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strike them down Facing Challenges, Creating Opportunities
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Editor' s note
Newest OdysseyNobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz fears that we are on the cusp of a double-dip global recession because global aggregate
demand is lacking.
Jacques Attali, founder of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, recently lamented that Europe has
grown to be a “strange animal” — a union with a central bank and single currency, but without a ministry of finance to
coordinate fiscal and tax policies across independent sovereign states.
Economist Nouriel Roubini argues that Greece’s sovereign debt crisis is only “the tip of the iceberg.
It is obvious that the current economic crisis has hit all countries. It is, however, particularly painful for the weaker econo-
mies, consequently for the most countries in the region.
In this era of global economic crisis, when all political and economic analysts underline risks prevalent in the global sphere,
The Bridge adopts an optimistic stance.
It is a chance to build links across the Mediterranean, creating a new sense of stability in the Eastern Mediterranean and
Balkans: Kosovo, the Middle East, policies in the Balkans, Greek-Turkish relations, EU enlargement, and raised subjects
ranging from climate change to green growth and development.
What about the EU?
EU’s neighbourhood includes countries which will one day become members, as well as its other immediate and close
neighbours around the Mediterranean, and in South-Eastern and Eastern Europe. The cooperation with these countries
aims at dovetailing their policies with those of the EU in trade, environmental and business regulation, energy, communica-
tions, education, training and immigration while providing support for infrastructure. By helping reform their economies,
create security and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, the EU also helps to make life safer within its own borders.
In this issue of The Bridge, we try to reveal the challenges and the opportunities that this turbulent era is creating.We try out
to find out the window of opportunity-that is now open-and to use it in order to catch up the major changes.
It is a matter of effective doing, a doing which will create opportunities.
Corporate Responsibility assured underAA1000 International Standard
PUBL
I
O TE’s 2009 Corporate Responsibility Report, which has just been published, is externally assured under the international AA1000 Ac-countAbility Principles Standard. This is the fifth annual review of OTE’s economic, social and environmental activities.
OTE's 2009 CR Report is one of the first by a Greek company to apply the AA1000 AccountAbility Principles Standard and develop its approach in terms of its three principles, namely inclusivity, materiality and responsiveness.
For the first time, the 2009 CR report was subject to external assurance by Deloitte, providing additional validity and valuable feedback on OTE’s ap-proach and constantly evolving performance on CR issues.
As a result, the report was also upgraded to GRI G3 B+ rating. For the last four years, OTE has been applying to its CR report the G3 guidelines of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), while the last two it was rated at B level. Also, since 2008, OTE has also been included in the FTSE4Good Index.
On this occasion, OTE’s Corporate Communications Director, Mrs Deppie Tzimea, commented: “Despite the tough times, due to the major economic crisis, we move forward with actions rather than words, based on a specific plan & targets, while our commitment for responsible action in favor of all stakeholders remains unchanged. The external assurance of our 2009 CR re-port under the international AA1000 standard is a result of systematic efforts and constant development of our programme, which is an integral part of OTE’s business plan."
The report details OTE's contribution to sustainable development through its “Building Ties” programme - in the marketplace, with employees, with society and for the environment. However, this year, on top of that, OTE at-tempts to inform and motivate all stakeholders towards a more responsible attitude by suggesting simple ways through which anyone can help society and the environment. In special supplements, included in the report, OTE Group employees give simple advice on how to surf the internet safely, how to recycle properly, how to be “green” at work etc.
Both the report and the videos related to the supplements are available on-line at the microsite
http://www.ote.gr/cr2009/
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© The bridge . All rights reserved. Neither this publication nor any part of it may be
reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means,
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A quarterly review on European integrationSE Europe & the SE Mediterranean
Upcoming Events
cover story 36 - 37
Thanos TriantafyllouEU renewable energy policy
cover story 16 - 17
cover story 18 - 19
Balkan Express-NEWS
www.bridge-mag.com
cover story 30 - 31
Thanos Triantafyllou Israel-Palestine talks
cover story 20 - 24
Alexandros ArvanitakisRoadmap to EU
EU-Albania relations
Kostas A. LavdasCrisis management &
political rhetoric in Greece
cover story 8 - 9
Stavros Kourtalis & Gerasimos TsourapasA step in the right direction
cover story 14 - 15
cover story 10 - 13
Dimitris DroutsasPracticing foreing policy
in times of economic crisis
contents
To manage a socio-economic crisis
in a politically sound manner, you need to
come to terms with three sets of issues.
First, you need to know, however vaguely,
what brought it about. Second, you need to
have a more or less clear view of objectives
and priorities. Finally, you will have to try to
penetrate the cognitive and sociocultural
context of the crisis in question.
Back to basics. Modern economic
and social life is dominated by complex
and intricate organizations. Perhaps para-
doxically, this complicates things when it
comes to crises. As Charles Perrow so bril-
liantly argued, even slight mishaps within
these massive and intricate infrastructures
can rapidly escalate in unforeseen ways.
And as far as ‘crises’ are concerned, the very
terminology needs examining. Arjen Boin
and Paul ’t Hart have shown that we need
to abandon the notion that crises are events
that are neatly delineated in time and space.
We need, instead, to treat crises as extended
periods of high threat, high uncertainty, and
high politics that disrupt a wide range of so-
cial, political, and organizational processes.
In short, crises are dynamic and chaotic pro-
cesses, not discrete events sequenced neatly
on a linear time scale.
On to Greece. What happened in the
last couple of years? To begin with, the
fundamentals of the Greek economy did
not change between 2009 and 2010. What
did change, was the way in which the pro-
longed crisis – because that’s what it was
– was dealt with. A textbook application
of Naomi Klein’s ‘shock doctrin’ (i.e., using
a phase of collective vulnerability as a win-
dow of opportunity to usher in change) got
out of hand. The point is rather simple. As
Robert Putnam explained a few years ago,
the politics of international negotiations can
usefully be conceived as a two-level game.
At the national level, interest groups pursue
their goals and politicians seek power by
forming coalitions among those groups. At
the international level, governments seek
to maximize their ability to satisfy their
own coalitions, while pursuing objectibves
which appear to correspond to perceptions
of ‘national interest’. Neither of the two
games can be ignored by national politi-
cians, so long as their countries remain both
interdependent and ‘sovereign’. Problem is,
each of these national politicians appears
at both game boards simultaneously. Give
too much attention to the national game,
By Kostas A. Lavdas
8 9
and the international gets side-tracked. And
vice versa. In short, while the government
in Athens, preoccupied with the domestic
game board, was busy trying to persuade
the public that things looked ugly and big
change was needed, governments in places
like Stockholm, Paris and Berlin were busy
finding ways to safeguard their banks,
whose lending to Latvia, Greece and other
EU states presaged trouble.
Still, there is a window of opportunity
that is now open – even if the actors that
actually did the job of opening it are not the
ones the governments in Athens or Riga
would have us believe. We need to use this
window, in order to curb some of the struc-
tural constraints on large-scale reform while
at the same time reassuring Greek citizens
that national democratic accountability is
not a thing of the past. The point, then, is to
use the current juncture in order to achieve
two distinct but closely linked objectives.
First, we need to privatize and liberalize,
deep and fast. Second, we need to remain
steadily fixed in the absolute necessity – for
a small state with an open economy and a
precarious geopolitical position – of the ex-
istence of a capable public sector and pow-
erful regulatory agencies.
Not all the interests – domestic and
transnational – that have been involved
in opening (and attempting to exploit) the
‘window of opportunity’ will be happy with
this combination of strategic objectives. Yet
it is the combination that is crucial. Its attain-
ment and sustainability will depend on par-
ticular policy coalitions. In what way a new
politics could construct a coalition between
entrepreneurs, professional strata and quali-
fied public servants, and whether a majori-
tarian government could be the medium
of such a coalition, are questions to which
it would be difficult to attempt a confident
answer in the present situation. These, how-
ever, are the questions that matter.
Kostas A. Lavdas is the Professor of Political
Science at the University of Crete.
cover story
Many see something of a contradic-
tion in the phrase “foreign policy in times of
economic hardship”.
The first thing that comes to mind is that
the one thing – economic hardship – pre-
cludes the other: the practice of foreign pol-
icy. In other words, conditions of economic
hardship place limits not only on economic
activities, but also on range of movement in
the international arena.
There are those who take this thought
further. They say that under these condi-
tions “we must first put our house in order”,
and only then make fresh forays into foreign
policy. They say that right now “we are at a
disadvantage in terms of international pow-
er interrelations”, and thus we must leave
things as they are if we are to avoid having to
back down due to our position of weakness.
They are intimidated. And they want to
keep themselves to themselves.
Prime Minister Papandreou’s govern-
ment took office in October 2009. The num-
bers we faced were harsh: a deficit of over
13% and public debt of over 110%. Apart
from the financial debt, we were facing a
competitiveness deficit. And most of all,
there was our credibility deficit in interna-
tional markets. The “spreads” – a word now
in the working vocabulary of every Greek
– jumped higher from one day to the next,
enabling speculators to siphon off national
revenues.
So we had to act – and fast. We started
with a huge effort to restore financial health
– with the aim of cutting the deficit from
about 14% in 2009, to under 3% by 2014 –
and reduce the debt as a proportion of GDP
after 2013. In 2010, we will cut the deficit by
5.5 percentage points, from 13.6% to 8.1%
of GDP.
