorded at 1 – 3 cm in the shotcrete vault in the same area. Course parallel cracks were also found on the back of the damaged wall elements. Cable bridges and SOS stations near the fire were also damaged. The Norwegian Public Roads Administration, the Directorate of Public Roads also carried out an inspection, taking relevant samples. Samples of the shotcrete in the roof were examined more closely, and it was concluded that the damage was not sufficiently extensive to justify replacement of the shotcrete.

TrafficmanagementThe tunnel was closed to traffic until 8 July 2011 as a consequence of the fire. After that, the tunnel was open to vehicles with a total weight of less than 7.5 tonnes until 27 February 2012. At that time, the tunnel was open to vehicles up to 12 metres in length, but it was not until 29 June 2012 that the tunnel was also opened to all heavy vehicles and vehicles carrying hazardous loads.

13

SafetyrecommendationsfromAIBNFollowing the investigation, AIBN has submitted four safety recommendations to the Ministry of Transport and Communications:

1. AIBN recommends that NPRA, together with DSB and the fire service, should review and update the emergency response plans for long bidirectional tunnels, including VTS’s procedures in the event of a fire so that the criteria for the self rescue principle are met

2. AIBN recommends that NPRA and DSB should establish systems for recording fires and

fire situations in road tunnels for use in systematic safety work 3. AIBN recommends that NPRA should further develop its safety management system in

accordance with risk-based and proactive principles in order to guarantee a satisfactory level of safety for the Oslofjord tunnel and corresponding road tunnels.

4. AIBN recommends that NPRA, together with DSB and the fire service, should follow up and

dimension rescue and fire extinguishing efforts according to actual fire energy and the design of the specific tunnel.

MeasuresimplementedinthetunnelRisk-reducing measures

1. The speed limit in the entrance zone has been signposted at a reduced 40 km/h 2. A reduced speed limit of 70 km/h throughout the entire tunnel 3. Digital variable speed limit signs have been installed for use in the event of incidents 4. Prohibited overtaking for HGVs in the tunnel heading upwards 5. Installed automatic traffic control on both downhill slopes 6. Installed a “Low gear” sign with yellow flashing lights that is activated by tall vehicles 7. “Low gear” is also painted on the road 8. Rumble strips have been placed in the tunnel 9. Signposting along feeder roads in Vestfold, Oslo, Akershus and Buskerud

Consequence-reducing measures 1. 25 evacuation rooms have been established with fresh air supplies for up to 3 hours as a preliminary measure 2. A dynamic guide light system has been installed next to the evacuation rooms 3. Signs have been installed inside all emergency stations 4. Electronic index prepared for operators at VTS for reference in the event of various

incidents and emergencies

Measures for faster, more efficient rescue efforts 1. Installed photoluminescent number signs outside all emergency stations 2. Signposted the main route to the exit portal to the evacuation tunnel for the emergency services 3. Entered into an agreement on clearing access to the emergency tunnel 4. Installed an automatic voice message from VTS at radio frequencies available in

14

the tunnel 5. Installed lightning mount for better image quality for VTS in situations where there is lots of smoke 6. Installed “Turn round and leave the tunnel” signs every 1.5 km (activated by the VTS) 7. Installed a key safe externally in the evacuation tunnel and LED lights in the same location.

Photo 2 Road marking reminding HGV drivers to select low gear. Photo: T Tollefsen, Norwegian Public Roads Administration

15

Photo 3 Indication of rescue room B using LED lights. Photo: T Tollefsen, Norwegian Public Roads Administration

16

3TheGudvangatunnel

The description of the tunnel, the equipment and the fires is based on the following references:

AIBN, Report, VEI 2015/02

NPRA Region West, Report dated 15 November 2013

DSB Report, HR2284, July 2014

AIBN, Report VEI 2016/03

NPRA, Report dated January 2016

Map showing the Gudvanga‐tunnel

17

Design,trafficandequipmentThe Gudvanga tunnel is a bidirectional tunnel on the E16, which is a TEN-T road, between Flåm and Gudvangen in the municipality of Aurland in Sogn og Fjordane. The tunnel is 11,428 m long and was opened in 1991 (opened officially on 27 May 1992).

Photo 4 Tunnel mouth and entry to the Gudvanga tunnel, photo: Kjell Voll, Norwegian Public Roads Administration

The tunnel has a 3.5% upward slope from Gudvangen towards Aurland. There is thus a height difference of approx. 300 m, and the highest point is located approx. 300 m west of the tunnel mouth at Flåm (Langhuso). The tunnel is constructed with cross-section type T8. Therefore, the carriageway is 6.0 m wide and the free heigth is 4.5 m. The speed limit was originally 80 km/h, but this was reduced to 70 km/h after the fire on 5 August 2013.

