The Bangladesh Crisis and the Arabesque of Alignments

8/3/2019 The Bangladesh Crisis and the Arabesque of Alignments

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World Affairs Institute

THE BANGLADESH CRISIS AND THE ARABESQUE OF ALIGNMENTSAuthor(s): Usha MahajaniReviewed work(s):Source: World Affairs, Vol. 136, No. 4 (Spring 1974), pp. 321-346Published by: World Affairs InstituteStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20671528 .

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Usha Mahajani THE BANGLADESHCRISIS AND THEARABESQUE OFALIGNMENTS

The events in Bangladesh in 1971 have meant many things tomany observers. To the people of Bangladesh they spelled freedomfrom Pakistani rule and independent status as a nation-state. The peopleof West Pakistan saw in the events a shattering blow to the unity oftheir country - a blow from which they have made a remarkablerecovery, psychological, economic, and military. For India, the year1971 began with bright hopes of a friendly united Pakistan on both theeastern and western frontiers. These were dashed by the militaryclampdown in East Pakistan. The year ended in amilitary victory overPakistan and the creation of a friendly state in the east.To students of world affairs the history, as it unfolded during1971 in what once was East Pakistan, has offered an opportunity todiscern and analyze patterns of shifting alliances and alignments in auniversal global system (in which the United States, the Soviet Union,and China are the dominant actors) and a regional South Asiansubsystem (in which India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh are the mainactors). It is the interaction between them that produced a uniquearabesque of alignments in the Indian subcontinent during theBangladesh crisis.

SubcontinentalConfigurationsBeforeMarch 1971In India the elections of March 1971 had given Prime MinisterIndira Gandhi undisputed control of the federal government. Variousforecasts about the possible balkanization or at least the weakening ofthe Indian federal government had proved false. In Pakistan, bycontrast, the process of dissolution had started. Whether its seeds weresown in 1947 or in Marshal Yahya Khan's ill-advised coup inMarch1971 will always remain a topic of historical controversy. The

indisputable facts are that numerous problems of inequality betweenthe two wings of Pakistan and the concentration of power in the handsof West Pakistanis had produced a deep psychological gulfbetween the321


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Bengalis in East Pakistan and the Punjabis inWest Pakistan, creatinga

case of Asian colonialism. In December 1970 the first fully democratic,free national elections were held in Pakistan in which the AwamiLeague of East Pakistan, led by Mujibur Rahman, campaigned on asix-point platform centered on the principle of autonomy for EastPakistan, and won 167 out of 169 seats allotted to that region. Thisvictory also gave the League an absolute majority of 313 seats in theNational Assembly and assured Mujib the prime ministership ofPakistan - a development that was both unexpected by the westPakistani establishment and unacceptable to it. A period of tortuouspolitical negotiations and uncertainty ended abruptly on the night ofMarch 25 when Yahya Khan arrested Mujib and several of his associatesand initiated what turned out to be an unspeakable bloodbath whichwas to become genocidal in character. East Pakistan's demand forautonomy was now alchemized into a demand for complete independence. A civil war, or an armed revolt or war of national liberation,commenced.'

TheWideningConflict and External InvolvementWhat technically started as an internal constitutional crisis andthen became an armed conflict within Pakistan soon acquired subcontinental proportions. India had welcomed the results of the nationalelections and hoped for their fruition in the installation ofMujib as thefirst democratically elected civilian Prime Minister of United Pakistan.After all, his platform had included not only regional autonomy forEast Pakistan but also, in foreign affairs, friendship with India on the

basis of peaceful resolution of disputes, and nonalignment. It specifically included withdrawal from the military pacts like CENTO, SEATO,and other bilateral alliances.2 India could not but rejoice in theprospect of a friendly, nonaligned, and united Pakistan under ademocratic government, for this alone could ensure its security both inthe East and theWest. This hope proved short-lived.India was sandwiched between the two parties to the conflict andwas drawn into it because the growing influx of refugees, eventuallynumbering 10 million, constituted the so-called migratory aggression byPakistan. Not willing to be a mute witness to themassacre of unarmedcivilians and deeply sympathetic to the cause of the people ofBangladesh, India gave sanctuary, military assistance, and training totheMukti Bahini (liberation army of Bangladesh). The chronic tensionand hostility between India and Pakistan became aggravated into a


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THE BANGLADESH CRISIS 323

trilinear antagonism between West Pakistan, on the one hand, and Indiaand Bangladesh, on the other.The three great powers were also involved in the Bangladesh crisis.China and the United States were major economic and military donorsto Pakistan. U.S. military aid, suspended during the Indo-Pakistani warin 1965, had been resumed in 1967 when spare parts for lethalequipment, supplied before 1965, were provided. In October andNovember 1970 military supplies worth $150 million were reportedlysold to Pakistan at a nominal cost of $15 or 20 million. These suppliesincluded seven B-57 bombers, four maritime reconnaissance aircraft, asquadron of F-104's or a squadron of the new F-5's (Freedom Fighterbombers), 300 M1/13 armored personnel carriers, and several kinds ofunspecified equipment and spares.3 Even after it began the crackdownin Bangladesh, Pakistan continued to receive U.S. military supplies.4China had given Pakistan $200 million worth of arms, including 200T-59 tanks, 120 MIG-19 fighter bombers, equipment to arm twoinfantry divisions, and several unspecified items.5 In April 1971, after afour-lane, all-weather highway from Singkiang to Gilgit in Pakistaniheld Kashmir was opened, Chinese supplies came faster. In June a largeshipment of Chinese machine guns, automatic rifles, and mortars with arange of 7,000 to 10,000 yards was unloaded at Chittagong. Thesewould have enabled Pakistani forces to pull back frommany areas alongthe India-East Bengal border and at the same time increase theircapability to fire into India.Pakistan's use of foreign military aid against the people ofBangladesh impelled India tomake its displeasure known to the donors.But different styles of showing that displeasure had to be adopted.Since China was not a friend, a "friendly complaint" could not belodged. Nor was China considered an enemy. In fact, ever since 1968India was trying to open border talks with China without preconditionsand to restore ambassadorial relations. It was also seeking China'sintercession in the Bangladesh crisis.6 A stern protest to China wouldhave nullified these efforts. India therefore took a lenient view of

Chinese aid to Pakistan, possibly interpreting it as reciprocation forsecuring a direct outlet to the Indian Ocean via the Singkiang-Gilgitroad which facilitated China's trade with Africa and theMiddle East.The United States, on the other hand, was a friend on whom Indiafelt more free to exert pressure to stop military sales to Pakistan, eventhose under past authorizations. Foreign Minister Swaran Singhdeclared on June 24 that the U.S. arms supplies to Pakistan would


