The Breakdown of the Iraqi Army Logistics

7/28/2019 The Breakdown of the Iraqi Army Logistics

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Tuesday, July 16, 2013

The Breakdown Of The Iraqi Armys Logistics

Given the dire security situation that Iraq faced from 2003-2008 it was no surprise that the

United States gave little attention to the Iraqi Armys logistics. It wasnt until several years

after the U.S. invasion that the Americans finally began planning and contracting to develop

Iraqs support network, so that it could maintain its forces and equipment. This went through

huge problems including the complete un-interest amongst the Iraqi military leadership for

this task. By the time the U.S. withdrew its forces in 2011, several supply depots had been

established and a computerized management system was in place. The problem was that the

Americans oversaw this network, and when they left the Iraqis werent capable of keeping it

up and running. The result is that most of the logistics for the Iraqi army has broken down

since then.

Iraqis are finding it harder to maintain their equipment like this Humvee because their logistic

network is falling apart (U.S. Department of Defense)

In early 2013 General Robert Caslen, the head of the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq told

the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) that Iraqs logistic system had

collapsed after the U.S. withdrawal. General Caslen told SIGIR that when the U.S. military

pulled out of Iraq it took the structures with it that made sure the Iraqi military could supply

and maintain itself. Around December 2012, General Caslen travelled to the spare parts

warehouse at the Taji facility, which is the top maintenance base for the Iraqi army. There the

general saw shelves packed with parts and the computers for the countrys automated

inventory management system. The problem was that the parts were covered with dust,

because they were never sent to any Iraqi units to repair anything. As a result, the Taji base

had not ordered a single spare part during 2012. The computers Caslen found were not turned

on, and had not worked for months. That was because the generators that ran the computers

were out of commission. When the U.S. left the base had no contract or budget to providefuel. That forced Iraqi soldiers to buy it themselves, which turned out to be of low quality,

which eventually broke the generators. This was symbolic of the entire supply system for the

Iraqi army. After the Americans departed, the Iraqis lacked the care, concern, know how, and

interest to keep up the facility, and the entire network running. In turn, it fell apart leaving

Iraqi units to fend for themselves. These problems were repeatedly brought up in audits and

investigations in the lead-up to the withdrawal.

The Special Inspector General and the Inspector General of the Department of Defense from

2009-2010 issued several reports warning that the Iraqis were incapable of maintaining their

supply system for the Iraqi forces. The problems actually started with the Americans. For thefirst several years after the invasion, the U.S. was only concerned with pumping out as many


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soldiers as possible. The Americans would do all the training, equipping, and supplying, so

nothing was really done about the Iraqis doing that work themselves. Eventually, the U.S.

decided to tackle the issue, and the Taji maintenance facility was to be at the forefront of that

effort. The company that was contracted to develop the base was originally given a deal for

$350 million, but that ballooned to $628.2 million by the time it was done. That was because

the job was badly designed, and the orders for it were changed 161 times. The Iraqi Defense

Ministry showed no interest in the facility, and the supply network overall, which meant the

U.S. had to work on the base longer than expected adding more costs. When Taji was

completed there were no Iraqi soldiers trained to use its equipment. The U.S. military stepped

in, but the Iraqi army and Defense Ministry again showed little concern, and never sent

enough soldiers to fully man the base or go for training. Not only that, but those that were

detailed for the task were often pulled out. A July 2009 report by SIGIR for example, found

that around 50% of students at Taji were absent at any given time. Of those permanently

stationed at the base, 75% had finished their required courses, but they were ranked as

marginally skilled. On top of that, only 33% of required troops were ever at the facility. Taji

was only one example of how the entire system was flawed. Other issues included the fact

that the Iraqi generals valued parts on the shelves over them being sent to units. That meant

the leadership did not want bases like Taji to actually do their job, but simply store parts.

Second, the system set up required Iraqi units to go to Taji to get parts rather than having

them shipped to them. That would require huge trips, often ones that commanders would not

allow. Requests for parts had to go all the way to the divisions general staff, and officers felt

if they constantly asked for repairs they would lose standing, so most of them did not make

the effort. There was also no guarantee that equipment sent to be fixed would be sent back to

their units. Instead, Iraqi soldiers were forced to buy spare parts on the open market,sometimes of spotty quality or scavenge them from other vehicles to maintain their forces.

Another factor was that Iraqi divisions were only given fuel for the number of vehicles they

had on hand whether they worked or not. That created an incentive for officers to keep as

many vehicles on hand as possible, even broke ones, so that they would get their fuel quota.

At the top, because the Defense Ministry did not value logistics, and didnt understand how it

worked, it didnt adequately budget, plan, or maintain it. The only thing that kept the system

working was American oversight and advisers. Now that they are gone, the whole thing is

collapsing. That has left each Iraqi division to take care of itself, while millions of dollars of

parts sit idle in places like Taji.

Rebuilding the Iraqi security forces is considered the only success of the U.S. effort to

reconstruct Iraq. A number of divisions were put together. After some huge setbacks, those

units eventually took the lead in fighting militants, and performed admirably. Behind the

scenes however, American and Iraqi neglect meant that the Iraqi army was only able to field a

force, because of the U.S. military was there to ensure that adequate supplies and parts were

made available. Once they withdrew the logistics system immediately began deteriorating.

Taji Maintenance Depot is a perfect example with parts collecting dust that could be used to

keep Humvees and other vehicles running. The Iraqi military leadership is making the

situation worse, because they value how many resources are on hand rather than whether theyare being used or operating properly. It has never understood the need for maintenance, and


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until it does the general staff will maintain incentives that will eventually lead to the

breakdown of most of its heavy equipment.

SOURCES

Hoffman, Michael, Logistics logjam is a challenge for Iraqi army, Army Times, 3/13/11

Inspector General United States Department of Defense, Assessment of U.S. Government

Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Iraq Security Forces,

Department of Defense, 11/17/10

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Developing A Depot Maintenance

Capability At Taji Hampered By Numerous Problems, 7/30/09

- Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress, 7/30/09

- Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 4/30/09

- Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 2013

Posted by Joel Wing at 9:26 AM

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The Breakdown of the Iraqi Army Logistics