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The Classic X.509 Profile Update and other assorted issues David Groep, July 2007

The Classic X.509 Profile Update and other assorted issues David Groep, July 2007

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The Classic X.509 Profile Update and other assorted issues David Groep, July 2007. Classic X.509 AP updates (v4.1). Major points addressed in 4.1 explicit definition of what we mean with “should” FQDN “ownership” maximum 5 years without any kind of checking - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: The Classic X.509 Profile Update and other assorted issues David Groep, July 2007

The Classic X.509 Profile Update

and other assorted issues

David Groep, July 2007

Page 2: The Classic X.509 Profile Update and other assorted issues David Groep, July 2007

3rd TAGPMA ‘Austin’ meeting – Nov 2006 - 2David Groep – [email protected]

Classic X.509 AP updates (v4.1)

Major points addressed in 4.1 explicit definition of what we mean with

“should” FQDN “ownership” maximum 5 years without any kind of checking reformulated on-line CA architectures

includes explicitly the two pre-vetted architectures

keyUsage SHOULD (was MUST) be critical in CA certs

compliance with Grid Certificate Profile draft (in OGF)

Page 3: The Classic X.509 Profile Update and other assorted issues David Groep, July 2007

3rd TAGPMA ‘Austin’ meeting – Nov 2006 - 3David Groep – [email protected]

Classic v4.1 Updates (1)

clearer definition of what we mean by should

FQDN ‘ownership’

A form of validation after at most five years

this has been buried in very old minutes and has now been made explicit

Page 4: The Classic X.509 Profile Update and other assorted issues David Groep, July 2007

3rd TAGPMA ‘Austin’ meeting – Nov 2006 - 4David Groep – [email protected]

Classic v4.1 Updates (2)

On-line CA architectures

Page 5: The Classic X.509 Profile Update and other assorted issues David Groep, July 2007

3rd TAGPMA ‘Austin’ meeting – Nov 2006 - 5David Groep – [email protected]

Classic v4.1 Updates (4)

keyUsage extensions SHOULD be critical in a CA cert this used to be a MUST, but that would unnecessarily exclude

some commercial top-level CAs (e.g., NetTrust)

Compliance with Grid Certificate Profile document document is now in draft in the OGF CAOPS-WG almost finished embodies lots and lots of community knowledge on what a

certificate ought to look like read it before you setup a new CA, or regenerate a root cert,

or think about an end-entity certificate profile

Auditing: if you re-issue without a new identity vetting, you MUST keep the original records for at least as long as there are certs based on this vetting plus the default grace period

Page 6: The Classic X.509 Profile Update and other assorted issues David Groep, July 2007

3rd TAGPMA ‘Austin’ meeting – Nov 2006 - 6David Groep – [email protected]

Classic v4.1+ - what is still pending

Still pending for a next version some real insights in the necessary site security

measures certificate/crl profile to be revised once the OGF

document thereon is formally published language clarification on documented traceability in

various places

Page 7: The Classic X.509 Profile Update and other assorted issues David Groep, July 2007

3rd TAGPMA ‘Austin’ meeting – Nov 2006 - 7David Groep – [email protected]

Other (non-) contentious issues discussed in TR

CRLs for compromised CAs non-repudiation bit in keyUsage

and how that relates to email signing the Meaning of Locality

and why to use O if you can objectSigning bits

should we also address who is allowed to get this bit? should the organisation be involved (Milan)? or does it only asserts that the code was signed by this

user, as is done in the UK, NL, AT and so better keep as is? Prepare the profile a bit better for Robot certificates CDP in EE certificates ought to point to a DER CRL auditable tracability in ID vetting and alternative

solutions – and the meaning of SHOULD

Page 8: The Classic X.509 Profile Update and other assorted issues David Groep, July 2007

3rd TAGPMA ‘Austin’ meeting – Nov 2006 - 8David Groep – [email protected]

TACAR

the TERENA Academic CA Repository

trusted and centralized place where root CA certs can be stored and safely

retrieved which is policy-neutral (but ‘IGTF-ready’)

for CAs directly managed by TERENA members belonging to a national academic PKI in member

states for all CAs set-up to support not-for-profit research, in

which the academic community is directly involved

Page 9: The Classic X.509 Profile Update and other assorted issues David Groep, July 2007

3rd TAGPMA ‘Austin’ meeting – Nov 2006 - 9David Groep – [email protected]

IGTF Distribution in Other Formats

Apart from validation via TACAR, the IGTF manages a distribution of all accredited authorities formerly known as Anders’ RPM set,

today also available as: JKS, tar-gz, configure && make, …

usually built by the EUGridPMA (me, actually) mirrored twice-daily to the apgridpma.org site copied and re-distributed by

downstream vendors (EGEE/LCG, VDT, …) also contains the fetch-crl utility (now at version

2.6.3) Download location

https://dist.eugridpma.info/distribution/

Page 10: The Classic X.509 Profile Update and other assorted issues David Groep, July 2007

Some dates for you to remember and schedule September 4-5, 2007

TF-EMC2 meeting, Prague, CZ September 19-21, 2007

11th EUGridPMA meeting, Thessaloniki, GR October 15-19 – OGF 21

CAOPS, IGTF, …, Seattle (WA), USA January 14-16, 2007

12th EUGridPMA meeting, Amsterdam, NL