To do this, we had to take very harsh
measures for the greek society, for every
greek citizen. But we have already seen
encouraging results: in the first 5 months,
the deficit fell by 40% year-on-year, rev-
enues increased, and expenditure has been
reduced significantly. So we are well within
the framework of the goals we set, and we
have yet to begin implementing many of
the new measures passed by the Hellenic
Parliament.
In the context of this effort, our foreign
policy has a special mission: to create more
opportunities for our country. In a truly glo-
balized economic and political system, the
winners are those who are most fully inte-
grated into that system – not those who
are isolated from it. Opportunities come to
those who dare to open up, not to those who
close themselves off.
That is why we ourselves are taking
initiatives and supporting the efforts of third
parties who are promoting an environment
of stability and prosperity in our wider re-
gion, which includes the Balkans, the East-
ern Mediterranean and the Middle East, the
Black Sea and the Caucasus.
In the Balkans, Greece was once the
principal advocate for our northern neigh-
bours’ regional integration into and acces-
sion to the European Union. In word and
indeed. With initiatives that led to what is
today the South East European Cooperation
Process. With the drawing up of the Thes-
By Dimitris Droutsas
10 11
saloniki Agenda in 2003; an Agenda that is
still the core of the European Union’s policy
on the Balkans. With the promotion of in-
vestments in every sector of the economy;
investments that have created tens of thou-
sands of jobs in Balkan economies. With
the promotion of the Southeast European
Energy Community.
And we are returning to this policy to-
day. The announcement of our new initiative
– Agenda 2014 – was among the govern-
ment’s first actions, and Agenda 2014 is
aimed at reinvigorating the European per-
spectives of all the countries in the region.
2014 is a very important year, it is one
hundred years from the beginning of the
First World War, and we think that we have
to remind to the public opinion what the
European Union is all about. It is the most
successful peace project and we think that
it can guarantee peace and stability for all
the countries of the western Balkans. This
is the aim of our Agenda 2014, we want to
promote the accession of all the western
Balkans countries and put this subject higher
on the European agenda. We want to say to
the peoples of the countries of the western
Balkans that the future, their future, lies
within the European Union.
In the Eastern Mediterranean and the
Middle East, Greece has a special place and
role that derive from our geopolitical posi-
tion and our traditionally very good relations
with the Arab world. We are utilizing this
store of trust to launch new cooperation on a
broad range of issues; cooperation with new
partners and old friends.
But in this region there are two open
wounds that have been festering for years
now. Two situations – unique unto them-
selves – that generate instability. And until
we resolve these situations, they will block
the whole region’s course toward real peace
and lasting prosperity.
The first is the Middle East issue, in all
its aspects. We recently experienced yet
another flare-up. This one arose from the
ongoing humanitarian crisis created by the
blockade on Gaza. Greece and its partners
reacted responsibly, trying to safeguard
the fragile peace process while also guar-
anteeing the flow of humanitarian aid. But
we must confront the root of the problem.
In Greece, we place great hope in the prox-
imity talks and we fully support them. The
solution can be none other than that already
described by the international community: A
solution based on two states that will coex-
ist in security and stability.
The second major issue is Cyprus. We
cannot close our eyes to the flagrantly unjust
and illegal state of affairs that has persisted
for 36 years now. In Cyprus – a member state
of the European Union – there are Turk-
ish occupation troops to this day. There is a
great wall – a wall of shame; the last wall in
Europe – separating the Cypriot people and
holding them back from their joint European
future. And Turkey bears a heavy responsi-
bility for this. The position of Greece is a very
wellknown one, we want a Cypriot solution.
We must leave Greek Cypriots and Turkish
cover story
Cypriots to decide on their joint future in the
European union, to decide without external
pressure or any kind of artificial deadlines.
We also want a European solution, meaning
that the Republic of Cyprus is an EU member
state and so after the solution will be found
the country must be able to function ef-
ficiently within the European Union. That is
why we always say that when negotiating,
when dealing with the settlement, we must
fully respect the “acquis communautaire”.
In the Black Sea region, Hellenism has
deep historical roots. On the first of this
month, Greece assumed the Chairmanship
of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation
(BSEC), presenting an ambitious agenda.
Our priorities are focused on green develop-
ment, renewable energy sources, and the
promotion of two major projects that will
benefit all the peoples in the region: the
Black Sea ring road and the development of
maritime links.
When speaking of the Black Sea re-
gion, I cannot but refer to the neighbouring
Caucasus, a critical zone of interests that in
future will be of increasing importance to
the European Union and its member states
– if for no other reason than the energy cor-
ridors that will criss-cross the region. And
here there are issues that touch upon justifi-
able sensitivities, but that nevertheless need
to be dealt with to the benefit – first and
foremost – of the peoples of the Caucasus.
Greece is pursuing the humble role, if you
will, of the honest broker. I think that our re-
cent Chairmanship of the OSCE left a legacy
that will be of some use in confronting the
issues plaguing this region.
How analogous to all this is the current
state of affairs in the European Union? What
does the economic crisis mean for the future
of the European Union? Or is this, perhaps,
an opportunity?
After a long – and for some partners,
painful – debate, we concluded on an in-
stitutional mechanism that will support
the European Union for the foreseeable fu-
ture. After much compromise, we ended up
with the Lisbon Treaty, which establishes an
inter-institutional balance that we all hope
will enable the European Union to play its
rightful role in the international arena. It
was for this reason, after all, that the Lisbon
Treaty endowed the EU with a new foreign
policy tool: the position of High Represen-
tative for Foreign Affairs and the European
External Action Service, which we are now
building up.
And the member states entrusted new
responsibilities to these new institutions. We
put it into their hands to deal with certain
very important matters. And we did this
based on our acceptance of one fundamen-
tal thought: that the interests of the member
states are also the interests of the Union. So,
when the Union’s institutions speak, they
do so in the name of the 27 member states,
who will be greater in number tomorrow.
They express this common interest. Indeed,
the leaders of the new EU institutions cre-
ated by the Lisbon Treaty have taken on no
12 13
small responsibilities. They have to rise to
the trust that we have put in them. Other-
wise, the leaders of these institutions and
these institutions themselves will find their
credibility compromised, perhaps beyond
redemption.
It was at this historic stage in European
integration that we were hit by the global
economic crisis. We feel the repercussions
in our national economies and, by exten-
sion, in our societies, which are witnessing
the collapse of fundamental covenants that
had been in place long enough to be taken
for granted; to be seen as a social acquis. The
shortcomings in global financial governance
– shortcomings that we now all agree ex-
ist – have reached the point, according to
some, of threatening our common currency:
the euro.
Faced with this challenge, the European
Union rose to the occasion and replied in a
coordinated manner. It acknowledged that
the challenge was and is a common chal-
lenge. It answered to the volatility of mar-
kets by announcing and institutionalizing a
support mechanism, from which of course
Greece benefited.
But I think the most important thing is
that in the global dialogue that has begun
on confronting the shortcomings of global
financial governance, the EU is speaking
with one single voice. From Brussels – in
the name of the 27 member states and the
EU – the President of the Council and the
President of the Commission sent a single
message to the G-20 meeting in Toronto.
Was that not a genuine expression of
truly common EU foreign policy? I maintain
the hope that perhaps as a result of this crisis
the European Union will once again find its
stride on the path to its original goal: A great
and strong Europe with a discrete and im-
portant position in the international system.
The international system without a
strong Europe is simply a system without
equilibrium. The world needs Europe. But
Europe, too, must open itself up to the world.
This means two things:
First, that we must complete the
Union’s enlargement. There can be no “black
hole” in the single European space of secu-
rity, justice and prosperity to which we as-
pire. The countries of Southeast Europe are
waiting on Europe’s doorstep. We can’t leave
them outside any longer.
Second, that we need to sustain the
momentum of the Union’s political deepen-
ing. Lisbon is a station, but not the terminus.
And if something good can come out of this
crisis, let it be this: the realization that we are
better fortified against the challenges of our
times when we have more Europe, not less.
Dimitris Droutsas is Alternate Minister of
Foreign Affairs
cover story
''In the European Union's [EU] latest
effort to deal a blow to irregular migration
across its southern borders, Frontex (estab-
lished in 2005 as the European Agency for
the Management of Operational Coopera-
tion at the External Borders of the Member
States of the European Union) will inaugu-
rate its first Operational Office in Piraeus,
Greece, on 1 August 2010.
Centrally located in Greece's largest sea-
port and one of South-East Europe's major
transport hubs, the new Piraeus Operational
Office will be in charge of coordinating Fron-
tex's actions across Eastern Mediterranean
countries (Greece, Italy, Cyprus and Malta),
as was decided at a Madrid EU summit in
May 2009.
Neither the decision to add to Frontex's
institutional capacities nor the particular
choice of Piraeus should come as a surprise;
since as early as 1999, at the European Coun-
cil meeting in Tampere, Finland, the EU has
striven to develop a proactive migration
policy, of which the fight against irregular
migration constitutes a central pillar.
