The Climate Institute

Doha Climate Summit: Time to focus global climate talks

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Doha Climate Summit: Time to focus global climate talks

November 2012

Acknowledgements

This report was written by Erwin Jackson, Deputy CEO, The Climate Institute. The Institute thanks Greg

Picker, Andrew Ure, Howard Bamsey and John Connor for their constructive comments on early drafts.

In particular, we would like to acknowledge the advice of Hugh Saddler from Pitt and Sherry on current

trends in emissions and Greg Picker from AECOM for his input into the impact of changes to the Kyoto

accounting rules on Australia’s Kyoto commitment. The views in this Policy Brief remain those of The

Climate Institute.

Policy Brief

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Summary ................................................................................................................................... 04

Doha in context ...................................................................................................................... 04

The road to Doha .................................................................................................................... 04

Doha - Potential outcomes ..................................................................................................... 05

Australia and the Kyoto Protocol ............................................................................................ 05

What should Australia’s Kyoto target be? ................................................................................. 05

Australia’s initial Kyoto target ...................................................................................................... 07

Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 09

Misconceptions around the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action ........................................ 10

Context: Doha Climate Summit .............................................................................................. 11

Snapshot Key Domestic Policy Developments of 2012 ........................................................... 12

Doha – 20 years from Rio ....................................................................................................... 12

Policy issues to watch in Doha ............................................................................................... 16

Scenarios for Doha ................................................................................................................. 17

Australia and the Kyoto Protocol ........................................................................................... 18

Defining a second Kyoto commitment period target .............................................................. 18

Australia’s Kyoto rules emission bonus ..................................................................................... 21

Defining an Australian QELRO based on domestic policy settings ........................................ 22

Linking domestic action to greater global ambition ................................................................ 22

Provisional application of the Kyoto Protocol amendments ................................................... 24

Appendix 1: Australian 2020 targets and conditions ................................................................ 25

Appendix 2: Technical aspects of translating Australian domestic policy settings ................... 30

Land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) .................................................................. 30

Global Warming Potentials .......................................................................................................... 30

New greenhouse gases................................................................................................................ 30

AAU carryover ............................................................................................................................... 30

Covered sector emissions and the level of the default cap ..................................................... 30

Sectors not covered by the carbon cap ..................................................................................... 31

Sensitivity analysis ........................................................................................................................ 31

Endnotes ................................................................................................................................... 33

Contents

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The next major meeting of the United Nations

Framework Convention on Climate Change

(UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol will begin in

Doha, Qatar, in late November 2012. This will

again focus international attention on the action

countries are taking individually and collectively to

avoid dangerous climate change.

Doha, if successful, will streamline three

negotiating tracks into one and focus

governments on achieving a new legally binding

agreement in 2015.

Doha in context

International climate change negotiations are

inherently complex as they incorporate

environmental, economic, security, trade and

energy issues. Undue emphasis on the politics

and symbolism of a global treaty has tended to

overlook the substantive practical progress that

has been made. Progress can be difficult, yet over

the past two decades, much has been achieved.

For example, countries representing over 80 per

cent of global emissions have committed to limit

or reduce their pollution under UN agreements.

These are not hollow words or without self-

interested motives.

Countries are implementing policies to meet

committed targets and drive investment in clean

energy and low carbon solutions. Many are

seeking to maximise energy security, deliver

energy productivity improvements, reduce

harmful pollution levels, support regional

development and develop export opportunities.

Emissions trading schemes have been, or will

soon be, enacted in Australia, the European

Union, China, South Korea and New Zealand.

Taxes on carbon and/or coal, as well as

renewable energy funds are in place in Japan,

India and South Africa. Regulations on new power

stations and vehicles are in place in the United

States and Canada. As The Climate Institute has

highlighted, all major emitters and many other

economies are implementing policies to reduce

pollution and stimulate low position investments.1

The reality is that the old ‘treaty before action’

global climate diplomacy is being replaced by an

‘action and agreement’ approach. Domestic

carbon laws are being implemented even as the

final shape of an international treaty is in the

process of being negotiated. These actions are

critical confidence building measures as countries

continue to make practical progress on detailed

international agreement design.

However, whilst many of these actions are

significant, collectively, they remain insufficient to

keep global warming to less than the UN agreed

limit of 2oC above pre-industrial levels, let alone

the 1.5oC guardrail that most countries have

sought to be formalised in an international

agreement.

The road to Doha

Understanding Doha requires examination of the

process towards the meeting over the last decade

of the climate change negotiations.

The agreement reached at the UN’s Durban

Climate Summit last December exceeded most

Summary

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expectations. Governments agreed to negotiate a

single, legally binding agreement by 2015 that will

cover all major carbon pollution emitters. This was

achieved through three linked agreements:

+ Finalise the Bali Action Plan:

Negotiations around the Bali Action Plan

that began in 2007 are to be finalised and

the plans agreed in Copenhagen and

Cancun moved into full implementation.

+ Implement new Kyoto commitments:

Agreement to implement amendments to

the Kyoto Protocol to allow a second

commitment period to be put into effect

from 2013.

+ Negotiate a new legal instrument: An

agreement to increase ambition and

launch negotiations towards a new, legally

binding agreement to be agreed in 2015

(the Durban Platform for Enhanced

Action).

Doha is an opportunity to finalise the negotiation

of the Bali Action Plan, begin full implementation

and move any outstanding technical issues into

the UNFCCC’s subsidiary bodies. Doha can also

finalise amendments to the Kyoto Protocol that

would see the beginning of new binding

commitments for some developed countries.

If Doha achieves these two goals, the focus of

governments can be clearly aimed at finalising the

post-2020 binding agreement in 2015. Doha is

therefore an important moment, because if

negotiations can be streamlined the potential for

friction can be reduced, helping build the crucial

trust and focus necessary between countries in

the few short years before 2015.

Australia and the Kyoto Protocol

In Durban, in-principle agreement by the EU and

others in 2012 to take on new commitments

under Kyoto was central to securing an

agreement by all major emitters to launch talks

towards a new treaty covering all major emitters

in 2015. The recent in-principle decision by

Australia to participate in the second commitment

period of the Kyoto Protocol will bolster

international negotiations aimed at securing this

outcome.

The announcement by Australia will provide

important positive momentum into Doha. The

climate negotiations are a complex set of moving

parts. Movement in one area loosens the cogs

and creates movement elsewhere. Australia is but

one country, but it has influence on others in the

talks.

A delay in an announcement would have

undermined progress and distracted from the

important contribution that Australia can make to

a positive outcome in Doha.

Australia taking on a new Kyoto target will also

eliminate the risk that Australian companies will

not be able to directly access emission units

generated under the UN’s international trading

mechanisms. This would have increased effective

carbon prices in Australia.

Potential outcomes in Doha The Climate Institute suggests that there are three possible scenarios for Doha: + Collapse. No amendments are made to

implement a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and the Bali Action Plan negotiations remain open. This leads to the collapse of the negotiations.

+ Business as usual. No amendments are made to implement a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and/or the Bali Action Plan negotiations remain open. In an attempt to save face, governments gloss over differences and delay key decisions to the next meeting in Eastern Europe in 2013.

+ Focus. Amendments are made to implement

a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and the Bali Action Plan negotiations are closed. From 2013, talks are integrated into a single streamlined track of negotiations.

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The Government and the Coalition support 2020

emission reduction targets of 5 per cent below

2000 levels (unconditionally) to 15 or 25 per cent

below 2000 levels (conditional on certain

international actions). In Durban, the Australian

Government agreed, along with other countries,

to launch a work plan to increase the level of

global emission reduction ambition.

To meet its international commitments, the

Government has implemented domestic

legislation to limit emissions by defining annual

limits (or ‘caps’) under the national emissions

trading scheme. Following advice from the

independent Climate Change Authority, the

Government will set caps for 2015-2019 in 2014.

These can be disallowed by either house of

Parliament. In a scenario where the caps are

disallowed a ‘default’ cap is triggered. This default

cap is not a simple straight line reduction from

2015 and is legislated to reduce emissions by at

least 12 million tonnes a year in sectors covered

by the mechanism.

In submitting a target for Kyoto’s second

commitment period this year, the Government

will agree to an international commitment to

reduce emissions ahead of the recommendation

on 2020 emission targets by the Climate Change

Authority and subsequent Government decision

on emission caps in early 2014.

It is vital that a second Kyoto commitment by

Australia in 2012 does not preclude higher

targets from being set in future. Neither the

independent process of the Climate Change

Authority and the chance for greater ambition

arising from negotiations should be undermined.

In other words, the form of the 2012 commitment

should act as a floor, not a ceiling. To ensure

this, the Government should state that:

+ The target is a minimum commitment;

+ Australia remains committed to doing its fair

share in a world that is acting to avoid

anything more than a 2oC increase in global

temperature; and

+ Australia will finalise its 2020 emission

pathway after the completion of domestic

processes and the consideration of the

Australian Parliament in 2014.

Any indication that the Government may lock in

its 5 per cent unconditional reduction target

would be damaging to both its reputation and

international processes. Independent

assessments to date suggest that Australia’s 5

per cent target is not a fair contribution to current

global actions and/or that the conditions for

moving to higher targets have been satisfied. The

Climate Institute’s assessments of the

Government stated target conditions indicate a

target of at least 10-12 per cent on 2000 levels by

2020.

In addition to restating its commitment to do its

fair share in global efforts to avoid 2oC the

Government should:

+ When submitting Australia’s proposed

commitment, include Australia’s current 2020

target range in the new Annex B to the

Protocol;

+ Request that a footnote also be included in

the amended Kyoto Protocol confirming

Australia’s already stated conditions for

moving to the higher end of the target range,

and;

+ Proactively contribute to efforts to streamline

the process under the Kyoto Protocol for

strengthening commitments during the

second commitment period.