The annual average daily traffic was 2,050 vehicles per day in 2012. Of these, 25.2 per cent were HGVs. Summer average daily traffic at this time was 3,760 vehicles per day, with maximum hourly traffic of approx. 400 vehicles. 7 accidents resulting in injury were recorded between 1991 and 2012, 4 of which involved severe injuries. The accident frequency was 0.07 injury accidents per million vehicle-kilometres, which is very low.

Before the fire, the tunnel had the following safety equipment: - 18 breakdown refuges - 6 turning points - Lighting (450 bulbs and additional lighting in the entry zones) - Longitudinal ventilation using 92 fans - 21 emergency telephones - 42 fire extinguishers

18

- Mobile phone and radio coverage - Red stop signal - Emergency power system (UPS) - Emergency network

The following changes were made to the safety equipment after the fire in 2013: - All power cables were replaced - New fibre cables were installed - Dead zones in emergency communications were rectified - The tunnel walls were painted white - Additional lights were installed in the entry zones - New barriers in the entry zones - Cameras were installed at the technical building and barriers - New, profiled road markings - Battery packs for auxiliary power (UPS) were replaced - The speed limit was reduced to 70 km/h

Otherwise, the traffic in 2014 amounted to 2,195 vehicles per day, and of this HGVs accounted for 26.2 per cent. Summer average daily traffic was 3,888 vehicles per day in July 2015.

Thefirein2013At 09:30 on 5 August 2013, a fire started in a Polish-registered lorry in the Gudvanga tunnel, which is 11.4 km long. This lorry was on its way from Bergen to Malmö, accompanied by another Polish lorry. The lorry had unloaded its cargo in Bergen and was empty for the return journey. The drivers had stopped in Gudvangen for a brief break before entering the tunnel. After approximately 6 km, the driver noticed that he was down on power and stopped after having driven a further 2 km. A fire had started in the tractor unit, and he pulled over to the right-hand side and put on his hazard warning lights before stopping. He initially attempted to put out the fire with his own 6 kg fire extinguisher, but this was not sufficient. As none of the other vehicles passing had fire extinguishers, he opted to leave the vehicle. The fire grew quickly and the vehicle was soon well ablaze.

The fire in the lorry began in the engine room and spread quickly, and the vehicle was well ablaze within approximately 20 minutes.

The fire was reported at approx. 12:00, and the fire service in Aurland received notification at 12:02. VTS (the Road Traffic Management Centre) in Bergen received notification to close the tunnel at 12:03, and the fire ventilation system was activated in a predetermined direction; i.e. from Aurland towards Gudvangen so that the fire service could work in a clear tunnel without smoke. The smoke was then directed approximately 8.5 km towards Gudvangen.

The fire service arrived at the scene at 12:30 and immediately began extinguishingthe fire. They used water from a tanker that they had brought with them, and the fire was almost out at 12:55. The vehicle was completely burnt out by that time.

The fire energy was estimated by SINTEF Technology and Society Transport Research (SINTEF) as probably being around 25 MW, but it may have been as high as 45 MW as more diesel than

19

assumed was burnt.

EffortsoftheemergencyservicesAll the emergency services were called out as soon as the fire had been reported. Aurland Fire Service, responsible for management of the firefighting effort by agreement, requested the assistance of the fire services in Lærdal, Voss and Bergen. For its part, Medical region Førde requested assistance from Medical region Bergen.

Aurland Fire Service arrived at the tunnel portal with three vehicles and nine people at 12:25. They all drove into the tunnel and arrived at the fire at 12:30. Ambulances from Lærdal arrived at the tunnel portal on the Aurland side at 12:32 and awaited a request from the fire service before entering the tunnel. A police patrol in the Lærdal tunnel arrived a little while after in the tunnel on the Aurland side. Management of the scene was established outside the tunnel (police and acute medical coordination centre), nobody from the fire service was present as they had all gone into the tunnel. Voss Fire Service arrived at the tunnel at 13:00, but they were asked to wait as a lot of smoke was anticipated. Ambulances from Voss arrived 4 minutes after the fire service. A smoke diving team from Bergen arrived at 13:52, followed by another crew about 8 minutes later.

There were 21 people, a tanker, three fire engines, a rescue vehicle, a smoke diving vehicle and two smaller vehicles working on the Aurland side of the tunnel. There were 26 people, two fire engines, an ATV, trailer, air bank and 4-hour units working on the Gudvanga side of the tunnel.

