The American Influence on Vietnam

7/24/2019 The American Influence on Vietnam

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THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF THE VIETNAM WAR

The American influence on Vietnam, though indirect, began in the early 20thcentury during the

French colonial rule at a time when the U.S. was largely ignorant about the societies and peoples

of ndochina. Although the French in ndochina !ept the American businesses and missionaries

away from the region", the Vietnamese elites and intellectuals were deeply mo#ed and influenced

by the American $e#olution. %hat particularly appealed to them, because of their subser#ient

position under the French, was the US declared opposition to &uropean colonialism. n "'"',

when (resident %oodrow %ilson supported the stri#e for nations to gain self)determination and

also during the %orld %ar when (resident $oose#elt elo*uently declared the rights of the

colonial people to their independence, the nationalists in Vietnam found a ray of hope in these

messages. The most important leader of Vietnam, +o hi -inh was influenced by the US stance

against imperialism, hoping that it would etend support to their struggle for independence.

nitially, +o hi -inh tried to gain political rights for the Vietnamese based on the principle of

%ilson/s self)determination, but since his letter to U.S. in"'"' urging for Vietnamese rights

remained unanswered, he started to loo! for other ways to independence. Thus in "'20,

influenced by the anti)colonial and anti)capitalist concepts of the $ussian $e#olution, he was

*uic!ly drawn to communism. This led to the establishment of the Vietnamese ommunist (arty

in "'0. The role of this party is crucial in the independence mo#ement and its communist

ideology is also a dri#ing force in its growing animosity with the U.S.

1 -arilyn 1. oung et al. The Vietnam War34ew or!5 6ford Uni#ersity (ress, 20027, "8.


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n the "'20s and "'0s, repression of the French colonial power increased and with the 9apanese

occupation of Vietnam during the %orld %ar , the struggle for independence was doubled since

the Vietnamese now had to defeat two colonial powers. n their struggle for independence against

the 9apanese, the U.S. assisted +o hi -inh to establish a small armed force !nown as the

$e#olutionary :eague for the ndependence of Vietnam 3or Viet -inh7. %ith the 9apanese defeat

in August "'8;, -inh announced the independence of the go#ernment and later in 2 September

"'8; establishing himself as the president, he declared +anoi as the capital of the


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As mentioned earlier, though the First ndochina %ar 3"'8=)"';87 was aided by US with some

reluctance, the hinese ommunist (arty/s #ictory in "'8' changed the scenario. n order to

pre#ent hinese military assistance to Vietnam, not only was the Sino)Vietnamese border sealed,

but US in an attempt to stop the spread of ommunism started financing the entire cost of the

French war by "';0. Faced with successi#e defeats from Viet -inh, the US began to fear that

should Vietnam fall to ommunism, so would the rest of Southeast Asia. As the old %ar

deepened, the US policies towards communist allies also hardened. n spite of the massi#e US

aid and support, the French were clearly losing in their armed struggle against the Vietnamese

and the disillusioned French under public pressure from the go#ernment wanted to negotiate with

the Viet -inh8. The United States howe#er, deterred the French from ta!ing any such step since

they urgently needed to dispel communism in Vietnam.


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:i!e the Viet -inh, the United States and the US sponsored State of Vietnam opposed the

partition since they resented the idea of a ommunist 4orth. The United States in its endea#or to

dri#e away the communist forces decided to create a strong base in Southern Vietnam, from

where it would carry out its operation against the 4orth and also introduced the counter)

insurgency program to contain communism in the affected areas. Thus in 9une "';8, 4go


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attac! on the 1uddhist church which resulted in a series of 1uddhist uprisings. $eali@ing that


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with the intensifying of


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in ndochina started to unfold, it turned out to be *uite an embarrassment for the &isenhower

administration. +is Custification of the U.S. in#ol#ement in Vietnam was based on the ?falling

domino principle that if Vietnam were to come under ommunist rule, so would the entire

Southeast Asia.


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n "'=" when (resident Lennedy too! office, the political situation had gone from bad to worse.