Together these elements allow Australia to

participate in a second commitment period,

maintain consistency with domestic legislation

and have the flexibility to increase ambition before

2020, consistent with the Durban Platform for

Enhanced Action.

What should Australia’s new Kyoto 2 target be?

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The commitments outlined above would give the

independent Climate Change Authority clear

scope to consider the full range of 2020 targets

when making its recommendations to the

Government. However, while the Government

can and should keep the target range on the table

under Kyoto rules it will need a single initial 2013-

2020 target until it makes a final decision on its

2020 ambition in 2014.

Kyoto targets (or Quantified Emission Limitation

or Reduction Objective, QELRO) are defined

differently to the 2020 targets generally

referenced in public debates. Kyoto targets are

effectively average emissions over a defined

period not emissions in 2020. For example, a

Kyoto target consistent with Australia’s 25 per

cent by 2020 would not be recorded this way. It

would be recorded as a number of around 90 per

cent, i.e. emissions over the entire period from

2013 to 2020 would, on average, be 90 per cent

of 1990 emissions, or 10 per cent below 1990

levels. The possible range of Kyoto targets base d

on Australia unconditional commitment or the

emission reductions implied by domestic

legislation suggest a commitment that range from

97-102 on 1990 levels (Figure S1).

Over the period from 2013-2020, Kyoto targets

based on Australia’s unconditional commitment

would be around 100-102 per cent on 1990

levels.2 Based on analysis of Australia’s domestic

policy settings, it appears that domestic

legislation will achieve emission reductions

equivalent to around a target of around 100 per

cent of 1990 levels over the same period.

Taking full advantage of Kyoto’s accounting rule

bonuses would allow these targets to be

strengthened to around 98 per cent (or 2 per cent

below 1990) at little to no additional effort. This

‘emission bonus’ exists because Australia will

overachieve its generous first commitment period

Kyoto target and because Australia can gain

additional credit from policies to increase the

uptake of carbon emissions in our managed

forests.

This Kyoto emission bonus should be used to

strengthen global emission reduction effort not to

weaken it. The government should transparently

apply this bonus to its new Kyoto commitment to

maximise our contribution to avoiding the impacts

of climate change.

Figure S1 summarises these possible second

commitment period targets including possible

ranges of uncertainty based on different

calculation methods. Australia’s first commitment

period target is also indicated. The line represents

1990 levels and shows whether the Kyoto

commitment sees emissions increase or decrease

below this agreed base year. Decreasing

emissions will be a key test of the credibility of

any agreement.

It is critical that Australia needs to be ready to

move beyond its current unconditional target. All

major emitters are acting on carbon emissions

and clean energy. Implementing an initial

minimum commitment to build momentum

towards a legally binding agreement covering all

major emitters is crucial. This can help

domestic and international

review processes time to build towards greater

global and Australian climate ambition.

To be credible internationally and consistent with

our legislation and emissions bonus, Australia’s

initial QELRO commitment should be less than

100.

Australia’s initial Kyoto 2 QELRO commitment

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Figure S1: Indicative initial 2013-2020 Kyoto commitments. The first group is based on possible calculations based solely on Australia’s unconditional 5 per cent target. The

second is based on what the current domestic legislation is projected to achieve if the default emission cap is

triggered in 2015. In both cases a scenario where the Government chooses to maximise its ambition using its

Kyoto rules bonus are indicated.

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In December last year, the Durban Climate

Summit ended with the adoption of a set of

formal UN decisions dealing with a wide range of

issues related to international cooperation on

climate change. This followed many years of

bruising negotiations around the future of

international cooperation on climate change, and

occurred against a backdrop of booming global

investments in clean energy.

Durban built on the significant, steady but insufficient progress made through multilateral climate negotiations over recent years. Overall, the 2011 Durban Climate Summit delivered critical progress in four key areas3:

+ Agreement to negotiate a single, legally binding agreement by 2015 that will cover all major carbon pollution emitters including, most importantly, China and the United States.

+ An agreement to implement a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol from 2013, with clarity on the majority of accounting rules for these obligations.

+ Establishment of the Green Climate Fund (building on the commitment made in Cancun) to raise US$100 billion a year to

help the world’s poorest nations invest in clean energy and manage the unavoidable impacts of climate change.

+ Commitment by all countries to increase the level of ambition of national efforts to reduce pollution, building on the formal recognition that existing commitments are not enough to keep global warming below 2°C or even 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.

The decision to adopt a new legally binding agreement in 2015 is important for both political and practical reasons. Politically, it is important because it removes a key barrier to the USA adopting a binding international target, which is unlikely to occur without China, India and all other major emitters also being covered under a single, binding agreement. Practically, it is important as it paves the way for a more comprehensive, economically efficient and environmentally effective international framework (see Misconceptions around the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action below).

This paper puts the Doha Climate Summit in context and identifies the issues that confront the Australian Government and its role in international climate diplomacy.

Introduction

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Misconceptions around the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action

Durban set a challenging but achievable deadline to agree a new legally binding agreement by

2015. Some have suggested that Durban was an agreement to keep talking. This misconception

underestimates the historic resistance by emerging economies to having their actions being

accountable to the international community. It also fails to recognise that (despite public expectations

to the contrary) when the current negotiating round was launched in Bali in 2007 it was never agreed

that a treaty would be the outcome’ The Durban Platform overcomes this long standing dispute and

defines a legally binding agreement as the end point of a negotiating process that is seeking to

redefine the direction of the global economy. A difficult and ambitious task.

Countries continue to implement and strengthen policies towards the 2020 deadline. Detractors

have also suggested that obligations only start in 2020 and countries will not act in the meantime.

Many countries are already implementing domestic laws to meet the targets they pledged in

Copenhagen and Cancun. While these are not internationally binding or sufficient to avoid dangerous

climate change they are binding on domestic industries (see Key Domestic Policy Developments of

2012 – A Snapshot).

It is the existence of these domestic policy frameworks that can in part explain why countries are

prepared to negotiate international obligations. Countries don’t take on international obligations

lightly. As countries have become more comfortable in the delivery of targets in a politically

sustainable way they are more likely to feel comfortable committing internationally.

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International agreements come in many forms and support, and are supported by domestic actions. Agreements can range from political agreements through to full blown international treaties with legally binding obligations. They may also include large or small groups of countris, and take forms ranging from technology agreements to emission trading coalitions.4,5 However, climate agreements and treaties do not reduce carbon pollution on their own; this is largely the role of domestic policy and changed investment decisions.

International climate change negotiations are also

inherently complex as they incorporate

environmental, economic, security, trade and

energy issues. Progress can be difficult, yet over

the past two decades, much has been achieved.

Undue emphasis on the politics and symbolism of

a global treaty has tended to overlook the

substantial practical progress that has been

made.6,7

For example, countries representing over 80 per

cent of global emissions have committed to limit

or reduce their pollution under UN agreements.

These are not hollow words: countries are

implementing policies to meet these targets and

drive clean energy investment.8 Emissions trading

schemes have been, or will soon be, enacted in

Australia, the European Union, China, South

Korea and New Zealand.

Taxes on carbon and/or coal, as well as

renewable energy funds are in place in Japan,

India and South Africa. Regulations on new power

stations and vehicles are in place in the United

States and Canada (see Key Domestic Policy

Developments of 2012 – A Snapshot).

The reality is global climate diplomacy is in

transition from a ’treaty before action’ world to an

’action and agreement’ approach.9 Domestic

carbon laws are being implemented even as the

final shape of an international treaty is in the

process of being negotiated. These actions are

critical confidence building measures as countries

continue to make practical progress on detailed

international agreement design.

Conversely, international agreements and

negotiations are crucial underpinnings for

domestic policy development and build the

foundations of trust between nations needed to

drive further global ambition. Likewise, domestic

actions support international agreements by

demonstrating that countries are living up to their

commitments and obligations.

However, whilst many of these actions are

significant, collectively, they remain insufficient to

keep global warming to less than 2oC above pre-

industrial levels, let alone the 1.5oC guardrail that

most countries have sought in international

negotiations.10

Context

Doha Climate Summit

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Snapshot Key Domestic Policy Developments of 2012

JANUARY

It is revealed that China’s central government has told the cities and provinces that will host pilot

emissions trading schemes to impose absolute limits on emissions.

FEBRUARY

South Africa's Finance Minister announces a carbon tax will be implemented in 2013-2014. The

effective level of the tax is not entirely clear, however the headline number is RAND 120 per tonne

(PPP$24 per tonne). A committee of EU parliamentarians clears the way for the European

Commission to propose measures to boost carbon prices by cutting the supply of carbon permits.

MARCH

China’s central government sets Guangdong province’s carbon limit at 660 million tonnes in 2015.

The Beijing municipal government releases draft rules for its emission trading scheme which will cover

sectors including electricity, manufacturing and major public buildings. The UK government sets the

2014–15 carbon price floor at £9.55 per tonne (PPP $13.60). This is in addition to the price electricity

companies pay under the EU ETS and designed to set a minimum carbon price of around £18 per

tonne (PPP $25/tonne). Officials state that the emissions trading system for the Brazilian region of

Rio de Janeiro is set to start in 2013. The US Environmental Protection Agency proposes a new

carbon pollution standard for new fossil-fuel power stations that excludes new conventional coal.

New power plants may emit no more than 454 kg CO2/MWh (or no worse than an efficient gas plant).

APRIL

The Mexican parliament passes General Climate Change Law which enshrines national emissions

reduction targets (30 below business as usual per cent by 2020 and 50 per cent below 2000 by 2050),

and a low-carbon energy target of 35 per cent by 2024. It also paves the way for economic

instruments, such as emissions trading, to reduce pollution.

