THE CHANGING ROLE OF PARTY COMMITTEES IN THE

AGE OF SUPER PACS

Dante J. Scala, University of New Hampshire

In just two election cycles, “super PACs” have become vehicles for the raising and

spending of hundreds of millions of dollars for political campaigns, thanks to a pair of 2010

decisions by the federal courts, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission and

SpeechNOW.org v. Federal Election Commission. The federal courts have removed caps on

donors’ contributions under the condition that super PACs would be “independent expenditure-

only” committees, avoiding coordination of their activities with potential allies such as

candidates or political parties. This change in campaign finance law raises the question of the

nature of super PAC independence: Are super PACs only independent in a narrowly legal sense,

or do they achieve functional independence as well? In other words, are super PACs actually

extended arms of political parties, or do they work at cross-purposes with political parties a

significant portion of the time? If the latter, is this evidence of a threat to the traditional role of

political parties in campaigns and elections? This paper considers these questions in light of

expenditure data from 2012 contests for the U. S. House of Representatives.1

More specifically, this paper asks whether the wake of the Citizens United decision, the

subsequent rise of “super PACs,” and the near-obliteration of existing campaign finance

regulations, marks the beginning of a new role for national congressional campaign committees.

(otherwise known as “Hill committees”) in congressional election cycles. In this new campaign

finance environment, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee and the National

Republican Congressional Committee may be reduced from being main players to merely the

first among equals, in an era in which their spending in particular districts can be matched, if not

overwhelmed, by spending from non-party (but obviously allied) groups. In this environment,

1 Research assistance by Bryan Merrill and Christina Patenaude, University of New Hampshire.

for instance, perhaps the congressional campaign committee may employ early spending against

incumbents of the opposing party as a way to signal optimism to allied groups, and to paint those

incumbents as vulnerable. In this sense, the congressional campaign committee offers early seed

money and the stamp of legitimacy, with the unspoken expectation that allied groups would

follow up. Late in the cycle, spending by allied super PACs free up the Hill committee to support

candidates with longer odds.

To explore the question of the potentially changing role of national congressional

campaign committees in the age of super PACs, this paper examines expenditures by both “Hill

Committees” and super PACs (independent expenditure-only committees) during the three

months of the 2012 electoral cycle for the House of Representatives. In particular, this paper

seeks evidence of coordination between the Hill committee and its allied super PACs.

Hill committee behavior

Past efforts at studying the behavior of congressional campaign committees in allocating

resources have focused on the question of whether they were making those allocations

efficiently. Hill committees, above all, pursue majorities for their party in Congress (Kolodny).

Jacobson (1985) described the dilemma thusly: congressional committees behave efficiently

when they maximize the number of seats their parties hold after an election. A typical barrier to

committee efficiency is the party’s individual candidates, all of whom wish to have the

committee send scarce resources their way, regardless of whether they in fact need those

resources to win or retain their seats. Back in the 1982 midterms, Jacobson argued, Republicans

built a more centralized committee decision-making structure that distributed resources in a

“strategically efficient” manner, thus saving seats they otherwise might have lost in a difficult

national political environment. Other congressional scholars followed up on Jacobson’s efforts

with a similar focus on efficiency; Nokken (2003), for instance, argued that party committees put

little priority on candidates’ “ideological congruence” to party beliefs when it came to spending

decisions, instead focusing on candidates’ chances of winning their respective contests. Glasgow

(2002) defined efficiency in spending as the percentage of total committee contributions to

House campaigns that were contributed to marginal races that are competitive, as opposed to

sending money toward “safe incumbents and weak challengers.” Glasgow concludes his article

by wondering if both parties’ congressional campaign committees have become too efficient at

their tasks, and thus left potential pickups “on the table”:

Today, both the DCCC and NRCC are very efficient campaigners, concentrating their resources in the closest races. In fact, some scholars believe that party committees are now too focused on contributing to competitive races, and are thus missing opportunities to win seats in districts that may not look promising in early polls but that would be competitive with party support. Thus it may be that the best distribution of resources in terms of efficiency may not be the best electoral strategy for winning seats. It remains to be seen if this trend towards efficiency by the congressional campaign committees will continue, or if they will begin to gamble on less likely challengers. (emphasis mine)

Legal vs. Functional Coordination

The Federal Election Commission (FEC) has issued a set of boundary lines that delineate

what counts as an independent expenditure, and what should be tallied as a coordinated one.