As the heat had lessened, the smoke divingteam went in and rescued 10 – 15 people. They then went back in with the smoke diving vehicle. In total, the fire service rescued 47 people from the Aurland side. A total of 20 people were evacuated on the Gudvanga side.

Medical assessments were carried out as road users came out of the tunnel.

InjuriesIn total, there were 15 vehicles and 67 people in the tunnel blocked by smoke. These people remained in the tunnel for between 50 and 95 minutes. 28 of these people suffered from smoke inhalation to such an extent that they had to receive hospital treatment. Medical examinations showed that of these people, 5 were deemed to be very seriously injured and 23 were deemed to be seriously injured. There are no published descriptions of the injuries of the other 39 road users in the tunnel, but it is likely that these people suffered only minor injuries.

DamagedvehiclesThe lorry in which the fire started was completely burnt out. Besides this, the following vehicles were affected by the fire: A lorry, a tourist bus, a van with a camping trailer, a car with a camping trailer, a mobile home, two cars with trailers, a van and 7 cars.

20

DamagetothetunnelIn the area of the fire, all technical equipment was destroyed. There was major smoke and soot damage to the tunnel. Some work was also carried out that was to have been done later anyway. The cost of repair was estimated at approx. NOK 50 million, of which around half was linked with the fire itself.

TrafficmanagementBoth the Gudvanga tunnel and the Flenja tunnel (the Flenja tunnel links Flåm with the municipal centre of Aurland) were closed immediately after the fire had been reported. The closure was reported on text displays on the E16 at Trengereid, on RV7/E16 at Hønefoss and on RV7 in Gol. Diversion signs will also setup in Sogndal, Kaupanger, Håbakken, Hol, Voss and Vinje. A night ferry was also established for the Hella - Vangsnes crossing, with an additional ferry on the Bruravik – Brimnes crossing. The night ferry service continued until 30 August. A high-speed ferry was also deployed between Flåm and Gudvangen from 19 August.

A convoy system through the tunnel was established for vehicles with a total weight of less than 7.5 tonnes from 23 August. A convoy system was established for all traffic from 30 August. The tunnel was opened fully from 5 September.

SafetyrecommendationsfromAIBNFollowing an investigation of the incident, AIBN has submitted six safety recommendations to the Ministry of Transport and Communications:

1. AIBN recommends that NPRA should improve the safety equipment in the Gudvanga tunnel in order to safeguard robustness and self-rescue conditions

2. AIBN recommends that NPRA and the relevant fire services should improve information to road users in the event of a fire in the Gudvanga tunnel. Signposting, radio announcementsand text message notification should all be assessed.

3. AIBN recommends that NPRA should work to ensure that the Nation center for statistics

(SSB) and/or the Directorate of Health includes injuries resulting from smoke inhalation in connection with tunnel fires in relevant accident statistics.

4. AIBN recommends that DSB and the fire service, in consultation with NPRA, should revise

their strategy for fire extinguishing, rescue and smoke control in long single bore tunnels so that fire ventilation systems conflict with road users’ options for self-rescue to as small an extent as possible.

5. AIBN recommends that in the event of a fire in the Gudvanga tunnel, the emergency

services involved (the fire service, health service, police) should coordinate their planning in order to ensure notification, management of the scene, sharing of information and sufficient resources.

6. AIBN recommends that NPRA Region West and Aurland Fire Service should work together to update and coordinate emergency response plans and other response plans for the Gudvanga tunnel in order to give tunnel users more opportunities for self-rescue, and to

21

carry out inspections and scenario-based exercises in the Gudvanga tunnel.

MeasuresimplementedinthetunnelThe EX cables in the tunnel have been replaced. Dead zones in emergency communications have been rectified, new fibre cable has been laid throughout the entire tunnel. The tunnel walls have been painted white in order to improve visual guidance and provide better light. Additional lights have been put up in the entry zones. New barriers have been put up, and cameras have been installed at the technical building and barriers. The tunnel has been given profiled road markings, and battery packs for auxiliary power have been replaced.

Thefirein2015A bus on its way from Flåm to Gudvangen caught fire at about 13:15 on 11 August 2015. A tourist bus carrying 32 Chinese tourists was on its way from Oslo to Gudvangen. After having driven through the Flenja tunnel, 5 km long, the driver noticed that he was losing engine power. As the power came back and there were no warning lights on the dashboard, the driver decided to continue driving into the Gudvanga tunnel. The bus continued for about 360 m into the Gudvanga tunnel after he spotted flames on the left-hand side of the bus in his rear view mirror. The fire extinguishing equipment on the bus was then deployed, and an audible warning device sounded an alert.