MAY

The South Korean parliament passes a bill to establish an emissions trading scheme in 2015. The

scheme would cover industries and emissions roughly comparable to Australia’s emissions trading

scheme. As part of its preparation for a national emission trading scheme, China announces that all

of its state-owned companies, including in the power generation, manufacturing, transport and

telecommunications, will have to start reporting carbon emissions. The UK’s Draft Energy Bill 2012

bans new conventional coal plants and would require that new fossil fuel-fired stations emit no more

than 450kg CO2/MWh.

JUNE

The Brazilian state of Sao Paulo announces plans to launch an emissions trading scheme. The

Chinese government publishes the rules that will govern its future domestic carbon offset market.

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JULY

Australia’s carbon price comes into effect. New Zealand announces a number of changes to its

emission trading scheme including extending transitional measures designed to reduce the initial cost

impacts of the scheme, deferring the start date for the inclusion of agriculture and introducing a

power to allow the Government to set an overall emissions limit. The European Commission

publishes proposals to push up carbon prices in the EU emission trading scheme and proposes to

implement targets to reduce emissions from new cars to 95g CO2/km in 2020 (Australia’s current

voluntary standard is over 220g). South Korea announces that it will not allow companies to use

international offsets to meet carbon limits until after 2020. Authorities announce that the Chinese

Shanghai emissions trading scheme will cover 16 sectors, including power producers and

manufacturers. India implements an energy savings target and obligations (‘Perform-Achieve-Trade’)

for energy intensive companies across nine industrial sectors.

AUGUST

Australia and the European Commission announce that their respective emission trading systems

will be linked, with Australian companies being able to access EU markets for compliance from 2015.

Treaty negotiations will also begin towards a full two-way link from 2018. The Brazilian region of Rio

de Janeiro delays the start of its emission trading scheme until 2014. The USA sets efficiency

standards for new light vehicles in 2017-2025 to be no more than 100g CO2/km by 2025 (more than

half Australia’s current voluntary standard).

SEPTEMBER

Vietnam sets a goal to cut its carbon emissions per unit of GDP by 8-10 per cent below 2010 levels

by 2020 and continues investigating the launch of an emissions trading scheme by 2018. Thailand

announces the exploration of a voluntary emissions trading scheme to be launched in October 2014.

Hubei province in China announces it will establish an emission trading scheme that will cover around

eight sectors and start in 2014. The first trade in one of China’s pilot emissions trading schemes, saw

four cement producers in Guangdong province buy 1.3 million permits from the local government at

CNY 60 per unit (PPP$14/tonne). Japan's Energy and Environment Council announces a strategy to

reduce energy consumption by 19 per cent by 2030 and see over 30 per cent of the countries power

produced by renewable energy by the same year. Canada announces that from 2015 emissions from

new coal power stations and existing plants over 50 years old must be no more than that of an

efficient gas plant. EU Parliament supports an energy efficiency directive that includes obligations on

member states’ energy companies to help customers save energy equivalent to 1.5 per cent of annual

sales.

OCTOBER

Norway announces it will nearly double its carbon tax on offshore oil and gas operations to roughly

NOK 410 per tonne (PPP$ 42/tonne). Extra revenue is being set aside for a new climate and energy

fund, rainforest protection and public transport. South Korea strengthens its target to reduce carbon

pollution from its industrial and power sectors. Brazil enacts a controversial law zoning forestland for

protection, exploitation and reforestation. The law relaxes restrictions on deforestation but stipulates

reforestation to offset clearing.

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Understanding Doha requires examination of the

negotiating process leading towards the meeting.

Figure 1 charts the last 22 years of the climate

change negotiations. The key point from this is

that over the last decade the international climate

negotiations have become increasingly complex.

Since the Kyoto Protocol became international

law (or ‘entered in force’) in 2005 climate

negotiations have been occurring in two parallel

conversations. The first centred on the Ad Hoc

Working Group on Further Commitments for

Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-

KP). This process seeks to define new legally

binding commitments for some developed

countries under the Kyoto Protocol.

The second conversation focuses on how the

commitments from the USA, China and other

major emitters would be developed and reflected

in an international agreement. This began in 2005

through the Dialogue on Long-Term Cooperative

Action which acknowledged that the global nature

of climate change called for the widest possible

cooperation and participation in an effective

international response.11 The chairs of this

dialogue were Australia and South Africa.

The Dialogue led to the establishment of the new

Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term

Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-

LCA) under the Bali Action Plan in 2007.

Subsequent meetings under the Bali Action Plan

delivered the Cancun Agreements in 2010 which,

among other things, captured non-binding

commitments by all major emitters to limit or

constrain carbon emissions.12 (The Copenhagen

Accord, while not formally adopted by the

UNFCCC, was central to achieving agreement in

Cancun.)

The agreement reached in the UN’s Durban

Climate Summit exceeded most expectations and

governments agreed to negotiate a single, legally

binding agreement by 2015 that will cover all

major carbon pollution emitters.

This was achieved through three linked

agreements:

+ The first involves finalising the negotiations around Bali Action Plan and moving this to implementation.

+ The second is agreeing amendments to the Kyoto Protocol to allow a second commitment period to be operationalised from next year.

+ The third is an agreement to launch negotiations towards a new legally binding agreement to be agreed in 2015 and enhance country ambition (the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, the ADP).

Progress in one track of the talks is also linked to

progress on the other track(s). The outcomes in

Copenhagen and Cancun would not have been

possible without progress under the Kyoto

negotiations. In Durban, the in-principle

agreement by the EU and others to take on new

commitments under Kyoto was central to

securing an agreement by all major emitters to

launch talks towards a new treaty covering all

major emitters in 2015.

If Doha is successful it will focus governments on

a single track processes.

Doha is an opportunity to finalise the negotiation

of the Bali Action Plan, begin full implementation

and move any outstanding technical issues into

the UNFCCC’s subsidiary bodies. It can also

finalise amendments to the Kyoto Protocol that

would see the beginning of new binding

commitments for some developed countries.

If Doha achieves these two goals, the focus of

governments can be clearly aimed at finishing the

post 2020 binding agreement in 2015 and

increasing ambition under the ADP.

Doha – 20 years from Rio

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Figure 1: From Rio to Doha: the Doha Climate Summit in context.

1990 UN General Assembly mandates negotiation of a climate change convention

1992 (Rio) UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) adopted and opened for

signature

1994 UNFCCC becomes international law

1995 (Berlin) Countries launch negotiations on Protocol or other binding instrument

1997 (Kyoto) Kyoto Protocol (KP) is adopted. Establishes binding emission reduction commitments on some developed countries.

2001 (Marrakesh) Detailed rules for implementation of KP agreed

2005 (Montreal) Dialogue on long-term cooperative action to

address climate change by enhancing implementation of the Convention launched.

KP becomes international law. Next phase of the KP talks under the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto

Protocol (AWG-KP) launched

2007 (Bali) Bali Action Plan agreed.

Linked the AWG-KP the new Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative

Action Under the Convention (AWG-LCA)

2009 (Copenhagen)

2010 (Cancun) Cancun Agreements

agreed. Establishes non-binding emissions reduction commitments on all major

emitter countries.

2011 (Durban) Agrees to terminate AWG-

LCA in Doha

A KP second commitment

period to be implemented

from 2013. Establishes binding emission reduction commitments on some developed

countries.

The Durban Platform for

Enhanced Action accepted. Agreement to negotiate a single,

legally binding agreement by 2015 that will cover all major carbon pollution

emitters.

2012 (Doha) Negotiations under AWG-

LCA concluded Amendments to KP agreed Ad hoc Working Group on

the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP)

negotiations

2015 New legally binding agreement with binding emission reduction commitments on all major

emitters adopted

Copenhagen Accord

Bali links

progress on

AWG-LCA to

progress on

AWG-KP and

vice versa.

� 16

Policy issues to watch in Doha

Doha’s success will in large part be judged on process decisions. However, there are some policy

wild cards that will either help or hinder progress at the meeting. Issues include:

+ Climate finance. A key outcome in Durban was confirmation of the arrangements for the

Green Climate Fund. While this is an important step forward, countries have yet to commit to

new, long-term, sources of finance. Ultimately, the goal is to identify sources capable of

delivering at least US$100 billion a year globally by 2020, which was the target agreed under

the Copenhagen Accord (and locked in under the Cancun Agreements). Any backwards steps

on current or future commitments to international public climate finance would be extremely

damaging to current negotiating dynamics and play into the hands of nations that do not want

to see a legally binding agreement that covers all major emitters.

While a share of this US$100 billion will be channeled through the Green Climate Fund,

countries will continue to use existing channels as well as expanding the role of the private

sector. In Durban, countries launched a work programme for 2012 to identify viable sources of

finance, with a report to be submitted in Doha.

During Copenhagen, developed countries also committed to provide US$30 billion for the

period 2010–2012 (the so called ‘fast-start finance’ period). As 2012 marks the end of the fast

start financing period, ensuring there is not a finance gap between 2012 and the 2020

commitment will be a key problem. Australia’s fast start climate finance program has been an

important international contribution. The program has balanced adaptation and mitigation

financing, made explicit commitments to focus on Least Developed Countries and Small

Island Developing States and, overall, has been a leader in transparency and reporting. The

Asian Century White paper restated Australia’s commitment to help mobilise this US$100

billion but the Government has not yet provided a clear and scaled up financing trajectory to

this goal (i.e. what contribution it will make to 2015).

+ Finalisation of Kyoto rules. Before amendments for the second commitment period can be

finished a number of outstanding policy issues need to be resolved. These include:

+ The length of the commitment period (five or eight years). Related to this are proposals

by the EU and Africa to allow countries to unilaterally increase – but not decrease – the

ambition of their targets mid-commitment period.

