Recent years have witnessed a development whereby Western troops have been deployed to still more complex and volatile theatres. As part of this development, the traditional and prima-ry task of the troops, that is, to defeat or neutralise an armed adversary, increasingly has to go hand-in-hand with a secondary task of creating conditions favourable for the re-building of weak or even collapsed states. This refl ects the recognition that these states, even if geographically quite distant, may pose a serious threat to the West.

The challenge for the troops is not only how to fi ght and to assist in the re-building at the same time, but also how to work together with other branches of the government machinery, with international organisations and with national non-govern-mental organisations to bring stability to a war-torn and fragile state. It is this combined endeavour on part of both military and civilian actors which is termed “The Comprehensive Approach”.

The articles in this book discuss the challenges and prospects of the Comprehensive Approach. They offer an in-sight into the state-of-the-art thinking on the issue, especially in light of the lessons learned in Afghanistan, and they give valuable advice on the future design of a Comprehensive Approach that will support the complicated task of creating favourable and lasting political, social and economic change.

With contributions from:

Allard Wagemaker Peter Dahl ThruelsenWilliam MitchellFrederic LabarreRene MoelkerEdwin DadoAlmer van der StoelSjoerd MevissenJody Borgers

Royal Danish Defence College

Challenges and Prospects

Royal Danish Defence College Publishing House

Edited by Flemming Splidsboel Hansen

The Comprehensive Approach

The Comprehensive Approach:Challenges and Prospects

Edited by

Flemming Splidsboel Hansen

Research Director

2009

Editor: Flemming Splidsboel HansenThe Comprehensive Approach: Challenges and Prospects

© Royal Danish Defence College

All rights reserved. Mechanical, photographic or other reproduction or photocopying from this book or parts thereof is only allowed according to agreements between The Danish Defence and CopyDan. Any other use without written consent from the Royal Danish Defence College is illegal according to Danish law on intellectual property right. Excepted are short extracts for reviews in newspapers or the like.

Copenhagen December 2009Royal Danish Defence CollegeRyvangs Allé 1DK-2100 CopenhagenDenmarkTel.: 3915 1515Fax: 3929 6172Editor in chief: Major General Carsten SvenssonPrinted in Denmark by Danish Defence, KorsørLayout: Bent-Ole KurePhoto: Morten Kromann WistrupISBN: 9788791421860Number printed 300

Roayl Danish Defence College Publishing House

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Contents

FOREWORD ................................................................................................ 4

CONTRIBUTORS .......................................................................................... 5

ACRONYMS ................................................................................................. 6

Chapter oneTWISTING ARMS OR FLEXING MUSCLES? .................................................. 9Allard Wagemaker

Chapter twoTHE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH IN HELMAND PROVINCE -FROM A MILITARY PERSPECTIVE .............................................................. 27Peter Dahl Thruelsen

Chapter threeTHE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH DILEMMA:NO UNITY OF COMMAND - NO UNITY OF EFFORT .................................. 42William Mitchell

Chapter fourEFFECT-BASED POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION ANDSTABILISATION .......................................................................................... 69Frederic Labarre

Chapter fi veTHE ”DUTCH APPROACH” AND THE EXPEDITIONARY FORMULA ........... 85Rene Moelker

Chapter sixTOWARDS AN EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE CORPS OF ENGINEERS:SUPPORTING INTERACTIONS BETWEEN EDUCATION, RESEARCH AND PRACTICE ................................................................................................ 107Edwin Dado, Almer van der Stoel, Sjoerd Mevissen & Jody Borgers

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FOREWORD

In October 2008, the Royal Danish Defence College hosted a workshop on The Comprehensive Approach, that is, the process of bringing together a variety of ac-tors, both military and civilian, to ensure lasting stability and security in a confl ict zone. As indicated by several of the contributions to this volume, the present con-fl ict in Afghanistan illustrates the acute challenge of developing and implementing a strategy that will not only bring military success against the Taliban but also pro-duce an attractive and viable alternative to the old societal order. It is this challenge which this study discusses.