“When an individual or political committee pays for a communication that is coordinated with a

candidate or party committee, the communication is considered an in-kind contribution to that

candidate or party committee and is subject to the limits, prohibitions and reporting requirements

of the federal campaign finance law,” according to the FEC. The regulation continues as follows:

In general, a payment for a communication is "coordinated" if it is made in cooperation, consultation or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, a candidate’s authorized committee or their agents, or a political party committee or its agents. 11 CFR 109.21. To be an "agent" of a candidate, candidate’s committee or political party committee for the purposes of determining whether a communication is coordinated, a person must have actual authorization, either express or implied, from a specific principal to engage in specific activities, and then engage in those activities on behalf of that specific principal. Such activities would also result in a coordinated communication if carried out directly by the candidate, authorized committee staff or a political party official. 11 CFR 109.3(a) and (b).2

The FEC has established a three-part test for determining whether a communication is

coordinated, including payment and content. The third part of the FEC coordination test concerns

conduct. A “coordinated expenditure” has taken place if a party or candidate

• suggests a particular communication to an independent expenditure-only committee;

• or becomes “materially involved” in decision-making regarding the makeup of the

advertisement;

• or participates in “substantial discussions” regarding the communication;

• or uses the same vendor to produce the advertisement;

• or if a former employee of the candidate or party conveys relevant campaign information

to the committee.

2 “Coordinated Communications and Independent Expenditures,” Federal Election Commission, accessed April 6, 2013, http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/indexp.shtml.

Satirists and scholars alike have noted that the FEC standards are not without loopholes.3 In a

paper on super PAC involvement in recent elections, Farrar-Myers and Skinner argue that super

PAC expenditures may meet the FEC’s standards for technical independence, yet still achieve

“functional” coordination that serves to benefit the candidate with whom the super PAC is

allied.4 For instance, the scholars note a 2010 congressional race in Texas, in which independent

groups supporting a particular candidate ran advertisements that strongly resembled the

candidate’s own. In addition, the groups publicly stated their intention to run the ads, and in

apparent response, the candidate’s party committee (the National Republican Campaign

Committee) reallocated funding toward other contests. “Certainly, [the candidate] and the NRCC

can be seen as receiving a benefit by having outside groups incurring the costs to run these

advertisements, thus enabling [the candidate] and the NRCC to use their funds in other ways,”

the scholars conclude. Given the transparency offered both by FEC reports and by “public files”

of advertising purchases maintained by television stations in accordance with FEC rules,

opportunities for functional coordination are plentiful.

This, in turn, raises a larger question about the place of super PACs within the extended

networks that comprise modern political parties.5 The example of Karl Rove, the Republican

political operative who guided George W. Bush’s climb to the presidency, is instructive. In 2010,

3 The comedian Stephen Colbert, for example, began his own super PAC to highlight what he viewed as the absurdities of campaign finance law. See, for example, this segment from “The Daily Show with Jon Stewart,” accessed June 20, 2013. http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/tue-january-17-2012/colbert-super-pac---not-coordinating-with-stephen-colbert.

4 Farrar-Myers, Victoria and Richard M. Skinner. “Super PACs and the 2012 Elections.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 30-September 2, 2012.

5 For an overview of the literature on political party networks, see Seth Masket’s article on “Party Networks,” accessed June 20, 2013. http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199756223/obo-9780199756223-0091.xml.

Rove and others started American Crossroads and its related 501(c)(4)6, Crossroads GPS, as a

shadow Republican National Committee (RNC), aiming to support the party at a time when the

leadership of the RNC was struggling. In the political media, American Crossroads became

emblematic of the dawning era of campaign finance regulations (or lack thereof). Crossroads,

however, proved to be just one type of super PAC in a diverse universe of new political

committees, which were far less than uniform in goals and methods.7 Republican candidates also

were diverse in ideology and quality, as the party became painfully aware during the 2012 cycle.