+ Eligibility criteria for the use of Kyoto emission trading mechanisms.

+ How surplus credits generated by countries that have overachieved their 2008-2012

targets can be used in the next commitment period (see Australia’s Kyoto rules

emission bonus).

+ The enhanced ambition: In Durban, countries reaffirmed the ‘below 2°C’ global goal and

recognised the possibility of needing to strengthen this to 1.5°C. They also noted the

“significant gap” between this goal and the commitments currently on the table. The Durban

Platform also commits governments to ensuring ambition is increased from current levels

under the new legally binding agreement to be in place by 2015. A Ministerial roundtable may

be held on enhancing ambition in November to focus the minds of political decision makers on

how individual and collective ambition can be increased in the short-term.

� 17

Scenarios for Doha

In advance of the Durban Climate Summit, The

Climate Institute painted four possible outcome

scenarios for the meeting – Collapse,

Fragmentation, Progress and Breakthrough.13

Based on the significant progress made at the

meeting the Institute judged it a ‘Progress plus’

outcome but not a Breakthrough as some have

suggested.14

For Doha, The Climate Institute suggests that

there are three broad scenarios:

+ Collapse. No amendments are made to

implement a second commitment period of

the Kyoto Protocol and the Bali Action Plan

negotiations remain open. This leads to the

collapse of the negotiations.

+ Business as usual. No amendments are

made to implement a second commitment

period of the Kyoto Protocol and/or the Bali

Action Plan negotiations remain open. In an

attempt to save face, governments gloss over

differences and delay key decisions to the

next meeting in Eastern Europe in 2013.

+ Focus. Amendments are made to implement

a second commitment period of the Kyoto

Protocol and the Bali Action Plan negotiation

is finished. From 2013, talks are unified into a

single track of negotiations. That Australia and

New Zealand make new Kyoto commitments

helps to make this scenario.

Doha is therefore an important moment, because

if negotiations can be coalesced, trust can be

built between countries and negotiations can be

put on an equal footing in the crucial years to

2015.

� 18

Current Kyoto targets lapse at the end of 2012. All

countries that ratified this treaty, except Canada,

are expected to meet these international

commitments.15

Australia ratified the Protocol five years ago,

ending years of recalcitrance that cost the country

diplomatically and in lost investment

opportunities. Australia was also the first major

Kyoto country in Copenhagen to say it was

prepared to take on a second commitment period

Kyoto target for the period after 2012 (albeit under

a number of conditions).

As part of the Durban Platform, it was decided

that new Kyoto targets would be agreed to by the

end of 2012. These would cover the period from

2013–2017 or 2013–2020.16

The importance of this decision cannot be

understated.

If the EU and others had not given in-principle

support for a second commitment period there

would have been no agreement to negotiate a

new legally binding instrument covering all major

emitters. Australia was non-committal at this time.

The Australian Government’s stated position on

the second commitment period of the Kyoto

Protocol is it is prepared to take on a new

commitment under the following conditions:

+ Continued progress towards the new 2015

agreement which covers developed and

developing economies.

+ An eight year commitment period to 2020).

+ Access to Kyoto mechanisms from 1

January 2013.

+ Existing land sector accounting rules

continue.

+ Rules for the carryover of unused credits

from the current commitment period into

the next are appropriate for Australia. 17

The opposition Coalition parties have given in-

principle support to a new Kyoto target.18

The in-principle decision by Australia – along with

the existing commitments from the UK, Germany

and other EU countries, Norway, Switzerland and

the Ukraine– to participate in the second

commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol will

bolster international negotiations aimed at

securing a new legally binding agreement

covering all major emitters by 2015.

The announcement by Australia before the Doha

meeting will provide important momentum

towards a scenario that builds trust and puts the

negotiations on a single track towards 2015. A

delay in an announcement would have

undermined progress and distracted from the

important contribution that Australia can make to

a positive outcome in Doha.

If Australia did not take on a new Kyoto target

there was also a risk that Australian companies

will not be able to directly access emission units

generated under the UN’s international trading

mechanisms.19

Australia and the Kyoto Protocol

� 19

Based on previous commitments made under the

UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol20, Australia has

committed under the Copenhagen Accord and

Cancun Agreements to reduce emissions by 5-15

or 25 per cent on 2000 levels by 2020.21 This

target range and conditions is supported by both

major political parties in Australia.

One consideration in Doha will be how Australia’s

current target range is converted into a Quantified

Emission Limitation or Reduction Obligation

(QELRO or formal Kyoto target).

Note that Kyoto targets are defined differently

from 2020 targets. Kyoto targets are effectively

average emissions over a defined period not

emissions in a single year (see Figure 2).

Because this QELRO is an average of emissions

over the period between 2013 and 2020 the

percentage reduction on the base year is above

than the 2020 target on which it is based (in this

illustration a 25 per cent reduction on 2000

levels).

There are a number of different ways that

Australia’s formal 2020 commitments could be

turned into a legally binding emission reduction

commitment under the Kyoto Protocol.

Two approaches that have been discussed

recently are:

+ Draw straight lines from a defined point to

a given 2020 target and calculate emissions

under this line. Recent examples of this are

discussed in a technical paper from the

UNFCCC Secretariat that estimated indicative

QELROs for countries by drawing straight

lines to 2020 targets starting from various

starting points.22 Table 1 extends these

estimates to include an estimate of an

Australian QELRO based on a 10 per cent

reduction on 2020 levels. Overall, this target is

more consistent with the commitments of

other countries than the current unconditional

5 per cent commitment (Appendix 1).

+ Define a QELRO based on domestic policy

settings. In defining its proposed QELRO the

EU calculated its emissions from 2013-2020

based on the impact of its domestic policies

like its emissions trading scheme (ETS) and

emission standards for vehicles. 23 This was

then converted into an international

commitment. The EU has not received

significant criticism on this approach from

other countries. The next section deals with a

similar approach to deriving Australia’s

QELRO.

Defining a second Kyoto commitment period target

� 20

Table 1: Australia’s indicative24 QELROs based

on drawing straight lines from different

starting points to different 2020 targets. The

table also indicates the QELRO is Australia takes

full benefits from its Kyoto emission bonus (see

below).

Figure 2: QELROs and

point targets. Kyoto targets or QELROs are

total amounts of emissions

that can be released into

the atmosphere over a

specific period of time

(called a commitment

period). This figure

illustrates Australia’s first

commitment period target

of 108 per cent of the

1990 ‘base year’ extended

from 2008 to 2012. An illustrative eight-year

second commitment

period is also shown as

are Australia’s 2020

targets.

� 21

Defining Australia’s QELRO is not straight

forward. In part this is due to these parameters

needing to be translated into Kyoto accounting

rules (see Appendix 2 for details).

+ Land use, land-use change and forestry

(LULUCF). Decisions in Durban made

accounting for forest management under

Kyoto mandatory. This means the

emissions and sinks caused by

management of existing forests are

captured under national emission targets

for the second commitment period. The

total net benefit for Australia from this rule

change is potentially 14.5 million tonnes

per annum (based on a cap of 3.5 per cent

of Australia’s base-year emissions) when

compared to when Australia announced its

target in 2009.

+ Global Warming Potentials. Global

Warming Potentials (GWPs) are used to

account for the different climate impacts

of different greenhouse gases. For

example, according to the latest

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate

Change (IPCC) assessment, methane has

a global warming GWP factor of 25 over a

100-year period, meaning that over 100

years it has 25 times the global warming

impact of carbon dioxide. Governments in

Durban agreed that these, more accurate

numbers should be used for a second

commitment period. The combined

influence of changes in GWPs mean

Australia’s second commitment period

target would be approximately 30 million

tonnes more difficult to meet over the

commitment period when compared to

when Australia announced its target in

2009.

+ AAU carryover. Governments with

commitments under the Kyoto Protocol have

accepted targets for limiting or reducing

emissions. These targets are expressed as

levels of allowed emissions, or assigned

amounts. The allowed emissions are divided

into assigned amount units (AAUs). Under the

first commitment period Australia has

2,957,579,143 AAUs, equivalent to 108 per

cent of 1990 levels on average over the period

2008-2012.

The Kyoto Protocol allows countries that have

AAUs to spare to sell this excess capacity to

countries that are over their targets and/or

carry them over to the next commitment

period. Based on current inventory accounts

Australia’s full potential carryover of AAUs into

the second commitment period is

approximately 90 million tonnes of CO2-e.25

Collectively and in aggregate these rules allow the

Government to maximise the environmental

effectiveness of any Kyoto target by achieving a

stronger emission target with little to no additional

effort.

Australia’s Kyoto rules emission bonus

� 22

Defining an Australian QELRO based

on domestic policy settings

Australia’s domestic emissions trading scheme is

the primary policy mechanism used to meet

Australia’s international emission reduction

obligations.26 This is clearly defined in the objects

of the Clean Energy Future Act and one of the key

considerations that the Minister must consider in

setting emission caps under the scheme is

Australia’s international obligations under the

UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol.

The setting of emission caps will occur in 2014

after the Government has received a report from

the independent Climate Change Authority which

will make recommendations on cap levels.27 In the

event that the caps do not pass through both

Houses of Parliament, a default cap is triggered.28

This default cap is not a straight line decline and

defined as a 38 million CO2-e29 tonne reduction in

covered sector emissions on FY 2012–13 levels in

FY 2015–16 and a 12 million tonne annual

reduction thereafter. Combined with Treasury

projections of the impact of policies in uncovered

sectors (e.g. some transport, agriculture, etc.) this

default cap was designed to ensure that Australia

would meet its unconditional 5 per cent reduction

target by 2020.

Based on the Government’s most recent

projections30 and Treasury papers31 a total carbon

budget for the period from 2013 to 2020 is

calculated assuming the default emission cap is

triggered. This is then converted into an average

emission level over the eight year period and

compared to 1990 levels (see Appendix 2 for

details).