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constitute condonation and encouragement to the continuation ofPakistani atrocities in East Pakistan. He claimed that this was "notmerely a technical matter but a matter of grave concern involvingsocial, economic, political and security considerations." The UnitedStates, however, maintained that it was impossible to intercept theloaded Pakistani ships at sea, as demanded by India. Although 11member countries of theWorld Bank's Aid Consortium to Pakistan haddecided to postpone indefinitely any new assistance to Pakistan, theUnited States continued to give economic aid to Pakistan.7Differences over the East Bengal situation did not, however, as yetmar Indo-U.S. cordiality. India assumed that Pakistan was maintainingtwo mutually exclusive alliances with China and the United States, thenconsidered major rivals. U.S. military aid to Pakistan could therefore berationalized in terms of the U.S. desire to prevent Pakistan from fallinginto China's camp. From this viewpoint, Pakistan's friendship withPeking and Washington appeared to be a manifestation of its sturdyindependence and ability to obtain aid from both the powers withoutbecoming committed to either.The Soviet Union adopted a position more sympathetic towardBangladesh though not as yet in support of its independence. Inresponse to India's request, President Podgorny sent a protest toYahyaKhan expressing a sense of alarm and urging him to stop "bloodshedand repression" in East Pakistan and seek a peaceful solution.Following Yahya Khan's strong rebuff, the Soviet Union continued tosupport India's demand for political conditions for the safe return ofthe refugees. Soviet arms supplies to Pakistan had already ended in

April 1970, and by March 1971 sales for spares and components hadbeen stopped.8The policies of the United States, China, and the Soviet Uniontoward the subcontinental developments were interlinked with theirmutual relations as well as with Pakistani politics. The NixonAdministration regarded Yahya Khan as a special friend, a staunchmilitary ally, and a valuable carrier of messages between China and theUnited States. Mujibur Rahman, in contrast, seemed singularly unattractive. His socialist program of nationalization of major industriesthreatened U.S. economic interests in Pakistan. Under his foreignpolicy, Pakistan would have ceased to be the kingpin in the NearEastern South Asian defense system against the Soviet Union. It would


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have also forged a political alignment with India and the Soviet Union.The Provisional Government of Bangladesh included a few pro-Moscowelements.

By mid-1971 China and the Soviet Union had ceased to be meredisputants and became major enemies. Forty-one Soviet divisions, threemore than in 1970, faced 33 Chinese divisions. These latter includedsome units that previously guarded China's border with Vietnam againstpossible U.S. invasion, since China no longer considered U.S. militarypresence in Indochina as a threat to its security in the southern region.China had also placed at least 20 medium-range (1000 mile) nuclearmissiles in the North within striking distance of Soviet industrialcenter.9

Like the United States, China considered Yahya Khan a morereliable ally than Mujib since he was hostile to India and had acquittedhimself well as a trustworthy friend in China's delicate negotiationswith the Nixon administration. Mujib was a "bourgeois" socialist whohad taken the wind out of the sails of the extreme leftwing. His policyof nonalignment militated against an alliance with China. Although hewas not hostile to China the latter feared the prospect of his closefriendship with India and the Soviet Union. Beset with its ownrebellious minorities in Singkiang and Tibet, China was also not inclinedto be sympathetic with what it chose to regard as a secessionist threatto its ally, Pakistan.In its relations with India, China did have a choice betweencontinuation of strained relations and resumption of friendship. Indiahad sought rapprochement with China by refusing to join theSoviet-inspired, anti-Chinese Asian Collective Security System. Asstated above, ithad also made overtures. China, however, rejected theseand attacked India for blatant interference in Pakistani affairs.10 Itmay be that China did not trust India as a loyal ally since, as a middlepower, the latter was bound eventually to assert leadership of a widerAsian bloc. Or the Chinese leaders may have underestimated India'sstrength and overestimated Pakistan's capacity to preserve its "territorial integrity" and decided to support what turned out to be thelosing side. Miscalculation is not a monopoly of nonrevolutionarynations. Certainly, given China's growing enmity toward the SovietUnion, India, as a friend of that power, was decidedly suspect inChina's eyes. With a rapprochement with the United States in theoffing, China was not desperately in need of India's friendship. Thus,


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for several reasons, China ranged itself against the national liberationstruggle of Bangladesh.

The Bangladesh crisis, moreover, brought into a sharper focus themulti-power clash of interest in the Indian Ocean which had developedin the 1960s." During December 1970 and January 1971 mutual fearsbetween the rival powers had been heightened. Soviet naval aid toIndia, especially in submarines, aroused Western fears that the SovietUnion was about to obtain naval facilities at Visakhapatnam.12 Thelatter countercharged that Diego Garcia, on which the United Stateswas building a naval communications center, was actually intended asan Anglo-American war base, designed to create a strategic triangle inthe Indian Ocean with other points inAustralia and South Africa.'3The Bangladesh issue, which involved a littoral region of theIndian Ocean, had a strong bearing on these power politics. The UnitedStates feared "the possible development of Soviet hegemony in theIndian Ocean, which might, in time, affect the central balance of poweradversely to [U.S.] interests." In its view, the allocation of nearlytwo-thirds of Soviet economic aid to the Third World countries in theIndian Ocean was calculated to serve Soviet naval expansion in thesupport of which the Soviet Union was "exploiting targets of opportunity among the revolutionary and nationalistic forces in the region."To counter this, the U.S. policy was to promote "domestic politicalstability in the countries around the Indian Ocean and maintain goodrelations with them as a way of limiting the development of [Soviet]Communist influence hostile to the United States in those countries."14 It seemed to the United States that the rise of a nonalignedPakistan under Mujibur Rahman or independence for a separateBangladesh would create a country inwhich influences hostile to theUnited States would develop. It was as much a matter of securityconcern as that of interest in preserving the territorial integrity of anally which underlay American policy in the Indian subcontinent.What appeared as a threat to U.S. interests must have seemed apromising development to the Soviet Union which, like India, welcomed the prospect of a nonaligned Pakistan under Mujib or, short ofthat, an independent Bangladesh, though as yet the Soviet Unionshowed no signsof supportingeither independence or of givingdirectassistance to theMukti Bahini.Thus, by mid-1971 the Indo-Soviet approaches on Bangladeshseemed to have converged though the precise degree of agreement was


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not known to outside observers. In contrast, the Sino-American views onthat region acquired a more noticeable commonality. Like the UnitedStates, China was accusing the Soviet Union of seeking "hegemony" inthe Indian Ocean. China's criticism of the U.S. State Department for"poking its nose into Pakistan's internal affairs" was mild compared toits severe denunciation of Soviet "impudence" in criticizing Pakistanalone.15 Whether the Chinese leaders discussed Bangladesh withKissinger in early July is not known. There is no reason to assume thatthey did not. But these alignments had not as yet wholly crystallized.Impact of Sino-American Rapprochement onIndiaand theSoviet Union

India was a long-time advocate of peaceful coexistence, and hadprevailed upon the United States to hold ambassadorial talks withChina in Warsaw in 1955. Thus, India treated the news of Nixon'scoming trip to China favorably and hoped that the potential normalization of Sino-American relations would speed up a peaceful settlementin Indochina.16 However, in the then current South Asian context, themove also appeared alarming to India because it shattered the long-heldassumption about Sino-U.S. rivalry and India's implicit reliance on U.S.protection against Chinese attack. Pakistan alone was privy to the secretof Kissinger's July 9-11 visit to China.7 The timing and themodalitiesof that trip were also an eye opener for India. It turned out thatKissinger's prior visit to New Delhi was not intended to examine thequestions of East Bengali refugees, as India had assumed, but to be acover to use the subcontinent as a route to China. It was also clear toIndia that, far from being either impartial and neutral or sympathetic tothe cause of the Bengali movement, the United States, like China, hadjoined the Pakistani camp. They were the only world powers firmly andjointly supporting Pakistan on the grounds of upholding its territorialintegrity. Earlier, Kissinger had warned India that in case of anIndo-Pakistani conflict over East Bengal, China would not remain aloof,and, if attacked by China, India should not expect U.S. support as in1962.18 This warning, coupled with the emerging Sino-U.S. ddtente,pointed to the rise of a triple alignment unfriendly to India amongChina, Pakistan, and theUnited States.

