THE

CHECHNYA

STORY

INTRODUCTION

1

“When grief-stricken, hold your head high. Bow your head before other people’s grief.”

- A Chechen proverb

The conflict in Chechnya remains as “one of the most extreme cases of the

complex and painful process of secession.”[1] Secession is defined as “the fact of an

area or group becoming independent from the country or larger group that it belongs

to.”[2] In this context, Chechnya, in all its struggle, is pursuing to establish an

internationally recognized state by separating itself from Russia.[3]

What drive Chechnya towards partition can be understood when one would like

to study the historical context of this conflict and the nature of its people. Roman

Khalilov who is acting as the head of the Political Department of the Chechen Foreign

Ministry addresses this issue by stating that, “The reasons why the Chechens want to

create their own state is clear. For centuries, Chechens have been victimized and

persecuted by Russian authorities. Russian czars in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries,

Bolsheviks in the early 20th century, Stalin in the mid-20th century, Yeltsin in the 1990s

and now Putin, they all have had the same policy towards the Chechens. The Czarist

regime in Russia was replaced by a Bolshevik one in 1917, that in turn was replaced by

a so-called ‘democratic’ regime in 1991. And yet, the Chechens felt little difference.

They have always been victims of Russian imperialistic policies. The Chechens have

been given only two options: to become Russians by assimilating to the Russians and

accepting “Russian moral” (as General Shamanov put it) or to die as Chechens. We

have always chosen the second option. Therefore, what the Chechens want to achieve

is security. Under the current world order, only statehood is able to provide security for

2

the Chechens. Thus, this is the aim of our struggle, nothing less than full independence

is acceptable.”[4]

As much as the issue of secession is being contended, the conflict is also being

portrayed to the rest of the world as a destructive war, which “many experts evaluate as

unprecedented since World War II because of its catastrophic outcome. For example

Medicins Sans Frontiers labeled it as ‘world’s cruelest war’.”[5] Western criticism always

has always put the blame on the Russian handling of the war. But recent world events

that drive the anti-terrorism war provided an avenue for Moscow to “silence what

Western criticism there was.”[6] Fareed Zakaria, who is editor of Newsweek International

wrote, “Thank goodness for moral clarity. President Bush’s black-and-white picture of

the war on terror has apparently made sense of Russia’s complicated struggle with the

Chechens. The White House offered its wholehearted support to President Vladimir

Putin in the aftermath of the Moscow theater siege, despite accounts of a heavy-handed

Russian operation that had little regard for the lives of the hostages or the terrorists. (the

latter were shot dead despite being unconscious.) But that’s all understandable. Russia

is, after all, fighting terrorism.

Bush’s spokesman, Ari Fleischer, revealed that, ‘the president’s first reaction [to

the events in Russia] is sorrow that other nations around the world are being victimized

by terrorist.’ The notion of Moscow as victim in this conflict is strange.”[7]

It is really strange since all the while the Russian has been accused of barbaric

behavior in the Chechen war. Since international law on the law of the war governed the

conduct of war, hence weather Russia is really a victim can be analyzed historically by

the application of this law.

3

Therefore, the aim of this paper is to explore the justification of Chechnya to

pursue secession from Russia in the lights of international law. This will be conducted

by analyzing the historical context of the struggle, Russian treatment towards his

Chechen subjects and the application of international law with regards to secession.

The conclusion derived from this analysis will be assessed in respect to the

current international community standing on this subject.

Historical Context of the Secession.

“Take no step forward before you’ve seen where you go, utter no word before you’ve

taken a look at where you’ve come from.”

-A Chechen proverb.

Chechnya is situated on the Russia’s southwestern border (figure 1), in the

eastern part of Northern Caucasus. It is surrounded by Georgia, Dagestan, Ingushetia,

Northern Ossetia and Stavropol Territory. They are all part of Russian Federation.