Overall, the process of translating the 2013-2020

emissions budget under Australian legislation to

an eight year second commitment period results

in an overall QELRO value of around 100 (98-103)

per cent. By taking full advantage of potential

Kyoto Protocol rule bonus this could be increased

to 98 (97-101) per cent with little additional cost.

Linking domestic action to greater

global ambition

Australia accepting a new Kyoto commitment will

be important in building global commitments to

reduce pollution. However, one concern that has

been raised about Australia submitting a target for

the second commitment period this year is that

this would come ahead of a decision on the cap

for the national emissions trading scheme due to

begin in 2015. Under the Clean Energy Future

legislation the cap will be set in the first half of

2014, based in part on advice from the

independent Climate Change Authority.

In making its recommendation on the cap to the

Government, the Authority must consider legally

binding obligations under the UNFCCC and Kyoto

Protocol but it must also reflect on “undertakings

relating to the reduction of greenhouse gas

emissions that Australia has given under

international climate change agreements.”32 The explanatory memorandum to the legislation

makes it clear that this includes international

undertakings in both binding and non-binding

international agreements.33

To ensure that the Climate Change Authority and

the Australian Parliament consider the full range

of Australia’s international commitments and

international action is taken consistent with

agreements to increase ambition in Durban, the

Government should:

+ When submitting Australia’s proposed

commitment, include Australia’s current 2020

target range in new Annex B to the Protocol;

+ Request that a footnote also be included in

the amended Kyoto Protocol confirming that

Australia’s already stated conditions, which

have bipartisan support, for moving to the

higher end of the target range; and

+ Work with other countries to ensure the Kyoto

Protocol is amended to streamline the

process for strengthen commitments during

the second commitment period.

Table 2 illustrates an example of how an

Australian QELRO would be inscribed under the

new Annex B to the Protocol.34

� 23

1 A reference year may be used by a Party on an optional basis for its own purposes to express its QELRO as a percentage of emissions of that year, that is not internationally binding under the Kyoto Protocol, in addition to the listing of its QELRO in relation to the base year in the second and third columns of this table, which are internationally legally binding. [Note that the EU use a 1990 base year so do not record an additional reference year in this column.] 2 Further information on these pledges can be found in document FCCC/SB/2011/INF.1/Rev.1. Notes: a Australia will reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 25% on 2000 levels by 2020 if the world agrees to an ambitious global deal capable of stabilising levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at 450 ppm CO2-eq or lower. Australia will unconditionally reduce our emissions by 5% below 2000 levels by 2020, and by up to 15% by 2020 if there is a global agreement which falls short of securing atmospheric stabilisation at 450 ppm CO2-eq and under which major developing economies commit to substantially restrain emissions and advanced economies take on commitments comparable to Australia's. f Upon deposit of its instrument of approval to the Kyoto Protocol on 31 May 2002, the European Community had 15 member States. g Upon deposit of its instrument of acceptance of the amendment to Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol on [date], the European Union had 27 member States. h As part of a global and comprehensive agreement for the period beyond 2012, the European Union reiterates its conditional offer to move to a 30 per cent reduction by 2020 compared to 1990 levels, provided that other developed countries commit themselves to comparable emission reductions and developing countries contribute adequately according to their responsibilities and respective capabilities.

Table 2: Illustrative example of an Australian QELRO and associated undertakings

Columns in dark grey are legally binding obligations based on a 1990 base year. QELRO in

square brackets is an indicate range. Final QELRO will need to be a single number. The EU

is also included to provide a comparison.

� 24

Provisional application of the Kyoto Protocol amendments

To prevent a gap between the first and second commitment period of Kyoto, any amendment to the

Protocol establishing a second commitment period will need to have entered into force prior to 31

December 2012.

However amendments to the Protocol require acceptance by three-quarters of the parties to the Kyoto

Protocol and enter into force 90 days later. As such, to prevent a gap between the first and second

commitment period, an amendment would have needed to be accepted by 143 countries by 3

October 2012. This is clearly impossible.

This issue can potentially be addressed by the amendment to the Kyoto Protocol including a provision

for ‘provisional application’ of the amendments (or similar). Under international law provisional

application is used as an interim measure to ensure obligations under international law become legally

binding while governments go through the formal domestic ratification procedures.

To date Australia has resisted agreeing to provisional application under the Protocol.

Provisional application of treaties is not explicitly (or implicitly) allowed in Australian law. Also, the

Constitution does not confer on the Australian Parliament any formal role in treaty making. However,

traditionally all treaties (except those the Government decided are urgent or sensitive, e.g. the

Implementation of Part XI of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982) are tabled in both

Houses of Parliament for at least 20 sitting days prior to binding treaty action being taken.35

The Parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Treaties (JSCOT) considers tabled treaties.

At the completion of a review, JSCOT reports to Parliament with advice on whether Australia should

take binding treaty action. Note this review is not binding. It took until 9 August 2012 for the

Government to formally respond the JSCOT report on the ratification of Kyoto36 – nearly four-and-a-

half years after Australia’s ratification.

Given in-principle bipartisan support for Australia participating in the second commitment period of

Kyoto Protocol, and that the Government has stated it is the national interest to avoid dangerous

climate change, there does not appear to be a strong case against Australia agreeing to provisionally

apply amendments of the Protocol.

In addition, if countries agree to provisionally apply amendments to the Kyoto Protocol these would

only be binding on those Parties that accepted their provisional application. This may impact on the

ability of business to access Kyoto’s flexibility mechanisms such as the CDM.37

� 25

Australia has submitted 2020 emission targets under

the Kyoto Protocol and the UNFCCC (e.g. under the

Cancun Agreements):

15 December 2008: Government announces it will

unconditionally reduce emissions by 5 per cent on

2000 levels by 2020 and up to 15% on 2000 levels by

2020, conditional on a global agreement “where all

major economies commit to substantially restrain

emissions and all developed countries take on

comparable reductions to that of Australia.”38 Further,

the Government indicated that it accepts the findings

of the Garnaut Review39 that a fair and effective global

agreement centred on stabilising long term

atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases at or

below 450 ppm CO2-e is in Australia’s national

interests. Should such an agreement emerge, the

Government indicated it would seek an electoral

mandate for setting tougher post-2020 emissions

reduction targets to ensure that we play our full part in

achieving this goal.

March 2009: Government submits 5-15% target range

to the AWG-LCA and Kyoto Protocol.40

4 May 2009: Government announces a new emission

reduction target, specifically, the possibility of adopting

a 25 per cent on 2000 level by 2020 target, “if the world

agrees to an ambitious global deal to stabilise levels of

CO2 equivalent at 450 parts per million or lower”.41 Up

to 5 per cent points of this target could be met by

purchasing international credits, such as avoided

deforestation credits, using carbon price revenue no

earlier than 2015. The Government also elaborates

more clearly the conditions associated for the up 15

per cent target and sets out conditions to move to a 25

per cent target.

May 2009: Government submits 5-15 per cent or 25

per cent targets to the AWG-LCA and Kyoto Protocol.42

27 January 2010: Government submits targets under

the Copenhagen Accord and sets additional conditions

on moving above 5 per cent. These are:

• The level of global ambition becomes sufficiently

clear, including both the specific targets of

advanced economies and the verifiable emissions

reduction actions of China and India;

• The credibility of those commitments and actions

is established, for example, by way of a robust

global agreement, or commitment to verifiable

domestic action on the part of major emitters

including the United States, India and China; and

• There is clarity on the assumptions for emissions

accounting and access to markets.

Copenhagen Accord targets subsequently become

captured under the UNFCCC with the adoption of the

Cancun Agreements.

2 February 2010: Liberal/National Coalition climate

change policy includes bipartisan support for the full

target range and associated conditions.43

May 2012: Government provides additional clarification

on emission pledges to UNFCCC.44

The table below specifies the conditions for the targets

the Government has announced. It also includes more

specific clarity on these conditions as was documented

in internal Department of Climate Change and Energy

Efficiency papers obtained under Australia’s Freedom

of Information laws. The table also provides some

commentary as to whether the various conditions have

been met or not.

It breaks the conditions into two groups. Primary

conditions are those that indicate the overall intent of

the conditions and indicate the high level commitments

the Government has made to the international

community. Secondary conditions elaborate the kinds

of actions that may add up to achieving the primary

conditions but are not necessarily individually binding.

This indicates that based on this and the progress that

has been made since Copenhagen that Australia’s

minimum emission reduction target should be 10-12

per cent on 2000 levels by 2020. This is consistent with

independent assessments to date that suggest

Australia’s 5 per cent target is not a fair contribution to

current global actions and/or that the conditions for

moving to higher targets have been satisfied.45

Appendix 1: Australian 2020 targets and conditions

� 26

Table 3: Australia’s 2020 target ranges and associated conditions

2020 Target Public condition (Minister of Climate Change, 2009)46

An interpretation of

documents obtained under

Freedom of Information Act

from the Department of

Climate Change and Energy

Efficiency# (The Climate Institute, 201047 and DCCEE, 2009)48

The Climate Institute’s Assessment and

Notes

5% below 2000 levels Unconditional

Policy settings in the emission trading legislation should see target achieved unless the Act is repealed. In the advent of the Parliament not agreeing an emission target, a default cap is triggered. This cap is consistent with the unconditional target.

Up to 15% below 2000 levels

PRIMARY CONDITION

International agreement where major

developing economies commit to

substantially restrain emissions and

advanced economies take on

commitments comparable to

Australia’s.

International agreement with

specified contributions from

advanced and major developing

economies, ideally COP mandate to

conclude simultaneous legal

outcome for KP and LCA (may be

one treaty or two).