Consequently, India's misgivings over the U.S. motives of Realpolitik also heightened its displeasure about the arms supplies to


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Pakistan. Swaran Singh pointed out that the current U.S. military aid of$35 million to Pakistan, as disclosed by Senator Frank Church, wasconsiderably "more than has been publicly admitted by the U.S.Government." He added that this policy, which was tantamount tocondonation of Pakistan's repressive measures, "would have an impacton the, Indo-U.S. bilateral relations" as well as on the peace andstability of the subcontinent.19In contrast to this strong criticism of the United States, Indiaremained surprisingly cordial to China and expressed gratification thatthere had been no movement of any major Chinese army units nor anynew concentration of troops along the border since March 25.20 Thereason was simple. The United States was denounced because as afriend it had not lived up to India's values and expectations. China wastolerated because as a dangerous enemy it had not been overlyaggressive.India's posture toward Pakistan, a weaker enemy whom it alsoregarded as the main culprit, was stern. Swaran Singh declared thatIndia had no desire to seize any part of East Pakistan but, he warned,the "activities of the Bangladesh freedom fighters [would] continueand increase" until a political settlement was reached. He addedsignificantly: "When freedom fighters succeed in liberating territory inBangladesh and [when] Pakistan uses it as a pretext for attacking us,then I must make it clear that we are ready to defend ourselves."21This was no longer a game of words between equals. Given strongjoint Sino-American backing for Pakistan, India pondered the parameters of this alignment in relation to the subcontinent. Did it entailChinese and/or American military intervention if an armed conflictensued? India was not inclined to wait like Patience on aMonument tofind out. As Prime Minister Gandhi later explained, even nonalignedcountries had to "safeguard the national interest from the threats of

military adventurism," referring to "rash adventurism on the part ofIslamabad."22 An effective riposte had to be made with the assistanceof a powerful ally so as to restore in the Southern Asian region the balanceof power which was then heavily weighted against India. The logicalchoice for an ally was the Soviet Union, which had for several yearssupported India in defense, economic development, and politicaldisputes like Kashmir and Goa. Moreover, since it had publiclycondemned Yahya Khan's policies and stoppedmilitary aid tohim, theSoviet Union could be viewed as a friend in need.


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Why did the Soviet Union respond and thereby give up its leveragewith Pakistan which until then it was trying to keep? The reasonappears that there were two major elements in the Sino-Americanalignment that caused grave concern to the Soviet Union. First, bothChina and the United States, hitherto separately hostile to the SovietUnion, now appeared to have joined together with Pakistan, animportant South Asian country, in a new Asian alignment against theSoviet Union. Second, on the European front, Rumania, a member ofthe Soviet bloc, also appeared

as a link between the United States andChina. During the 1960s, several Western firms had invested inRumanian chemical industries. Rumania had refused to join otherWarsaw Pact countries in the 1968 invasion of Czechoslavakia and in1969 invited President Nixon. Its growing economic contacts with theUnited States and readiness to permit U.S. private investments throughjoint ventures were viewed by the Soviet Union as an abandonment ofsocialism - a dangerous example to the Soviet bloc.23 China's ties withRumania had been strengthened during 1970 and 1971; ties withYugoslavia and Albania were already well consolidated. Rumaniasupported and reportedly helped China's contacts with the UnitedStates. China had also praised Rumanian efforts to withstand "foreignpressure and safeguard national independence," an obvious dig at theSoviet Union. Moreover, reports were then circulating that Rumaniahad been asked to help explore China's offshore oil and mineralresources. These reports, coupled with the growing U.S. investment inRumania's petro-chemical industry, also seemed to point to someU.S.-Rumanian-Chinese economic links. The Soviet Union probablyfeared another "imperialist encirclement" in Europe with the antiSoviet nucleus of Albania, Yugoslavia, and Rumania in the Balkans.24India was the only not-so-insignificant country in the world whichstood in solid friendship with the Soviet Union, since there was noguarantee that the then current Soviet overtures to Japan would befruitful. Moreover, in the South Asian context, India was a majorpower, the largest land area abutting the Indian Ocean. It now sharedSoviet alarm over the Sino-U.S.-Pakistan alignment. The Soviet Unionmay also have reasoned that an alliance of friendship would make Indiamore amenable to the Brezhnev proposal of the Asian CollectiveSecurity System. The urgency for such a scheme had been increased bythe signs that the Sino-U.S. detente implied U.S. backing for theexpansion of the Chinese sphere of influence in the China Seas,


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versa it was the Soviet Union that must be said to have joined theIndian camp and in return secured India's friendship and alliance.

Arabesque ofAlignmentsThe East Bengal crisis was the catalyst that produced theIndo-Soviet alignment but the treaty made no reference to that crisis.The omission was calculated to emphasize the long-range importance ofthe treaty as a means to restore the balance of power in South Asia. It

was clear, however, that the two countries held congruent views onBangladesh. Rejecting Yahya Khan's military solution, they called foran immediate political solution and safe return of the refugees to EastPakistan.30 There was no Soviet pressure on India against givingassistance to the Mukti Bahini. In fact, India's aid to the guerrillasincreased. Kosygin began to refer to the "legitimate interests of thepeople of East Pakistan" and declared that India and the USSR "willcontinue to pool their efforts to bring about an early politicalsettlement."31 Their only divergence concerned the Indian Oceanwhich India wanted to be free of all foreign naval presence. The SovietUnion was prepared to solve the question "together with other powerson an equal basis."32 This disagreement did not hamper consolidationof Indo-Soviet entente. In October, following high-level Indo-Soviettalks, held under Article 9 of the Peace Treaty, complete agreement wasannounced on the Bangladesh situation. Within two weeks spare partsfor India's 210 MIG-21s and 140 Su-7 fighter bombers, earlier providedby the Soviet Union, arrived. Aid and political support for India werematched with Soviet press comments which blamed Pakistan foraggravating the situation and urged it to restore good neighborlyrelations with India.33

The convergence of Indo-Soviet views and interests was undoubtedly accelerated by the developments such as the deepening crisis inBangladesh, the growing Sino-U.S. detente and Chinese and Americanjoint support for Pakistan. In turn, the Soviet alignment with India, acountry disliked by both the Chinese and American leaders, acceleratedthe momentum of their detente. The "shuttle diplomacy," inauguratedafter China's admission to the UN in October, facilitated closerconsultations between Chinese and American officials inNew York and

Washington.34 This diplomacy between China and the United Statesfurther reinforced Indo-Soviet alignment and mutuality of interests.


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Thus the two international alignments were locked in a frictionalinteraction. Each served to consolidate the spirit of solidarity in theother and to heighten proportionately the degree of the mutualhostility between those alignments. Another result of the two alignments was to exacerbate bilateral relations between members of therival alignments.In securing a powerful Soviet backing, India had several expectations. One was to ensure her own security against Pakistan which wasbacked by China and the United States. The other was to have a freerhand to help the Mukti Bahini. These two expectations were fulfilled.But India had another objective. It also hoped to strengthen itspersuasive influence on the United States by demonstrating to theNixon administration that India was not without allies and was noturging U.S. intervention on behalf of Bangladesh from a position ofweakness. It must not be forgotten that right up to the outbreak of theIndo-Pakistan war, what India was hoping for was not a hands-offpolicy from the United States but intervention in Bangladesh, in orderto secure a political settlement based on the release of Sheikh MujiburRahman. India repeatedly assured the United States that no naval basewould be granted to the Soviet Union as a result of the treaty.35 But inthe calculations of the Nixon administration friendship with India wasexpendable.