The nomination of Congressman Todd Akin for the Missouri Senate race, for example, was

viewed as a lost opportunity to pick up a seat in a Republican-leaning state after Akin became an

object of ridicule for his comments on rape. Looking forward to the 2014 cycle, Rove launched

the Conservative Victory Project, promising to take sides in Republican primaries to ensure that

the party did not nominate candidates who were too conservative to win in the November general

elections. In response, a high-profile Tea Party organization began a new super PAC, the Tea

Party Patriots Citizens Fund, to ensure support for conservative candidates.8 Within a few years,

6 501(c)(4) organizations are named after the section of Internal Revenue Service code which covers them. See http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Other-Non-Profits/Types-of-Organizations-Exempt-under-Section-501(c)(4), accessed August 19, 2013. Crossroads GPS qualified as a “social welfare organization,” Such groups may take part in politics as long as their spending on politics equals less than half of their funding. They also are not required to disclose the identities of their donors, while super PACs must do so. For a quick primer, see Sean Sullivan, “What is a 501(c)(4), anyway?”, accessed August 19, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/05/13/what-is-a-501c4-anyway/

7 Scala, Dante. “Toward a Typology of Super PACs.” Included in the Proceedings of Ethics & Reform Symposium on Illinois Government, Paul Simon Public Policy Institute, September 27-28, 2012.

8 Jaffe, Alexandra. “Tea Party super-PAC girds for coming primary clashes with Karl Rove group.” Roll Call, February 11, 2013. Accessed June 20, 2013. http://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/282407-tea-party-pac-girds-for-coming-primary-clashes-with-rove-group.

Rove has transformed from party guru to establishment mouthpiece in the eyes of some members

of his party.

Rove’s struggles within his own party raise a larger question about functional

coordination: How compatible are the goals and methods of political parties and super PACs?

Obviously one should expect a considerable amount of overlap between, say, the Democratic

Party’s national congressional committee and a liberal super PAC. The devil, however, may be

in the strategic details of coordination. In congressional elections, for instance, political action

committees traditionally have pursued contribution strategies designed to maximize access to

officeholders, including the funneling of contributions toward incumbents. Political parties, in

contrast, have focused on gaining majority control of the legislative chamber, focusing their

efforts on the support of quality contenders in the most competitive races. Recently, however,

PACs have changed their strategies in response to a polarized political environment in which

control of one or both houses of Congress is contested on a biennial basis; presented with an

opportunity to move the entire congressional agenda toward their preferred issue position, PACs

have behaved in a more aggressive, partisan fashion.9 Political parties welcomed the efforts of

allied PACs to gain majority control. However, the advent of super PACs, combined with the

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s shutdown of the soft money spigot in 2002, raises an

unhappy prospect for political parties: the loss of leverage over campaign strategy and tactics to

a motley crew of independent expenditure committees.

9 Michael Franz. Choices and Changes: Interest Groups in the Electoral Process. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2008).

Hypotheses

This paper will examine the following hypotheses regarding functional coordination

between party committees and super PACs:

• Strong coordination. Super PACs tended to take their lead in expenditure decisions from

Hill committees. When a Hill committee spends significant amount of money in a

district, allied super PACs will follow suit and prioritize that district in their expenditure

decisions.

• Weak coordination. While super PACs did not strictly imitate the decisions of Hill

committees, they had access to the same quality “insider” information as the Hill

committees. In other words, as insiders such as Rothenberg went, so went the super

PACs, focusing their expenditures on the races deemed to be the most competitive.

• It’s the ideology. Super PACs may be allies of convenience with Hill committees, but

their goals are not confined to winning chamber majorities. Specifically, they may seek to

populate Congress with representatives with a particular ideological stance, as a means to

an end of moving the ideology of the party itself in a more conservative (or more liberal)

direction. If this is true, then there should be evidence of super PACs forsaking the most

competitive races for the House, and instead supporting candidates of a particular

ideological cast.

Data

This paper analyzes Federal Election Commission data on independent expenditures in

House of Representatives contests from August 2012 through November 2012. These data

include the expenditures of the rival Hill committees, the DCCC and the NRCC. In addition, the

districts in which they make independent expenditures – the joint list of targets, so to speak –

will comprise the universe of cases considered here.

The universe of super PACs considered here is confined to the top 22 independent-

expenditure committees, in terms of total spending in House races.

Both super PAC and Hill committee spending was divided into two time periods: Early

spending in period 1, comprising August and September; and late spending in period 2,

comprising October and November.

A clear method to consider the importance of ideology to Hill committees and super

PACs is to examine the ideological positions of the candidates whom they supported. Happily,

Boris Shor of the University of Chicago recently took on such work. Using data gathered by the

nonpartisan organization Project Vote Smart, Shor generated ideology scores for major-party

candidates in 2012, including challengers as well as incumbents.