Historically, “the Chechens have evidently been in or near their present territory

for some 6000 years and perhaps much longer; there is fairly seamless archeological

continuity for the last 8000 years or more in central Dagestan, suggesting that the Nakh-

Dagestanian language family is long indigenous.”[8]

The Chechens always identify themselves as Nokhchii and speak a distinct

language which belongs to the Nakh group of Caucasian languages.[9] Ninety seven

percent of them also speak Russian as their second language. They are addressed as

“Chechen” by the Russian. Historically, the name “Chechen” has been assigned by the

4

Russian in connection with the village of Chechenaul, a place where the Russian were

defeated by the Nokhchii tribe in the Russian expansionist war.[10]

Figure 1: Regional Map of Chechnya.[11]

“In the history of the difficult relations between Chechen and Russians, two

episodes are central: the War of the Caucasus (in the 19th century) and the deportation

of Chechen by Stalin to Kazakhstan and to Kirguizstan (1944-1957)…The first contacts

between Chechen and Russians date to the early 18th century.”[12] Throughout the

conflicts which developed into the Caucasian War of 1817-64, the Chechen “have never

5

undertaken the battle[s] except in [self] defense. The Russian conquest of the Caucasus

was difficult and bloody, and the Chechens and Ingush with their extensive lowlands

territory and access to central pass were prime targets and were among the most

tenacious defenders.”[13] Grozny was founded by the Russian during this Caucasian War

to serves

Figure 2: Map of Chechen Republic[14]

6

“as one of a number of fortresses from which they waged a ruthless and destructive

campaign.”[15] This period witnessed savageness of Russian conducts of the war.

Villages were destroyed, civilian population were deported, exiled or slaughtered.

Russian finally took Chechnya in 1858. Consequently, many Chechen become refugees

who migrated or were deported to the Middle East, especially to Ottoman Empire.

“Sporadic resistance to Russian rule continued and with the coming of the Russian

Revolution a Chechen Oblast

(autonomous province) was established in 1922. It merged with that of the neighboring

Ingush in 1934 and became a Soviet Republic in 1936, though Stalin’s purges of that

period cost the lives and liberty of thousands of Chechens and did nothing to win their

support as war with Germany loomed…In 1944, Chechnya paid a shocking price for

continued defiance of Russian rule which, Stalin charged, went so far as collaborating

with the German invaders. On Feb. 23 and 24, 400,000 Chechen and Ingush people—

almost the entire population—were rounded up and deported, mostly to Kazakhstan.

30-50% of them are estimated to have died within the year—one of the most

devastating incidents of ethnic cleansing in the 20th century. Yet, amid the turbulence of

the war, the episode went largely unnoticed outside the region. In the issue of July

8,1946, TIME sourly noted: ‘The Soviet Union has a social system of its own but

borrows from others…from tribal jurisprudence, group punishment for individual guilt…

Because ‘many’ Chechens and Crimean tartars fought on the side of Germans and the

‘main mass of the population…did not give opposition, their ‘autonomous’ republics

were expunged by Moscow. Charged with treason, sabotage and collaboration, an

estimated 400,000 men, women and children were driven from the land on which their

7

ancestors had lived for untold generations, and ordered to trek eastward. Where?

Nobody knew—probably to the vast Kazak steppes beyond the Caspian Sea.’ Only with

the passing of Stalin did Russia begin to acknowledge its inhumane crime against the

Chechens.”[16] In 1957, the Chechen nation was allowed to return to their homeland.

There they found ruined houses, destroyed villages, wrecked mosques, and strangers

(Russian and Georgian) occupy their homes and farms.[17]

Since 1990, there has been an active pro-independence movement within

Chechnya and with the breakup of the USSR in 1991, Chechnya tried to break away by

declaring its independence and proclaiming it as “The Chechen Republic of Ichkeria”.

That prompted the 1994 Russian clampdown and a brutal war in which some 100,000

people were killed, mainly innocent civilians. Boris Yeltsin, who was the Russian

president during that period had always manipulated the war in Chechnya for his

political advantage. But eventually the war turns its table and become an “unmitigated

disaster for Yeltsin personally and for Russia generally…Politically, the war only

deepened Chechen enmity toward Moscow, making it all but inconceivable that

Chechnya will never become a normal ‘subject of the federation.’ It also dealt a severe

blow to Russia’s international prestige, placed additional burdens on an already strained

budget, and badly damaged Yeltsin’s approval ratings.”[18]

8

Figure 3: Russian Penetration into Chechnya

9

On 12 May 1977, Yeltsin signed a peace accord with Grozny. “Entitled ‘Treaty

on Peace and the Principles of Mutual Relations between the Russian Federation and

the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria,’ the terse agreement included only three provisions:

the first stipulated that both sides had ‘renounced forever (navsegda) the use of force

and the threat to use force in resolving all disputed issues’; the second affirmed that

they both agreed ‘to construct (stroit’) relations in accordance with the generally

recognized principles and norms of international law, and to deal with one another on

the basis of specific agreements’; while the third indicated that the treaty would ‘serve

as the basis for additional treaties and agreements on the entire complex of mutual

relations.’….Having won a military victory against improbable odds, and having suffered

enormous losses in defeating an invading army, the Chechens have understandably

concluded that their republic is now defacto, if not de jure, independent.”[19]

The peace accord only survived for two years. When Vladimir Putin won the

Presidential election,[20] he chose to reverse the peace accord by sending 80,000

Russian troops to invade the republic.