The United States sought to impress on India .this very fact.Angered by the Indo-Soviet Treaty, just two days after the treaty wassigned, it warned India that it could not "extend economic aid to anation that started war" - a clear-cut threat that in the event of anarmed action on behalf of East Bengali guerrillas India would forfeitU.S. economic aid.36 The warning only reinforced Soviet backing forIndia. The Soviet Union "informed Yahya Khan that an armed attackby Pakistan against India, under whatever pretext, would give rise tothemost resolute condemnation in the Soviet Union."37

Indo-American relations deteriorated progressively and the irreconcilability of their views was heightened. India opposed the U.S.proposal for India and Pakistan to withdraw troops from the bordersince, in India's view, such a move would equate the culprit and theaggrieved party. India claimed that having been attacked twice byPakistan in the past, it could not relax its vigilance. India's demand forthe withdrawal of Pakistani troops from Bangladesh was unacceptableto the United States. The American proposal for stationing UN


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observers on both sides was rejected by India because hundreds offoreign observers were already visiting border areas within India tocheck whether the refugees were being prevented from going home.India was prepared to welcome UN observers if they investigated all thebasic issues, including the killing of Bengalis by Pakistani soldiers.

Furthermore, the United States declined to put pressure on YahyaKhan to release Mujibur Rahman and negotiate a settlement with him,instead of with other second-level East Bengali leaders. It claimed thatYahya

Khan could not be forced into negotiating withsomeone whom

he regarded as a traitor. India contended that to accuse an elected andpopular civilian leader of treason and subject him to a secret militarytrial was in itself a grievous wrong. Nor was the United States preparedto prevail upon Yahya Khan to create political conditions which wouldhave facilitated return of the refugees. In fact, reports came forth thatthe U.S. Agency for International Development was considering amultimillion-dollar program to woo back refugees into East Bengal forcash benefits as if itwere poverty and not man-made terror that hadforced them to flee to India. The plan was denounced by SenatorEdward Kennedy and Congressman Cornelius Gallagher and was quietlyshelved.38

The only concession made to India by the United States was theannouncement of the stoppage of military supplies to Pakistan afterMrs. Gandhi's visit toWashington inNovember. This too was done withthe consent of Yahya Khan himself and on the understanding thatPakistan had already had more than enough aid. Only three milliondollars' worth of licenses were cancelled while one hundred sixtymillion dollars' worth of spare parts, until then held up by dock strike,were allowed to go. The total parting of ways between India and theUnited States came inNovember itself. Next to Pakistan, India viewedthe United States as its adversary and warned that the limits of Indianendurance had been reached; that the burden of refugees was posing athreat to India's "political stability and even our independence"; andthat, while seeking U.S. support, "India is prepared to fight alone forwhat it thinks isworth fightingfor."When theUnited States beganexploring avenues of action through the UN Security Council, Indiadeclared that those who were trying to internationalize the issue were"suspect" in its eyes.39

Thus, while the Indo-Soviet Treaty did not initiate deteriorationof Indo-U.S. relations, it certainly did little to improve them. Moreover,


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the differences of opinion between India and the United States weretoo deep to be affected one way or the other. For various reasons,therefore, India's aim to secure American support remained unfulfilled.India's fourth objective in signing the treaty was to strengthen itsbargaining position with China and enhance the value of its ownfriendship. Accommodation with China was still India's major goal.40But this optimism was totally misplaced. China's acute distrust of theSoviet Union made India "guilty by association." It denounced Indiaand the Soviet Union for "continuing

toexploit

the East Pakistanquestion" and promised "resolute support" for Pakistan against foreign(Indian) aggression.41 India was as expendable to China as to theUnited States.

Relations between China and the Soviet Union also took a rapidturn for the worse and a veritable war of words broke out betweenthem. The emergence of Chou En-lai as the undisputed heir to MaoTse-tung and the conductor of China's foreign policy snuffed out thelast flickering hope for a Sino-Soviet rapprochement. China's growingfriendship with Rumania, coupled with the latter's increasing economiccontacts with the United States42 prompted Pravda to warn EastEurope not to fall under China's "dangerous influence." The warningonly reinforced Sino-Rumanian ties and provoked fresh Chinese attackson Soviet "policy of hegemony" and on Soviet military maneuvers inBulgaria staged in late August.43 Moscow thereupon accused China oftrying o rival India for leadershipof the Third World and of playing atreacherous double game, viz., inciting and financing left-wing EastBengalis to rebel against Pakistan and strengthening military ties withPakistan at the same time.44Between themselves, the United States and the Soviet Unionmaintained a semblance of cordiality and continued SALT negotiations.On Bangladesh, the United States viewed the Soviet Union not as anagent provocateur but as a possible restraining influence on India. Buttheir confrontation in the Indian Ocean was intensified. In October, asthe Soviet naval presence increased from 12 to 15 vessels, the UnitedStates dispatched the nuclear carrier Enterprise, equipped with nuclearweapons, and the frigate Bainbridge on a cruise of the Indian Ocean andthe Andaman Sea as a "counterbalancing" force.45 In November, at theheight of the neither-war-nor-peace crisis in East Bengal, the UnitedStates, asserting its right to establish "military facilities" in the IndianOcean, warned that while "there appears to be no requirement at this


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time for us to feel impelled to control, or even decisively influence, anypart of the Indian Ocean or its littoral ... nonetheless, the UnitedStates must ultimately decide whether or not it will maintain theoption to counter an enlarged Soviet military buildup.46

Thus, in late November, on the eve of the outbreak of theIndo-Pakistan war, the multinational alignments had become clearlydrawn. The United States, China, and the Soviet Union reaffirmedbacking for their respective allies at every opportunity.The Indo-Pakistani War

The two alignments became more antagonistic during the war. Itseemed that the major powers were on the brink of involvement. Eachforeign power hardened its support for its respective ally. The UnitedStates reiterated that India bore "the major responsibility" for the warand charged that it had in fact frustrated U.S.-Pakistani efforts toward apolitical settlement.47 China denounced the Indo-Soviet Treaty itself asbeing directed against all those to whom the Soviet Union was hostileand renewed its charge of Indo-Soviet expansionism and collusion todismember Pakistan.48 The Soviet Union equally stoutly defendedIndia and blamed Pakistan for starting the war by attacking Indianairfields. Kosygin called for an end to the war but only with a view tolegitimization of the 1970 election results in Pakistan.49The mutually hostile interaction of various alignments wasbrought into sharp focus in the UN debates. The United States andChina won the first battle in calling an emergency session of theSecurity Council over the objections of Poland and the Soviet Union.The latter two failed to secure participation for Bangladesh representatives in the debate. Thereafter each camp frustrated moves by theother. The U.S. resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire andwithdrawal of Indian and Pakistani forces within their respectiveboundaries was three times vetoed by the Soviet Union. Theseproposals were unacceptable to India because they did not provide for abasic political solution in East Pakistan. China vetoed a Sovietresolutionwhich called for a political settlement thatwould lead tocessation of hostilities. The United States merely abstained, probably inprior arrangement with China whose single veto was sufficient. Chinahad drafted a resolution condemning India as the aggressor and callingupon all states to support Pakistan, but withdrew it, possibly onAmerican advice.50 Although theUnited States considered India the