To measure perceptions of candidate viability and the competitiveness of a particular

contest for the House, the author used an inside-the-Beltway “tip sheet” heavily cited by political

insiders. Stuart Rothenberg, lead author of the Rothenberg Political Report, issues periodic

ratings of various contests throughout an election cycle. Rothenberg’s ratings range from races in

which one candidate is a clear favorite; to races which lean in one party’s direction; to contests

that merely tilt in one party’s favor; to pure toss-ups.

Hill committee behavior in the 2012 cycle

As one might expect, spending strategies of Hill committees were fairly consistent during

the three months prior to Election Day. As has become standard practice for national party

committees, both the DCCC and NRCC focused the majority of their efforts on winning open

seats and unseating incumbents of the opposing party. (See Table 1.) As one might expect, the

NRCC focused more of its resources on protecting incumbents, and thus the Republican majority

itself, than the DCCC. Both parties expanded their target list in October as the election drew

close, the DCCC more aggressively than the Republicans.

Table 1: Allocation of Hill committee spending among incumbents and open seats

D incumbents Open seats R incumbents

DCCC, Aug.-Sept. (period 1)

3 (9%) 17 (50%) 14 (41%)

DCCC, Oct.-Nov. (period 2)

8 (15%) 27 (51%) 18 (34%)

NRCC, Aug.-Sept. (period 1)

8 (20%) 18 (45%) 14 (35%)

NRCC, Oct.-Nov. (period 2)

10 (21%) 20 (43%) 17 (36%)

The Hill committees also closely emulated their rivals throughout the fall of 2012. As the

following correlation matrix displays, the spending patterns of the DCCC and NRCC were

closely associated with each other (Table 2).

Table 2: Correlation of Hill committee spending

DCCC, Aug.-Sept (period 1)

DCCC, Oct.-Nov. (period 2)

NRCC, Aug-Sept. (period 1)

NRCC, Oct.-Nov. (period 2)

DCCC, period 1 *

DCCC, period 2 .60* *

NRCC, period 1 .63* .48* *

NRCC, period 2 .48* .53* .70* *

*= significant at .05 level

The position of party nominees on the ideological spectrum apparently played no

significant role in the spending decisions of the party committee during the fall of 2012. Nor did

the ideological position of the opposing party’s candidate. (See Table 3).

Table 3: Correlation of Hill committee spending with candidate ideology

DCCC, Aug.-Sept. (period 1)

DCCC, Oct.-Nov. (period 2)

NRCC, Aug-Sept. (period 1)

NRCC, Oct-Nov. (period 2)

Ideological position of D candidates

-.03 -.08 .23 .07

Ideological position, R candidates

.01 .13 .02 -.05

The competitiveness of the House race, in contrast, appeared to play a large role in Hill

committee decisions. Both the DCCC and the NRCC focused the majority of their attention on

contests that were either toss-ups or, at most, slightly titled toward one candidate. They

contributed little to races with a clear favorite. (Table 4; Graphs 1-4).

Table 4: Allocation of Hill committee spending among Rothenberg-ranked contests

DCCC targets

D favored

D lean D tilt Open R tilt R lean R favored

August – September

0 (0%) 5 (14.7%)

3 (8.8%) 11 (32.4%)

8 (23.5%)

5 (14.7%)

2 (5.9%)

October - November

0 (0%) 5 (14.7%)

5 (14.7%)

11 (32.4%)

8 (23.5%)

4 (11.8%)

1 (2.9%)

NRCC targets

D favored

D lean D tilt Open R tilt R lean R favored

August – September

4 (9.5%) 6 (14.3%)

4 (9.5%) 14 (33.3%)

8 (19.1%)

4 (9.5%) 2 (4.8%)

October - November

3 (7.1%) 7 (16.7%)

6 (14.3%)

14 (33.3%)

7 (16.7%)

3 (7.1%) 2 (4.8%)

Graph 1: Allocation of early DCCC spending, according to Rothenberg rankings

Graph 2: Allocation of DCCC late spending, according to Rothenberg rankings

050

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D favor D lean D tilt Open R tilt R lean R favor

Graph 3: Allocation of NRCC early spending, according to Rothenberg rankings

Graph 4: Allocation of NRCC late spending, according to Rothenberg rankings

050

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How closely did Super PACs coordinate with national party committees?

Thus far, we have seen how the Hill committees of rival parties pursue a consistent strategy over

the three months prior to the 2012 election, shaping a distinct “target list” of heavily competitive

races. In the fall of 2012, how did super PACs which clearly chose sides (i.e. spent all their

resources in support of one party’s candidates or in opposition to the other party’s candidates)

respond to the list of targets set by their Hill committee ally? Did their allocations match those of

the Hill committees, or did they pursue their own strategies?