As for the situation in Chechnya today, it can be vividly pictured by Anna

Politkovskaya’s article in a Russia newspaper, Novaia Gazeta:

“Chechnya is an isolated enclave within Russia, a 21st century ghetto. No one

may freely enter or freely leave – neither men nor women; neither children, nor the old.

Military checkpoints are everywhere. In order to pass these checkpoints, civilians must

place a form ‘Form # 10’ (a 10-rubble bribe) in their passport. Without such bribes,

soldiers might shoot you in the back or simply detain you, the consequences of which

are also usually fatal.

10

The most characteristic feature of life in Chechnya today is the uncontrolled

blizzard of bullets and shells all around you. No one is safe. Any discussion of human

rights is silly: Such rights simply do not exist. As Sultan Khadzheiv, one of the few

surgeons remaining in Chechnya, stated, Chechnya is a place where some people can

do anything they like, while the rest have to put up with it.

In this drama, the leading roles are played by the military and the supporting

roles by the civilian population. As for the fighters and other militants, they are nothing

more than extras, providing the necessary background and scenery for a dirty little war.

A brief look at the events on a typical day this month illustrate the point. Nov.4:

Federal troops at a checkpoint open fire on a passing tractor. Fifty-two-year old tractor

driver Sultan Suleimanov and his assistant, 42-year-old Akhmed Sadullayev, are lucky.

They are in intensive care, but they are alive. While proceeding along a road bordering

the town of Akhchoi-Martan, a military column opens fire on a roadside café. A 19-year-

old waitress, Larisa Bugaeva, a refugee from Grozny is killed immediately; another

waitress, a 30-year-old Larisa Khatimova, is seriously wounded and is taken to the

intensive care unit. The column, meanwhile, continues toward the mountain without

even slowing down.”[21] This make one wonder whether the Russian are just in their

campaign in Chechnya, whether law of war is adhered to by the invading forces.

Jus Ad Bellum, Jus In Bello and Human Right Abuses.

11

“If Moscow will find a way to kill the very last Chechen, then Moscow will not stop

for anything. They understand that the only way you [they] can bring us to our knees is

by the complete annihilation of our nation.”[22]

- Dzhokhar Dudayev (killed in Russian missile attack which

homes on his mobile phone signal on 21st April, 1996)

The Russian justified that they have the right to go to war in order to preserve

their territorial boundary. The justification is more pressing when the issue of security

and economics are put into the equation. Hence the official reason stated by Russia “is

to stamp out Islamic guerilla who in summer [1999], had launched a separatist

insurrection in neighboring Dagestan, whom Moscow blames for a series of terrorist

bombings inside Russia [some speculations pointed out that these are the provocation

carried out by Moscow to rally public support for the invasion[23]]. But Moscow is well

aware that President Mashkadov has no control over the guerillas operating from his

increasingly anarchic country; in fact, they have demanded his ouster. The full-scale

invasion therefore seems in part an opportunity for the Russian military to redeem itself

from what was a humiliating failure in the last Chechnya war.”[24] But that reason that

does not stop there. The main goal of Moscow decision to attack Chechnya back in

December 1994 “was to ensure control of the oil pipeline which runs from Baku, via

Grozny, the Chechen capital, to the Russian city of Tikhorestsk. The pipeline ends at

the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, designed by Russia to be the terminal for

the purposed Kazakh and Azerbaijani pipelines. In addition, Grozny boasts a large

refinery with a processing capacity of 12 million ton per year.”[25] But even if jus ad

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bellum is on the side of the Russian, the jus in bello tells a different story. The conducts

of the Russian Federal Forces in Chechnya are very gruesome. Consider some of the

Russian soldiers’ blatant confessions on their crime in Chechnya:

· “I remember a Chechen female sniper. She didn’t have any chance of making

it to the authorities. We just tore her apart with two armored personnel

carriers, having tied her ankles with steel cables. There was a lot of blood, but

the boys needed it.” – Boris, Russian soldier.