Two years ago, based upon the 2004
Hague programme that had aimed for the
creation of a common EU immigration and
asylum policy, the Council of Ministers ad-
opted the so-called 'Return Directive', stan-
dardising procedures regulating the return
of illegally staying third-country nationals.
More recently, in May 2009, the European
Parliament adopted a directive on imposing
sanctions for employers who hire irregular
migrants.
The choice of Frontex's Operational Of-
fice location also makes perfect sense, given
that the latest Frontex Annual Risk Analysis
argues that, by 2010, 75% of total illegal EU
border crossings take place through Greece.
In fact, it has been argued that tackling
the 'Eastern Mediterranean' route (crossing
Turkey to eastern Greece, southern Bulgaria
or Cyprus) constitutes one of the Agency's
top priorities, given that migration waves
have slowed down in the two other major
routes, the Central Mediterranean (Northern
Africa to Italy and Malta) and Western Afri-
can (Western African countries to Spain via
the Canary Islands) ones.
To what extent does the inauguration of
a new Operational Office in Greece merit op-
timism in the fight against irregular migra-
tion? On the one hand, the numbers seem
to agree that the new Office will most likely
augment Frontex's already successful role:
according to its Deputy Executive Director
Gil Arias-Fernandez, a 33% reduction in to-
tal illegal entry detentions (from 166,000 to
106,000) has already been registered.
A drop also took place in terms of sea
border arrests between Greece and Turkey,
from 56,000 (in 2008) to 49,000 (in 2009).
Land border arrests between the two coun-
tries were also decreased, from 14,000 to
10,000 under the same time period.
Across the Mediterranean basin, a num-
ber of bilateral agreements (such as the one
signed between Italy and Libya, Spain and
Senegal, and so on) have also helped stem
the tide of arrivals: in West Africa, only
five detentions took place in the first three
months of 2010, as opposed to a staggering
31,700 detentions during 2006.
The above numbers, however, hide the
much more sober picture of immigration
waves in South-Eastern Europe: the absence
of a working agreement on immigration
prevention and control between Greece and
Turkey (only recently have political steps
been taken towards the activation of the
2001 bilateral Re-Admission Protocol) has
helped encourage Eastern Mediterranean
immigration as other routes have been more
effectively patrolled.
By Stavros Kourtalis
& Gerasimos Tsourapas
14 15
European NGOs continue to lament the
lack of reliable quantitative data on irregular
immigration, which, in turn, help promote
unfounded stories on 'floods of illegal im-
migrants', on the loss of jobs to immigrants,
or on exorbitantly heavy strains on public
services. At the same time, Frontex has been
frequently confronted with accusations of
human rights violations, especially in its
treatment of asylum seekers who attempt to
enter the EU.
The creation of a new Operational Office
in Piraeus and the strengthening of Frontex
in general needs, thus, to be accompanied
by a number of other political efforts, both
on the national and the European level that
would enable the Agency to acquire the en-
hanced role it seeks.
Firstly, the European Commission should
work closely with national policymakers
towards the creation of standardised data-
bases on migration across the continent, in
the hope of generating more reliable esti-
mates. A more accurate numerical portrayal
of irregular migration in Europe would also
aid in the visibility of Frontex's efforts and, in
the long term, in increased social awareness
across the EU member states.
Lastly, the positive effects that bilateral
readmission agreements between EU mem-
ber states and neighbouring countries have
had on curbing migration waves suggest
that such agreements should continue being
forged between countries of origin (such as
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia, etc.) and EU
countries of transit.
All things considered, the new Opera-
tional Office should, indeed, be considered
a significant step in enhancing Frontex's
role in South-Eastern Europe and dealing a
significant blow to irregular migration in the
Mediterranean. At the same time, however,
it should serve to remind us of the political
and administrative gaps that remain to be
bridged, before we can truly talk of an effi-
cient, proactive, pan-European immigration
strategy.''
Stavros Kourtalis and Gerasimos
Tsourapas are researchers at the Hellenic
Centre for European Studies (EKEM)
cover story
In these times of economic imbal-
ance and financial insecurity the energy
matter becomes more and more important
in particular for the weak economies of the
planet. Especially for the “countries of crisis”
(Portugal Italy Greece Spain) the energy sec-
tor is crucial in enabling their economies to
overcome the current difficulties and return
to high growth rates through the assurance
of continuous and sustainable energy supply.
Despite the important steps towards
the synchronization of the electricity sector
of the past years, the electricity supply gap
is widening as major planned power sector
capacity additions are delayed. In parallel,
competition for private investment required
for new energy infrastructure is fierce. Con-
tinuing concerns over energy security and
high import dependence have highlighted
the importance of efficiency improvement
and supply diversification. The role of green
energy technologies (i.e. renewables and
energy efficiency) to address these problems
is crucial. They provide unique development
opportunities and under the right conditions
and safeguards they are main vehicles for
achieving environmental targets while they
contribute to the security of supply. Renew-
able energy sector attracts investments in
short time period that, under the appropri-
ate support framework, offer secured capital
returns for long time, and create significant
job opportunities.
The acceleration of green investments
in the region is an urgent need, especially
taking into account that the EU has estab-
lished an overall target of 20% share of RES
in energy consumption by 2020, as well as
specific national ones for each EU member
state, as part of the Climate Action Package
20-20-20 by 2020.
Developments are needed in the energy
sector, particularly in the oil industry - where
skyrocketing prices are having a drastic ef-
fect on the economies of most countries
- and the continually growing threat of cli-
mate change has now made it obvious that a
transition to new energy sources, which are
less polluting and more secure, is vital. The
most promising proposal for this transition
is the use of renewable energy sources (RES),
which can reduce greenhouse gas emissions
and pollution using local and decentralized
sources. At the same time, we now real-
ize that we cannot keep increasing energy
production to cover our needs, but that we
By Thanos Triantafyllou
16 17
must manage energy in a rational way and
improve our energy efficiency. Investments
in these sectors contribute to the protection
of the environment, the security of energy
supply and long-term development while
functioning simultaneously as a magnet for
innovation, providing export opportunities.
Status and perspectives of RES
Renewable energies such as wind
power, solar energy, hydropower and bio-
mass can play a major role in tackling the
twin challenge of energy security and global
warming because they are not depletable
and produce less greenhouse-gas emissions
than fossil fuels.
Since the energy crises of the 1970s,
several industrial nations have launched
programmes to develop renewable energy
solutions, but the return of low oil prices
prevented renewable energies from picking
up on a large commercial scale.
Despite the significant utilization of hy-
dro power plants only limited portion of the
total potential is not utilized. In the recent
years there has been extensive modern-
ization of existing large and small plants
through funds provided by international
institutions. In almost all of these countries
an extensive program for further develop-
ment of the sector and in particular of small
hydro power plants has already started with
sometimes significant results.
Wind energy has significant potential
in several countries of the region; however
there is currently no significant capacity.
However, there is already great interest from
investors in investigating the potential and
developing projects that is supported by
recent legislative reforms to promote wind
energy in some countries.
Another important renewable source of
energy in the region is biomass, but the cur-
rent utilization is almost entirely restricted
to the traditional uses for cooking and space
heating. Significant support will be needed
to promote modern utilization of biomass
for space heating, electricity generation and
combined heat and power production.
Solar energy is abundant in the region
and can be used most cost-effectively for
water heating. Solar photovoltaic (PV) in-
stallations, whether at the household level
or for centralized applications require sig-
nificant support measures given the high
capital cost of the systems.
Finally, there is important potential for
low-temperature geothermal resources that
can be used for heating as well as electricity
production in some of the countries.
We do face two energy challenges: on
the one hand, to ensure secure and sufficient
energy and, on the other, the sustainable
management of the environmental impacts
of the production, conversion and use of en-
ergy. These challenges are not insurmount-
able. If we all take greater responsibility for
our actions, basing our energy decisions on
best practice, we can ensure a clean, intel-
ligent and competitive energy future.
cover story
EU-Western Balkans High Level
Meeting in Serajevo
The EU-Western Balkans High Level
Meeting, organized on the 2nd of June, in
Sarajevo by the Spanish Presidency, marks
the 10th anniversary of the Zagreb Summit
of 25 November 2000, where EU launched
the Stabilization and Association Process
and the European perspective for Western
Balkans.
The EU and the west Balkan countries,
but also participants from US, Russia, Turkey,
OSCE, Council of Europe and NATO, wel-
comed the progress of the last decade that
brought the Balkans from war-torn times on
the road to prosperity.
The High Representative of the EU for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-
President of the Commission, Catherine Ash-
ton, and the Commissioner for Enlargement
and European Neighbourhood Policy, Štefan
Füle, welcomed the outcomes of the meet-
ing, stressing that the EU will support and
reaffirm the Balkans’ place in Europe and the
European perspective for the region.
The Director of OSCE's Conflict Preven-
tion Centre, Ambassador Herbert Salber,
stressed that “Making more use of the tools
that the OSCE provides would benefit the
countries of the Western Balkans”, inviting
in this way the participant countries to make
use of the OSCE tools to achieve more stabil-
ity on the basis of cooperative security.