The A agent &dward :ansdale was sent to Vietnam to pro#ide an o#er)all study of the situation

and he returned with the report that the situation was near total collapse and if the policies of the

he

congratulated :ansdale on the report and e#en suggested that a portion of it be published in the

Saturday &'ening Post. t is possible that Lennedy wanted to ma!e the most of this dire situation

through publici@ing it, hoping it would gi#e him a pretet for strengthening more forces in

Vietnam. Thus instead of ta!ing heed of :ansdale/s ad#ice to reform the


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barbed wire or bamboo spear and also guarded by local troops. The peasants would also be gi#en

weapons and trained in self)defense and these strategic hamlets would not be isolated> it was

held that these hamlets would impro#e the li#es of the peasants and thus the tie between the

locals and the Southern go#ernment would be strengthened"2.This was implemented on the

con#iction that though the peasants would be transferred against their will, once security is

ensured they will e#entually come to support the go#ernment, while the Viet -inh in the

meantime would lose their source of men, accommodation and food supplies. This program was

one part of a tas! force !nown as Taylor Mission. The other part in#ol#ed ma!ing the U.S.

military e*uipment more efficient and stepping up the counter)insurgency program by employing

thousands of American ad#isers in the combat units. Although the Taylor Missionwas intended

to restrict and subdue the Viet -inh forces from all *uarters, it only led to the waning of the

support for Southern go#ernment and an increase in sympathy for the Viet -inh.


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the spread of ommunism that led to U.S. in#ol#ement since Lennedy from the onset of his

presidential rule wanted to heighten America/s prestige and secure its position as a world power

by crushing the guerilla forces. This conclusion was drawn by Deorge +erring from his analysis

of The Pentagon Pa)erswho held that (resident Lennedy and many of his ad#isers adopted this

perspecti#e) ?South Vietnam would become a test case of America/s determination to uphold its

commitments in a menacing world and of its capacity to meet the new challenges posed by

guerilla warfare in the emerging nations";.

The highlight of Lennedy administration in Vietnam was the counterinsurgency program. The

program initially began to combat 4:F battalions and pro#ide more manpower to A$V4.

ronically with e#ery increase of military technology and deploying U.S. troops, the program met

a crushing defeat from the 4:F which was growing e#er)stronger. The failing of the

counterinsurgency was owing to the fact that U.S. was only ta!ing into consideration the military

aspects, completely ignoring the massi#e political support of the Viet -inh which dictated the

entire situation of Vietnam. ssues such as psychological loyalties which could ha#e been

manipulated through social change was also disregarded) the U.S. being predominantly engaged

in impro#ing and consolidating its military tactics and troops> in"'=", South Vietnam had less

than ",000 military personnel and by "'=, the number rose to more than "=,000. +owe#er in

this also the U.S. miscalculated the 4:F potentials whose strength was considered only in terms

of soldiers and weapons, and not as a mass re#olutionary mo#ement which had a constant influ

of weaponries and man power from the 4orth. A program was initiated by


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and eecuted. ronically, this too bac!fired and instead of subduing the ommunists, it led to the

emergence of 4:F in South Vietnam.

The 4:F on the other hand was primarily de#oted to establishing peace and unity between the

4orth and South and aimed to achie#e this obCecti#e through social changes. t did not aspire for

any political gains and its only purpose was to gain independence. Unli!e the U.S. policy, its aim

was to stabili@e the unrest situation in South Vietnam through education, de#elopment of

economy, science and technology and free the region from U.S. dominion and the dictatorial

powers of 4go


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9ohnson remained undeterred in his decision to continue and step up the attac!s on Vietnam.

Following the assassination of


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employing the South Vietnamese troops and mercenaries though it would be masterminded and

financed by the U.S. > hence the aim was to ma!e it appear less of an American in#ol#ement.

These co#ert attac!s were to be escalated o#er time by enlarging the military bases and

increasing the number of U.S. military troops> also any form of retaliation from the 4orth would

be used as pretet to use air attac!s on +anoi, deploying more U.S. troops and conse*uently

occupying +anoi. The intricate nature of these attac!s is seen as plans for Hretaliatory/ bombing

of 4orth Vietnam were drawn e#en before the co#ert operations were carried out. These co#ert

operations began in February ", "'=8, under the code name /)eration Plan $0A36plan 8A7.