The bus driver evacuated all passengers from the bus. The passengers were picked up by a van that arrived at the scene. This van took the passengers on to Gudvangen. The bus driver took the fire extinguisher and emptied it into the engine room, but without extinguishing the fire.

The bus driver then called the police and a triple alert was quickly triggered. VTS (the Road Traffic Management Centre) lowered the barriers and activated the red warning lights. They were asked to delay activation of the fire ventilation system, but this was deployed automatically when the driver removed a fire extinguisher from the tunnel wall. Aurland Fire Service entered the tunnel at 13:30. They experienced major challenges with extinguishing the fire, and so they decided to stop attempting to put out the fire and ask VTS to turn the ventilation as there were road users in the smoke-filled part of the tunnel.

SP Fire research estimated the fire energy to be approx. 30 MW.

22

Photo 5 A burnt-out bus in the Gudvanga tunnel, photo Lars I Menes, Norwegian Public Roads Administration

EffortsoftheemergencyservicesThe bus driver called the police at 13:17. A triple alert was then triggered within two minutes and VTS in Bergen were then asked to close the tunnel and hold off on starting the fire ventilation system. However, this was started automatically when the bus driver took a fire extinguisher from the tunnel wall. VTS also implemented radio announcements according to set procedures. Aurland Fire Service were on scene quickly and entered the tunnel 15 minutes after receiving the alert. Aurland Fire Service experienced major problems while putting out the fire and were informed that there were a number of road users in the smoke-filled part of the tunnel. Therefore, they asked VTS to turn the direction of the ventilation back to the original direction of extraction. This was done at 13:53. By this time, the smoke had travelled 6.9 km into the tunnel towards Gudvangen. Voss Fire Service arrived at 14:00 and followed the smoke as it travelled through the tunnel towards Aurland. After about 40 minutes, they found road users in the tunnel and transported them out of the tunnel. Voss Fire Service then began extinguishing the fire. This was done over the course of about 20 minutes.

Injuries5 people in total were trapped by smoke, and 4 of these were sent to hospital for treatment. These five people were a person in a lorry, the bus driver, a driver of an empty bus and two people in a camper van. These people were in contact with the emergency services throughout

23

the entire fire. They were told to remain in their vehicles and breathe through wet towels until they could be rescued.

DamagedvehiclesThe bus was completely burnt out. No information is provided on whether there was any damage to the other lorry, the bus or the camper van in the tunnel. There was probably only smoke damage to these.

Photo 6 The bus was completely burnt out after the fire in the Gudvanga tunnel in 2015. Photo: Arild P Søvik, Norwegian Public Roads Administration

DamagetothetunnelFalling rock and boulders from the roof of the tunnel near the bus and up to 50 m towards Flåm were reported. Here, the roof of the tunnel consisted of raw blasted rock, but parts of the area above the bus were covered with shotcrete. There was no damage to the tunnel body here. The equipment in the tunnel survived well as it had been moved following the fire approximately two years before. The equipment this time was more robust, and it was built up more in sections.

TrafficmanagementThe Gudvanga tunnel and Flenja tunnel were closed after this fire as well, and diversion signage was set up. Road users between east and west were asked to use RV7 over Hardangervidda, RV13 at Vikafjellet or E134 over Haukelifjell. Text displays we used in the same locations as in the case of the 2013 fire. A night ferry was also established on the Hella – Vangsnes – Dragsvik crossing until 31 August, with five return journeys. A convoy system was introduced for emergency vehicles from 18 August, and for lorries/buses without passengers from 19 August.

24

The tunnel was opened fully from 30 August.

SafetyrecommendationsfromAIBNFollowing an investigation of the fire, AIBN has submitted five recommendations:

1. AIBN recommends that NPRA, based on an assessment of a feasible and effective solution, should establish an option and recommendation for safety checks when entering vulnerable tunnels

2. AIBN recommends that NPRA, based on a risk analysis for vulnerable tunnels, should

change the automatic system and ensure that the ventilation control system takes into account road users’ options for self-rescue.