CONDITION MET

The combination of the Cancun Agreements and the

Durban Platform for Enhanced Ambition satisfies this

condition.

SECONDARY CONDITIONS

Global action on track to stabilisation between 510-540ppm CO2-e.

Contributions consistent with pathway to stabilisation at less than 550ppm.

CONDITION LARGELY MET

The assumptions in the Government’s domestic policy surround a 550 ppm world. The Commonwealth Treasury (2011)49 states: “The medium global action scenario [central case] assumes countries implement the less ambitious end of their mitigation pledges made in the Cancun Agreements and Copenhagen Accord, and stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations at 550 ppm by around 2100.”

Advanced economy reductions in aggregate, in the range of 15 – 25%

Seek 15-25% off 1990.

CONDITION MET IN PART

� 27

below 1990 levels. (Advanced economy refers to Annex 1 parties to the UNFCCC and at least some other high/middle income emerging economies.)

Need most/all to confirm pledges at the top end of current ranges.

Department states, “Norway’s conditional target comparable to Australia’s 25; majority of advanced economies (EU, Japan, US, NZ) have conditional targets comparable to Australia’s 15” Separately, the Department (2009b)50 has stated that matching the average emission reductions for developed countries would be fair contribution from Australia. This balances, in their view, higher aggregate emission reduction costs for Australia versus undertaking ambition action in line with the national interest of avoiding a 2oC increase in global temperature. Based on current pledges from other developed countries this implied a minimum 2020 target of around 12% (Climate Action Tracker, 2012)51.

Substantive measurable, reportable and verifiable commitments and actions by major developing economies, in the context of a strong international financing and technology cooperation framework, but which may not deliver significant emissions reductions until after 2020.

In 2009, the Department stated that this condition would be satisfied if the commitments from that time were “reflected … in a COP decision/future treaty”.

CONDITION MET

The current emission pledges from developing economies in combination with the Cancun Agreements and the Durban Platform for Enhanced Ambition satisfies this condition.

Progress toward inclusion of forests (REDD) and the land sector, deeper and broader carbon markets, low carbon development pathways.

Must retain current provisions to include land clearing in our base year, voluntary Art. 3.4 activities, no cap on LULUCF sinks. Ideally, agreement to create a REDD market mechanism. Need continued unrestricted access to KP market mechanisms, agreement to enhance mechanisms, and links between tracks. Ideally, developed country pledges to provide substantial public finance to enable developing country mitigation.

UNCLEAR WHETHER CONDITION IS MET, IN PART

DEPENDS ON PARTICIPATION IN KP SECOND

COMMITMENT PERIOD

The Australian Government, post Durban agreements on LULUCF has stated: “The Australian Government is in the process of giving consideration to the Durban land sector decisions and their implications both domestically and for Australia’s accounting of its emission reduction commitments.” Access to KP market mechanisms is uncertain depending upon amendments to the Protocol and Australia’s participation in the second commitment period.

� 28

Developed countries have contributed to fast start financing and have pledged but not yet delivered significant public and private finance to 2020. The Government does not define “substantial”.

25% below 2000 levels (up to 5 percentage points through Government purchase)

PRIMARY CONDITION

Ambitious agreement including

comprehensive global action

capable of stabilising CO2-e

concentrations at 450ppm CO2-e or

lower.

COP decision with draft national

schedules (or variation) for all major

emitters; ideally mandate to

conclude single treaty.

CONDITION NOT MEET (BUT PROGRESS HAS BEEN

MADE)

The combination of the Cancun Agreements and the

Durban Platform for Enhanced Ambition in part

satisfies this condition.

Actions not consistent with a 450ppm-e world.

SECONDARY CONDITIONS

Comprehensive coverage of gases, sources and sectors, with inclusion of forests (REDD) and the land sector (including soil carbon initiatives (e.g. bio char) if scientifically demonstrated) in the agreement.

Seek inclusion of REDD and the land sector (soil carbon, if scientifically demonstrated). Must retain current provisions to include land clearing in our base year, voluntary Art. 3.4 activities, no cap on LULUCF sinks. Need adequate treatment for natural disturbance. Need agreement to create a REDD market mechanism.

CONDITION MET IN PART

Ongoing negotiations on REDD and new mechanisms. Natural disturbance treatment has been resolved. Other land-based accounting rule decisions still being accessed (see above).

Clear global trajectory, where the sum of all economies’ commitments is consistent with 450ppm CO2-e or lower, and with a nominated early deadline year for peak global emissions not later than 2020.

Contributions consistent with pathway to stabilisation at 450ppm or less; ideally adoption of 2 degree goal and/or global peak by 2020.

CONDITION NOT MET

2oC goal adopted but current commitments inconsistent with 450ppm or less (without very rapid emission reductions post 2020).

Advanced economy reductions, in

Need most/all (except Norway and Australia) to increase ambition.

CONDITION NOT MET

� 29

aggregate, of at least 25% below 1990 levels by 2020.

Current unconditional pledges indicate around 12% reduction below 1990 levels by 2020.

Major developing economy commitments that slow emissions growth and then reduce their absolute level of emissions over time, with a collective reduction of at least 20% below business-as-usual by 2020 and a nomination of a peaking year for individual major developing economies.

Seek commitments delivering at least 20% off BAU; nominated peaking years.

CONDITION NOT MET

Current assessments indicate emission pledges from developing countries are in the order of 3-4% below business as usual.52

Global action which mobilises greater financial resources, including from major developing economies, and results in fully functional global carbon markets.

Seek progress towards fully functional global carbon markets. Need unrestricted access to KP market mechanisms, agree to develop new mechanisms, broad coverage (sectors, technologies), and links between tracks. Seek to mobilise greater financial resources, including from major developing economies. Ideally all countries except LDCs pledge to contribute to global finance.

CONDITION LARGELY NOT MET

New mechanisms being developed. Access to KP market mechanisms is uncertain depending upon amendments to the Protocol and Australia’s participation in the second commitment period. Developed countries have contributed to fast start financing and had pledged but not yet delivered significant public and private finance to 2020. Major developing economies have not pledged financing commitments.

#Code: ‘Need’ indicates requirement. ‘Seek’ and ‘ideally’ indicate strong preference but not requirement.

� 30

The following outlines the assumptions behind the

calculation of an Australian QELRO based on domestic

policy settings.

Land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF)

As per the first commitment period, it is assumed

Australia continues to count emissions from land

clearing in 1990 towards its base-year calculation

(Article 3.7 of the Kyoto Protocol).

Decisions in Durban also made forest management

under Kyoto’s Article 3.4 mandatory. This means the

emissions and sinks caused by management of

existing forests are captured under national emission

targets for the second commitment period. The total

net benefit for Australia from this rule change is

potentially 14.5 million tonnes per annum (based on a

cap of 3.5 per cent of Australia’s base-year emissions)

when compared to when Australia announced its target

in 2009.

As per Treasury’s modeling, the QELRO calculation

includes abatement from the domestic Carbon Farming

Initiative (CFI, a LULUCF-based domestic carbon offset

scheme).53 CFI emissions reductions are included to

2016 because, under the fixed price period in the

emissions trading scheme, these reductions are truly

additional. From 2016, CFI emissions are added back

into uncovered sectors calculations as they are

captured under the default cap and no longer

additional.

The base case does not include the impact of other

policies that may impact land sector emissions and

reduce the effort required by other sectors in meeting

any national target.54

It is assumed that other voluntary LULUCF

activities are not included in Australia’s accounts

(Article 3.4). Internationally credible abatement

from soil carbon activities and other 3.4 activities

will be very small to 2020 so this does not

materially impact the results.55

Global Warming Potentials

The IPCC in its Fourth Assessment Report revised a

number of GWPs.

Governments in Durban agreed that these, more

accurate numbers should be used for a second

commitment period. While this is a straightforward

change in international accounting, Australia’s current

policy settings are based on first-commitment-period

accounting rules. The combined influence of changes

in GWPs of methane and N2O together mean that

Australia’s 2CP would be approximately 30 million

tonnes more difficult to meet over the commitment

period when compared to when Australia announced

its target in 2009. This change is not included in the

base case for the below analysis.

New greenhouse gases

The inclusion of new greenhouse gases in the second

commitment period will not have a material impact on

Australia’s QELRO as the new gases are not used in

significant quantities.

AAU carryover

The rules for the carryover from the first to the second

commitment period will have a significant impact on

the environmental integrity of some national targets.

Based on current inventory accounts Australia’s full

potential carryover of AAUs into the second

commitment period is approximately 90 million tonnes

of CO2-e.56

Under Australia’s legislation AAUs are not available to

liable entities for compliance under the domestic

emission trading scheme. If Australia were to join a

second commitment period the Government may use

this carryover to help meet Australia’s compliance

obligations under Kyoto. Treasury does not account for

the value of these AAUs in Federal Budget forward

estimates.

Covered sector emissions and the level of the

default cap

The default cap is defined by Australia’s FY 2012–13

emissions covered by the emission trading scheme.

The most recent inventory report has FY 2011-12

emissions for stationary energy, fugitive emissions,

industrial processes and waste at 373.6 million

tonnes.57 The latest emission reports for liable entities

under the domestic scheme (FY 2010–11) have

emissions at 344.1 million tonnes.58 The difference in

emission estimates will be in part be explained by the

fact that looking at a sector level does not capture the

emissions in these sectors that are not directly covered

by the carbon price mechanism. For example,

Appendix 2: Technical aspects of translating Australian domestic policy settings into a QELRO

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synthetic greenhouse gases and transport fuels used

for stationary energy are covered by an effective

carbon price rather than the mechanism itself, and

emissions from legacy waste, decommissioned mines

and facilities below the liability threshold are not

covered.

