The Changing Pattern of Indonesia's Representative Government

The Changing Pattern of Indonesia's Representative GovernmentAuthor(s): Justus M. van der KroefSource: The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science / Revue canadienned'Economique et de Science politique, Vol. 26, No. 2 (May, 1960), pp. 215-240Published by: Wiley on behalf of Canadian Economics AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/138652 .

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THE CHANGING PATTERN OF INDONESIA'S REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

JUSTUS M. VAN DER KROEF University of Bridgeport

IN the new states of Southeast Asia the idea of parliamentary government has

usually been closely linked with the struggle for national independence, yet with the latter a reality in most of the area, there has come a curious disil- lusionment with the actual values of the former. Thus, during the 1920's and 1930's in what was then called the Netherlands East Indies, nationalists

agitated on behalf of "Indonesia berparlemen" (a parliament for Indonesia), but

today we find leading Indonesian public figures, such as President Sukarno, declaring that Western-style parliamentary government has failed in Indo- nesia, and that what the country needs is a governmental system "in harmony with the Indonesian soul," that is, a "democracy with leadership," or a "guided democracy."' The following pages will seek to suggest some of the causes of this disenchantment with the principle of representative government in Indonesia, by focusing on its historic origins and functions during these, Indonesia's first, years of national independence.

I

When on August 17, 1945, Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta, acting on behalf of "the people of Indonesia," formally proclaimed the independence of their nation, they confronted a condition of widespread popular inexperience in the art of representative government. It was not until 1918 that a rudimentary parliamentary body for all of Indonesia (the so-called Volksraad, or People's Council) had been established, in line with the plans, in great variety and often confusingly contradictory, of the Dutch colonial policy-makers to give their East Indian possessions a greater degree of autonomy. With elected as well as appointed members, and with delegates from the principal population groups in the country (Indonesian, Chinese, and Dutch), the Volksraad served to articulate the cross-currents of public opinion, but its authority was at all times inadequate to meet Indonesian as well as colonial Dutch demands for greater self-rule. As an official advisory memorandum to the Dutch government in exile during the Second World War pointed out, the public administrative relation between the Netherlands government and Indonesia was a

purely hierarchical one, in which the States General in Holland had final authority in all matters and could abrogate all Indonesian ordinances if it deemed such necessary,2 while often issues which "in the Volksraad found a

1Justus M. van der Kroef, "'Guided Democracy' in Indonesia," Far Eastern Survey, XXVI, 1957, 113-24.

2W. H. van Helsdingen, ed., De Plaats van Nederlandsch-Indie in het Koninkrijk: Stemmen van Overzee (Leyden, 1946), II, 92-3.

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Vol. XXVI, no. 2, May, 1960



Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science

passionate defence," were in the States General "settled with a single word or none at all."3

Still, the last decades of Dutch colonial control before the outbreak of the Second World War witnessed growing official and private concern with the

implementation of principles of self-rule. Unfortunately this discussion and

planning had little practical result, and the governmental changes themselves often had a haphazard and experimental character which alienated more

thoughtful elements within the community. Administrative schemes for decentralization, efforts to expand the sphere of authority of the indigenous Indonesian civil service, a broadening of executive functions also in line with new policies of social betterment-these alternated and collided with one another, while at the same time a dominant conservatism, especially in the thirties, proved generally hostile to suggestions of additional autonomy. Yet, the nature of parliamentary government had found interested Indonesians at the very dawn of their national awakening, and continued to elicit various

proposals from Indonesian quarters till the end of the Dutch colonial era. In view of the current controversy in Indonesia over the operation of the so-

called National Council, which embodies representatives from social and "functional" groups (peasants, youth, women, workers, and so on), it is also of interest to note that as early as 1919, on the occasion of the organization of one of the first major Indonesian labour federations, a political scheme was proposed for the country one of the features of which was a bicameral legislature, having one popularly representative chamber of delegates from political parties, and another chamber of "functional" interests, comprising representatives of peasant associations, workers, and other socio-economic groupings.4 In 1940, during a special government investigation of the wishes of various layers of society regarding the future development of government in Indonesia, a combination of autochthonous Indonesian organizations proposed much the same thing: in addition to a popular representative body an additional chamber was suggested, in which representatives of "social, cultural, religious, and economic interest groups" would be seated.5 The significance of these suggestions lies, as will be indicated later, in the early tendency of many politically conscious Indonesians to see a need for a balance with, if not a control over, a legislative body based on proportional representation, by other differently grounded co-legislative organs.

During the Japanese occupation over much of Indonesia (1942-5), the Volksraad ceased to function, although Indonesians acquired some experience in the Japanese bureaucracy and in a few local government councils which intermittently continued to operate. Along with the proclamation of independence on August 17, 1945, a new constitution was proclaimed, which in fact was based on the preceding public administrative order by the declaration

3J. Drijvers, "De Praktijk der Conflictenregeling tusschen Volksraad en Regeering," dissertation, Leyden, 1934, 84.

4Mededeelingen der Regeering Omtrent Enkele Onderwerpen van Algemeen Belang, 1921 (Batavia, 1921), 1-2.

5Verslag van de Commissie tot Bestudeering van Staatsrechtelijke Hervormingen Ingesteld bij Gouvernementsbesluit van 14 September 1940 No. Ix/KAB (2nd ed., New York, 1944), II, 192-3.

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Indonesia's Government

that all existing authority would continue to function so long as no new laws in accordance with the new constitution had been promulgated.6 The principal source of public power in the 1945 constitution was the People's Congress (Madjelis Permusjawaratan Rakjat), which embodied the members of the

regular unicameral parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat) supplemented by delegates from the provinces and districts and other special population groups. The tasks of the Madjelis were to determine the "major lines of policy," to

approve the definitive constitution, and to elect a president and vice-president; it was to meet every five years. Not only was the Dewan (a body to be elected on the basis of proportional representation) circumscribed in its authority by the policy decisions of the plenary Madjelis, but the 1945 constitution also vested considerable powers in the presidential office. The presidency was a

co-legislative authority, although most laws also required the approval of the Dewan. The president was not subordinate to the Dewan, however, but only to the Madjelis, though the president was expected to heed the Dewan's "voice." The president appointed the ministers, and they were responsible only to him; a minister might give information about executive policies to the Dewan on behalf of the president, but the cabinet remained a "presidential" one. Accord-

ing to article 16, the 1945 constitution also provided the president with a High Advisory Council (Dewan Pertimbangan Agung), whose advice, however, the chief executive was not compelled to follow.7

The constitutional relation here described largely remained a dead letter because, in view of revolutionary turbulence, elections for Madjelis and parliament were not held. The 1945 constitution had wisely foreseen this contingency, and, in its "transition" amendments, it had provided for the election of a president and vice-president by the Panitia Persiapan Kemer- dekaan (Freedom Preparation Committee), under whose auspices the constitution and the proclamation of independence had in fact been launched, and which was the core of the Indonesian revolutionary movement. The work of this Committee, whose members were in touch with local committees of a similar nature in many parts of Java and Sumatra, was to have far-reaching consequences.8 The Committee not only elected Sukarno and Hatta President and Vice-President respectively, and made provision for the establishment of executive departments and provinces; it also created a monolithic political party, the National Indonesian party (Partai Nasional Indonesia-P.N.I.), intended to be the single expression of organized political life. It also wrote into the 1945 constitution the provision that so long as a Madjelis and parliament could not be elected the president would be "assisted" by a new national committee, which, under the name Central National Indonesian Committee (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat-K.N.I.P.), began to function on August 29,

6Koesnodiprodjo, Himpunan Pemerintah Republik Indonesia, Undang-Undang, Peraturan- Peraturan, Penetepan-Penetepan (Djakarta, 1945), 12-13.

7For analyses of the 1945 Constitution see F. R. Bohtlingk, "De Verhouding tussen Regering en Volksvertegenwoordiging in Indonesii sedert 1945 en in de Toekomst," Indo- nesie, VII, 1953, 62-79, and Assaat, Hukum Tata Negara Republik Indonesia Dalam Masa Peralihan (2nd ed., Djakarta, n.d.), I, 5-12.

8Muhammad Yamin, Proklamasi dan Konstitusi Republik Indonesia (Djakarta, 1951), and G. W. Overdijkink, Het Indonesische Probleem: De Feiten (The Hague, 1946), 45-52, describe the work of the Freedom Preparation Committee.