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main aggressor,51 it did not want to support a categorically condemnatory resolution against it. Over the Indo-Soviet abstentions, the debatewas removed to the General Assembly on December 6 where aresolution calling for immediate cease-fire and troop withdrawal waspassed 104 to 11 with 10 abstentions. On December 13, the UnitedStates again moved a cease-fire resolution in the Security Council onlyto see it defeated by a Soviet veto.52 India's diplomatic triumph cameon December 21, four days after Pakistan's surrender, when theSecurity Council passed a resolution 13 to 0, with Poland and theSoviet Union abstaining, calling for a durable cease-fire.53There was a much more serious activity of the alignments outsidethe UN. The U.S. revoked all licenses earlier approved for the export toIndia of $13 million worth of military hardware, including spare partsfor aircraft and electronic equipment. It also refused to renew oldlicenses or grant new ones. These cancellations affected Indo-U.S.monitoring and radar projects in the Nepal-Tibet border, especiallyProject Star Sapphire, which had been in existence since 1962 to warnof impeding Chinese air attack. India

was also electronically monitoringChinese activities like nuclear tests at Lop Nor in Sinkiang. The decisionto suspend aid for these Indian projects was taken by President Nixonas a public assurance to China that the United States would not takeany action adverse to China. The United States also suspended $87.6million in development loans to India "so as not to make it easier forIndia to sustain itsmilitary efforts."54 While invoking strict sanctionsagainst India, the United States arranged to continue the supply ofmilitary aid to Pakistan through "third country transfers" of U.S. arms,especially via Middle Eastern countries."55The United States, however, was not inclined to intervenemilitarily against India. A minor brush occurred between the twocountries when Indian planes strafed a U.S. merchant vessel andintercepted another which was released after the captain gave a writtenguarantee that he was not carrying war material for Pakistan. TheUnited States "protested" these actions by India but was evidently notprepared to consider them as provocations to justify U.S. militaryinvolvement in the war against India.56 It staged a shadow interventionby sendinga task forceof theSeventh Fleet to theBay ofBengal, butits dispatch cannot really be said to have influenced the course ofevents in any way.57


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Besides the exercise of veto, the Soviet Union gave concrete aid toIndia with whom it also maintained high-level consultations. Sophisticated arms were rushed to India. More significantly, as a deterrentagainst possible Chinese involvement, the Soviet Union warned that it"cannot remain indifferent to the developments, taking into consideration, too, the fact that they are occurring in direct proximity to theUSSR's frontiers and, therefore, involve the interests of its security....The Soviet government also believes that the governments of allcountries should refrain from steps signifying, in one way

or another,their involvement in the conflict and leading to a further aggravation ofthe situation on the Indian peninsula."58 From secret documents, nowdisclosed, it appears that China was probably contemplating movingtroops along the Indian borders and taking action in the Ladakh area,but the Soviet Union successfully warned it off.59With no hostile foreign intervention forthcoming, India was ableto conduct the war according to its strategy and halt it accordingly toits timetable. On December 10, it had announced that its objectiveswere limited, that it had no territorial ambitions but that itwould keepon fighting until the Pakistani troops were driven out of Bangladesh.Accordingly, on December 16, following Pakistan's unconditionalsurrender in the eastern sector, India unilaterally proclaimed a cease-fireon the western front. Pakistan's acceptance two days later signalled anend to the war. Amidst the ruins of conflict the new state ofBangladesh emerged, a reality recognized amazingly swiftly by aprocession of world states, including, in early April 1972, the UnitedStates."

Conclusion:A philosopher-historian would see in the creation of Bangladesh adialectic fulfillment of John Seeley's prophetic warning:

When a state advances beyond the limits of nationality its power becomesprecarious and artificia .. .When a nation extends itself into other territories thechances are that it cannot destroy or completely drive out, even if it succeeds inconquering them.When this happens, it has a great and permanent difficulty tocontend with, for the subject or rival nationalities cannot be properly assimilated,and remain as a permanent cause of weakness and danger.61

But in the real world of -power politics, there is no inevitabilityabout the success or failureof any policy. It isonly theright ind of a


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constellation of circumstances that can determine the outcome of anyhistorical evolution. The breakup of Pakistan, when it did occur, wasnot a natural fulfillment of destiny but a political "miracle" thatdeviated from the law governing postwar international relations, viz.,the law of national territorial integrity and ineffectuality of secessionistmovements. Modern Asian and African nation-states had emerged fromthe breakup of old empires. Once created, each had remained an entityand had crushed secessionist movements, as in Nigeria, Zaire, Philippines, Burma, and Indonesia. The only exception was the breakup ofMalaysia and the emergence of Singapore in 1965. But Singapore didnot secede; itwas thrown out by the federal Malaysian government.Bangladesh was the first successful case of "secession" and thus adeviation from the rule.

But why did the deviation occur? The reason was that anotherpolitical miracle, deviating from yet another "law" of the postwarUniversal International System and the Regional Subsystems hadoccurred a few months before. That was the entente, approximatinga military alliance, between the Soviet Union, leader of the EastEuropean communist bloc, and India, a ranking nonaligned nation.Until then, the superpowers had gradually built friendly relations withthe nonaligned countries but no alliance relationship could be envisagedbetween them since military nonalliance was the bedrock of politicalnonalignment. The Soviet-UAR treaty of May 1971 had a specialMiddle Eastern raison d '2tre. The Indo-Soviet alignment was little shortof a revolutionary step for both the countries to take. This alignmentproved the catalyst in the germination of a new state of Bangladesh.

The Indo-Soviet alignment, for its part, was an upshot of anotherpolitical miracle, the Sino-U.S. detente, dramatized in July 1971.Until then, a long-drawn-out cold war among the United States, theSoviet Union, and China had established an assumed incompatibilitybetween communism and capitalism. In the 1960s the United Stateshad reached a degree of peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union,though not with China, but an alliance between the United States and amajor communist power was still considered out of the question.Sino-U.S. rapprochment, entailing a triple alignment among the UnitedStates (a leading capitalist democracy), Pakistan (a right-wing ilitarydictatorship), and China (a "revolutionary" community state), destroyed that law of international relations in the universal globalsystem. This first political miracle, the Sino-U.S. detente, set intomotion the other two miracles. Each reinforced and accentuated the


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impacts of the other two miracles, producing an arabesque of alignmentswhich permanently altered the political configurations of the Indiansubcontinent.The war of Bangladesh also entailed a case of successful foreignintervention - that by India. Why did India intervene? Certainlynational security was involved. The influx of 10 million refugees was anunbearable burden and threat to stability. India could have sealed theborders to prevent their entry but that would have been a mostinhumane act. Granted that every state undertakes action for someselfish reason, a distinction must be made between selfish action fornational self-aggrandisement and one in the interest of humanity. India

sought for both humane and national reasons to send the refugees backsafely to their own homeland.