The Annual Regional Meeting of
OSCE
On the 21st of June, was held the annual
regional meeting, hosted by Vienna-based
OSCE Secretariat's Conflict Prevention Cen-
tre. In cooperation with the OSCE Mission
to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the meeting
brought together Heads of OSCE Field Op-
erations from South-Eastern Europe, the
Director of the Conflict Prevention Centre,
Ambassador Herbert Salber.
The participants discussed present and
future work of OSCE Missions in the region
and the importance of cooperation and
partnership between the OSCE and EU in
South-Eastern Europe.
“Both organizations value democracy
and fundamental freedoms, values that are
shared by each of the countries we work in,”
said Ambassador Gary D. Robbins, Head of
the OSCE Mission to BiH. “The OSCE, with its
inclusive membership and its comprehen-
sive security concept, is the natural place for
dialogue and cooperation of all.”
All participants agreed that cooperation
between the two organizations is crucial for
stability in South-Eastern Europe.
18 19
Montenegro: the role of women in
the security sector
The Third OSCE Regional Meeting of
Women Parliamentarians was held in Cetin-
je of Montenegro, on the 22nd of June, in
order to strengthen the role and participa-
tion of women in the security sector.
Ambassador Paraschiva Badescu, the
Head of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro,
argued that "Although enormous strides
have been made over the last decades, the
continued under-representation of women
in governance structures requires specific
effective measures to promote gender bal-
ance in all legislative, judicial and executive
bodies, especially at the political and deci-
sion-making levels". Meeting participants
agreed that enhancing gender equality was
an important tool for conflict prevention and
the creation of sustainable peace. They also
noted that women played an important sta-
bilizing role in South-Eastern Europe during
the conflict and post-conflict period of the
last decade.
The meeting was held as part of the
10th Cetinje Parliamentary Forum, orga-
nized by the Parliament of Montenegro,
the OSCE Mission to Montenegro and the
United Nations Development Programme in
Montenegro on the occasion of the 10th
Anniversary of the adoption of UN Secu-
rity Council Resolution 1325 on women and
peace and security.
OSCE Presence supports
parliamentary oversight of security
services
The OSCE Presence in Albania an-
nounced on the 14th of July, in Tirana, that
it is providing assistance with the drafting of
a bill on parliamentary oversight of the intel-
ligence and security services.
A former expert member of the Intel-
ligence and Security Committee of the U.K.
parliament, together with OSCE staff were
authorized to provide recommendations
that would be submitted to the Chair and
the Committee members of all political par-
ties, members of institutions and civil soci-
ety, before the bill is drafted. The objective
is to help produce a first draft to strengthen
parliamentary procedure, regulating the
oversight of the parliament over the work of
the Intelligence and Security Services.
The support followed a request from the
Chairman of the National Security Commit-
tee of the National Assembly of Albania and
is part of the Presence's Parliamentary Sup-
port Project, funded by the Embassy of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands.
Anniversary of the signing of the
Ohrid Framework Agreement
On the 12th of August a joint statement
was issued in Skopje, by EU, NATO, OSCE
and UN, in order to mark the 9th anniver-
sary of the signing of the Ohrid Framework
Agreement.
According to the statement, the EU Spe-
cial Representative and Head of Delegation
of the EU, Erwan Fouéré, the NATO HQ Sko-
pje Commander and Senior Military Repre-
sentative David Humar, the Head of the OSCE
Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje Am-
bassador Jose-Luis Herrero and the United
States Ambassador Philip T. Reeker, on behalf
of the four organizations, recognized and
welcomed the positive progress the country
has made in improving interethnic relations
since the signature of the Ohrid Framework
Agreement. They also recognized, that the
Agreement and relevant constitutional pro-
visions remain indispensible to building a
peaceful, and cohesive multiethnic society,
verifying in this way their commitment to
the Ohrid Framework Agreement.
They also stressed the particular impor-
tance of adopting further measures in the
fields of equitable representation, decentral-
ization and education, noting, that further
efforts are needed in order to establish an
education system able to foster integration
and interethnic relations at all levels.
cover story
Albania formally applied for EU
membership in April 2009, but if its acces-
sion bid is to move forward it must tackle a
number of issues: particularly political sta-
bility, economic reform and corruption.
Milestones
• 1992: EU and Albania sign Trade and Co-
operation Agreement. Albania becomes
eligible for funding under the EU's pre-
accession PHARE programme.
• 1993: Opening of first EU delegation in
Tirana.
• 1999: EU proposes new Stabilisation
and Association Process (SAP) for five
countries in South Eastern Europe, in-
cluding Albania.
• June 2000: Feira European Council
states that all SAP countries are 'poten-
tial candidates' for EU membership.
• Nov. 2000: Zagreb summit starts SAP for
Albania.
• Jan. 2003: Negotiations on Stabilisa-
tion and Association Agreement (SAA)
between EU and Albania officially
launched.
• June 2003: Thessaloniki Summit con-
firms that SAP countries may join EU
once they are ready for membership.
• June 2004: Council adopts first Euro-
pean Partnership for Albania.
• June 2006: Signature of the SAA.
• Jan. 2008: EU visa facilitation agreement
with Albania enters into force.
• Jun. 2008: Commission presents road-
map identifying specific requirements
for visa liberalisation.
• 1 Apr. 2009: SAA enters into force.
• 1 Apr. 2009: Albania becomes official
member of NATO.
• 28 Apr. 2009: Albania submits applica-
tion for EU membership.
• 14 Apr. 2010: Albania returns Com-
mission questionnaire on EU accession
preparations.
Policy Summary
After World War Two, Albania became
a communist state allied with the Soviet
Union and then China, before pursuing its
own form of autarchic socialism under the
dictatorship of Enver Hoxha.
Under Hoxha, Albania became one of
the most economically underdeveloped
countries in the world. In the early 1990s,
a multiparty democracy was established –
replacing decades of isolationist communist
rule.
Albania is bordered by Montenegro
and Kosovo to the north, the Former Yugo-
slav Republic of Macedonia to the east and
Greece to the south. It has a coastline on the
Adriatic Sea.
Ethnically, Albania is largely homog-
enous – over 95% of its 3.6 million inhab-
itants are ethnic Albanians. According to
estimates, roughly 70% of the population is
Muslim, 20% Albanian Orthodox and 10%
Roman Catholic. The average age in Albania
is just 29.
Despite undergoing a radical transfor-
mation since the communist era, Albania re-
mains a very poor country. A recent Eurostat
survey places it at the very bottom of Europe
in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
EU relations since 1990
In 1992, Albania became eligible for
funding through PHARE, the EU's main
financial instrument to assist Central and
Eastern European countries in the run-up
to the 2004 enlargement. In 2001, CARDS
replaced PHARE for the Western Balkan
countries.
Since 2007, Albania has been receiving
EU financial aid under the Instrument for
Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) for transition
assistance, institution building and cross-
border cooperation. IPA aid for 2008-2010
totals €245.1 million.
Roadmap to EUBy Alexandros Arvanitakis
EU-Albania relations
20 21
Albania's Stabilisation and Association
Agreement (SAA) entered into force on 1
April 2009. Albania officially joined NATO on
the same day.
In December 2009, the EU excluded Al-
bania from the first stage of its visa liberalisa-
tion scheme for Western Balkan citizens. On
27 May 2010, the European Commission ad-
opted proposals to lift the requirements for
Albanian citizens once the country satisfies
the remaining criteria – meaning that visas
could be lifted by autumn this year.
Issues
Albania became a potential candidate
country for EU accession at the Thessaloniki
EU summit in June 2003 and officially sub-
mitted its application for membership in
April 2009.
Once it has evaluated the responses to
a questionnaire aimed at determining Alba-
nia's readiness to join the EU, the European
Commission will issue an 'opinion'. If it is
positive and then endorsed by the EU Coun-
cil of Ministers, the country will acquire of-
ficial candidate status.
After Albania had officially requested to
join the European Union, EU foreign minis-
ters stated that they would return to the
country's application once national elections
had been completed in June 2009.
However, since the poll was held on 28
June 2009, the ruling Democratic Party of
Prime Minister Sali Berisha and the Social-
ist party of opposition leader Edi Rama have
kept accusing each other of fraud
Berisha's party prevailed in a very close
vote. Olli Rehn, the EU's enlargement com-
missioner at the time, said the country must
do better when staging elections in future,
citing campaign violence and procedural
violations.
In its observation report on the elec-
tions, the OSCE's Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights stated that
the elections marked tangible progress for
Albania but the improvements were over-
shadowed by the ''politicisation of technical
aspects''.
While the elections met most OSCE
[Organisation for Security and Cooperation
in Europe] commitments, they did not ad-
here to the highest standards for democratic
elections and all the political parties must
work harder to respect the letter and pur-
pose of the law, the report concluded.
The Socialist Party, which controls near-
ly half the seats in parliament, proceeded
to boycott the assembly for several months
and thus block the passage of laws – many
of which are needed to align the country
with EU legislation.
Though the Socialists returned to the
legislature in February, they are refusing to
take part in parliamentary activities as their
demand that the votes be recounted was re-
jected by the assembly, which is dominated
by Berisha's coalition.
EU Enlargement Commissioner Stefan
Füle has expressed concern about the lack
of political dialogue and recently warned Ti-
rana that such instability has no place in the
democratic politics of the EU.