Treasury’s revenue forecasts in the latest budget

are used to define FY 2012–13 covered sector

emissions for the purpose of defining the default

cap (334 million tonnes in FY 2012–13 accrual

revenue).59 Based on private sector estimates a

higher estimate is used in a sensitivity analysis. 60,61

Pitt and Sherry also estimate, based on the current

best available data, that 2012/13 emission used to

define the cap will be around 320 million tonnes.62

This is used as a low estimate.

In years where covered sector emissions are not

covered by the cap, the Department of Climate

Change and Energy Efficiency sector level

forecasts are used (stationary energy, fugitive

emissions, industrial processes, and waste).63

These update previous Treasury estimates to

capture 2011 data and are higher than current

emissions suggest.64

An important uncertainty in calculating the QELRO

is the impact of emissions from the stationary

energy, fugitive, industrial and waste sectors that

are not covered by the emissions cap but which

also contribute to national emissions.

Over the period between 2013–15, the difference

between the Department of Climate Change and

Energy Efficiency’s overall forecasted covered

sector emissions and Treasury’s budget revenue

numbers indicates a range of these emissions

from 20–40 million tonnes a year. Pitt and Sherry

estimate that emissions not covered by the cap in

these sectors in 2012 was around 50 million

tonnes.65 In the base case analysis of the QELRO

30 million tonnes is used and sensitive scenarios

of 20 and 50 million tonnes are undertaken to

capture the full range of emissions outcomes.

Sectors not covered by the carbon cap

The final, critical assumption is the impact of policies

on sectors not covered by the emissions trading

scheme. For the purposes of this paper, the latest

emission forecasts by the Department of Climate

Change and Energy Efficiency where used in these

calculations (transport, agriculture, and forestry and

land-use change).66 This includes the impact on

transport emissions from subsectors subject to

equivalent carbon prices and the impact of the

Government’s other emission reduction policies.

Sensitivity analysis

Tables 4 and 5 summarise the data and a few

sensitivity tests.

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Table 4: Translating domestic legislation into an

international commitment

*Treasury (2012) budget forecasts (336 Mts FY 2012-13) minus 38 million tonnes in first year and 12 million tonnes per year thereafter.

§ 2013-15: Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency (2012), carbon price and CFI scenario: stationary energy, fugitives, industrial

and waste emissions. 2016-2020: Assumed 30 million tonnes of emissions not covered by cap.

# Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency (2012), carbon price and CFI scenario: Transport, Agriculture and Deforestation and

Forestry emissions. Carbon Farming Initiative credits are added to uncovered sectors from 2016 (7 million tonnes per year). Pre-2016 these

emission reductions are truly additional.

Table 5: Sensitivity of results to assumptions

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Endnotes

1 See high-level overview of the policies countries are implementing at: The Climate Institute, ‘Global Climate Action Map’, The Climate Institute [web page] (2012) <http://globalclimateactionmap.climateinstitute.com.au/#/criteria>, accessed 29th Oct. 2012. 2 Kyoto targets (or Quantified Emission Limitation or Reduction Objective, QELRO) are defined differently to the 2020 targets generally referenced in public debates. Kyoto targets are effectively average emissions over a defined period not emissions in 2020. For example, a Kyoto target consistent with Australia’s 25 per cent by 2020 would not be recorded this way. It would be recorded as a number of around 90 per cent, i.e. emissions over the entire period from 2013 to 2020 would, on average, be 90 per cent of 1990 emissions, or 10 per cent below 1990 levels. 3 The Climate Institute, ‘Durban Climate Summit: Implications for Australia, Policy Brief’, The Climate Institute [web document] (2011) <http://www.climateinstitute.org.au/articles/publications/durban-climate-summit-implications-for-australia-publication.html/section/478>, accessed 29 Oct. 2012. 4 Lutz Weischer, Jennifer Morgan and Milap Patel, 'Climate Clubs: Can Small Groups of Countries Make a Big Difference in Addressing Climate Change?' Review of European Community & International Environmental Law, forthcoming (2012). 5 Salim Mazouz and Erwin Jackson, 'Emissions Trading Coalitions – Leveraging Emissions Trading to Achieve Greater Levels of Global Mitigation Ambition, Discussion paper', The Climate Institute [web document] (2012) <http://www.climateinstitute.org.au/verve/_resources/tci_regionalemissionstradingcoalitions_discussionpaper_mar2012.pdf>, access 2 Nov. 2012. 6 The Climate Institute, ‘Durban, Australia and the Future of Global Climate Action, Policy Brief’, The Climate Institute [web document] (2011) <http://www.climateinstitute.org.au/verve/_resources/tci_futureofglobalclimateaction_policybrief_nov2011.pdf >, accessed 29 Oct. 2012. 7 Daniel Bodansky and Lavanya Rajamani, ‘The Evolution and Governance Architecture of the Climate Change Regime’ in International Law and International Relations (Detlef Sprinz & Urs Luterbacher, eds., MIT Press, 2nd ed. 2013) Forthcoming, available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2168859>, accessed 29 Oct. 2012. 8 See high-level overview of the policies countries are implementing at: The Climate Institute, ‘Global Climate Action Map’, The Climate Institute [web page] (2012) <http://globalclimateactionmap.climateinstitute.com.au/#/criteria>, accessed 29th Oct. 2012. 9 The Climate Institute, ‘Durban, Australia and the Future of Global Climate Action, Policy Brief’, The Climate Institute [web document] (2011) <http://www.climateinstitute.org.au/verve/_resources/tci_futureofglobalclimateaction_policybrief_nov2011.pdf >, accessed 29 Oct. 2012. 10 Ecofys, Climate Analytics, PIK, ‘Climate Action Tracker’, Climate Action Trackers Partners [web page] (2012) <http://www.climateactiontracker.org/>, accessed 29 Oct. 2012. 11 UNFCCC, 'Dialogue on long-term cooperative action to address climate change by enhancing implementation of the Convention', Decision 1/CP.11, FCCC/CP/2005/5/Add.1, UNFCCC [web document] (2005), <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2005/cop11/eng/05a01.pdf#page=3>, accessed 29 Oct. 2012. 12 UNFCCC, 'The Cancun Agreements, An assessment by the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change', UNFCCC [web page] (2011) <http://cancun.unfccc.int/>, accessed 29 Oct. 2012. 13 The Climate Institute, ‘Durban, Australia and the Future of Global Climate Action, Policy Brief’, The Climate Institute [web document] (2011) <http://www.climateinstitute.org.au/verve/_resources/tci_futureofglobalclimateaction_policybrief_nov2011.pdf >, accessed 29 Oct. 2012. 14 The Climate Institute, ‘Durban Climate Summit: Implications for Australia, Policy Brief’, The Climate Institute [web document] (2011) <http://www.climateinstitute.org.au/articles/publications/durban-climate-summit-implications-for-australia-publication.html/section/478>, accessed 29 Oct. 2012. 15 See for example, European Environment Agency, 'Annual European Union greenhouse gas inventory 1990–2009 and inventory report 2011 Submission to the UNFCCC Secretariat', European Environment Agency, Technical report No 2/2011 (EEA, 2011) and Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, Quarterly Update of Australia’s National Greenhouse Gas Inventory, June Quarter 2012', Australian Government [web document] <http://www.climatechange.gov.au/~/media/climate-change/emissions/2012-06/QuarterlyUpdate-NationalGreenhouseGasInventory201206-PDF.pdf>, accessed 29 Oct. 2012. 16 UNFCCC, 'Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its seventh session, held in Durban from 28 November to 11 December 2011', FCCC/KP/CMP/2011/10/Add.1, UNFCCC [web document] (2011) <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cmp7/eng/10a01.pdf>, accessed 29 Oct. 2012. 17 Minister for Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, ‘Australia ready to join Kyoto Second Commitment Period’, (Australian Government,2012). 18 David Wroe, 'Coalition ready to back Kyoto 2', The Age [web page] (2012), <http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/political-news/coalition-ready-to-back-kyoto-2-20120815-24938.html>, accessed 16 Aug. 2012. 19 The Climate Institute, ‘The Kyoto Protocol: Impact on International Carbon Market Access for Australian Business, Policy Brief’, The Climate Institute [web document] (2012) < http://www.climateinstitute.org.au/verve/_resources/TCI_PolicyBrief_CDMandKP_August2012.pdf>, accessed 29 Oct. 2012. 20 Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, ‘Strengthening Australia’s National Ambition for 2020, Submission to the AWG-LCA and AWG-KP’, Australian Government [web document] (2009) <http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/initiatives/unfccc/~/media/publications/international/submission-australias-national-ambition.pdf>, accessed 11 Sept. 2012. 21 UNFCCC, 'Compilation of economy-wide emission reduction targets to be implemented by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention', FCCC/SB/2011/INF.1/Rev.1, UNFCCC [web document] (2011) <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/sb/eng/inf01r01.pdf>, accessed 29 Oct. 2012. 22 UNFCCC, 'Issues relating to the transformation of pledges for emission reductions into quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives: methodology and examples, Revised technical paper', FCCC/TP/2010/3/Rev.1, UNFCCC [web document] (2011) <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/tp/03r01.pdf>, accessed 29 Oct. 2012. 23 Danish Presidency of the Council of the European Union, ‘Submission by Denmark and the European Commission on behalf of the European Union and its Member States, Information on the quantified emission limitation or reduction objectives (QELROs) for the second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol’, Danish Presidency of the Council of the European Union [web document] (2012) <http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/kp/application/pdf/awgkp_eu_19042012.pdf>, accessed 11 Sept. 2012. 24 Values will depend on the national greenhouse gas inventory used.