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1945, after the Freedom Preparation Committee had duly dissolved itself. But after Sukarno had appointed his first "presidential" cabinet there were no constitutional checks of any kind on his authority: in the absence of a Madjelis and Dewan, and in view of the fact that the High Advisory Council and the K.N.I.P. had only advisory functions, the President could not be constitutionally challenged by any organ of government.9

In a way this great presidential authority was quite understandable: Sukarno, more than any other Indonesian, symbolizes the unity and aspirations to national greatness of his country. Nor can there be much doubt that the President saw his own leadership over the untutored mass in essentially charismatic fashion: he has long been an adherent of the Rousseauist levee en masse, and the mass movement is his favourite tactical weapon.10 Still, in a matter of weeks opposition arose from within the K.N.I.P. to the President's unlimited authority, and on October 16, 1945, a presidential decree provided that so long as a Madjelis and parliament were lacking, the K.N.I.P. would have legislative authority along with the President. The K.N.I.P. had thus in effect become a parliamentary body, and among its members there were those anxious to broaden its powers still further so as to make the ministers responsible to it. An effort to neutralize the radical Marxists' opposition to Sukarno and a desire to portray the revolutionary government abroad as a democratic state prompted another presidential decree (November 14, 1945) which made the cabinet, hitherto responsible only to the President, responsible exclusively to the K.N.I.P., which now, if it so chose, could force the resignation of one or more ministers.

But perhaps the most significant of these early developments was the presidential decision of November 3, 1945, to liberalize party formation, eliminate the party monopoly of the P.N.I., and allow the organization of other political groups. The immediate upsurge in political partisanship showed that deep differences of opinion existed in the articulate republican community and these tended to be amplified through the new powers acquired by the K.N.I.P. The day was to come when President Sukarno would publicly regret his decision of November 3, 1945, as a "fault which has led to free-fight liberalism" among the parties, impeding the whole national development effort."1

Though the extension of the K.N.I.P.'s power may be seen by one authority as "a voluntary self-restriction of the presidential authority,"'2 in view of current developments it is well to note that with regard to the K.N.I.P. Sukarno also followed a policy of "balancing" partisan political opinion by trying to make the K.N.I.P. a focal point of all the heterogeneous socio-political currents in the Republic. Thus, Sukarno believed, national unity could best be achieved. The hand of Sukarno was unmistakable in frequent extensions of the K.N.I.P.'s membership, and as one perceptive Indonesian politician has put it, "many

9Bohtlingk, "De Verhouding," 69. 10On Sukarno's political philosophy see Justus M. van der Kroef, "Sukarno and Hatta:

The Great Debate in Indonesia," Political Quarterly, XXIX, 1958, 238-50. See also Leslie H. Palmier, "Sukarno, the Nationalist," Pacific Affairs, XXX, 1957, 101-19.

"Java Bode (Djakarta), Sept. 5, 1957. 12J. H. A. Logemann, Het Staatsrecht van Indonesie: Het Formele Systeem (The Hague,

Bandung, 1954), 36.

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times" the K.N.I.P.'s working committee (the actual legislative heart of the

K.N.I.P.) "was improved with additions of deputies registered as representing labour, peasants, socialists, youth, the national-democratic current, the Christian

groups and so on," as well as with those who were deemed to be truly in touch with popular sentiment.13 Indeed, the appointment by the President of a large number of new members to the K.N.I.P. once caused a major domestic political crisis between the President and the older, more politically partisan K.N.I.P. members (at a time when there was controversy over an impending agreement with the Dutch), which was not resolved until President Sukarno and Vice- President Hatta threatened to resign if the new members were not seated. The K.N.I.P. thereupon acquiesced, but its conflict with the President was perhaps the first clear indication of the fundamental divergence of opinion between Sukarno and other key political figures over the structure and role of a

parliament. In the extremity of the revolutionary war against the Dutch this clash of views remained in the background, but in later years, when independence had brought grave problems in its wake, it emerged again with increased

intensity. Because of its subsequent significance the nature of this conflict may be sketched.

As has been indicated, Sukarno has long favoured the aroused, broadly popular movement, the idea of the "nation in arms," and the submergence of all partisan interest in the mass levy whose undisputed symbol is Sukarno himself. Even before the war he favoured the mass party over the small, elite party (educating and speaking for the inarticulate mass) which was favoured by Hatta and others.14 When the idea of a monolithic mass party was abandoned by presidential dcree on November 3, 1945, partisan factions, many of them continuations of pre-war political currents, increased their activities.15 Sukarno's idea of the nearly mystical levee en masse simply ran counter to the heterogeneity of Indonesian society, which was reflected in a multiplicity of parties. The President did not sufficiently appreciate that in the context of the rapid social and political changes caused by the breakdown of the self- contained agrarian society and of the traditional relations between colony and mother country, and caused also by the Japanese occupation and revolutionary war, the aspirations to leadership in the various parties, long repressed, were coming to the fore to fill an existing vacuum.

The emergent parties then, as one student has aptly put it, should be under- stood as "potential elite groupings, which, in order to maintain and strengthen their present and future position, seek seemingly democratic support."16 Bourgeois, Westernized, nationalist interests, essentially secular in outlook, Communist and other Marxist proletarian movements of workers and peasants,

l3Roeslan Abdulgani, "Parties and Parliament" in Basic Information on Indonesia (Djakarta: Ministry of Information, 1953), 45.

14J. M. Pluvier, Overzicht van de Ontwikkeling der Nationalistische Beweging in Indo- nesie in de Jaren 1930 tot 1942 (The Hague, Bandung, 1953), 49-51.

150n the origin and development of parties see: A. K. Pringgodigdo, Sedjarah Pergerakan Rakjat Indonesia (Djakarta, 1950); L. M. Sitorus, Sedjarah Pergerakan Kebangsaan Indo- nesia (Djakarta, 1947); and A. C. van den Bijllaardt, Ontstaan en Ontwikkeling der Staatkundige Partijen in Nederlandsch-Indie (Batavia, 1933).

16C. A. 0. van Nieuwenhuijze, Mens en Vrijheid in IndonesiY (The Hague, Bandung, 1949), 197.

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groups of modern, reform-minded, urban, Muslim intellectuals and business men, more nativistic, rural, agrarian, Islamic currents, the traditional, feudal aristocracy long trained in public administration, racial minorities (for example Chinese, Arabs, and Eurasians) of various political hues, representatives from

ethnically and culturally distinct regions inside and outside Java-these and

many others reflected the various strands in the multicoloured tapestry of

changing Indonesian life. Few, if any, of these groups saw the K.N.I.P. (or for that matter any other government agency) as the only focal point of their activity. Many possessed their own armed gangs and fighting units (lasjkar, barisan) which operated alongside the Indonesian Republican Army against the Dutch;17 many engaged in extensive extra-governmental activities (for example in the establishment of schools, training institutions, co-operatives, newspapers, banks, and other businesses) in order to influence the course of public affairs.

The K.N.I.P., its all important Working Committee, or any other future parliamentary body for that matter, thus provided only a very limited arena for the operations of the parties, and in time this would inevitably mean that the true functions of a parliament in the context of representative government would not be allowed to come into existence. One illustration of this contention is afforded by the manner in which various cabinets of the revolutionary government were brought down. Notwithstanding the parliamentary status of the K.N.I.P. and the responsibility of ministers to it, all five cabinets fell because of extra-parliamentary pressures and political changes; not once did a government fall because a parliamentary majority voted its lack of confidence. And indeed the seven cabinets which have fallen since Indonesia formally attained her independence at the end of the revolution in 1949 fell not because of any parliamentary vote, but solely because of extra-parliamentary events.

Originally, the leaders of the revolutionary Indonesian Republic had claimed to speak for all Indonesians. But in the course of the revolution the Republic's control over its territory steadily diminished and the Dutch succeeded in establishing separate autonomous states, first in East Indonesia, and then in Sumatra and Java itself, in accordance with a plan to federalize the whole future Indonesian government. The relative merits of this plan need not concern us here. Suffice it to say that it had essentially the nature of a "feudal counter- revolution under Dutch auspices,"18 which depended on the ethnic exclusive- ness of the divers peoples that inhabit the Indonesian archipelago. The political significance of this ethnic separatism cannot be gainsaid, and in the structure of the parliament of the state of East Indonesia it was given explicit recognition;19 but the Dutch did not realize that notwithstanding the creation of federal states (often in a very arbitrary manner) sympathies outside Java for the original Republic would continue to be strong. Indeed, the later efforts of the Dutch to coerce the Republic into submission failed in the very regions

7G. W. Overdijkink, Het Indonesische Probleem: Nieuwe Feiten (Amsterdam, 1948), 31-40.

18Henri J. Alers, Om Een Rode of Groene Merdeka: 10 Jaren Binnenlandse Politiek Indonesid, 1943-1953 (Leyden, 1956), 134. On the creation of the federal states see also A. Arthur Schiller, The Formation of Federal Indonesia (The Hague, Bandung, 1955).

19J. W. Levij, "Twee Jaar Oost Indonesia," Indonesia, II, 1949, 434-7.