Yet the Socialist Party is showing no
signs of letting up, calling for anti-govern-
ment demonstrations to ''accelerate the
end'' of Berisha’s government. In May, 200
protestors from the socialist camp – in-
cluding 22 members of parliament – even
started a hunger strike.
cover story
In response, Martin Schulz of the Eu-
ropean Parliament’s Socialist group and
Joseph Daul of the European People's Party
have urged Prime Minister Berisha and op-
position leader Rama to end the political
deadlock and avoid a suspension of Albania’s
EU accession process .
On 8 July 2010, the European Parliament
adopted a resolution urging the Albanian
government and the opposition to end the
ongoing political crisis. MEPs called on the
two factions "to take over responsibility and
to enter into a constructive dialogue" and
reiterated their "comprehensive support" for
Albania's EU membership bid.
Economic prospects
Albania, which was a closed, centrally-
planned state for almost fifty years, has been
making the difficult transition to a modern,
free-market economy since the early 1990s.
Between 2004 and 2008, macroeco-
nomic growth in Albania averaged around
6% and despite the global economic crisis,
it still recorded 3% growth in 2009. A fiscal
reform package was recently adopted with
the aim of reducing the grey economy and
attracting foreign investment.
Agriculture accounts for over half of em-
ployment in Albania but modern equipment
is seriously lacking, while energy shortages
and poor infrastructure mean that business
development and outside investment is
scarce.
The EU is Albania's main trading partner
but the gap between imports and exports
has produced a large trade deficit. EU funds
are being used to improve the national road
and rail networks, the poor state of which is
hampering economic growth.
Corruption and organised crime
In its most recent report on Albania, the
European Commission raised concerns about
the impartiality of the judiciary and said a
comprehensive reform strategy was needed.
The Commission criticised attempts by
the national executive to limit the indepen-
dence of the judiciary and raised concerns
about its impartiality, following the post-
ponement of certain high-level cases on
procedural grounds.
The government has implemented an
anti-corruption strategy and action plan
in line with the EU's European Partnership
initiative and efforts have been made to in-
crease transparency.
However, the Commission still stated
that corruption remains a problem in many
areas and has called for greater political will,
stronger institutional arrangements and
better inter-agency coordination to fight a
''culture of impunity''.
On a visit to Brussels on 14 April, Prime
Minister Sali Berisha declared that a number
of tough measures had been put in place
to crack down on corruption and organised
crime.
He claimed that corruption had been
eradicated and that foreign investors now
enjoyed simple procedures for starting busi-
nesses at an attractive flat tax rate of 10%.
Speaking to EurActiv in an exclusive in-
terview, Berisha also that the Albanian mafia
is now a thing of the past, as arrests have
been conducted across Western European
countries and more than 1,000 criminals
have been sent to jail.
Positions
In an April 2010 statement following a
meeting with Albanian Prime Minister Sali
Berisha, Permanent President of the Euro-
pean Council Herman Van Rompuy said:
''Prime Minister Berisha represents a country
that has made its political vision and ambi-
tion very clear. I would like to use this oppor-
tunity as well to reiterate my strong com-
mitment to the EU integration perspective
of the entire region of the Western Balkans.''
On a visit to Albania in March, EU En-
largement Commissioner Štefan Füle used
unusually tough language, warning Tirana
that a prolonged political stalemate would
harm the country's EU accession prospects.
22 23
''A fully functioning parliament is essen-
tial to a fully functioning democracy. If the
current political stalemate were to persist,
it could well prevent Albania from reach-
ing the political standards expected from
a country that has applied for EU member-
ship,'' he said.
Speaking to EurActiv in March, Füle
expressed concern about the ''stability of
democratic institutions and the lack of polit-
ical dialogue in the parliament''. Recognising
that considerable progress had been made
in recent years, he urged Albania to over-
come the impasse, adding that ''responsibil-
ity lies with both political parties – both the
ruling group and the opposition'.'
On a visit to Brussels on 14 April, Al-
banian Prime Minister Sali Berisha pleaded
the case for his country's EU accession and
provided numerous examples of tough mea-
sures imposed to crack down on organised
crime and corruption.
In an exclusive interview with EurActiv,
the prime minister said that his country was
now one of the safest in Europe following a
''zero tolerance'' crackdown on the Albanian
mafia, and economic growth had remained
steady despite the global crisis.
On 5 April, Socialist opposition leader
Edi Rama called on Albanians to instigate
demonstrations against the ''bad govern-
ing'' of Prime Minister Berisha's ruling Dem-
ocratic Party.
''The time has come for a big popular
movement in order to accelerate the end of
this government, responsible for electoral
fraud, but also for other social and economic
injustices,'' he said. Rama, who is also mayor
of Tirana, urged citizens to protest against
''stolen votes'' and the ''ruining of the coun-
try's and each family's economy''.
Albanian Foreign Minister Ilir Meta con-
ceded that the political stalemate was not
''contributing'' to speeding up the country's
EU integration. In an interview with RFE/
RL, he accused Socialist leader Edi Rama of
making demands that run counter to the
country's constitution.
He declared that an inquiry commission,
which was only set up by votes from the
ruling party, had the legal stature to rule on
the controversy and accused the Socialists of
''damaging the country's image for the sake
of the personal agenda of their own party
chairman'.'
Speaking to EurActiv in March, Albanian
Ambassador to France Ylljet Aliçka claimed
that Albania is making steady progress on
adopting European standards and has a lot
to offer the EU.
''Corruption and organised crime re-
main a problem in Albania, but there is a
strong desire to tackle these issues and the
results are encouraging […] But we have to
speed up the pace of reform in economics,
infrastructure and tourism,'' he said, adding
that the country's administrative capacity is
''more mature'' than its political class.
Aliçka believes that Albania suffers from
an image problem in Europe and would in
fact bring many positive things to the EU:
''Religious tolerance, secularism, cultural di-
versity, tourism, young people, skilled work-
ers... Albania's energy resources are also
very important – only 20% are currently
exploited,'' he said.
cover story
Speaking on 8 July in the European Par-
liament, German MEP Doris Pack (European
People's Party) lamented the socialist oppo-
sition's boycott of the parliament and wants
the EU to use visa liberalisation as an incen-
tive for reform.
"A continuation of the boycott is bad
for Albania and immobilises the approach
towards the European Union, because with-
out a functioning Parliament, the upcoming
reform laws cannot be adopted. The op-
position must stop poisoning the political
climate of the country with its irresponsible
acting. The citizens of Albania are fed up
with these political games. All they want is a
functioning parliament, which can build up
a new - European - future for the country,''
she stated.
''The European Parliament supports a
European perspective for Albania. If Albania
fulfills the criteria, Albanian citizens should
then be allowed to enter into the European
Union also without a visa. This would be an
important incentive for the necessary re-
forms," added Pack.
After its observation mission for last
year's national elections, the OSCE's Of-
fice for Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights stated: ''The 28 June 2009 parlia-
mentary elections marked tangible progress
with regard to the voter registration and
identification process, the legal framework,
adopted in a consensual manner by the two
main parties, the voting, counting and the
adjudication of election disputes."
"These substantial improvements were
overshadowed by the politicisation of tech-
nical aspects of the process, including dur-
ing the vote count and tabulation, which
temporarily blocked the counting process in
some areas, as well as by violations observed
during the election campaign. These actions
of political parties undermined public con-
fidence in the election process," the state-
ment continued.
In its April 2010 report on the state of
democracy in the country, the Madrid-based
European think-tank FRIDE concluded that
''Albania's democratic status still falls short
of European standards'' and that ''important
democratic deficits remain in the areas of
the rule of law, judicial independence, elec-
tions, media independence, and control over
corruption''.
The HYPERLINK "http://www.fride.org/
download/IP_Albania_ENG_ap10.pdf"
report calls for the strengthening of demo-
cratic institutions, promoting the respect of
the rule of law and the fight against corrup-
tion, dismantling the unlawful interconnec-
tions between business, media and politics,
closer monitoring by the international com-
munity of the developments in Albania and
further concerted action on the country's
democratic flaws.
''Our report uncovers some major chal-
lenges that both sides of the political divide
in Albania need to take seriously if the coun-
try is to deepen its democratic reforms and
move closer towards the EU,'' said FRIDE
director-general Richard Youngs.
EU official documentsEuropean Commission: Albania 2009 Progress Report (14 Oct. 2009)European Commission: Conclusions on Al-bania - Enlargement Strategy & Main Chal-lenges 2009-10 (14 Oct. 2009)European Commission: Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2009-2010 (14 Oct. 2009)European Council: Decision on the Europe-an Partnership with Albania (18 Feb. 2008)European Council: EU-Albania visa facilita-tion agreement (19 Dec. 2007)
Alexandros Arvanitakis is a political
scientist
24 25
A quarterly review on European intergration S.E. Europe & the the S.E. Mediterranean
A quarterly review on European intergrationS.E. Europe & the the S.E. Mediterranean
The curtain rose on the latest act of
Balkan diplomacy: the advisory opinion of
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the
legality of Kosovo’s proclamation of inde-
pendence in 2008 was announced at 15:00
CET on Thursday, July 22. Contrary to what
had many expected, the Court did not come
up with a Solomon’s judgment that might
prove equally (un)satisfactory for both sides;
rather, it produced a clear winner and a loser.