· “We would also throw fighters off the helicopters before landing. The trick was

to pick the right altitude. We didn’t want them to die right away. We wanted

them to suffer before they died. Maybe it’s cruel, but in a war, that’s almost

the only way to dull the fear and sorrow of losing your friends.” – Boris,

Russian soldier.

· “It’s much easier to kill them all (Chechens). It takes less time for them to die

than to grow.” – Valery, Russian personnel officer.

· “Our hatred is against all Chechens, not just the individual enemies who killed

your friends.” – 23-year-old Russian Army officer.

· “Our commander told us all the time, ‘There’s no such thing as Chechen

civilian.” – Russian conscript[26]

“Russian and Western human rights group have extensively and meticulously

documented hundreds of war crimes by Russian troops, including extrajudicial

executions, torture, extortion and reduction to rubble of Chechen towns with

indiscriminate bombing an shelling. A typical Russian “military operation” in Chechnya

consists of invading a village or town, rounding up all of its inhabitants and separating

13

out men and older boys for detention in open pits. Most are released to their families in

exchange for bribes, but many are tortured and some are summarily executed, their

bodies left at dumps or sold back to relatives.”[27]

The summary from the Russian President’s Commission on Human Rights report

indicated that the war in Chechnya is considered “as an armed conflict not of an

international nature, which is covered by Article 3 in all four Geneva Conventions, dated

August 12, 1949, and by the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions and

Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II).

The Russian Federation ratified these agreements and is bound by their provisions

regardless of whether they have been incorporated into domestic legislation.”[28] This

report, which addressed the 1994-1995 Chechnya conflict listed down six major areas

of human right violation by the Russian Federal Forces:

· “The most flagrant violation of humanitarian law regarding the protection of

victims of non-international conflicts has been the massive assault on the life

and physical integrity of the civilian population.”

· “Deliberate attacks on civilian targets [which] are a gross violation of

international humanitarian law.”

· “Kidnapping, the detention of people without due cause, and execution

without judicial procedure.”

· “Throughout the armed operations in the Chechen Republic, the federal

forces widely applied the principle of collective guilt and collective punishment

which is expressly prohibited by Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions.”

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· “The unlawful detention of civilians, harsh and degrading treatment of

detainees, and the use of torture [which] are serious violations of

humanitarian law and ethical principles.”

· “Looting and destruction of civilian property has been widespread in the

combat zone.”[29]

Russian complete disregards to the terms of all agreements that they signed on

the highest level, the cruel war and the gross abuse of human rights, makes one

wonder why does the Chechen struggle for its independence does not received a

favorable response from the international society. The answer may lie in the conflict of

“two foundational principles of international law: the principle of self-determination of

peoples and the principle of the territorial integrity of states”.[30]

The International Law on Secession.

“Two enemies can hardly live under one roof.”

- A Chechen proverb.

“No area of international law is more confused, incoherent, and unsatisfactory

than the law of self-determination.”[31] This incoherency lies in the fact that the law

affirms at the same time the inalienable right of self-determination that peoples have

and the right of existing states (its sovereignty) to maintain their territorial integrity. The

international law also lacking the criteria to know when a self-determination or

secession claim is sound. As R. Teson observes, “An international lawyer confronted

15

with a secessionist movement reasons as follows. If the secessionists win, then they

form their own state, which third states must recognized because it is effective (i.e., the

new government effective exercise political power over the population in the territory),

and the right of self-determination has been exercised. If the government wins, then

there is no new state, third states ought to refrain from recognition because the rebels

have no effective government, and the right to territorial integrity has been vindicated.

As a consequence, if our imaginary lawyer is consulted in advance about the dispute he

has to say that there are no preexisting principles and that the outcome can only be

decided in the battlefield! In my view, this is not law but antilaw. Such unconditional

surrender to the most brutal realities of power politics has no place in a philosophy of

international law: we want to know whether or not secessionist are justified in their

demands, regardless of whether or not they win the struggle.” In conducting the analysis

on the philosophers and political scientist’s approaches to fill this gap in international

law, Teson comes to a conclusion that “there are three factors to be considered in the

moral evaluation of self-determination claims. The first is the moral urgency to escape

serious political injustice against a group. In this case, self-determination, autonomy,

group rights and even secession may be the only viable forms of political reorganization

to end the injustice. The second is need to remedy past territorial injustice against the

group…Political injustice occurs when members of the group are denied human rights;

territorial injustice occurs when the group’s governance over the territory has been

forcibly replaced by outsiders…The third factor is the need to take into account the

legitimate interest of third parties, in particular, of people in the parent state. Those

legitimate expectations of third parties, however, ought always be either moral reasons