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25 Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, Quarterly Update of Australia’s National Greenhouse Gas Inventory, June Quarter 2012', Australian Government [web document] <http://www.climatechange.gov.au/~/media/climate-change/emissions/2012-06/QuarterlyUpdate-NationalGreenhouseGasInventory201206-PDF.pdf>, accessed 29 Oct. 2012. 26 Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cwlth), s.3. 27 Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cwlth), s.14. 28 Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cwlth), s.17. 29 All references to emissions in this paper are to carbon dioxide equivalents (CO2-e). 30 Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, ‘Australia’s emission projections: 2012’, Australian Government [web document] (2012) <http://www.climatechange.gov.au/~/media/government/aep/AEP-20121030-Summary.pdf>, accessed 1 Nov. 2012. 31 Treasury, 'Mid-year economic and fiscal outlook 2012-13', Australian Government [web document] 2012 <http://www.budget.gov.au/2012-13/content/myefo/download/2012-13_MYEFO.pdf>, accessed 29 Oct. 2012. 32 Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cwlth), s.289. 33 Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Clean Energy Bill 2011, Explanatory Memoranda’, Australian Government [web page] (2011) <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/bill_em/ceb2011129/memo_0.html>, accessed 29 Oct. 2012. 34 UNFCCC, 'Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its seventh session, held in Durban from 28 November to 11 December 2011', FCCC/KP/CMP/2011/10/Add.1, UNFCCC [web document] (2011) <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cmp7/eng/10a01.pdf>, accessed 29 Oct. 2012. 35 Such action would include entering into a new treaty, negotiating an amendment to an existing treaty or withdrawing from a treaty. 36 Australian Government, 'Australian Government response to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties report: Report 100- Treaties tabled on 25 June 2008 (2): Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’, (Australian Government, 2012). 37 The Climate Institute, ‘The Kyoto Protocol: Impact on International Carbon Market Access for Australian Business, Policy Brief’, The Climate Institute [web document] (2012) < http://www.climateinstitute.org.au/verve/_resources/TCI_PolicyBrief_CDMandKP_August2012.pdf>, accessed 29 Oct. 2012. 38 Australian Government, ‘Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme, White Paper, Vol. 1’, (Australian Government, 2008). 39 Ross Garnaut, The Garnaut Climate Change Review, Final Report (New York/Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 40 Australian Government, ‘Australia’s National Ambition, Submission to the AWG-LCA and AWG-KP’, Australian Government [web document] (2009) <http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/initiatives/unfccc/~/media/submissions/international/Australias-national-ambition-submission-AWG-LCA-and-AWG-KP.ashx>, accessed 27 Sept. 2012. 41 Minister of Climate Change, ‘A new target for reducing Australia’s carbon pollution’, 4 May 2009, Press Release, Australian Government [web document] (2009) <http://www.climatechange.gov.au/minister/previous/wong/2009/mediareleases/May/mr20090504c.aspx>, accessed 27 Sept. 2012. 42 Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, ‘Strengthening Australia’s National Ambition for 2020, Submission to the AWG-LCA and AWG-KP’, Australian Government [web document] (2009) <http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/initiatives/unfccc/~/media/publications/international/submission-australias-national-ambition.pdf>, accessed 11 Sept. 2012. 43 The Liberal Party of Australia, ‘Direct Action Plan’, The Liberal Party of Australia [web document] (2010) <http://www.liberal.org.au/sites/default/files/ccd/The%20Coalitions%20Direct%20Action%20Plan%20Policy%20Web.pdf>, accessed 27 Sept. 2012. 44 Australian Government, ‘Submission under the Durban Agreements, Enhanced action on Mitigation, AWG-LCA Clarification’, Australian Government [web document] (2012) <http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/initiatives/unfccc/submissions/~/media/government/initiatives/unfccc/submissions/may-2012/unfcc-clarification-may-2012.pdf>, accessed 27 Sept. 2012. 45 For example, Professor Ross Garnaut notes that current commitments to limit pollution by major developing and advanced economies mean that Australia's unconditional 5 per cent target would not be a fair contribution towards global mitigation. See Ross Garnaut, 'Australia in the Global Response to Climate Change, Summary', Garnaut Climate Change Review [web document] (2011) <http://www.garnautreview.org.au/update-2011/garnaut-review-2011/summary-garnaut-review-2011.pdf>, accessed 29 Oct. 2012. 46 Minister of Climate Change, ‘A new target for reducing Australia’s carbon pollution’, 4 May 2009, Press Release, Australian Government [web document] (2009) <http://www.climatechange.gov.au/minister/previous/wong/2009/mediareleases/May/mr20090504c.aspx>, accessed 27 Sept. 2012. 47 The Climate Institute, ‘Summary of Freedom of Information Request from The Climate Institute to the Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency: Documents regarding the influence of foreign emission reduction targets on Australian emission reduction targets, Media Summary,’ The Climate Institute [web document] (2010) <http://www.climateinstitute.org.au/verve/_resources/foi_request_summary.pdf>, accessed 27 Sept. 2012. 48 Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, ‘Background Target conditions - where do we stand, December 2009’, Obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by The Climate Institute [web document] (2010) <http://www.climateinstitute.org.au/verve/_resources/41_Background_Target_conditions_-_where_do_we_stand_December_2009.pdf>, accessed 27 Sept. 2012. 49 Treasury, ‘Strong Growth, Low Pollution, Modelling a Carbon Price’, Australian Government [web document] (2011) <http://carbonpricemodelling.treasury.gov.au/carbonpricemodelling/content/report/downloads/Modelling_Report_Consolidated_update.pdf>, accessed 27 Sept. 2012. 50 Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, ‘Notes on 25 per cent aggregate target for advanced countries, December 2009,’ Obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by The Climate Institute [web document] (2010) <http://www.climateinstitute.org.au/verve/_resources/38_Notes_of_25_per_cent_aggregate_target_for_advanced_countries_December_2009.pdf>, accessed 27 Sept. 2012. 51 Ecofys, Climate Analytics, PIK, ‘Climate Action Tracker’, Climate Action Trackers Partners [web page] (2012) <http://www.climateactiontracker.org/>, accessed 27th September, 2012. 52 Michel den Elzen, Mark Roelfsema, Andries Hof, Hannes Böttcher and Giacomo Grassi, ‘Analysing the emission gap between pledged emission reductions under the Cancún Agreements and the 2oC climate target’, PBL Netherlands, Environmental Assessment Agency, [web document] (2012) <http://www.pbl.nl/sites/default/files/cms/publicaties/pbl-2012-analysing-the-emission-gap-between-pledged-emission-reductions-500114021.pdf>, accessed 27 Sept. 2012.

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53 Treasury, 'Strong growth low pollution: modelling a carbon price’, Australian Government [web document] (2011) <http://archive.treasury.gov.au/carbonpricemodelling/content/default.asp>, accessed 29 Oct. 2012. 54 For example, recent work on Tasmanian forests by Andrew Macintosh at ANU suggests that the abatement available if certain policy decisions were made could deliver approximately 11 million tonnes of abatement per annum. Andrew Macintosh, ‘Durban Climate Conference and Australia’s Abatement Task’, CCLP Working Paper Series 2011/2, ANU Centre for Climate Law and Policy [web document] (2012) <http://150.203.86.5/cclp/Working_Papers/WPSeries2011-2_Durban_Climate_Conference.pdf>, accessed 29 Oct. 2012. 55 DCCEE project a maximum of 7 million tonnes of abatement from these activities in 2020. Department of Climate Change, ‘Carbon Farming Initiative, Preliminary estimates of abatement, Discussion Paper’, Australian Government [web document] (2011) <http://www.climatechange.gov.au/~/media/publications/carbon-farming-initative/CFI-Preliminary-estimates-of-abatement.pdf>, accessed 29 Oct. 2012. 56Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, Quarterly Update of Australia’s National Greenhouse Gas Inventory, June Quarter 2012', Australian Government [web document] <http://www.climatechange.gov.au/~/media/climate-change/emissions/2012-06/QuarterlyUpdate-NationalGreenhouseGasInventory201206-PDF.pdf>, accessed 29 Oct. 2012. 57 Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, Quarterly Update of Australia’s National Greenhouse Gas Inventory, June Quarter 2012', Australian Government [web document] <http://www.climatechange.gov.au/~/media/climate-change/emissions/2012-06/QuarterlyUpdate-NationalGreenhouseGasInventory201206-PDF.pdf>, accessed 29 Oct. 2012. 58 Clean Energy Regulator, ‘National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting’, Australian Government [web page] (2012) < http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/National-Greenhouse-and-Energy-Reporting/Pages/default.aspx>, accessed 29 Oct. 2012. 59 Treasury, 'Mid-year economic and fiscal outlook 2012-13', Australian Government [web document] 2012 <http://www.budget.gov.au/2012-13/content/myefo/download/2012-13_MYEFO.pdf>, accessed 29 Oct. 2012. 60 Reputex, 'Carbon Market Update - October', (Reputex, 2012). 61 Bloomberg New Energy Finance, personal communication, October 2012. 62 Hugh Saddler, 'Projecting Australia's emissions from covered sectors in 2013, Prepared for The Climate Institute', (Pitt and Sherry, 2012). 63 Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, ‘Australia’s emission projections: 2012’, Australian Government [web document] (2012) <http://www.climatechange.gov.au/~/media/government/aep/AEP-20121030-Summary.pdf>, accessed 1 Nov. 2012. 64 Hugh Saddler, 'Projecting Australia's emissions from covered sectors in 2013, Prepared for The Climate Institute', (Pitt and Sherry, 2012). 65 Hugh Saddler, 'Projecting Australia's emissions from covered sectors in 2013, Prepared for The Climate Institute', (Pitt and Sherry, 2012). 66 Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, ‘Australia’s emission projections: 2012’, Australian Government [web document] (2012) <http://www.climatechange.gov.au/~/media/government/aep/AEP-20121030-Summary.pdf>, accessed 1 Nov. 2012.

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