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which they had counted on to provide a counterweight to republican claims.20 In the end, after protracted negotiations and with the aid of the United

Nations, a free federal Indonesian Republic (Republik Indonesia Serikat- R.I.S.) came into existence, in which the original Republic was one of sixteen

component units (states, federations of regions, and special territories). A new constitution also took effect (December 27, 1949), the product of the Inter- Indonesian Conference which had been meeting in Djakarta and Djokjakarta (Central Java) during July and August, 1949, and which was composed of

delegates from the various federal states created by the Dutch and from the

original Indonesian Republic. Among the provisions of this R.I.S. constitution, which was to be in operation

for only about six months, was the creation of a bicameral legislature. It was to have a Senate of 32 members to represent the territorial divisions (2 members from each of the component states), and a lower chamber to represent the Indonesian people as a whole (50 deputies were to be elected from the original Indonesian Republic on Java, 100 from the various other states, and an additional 18 appointed by the government from the principal racial minorities in the country).21 The relations among president, cabinet, and the legislature were very ambiguous: the president was to be constitutionally inviolable, and the cabinet was to be responsible to the legislature; however, the provisional legislature (which was in being before the elections) could not force the fall of the cabinet or of individual ministers. This latter clause was presumably provided to ensure the stability of the government in the difficult early months of independence.22 According to article 112, the members of the provisional legislature were to be designated by the individual states, either elected, or appointed by their respective executives. The latter procedure was followed in most cases.

The ambiguities in the R.I.S. constitution had little time to make themselves felt. In the first half of 1950 the movement to dissolve the federal states into a single unitary republic gained momentum, and a commission of delegates from the original Republic of Indonesia as well as from the R.I.S. drafted a new constitution.23 The merger of states involved procedures of doubtful legality,24 and was accompanied by civil disturbances, especially in Eastern Indonesia, the effects of which are still felt.25 The new constitution of August 15, 1950, defined the Republic as "a democratic, constitutional State of unitary structure," whose sovereign power is exercised both by the executive and by a unicameral house of representatives (art. 1, subs. 1-2), and in which, since the president and vice-president are inviolable, the ministers are "responsible

20Whitney T. Perkins, "Sanctions for Political Change-The Indonesian Case," Inter- national Organization, XII, 1958, 40.

21For the complete text of the R.I.S. Constitution see Resultaten van de Ronde Tafel Conferentie zoals Aanvaard tijdens de Tweede Algemeene Vergadering welke op 2 Novem- ber 1949 Werd Gehouden in de Ridderzaal te's Gravenhage (The Hague: Secretariaat van de Ronde Tafel Conferentie, 1949), Bijlage, 5-56.

22B6htlingk, "De Verhouding," 74. 23See Hasil-hasil Pekerdjaan Panitya Bersama RIS-RI (Djakarta: Pertjetkaan Negara,

1950). 24F. R. B6htlingk, "De Nieuwe Eenheidsstaat," Indonesia, IV, 1950, 106-18. 25Giinter Decker, Republik Maluku Selatan: Die Republik der Siid-Molukken (G6ttingen,

1957).

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for the entire policy of the Government" (art. 83).26 Both from the latter article and from an analysis of the intent of the drafters of the constitution it is clear that the principle of ministerial responsibility was explicitly recognized. Since national elections would not be held until the close of 1955, the members of the original unicameral legislature were drawn from the Working Committee of the K.N.I.P., from the original Republic's High Advisory Council, and from the Senate and Lower House of the R.I.S.

In this legislature, representatives from the original Republic of Indonesia on populous Java were in clear predominance.27 This imbalance probably contributed to the increasing ineffectiveness of parliamentary efforts at dealing with the rising dissatisfaction in the areas beyond Java in subsequent years,28 particularly since the constitution left the organization of local government undefined, though declaring (art. 131, sub. 2) that "the largest possible measure of autonomy" would be given the various territories.29 It is to be noted, however, that the house of representatives was to represent "the entire Indonesian people" (art. 56), and that members of parliament were enjoined to vote as their conscience directed "without instructions from or without the

obligation to consult with those who have designated them members" (art. 72, sub. 1).

The significance of these provisions would become apparent in later years. For example, the creation of extra-constitutional bodies, such as the National Council (to be discussed below), for the purpose of making the legislative process more representative by having delegates from functional or social groups exercise influence on the course of legislation in parliament, as is at present the case, was contrary to the 1950 constitution, though it represents, as we have seen, a wish of long standing in politically articulate Indonesian

26See Provisional Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (Djakarta: Ministry of Information, Pertjetakan Negara, 1953), and, for an extensive commentary, R. Soepomo, Undangundang Dasar Sementara Republik Indonesia dengan sekedar tiatatan dan keterangan dibawah tiap-tiap apsal menurut pendjelasan dan djawaban Pemerintah kepada Parlemen R.I.S. (Djakarta, 1951).

27A. K. Priniggodigdo, The Office of President in Indonesia as Defined in the Three Constitutions in Theory and Practice, Translation Series, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University (Ithaca, 1957), 34-5.

28George McT. Kahin, ed., Major Governments of Asia (Ithaca, N.Y., 1958), 538-9, asserts that a substantial portion of the members of the new unicameral legislature under the 1950 constitution, who, having worked with the Dutch in the federal states and owing their position in the new legislature to this collaboration, introduced an "unhealthy political atmosphere," since many were tainted by opportunism and corruption. In contrast the original Republic's non-elected parliament is seen as more representative. This strikes one as a debatable view. For one thing a number of members of the K.N.I.P. were equally opportunistic and their corrupt activities during the revolution were certainly as spectacular. The history of the original Republic during the revolution is shot through with debilitating rivalries among the Elite, campaigns of intimidation and opportunistic jockeying for position, which more than once threatened the embryo government with complete disaster. More- over, among the "federals" who had collaborated with the Dutch in the federal states were many with long experience in various phases of public administration, something that could not be said of many members of the K.N.I.P. or its Working Committee.

29Such early decentralization laws as were implemented were characteristic more of an indiscriminate levelling of various structures of local and regional autonomy, many of them anciently founded in ethnic custom, than of a systematic creation of appropriate organs of local government. Cf., e.g., F. R. Bbhtlingk, Staatsrecht in Indonesia, 1942-1952 (Leyden, 1952), passim.

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circles. Also, the requirement that a member of parliament should exercise his function free from party influence gravely misread the facts of the Indonesian

political scene and of the growth of the parties. The opinion advanced by one scholar30 that a deputy might even be duty-bound to disregard a decision taken

by his party on some matter of policy strikes one as unrealistic: there is some doubt whether modern parliamentary government can function at all without

partisan loyalty in a party structure. In any event, this constitutional injunction was ignored more often than it was observed.

The constitutional inviolability of the chief executive is reminiscent of the

position of the Crown in modern constitutional monarchies; it means, in effect, that every public act and utterance of the president is circumscribed by ministerial responsibility. Sukarno's own position in this respect has been

ambiguous. Given his personality and role in the articulation of modern Indonesia's aspirations it was almost inevitable that from time to time he would say and do things without the knowledge or approval of his ministers. Nor has his independent behaviour ever forced a cabinet to fall as might be expected under the procedure of ministerial responsibility. Indeed, there have been cabinets which have in effect condoned the President's freewheeling position, on the grounds that he is not merely a head of state but also a leader of his people.31 Sukarno himself has on occasion declared that he is a "constitutional president," standing "behind and above all parties" and therefore refusing to commit himself on cabinet crises.32 Then again, he has acted with an independence difficult to reconcile with the avowed constitutionality of his position. It should also be noted that under the 1950 constitution, the president was not to be a mere figurehead, for he was expected to consult direct with ministers (art. 52, sub. 2), he could attend and participate in deliberations of the cabinet at his or at the premier's wish,33 and his role in selecting the formateur of a new cabinet was decisive.

Sukarno has not, however, been content with the exercise of his influence behind the scenes; whether he would have served his nation better in the long run by emphasizing the constitutional restrictions on his position may well be argued. It should also be noted that the inviolability of the president was by no means absolute. Article 106 stated that he was subject to prosecution for crimes and misfeasance while in office. This means, as Logemann has noted, that since a judge under the penal code can take away the right to hold public office, he can thereby, in effect, also remove the president from office.34

During 1958 Sukarno's increasing dissatisfaction with the 1950 constitution found expression in intensified plans to modify the multi-party parliamentary system of government. These plans, most of which emanated direct from the President himself, at times revolved around a "simplification" (that is, a

30Logemann, Het Staatsrecht, 99. Since the constitution also prescribes that one deputy will be elected for every 300,000 of the population, a certain confluence of opinion among the electorate is necessary, since a "too individualistic voter renders his vote without value." Party formation is therefore essential. Ibid., 73.

31See, e.g., Bohtlingk, "De Verhouding," 78. 32Nieuwsgier (Djakarta), Oct. 30, 1954. 33Logemann, Het Staatsrecht, 45. See also W. L. G. Lemaire, Het Recht in Indonesie:

Hukum Indonesia (The Hague, Bandung, 1952), 118. 34Logemann, Het Staatsrecht, 49.