3. AIBN recommends that NPRA should review and improve equipment and procedures in

the event of tunnel fires, including the development of technology providing real-time information and instructions for VTS, providing immediate warnings for road users in the event of a fire

4. AIBN recommends that NPRA should work in consultation with the Directorate of Emergency Communication to ensure that VTS is linked to the emergency network in tunnels

5. AIBN recommends that DSB should further develop how the fire service’s efforts and

smoke management can best support the self-rescue principle for road users during a tunnel fire

MeasuresimplementedafterthefireA number of maintenance tasks have been implemented beyond the planned schedule since the fire. The entire tunnel has been washed and painted white again. The area of the previous fire in 2013 has also been asphalted again.

25

4.TheSkatestraumentunnel

The description of the tunnel, the equipment and the fire is based on the following references:

AIBN Report VEI 2016/05

NPRA, Region West, Reports dated January and 14 July 2016

Map showing the Skatestraumtunnel

Design,trafficandequipmentThe Skatestraumen tunnel is located in the municipality of Bremanger in Sogn og Fjordane under Skatestraumen, which is adjacent to Nordfjord. This tunnel is located on FV616 (County Road 616). It was opened to traffic on 12 July 2002. This is a subsea tunnel between Hamnen on the island of Rugsundøy and Klubben on the island of Bremangerlandet. This tunnel is 1,902 metres long and provides a link to the mainland for Bremangerlandet.

26

Photo 7 Tunnel mouth and entry to the Skatestraumen tunnel, photo: Petter Hole, Norwegian Public Roads Administration

The maximum gradient of the road is 10%. About 650 metres of the tunnel is beneath the sea, and at its lowest point the roadway is 80 metres below sea level.

The speed limit was 80 km/h at the time of the fire.

The tunnel is constructed with cross-section type T8. The carriageway is 6 metres wide, plus two narrow shoulders of 0.25 cm to a moulded pedestrian walkway, and the tunnel has free heigth of 4.5 metres. The waterproofing and frostproofing consist of PE foam covered with fibre reinforced shotcrete.

Figure 2 Vertical and horizontal curvature

27

The annual daily traffic (ADT) on this section was 407 vehicles per day in 2014, 8.6% of which are HGVs. Traffic in summer is slightly higher (SDT 2014 = 527). In July 2014, the tunnel had

an

28

average traffic of 617 vehicles per day.

The police have recorded no incidents involving injury in the Skatestraumen tunnel from the time of its opening to traffic in 2002 to the end of 2014.

The following safety equipment was available in the tunnel:

One breakdown refuge for large vehicles and two on the rise towards Hamnen, with another one on the rise towards Klubben. These three are large enough for cars/vans.

Lighting

Longitudinal ventilation consisting of 4 impulse fans at either end of the tunnel. The system is controlled automatically on the basis of CO and NO readings in the tunnel or from control panels outside the tunnel.

Uninterruptible power supply

SOS telephones, 3 in the tunnel and one outside each tunnel mouth

Fire extinguishers, 18, two in each cabinet Red stop signals outside the tunnel

mouths Variable signs

Communication and broadcasting equipment

An emergency response plan has been compiled, dated 1 December 2013. The specific part relating to Skatestraumen refers to the emergency equipment and how various incidents are to be handled. A risk analysis has also been compiled for the tunnel.

ThefireOn Wednesday, 15 July 2015, a tanker with a trailer lost its trailer in the Skatestraumen tunnel. The tank on the tractor unit contained 19,000 litres of petrol, while the tank on the trailer contained 16,500 litres of petrol in several chambers. The drawbar between the vehicle and the trailer failed when driving downhill in the tunnel due to internal corrosion in the drawbar. An attempted had been made to repair this, but this was not done in a satisfactory fashion. This effect was not discovered, even after several inspections and periodic vehicle inspections.

The driver managed to drive the tanker out of the tunnel, but the trailer that had come loose collided with the tunnel wall, fracturing the tank and causing petrol leakage. The petrol continued to leak out of the tank for 2.5 minutes before it caught fire. Ignition of the petrol was most likely caused by a camper van driving up to the trailer and stopping in an area where there was flammable petrol vapour. After a short time, the armour plating cracked open and the fire started. This is consistent with a loud bang that tore apart the engine’s armour plating. The petrol that ran along the shoulder/pedestrian walkway and down into the drainage system then caught fire. The tunnel was quickly filled with smoke towards Hamnen. The trailer and all the petrol were consumed in the severe fire. A car following the trailer was also burnt.