The workshop on The Comprehensive Approach was organised within the frame-work of the International Society for Military Sciences (ISMS) which was established in Copenhagen in October 2008. The ISMS has as its purpose the building of a network for the creation, development, exchange and diffusion of research and knowledge about war, confl ict management and peace support efforts. ISMS activi-ties are announced at the society’s website at www.isofms.org.

Dr. Flemming Splidsboel HansenRoyal Danish Defence College

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CONTRIBUTORS

Allard Wagemaker, LtCol, Netherlands Defense Academy(aje.wagemaker@nlda.nl)

Almer van der Stoel, Dr., Netherlands Defense Academy(AEC.vd.Stoel@nlda.nl)

Edwin Dado, Dr., Netherlands Defense Academy(E. Dado@nlda.nl)

Flemming Splidsboel Hansen, Dr., Royal Danish Defence College(forsk-01@fak.dk)

Frederic Labarre, MA, Baltic Defence College(Frederic.Labarre@bdcol.ee)

Jody Borgers, MSc, Netherlands Defense Academy(JBW.Borgers@nlda.nl)

Peter Dahl Thruelsen, Research Fellow, Royal Danish Defence College(ifs-71@fak.dk)

Rene Moelker, Dr., Netherlands Defense Academy(r.moelker@nlda.nl)

Sjoerd Mevissen, Cpt., MSc, Netherlands Defense Academy(SAN.Mevissen@nlda.nl)

William Mitchell, Dr., Royal Danish Defence College(ilo-16@fak.dk)

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ACRONYMS

ANA Afghan National ArmyANP Afghan National PoliceANSF Afghan National Security ForcesASG Afghan Security GroupBSc Bachelor of ScienceC2 Command and ControlCA Comprehensive ApproachCAP Combined Action PlatoonCAS Close Air SupportCE Civil EngineeringCOIN Counter-InsurgencyDoD Department of DefenseEBAO Effects-Based Approach to OperationsESS European Security StrategyEU European UnionEUCTS European Union Counter-Terrorism StrategyFMS Faculty of Military SciencesFOB Forward Operation BaseICBM Intercontinental Ballistic MissileICKT Information, Communication & Knowledge TechnologiesIDEA Integrated Development and Entrepreneurial ActivitiesIO International OrganisationIPB Intelligence Preparation of the BattlespaceIR International RelationsISAF International Security Assistance ForceKM Knowledge ManagementMI Military IntelligenceMoE Measures of EffectivenessMSC Master of ScienceNATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNGO Non-Governmental OrganisationNLDA Netherlands Defence AcademyNVAO Accreditation Organisation of the Netherlands and Flanders

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OPP Operational Planning ProcessORBAT Order of Battle ReportPBA Predictive Battlespace AwarenessPBL Problem-Based LearningPMESII Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure & InformationPRT Provincial Reconstruction TeamPSIBouw Process and Innovation in BuildingQANU Quality Assurance Netherlands UniversitiesR/D Reconstruction and DevelopmentS&R Stabilisation and ReconstructionSCRS Offi ce of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and StabilisationSIGINT Signals IntelligenceUK United KingdomUN United NationsUS United StatesUSA United States of AmericaUT University of Twente

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CHAPTER ONE

TWISTING ARMS OR FLEXING MUSCLES?