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merger) of political parties, the inclusion of representatives of so-called functional social groups (that is, labour, veterans, youth, the military, professional workers, business men, women, and others) into the parliament, a

larger political role for the leaders of the armed forces, and a cabinet responsible solely to the executive. It is difficult to determine to what extent these ideas were shared in other political circles, but the continuing political insta-

bility and economic retrogression, combined with the President's never-failing ability to present his nation with a new charismatic device in times of crisis, gave the proposals for reform greater popularity. As the Djakarta nationalist

daily Indonesian Observer put it (March 13, 1959): "Under the present conditions people have become so tired of every thing that they are only hoping for a change." Ultimately Sukarno's proposals for reform culminated in the

suggestion to "return to the Constitution of 1945."35 During the first months of 1959 it became clear that considerable confusion and opposition existed in various political groups about these suggestions. The situation was not clarified

by simultaneous statements of government spokesmen that the 1945 constitution would be fixed as the "permanent Constitution" of the country, and yet that the Constituent Assembly, then in session, would not be "forced" to

accept a return to the 1945 constitution.36 The Constituent Assembly failed three times to approve Sukarno's proposals, however, and on July 5, 1959, Sukarno, after consultation with top military leaders, proclaimed the 1950 constitution invalid and reimposed the 1945 constitution by executive decree. A thoroughly cowed parliament approved the President's decision on July 22.

It is too early to tell the exact nature of the governmental process under the reimposed constitution of 1945, but some important aspects may perhaps receive preliminary consideration. The organs of government provided for in the 1945 constitution have been reimposed for the most part. The membership of the previous parliament, in so far as it has taken an oath of allegiance to the 1945 constitution, will function as the new Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat, and will be supplemented by delegates from the functional groups. A new High Advisory Council and a National Planning Board (the latter body, though not provided for in the original 1945 constitution, is to concern itself with "over-all development of the nation") have also been appointed. A new People's Con- gress (Madjelis Permusjawaratan Rakjat) is to be appointed shortly by the President, to act provisionally (as does the new parliament) until general elections can be held. A cabinet of eleven ministers, including the President who now acts also as Premier, and an additional twenty-five deputy ministers and seven ex-offJicio ministers now compose the executive, the ministers being responsible only to the President, who in turn is responsible only to the as yet unformed Madjelis, and indirectly to parliament. Parliament and executive presumably are to collaborate on major issues, but in what specific manner is far from clear. In early 1960 it came to a rupture between parliament and the President.

35The details of Sukarno's proposals and the means he suggested for realizing them were laid down in his speech entitled "Res Publica! Once More Res Publica!" to the Constituent Assembly in Bandung on April 22, 1959. For the complete text of this address see Indo- nesian Spectator (Djakarta), May 1, 1959, 10-14; May 15, 1959, 15-19, 22; and June 1, 1959, 18-22. 36Indonesian Observer, April 4, 1959.

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The new constitutional arrangement is influenced by a number of political and legal factors. One of these is the power wielded by the Army Chief of Staff, Lt.-Gen. A. H. Nasution, and army officers generally. There are eleven

military men in the cabinet, Nasution himself being Minister of Defence, and an as yet undetermined number of officers are to be appointed to parliament and the Madjelis, even though the armed forces have been forbidden to take

part in politics. More significant is the fact that the 1957 law that established a condition of "emergency" is to remain in force, so that martial law, which has

given the military near dictatorial authority to issue measures in the interests of national security, will continue.37 This has in the first place meant a most

stringent supervision of all political activity: partisan meetings or publications require military approval. Members of parliament have been informed that

partisan politics may only be discussed in the parliamentary chambers; political expression in the press is subject to continuous scrutiny. The arrest by Nasution of the newly appointed Attorney General, an ex-officio member of the cabinet, on charges that his investigation of alleged smuggling on the part of army officers had given rise to "difficulties" and "tensions," indicates that the army's authority under martial law extends to the executive as well.

The vastly increased authority of the executive itself is also a factor. Now that the Constituent Assembly has been dissolved, the President has reportedly entrusted his cabinet with the task of perfecting the 1945 constitution by making such amendments to the law as are necessary. Three types of laws are now envisaged: (1) those originating in parliament; (2) those originating with the government; and (3) "laws originating with the government which replace laws adopted by parliament."38 The third category presumably involves executive decisions which can countermand parliamentary legislation. In its relation with units of local government the executive likewise means to assert its authority. The presidential decree (number 6) announced on September 10, 1959, gives the President authority to appoint heads of provinces and regencies and prohibits party membership to the personnel of regional government executive bodies. Though local government heads can be chosen from a list proposed by local legislative bodies, the President may ignore this list, a decision which, as the nationalist daily Suluh Indonesia put it, would "nip in the bud the idea of democratic autonomy wanted by the people."

Finally there is the policy of "depoliticalization" on which the government seems agreed under the present constitutional arrangement. Political party membership is now forbidden to all senior government officials, whether in national or local government, in state industries, in the police, or in military organizations. Some 50,000 persons of the best-educated and politically most sophisticated segment of the population are involved. This measure, as Maladi, Minister of Information, explained on July 28, 1959, is to be regarded as "the first step towards 'depoliticalizing' the entire government apparatus." It is

37For the text of the emergency law, which replaces but does not greatly modify earlier laws on the state of "war" and "siege" in Indonesia, see Lembaran Negara 1957-60, Tambahan Lembaran Negara 1485, and Mededelingen van het Documentatiebureau voor Overzees Recht (Leyden), VIII, nos. 8-9, 1958, 61-79. In December, 1959, a new "state of war" decree shifted authority to the President.

38Antara Daily News Bulletin, Sept. 17, 1959, 1.

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evident from these and other measures that the formation and expression of

political opinion in Indonesia will henceforth be allowed only on the sufferance of the executive arm of the state.

II

This sketch of the development of the constitutional provisions of representative government now needs to be supplemented by a brief analysis of the political context in which parliament and the executive have operated since 1950. Some 220 members of parliament came, as we have seen, from earlier representative bodies, and until the first national elections, vacancies were filled by the President in consultation with party leaders. In terms of actual party strength, as revealed by the later election, the division of seats in the provisional parliament was roughly representative for the two biggest parties, the Masjumi (Muslim federation) and the Partai Nasional Indonesia (National Indonesian party-P.N.I.), but it greatly under-represented the Communists and the Nahdatul Ulama (Muslim Scholars-N.U.-a more conservative Muslim party), while it heavily over-represented a number of smaller parties, especially the Socialists.9 This allowed the smaller parties to exercise an influence out of all proportion to their actual strength, a problem aggravated by the tendency to have all the parties, including the minor ones, represented on important, policy-making, parliamentary committees. But perhaps the gravest consequence of the system was that in the absence of a clear mandate from the electorate, and because of an excessive desire to accommodate all shades of opinion, extremes of individualism, self-interest, and irresponsibility were encouraged, and parliament was turned into an arena for the manceuvring of rival elite groups and the peddling of influence. In turn, the more or less organized resistance to the holding of national parliamentary elections was increased, not only among deputies from the smaller parties or from thinly populated areas beyond Java (deputies whose chances of keeping their seats in a parliament elected on the basis of popular representation would be slim), but also among delegates of the larger political groups who saw no reason to jeopardize an extremely profitable status quo.40

39See the comparison of seats in the provisional and elected parliaments in A. van Marle, "The First Indonesian Parliamentary Elections," Indonesia, IX, 1956, 258. The Masjumi is the forum of Reform Islamic political life in Indonesia. The party is anti-Communist, mildly pro-Western, and has a following among intellectuals, business men, and, to a lesser extent, in organized labour. The P.N.I. is the old standard bearer of secular nationalism. It was founded in 1927, was repressed, and did not fully emerge again until the revolution, when it became briefly the monolithic structure of organized political opinion. Today, it draws its strength from the bourgeoisie, the bureaucracy, and much of the Javanese aristocracy. Masjumi is strong beyond the island of Java. The P.N.I. is weak there, but has a strong following in Central and East Java provinces. The N.U. is anti-reform Islam; it has a strong following primarily in the Javanese countryside, as has the Indonesian Communist party. Urban proletarian support for the Communists is also strong. Among the smaller parties the Socialists are influential among the intellectual elite in the country, but weak among the masses. There are also Christian confessional parties (both Protestant and Catholic), Muslim splinter groups and radical Marxist organizations. On these parties and their programmes see Kepartaian dan Parlementaria Indonesia (Djakarta: Information Ministry, 1954).

4OHerbert Feith, "Toward Elections in Indonesia," Pacific Affairs, XXVII, 1954, 236-54.