Equally, India's sympathies and interests coincided with theaspirations of the peoples of Bangladesh. They did not involvedismemberment of Pakistan for such a contingency would still have leftWest Pakistan as powerful and hostile as before, as indeed it is. India'snational interest would have been decidedly better served by

a united,friendly Pakistan under a prime minister whose foreign policy was inline with that of India and who advocated cooperation instead ofconfrontation with India. Such a Pakistan became a possibility from theelections of December 1970 until March 25, 1971. Thereafter, theaspirations of Bangladesh shifted to total independence and so didIndia's national interest. For itwas better to have a friendly neighbor,Bangladesh, on at least one side. The congruence between India'sinterests and Bangladesh's aspirations added an extra element oflegitimacy to India's intervention on behalf of the people of Bangladeshand not in support of a military or civilian dictatorship of a foreign

minority.Considerations of national interest and legitimacy alone could nothave prompted India to undertake intervention without a political andmilitary calculation about its effectuality or otherwise. A just cause isnot necessarily always a successful cause. Foreign intervention, even fora just cause, may not always succeed in bringing about the desired endto a conflict. In fact, intervention may provoke counterintervention byother powers aligned with the opponent, and, in the ensuing expandedconflict, victory is achieved not on the basis of the justness of a causebut on that military power.


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This fact has not been lost on states. Countries, including greatand superpowers, do not just get dragged into intervention in a disputein a fit of anger or absent-mindedness. They do not necessarily make,nor have tomake, everybody else's war their own. Intervention is a steptaken deliberately, based on a calculated judgment - whether withadequate or inadequate examination of all relevant factors. Above all,they have to take stock of their own capacity or military power tointervene. India did not rush into intervention but sent armies intoBangladesh 10 months after the crisis began. Meanwhile, it putpersuasive pressure on every major power - the United States, theSoviet Union, China, Britain, France, and Germany - to help bringabout a peaceful settlement. At the same time, so long as Pakistanimilitary measures against Bangladesh continued, India deemed it rightto help the Mukti Bahini guerrillas resist Pakistani armed forces.Adherence to nonalignment and advocacy of peaceful resolution ofdisputes, as Mrs. Gandhi explained in November 1971, have nevermeant that India would passively watch the steady extermination of apopulation

next door, if it could be helped. Unlike in Tibet, wherepowerlessness and acceptance of Chinese sovereignty had preventedIndia from intervening, it was not constrained in Bangladesh byhelplessness, especially in the light of convincing evidence of thedetermination of 75 million Bangladesh people themselves to launcharmed resistance to Pakistan.

In addition to seeking a peaceful settlement and, until that wasreached, providing arms toMukti Bahini, India made contingency plansfor military intervention in Bangladesh as evidenced by its efficientexecution of the campaign. But preparation forwar as a last resort doesnot necessarily call into question the genuineness of preceding efforts atpeaceful resolution of a conflict.As combatants in a major conflict, India and Pakistan had madecertain demands upon their respective allies. India's expectation wasnot that the Soviet Union as an ally should intervene to lend support toIndia but that it should deter the United States and China fromintervening to help Pakistan. India at that time was the dominant

military and political factor in the subcontinent. Its army outnumberedthat of Pakistan; its Air Force and Navy exercised monopoly over theskies and the surrounding waters. It had the full sympathy and supportof the 75 million people in the actual theater of war. It therefore didnot seek any foreign intervention even from an ally. But there is little


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doubt that, while the strategy for the Indo-Pakistan war was entirelymapped and executed by India, itwas the Soviet alliance that enabled itto do so without fearing Sino-American retaliation. The Indo-SovietTreaty was thus activated.

Pakistan, the weaker party, wanted military intervention from itsallies. Its alliance with the United States had withered since thesuspension of U.S. military aid in the 1965 Kashmir war but was notscrapped. It was revived in 1970 with the sale of U.S. arms and withU.S. support to Yahya Khan on Bangladesh in 1971. Other U.S."commitments," such as the bilateral treaty of March 1959 and theKennedy-Ayub Khan memorandum of 1962, specifically provided forU.S. assistance against an attack by India. Moreover, Chinese pronouncements, taken at their face value, clearly indicated categoricalsupport for Pakistan in the event of "foreign aggression." In short,Indian intervention on behalf of Bangladesh and even without Soviet

military involvement, could have been countervailed by Sino-U.S.intervention. Pakistan had been invoking these commitments evenbefore the war began but the United States, though anticipating awar,was not prepared to go that far and declared it would do its best to"stay out."62 Pakistan felt betrayed by U.S. nonintervention but theNixon administration reportedly argued that since the commitmentswere not invoked in 1965 they did not apply in 1971 either.63 China'sconstant support for Pakistan also remained resolutely rhetorical.Sino-U.S. counterintervention, so desperately sought by Pakistanto swing themilitary balance in its favor, did not take place. The reasonwas that, like intervention, nonintervention is also a move, chosenpurposely. The decision by the United States and China not tointervene was based on the calculation that the disadvantages fromdirect military intervention far outweighed the advantages. The warremained a strictly subcontinental conflict. The posture of the threegreat powers shows that a war can remain limited both in the sense ofthe actual character of the armed conflict and the limitation of theterritory on which it is fought. This is a comforting thought. Warcannot be entirely eliminated so far; therefore the next best thing is tolimit it in character, territory, and duration. This was made possible inthe 13-day war.The Indo-Pakistan war, resulting from the Bangladesh crisis, hasproven that alliances, already in existence and forged with a specificcontingency inmind, do not necessarily become activated even when


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such a contingency does arise. For a counteralliance, if activated, maydeactivate the first alliance. The Indo-Soviet treaty was such acounteralliance vis-A-vis the Sino-American-Pakistani alignment. Theformer was swiftly activated to serve India's and the Soviet Union'spurpose as soon as the Indo-Pakistan was began. When China seemed tomove toward a military action in pursuance of its alliance with Pakistanand in implementation of its earlier assurances of support against"foreign attack," the warning by the Soviet Union effectively neutralized China. The United States had already decided not to intervene, andany temptation to invoke the Pakistan-U.S. alliance must surely havecooled in the wake of the Tass announcement of December 5, 1971,threatening Soviet intervention.U.S. recognition of Bangladesh and of the overall "realities" inthat region, coupled with India's desire not to snap ties with itslong-time donor, has helped remove much of the bitterness that markedIndo-U.S. relations in 1971. The Indo-Pakistani summit meeting and theoffer by India and Bangladesh to Pakistan for a tripartite populationexchange opened prospects for normalization of relations amongthem. These prospects have brightened since the signing of the tripartiteagreement among India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, settling all theirmajor disputes relating to the Bangladesh crisis. The new spirit ofdetente between the United States and the Soviet Union, paving theway for closer cooperation, makes their recriminations over Bangladeshin 1971 an event of a distant past.

Nevertheless, the basic pattern of the two mutually antagonisticalignments on the subcontinent has not changed; rather, it hascrystallized and acquired extraregional dimensions. The signing of theFriendship Treaties between the Soviet Union, on the one hand, andBangladesh and Iraq, on the other, and between India and Bangladeshhas created a wider four-power alignment. The consolidation of Iran'smilitary and "strategic ties" with Pakistan and the United States,together with the affirmation of China's strong support to Pakistan andIran and consolidation of its detente with the United States, has createda counter-four-power alignment. It is hardly a coincidence that Iraq andIran are on intensely hostile terms. Iran's friendship with Pakistan iscountered by that of Iraq with India. Hopes for Sino-Indian rapprochement remain only hopes. This expanding arabesque of alignments isaccompanied by growing supply of military aid by the three greatforeign powers to their respective allies. Alliances may bring abouttemporary advantages. They rarely ensure an abiding peace.