16

(e.g., a fear that larger autonomy for the group would impair the democratic institutions

in the parent state) or strong prudential reasons (e.g., a danger that larger group

autonomy will jeopardize a vital food supply).”[32]

Looking back at the Chechen secessionist struggle, the first factor qualified in

this analysis since the current and historical evidence displayed that the Chechen

subjects are always being victimized by the Russian (and previously Soviet)

government. Since the principle responsibility of a state (in the concept of an

international society), is to provide security and welfare to its citizen or subjects, the

breach of this principle or the inability to honor it, justified the demand of the afflicted for

self-governing. The aggression and occupation carried by the Russia on Chechnya

territory and forcibly annexed it to the Russian empire also substantiated the claim that

there is a pressing need to address the issue on the territorial injustice. As for the third

factor, availability of natural resources within Chechnya, or the necessity of oil pipeline

routing via this territory does not justified the denial of its independence, since it can be

overcome by bilateral agreement or what ever trade mechanisms which exist within the

international society.

Conclusion.

“A river may change its course”

- A Chechen proverb.

Given the historical context of the Chechen’s struggle, the forced annexation with

Russia, the repetitive inhumane treatment by Russian on his Chechen subjects, which

include the genocide carried out by Stalin and the latest attempted genocide[33] by

17

Russian forces, with the application of the concept concluded by Teson, the Chechen

has the very right to secede within the framework of international law.

But this right has not been honored by the international community since “the

international community default position is overwhelmingly in favor of territorial integrity,

not self-determination.”[34] Moreover the international community does not wish to

“create ‘a moral hazard’ whereby the legitimization of secession in certain cases

induces others to launch wars of secession elsewhere.”[35] This is more so for the states

that already facing “active or potential separatist threats within their own borders.”[36]

Fearful of severed diplomatic relation with Russia also stopped many states from

proclaiming diplomatic recognition of Chechnya independence.[37]

This disjuncture between the right according to the law and the right to apply the

law, characterizes the international law in the absence of sole enforcement authority. As

the tragedy of Chechen nation attracts worldwide attention, this issue will certainly

become a subject of future debates among historians of modern history, academics of

International Relations and Lawyers of International Law.[38]

Written by Mej Abdul Latif Mohamed TUDM for International Law And

Organization Seminar Paper.

Microsoft word count: 3805 words.

[1] Lyoma Usmanov, “The Political Economy of Chechnya’s Secession”, Washington DC, 1999. Assessed online 09 November 2002, <http://www.amina.com/article/pol_econ.html>[2] Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary, p.1152.[3] Edward W.Walker, Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, “No Peace, No War in The Caucasus: Secessionist Conflicts in Chechnya, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh”, Harvard University, 1998, p.2[4] Roman Khalilov, The Eurasian Politician, “Independence and State of Chechnya”, 2000. Assessed online 09 November 2002, <http://www.amina.com/article/indest.html>[5] Lyoma Usmanov, “The Political Economy of Chechnya’s Secession”, Washington DC, 1999. Assessed online 09 November 2002, <http://www.amina.com/article/pol_econ.html>