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Not the least of the reasons why an atmosphere of graft and corruption began to settle upon parliament was that the political parties continued the extensive, extra-parliamentary, socio-economic operations which had amplified their role in public life since the revolution. Besides liberalizing the parties, the revolutionary Indonesian government had issued a call in November, 1945, for the formation of trade and professional associations, labour unions, organizations of merchants and private entrepreneurs, and similar functional groups. In the next decade these functional groups tended to identify their interests with the members of various parties, or even had their own deputy in parliament (as did the Communist-dominated S.O.B.S.I. labour federation for

example). Persuading deputies to pass legislation that would benefit a

particular group brought lobbying to new depths of nefarious collusion. A Dutch Socialist friendly to the Indonesian cause, who toured the country in 1952 at the invitation of the Indonesian government, wrote that "it was

generally known that certainly half of the members of the so-called parliament were hunting after personal gain the whole day long," having "established all sorts of trading companies and corporations of which they themselves were directors or chairmen," and were running from one government department to the other to solicit government orders from ministers and high officials.41 Government officials themselves increasingly came to see the parties as avenues of personal advancement. The holding of elections and the greater solidification of the party structure that ensued did little to change this attitude. An editorial in a Djakarta paper observed:

It has been known for a long time that parties in power abused their positions to plant party members in key posts, in order to get a most favored treatment by ministries or departments in which those members are working. A result of this unhealthy practice is that rewards of promotions to officials are often not based on ability, but on whether they belong to the reigning party. We do not seldom observe the existence of "party acrobats," i.e. officials who jump from one party to another depending on which party is in power at the time.42

The splintering and multiplying of parties, especially prior to the elections, was also in large measure caused by clashes of personalities in the parties and in the competing elites of the military, commerce, organized labour, or the

professions, and by the tendency on the part of these elite elements to establish their own partisan groupings in parliament if their aims could not be realized

through existing parties. As we have seen, the policy of accommodating all the groups, even the smaller ones, made such splintering of parties or groups quite profitable. At the same time the relative lack of political sophistication in the country at large (some 60 per cent of all Indonesians are still illiterate) strengthened the position of the elite elements, while the inadequacy and

expense of existing media of communication and information prevented even the fairly well educated who live outside the capital from knowing about

41F. J. Goedhart, Een Revolutie op Drift: Indonesisch Reisiournaal (Amsterdam, 1953), 199-200.

42Indonesian Observer (Djakarta), Aug. 12, 1958. Top-ranking civil servants have now been ordered to register their political affiliation, but it is not certain if this measure will greatly deter future party "acrobatics."

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prevailing political chicaneries. As one knowledgeable Indonesian journalist has recently pointed out, the fact that there are "Indonesian families with a fairly good education, who never or hardly ever see a newspaper" is the heart of the whole Indonesian press problem.43 Thus, the means by which the elite were enriching themselves were effectively hidden from public scrutiny. On the one hand, as Mohammad Hatta, the former Vice-President, noted, a handful of officials, business men, and parliamentary deputies were enabled to

gather riches at the grievous expense of the rest of society, while on the other hand the competition of elite groups for lucrative posts and emoluments pushed party activity in the direction of anarchy.44 Political instability, in the opinion of one cabinet minister, was aggravated by the tendency toward "mutual destruction" (saling banting membanting) among the leading parties.45

These developments provide the necessary background for President Sukarno's recent new emphasis on political unity and a needed "burying" or

merging of the parties. As the President complained at the Independence Day ceremonies in 1958: "The people have become aware that political parties often are being used as a means not to serve the interest of the people, but rather jealously to guard the personal interests of a handful of party-tycoons. In other cases parties are misused to provide employment ... or are used as a tool for those who are seeking licenses."46 He urged therefore, a "simplification" (that is, a merger) of the parties, a suggestion that also found approval in other quarters, though many political parties were unenthusiastic. However, after the reimposition of the 1945 constitution on July 5, 1959, combined with the continuance of martial law, the role of the parties has been so greatly curtailed that an actual "simplification" would be an unnecessary formality.

The relative ineffectiveness of parliament has been exacerbated by confused and undeveloped rules of procedure.47 The concept of a parliamentary session, for example, is inadequately defined. There are no guarantees that a newly elected parliament will be convened on time, nor is it indicated who has the power to call a session to a close or when. The presidential address, at the beginning of the session, is not accompanied by the introduction of the budget, and since it is apt to lack a specific and systematic analysis of national needs it is from a strict legislative point of view essentially meaningless. Parliamentary rules of order do not clearly define the matter that is to come before the legislators, and business not settled in one session is simply carried forward to the next. The actual scope of authority of the parliamentary committees is far from clear, and over the years the government has been so tardy in sub- mitting budgets that there is no effective parliamentary control over the state's finances, and the discussion of Indonesia's worsening economy by various deputies yet has to culminate in measures of any significance initiated by parliament to remedy the situation. It is not likely that the present parliament, operating under the 1945 constitution, will see any changes in this respect. The

43Adaham Hasibuan, "Genesis of a Press: Economic Aspects of the National Press in Indonesia," Gazette: International Journal of the Science of the Press (Leyden), III, 1957, 42.

44Nieuwsgier, July 17, Nov. 27, 1954. 45Ibid., March 28, 1955. 46Indonesian Observer, Aug. 18, 1958. 47Logemann, Het Staatsrecht, 63-9.

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1950 constitution also indulged in wishful thinking about the conduct of

deputies. The injunction that they must cast their votes only as conscience directs has been noted, but under article 72, subsection 2, of the 1950 constitution, deputies are also forbidden to vote on any issue which affects them

"personally"; no penal provisions are provided for those who transgress this

vaguely worded injunction. But perhaps no single factor has impeded the development of sound

parliamentary working procedures so much as lack of clarity in the relation between president and parliament. The personal stature of Sukarno has, as was noted, tended to overshadow his constitutional limits as President, and there is a strong inclination on the part of many in parliament to view the office in

nearly mystical terms. This is not to say that all parliamentary criticism has been lacking. Sukarno's second (polygamous) marriage, his charge that there were several Indonesian political leaders who were "selling out" their country to foreigners, and his assertion that Western parliamentary government has failed in the country all produced strong reactions in parliament. During 1957, for example, when the government attempted to make martial law constitutional by enacting a new law on "the state of emergency," parliament rever- berated with sharp criticisms castigating the undemocratic and "colonialist" nature of the proposed measure.48 Nor can it be said that parliament failed to take its duties seriously or allowed partisan considerations to halt the legislative process. Even during 1958, for example, when representative government was seriously curtailed, some two hundred bills of various types were passed, for the first time the draft budget was submitted and settled on time, and

inquiry was begun into such highly controversial areas as land tenure and

foreign investment. Yet the periodic assertion of parliamentary powers never seemed to translate

itself into an organized demand for greater recognition of the constitutional limits on the presidential powers, nor into a demand that the cabinet account for its general policy. "Votes of confidence" have been rare. Part of the reason was that the executive, sustained generally by the enormous prestige of Sukarno, was able in various ways to browbeat much of the parliamentary membership, especially after the proclamation of martial law in 1957. The summary arrest of deputies on charges of having made "propaganda" for

insurgent elements in the provinces, or for criticizing the idea of "guided democracy," elicited barely an outcry. The partisan press, like journalism generally, seemed powerless to bolster parliamentary authority. The Minister of Information has declared that the idea of a free press is "long past," as obsolete as other "liberal democratic ideas."49 Early in March, 1959, when it became apparent that there was less than unequivocal enthusiasm for his idea of returning to the 1945 constitution, President Sukarno urged the Djakarta mob to put pressure on the Constituent Assembly to accept the 1945 funda-

48See the parliamentary discussion in Ichtisar Parlemen, VIII, nos. 39-56, 60-61, 65, 70-71, 79, 86-88, 1957, as summarized in Mededelingen van het Documentatiebureau voor Overzees Recht, VIII, nos. 10-11, 1958, 81-92.

49Indonesian Observer, Feb. 11, 1959.

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mental law, and later Premier Djuanda was to hold out the possibility of an

impending military dictatorship in Indonesia if the return was not approved. The harassment and intimidation of parliamentary figures and other political leaders who disagree with executive policies, by means of visits by military police, lengthy interrogations, and frequent arrests on spurious charges, had

by the end of 1957 become almost an accepted feature of life in the capital. Had parliament, despite the national election of 1955, been more in touch with

the electorate, these conditions might have been ameliorated. Unfortunately, the role of parliament in terms of regional and local needs and demands has not as yet crystallized; in the vast rural hinterlands of Indonesia national loyalties are still not fully developed, and therefore local, tribal, and ethnic bonds have far greater strength.50 Parliament as a national institution demanding the interest of every citizen is as yet a vague image.51 The sense of legislating in something of a vacuum never left the Indonesian parliament, not even after the elections of 1955. The result was that not only did the electorate have no effective check on parliamentary excesses, but also that parliament was unable to draw strength from the electorate in a period when parliamentary powers were progressively being eroded. In addition there existed in articulate political circles no clear idea of the principles of parliamentary government, as indeed there has been no agreement on fundamental principles such as the collectivist nature of the national economy.52 The incessant appeal to new nationalist mystiques53 had the effect of discrediting parliamentary government, even before it had had time to be realized. A pattern of ad hoc accommodation of powers, developed in the vagaries of changing political and economic circum- stance, determined the scope and operations of branches of government.