The strategy of pro#o!ing the 4orth to engage them in an armed struggle was belie#ed by

(entagon to result in obtaining a resolution from ongress granting carte 1lancheto wage war.

This was necessary since it would then gi#e U.S. a pro#ision for deploying ground forces, ships

and air power on the pretet of self)defense, without fear of public criticism. :i!e Lennedy/s

administration, 9ohnson/s presidency also suffered from the illusion that employing more

military troops and increasing its attac!s would result in a U.S. #ictory.

6n August 2, 6plan 8A launched attac!s on three 4orth Vietnamese ships on the coastal

defenses of 4orth Vietnam and on August 8, it was reported that U.S. destroyerMaddo2along

with another U.S. destroyer Turner 3oyHclaimed/ that they were under attac! from 4orth

Vietnam. These e#ents which too! place in Dulf of Ton!in were important in sanctioning the

Americani@ation of the Vietnam %ar. J%hat actually too! place on the 8this beyond the scope of

this study but (resident 9ohnson/s tele#ised speech that US ships were attac!ed without

pro#ocation is a fallacy since U.S. was the first to attac! and that too on 4orth Vietnamese na#al

forts.K Following this, on August I, ongress passed the resolution which ga#e the (resident the


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right ?to ta!e all necessary steps in Southeast Asia, ?including the use of armed force"I.The

Dulf of Ton!in mar!ed the first admitted participation of the US in war against the this operation !nown as4olling Thunderwas

inaugurated by 9ohnson in February ". The e#ent howe#er was reported to the Americans as

Hretaliatory/ air raids and in order to further Custify their action the State


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%ashington and Saigon Cointly announced that they would begin continuous air raids against the

4orth. The %hite (aper was issued following -cDeorge 1undy/s policy of ?sustained reprisal

whereby it was belie#ed that success in Vietnam could be ensured by Custifying the air and na#al

operations as a response to the Viet ong campaign of terror and #iolence against the South.

1undy belie#ed that this policy would not only allow them to escalate the attac!s but would also

show the Americans and their allies that U.S. did not lea#e any stone unturned in its attempt to

help the State of Vietnam.


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that compromise is the best they can ma!e out of the current situation, since the ground force,

regardless of si@e, is incapable of defeating the guerilla Viet ong, which is recei#ing support

and assistance from the ci#ilians. 1ecause of this cooperation, co#ert operations were lea!ed to

the Viet ong before being eecuted, which not only put the U.S. troops out of their dept, but

also made them susceptible to attac!s. 1all in his lengthy opposition to the war was supported by

other %hite +ouse staff and officials, though a large maCority still belie#ed that #ictory was

feasible through escalating the troops.


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the decimation of the land, people were forced to flee to refugee camps near Saigon and other

cities.

1ecause of these measures, by "'=I the Viet ong and the 4:F who had control o#er large areas

in South Vietnam were dri#en away from the populated areas, compelled to disperse and this was

seen by many U.S. as a prospect of #ictory. Thus (resident 9ohnson and Deneral %estmoreland

termed this as military #ictory, ha#ing succeeded in dri#ing the 4:F combat troops away from

their establishment in Saigon and also ha#ing managed to reoccupy +ue in central Vietnam. t is

possible that what U.S. termed as military feat, for the guerillas and the 4:F it was nothing but a

reorgani@ation of their troops for the most decisi#e and comprehensi#e attac! on U.S. troops up

to date in the Second ndochina %ar. This attac! came to be !nown as the Tet 6ffensi#e which

started in 9anuary 0, "'=B and continued for four wee!s. -uch to the surprise of Deneral

%estmoreland who thought the army had a firm grip o#er South Vietnam, combined 4:F and

4orth Vietnamese troops attac!ed no fewer than 8 pro#incial centers, =8 district towns and

e#ery maCor city in the south, including o#er one hundred U.S. military installations from the

4orth to the South. The 4:F also bro!e into the prisons and thousands of political prisoners

were freed and maCor DV4 3Do#ernment of the $epublic of Vietnam or South Vietnam7

head*uarters were either occupied or burned down. (anic)stric!en, the US)DV4 forces hastily

withdrew to escape the assaults.