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NOTES1. Events in Bangladesh have produced voluminous literature. Perhaps the most objectiveand dispassionate account is Louis Dupree, Bangladesh, parts I and II, American UniversitiesField Staff Reports, voL XVI, nos. 5 and 6, July 1971 and June 1972.2. Mujibur Rahman's broadcast, October 28, 1970, outlining his policy. He called for a

strong but federally united Pakistan. Text in S. C. Kashyap, ed., Bangladesh: Background andPerspectives (New Delhi: National Publishing House, 1971), pp. 150-51.3. The Military Balance, 1971-72, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London,September 2, 1971, cited in Asian Recorder, September 24-30, 1971, pp. 1375-76; alsoWashington Post, October 8,1970.

4. New York Times, June 24, 1971.5. R. Rama Rao, "Pakistan Re-?rms," India Quarterly, vol. xxvii, no. 2 (April-June 1971)p. 141.6. Mrs. Ghandhi's letter to Chou En-lai, July 1971; USSR and Third World, London, vol.1, no. 9, September 20-October 24, 1971, p. 500; Far Eastern Economic Review, no. 37(1971), p. 7.7. Asian Recorder, August 6-12, 1971, p. 10300.8. USSR and Third World, vol. 1, no. 4, March 22-April 25, 1971, pp. 172-73; texts ofPodgorny's letter and Yahya Khan's reply, April 1 and 4,1971, inPeking Review, no. 16, April16,1971, pp. 8-9; on stoppage of Soviet aid to Pakistan, see statement by Swaran Singh, July 8,1971,AsianRecorder,July23-29,1971, p. 10270; ibid.,July30-August ,1971, p. 10282.

9. The Military Balance, op. cit., Asian Recorder, September 24-30,1971, p. 10371; U.S.News and World Report, October 11, 1971; articles inKommust Tadjukistana, November 1,1971, and in Red Star, November 17, 1971; comments in a recent Soviet book, The Foreign

Policy of the People's Republic of China, cited in Christian Science Monitor, November 26,1971; annual report to Congress, February 15,1972, by Defense Secretary Melvin Laird.10. Peking Radio, April 28, and Renmin Ribao commentary, April 11, Peking Review, no.16, April 16, 1971, pp. 7-8; see also Financial Times (London), April 29; Asian Recorder, July23-29,1971, pp. 10269-70.11. In the early 1960s the United States and Britain had begun to project their long-terminfluence in that region. In 1965 Britain sequestered a group of islands in the Seychelles asBritish Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT). The following year the two signed a 50-year agreementto build facilities in the BIOT. The Soviet Union then deployed ships with military and civiliancrews for oc?anographie and space-event support operations, whereupon the Anglo-Americanpowers began a naval survey of Diego Garcia in the BIOT with "specific militaryconsiderations," and, in 1968, built a communications facility there. The Soviet Unionreportedly initiated combat deployments in the Indian Ocean. U.S. National Security Policyand the Indian Ocean: Current Foreign Policy, Department of State, publication 8611, Bureauof Public Affairs, General Foreign Policy Series 256, November 1971; henceforth cited asPublication 8611.

12. Statement by Prime Minister Edward Heath, January 20, 1971, in Singapore, USSR andThird World, vol. 1, no. 2, January 11-February 14, 1971, p. 544. For the first seriousexpression of Western concern see T. B. Miller, "The Indian and Pacific Oceans: Some StrategicConsiderations," the Institute for Strategic Studies, London, Adelphi Paper, no. 57, May 1969,and his comments inNewsweek, January 18, 1971, p. 32; George G. Thompson, Problems ofStrategy in the Pacific and Indian Oceans (New York: National Strategy Information Center,Inc., 1970), p. 37. See also New York Times, April 22, 1971, for expressions of Westernconcern over Soviet influence inCeylon.


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13. Moscow Radio, December 17 and 21, 1970, and January 8, 1971; Izvestia, December29, 1970; USSR and Third World, vol. 1, no. 1, December 7, 1970-January 10,1971, p. 2.14. Statement by Ronald Spiers, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, before theSubcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the HouseCommittee on Foreign Affairs, July 28,1971, Publication 8611, op. cit.15. Peking Review, no. 6, February 5, 1971, p. 12; USSR and Third World, vol. 1, no. 5,April 26-June 1,1971, pp. 232-33.16. Statement by Foreign Minister Swaran Singh, July 16,1971; text distributed by IndianEmbassy, Washington, D.C.17. New York Times, September 24,1971.18. Max Frankel, "To India, U.S. is Bitter Disappointment," ibid., November 30,1971, p. 2.

19. Statement by Swaran Singh, July 19, 1971, in Rajya Sabha; text supplied by IndianEmbassy, Washington, D.C. Subsequently, Senator Edward Kennedy disclosed at the hearingsbefore his Senate Subcommittee on Refugees that the Defense Department had signed contractsagainst future delivery of arms to Pakistan long after March 25. Before that date Americancommercial firms supplied Soviet and East European arms to Pakistan. It was expected thatPakistan, denied supplemental arms by the Soviets, was seeking the same through Americansources. India Abroad (New York), October 1971.20. Statements by Swaran Singh on July 20 and 28, 1971, USSR and Third World, vol. 1,no. 7, July 5-August 15,1971, p. 358.21. Statement, July 21, 1971, in Rajya Sabha; text distributed by Indian Embassy,Washington, D.C. India had started using the term "Bangladesh."22. Interview with Secretary General ofWorld Peace Council, Romesh Chandra, August 26,1971; text supplied by the Embassy of India, Press Release no. 511, August 31,1971.23. Bradford Mills, President of Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), set up in1970 to handle U.S. government-backed insurance for private U.S. investments abroad, visitedRumania in late July 1971. Chemical and Engineering News, August 9,1971, pp. 23-25; ibid.,September 6, 1971, p. 6; Daily Express (London), August 6, 1971; New York Times,December 1,1971.

24. Peking Review, no. 13, March 26, 1971, pp. 5-6; ibid., no. 23, June 4, 1971, pp. 6-7;Financial Times (London), April 7, 1971; Asian Recorder, September 3-9, 1971, p. 10341;Newsweek, August 9, 1971, p. 36; "Regarding the Peking-Washington Contacts," Pravda, July25, 1971; SovietNews (London),August 6,1971; New YorkTimes,July 16,1971.25. Texts of Indo-Soviet Treaty, joint communique and statements, Times of India, August

10,1971.26. Soviet military supplies to Pakistan are estimated to be not less than $85 million. Theexact figure is unknown. Rama Rao, op. cit., p. 141.27. Joint statement on Sadat's visit toMoscow in October 1971, Soviet News (London),October 15,1971.28. Interview with Mrs. Gandhi by Romesh Chandra, August 26,1971, op. cit., New York

Times, August 12,1971.29. Speeches after signing the Treaty, Times of India, August 10,1971.30. Joint communique, August 11, 1971, Times of India, August 12,1971. Observers notedthat this was a significant change in the Soviet stand. Izvestia until then was equating India andPakistan. Asian Recorder, August 27-September 2, 1971, p. 10332. If one man's journalisticreport is to be believed, then Gromyko actually came to India with a big package of promisesand assurances. In addition to providing modern sophisticated weapons, the Soviet Unionwould give full support to India in the United Nations, divert possible southward movement ofChinese troops from Sinkiang to the Indian border by simply maneuvering its own troops so asto cause alarm in Sinkiang and finally warn Turkey, Iran, and other Middle Eastern countriesagainst aiding Pakistan. Max Frankel, 'To India, U.S. is a Bitter Disappointment," New YorkTimes, November 30, 1971, p. 2.