The first few years of Indonesia's formal existence as an independent state coincided with the outbreak of the Korean War. The young Republic greatly benefited from the initial world demand for and the rise in price of rubber, Indonesia's chief export crop. In 1950 the small holders' production of rubber doubled, and by 1951 the total production of rubber had reached 793.8 thousand long tons, a peak which it was not to attain again.54 Indeed, in the

5OSee, e.g., G. William Skinner, ed., Local, Ethnic, and National Loyalties in Village Indonesia: A Symposium (New Haven, New York, 1959).

51To the Indonesian parliament as to the other national institutions applies the observa- tion of an Australian student of regional and local government in Indonesia, that even though Indonesia is now a state free from colonial control, the government's task at the local level is not wholly different from that of an alien government that establishes and preserves its authority in a "subject" society. J. D. Legge, "Central Supervision and Local Government in Indonesia," Australian Journal of Politics and History, III, 1957, 79-95.

52Cf., e.g., Wilopo and Widjojo Nitisastro, The Socio-Economic Basis of the Indonesian State, Moder Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University (Ithaca, 1959).

53Examples of semi-mystical rationalizations about the future development of the Indo- nesian state can be found especially in the utterances of Mohammad Yamin, a leading political figure and close associate of the President. See for instance Yamin's analysis of the "functional" revolution in Indonesia in Indonesian Observer, Feb. 20, 1959. It is this kind of political mystagogy that has contributed as much as any other factor to the postpone- ment of constitutionally sanctioned practices of everyday government and thereby has so gravely impeded the development of parliamentary processes.

54Indonesia: Review of Commercial Conditions, July 1951 (London: The Board of Trade, 1951), 34; and Harry Jiler, ed., Commodity Year Book, 1958 (New York, 1958), 286.

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following year, with the drop in the demand for rubber, there began a slow and steady deterioration in the Indonesian economy55 which greatly amplified the tensions in political life. Increasingly, areas beyond Java came to feel that

they were being neglected by the over-centralized national government, and ancient ethnic antagonisms were revived in Indonesia's heterogeneous population as the government seemed unable to deal with partisan intrigue, bureau- cratic corruption, and general impoverishment.56

It was at this point that the army began its rise to political power. The reason why the Indonesian army has always been unusually close to the

political cross-currents in national life and why its commanders have voiced the discontent of the provinces at the ineptitude of the central government in

Djakarta has already been explored elsewhere.57 Suffice it to say here that as

early as 1952 high-ranking officers had become greatly disturbed over the

incompetent meddling of many of the parliamentary deputies in public affairs

generally and in a contemplated army reorganization scheme particularly. Some of these commanders appear in fact to have favoured even then a kind of

military dictatorship with which the Afro-Asian world has become well familiar in the past few years, but their attempt to intimidate parliament in a mass demonstration in Djakarta on October 17, 1952, failed because of dissen- sions among the army leaders themselves. In the subsequent confusion and

shake-up of command, parliament was briefly able to reassert the principle of civil control over the military; but as partisan extremism increased and the economy went from bad to worse, a number of regional army commanders identified themselves with movements in the provinces for greater local autonomy. Early in 1957 they formed a number of juntas with provincial leaders and in fact dissociated themselves to a large extent from the authority of the national government, though continuing to proclaim their loyalty to the President.58

At this juncture a significant new constitutional development took place with the proclamation by the President on March 14, 1957, of a decree establishing the conditions of "a state of siege" in the country. On December 17 this was modified by a new decree establishing a "state of emergency." Most of the armed forces, particularly units on Java, had remained loyal to the central government, and it was on their strength that these decrees, in the last analysis, were based. As Premier Djuanda pointed out at the time, the decree

55See generally B. H. Vlekke, ed., Indonesia in 1956: Political and Economic Aspects (The Hague, New York, 1957), 53-92; Douglas S. Paauw, "The High Cost of Political Instability in Indonesia, 1957-1958" in B. H. Vlekke, ed., Indonesia's Struggle, 1957-1958 (The Hague, New York, 1959), 23-55, and B. Higgins, Indonesia's Economic Stabilization and Development (New York, 1957).

56In the provinces themselves the resurgent spirit of regionalism was variously attributed to continued subversion in the state by Dutch elements and to excessive centralization in Djakarta. As early as the middle of 1955 there was a movement in Northern Celebes to re-establish the State of East Indonesia and the federal structure of government throughout the country. See Nieuwsgier, Nov. 17, 1953, June 17, 1955.

5TSee, by this writer: "The Place of the Army in Indonesian Politics," Eastern World (London), Jan., 1957, 13-18; "Indonesia's Military and the State," Far Eastern Economic Review (Hongkong), XXIV, May 29, 1958, 683-7; and "Instability in Indonesia," Far Eastern Survey, XXVI, April, 1957, 49-62.

58Van der Kroef, "Instability in Indonesia," 49-62.

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of March 14 made the Minister of Defence (who at that time was Djuanda himself) the highest authority in the land,59 and the President, though con-

stitutionally supreme commander of the armed forces, did not challenge this contention. The decree of December 17 did not lessen the authority of the Minister of Defence, because the President could declare the "emergency" only as a result of a cabinet decision.

But the reimposition of the 1945 constitution ended ministerial responsibility, and the President, now also Premier, is in sole authority, the Minister of Defence being constitutionally responsible to him alone. In day-to-day practice the decrees have meant that the various chiefs of staff of the armed forces

(especially Lt.-Gen. Nasution, Army Chief of Staff), acting also in concurrence with local military subordinates in their respective roles as "war administrators," have acquired immense political power, the scope of which is only limited by Sukarno's prestige. The army has virtually carte blanche in the area of national security, it has become a decisive part of the various branches of government, and controls partisan political activity. It may investigate closely every citizen's personal and business wealth; it has begun a campaign against dawdlers in the government's oversized bureaucracy; it has supervision over intra-island transport and with the navy over all shipping; it exercised initial control over the expropriated Dutch estates and other businesses. In spite of all this, Lt.-Gen. Nasution has rejected military dictatorship in favour of a "middle way" in which civilian and military authority will complement each other. Nasution has also carefully indicated that these special powers of the army were "the work of President Sukarno," and his subordinates also have reiterated the "complete understanding" between civil and military leaders.60

The desire to accommodate, as much as possible, demands for reform coming from the military (previously little or no such accommodation existed, and some army commanders were driven into open rebellion) does not appear to be equally strong in all segments of public life. President Sukarno, in a message to the conference of armed forces held in Bandung late in December, 1958, told military leaders to concentrate their efforts on the restoration of internal security and to leave civil affairs to the civil government.61 His words found a sympathetic echo in much of the press. Among veteran politicians of the P.N.I. there has also been dissatisfaction with the steady encroachment of the army; and in the Communist party, perhaps the dominant party in Java at present, Nasution and his associates have long been anathema, though Communists have not as yet dared to criticize the army's rise very openly.62

59Nieuwsgier, May 29, 1957. 60Antara Daily News Bulletin, Nov. 14 and 28, Dec. 16, 1958. See also J. H. Logemann,

"De Staat van Oorlog en Beleg," Mededelingen van het Documentatie Bureau voor Overzees Recht, VII, 1957, 9-12.

61Antara Daily News Bulletin, Dec. 23, 1958. 62For a critique of what the Indonesian Communist party calls the "negative aspects" of

military power see the party's publication Material for the Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of Indonesia (Djakarta, 1959), 33. Of late the Communists have posed as champions of parliamentary democracy, which, though inadequate, "is better than fascism, better than military dictatorship or one man dictatorship." Documents: Seventh Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Indonesia, Jacarta, November 19-21, 1958, Supplementary Issue to Review of Indonesia, no. 12, 1958, 10. Sukarno's "guided democracy" is seen as a step beyond parliamentary government, however, and for

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The army's new prominence, a reflection of continuing political instability and economic stagnation, has further beclouded the operations of parliamentary government; yet, at one point in recent years, it seemed that parliamentary government might obtain a more solid foundation. After years of postpone- ment the first national elections were finally held in September, 1955, and

though instances of mismanagement and fraud have been uncovered, the results were undoubtedly a roughly accurate reflection of the electorate's wishes.63 Four major parties (P.N.I., Masjumi, N.U., and the Communists) emerged as the principal groups, the plethora of lesser organizations and factions lost

virtually all reason for existence, and parliament seemed at last to have a chance to act as something of a focus of the political life of the country. But bad habits were not lost overnight. The atmosphere of corruption about parliament was not easily removed and as the national economy worsened the country plunged into a series of provincial rebellions with which the people's representatives seemed unable to cope.