LtCol Allard WagemakerNetherlands Defense Academy

The ends to which military force are used in the twenty-fi rst century are changing into something more complex and less strategic or vital than was the case in the previous age. States continue to have armed forces and they continue to use those symbols and expressions of power as they did in the industrial age. While confrontation, confl ict and combat are still undoubtedly with us, and intervention and state-building are important issues, war is no longer a massive deciding event – concentrated in time – in interna-tional affairs. Lasting solutions must be found for confl icts by winning the war and the peace. More is needed than traditional hard power, the use of which must be weighed against other options. Post-modern (i.e. Western, Enlightenment-based) states today face threats that require a timed, multi-faceted, and just use of power. Their foreign policies are charac-terized by a strong moral element and well-formulated paragraphs on human rights and security but they have chosen to structure their societies in such a way as to limit the means available to pursue unilateral policies or to intervene as lone actors militarily. The United States of America [USA] appears to be a relative exception to that principle, but even this strong military power realizes (to greater or lesser degrees) the importance of international political support and even the American superpower is discovering the lim-its of its military might today. Post-modern states have an interest in stabilizing regions that are vital for their economies. They believe that state-building and democratization are essential parts of policies for preventing extremism and the rise of asymmetrical threats. Whether rational, small and Western post-modern states – like the Scandina-vian countries, the Netherlands, and Canada – should go to war and how they can cooperate in transition operations and in a comprehensive approach with their superior coalition partner, the USA, which has a more offensive realist view of the world, is the subject of this chapter.

Why Postmodern States FightWar in the twenty-fi rst century is still rooted in the fundamental precept that the superior will defeats the inferior. Warfare is no longer about defeating the enemy’s military forces

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and more a “war amongst the people”.1 War has become according to Rupert Smith “… a continuous criss-crossing between confrontation and confl ict, regardless of whether a state is facing another state or a non-state actor. Rather than war and peace, there is no predefi ned sequence, nor is peace necessarily either starting point or end point: confl icts are resolved, but not necessarily confrontations”.2 Via networks, the minds of enemy decision-makers and society are directly attacked to destroy their will to resist.3 As demonstrated in the 2005 bombings in Beirut, London, Madrid, and in the ongoing terrorizing campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, most casualties will be civilians. Curi-ously enough, most of the casualties are not caused by military weapons but by materi-als that are readily available in modern society. The asymmetric, often non-state, warrior is in thereby relieved of the strategic necessity of defending core production assets and supply lines. He will use networks to understand the intentions of his superiors and will independently carry specifi c messages to policy-makers. The asymmetric warrior is free to focus on offense rather than defense which is more than a challenge for the current security doctrines and (third-generation) warfare methods that are used by most post-modern states, which fi ght to create stability to preserve the status-quo and eradicate the causes of asymmetrical threats, if possible. Short of solutions and because wars are no longer won on the battlefi eld, wars need at least to be contained and controlled, a re-alistic approach to most of these (intractable) confl icts may well be one of management rather than resolution.4 Management preserves the confl ict for resolution at a more propitious time on another day and may be able to forestall the self-reinforcing effects of some of the characteristics.5 If the confl ict does not present an existential threat; freez-ing seems better and less painful than boiling. The question that then arises, however, is what peace is under these circumstances?

A Comprehensive Concept of PeacePeace is much more that the absence of war. It is the absence of violence and the presence of mutually benefi cial cooperation and learning. Johan Galtung offers a com-

(1) Rupert Smith, Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London: Allen Lane 2005), pp. 1-26 and 394-398.(2) Ibid., p. 17(3) Hammes, Thomas, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (St. Paul: Zenith Press 2004), pp. 208-215, Smith, Utility of Force, 398-404.(4) Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson & Pamela Aall, Taming Intractable Confl icts: Mediation in the Hardest Cases (Washington, DC: Unites States Institute of Peace Press 2004), Oliver Ramsbothan, Tom Woodhouse & Hugh Miall, Contemporary Confl ict Resolution (2nd edition) (Cambridge: Polity Press 2005), pp. 9-27; Hugh Miall, Emergent Confl ict and Peaceful Change (Basingstoke: Palgrave McMillan 2007).(5) Ramsbothan, Woodhouse & Miall, Contemporary Confl ict Resolution, pp. 106-184.

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prehensive understanding of peace with eight components (see Table).6 In the Table, human needs are grouped into four basic categories: survival, economic well-being, freedom and identity (the opposites of death, misery, oppression and alienation). These are threatened by four forms of violence: direct violence (hurting and killing people with weapons), structural violence I (the slow death from hunger, preventable diseases and other suffering caused by unjust structures of society), structural violence II (deprivation from freedom of choice and from participation in decisions that affect people’s own lives), and cultural violence (the justifi cation of direct and structural violence through the nationalism, racism, sexism and other forms of discrimination and prejudice). These four forms of violence correspond broadly to four forms of power: military, eco-nomic, political and cultural. Negative peace is defi ned by the absence of the four forms of violence, while positive peace is characterised by the presence of activities to bring relief for past or present violence and to prevent future violence.