29

Photo 8 A burnt out tanker trailer in the Skatestraumen tunnel, photo: Petter Hole, Norwegian Public Roads Administration

The Skatestraumen tunnel fire underwent three phases. Firstly, the petrol leaking out of the wrecked tank caught fire. The petrol that ran down inside the tunnel was consumed within 7 minutes. The fire energy here is estimated at max. 440 MW. After that, the petrol left in the trailer caught fire. This took a further 41 minutes to be consumed, and the fire energy in this case is estimated at approx. 220 MW. It was not until 6 days later that it was deemed advisable to enter the tunnel, because of uncertainty as to whether the fire in the drains had been extinguished and whether material was still falling from the roof of the tunnel. The temperature in the roof above the trailer was estimated to be 1350 degrees Celsius. Besides this, high temperatures caused large parts of the shotcrete around the trailer to come loose, and the insulating mats (PE foam) also began to burn.

30

Photo 9 The picture shows how the shotcrete in the tunnel was removed due to large cracks and loose sections in the Skatestraumen tunnel. Photo: Petter Hole, Norwegian Public Roads Administration

EffortsoftheemergencyservicesAmbulances arrived at Hamnen at 10:45, followed by the air ambulance and Sea King a little later. The police arrived at 10:48. The fire service arrived at the scene at 11:12, and smoke diving team searched the tunnel between 11:20 and 11:28.

InjuriesThere were 17 people in the tunnel when the fire started. The tanker driver collided with cars on his way down into the tunnel. All 17 were evacuated. Of these, five suffered slight injuries.

DamagedvehiclesA tanker with trailer, a camper van and four cars were in the tunnel when the fire started. The tractor unit, three cars and the camper van were evacuated. The trailer and one car were burnt out. One camper van was slightly damaged.

DamagetothetunnelThe tunnel sustained major damage, and the Norwegian Public Roads Administration estimated that it would cost around NOK 64 million to rectify, of which NOK 3 million would be needed for measures to meet the requirements of the tunnel safety regulation. The wash and cleanup operation cost around NOK 31 million, electrics cost around NOK 9 million and traffic

31

management initiatives cost NOK 5 million (these amounts are ex. VAT).

Photo 10 This picture shows some of the destruction of the technical equipment in the tunnel after the fire. Photo: Petter Hole, Norwegian Public Roads Administration

TrafficmanagementAs a result of the fire, it was necessary to establish a long diversion from Ytre Bremanger, heading south. A ferry was deployed between Smørhamn and Kjelkenes in order to help alleviate the situation. This ferry operated until 5 September. At that time, a convoy system was introduced until 9 December 2015. After this only minor repair work remained to be completed, including the installation of new fans.

32

RecommendationsfromAIBN

AIBN has submitted four safety recommendations following the fire. 1. AIBN recommends that the Norwegian Public Roads Administration should revise the

requirements for drainage systems in tunnels, allowing them to be dimensioned to deal with large quantities of hazardous liquids escaping from vehicles.

2. AIBN recommends that Sogn og Fjordane County Council and the Norwegian Public Roads Administration, when carrying out risk analyses, should describe and follow up measures in connection with described scenarios/incidents.

3. AIBN recommends that DSB, in consultation with the relevant road authorities in consultation with DSB, should introduce restrictions on the transportation of hazardous goods in tunnels, based on risk assessments of the individual tunnels.

4. AIBN recommends that Sogn og Fjordane County Council should carry out and reinforce its safety follow-up of the Skatestraumen tunnel and other tunnels on the county roads.

MeasuresimplementedafterthefireSince the fire, the Norwegian Public Roads Administration has sent out information letters to truck workshops and inspection agencies emphasising the importance of carrying out thorough inspections of trailer drawbars and associated components. They also refer to the fact that manufacturers are very restrictive in terms of repairs and modifications. They also provide guidelines to inspection agencies with regard to how to deal with suspected rusting. This is also pointed out to the inspection personnel at the Norwegian Public Roads Administration.

The following measures have been implemented in connection with the tunnel upgrade following the fire:

10 new emergency telephones and 19 new fire extinguishers have been installed PE foam fire sectioning has been installed in the damaged part of the tunnel

Alarms have been installed in all technical rooms to notify staff about closures A new daylight system has been installed in the tunnel mouth at Hamnen

Evacuation lights have been installed throughout the entire tunnel

Remotely controlled barriers have been installed at the tunnel mouths

Larger-diameter fans have been installed to replace the ones that were damaged The emergency response plan from 2013 has been revised.

Incorrectly fitted gaskets in storm hatches have also been remedied.

33

5Lessonslearned

When reviewing the five fires and conditions relating to the fires, a number of points become apparent and ought to be assessed. “Lessons learned” in this case are questions raised by AIBN and others with a view to reducing the likelihood of corresponding or similar fires having the same consequences. This is applicable in particular to consequences in terms of personal safety. A number of the reports also point out the necessity of good cooperation between agencies.