After a protracted cabinet crisis early in 1957, which indicated that regional dissatisfaction was bringing the Republic close to open civil war, President Sukarno, acting on the basis of the state of war and siege and in his capacity as supreme commander of the armed forces, appointed on April 9 "an extra-

parliamentary emergency cabinet of experts" headed by Premier Djuanda. The constitutional basis of this presidential action was questionable, although the new cabinet was subsequently given "the opportunity to work" (that is, it was approved) by parliament, and Premier Djuanda repeatedly stressed that the principle of ministerial responsibility had not been abrogated. But the circumstances under which the Djuanda cabinet came into existence, coupled with the widening feeling that any cabinet was better than none, created a new relation between parliament and cabinet and one in which the supremacy of the former over the latter was greatly attenuated. Then came the launching of Sukarno's plan for "guided democracy," the first feature of which was his establishment, on May 8, 1957, of a Dewan Nasional (National Council), of which he himself was chairman, to advise the cabinet on current problems whether it wished such advice or not.64 The creation of the Council raised all manner of constitutional questions, which, though by now largely of historical interest (in as much as the 1945 constitution provides for a similar body), are indicative of the confusions surrounding the parliamentary process.

The Council was perhaps the first concrete expression of a new principle of representation in Indonesian government-that "functional" groups should work side by side with political parties. The belief that the "functional" groups required separate representation rested, at least in so far as the President was

that reason the Communists have been willing to support it. In contrast to other parties the Indonesian Communist party has subjected itself to extraordinary self-criticism regarding its work in the rural areas and its increasing following in Java is at least in part based on this pseudo-scientific soul-searching. See, e.g. M. H. Lukman's analysis of local legislative councils in the party's newspaper Harian Rak/at, April 5, 1958.

630n the national elections see Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955, Interim Reports Series, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University (Ithaca, 1957), and Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesia's First National Election: A Sociological Analysis," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, xvi, 1957, 237-50, 407-20.

64Van der Kroef, "'Guided Democracy' in Indonesia," 113-24.

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concerned, on the assumption that the existing political parties were not truly representative of all the social interests, and that only if all the special interest

groups-from labour to business men, from peasants to artists-had their own "functional" delegates in parliament could political stability come about. From the start the President chose to ignore the relation between parties and functional groups, with the result that when in 1959 he proposed a further

implementation of the principle of "guided democracy" and a further recognition of "functional" interests in a new representation under the 1945 constitution, bitter wrangling broke out between him and a number of political parties over the number of "functionals" that should enter parliament and

especially over the manner of their election.65 This issue, it now seems, will be settled by presidential fiat; the parties, whether now in parliament or out, will have little to say in the matter.

The National Council raised other problems. The Council of some fifty men, as originally appointed by Sukarno in 1957, had among its members ministers of the Djuanda cabinet, staff officers of the armed forces, police officials, and other government officials. The Council was to give the cabinet advice but the cabinet was not required to accept it. Constitutional government that relies

largely on the subtleties of unwritten persuasion among various office-holders travels a hazardous road. The President assured parliament, for example, that the Council would in no way diminish the cabinet's responsibility to parliament, but in view of the fact that cabinet members were themselves in the Council the question arose what they were to do if and when the cabinet as a whole decided not to follow the Council's advice. Moreover, if the cabinet were to accept the Council's advice on a specific issue, could parliament exact responsibility from the cabinet on that issue (that is, if necessary force its fall)? Since the Council was created in line with the President's belief that the "parliamentary system" had failed in Indonesia, did not the Council thereby acquire a position beyond parliamentary control, and so drive a wedge between cabinet and parliament? And how was Sukarno's constitutional inviolability to be reconciled with his leadership of the Council? The fact that the cabinet approved the President's appointments to the Council did not remove the

65Early in 1959 the National Council proposed, with the concurrence of Sukarno, that 50 per cent of parliament should be made up of representatives of "functional" groups, and that they should be elected from a list drawn up, not by the political parties, but by the National Front for the Liberation of West Irian, an ultra-nationalist federation of functional group interests that is under military control. The parties bitterly protested this proposal, suggesting instead that "functionals" at the most comprise one-third of the total parliamentary membership and be elected from party lists. The conflict remained unre- solved, though in his address to the Constituent Assembly on April 22, Sukarno, urging the return to the 1945 constitution, proposed that functional group and party candidates appear jointly on lists of candidates, that some functionals be appointed by the President, and that a new National Front (not the National Front for the Liberation of West Irian) be formed to assist in drafting the candidates' list. The exact number of functionals that would thus be elected to parliament Sukarno left undecided. The proposal satisfied few party leaders and it is not known if this dissatisfaction contributed to the defeat in the Constituent Assembly of Sukarno's proposal to return to the 1945 constitution. With the imposition of the 1945 constitution by executive decree it appears that Sukarno's proposal will be carried out when elections for a new parliament and People's Congress are held in the future.

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problem of his co-responsibility for the Council's advice, particularly if a cabinet were to set such advice aside.66

The creation and function of the Council has been justified by Ruslan

Abdulgani, its vice-chairman. The government, he has pointed out, has the task of guarding the general welfare (1950 constitution, art. 82) and is given authority to act by emergency decree so long as such emergency decrees are later submitted to parliament for ratification (art. 96). The President, since he faced an emergency, was thus clearly empowered to establish the Council, while parliament, though it did not formally ratify a bill establishing the Council's existence, accepted the Council's financial estimates and so lent de jure recognition to the Council. Moreover, Abdulgani argued, there were

political elements in Indonesian society which were not given an outlet through the party system, and in view of the relative absence of a "politically literate and politically aware" society in Indonesia, the Council could serve the elements whose voice was not being heard and at the same time could en-

courage greater political awareness.67 These arguments are of dubious value. To be sure, the President could

declare that a state of emergency exists (art. 129, sub. 1 of the 1950 constitution, reinforced by the emergency legislation later in 1957); but the 1950 constitution also provided (art. 129, sub. 2) that regular laws would determine the nature and the degree of the emergency under which civil authority would

pass into the hands of the military, and constitutional competencies and established powers were not necessarily vitiated by that emergency.68 The constitutional position of parliament, for example, was not specifically affected

by the emergency described in the 1950 constitution, nor indeed by the

emergency law of 1957, so that the question could arise whether any measures

might be taken which would confine, obstruct, or otherwise jeopardize the constitutional position of parliament (as the creation of the National Council in effect did). As to the second part of Abdulgani's argument, that is, that certain political elements were not given "an outlet," one can only remark that if that were the case then the formation of new parties would seem to be necessary. If however, this argument is taken to mean that certain political elements were not making their influence felt in parliament as a result of structural inadequacies in the existing party system, and that, therefore, an additional organ of government was deemed necessary to influence the legislative process, then it must be recalled that article 56 of the 1950 constitution specifically indicated that parliament is to represent the entire Indonesian people.

Sukarno, Abdulgani, and others in sympathy with the scheme of "guided democracy" are apt to see an allegedly necessary modification of the parliamentary system in terms of specific Indonesian cultural values, such as gotong

660n these and related constitutional questions see J. H. Logemann, "Constitutionele Ontwikkelingen in Indonesia," Mededelingen van het Documentatie Bureau voor Overzees Recht, VII, 1957, 57-65.

67Ruslan Abdulgani, "The First Year of the National Council," Indonesian Spectator, (Djakarta), July 15, 1958, 10-13.

68Logemann, Het Staatsrecht, 61.

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royong. This term means mutual assistance, and it describes the once extensive

pattern of co-operative effort, common assistance, and mutual deliberation that characterized social relations in Indonesian village society. To Sukamo (and others) gotong royong is a principle that should be applied to all phases of national Indonesian life, and thus he has been apt to speak of a gotong royong cabinet, a gotong royong parliament, and so on. An expression of this expanded gotong royong concept is, as we have seen, the notion of the participation of functional and other social groups in the legislative process, and this concept may seem particularly appealing in times of factional struggles and partisan extremism. The difficulty is that the idea of gotong royong may no longer be a meaningful reflection of Indonesian social patterns. As early as 1921 an

investigation by the colonial government into the prevalence of gotong royong and similar practices in village society showed that the custom was rapidly declining and in some areas had disappeared altogether, as a monetary, con- tractual relation between individuals made headway.69

One is inclined to the belief that the doctrinaire propagation of gotong royong today in the realm of government is primarily caused by the Revisionist Socialist principles that have so deeply influenced many Indonesian leaders, combined with a nationalistic desire to provide a "unique" autochthonous cultural quality for the political process. The consequence of the gotong royong mystique has been to obscure the workings of parliamentary government and the implementation of constitutional principles, without providing a noticeable increase in government stability. Proposed solutions to pressing political problems are drowned in zenophobic hysteria, and the once-inspiring concept of "Indonesia berparlemen" has been so attenuated that between the lame authority of the colonial Volksraad and the emasculated powers of the present Indonesian parliament there is little or no significant distinction.

III

"Both the creation of the federal state in the years after 1945 and its dissolu- tion in 1950 did not come about in the first instance out of a knowledgeable preference for one or the other form, but under pressure of circumstances and sentiments created and inspired by political events, in consequence of which the political scientific question of the proper governmental structure for Indo- nesia. . . was never clearly raised."70 "During the last few years procedures of

government have fashioned themselves with only the loosest relation to the formal machinery of the provisional constitution ...."71 There is little question that the Indonesian political experiment has not allowed sufficient time for newly established organs of government to learn to function. Yet, even so, the ideal of representative government is of long standing in the nationalist movement, and by and large the character of such representative government has been interpreted in terms of a parliament to which the executive is responsible.