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[6] Phil Reeves and Mary Dejevsky, The Independent, “Analysis: Chechnya: The bloody history of a people with an unquenchable thirst for independence”, London, 2002. Assessed online 09 November 2002, <http://infoweb2.newsbank.com/iw-search/we/InfoWeb?p_action=doc&p_docid=0F703A3…>[7] Fareed Zakaria, Washingtonpost.com, “This Is Moral Clarity”, The Washington Post Company, 2002. Assessed online 09 November 2002, <http://www.chechenpress.info/english/news/11_2002/09/1.htm>[8] Johanna Nichols, “Who Are The Chechen?”, University of California, Berkeley, 1995. Assessed online 09 November 2002, <ftp://coombs.anu.edu.au/coombspapers/otherarchieves/asian-studies-archieves/caucasus-arch...>[9] “Chechnya,” Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia 2002. Assessed online 16 December 2002, <http://encarta.msn.com>[10] Time Europe, “Chechnya: A Time Trail”, Time Inc. New Media, 2000. Assessed online 09 November 2002, <http://www.time.com/time/europe/chechnyatrail/chechnyatrail.html>[11] Chechen Republic Online 1996-2002. Assessed 16 December 2002, <http://www.amina.com/maps/Chechnyaregion.gif>[12] Viatcheslav Avioutskii, Strategic International, “Chechnya: Towards Partition?”, Chechen Republic online 1996-2002. Assessed online 09 November 2002, <http://www.amina.com/article/partition.html>[13] Johanna Nichols, “Who Are The Chechen?”, University of California, Berkeley, 1995. Assessed on line 09 November 2002, <ftp://coombs.anu.edu.au/coombspapers/otherarchieves/asian-studies-archieves/caucasus-arch...>[14] Chechen Republic Online 1996-2002. Assessed 16 December 2002, <http://www.amina.com/maps_1.jpg>[15] Time Europe, “Chechnya: A time Trail”, Time Inc. New Media, 2000. Assessed online 09 November 2002, <http://www.time.com/time/europe/chechnyatrail/chechnyatrail.html>[16] Ibid.[17] Alex Chia, Independent Politics, “Chechnya Freedom Struggle – Yeltsin’s Vietnam”, 1995. Assessed online 08 November 2002, <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archieves/63/074.html>[18] Edward W. Walker, Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, “No Peace, No War In The Caucasus: Secessionist Conflicts in Chechnya, Abkhzia and Nagorno-Karabakh”, Harvard University, 1988, p. 7.[19] Ibid., pp.5-6[20] A hardline policy on Chechnya was the hallwark of Putin’s campaign to succeed Yeltsin as president in March 2000. Assessed online 17 Nov 2002, <http://infoweb2.newsbank.com/iw-search/we/Infoweb?p action=doc&p docid=0F6FB94...>[21] Anna Politkovskaya, “Remember Chechnya”, Washington Post, 2001. Assessed online 17 December 2002, <http://www.amina.com/article/remember_cheche.html>[22] Lyoma Usmanov, “Crimes Against Humanity in Chechnya”, Washington, DC, 1999. Assessed online 09 November 2002, <http://www.amina.com/article/crime_hum.html>[23] Antero Leitzinger, History Of Provcocations, Eurasian Culture Institute, Helsinki, 2000. Assessed online 17 December 2002, <http://www.amina.com/article/history_provoc.html>[24] Time.Com, A Chechnya Primer, Time Inc. New media, 1999. Assessed online 09 November 2002, <http://www.time.com/time/daily/special/russia/chechnya.html>[25] Aerial Cohen, “The New Great Game: Oil Politics In The Caucasus And Central Asia”, The Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder No. 1065, 1996. Assessed online 09 November 2002, <http://www.idis.com/ChouOnline/xxb-oilgame.txt>[26] All the confessions are assessed from <http://www.amina.com/war/rusquote.html>, 17 December 2002.[27] Washington Post, “Why Chechnya Is Different”, 2001. Assessed online 17 December 2002, <http://www.amina.com/article/cheche_diff.html>[28] Report of the President’s Commission on Human Rights – Translated by Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, “Chapter 2. Violation of human rights and International humanitarian law during armed conflict in the Chechen Republic”. Assessed online 17 December 2002, <http://www.amina.com/article/humr_viol.html>[29] Ibid.[30] Maivan Clech Lam, Cecelia Lynch and Michael Loriaux, Law And Morality in World Politics, “Indigenous Peoples’ Conception of Their self-Determination in International Law”, University of Minnesota Press, 2000, p.205[31] Fernando R. Teson, A Philosophy of International Law, Westview Press, 1998, p.130

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[32] Ibid., pp. 150-151[33] “Genocide in Chechnya”, ISCA, 1999. Assessed online 17 December 2002, <http://www.amina.com/article/genocidin_chech.html>[34] Edward W.Walker, Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, “No Peace, No War in The Caucasus: Secessionist Conflicts in Chechnya, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh”, Harvard University, 1998, p.46[35] Ibid.[36] Ibid[37] Only Taliban government of Afghanistan recognized the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, but until year 2000, the Taliban government itself was only recognized by Pakistan, <http://www.amina.com/article/partition.html>. In year 2001, the Taliban government was annihilated in a war with coalition forces led by America.[38] Roman Khalilov, “Main Causes of the Present Russian Aggression”, 1999. Assessed online 17 December 2002, <http://www.amina.com/article/main_causeswar.html>

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