Table 1: Eight Components of Peace7

Negative peace Positive peaceSurvival: absence of direct violence caused by military power

Absence of direct violence: cease-fi res, disarmament, prevention of terrorism and state terrorism, nonviolence

Life-enhancing cooperation and prevention of direct violence: peace-building, confl ict transformation, reconciliation and reconstruction

Development: absence of structural violence I caused by economic power

Humanitarian aid, food aid, al-leviation of poverty and misery

Building a life-sustaining economy at the local, national and global level in which everyone’s basic needs are met

Freedom: absence of structural violence II caused by political power

Liberation from oppression, oc-cupation, dictatorship

Good governance and participation, self-determination, human rights

Peace culture (iden-tity): absence of cul-tural violence caused by cultural power

Overcoming prejudice based on nationality, race language, gender, age, class, religion, etc.; elimination of the glorifi cation of war and violence in the media, literature, fi lms, monuments, etc

Promotion of a culture of peace and mutual learning; global communica-tion and dialogues; development of peaceful deep cultures and deep structures; peace education; peace journalism

Military power traditionally plays a role in the “survival” sphere; however, as its role extends to stabilization, it may also get involved in the “development” sphere. By con-

(6) Johan Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Confl ict Development and Civilization (London: Sage 1996).(7) Dietrich Fischer, “Peace as a Self-regulating Process”, in Charles Webel and Johan Galtung, eds., Handbook of Peace and Confl ict Studies (London: Routledge 2007), p. 188.

12

trast, development workers have a limited role to play in survival and a traditional role in development. Consequently, soldiers and development workers have traditionally oper-ated in different spheres under a principle of division of labour. Military forces conduct peace operations to maintain the negative peace by pressuring both sides to adhere to the agreement, while development workers stimulate a non-war economy by creating a viable market. The reality, of course, is more complicated. As survival and development are mutu-ally interdependent, however, the relationship between soldiers and development work-ers must be much more interdependent in their interaction with each other as well as with diplomats, to ensure a holistic approach to peace building. Trust in the good faith of all parties is also easily damaged. Cease-fi re agreements have on numerous occasions been broken, with each side accusing the other of resuming hostilities fi rst and claiming that they acted in self-defence. Economic incentives are another source of contention: the availability of “lootable” resources (diamonds and other precious stones, minerals, oil, coal, timber, opium, etc.) coupled with high unemployment, especially among the youth, makes it inexpensive to build an army, often without no money to pay them, but simply by promising them that they can keep whatever they can loot.8 Trust in the good intentions of both interveners and local and national establish-ments in the host country needs to be preserved and may also need to be managed.

Peace, Violence and WarViolence and war are typically the result of untransformed confl icts and unresolved security dilemmas. Peace with survival concentrates therefore on the prevention of a negative spiral of violence. A possible remedy or goal of mediation would be confl ict transformation and prevention of war by the identifi cation of common goals or at least agreements on how to deal with differing interests in a peaceful way. Cooperation in mu-tually benefi cial projects is an effective way to build mutual trust which makes it easier to transform any emerging confl ict peacefully. During the initial stages of the process moving from a negative to a positive peace, it is essential to make sure that those who initiate war do not profi t from it: as long as aggression is rewarded, war continues. This is where the interests of the military forces and the development workers overlap: the gap needs to be bridged between a dysfunc-tional and a functional state. This is known as the “sovereignty gap”. According to Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, “this glaring gap exists between the de jure sovereignty that the international system affords such states and their de facto capabilities to serve

(8) Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffl er, ”On Economic Causes of Civil Wars”, Oxford Economic Papers 50/4 (1998), pp. 563-573 and Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008), pp. 65-84.