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The Tet 6ffensi#e which in#ol#ed simultaneous coordinated attac!s by a large number of small

units, spread all across South Vietnam and also in the central regions where some areas were

controlled by the U.S. The success of this attac! was particularly owing to the fact that U.S.

troops were caught off guard and being attac!ed at the same time in all areas of their

establishment, e#en the troops could not be replenished by mobili@ing. Also the Americans o#er

the years ha#e gotten accustomed to an enemy which made a policy of a#oiding military

confrontation and thus were sha!en to the core when continuous attac!s with shoc!ing power

were launched on them. The U.S. leaders, though clearly at a loss, were unwilling to admit


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defeat Hso early/ and termed these attac!s as a ?desperation tactic and a final death throe before

the end of guerilla resistance20.

The impact of Tet 6ffensi#e was monumental since it shifted the position of U.S. from offensi#e

to defensi#e almost o#ernight. 6n the part of the rebels, it was not an operation aimed at sei@ing

and controlling some areas of land, but it was to mount pressure on the Americans and

undermine their determination to pursue the war. Apart from suffering military defeat, they were

also morally crushed because of the number of casualties which amounted to B'; between

9anuary 0 and -arch "> also the 4:F claimed to ha#e wrec!ed o#er ",B00 U.S. aircrafts as a

result of the fighting. This lowered the U.S. military efficiency and there was a lac! of

coordination between the American and Saigon forces and also between the ground units and the

air support which wea!ened the defense. Also there was a growing antagonism between the U.S.

troops and the A$V4 3Army of the $epublic of Vietnam7 which escalated as the latter reali@ing

the ine#itability of U.S. defeat, sided with the 4:F troops.

(olitically, the impact was e#en greater, since ha#ing drained all their resources in Vietnam, U.S.

reali@ed that in the e#ent of a crisis elsewhere in the world, its options would be limited. The Tet

6ffensi#e was also crucial in crushing the illusion of the American leaders that #ictory could be

ensured through escalation of military tactics> it was a huge blow to their morale as it highlighted

their massi#e incompetence and brought into open the futility of the sacrifices, forcibly imposed

on the U.S. troops. +owe#er, U.S. was still not prepared to gi#e in and in a desperate attempt, the

policy ma!ers recommended a deployment of 22,000 troops and replacing the (remier of South

Vietnam to turn the tide. (resident 9ohnson was also facing trouble at home as &ugene

-carthy, running on an anti)Vietnam war platform in the "'=B presidential election, achie#ed

20 New York Times, anuary 21, 1968.


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an unepected #ote total in the 4ew +ampshire and %isconsin primary. Thus it was becoming

e#ident on the part of 9ohnson that he was facing not only military but also political defeat as a

result of Vietnam %ar and in a last attempt to resol#e the matter, whiche#er way it might turn

out, he decided to consult a group of policy ma!ers who were engaged in designing the means of

global confrontation with communism and also shaping the U.S. foreign policies regarding

Vietnam. These men unanimously decided that U.S. should not epand its forces on Vietnam and

should withdraw its troops and ta!e all measures for de)escalating the war. $eali@ing that the

battle is lost, both home and abroad, (resident 9ohnson in a tele#ised speech on " -arch, "'=B

too! a defensi#e stance, declaring that he would de#ote the remainder of his presidential term

see!ing peace and that he would not see! re)election.