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31. Speech at a luncheon honoring Mrs. Gandhi, September 28, 1971, Moscow, Times ofIndia, September29, 1971; joint communique,September29, 1971, USSR and ThirdWorld,vol. 1, no. 9, September 20-October 24,1971, pp. 494-96.32. Ibia%, p? 496; Western observers, notably Times (London), September 30, and ChristianScience Monitor, October 1, tended to discern greater divergence than convergence of views.33. Asian Recorder, November 26-December 2, 1971, p. 10479; Times (London), October

26,1971, and International Herald Tribune, November 8 and 11,1971; USSR and Third World,vol. 1, no. 10, October 25-December 5,1971, pp. 577-7S;Izvestia, November 15,1971, cited inNew York Times, November 16,1971.34. The shuttle diplomacy was to enable White House officials to come to New York by auto confer with Chinese delegates and, it is presumed, vice versa. New York Times, November 15and 25,1971.35. Asian Recorder, August 27-September 2,1971, p. 10330.36. "United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's," President Nixon's Report to theCongress, February 9, 1972, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 8, no. 7,February 14,1972.37. This was revealed in Tass statement, December 5, 1972. It claims that this move wasmade inAugust "since the Pakistan government did not take measures for a political settlementin East Pakistan and continued to build up military preparations against India." Text in Soviet

News, Soviet Embassy, London, no. 5617, December 7,1971.38. New York Times, November 5, 6, 17, 21, and 24,1971; Sidney Schanberg, "India andPakistan Short of War," ibid., November 18, 1971; Mrs. Gandhi's speech, November 30, ibid.,December 1,1971.39. Mrs. Gandhi's speeches inWashington, November 6; and in India, November 29; NewYork Times, November 7 and 30, and December 1,1971.40. Asian Recorder, August 27-September 2,1971, p. 10330. India sent a warm message ofcongratulations on China's admission to the United Nations, with a fervent hope ofcooperation. China's routine reply implied a promising start for close relations in all fields andeven an imminent exchange of ambassadors. New York Times, November 19, 1971, andWashington Post, November 25, 1971; Peking Review, no. 49, December 3, 1971, p. 5. Indiawas not the only one to entertain hopes. Some Western observers also noted that China wasgenerally showing "restraint," possibly out of a desire for friendly relations with India andhopes for a peaceful settlement. New York Times, November 26,1971.41. Speech by Acting Foreign Minister Chi Peng-Fei, November 7, 1971, Peking Review,no. 46, November 12, 1971, pp. 2-3; New York Times, November 14 and 19,1971; USSR andThird World, vol. 1, no. 10, October 25-December 5,1971, p. 581.42. In November the Export-Import Bank was authorized to extend credits for the sale ofU.S. goods to Rumania, making it the next communist country after Yugoslavia and Poland toobtain credit authority. Extension of the most-favored-nation provision to Rumania was alsoreportedly in the offing. New York Times, December 1,1971.43. Remarks by Acting Foreign Minister Chi Peng-Fei at a Rumanian embassy reception,Peking Review, no. 35, August 27, 1971, pp. 4 and 28.44. L. Kirichenko in Za Rubshan (aMoscow weekly) inAugust, quoted inAsian Recorder,September 24-30, 1971, pp. 10371-72\Pravda, September 4, cited in The Guardian, September4, 1971; Moscow Radio, November 15, 1971; USSR and Third World, vol. 1, no. 1, October25-December 5, 1971, p. 571. The Radical Left also states that China gave aid to Maoistguerrillas in Bangladesh. E. Ahmad, interview in American Report (New York), December 24,1971, p. 9.45. Times (London), October 29, 1971; New York Times, November 4 and 5, andDecember 10, 1971. The Financial Times (London), November 16, 1971, questioned whetherthe Soviet naval presence was so great a threat as to attract attention.


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346 USHA MAHAJANI46. Publication 8611, op. cit., p. 7; author's italics.47. Subsequently the secret cables from Ambassador Keating in India as disclosed by JackAnderson disputed White House claims on this point. New York Times, January 6, 1972.48. Speeches by Huang Hua, December 4, 5, and 6, in the Security Council and by Chiao

Kuan-hua, December 7, in the General Assembly. Peking Review, no. 50, December 10, 1971,pp. 7-8 and 11; NCNA Commentary and Ch?nese government statement, December 3 and 16,ibid., no. 51, December 17, 1971, pp. 11-16; also USSR and Third World, October25-December 5,1971, p. SSI;New York Times, December 5, 7, 8, and 10, 1971.49. Tass statement, December 5, 1971; text in Soviet News (London), December 7,1971;New York Times, December 11 and 12,1971.50. Peking Review, no. 50, December 10, 1971, p. 10; New York Times, December 10,1971.51. New York Times, December 4 and 7,1971.

52. Many Western diplomats were critical of the United States for its haste in recalling aSecurity Council meeting and evidently would have preferred towait for a few days until itwasall over. British Foreign Secretary Sir Alex Douglas-Home even claimed that no party was toblame and called for political settlement that would take into account thewishes of the peopleaffected. Times (London), December 7,1971; New York Times, December 13 and 14,1971.53. Ibid., December 21,1971.54. Ibid., December 2,4, and 6,1971.55. Ibid., December 2, 4, and 13,1971 ;Jack Anderson's column, Washington Post, January10 and 11, 1972; typescript of the text of one of the secret documents, Vancouver Times(Canada), January 5, 1972. Pakistani military sources later disclosed that American-builtcombat aircraft, Northrup F-5 and F-104 jets, were supplied to Pakistan by Libya and Jordanduring the war. The Asian Student, April 8, 1972; San Francisco Chronicle, June 3,1972.56. New York Times, December 7,1971.57. The dispatch of U.S.S. Enterprise, carrying nuclear weapons, was ostensibly acountermove to the intelligence reports on December 7 about a Soviet naval task force speedinginto the Bay of Bengal. Jack Anderson, "Bengal Bay Show of Force to Russians," The DailyTelegraph (London),January10, 1972.58. Tass statement, December 5, Soviet News, December 7,1971, op. cit.59. Jack Anderson, The Anderson Papers (New York: Random House, 1973), chapter titled"Bangladesh: Birth by Fire," pp. 234-35, 247-48, 259-62.60. Whether India had contemplated "conquering" west Pakistan or at least recoveringPakistan-occupied Kashmir and whether it halted the war simply under Soviet pressure whichitself came under U.S. pressure is too speculative a question to merit credence or to discuss atthis stage.61. John Seeley, quoted in John A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (London: George Allenand Unwin, Ltd., 1902), pp. 3-13.62. Secretary Roger's remarks, November 12, and Pakistani ambassador's observations,November 23, New York Times, November 7, 13, 14, 24, 27, and 30, 1971. Under the 1959agreement which was similar to the ones the United States signed with Turkey and Iran, itagreed to take such appropriate action, including the use of armed force as might be mutuallyagreed upon "in the event of foreign aggression against Pakistan." India had accepted U.S.assurances that itwas only against "communist aggression." Ibid., November 25, 1971.

63. "Listening to theWorld," The Atlas, February 1972, pp. 3-4.