69Teng Sioe Tjhan, "De Landrente-Belasting," dissertation, Rotterdam, 1933, 96-7. 70F. R. Bihtlingk, "De Grondtrekken van de Indonesische Staat," Leids Universiteitsblad,

Nov. 16, 1951. 71J. D. Legge, "Guided Democracy and Constitutional Procedures in Indonesia,"

Australian Outlook, June, 1959, 93.

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A summary of the reasons why the Indonesian parliament has thus far been unable to stabilize its position, notwithstanding support for the ideal of

parliamentary government, would probably have to include the following. 1. Indonesians' lack of experience in parliamentary government. The blame

for this, as was suggested, must in large measure be laid at the door of the Dutch colonial administration. The impotence of the Volksraad and the relation between the colonial government and the Dutch States General were hardly conducive to the acquisition of the requisite training in responsible parliamentary government. Later, during the Japanese occupation and the revolution, there was often equally little opportunity to obtain such experience.

2. The influence of competition among elite groups in parties and parliament. Especially prior to the election of 1955 the party members who sat as deputies in the provisional national legislature represented not just divergent currents of

political opinion, but, rather, potential social elites competing with one another for socio-economic leadership in a rapidly changing society.72 At its worst this

competition augmented widespread public corruption and a self-centred

manoeuvring for power that filled much of the politically articulate segment of

society with dismay and in their eyes brought discredit on the whole system of parliamentary government.

3. Charismatic tendencies which hampered definition of parliamentary responsibilities. The inconsistency between the constitutional position and the actual political conduct of the President not only retarded the implementation of constitutional principles governing the relation between parliament and executive, but also had the tendency to strengthen ancient charismatic cultural patterns in Indonesian society as a whole, a tendency which in turn caused the politically untutored electorate to continue to think of solutions to their domestic predicament in messianic terms.73 In time this process weakened parliamentary initiative and responsibility and thus strengthened such extra- constitutional power structures as the National Council and the army.

4. A disinclination to press for clearly defined relations in the entire governmental structure. This disinclination has been attributed to the allegedly typical Indonesian refusal to drive conflicting or potentially conflicting opinions to their extremes, and to seek instead a pragmatic, undefined working relation in the interests of compromise. The fact probably is that after independence Indonesians came to realize more fully how extensive and profound the divergencies of aspirations and opinions in the welter of various ethnic, religious, and socio-economic groups in the country really were. For Indonesia is truly a society of societies in ferment,74 and the crazy-quilt pattern of newly emerging economic forms, social conflicts, different cultural levels, and regional

72Justus M. van der Kroef, "The Changing Class Structure of Indonesia," American Sociological Review, XXI, 1956, 138-48.

730n the nature of these charismatic tendencies and their influence on contemporary Indonesian life see by Justus M. van der Kroef: "Racial Messiahs" in Edgar T. Thompson and Everett C. Hughes, eds., Race: Individual and Collective Behavior (Glencoe, Il., 1958), 357-64; and "Javanese Messianic Expectations: Their Origin and Cultural Context," Comparative Studies in History and Society, I, 1959, 299-323.

74See generally W. F. Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transition: A Study in Social Change (The Hague, New York, 1956), and Justice M. van der Kroef, Indonesia in the Modern World (2 vols., Bandung, 1954-6).

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ethnic demands augured ill for future political unity. Out of necessity, often

mutually antagonistic elements were accommodated in the early unstable years of independence, but as events were to show, the lack of clearly defined relations (for example, between the central government and the outlying provinces) was to bring the nation to the brink of civil war. In the meantime the constitutionally established organs of government were unable to circumscribe their actual sphere of authority with any degree of precision, and thus became progressively unable to provide the necessary political stability within the indicated constitutional limits.

5. The pressure of extra-parliamentary events. Indonesia's domestic economic development is unusually dependent on the world market conditions of her few major exports.75 With extreme fluctuations in the price of such commodities as rubber and tin it became increasingly difficult to finance a steady rate of development, and the stagnation of the domestic economy adversely affected the entire range of public life, particularly the fiscal relation between the national government and the outlying provinces. Political issues, such as the anti-Dutch agitation in conjunction with the campaign to get control over Dutch-held West New Guinea, encouraged xenophobia, calmer parliamentary counsels were drowned out in the sabre-rattling hysteria of a few extremists, and parliamentary government as a whole was increasingly placed in jeopardy by Djakarta mobs and radical para-military labour and veterans' organizations.

6. A feeling that the current parliamentary function is only temporary and of transitory importance. With increasing domestic instability, the strong assertion of presidential powers, and the rise of the army, parliament has sunk into a state of passivity. Shortly after the return to the constitution of 1945 the President began to issue executive decrees in great profusion. All through the final months of 1959 covert hostility was rising in parliament against his alleged pre-emption of legislative authority. On December 2 he attempted to silence parliamentary criticisms by declaring that he reserved the right to govern Indonesia by decree "even though this may not be the procedure stipulated in the 1945 Constitution," and that he intended to do so until the People's Congress had convened.76 Sukarno's justification was that if he was right and had sufficient power to re-enact the 1945 constitution, he was also empowered to regulate "everything inherent in and closely related to" the decree that had established that constitution. On December 17 he replaced the "state of emergency" decree of 1957 by a new "state of war" decree whereby he himself became the supreme "state of war" administrator, a position which, under the 1957 law, had been shared by the heads of the army, navy, and air force. The next day the President reiterated that political parties that were not "genuine" would not be allowed, and that a "simplification" of the party system might soon be expected.77 In all these measures the dominant tone was that parliament, though its members had taken an oath of loyalty to the

75A. Kraal, "Enige Aspecten van de Ontwikkeling der Industrie in Indonesia," Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia, X, 1957, 253-61.

76Indonesion Observer, Dec. 2, 1959. 771bid., Dec. 17, 18.

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constitution of 1945, was still not what the chief executive wanted it to be, and that it had best realize its temporary character. It is clear that the President was voicing a notion long held in circles close to him that a parliamentary system of government was out of tune with the Indonesian national character.

Yet then, driven to the point of having to acknowledge the extinction of its own functions, parliament began to exhibit rare unity. In the early months of 1960 the principal parties-Masjumi, the Communists, the Nationalists, and even the equivocal Muslim Scholars-moved to battle the executive on well- chosen ground-the budget for 1960. With complete unanimity the first three

parties named (the fourth proved even at that point to be somewhat more

conciliatory) opposed the government's intention to establish a budget in which

expenses far outran revenues, and insisted that it was not to take on deficits and borrow without explicit parliamentary approval.78 When government spokesmen proved adamant, it soon became clear that (rara avis!) parliament would reject the budget for the first time in Indonesia's national history. It was

equally evident that a host of grievances among the lawmakers, not just the

budget issue, had solidified the ranks. But Sukaro, enjoying the support of the military high command, was able

to counter the crisis again. On March 5 he issued a new decree stopping "the

present members of parliament... from carrying out their tasks" and indicating that the composition of parliament would shortly be "refreshed." Local military "war administrators" explained to the press that this did not mean that

parliament was "dissolved," but only that it was "frozen."79 With little protest, the deputies left the parliament building. For the time being the era of what Sukarno has contemptuously referred to as "liberal democracy" had come to an end.

Today Indonesia stands uneasily between a government of men and a

government of laws. The main reason is clear. Even among Indonesian states- men who are critical of Sukarno's political mystique there is a feeling that the new individualism and partisan particularism evident in Indonesian society today are dangerous, that they mark a morally debasing retrogression from the elan and mass movement spirit of the revolutionary era.80 But this accelerating individualistic and partisan political consciousness is as old as nationalism itself. To be sure, its debilitating potential has been conspicuous in the new Indo- nesia; but it is also the expression of new forces in national life, liberated by the revolution from the stifling stratifications of colonial society. To minimize these forces or attempt to confine them so severely is to ignore the very dynamics of Indonesian life. As one of the ablest students of Indonesia's constitutional history, commenting on the return to the 1945 constitution, has written: "authoritarian constructs could find little support among a people whose 'native movement' under the colonial regime already gave evidence of

78Antara Daily News Bulletin, March 10, 1960. 79Ibid., March 11. 80See, e.g., the views of the chairman of the Indonesian Socialist party and former

Premier Sutan Sjahrir, "Nationalism at a Dead End: The Background of Indonesia's Crisis," Socialist Call, XXVI, no. 1, Jan., 1958, 19-13.

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240 Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science

a whole colour spectrum of opinions."8s It is the purpose of a parliament to afford an arena for the interplay of these forces and opinions according to constitutional precept. Rather than weaken parliament by all manner of ill- defined extra-constitutional devices, the greater wisdom may well be to

strengthen it.

81J. H. A. Logemann," Indonesie's Terugkeer tot de Grondwet van 1945," Bijdragen tot de Taal-Land-en Volkenkunde (The Hague), CXV, 1959, 213.