Both Democratic and Republican super PACs, as a whole, exhibit spending patterns

which correlate significantly, albeit moderately, with their allied Hill committees. (Table 5

displays the correlations between the national Hill committees, and the combined spending of all

Democratic super PACs examined here; and all Republican super PACs examined here.) The

moderate strength of these correlations cast doubt on the “strong coordination” hypothesis

mentioned above; and suggests a significant amount of diversity in super PAC spending

strategies. Functional coordination of Republican super PACs and the NRCC are slightly higher,

and more consistent, than among their Democratic counterparts.

Table 5: Correlation of Hill committee expenditures and super PAC expenditures

Democratic super PACs, period 1

Democratic super PACs, period 2

Republican super PACs, period 1

Republican super PACs, period 2

DCCC, period 1 .08 .26* .31* .34*

DCCC, period 2 .37* .20 .38* .48*

NRCC, period 1 .20 .31* .40* .38*

NRCC, period 2 .27* .47* .37* .33*

*=significant at the .05 level

The NRCC and Republican super PACs

Of the top Republican-supporting super PACs, slightly more than half exhibited a spending

pattern that correlated significantly with the NRCC’s spending allocations, even when the

criterion for significance is relaxed to the .10 level. (Table 6)

Table 6: Correlation of Republican super PAC expenditures to NRCC expenditures

American Action Network

American Future Fund

Americans for Tax Reform

Congressional Leadership Fund

Crossroads Grassroots

.13 .22* .22* .24* .11

FreedomWorks Now or Never

Spirit of Democracy

U. S. Chamber YG Action YG Network

.01 -.04 .01 .32* .22* .27*

*= statistically significant at the .10 level

To understand why coordination between top Republican super PACs and the NRCC appears

weak, we need to review the activities of the former in more detail. The first detail of note, as

Graph 5 shows, is the variation in the number of districts in which super PACs participated.

While the NRCC spent a total of $61.2 million in 49 districts, just two (American Action

Network and the U. S. Chamber) of the eleven super PACs made independent expenditures in

even half as many districts. In fact, four super PACs made independent expenditures in fewer

than 10 districts. Two of those, Now or Never and Spirit of Democracy, spent money in just one

and two districts, respectively. At this point, we appear to cross the line into candidate-centered

super PACs, organizations that are set up merely to help a particular candidate or, at most, a few

candidates. Such super PACs are unlikely to try to emulate national party committee strategy

because they lack the scope and scale to do so.

Graph 5: Scope and scale of Republican Super PAC activity

Another, potentially more significant, source of variation is candidate ideology – more

specifically, the attraction of certain super PACs to candidates with more extreme ideological

profiles. The NRCC, in keeping with its pursuit of maintaining the Republican majority in the

House, did not appear to make adherence to a particular ideological stance a prerequisite for

support. The median ideology of the candidates the NRCC supported was just 0.48. Nine of the

eleven super PACs considered here had higher median ideology scores (Graph 6), four

considerably higher: YG Action (1.08), YG Network (.85), Americans for Tax Reform (1.16),

and FreedomWorks (1.22).

American Action Network

American Future Fund

Americans for Tax Reform

Congressional Leadership FundCrossroads Grassroots

FreedomWorks

Now or NeverSpirit of Democracy

U. S. Chamber

YG Action

YG Network

050

0000

01.

00e+

071.

50e+

07In

depe

nden

t exp

endi

ture

s

0 10 20 30Districts in play

Graph 6: Median ideology of candidate supported by Republican super PACs

The median ideology of the candidates supported by a particular super PAC is of more

significant interest if it is associated with a shift in expenditure strategy away from a focus on the

most competitive races, and toward emphasis on supporting candidates with a particular

ideological stance. In order to take an initial cut at this question, the author examined how

focused each super PACs was on the most competitive races in the House during October and

November, 2012 – i.e. the races that Rothenberg ranked as “toss-ups” or merely “tilting” toward

one party or the other. Preliminary results (Graph 7) are intriguing enough to pursue in further

research. Some (though not all) super PACs with a median candidate ideology similar to the

NRCC, such as the U. S. Chamber and American Action Network, maintained a similar

emphasis on the most competitive races of the cycle. In addition, the two super PACs which

0 .5 1 1.5Median ideology of candidate supported

YG Network

YG Action

U. S. Chamber

Spirit of Democracy

Now or Never

NRCC

FreedomWorks

Crossroads Grassroots

Congressional Leadership Fund

Americans for Tax Reform

American Future Fund

American Action Network

supported the most conservative candidates, Americans for Tax Reform and FreedomWorks,

placed less emphasis on the most competitive races on the Hill committees’ target list.