In its ruling the ICJ stated that the Feb-
ruary 2008 declaration of independence
by the Kosovo Assembly violated neither
the international legal order nor the United
Nation Security Council Resolution 1244. In
September 2008 the Court was asked by
the United Nations General Assembly to
give its advice on a question put forth by
Serbia, which inquired “whether the dec-
laration of independence by the provisional
self-ruling institutions of Kosovo was in line
with international law.” Resorting to the ICJ
was a shrewd diplomatic stroke by Belgrade,
through which it bought time and slowed
international momentum toward recogni-
tion of Kosovo for over two years. Pristina
and Belgrade are engaged in a battle on
the world stage to draw countries into their
respective camps. Ultimately, Serbia’s at-
tempt to outmaneuver Kosovo through the
ICJ laid in ruins, leading to one of the most
important victories of Kosovar Albanians in
the international arena.
The President of ICJ Hisashi Owada read
the decision according to which Kosovo’s
declaration of independence does not violate
international law in principle, since the latter
contains no prohibition of such kind. In this
light, he pointed to around 100 similar dec-
larations throughout world history, whose
legality has not been questioned. Further,
the Court’s decision read that the UN Char-
ter principle of territorial integrity applies to
inter-state relations, not secessions. With re-
gard to UN Security Council Resolution 1244,
the Court argued that it did not preclude any
sort of final status outcome, including inde-
pendence. The judgment did not mention
whether Kosovo’s secession was legal, or
whether other states could legally recognize
its independence. Rather, all it did was to
rule that international law does not prohibit
the declaration of independence.
The ICJ opinion can be summarized in
three main points:
1. Kosovo’s Declaration of independence
does not violate international law
2. Kosovo’s declaration of independence
does not violate UN Security Council
Resolution 1244
3. Independence does not violate the
Constitutional Framework for Provi-
sional Self-Government
Although not binding, the ICJ’s advisory
opinion bears significant political weight
and forms a turning point in the long-debat-
ed Kosovo issue, as it can be seen from the
reactions that it provoked both throughout
the region, as well as globally. Reactions of
the two parties concerned are indicative of
their attitudes and their future intentions.
Additionally, since each side is not made up
of one single subject, it is crucial to exam-
ine all basic actors that exercise a larger or
smaller influence within each side.
Reactions from Serbia
The advisory opinion of the ICJ came as
a slap in the face to the Serbian side. Opti-
mist statements of their leaders in the previ-
ous days notwithstanding, Serbs were very
disappointed to see that their own initiative
backfired, although it had initially been ex-
perienced as a victory, when pro-Albanian
countries at the UN General Assembly in
September 2008 failed to block the Serbian
proposal from proceeding to the ICJ.
Serbian president Boris Tadić described
the decision as harsh, but nevertheless tried
to downplay its impact by pointing out to
the rather vague distinction that ICJ itself
had made between the unilateral declara-
tion of independence and the right to se-
cede, claiming that the Court concentrated
on the technical nature of the former, while
it avoided to take positions on the latter,
by Bledar Feta
& Apostolis Karabairis,
EKEM/CSIS
26 27
which is of most substance. This distinction,
as well as the Court’s omission to rule on
the legal implication of the independence
declaration (as, for example, on whether
it produces statehood), has appeared in
the statements of other Serb officials, too,
and generated a debate about whether the
question to the ICJ was properly formulated
by the legal expert team. The government,
on its part, reaffirmed its resolution never
to recognize an independent Kosovar state
and reiterated its commitment to continue
fighting by political means. Furthermore, it
announced an extraordinary session to ex-
amine its next steps, above all seeking the
adoption of a favorable resolution at the UN
General Assembly.
Government parties came up with calls
for unity and renewed efforts but were also
supportive of the government and the Presi-
dent, despite the debacle. On the contrary,
opposition parties were highly critical: DSS
president Koštunica called for resignations,
while Nikolić’s SNS and Šešelj’s SRS de-
manded a harder line in the Kosovo issue,
since the current policy of concessions and
partnership with the West proved, as they
claimed, to be detrimental to Serbian na-
tional interests. On the other side, Jovanović
and Drašković, leaders of LDP and SPO re-
spectively who had previously endorsed
the idea of Serbia’s recognizing Kosovo as a
sovereign state, each applying their own ra-
tionale, found new grounds to support their
stance and invited more political parties in
the country to join them.
All the same, such revisionist approaches
remained marginal in the political spectrum,
while gaining only little support among the
circles of domestic liberal thinkers. The pre-
vailing mainstream opinion reads that the
official state policy vis-à-vis Kosovo should re-
main generally the same. This is, after all, what
the Kosovo Serb local leadership had asked for
immediately after the announcement of the
ICJ opinion. The head of the Kosovska Mitro-
vica periphery Radenko Nedeljković called
Belgrade not to give up fighting against the
recognition of the Kosovar state and his fel-
low Serbs in Kosovo to continue their boycott
of Kosovar institutions and retain their own
parallel ones.
Non-party actors’ reactions were less
visible in Serbia. No massive demonstra-
tions were observed either in Serbia proper
or in Kosovo. Even in Kosovska Mitrovica
the crowd remained quiet, unlike previous
times. High security measures taken by
KFOR were thus rendered needless. Obvi-
ously the prevailing feeling was disappoint-
ment rather than indignation, hence no one
burst out in dynamic actions.
The reaction of the usually talkative
Serb Patriarch Irinej was in the same wave-
length. He called the flock to join a special
service and pray for Kosovo. Carefully cho-
sen words made up a statement, which,
although partial, did not convey intolerance
or xenophobia.
In conclusion, initial Serb reactions to
ICJ’s decision show that no major shift is
expected to take place on Serbian policy as
far as the Kosovo issue is concerned. And this
is due to the salience attributed to it by the
right-wing parties and because advocating
a revised approach has become a taboo for
almost every Serb politician. Therefore, al-
beit with a weakened arsenal, Serbia seems
intent to remain on the same track. What
is most likely to change is the people that
occupy some key positions. There has been
increasing pressure that Serb Minister of
Foreign Affairs Vuk Jeremić is removed from
office, because he has been the champion of,
and directly responsible for the ICJ venture,
but also because he most objects to any pol-
icy update. In a broader aspect, the whole
government, along with the President of the
Republic, has been held responsible for the
heavy defeat. Fortunately for them, the gov-
ernmental coalition has remained united,
which is not given in such cases, but still
their image has been suffered and opposi-
tion has got a chance to morally discredit
them in front of the electorate on this all-
important issue.
As a consequence, many are those who
fear that Serbia again risks turning isolation-
ist and putting its European integration per-
spective at stake, not only because this per-
ceived national debacle is attributed to the
pro-Western block, but also because Serbian
citizens largely got disillusioned by the inter-
cover story
national community, and especially Western
nations, most of which stood against their
country with no serious reservation.
Reactions from Kosovo
The advisory opinion of the ICJ drew
immediate reactions from Kosovo and
Albanian-inhabited countries. Scattered
across Kosovo, Serbia, FYR of Macedonia and
Montenegro, Albanians followed intently
what was happening miles away in The
Hague. The decision has been interpreted as
a historical victory for the Albanian nation,
and also an argument that will add many
more recognizing states to the current list
of 69. Kosovars celebrated the verdict on the
streets of Pristina by hugging each other,
blowing the horns of their cars and waving
Kosovo’s flag, considering the decision a re-
sounding reaffirmation of the legitimacy of
their cause.
Kosovo officials described the long-
awaited opinion as a great victory in their
country’s struggle to be recognized as a
full and legitimate state, as the Court stated
clearly and explicitly in favor of Kosovo, an
unexpected outcome for the majority of the
Albanian population. Kosovo Prime Minister
Hashim Thaci reaffirmed his government’s
willingness for talks with Serbia over techni-
cal issues. According to him the “decision on
the declaration of independence has been
reconfirmed, legalized, and re-legitimized
by the ICJ’s opinion, offering an opportunity
to all countries that hesitated to recognize
Kosovo, to do so, as all the dilemmas have
been resolved”. The Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs Skender Hyseni made clear that any dis-
cussion with Serbia on practical matters of
mutual interest must be on an equal footing
and on a state-to-state basis. Kosovo lead-
ers desire engaging in negotiations that aim
to leave Kosovo an independent state with
its Serb-populated northern region part of
it. Diplomatic sources claim that discussion
between the two countries on decentraliza-
tion, cultural heritage and the northern part
of Kosovo can start later this year. July 22
was another blessed day for the Republic of
Kosovo and all her people, stated the coun-
try’s President Fatmir Sejdiu. The Kosovo
President called for more international rec-
ognitions, as the ruling eventually removes
all the doubts that countries that have not
recognized Kosovo yet may have had.
There is now more optimism in Pristina
that the nonbinding verdict, which comes
two years after the UN General Assembly re-
quested the opinion, will set the stage for a
renewed Kosovo push for more international
recognitions. The government in Pristina
desires to expand the current total of 69
recognitions to more than 100, thus dem-
onstrating the country’s legitimacy through
the majority of United Nation members. This
could provide a new impetus to Kosovo’s
regional cooperation and integration into
international organizations. It should, how-
ever, be noted that the increased number of
recognitions does not necessarily open the
way for Kosovo’s UN membership given the
opposition by China and Russia, two veto-
wielding members in the United Nation Se-
curity Council. Kosovo is expected to apply
for United Nations’ membership in 2011.