6n the part of the insurgents, apart from the nature of the surprise attac!s of the Tet 6ffensi#e,

#ictory was ensured through peaceful cooperation with the locals. t is important to note that a

mass influ of Viet ong from 4orth to the South had begun much earlier as mentioned in the

%hite (aper and therefore mobili@ation of troops was not an issue since they were already

stationed in #arious regions in the south. n certain cities, the guerilla forces bro!e into laundries

and stole A$V4 uniforms which were worn during the attac!s, causing great confusion in the

enemy lines. Duns and machineries were remo#ed and U.S. bases and head*uarters were

attac!ed, destroying millions of dollars worth of e*uipment. Also as the relations between the

A$V4 and U.S. troops deteriorated, the A$V4 were less inclined to put up a fight with the

guerillas and thus 4:F occupation of most cities were swift and peaceful. Far from putting any

resistance, a number of local officials of DV4 switched sides and started wor!ing for the

guerillas. ery aspect of this re#olutionary campaign was dependent on ci#ilian cooperation as

tens of thousands of people, both in the #illages and cities, assisted them in smuggling food and


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weapons and also ga#e them refuge. t was belie#ed that they were accepted into the

neighborhoods without any force and this not only ga#e the guerillas a firm ground whereby they

could launch attac!s but also ga#e them the much needed moral and psychological support. This

pro#ides a star! contrast to the U.S. troops who were fighting a war in a far away land only

because they were compelled to. 1ecause of the atrocities and attac!s they carried out on the

whims of their superiors, they were regarded with contempt and disdain by the locals as one

American officer remar!s5 ?f loo!s could !ill, #ery few marines would still be ali#e2".Thus

they suffered from disillusionment, unwillingly fighting a war that had no purpose for them and

this loss of spirits was a huge setbac! for the U.S. forces which no foreign policy could mend.

Also it is reported that the massacre carried out in #illages by U.S. troops as a response to the Tet

6ffensi#e was deliberately lea!ed to the American public by an army personnel leading to the D

anti)war mo#ement within the army which was one of the decisi#e factors for ending the war.

(rior to the Tet 6ffensi#e, 4:F suffered high casualties and was also sha!en to the core at the

U.S. escalation of attac!s. The #illagers too grew disheartened as they endlessly pursued the tas!

of maintaining underground tunnel system, tending the wounded, culti#ating crops and

contributing food to the troops as U.S. bombs and shells rained on them. :eaders of the Front

organi@ations played a maCor role in !eeping the people and the troops in high spirits as #illagers

remained steadfast in their role to assist the guerillas despite the resistance. en in the most

difficult times, 4:F managed to stri#e based on its obCecti#e which still had a purpose and

meaning to the people. The DV4 on the other hand, had no real ties with the population and

sur#i#ed on the basis of U.S. money and military support and as the war continued the morale of

the US)DV4 troops declined, especially at the growing determination of the enemy troops. The

21 Marin . ettle$an et al., 367.


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4:F was also strategic in its initiation of the Tet 6ffensi#e since prior to it in "'=I, it laid low in

many regions, which U.S. considered to be a military defeat on the part of the former and thus

when it least epected, all force units, from one end of the country to another, attac!ed

simultaneously.

Another *uarter from where the go#ernment recei#ed considerable pressure to end the war was

the American public. %hen the bombing of 4orth Vietnam started periodically in February "'=;,

following the Ton!in incident, the antiwar mo#ement began as a national phenomenon. +owe#er

campaign began earlier in


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4o#ember "'=', 4ion introduced his plan for ?Vietnami@ation whereby, American troops

would be withdrawn and more A$V4 troops would be employed to replace them and this

withdrawal of troops would be compensated by increasing artillery and aerial bombardment.

+owe#er at the same time 4ion was also conducting the peace negotiations with


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Against the %ar7 who demanded immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops. %ith the failure to

populari@e Vietnami@ation, Lennedy began to support the 4guyen Van Thieu/s regime of the

South Do#ernment and the U.S. policy towards neutrali@ation 3established during the early

presidency of 9ohnson7 remained the same whereby it strongly opposed and stro#e to uproot any

attempt aimed at bring the 4orth and South in reconciliatory terms, with the latter recogni@ing

the ommunist rule of the former. The


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"B)2', which came to be !nown as the ?hristmas 1ombing. +owe#er the Vietnamese were

prepared that U.S. would ma!e one last attempt to crush their spirits and as a response to it many

U.S. airmen were !illed and captured. onse*uently in


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adopting the hinese custom, culture and e#en political model in the Vietnamese society and

administration, they resented the hinese rule and ta!ing ad#antage of its military wea!ness in

'' A.


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Bibliography

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The American Influence on Vietnam