Self‐rescueand/orassistedrescue:A number of the tunnels are long and steep, and self-resque is difficult due to both the gradient and the evacuation distance. It may be difficult to choose the right direction in which to evacuate if there is not much smoke when a fire starts. Even though self-rescuet is an internationally recognised principle and applicable in all our tunnels, AIBN is of the opinion that self-rescuet conditions have not been present in the case of a number of the fires. Therefore, it is important to discuss what conditions must be in place to allow self-rescuet to work. Assisted rescue is a principle that ought to be discussed. In the case of these tunnel fires, how quickly people – both road users and rescue workers – lost their sense of direction in smoke-filled surroundings was also seen. Safe evacuation was then even more demanding a task.

Fireventilation–predeterminedorfollowingassessment:In Norway, the direction of fire ventilation systems is defined in consultation with the fire service. This is done on the basis of which fire service is closest and best qualified to perform the task in hand. Essentially, the fire service must be able to enter the premises with fresh air behind them. If the fire occurs close to the tunnel portal through which the fire service would normally enter, evacuation through smoke may take place over long distances. Here, each tunnel should be assessed individually. If it is possible to determine where the scene of the fire is, whether the direction of the ventilation can be established individually should be assessed. Another option is to maintain the direction of the ventilation until the fire service arrives on scene and then make a decision. This has now been clarified in revised manual N500 – Road Tunnels and has already been introduced in some regions.

Communicationbetweentheemergencyservices:Being able to offer secure links for communication between emergency agencies has presented a challenge in a number of instances. It is assumed that this will become less of a challenge when a digital and redundant emergency network has been installed in the tunnels. With feeds from both sides, the emergency network will be more robust. However, communication is something that should be tested during all fire drills in tunnels. The main message to all fire services with tunnels in their catchment areas is: “Know your tunnel!”.

Recordingandlearningfromevents:AIBN investigates fires in HGVs in tunnels, thereby contributing to an extensive knowledge base

34

on how fires start and develop. Fires starting in connection with road traffic accidents are investigated by the police and the Norwegian Public Roads Administration and are included in the official personal injury statistics. The Norwegian Public Roads Administration is required by the tunnel safety regulation to report serious incidents in tunnels. In this respect, the regions have been asked to report such incidents for the years 2014 – 2016 on national and county road tunnels before January 2017. Injuries due to smoke inhalation will not be recorded anywhere other than during health checks. DSB is working on establishing statistics on all fires involving the fire service been called out. Besides this, car fires will often be reported to the Road Traffic Management Centres, and this information will then be stored. In time, this will provide a very good basis for analysis and extending our knowledge. There is a lot to be learned from extensive analysis of accidents/fires that have taken place.

Followinguponpeoplesufferingfromsmokeinhalation:

This is a job for the health service. We know of no long-term injuries at present. Many road

users ended up spending a relatively long time in smoke-filled surroundings and were treated for smoke inhalation. Little is known about the human ability to withstand exposure to heat and combustion gas that can provide valuable input when dimensioning any safety measures. It has also been noted that the reactions of individuals following traumatic incidents are often underestimated. The fact that the smoke could contain toxic gases, depending on what is burning, is also a problem.

Dynamicemergencyresponseandotherresponseplans:Even though understanding of the need for up to date emergency response and other response plans has become more widespread over the past few years, it is important to review the plans at regular intervals and to put the plans into practice regularly. This has to be done in consultation between the Norwegian Public Roads Administration and the emergency agencies. The need to commission emergency response analyses to a greater extent must also be assessed.

EmergencyresponseanalysisEmergency response analysis gives us an idea of what efforts and rescue can be expected at individual tunnels, what resources are available and when these resources are available. The results of an analysis of this kind may be used as a basis for self-rescue measures in tunnels and/or other measures for emergency response enhancement. The emergency response analysis could also document what measures are sufficient. An emergency response analysis is based on the phases of raising the alarm, mobilisation, rescue, evacuation and normalisation. Anticipated development in the various scenarios is mapped, along with emergency response requirements and the structure of the existing/planned emergency response in the various emergency response phases. Responsibility for compiling emergency response analyses rests with tunnel administrators, and this task is carried out in consultation with emergency agencies, road traffic management centres and the parties that are to operate and manage the tunnel.

35

This measure is implemented at the Norwegian Public Roads Administration and is designated as a requirement in N500 Road Tunnels.