Kosovo Assembly has adopted a declara-
tion in support of the advisory opinion, stat-
ing that the historical decision will contribute
to peace and stability not only of the Republic
of Kosovo, but the whole region. Considering
the Court’s decision to be professional and
impartial, respecting at the same time Kosovo
citizen’s willingness for independence the dec-
laration call the European Union to find a mo-
dus vivendi on Kosovo issue while demands
from the reluctant countries to recognize the
new state. In clear contrast to Serbian views,
Kosovo officials believe that Kosovo does not
constitute a precedent in any other case in the
world. The Court’s opinion was closely tailored
to the unique circumstances of Kosovo; it was
not about other regions or states. Furthermore,
as far as the statements of Kosovo officials are
concerned, it has been clear that nothing in the
opinion given by the Court casts any doubt on
the statehood of the Republic of Kosovo, which
is an established fact.
The reaction from the political parties
was in the same wavelength. The IJC opinion
was considered from both government and
opposition parties as the best answer that
has been given thus far on the Kosovo’s right
as a legitimate, legal, consolidated and func-
tional state. Generally, there was a consensus
between them that the decision is righteous
international historical response to histori-
cal injustice that has been made to Kosovo.
In contrast to Kosovo’s officials, the Vete-
vendosje (self-determination) movement, a
popular nationalist civil society group, does
not share the same views. They accuse Kosovo
government and politicians of attributing
more importance to the formal attributes of
Kosovo independence and less to its territorial
integrity and genuine sovereignty. Veteven-
dosje thinks that the government’s celebra-
tory tones are not justified by the ICJ decision
since the latter did not rule on the substance
of Kosovo’s independence but rather on the
fact that the declaration is not illegal. More
have to be done for consolidating Kosovo
independence. The movement’s leader Albin
Kurti protests against the implementation
of the Ahtisaari plan as it does not provide
sovereignty to Kosovo but a ‘deepening parti-
tion’ giving Belgrade actually the opportunity
through decentralization to control every Ser-
bian populated territory.
28 29
Reactions from Banja Luka, Tirana,
Tetovo and the Presevo Valley
Every development in the Kosovo is-
sue unavoidably has an impact on Bosnian
Serbs, since it is often linked to the future of
Republika Srpska. With regards to ICJ’s advi-
sory opinion, Bosnian Serb leaders once more
aligned themselves with official Belgrade.
They accused the court of bias and politically
driven decision-making and reassured that
Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue its pol-
icy of non-recognition with regard to Kosovo.
To the question of whether the ICJ ruling will
affect Republika Srpska’s status vis-à-vis the
Bosnian state similar, Prime Minister Dodik
made it clear that Republika Srpska remains
an entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina ac-
cording to the Dayton Agreement. However,
Dodik did not dismiss the possibility of its self-
determination in the long run. Apart from his
intentions in the domestic scene, this state-
ment indicated support to the Serbian cause
but also served as a warning that insistence
on Kosovo’s independence may have far-
reaching spillover effects.
Swift was the reaction from Albania,
which is seen as the “mother country”. Im-
mediately after the decision the Albanian
Prime Minister, Sali Berisha, welcomed the
“historical” opinion. Berisha believes that
the Hague verdict makes a major contribu-
tion toward fresh relations between the
Serbs and the Albanians between, Tirana
and Belgrade as well as to help in the re-
lations between Pristina and Belgrade.
There is no doubt that after the unilateral
declaration of Kosovo’s independence Al-
bania has increased its efforts to cooper-
ate with region countries, especially with
the Albanian inhabited ones. Furthermore,
Albanians and Kosovars are against every
attempt of bargaining with territories. Ac-
cording to him, The Hague definitely puts
an end to this chapter and through Kosovo’s
independence the fluidity of the Albanians
in the Balkans comes to an end; it turns into
a settled issue and, thus, gets consolidated.
The Albanian Minister of Foreign Affairs
described the decision as a reconfirmation
of the unchangeable right of the citizens of
Kosovo for self-determination, contribut-
ing to stability in Kosovo, the region and
further. Albania expresses its full support
for the further affirmation of Kosovo across
the international arena. Opposition leader,
Edi Rama expressed great satisfaction with
the decision, stressing that Albanians are not
divided when it comes to Kosovo issue. All
political parties and institutions in Albania
also welcomed the Court’s decision.
For more than two decades, Kosovo and
the Kosovo issue have been in the center of
attention of the political and scientific circles
of the Albanian inhabited countries in the
area. The Albanian political parties in the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
have an unchanged position towards the
Kosovo issue, which is: “Kosovo a sovereign
and independent state and an important
precondition for the stability of the region”.
They do not see nor treat the resolution of
the issue as a national problem of Albanians,
but as something that surpasses the national
boundaries and affects regional stability and
progress. Thus, the Democratic Union for In-
tegration, the largest Albanian political par-
ty in the country, considers the Court’s deci-
sion as a clear confirmation of the legality of
the creation of the new state; in addition, it
views its decision as endorsing the correct-
ness of the FYROM government’s earlier de-
cision to recognize Kosovo and to establish
diplomatic relations. For the leader of the
opposition Democratic Party of Albanians,
Menduh Thaci, the ICJ’s opinion constitutes
a fundamental act of the new historical
era that begins in the region. For Thaci the
decision is proof of the honorable Albanian
struggles for freedom and independence,
while at the same time constituting an
extraordinary contribution to peace and
stability in the region. Generally, Albanians
in FYROM view the decision as serving the
common good of the region and downplay
the Albanian nationalist element in it.
The political elite of Presevo Valley,
which is home to the largest Albanian com-
munity in Serbia, notice the great impor-
tance of the decision not only for Kosovo but
also for its eastern side: Presevo, Bujanovac
and Medvedja, “three municipalities that
never given up the struggle for freedom
and independence.” Radical and moderate
political parties in the Valley published press
releases on ICJ’s decision, congratulating the
Kosovo authorities and the Albanian nation.
Additionally, the Albanian diasporas around
the world celebrated their personal contri-
butions to this historical achievement. In all
Albanian-inhabited territories, community
leaders, activists, politicians, and intellectu-
als viewed the decision as a historical victory
that belongs to the whole Albanian nation.
Although Albanian political elites in the Bal-
kans have a long history of mutual animos-
ity as far as their own distinct problems and
agendas is concerned, it should not be dif-
ficult to find common ground when it comes
to the Kosovo issue.
Bledar Feta is a Junior Researcher at the
Hellenic Centre for European Studies.
Apostolis Karabairis is an expert on Balkan
affairs.
cover story
World powers facing a fateful dead-
line in the Middle East peace process will
invite Israelis and Palestinians to open direct
talks on 2 September in Washington. Envoys
from the so-called Quartet of Powers - the
United States, the European Union, Russia
and the United Nations - have been discuss-
ing a draft statement inviting the two sides
to talks intended to conclude a treaty in one
year, diplomatic sources said.The Israelis and
Palestinians were expected to agree to at-
tend, and US President Barack Obama would
be present at the talks. The Quartet said in
June that peace talks would be expected to
conclude in 24 months, but the new draft
says 12 months. The Palestinian Authority
government intends to have established all
the attributes of statehood by mid-2011.
Diplomats say the idea that a unilateral
declaration of statehood could win support
if talks do not start or collapse in the next
12 months is gaining interest. The peace
process resumed in May after a hiatus of 19
months but is stalled over the terms of an
upgrade from indirect talks mediated by US
envoy George Mitchell to direct negotia-
tions. Israel insists it is ready for direct talks
provided there are no preconditions. The
Palestinians are ready provided there is a
clear agenda. Israel says an agenda means
preconditions. Resolving the snag over
terms is crucial, diplomats say. The "invita-
tion to talks" statement by the Quartet has
been awaited since Monday.
Face to face
Obama wants face-to-face talks started
well before 26 September, when Israel's
10-month moratorium on Jewish settle-
ment building in the occupied West Bank is
due to end. Full-scale return to settlement
construction could sink the talks for good.
US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
spoke by telephone with the Quartet repre-
sentative, former British Prime Minister Tony
Blair, as well as Jordanian Foreign Minister
Nasser Judeh as Washington kept up pres-
By Thanos Triantafyllou
30 31
sure for talks to resume. State Department
spokesman P.J. Crowley said: "We believe
we are getting very close to an agreement
to enter into direct negotiations. We think
we're well positioned to get there. But
we continue to work on the details of this
process. "Clinton also spoke to Egyptian
President Hosni Mubarak about the peace
process. The Quartet draft reaffirms a "full
commitment to its previous statements".
Quartet statements from Moscow, Trieste
and New York this year called for a halt to
settlement building. The draft, however,
does not explicitly repeat that demand,
which would be rejected by right-wingers in
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's
centre-right coalition. It simply says that
direct, bilateral negotiations that resolve all
final status issues should "lead to a settle-
ment, negotiated between the parties, that
ends the occupation and results in a state at
peace with Israel". It says negotiations "can
be completed within one year". Success will
require the sustained support of Arab states,
it adds. Netanyahu may benefit from a move
to direct talks, countering the notion abroad
that he is not a genuine peace-seeker. Pal-
estinian President Mahmoud Abbas, by con-
trast, has a lot to lose politically. He could be
destroyed if he emerged from the process
after months of talking as a failed appeaser.