Graph 7: Super PAC focus on most competitive contests of cycle

Coordination between Democratic super PACs and the DCCC

An examination of the relationship between the Democratic Hill committee and allied

super PACs reveals a similarly weak form of coordination of expenditures (Table 7). Only five

super PACs have a pattern of expenditures that correlates significantly, even at the more relaxed

.10 criterion of significance.

American Action Network

American Future Fund

Americans for Tax Reform

Congressional Leadership Fund

Crossroads Grassroots

FreedomWorks

U. S. Chamber

YG Network

NRCC

.4.5

.6.7

Por

tion

of ta

rget

s m

ost c

ompe

titiv

e

0 .5 1 1.5Median ideology of candidates supported

Table 7: Correlations between DCCC expenditures and Democratic super PACs

America Shining

AFSCME People

AFSCME AFL-CIO

Center Forward

Friends of Democracy

House Majority

-.01 .15 .20* -.01 .29* .25* Independence USA

LCV Inc. NEA Fund SEIU COPE SEIU PEA

.11 .13 -.11 .27* .23* *=significant at the .10 level

A more detailed look at individual Democratic super PACs indicates, as their Republican

counterparts did, that not all “super” PACs are created equal. Once again, we see several such

organizations that concentrate on very few contests, with no aspirations to the scope or scale of

Hill committee activity. Among the most active are the SEIU organizations, as well as House

Majority, which sits in a league of its own, much closer to the DCCC than its fellow super PACs.

Graph 8: Scope and scale of Democratic super PAC activity

Ameri

ca Shin

ing

AFSCME People

AFSCME AFL-CIO

Center

Forward

Friend

s of D

emoc

racy

House

Majo

rity

Indep

ende

nce U

SA

LCV

NEASEIU

COPE

SEIU PEA0

1.00

e+07

2.00

e+07

3.00

e+07

4.00

e+07

5.00

e+07

Inde

pend

ent e

xpen

ditu

res

0 20 40 60Districts in play

In terms of the ideology of the candidates supported by Democratic super PACs, the

striking finding is the close uniformity of these organizations (Graph 9). Most Democratic super

PACs were closely in line with the DCCC in these terms. The three super PACs with significant

variation from the norm were relatively minor players.

Graph 9: Median ideology of candidate supported by Democratic super PACs

Finally, as Graph 10 indicates, the median ideology of candidates supported by a

particular Democratic super PAC apparently had little relation to the organization’s decision with

regard to spending targets.

-1.5 -1 -.5 0Median ideology of candidates supported

SEIU PEA

SEIU COPE

NEA

LCV

Independence USA

House Majority

Friends of Democracy

DCCC

Center Forward

America Shining

AFSCME People

AFSCME AFL-CIO

Graph 10: Democratic super PAC focus on most competitive contests of cycle

(Tentative) conclusions

A first-cut examination at expenditures of super PACs and Hill committees suggests

some form of weak coordination between the two groups. First of all, a good number of even the

highest-spending “super PACs” are not, in fact, all that formidable compared to the scope and

scale of the Hill committees. Such not-so-super super PACs tend to focus on one or a few

contests, where their resources can have significant impact. Among those super PACs which

participated in dozens of contests, like the Hill committees themselves, significant variance in

spending decisions is still apparent. Some of this variance may be due to super PAC concerns

with matters other than the competitiveness of the race, such as ideology. The behavior of

AFSCME People

Friends of Democracy

House Majority

SEIU COPE

SEIU PEA

DCCC

.5.6

.7.8

.9P

ortio

n of

targ

ets

mos

t com

petit

ive

-1.5 -1 -.5 0Median ideology of candidates supported

conservative super PACs such as FreedomWorks is the most intriguing in this regard. Another

possible explanation for the variation in spending patterns is that super PACs seek to play a

complementary role to the Hill committees, such as shoring up potentially vulnerable

incumbents, or spending money against the other party’s incumbents in hope of spurring the

opposition to counter needlessly. Such possibilities will be considered in future research.

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