Real‐timeinformationandtheuseofsocialmedia:The options for viewing data relating to conditions inside tunnels at any time have been extended over the past few years. The options have been extended, and the costs have been reduced. Real-time information can allow rescue initiatives to be targeted more accurately. The fact that everyone has mobile phones nowadays paves the way for a range of options for active use of mobile phones during incidents. It is also possible to extract interesting information on movements, etc. from mobile phones.

Constructionofevacuationfacilitiesinlong,bidirectionaltunnelsUse of rescue rooms in tunnels is not permitted at present according to the tunnel safety regulation. This is based on an EU provision. Questions are gradually being asked on whether rescue rooms could nevertheless be an option for long, bidirectional tunnels. Before this is examined, where applicable, a study should be carried out on whether road users would actually choose to enter rescue rooms during an evacuation. How these rooms should be designed and equipped should also be evaluated. Another important problem to address involves the types of fire to be used as design values. It is important for people seeking refuge to be able to expect to be rescued within a given time (a few hours, for example). Experiences from the Oslofjord tunnel showed that people attempt to escape from the smoke and so used all options, such as telephone boxes, the option of getting in behind the wall panels, etc.

Riskanalyses,riskacceptanceandselectionofeffectivemeasures:It is important to put in place a kind of DSM (Decision Support Model) that can be used in order to make the right choices in respect of upgrades and safety measures. It should also be possible to use this model when assessing whether hazardous goods can be transported through tunnels. There are actually a limited number of mitigating measures of relevance at present. A number of the measures that there is a desire to put in place conflict with current regulations.

It is also been found that it may take a long time for people to actually realise that situations are critical. This is not a new finding, but it confirms what has been seen previously.

36

References

Report from the fire in the Oslofjord tunnel, 29.03.2011. T Tollefsen, 13 July 2011.

Report on fire in a lorry on National Road 23 in the Oslofjord tunnel, 23 June 2011 (Vei2013/05 – AIBN). https://www.aibn.no/Road-Traffic/Reports/2013-05

Report from the fire in the Oslofjord tunnel, 23.06.2011. T Tollefsen, SVV, 4 April 2012

Experiences from rescue work and self-rescue during the fire in the Oslofjord tunnel, 23 June 2013, Ove Njå, Report IRIS-2014/250

Fire in the Oslofjord tunnel 23.06.2011, Report compiled by Søndre Follo Fire Service, 24 August 2013

Report on fire in a lorry on the E16 in the Gudvanga tunnel in Aurland, 5 August 2013, (Vei 2015/02 SHT). https://www.aibn.no/Road-Traffic/Published-reports/2015-02-eng

Fire in the Gudvanga tunnel, 5 August 2013, Region West, Sogn og Fjordane Roads Department, November 2013

Brannen i Gudvangatunnelen Rapport om læring og erfaringer, DSB, ISBN: 978-82-7768- 340-9. https://www.iris.no/publications/414551636/2014-250

Report on the bus fire in the Gudvanga tunnel on the E16 in Aurland, 11 August 2015, VEI

2016/03. https://www.aibn.no/Road-Traffic/Published-reports/2016-03-eng

Fire in the Gudvanga tunnel, 11 August 2015, Region West, Sogn og Fjordane Roads Department, January 2016

Fire in the Skatestraumen tunnel, 15 July 2015, Region West, Sogn og Fjordane Roads Department, January 2016

Report on fire in tanker trailer in the Skatestraumen tunnel in Sogn og Fjordane, 15 July 2015 SHT Road report. https://www.aibn.no/Road-Traffic/Published-reports/2016-05-eng

Mapping of vehicle fires in Norwegian road tunnels 2008 – 2015, Tor-Olav Nævestad, Ranestad Karen, Elvebakk Beate and Meyer Sunniva, TØI report 1542/2016. www.toi.no/kjoretoybrannerivegtunneler2017

Subsea road tunnels vulnerable to fire, Tor-Olav Nævestad, working document 50357, 7 May 2013. Mellum Rolf, “Public incident investigation of four vehicle fires in long single tube tunnels in Norway during 2011 – 2015”. Accident Investigation Board Norway, 2016

37

Norwegian Public Roads

Administration Directorate of

Public Roads Publications Office

Postboks 8142 Dep NO-0033

OSLO Tel.: (+47 915) 02030

[email protected]

ISSN: 1893-1162

vegvesen.no

Trygt fram sammen – Arriving safely together

Documents

The 5 major tunnel fires in Norway ver270417 Tunnel AG2... · kilometre of tunnel on average in Norwegian road tunnels, i.e. 24 fires for every 1,134 road tunnels. Fires in HGVs were