If accepted by Netanyahu as the basis for
talks, the Quartet invitation could give Ab-
bas the backing he needs. Few Palestinians
or Israelis believe direct talks would lead to
a peace treaty soon, or that one would be
quickly implemented if it were ever agreed.
In Israel's coalition, attention is focused on
the 26 September settlement moratorium
deadline, with a majority of Netanyahu's in-
ner cabinet opposed to extending the settle-
ment freeze, but a minority seeking some
compromise that Abbas could swallow. One
idea is to allow building in big established
settlements that Israel expects to keep in a
peace deal but not in those it would hand
over in a land swap with the Palestinians.
cover story
book reviewsGreece’s decision to lift its veto and
grant candidate status to Turkey at the
ΕU Summit in Helsinki in December 1999
was the result of a paramount shift in
Greece's foreign policy that most ana-
lysts attributed to Greece's entry into the
European Community in January 1981.
The paramount shift in Greece’s policy
toward Turkey has been the instigator
of a process that managed to bring a
substantive change, actually a break-
through, on Greek-Turkish relations.
What were the reasons for this U-
turn in Greece’s foreign policy vis-à-vis
Turkey, the neighboring state which was
considered to be Greece’s major security
threat over the course of the last thirty
years, as well as of the reasons behind
Greece’s major foreign policy initiatives?
Was this fundamental reorientation of
Greece’s strategy the result of a rational
recognition of Greece’s new strategic
needs and priorities, of a more in-depth
ideational change related to a collapse of
the traditional – and reigning – ortho-
doxy about how to deal with the ‘threat
from the east’ or of a combination of
both? When did Greece’s new strategy
to transform the three decades dispute
with its NATO-ally and ‘arch-enemy’
into a less confrontational and more
stable relationship reach its climax?
What were the particular goals the new
strategy was aiming at achieving and,
most importantly, to what extent had
the new strategy managed through its
implementation to affect the behavior
of Turkey and/or its definition of national
identity and interests? To what extent
had the assumption of power by a con-
servative government, in March 2004,
resulted in an alteration for the better
– the so-called refinement – or for the
worse – the so-called invalidation – of
the strategy adopted by the socialists?
Panayotis Tsakonas’ new book offers
insightful answers to the above central
questions which --although related to
the most important chapter of Greece’s
foreign policy in the post-WWII era—
remained unanswered in the relevant
literature. Moreover, based on unique
primary sources (given that the author
is an academic who served as an advisor
to the former Minister of Foreign Affairs,
George Papandreou from June 1999 to
January 2004) and extensive research
on secondary sources, the book presents
the first theoretical treatise of the most
significant shift ever made in Greece’s
strategy vis-à-vis Turkey.
Indeed, by advancing the 'strategic
culture' literature the book illustrates
that culture is a basic determinant in un-
derstanding change in a state’s strategy.
It also highlights the causal linkage be-
tween culture and strategic behavior by
demonstrating the role particular realms
of Greece’s strategic culture – agentic
culture and national culture – play in
explaining outcomes and in accounting
for change.
Moreover, by proposing how states
employ international socialization in
their strategic approaches to transform
the behavior of other states, the book
presents the most comprehensive ex-
planation to date of what defines a
state's socialization strategy, when it is
likely to emerge in relations between
adversaries, what forms it can take and
with what consequences. The book thus
shows how the paramount change in
the traditional strategy Greece followed
towards Turkey from the mid-70s and
the adoption and implementation of a
new strategy in the late-90s provides a
unique empirical case to approach the
concept of international socialization
as a state strategy, pursued and imple-
mented by a threatened Greece vis-à-vis
a threatening Turkey. By developing a
particular type of socialization strat-
egy, namely active socialization strategy,
Greece managed –Tsakonas argues—
to transform over a certain period of time
the EU factor into a catalytic instrument
able not only to strengthen its balancing
efforts but also to lead to the resolution
of the Greek-Turkish dispute.
The book does not only offer a fasci-
nating new theory on foreign policy be-
havior, as T.V. Paul, James McGill Profes-
sor of International Relations, notes in his
endorsement. More important, taking
stock of the book’s findings Greek and
Turkish decision makers now do know
what it would take for a breakthrough in
Greek-Turkish relations to happen.
Dimitris Xenakis
The Incomplete Breakthrough in Greek-Turkish Relations. Grasping Greece’s Socialization Strategy
Panayotis J. Tsakonas, The Incomplete Breakthrough in Greek-Turkish Relations. Grasping Greece’s Socialization Strategy
(Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke and New York, 2010), pp. 304.
34 35
The State of Europe: Tough
questions for the EU
On October 14 Friends of Europe will
host its seventh annual State of Europe high-
level brainstorming roundtable for Friends of
Europe’s Trustees, business leaders, top poli-
cymakers and opinion-formers at the Palais
d’Egmont. Organised by Friends of Europe
with the support of Belgium’s EU Presidency
and the Financial Times in partnership with
Veolia Environnement, NYSE Euronext and
Vodafone, it will consist of three sessions and
a TV debate. The roundtable will welcome a
select group of some 70 senior discussants,
including ministers, senior policymakers,
business leaders and international press. A
maximum of 2 introductory discussants will
give remarks at the start of each session be-
fore the senior discussants will engage in an
interactive debate. The roundtable will also
be attended by a few hundred observers.
Entitled “Tough Questions for the EU”, State
of Europe will be co-chaired by Friends of
Europe’s President Viscount Etienne Davi-
gnon and Former European Commissioner
for Competition and President of Università
Bocconi Mario Monti. Herman Van Rompuy,
President of the European Council, Michel
Barnier, EU Commissioner for Internal Mar-
ket and Services, Jerzy Buzek, President of
the European Parliament, Dominique Ce-
rutti, President, Deputy Chief Executive Of-
ficer and Global Head of Technology of NYSE
Euronext, Vittorio Colao, Chief Executive of
Vodafone Group and Josette Sheeran, Ex-
ecutive Director of the United Nations World
Food Programme (WFP), have confirmed
their participation.
http://www.friendsofeurope.org/Home/tab-
id/454/Default.aspx
The Future of the Integrated Border
Management Strategy
On September 06, Centre For European
Policy Studies, will organize In cooperation
with the Law, Science, Technology and So-
ciety (LSTS) research centre of the Vrije Uni-
versiteit Brussel (VUB).
Speakers: Jean-Louis De Brouwer,
Deputy Director-General, DG Home Affairs,
European Commission; Simon Busuttil, MEP
and Member of the Committee on Civil Lib-
erties, Justice and Home Affairs; Sergio Car-
rera, Research Fellow, CEPS; Henrik Nielsen,
Head of Unit for Border Management and
Return Policy, DG Home Affairs, European
Commission; Anneliese Baldaccini, Execu-
tive Officer for Asylum and Immigration,
Amnesty International EU Office; María Duro
Mansilla, Advocacy Officer, European Council
on Refugees and Exiles; Katarzyna Cuadrat-
Grzybowska, Legal Advisor, European Data
Protection Supervisor (EDPS)
http://www.ceps.eu
Upcoming
36 37
International Conference EuroMed
2010 on Digital Cultural Heritage
The EuroMed 2010 joint event will focus
on interdisciplinary and multi-disciplinary
research concerning both cutting edge Cul-
tural Heritage Informatics and use of tech-
nology for the representation, documenta-
tion, preservation, archiving and communi-
cation of CH knowledge. The scope includes
every phase of CH information technology:
initial data capture/digitization, informa-
tion/data processing, reconstruction, visu-
alization, preservation and documentation
as well as dissemination of results to the
scientific and Cultural Heritage communities
and to the general public (Multilingual, Mul-
timedia Digital Library). This event will be
supported by a scientific committee which
consists of almost 100 renowned profession-
als in the area of CH for a blind peer review
of all submitted papers. The main goal of the
event is not only to illustrate the programs
underway but also excellent work wherever
it is located and however it is supported, in
order to promote a common approach to the
tasks of e-documentation of World Cultural
Heritage. Furthermore, regional capacities
in the area of Cultural Heritage and IT will
be facilitated in advancing their know-how
through the exchange of information and
generation of new ideas and cooperation’s,
where the world meets the finger prints of
several ancient civilizations on earth.
http://www.cs.ucy.ac.cy
European Innovation Summit (EIS
On October 11, Knowledge for Innova-
tion, organize the 2nd European Innovation
Summit (EIS) in the European Parliamen.
The role of innovation in tackling the
grand challenges will be at the centre of dis-
cussion with stakeholders and policy makers
from all over Europe and beyond. A debate
will take place on how to achieve Europe’s
goal to become a global leader in innovation
and how we can make innovation partner-
ships successful. The Summit includes a
three-day exhibition in the European Parlia-
ment, breakfasts, lunches and dinners, as
well as the session “Europe’s Future Nobel
Prize Winner”, aiming to raise students’ in-
terest in science and technology careers.
http://www.knowledge4innovation.eu
Events
cover story