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their populations and act as responsible members of the international community”.9 The success or failure of a peace process – or, maybe better, of state-building and na-tion-building – is assessed by using the “sovereignty index”.10 It makes it possible to assess the progress or decline in a country’s sovereignty by indexing and evaluating the ten functions of the state: legitimate monopoly on the control over the means of violence and use of force; administrative control; management of public fi nances; investment in human capital; delineation of citizenship rights and duties; provision of infrastruc-ture services; formation of the market; management of the state’s assets (including the environment, natural resources, and cultural assets); international relations (including entering into international contracts and public borrowing); and rule of law.11 If the goal of state-building is to create a functioning state, then the state in which the intervention is taking place should be helped and assisted to achieve at least the minimum required standard for all ten functions. If this is achieved, an intervention will not only have been successful, morally it also will meet the minimum objective that interveners would want to see achieved if they considered the situation in a failed or failing, often pre-modern, state grave enough to have violated its sovereignty. The modern, functioning state performs the ten functions for its citizens, thereby becoming an instrument for collective mobilization, cooperation and trust. It is able to deal with both the immediate-term societal needs and the longer-term generational and environmental requirements. The state forms an integrated whole in which all of the functions are interlinked. Pre-modern states are often dysfunctional and weak: offi ce holders focus primarily on personal benefi t while the state fails to perform essential functions. The state’s failure to perform takes a high toll on its citizens, as well as on the security of neighboring states. In these weak or failing states, security is often the dominant state function, with economic or political issues being pushed into the back-ground. When a state performs the ten functions in an integrated fashion, it produces a clustering effect which is typical for modern and post-modern states.12 A virtuous cycle is created in which state decisions in the different domains bolster overall enfranchise-ment and opportunity for the citizenry. This process reinforces the legitimacy of both the decision-makers and their decisions, engendering trust in the system as a whole and thereby produces a “sovereignty divided”. By contrast, failure to perform one or more of

(9) Ghani and Lockhart, Fixing Failed States, pp. 3-4.(10) Ibid., p. 164 and Michael Carnahan, “Closing the Sovereignty Gap: an Approach to State-Building”, Working Paper 253 (London: Overseas Development Institute 2005).(11) Ghani and Lockhart, Fixing Failed States, pp. 124-166.(12) Ibid., p. 163, Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003), pp. 22-26.

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these functions leads to the creation and acceleration of a vicious cycle which results in the creation of contending centers of power, the multiplication of increasingly contradic-tory and ineffective decision-making processes, the loss of trust between citizens and state, the de-legitimization of institutions, the disenfranchisement of the citizenry and ultimately the resort to violence. This negative cycle creates the sovereignty gap. Development and the formation of markets are catalysts and instruments in peace-building strategies.13 Although negative peace can be maintained with the help of the military, corruption, which may well lead to violence, is the main obstacle to the development of a positive peace.14 As long as it is easier to get rich by controlling the army and the police than by producing goods, it is more tempting to plot coups than to develop business enterprises that can meet people’s needs and provide employment. Corruption increases a climate of secrecy, where offi cials can make arbitrary decisions that are not subject to public scrutiny.15 Openness and transparency are among the best remedies against corruption. Corruption is easily possible in an ineffective, dysfunctional state, often a central-ized state that lacks instruments for the preservation of the rule of law.16 Interveners must not only restore order or create a negative peace to be successful but it is also their moral duty to restore the rule of law.17 This process derives its effectiveness not only from setting up a well-functioning legal system but also from the delineation of governance processes that assigns decision-making authority to the appropriate level of government. When a lower level of government can handle a particular function, higher levels can stand back and monitor, plan and set the agenda. In a modern state, fl ows of information, decisions, rights and policies are aligned to ensure their effective per-formance. Development strategies are therefore comprehensive and focus on the ten functions of the state simultaneously, thereby offering a holistic approach to the transfer of negative to positive peace.

Peace and State-buildingThe activities in the transition from negative to positive peace are grouped under the term “post-confl ict peacebuilding”. According to Joris Voorhoeve this means “… building or reconstructing a country after its government, institutions, population and economy

(13) Ghani and Lockhart, Fixing Failed States, pp. 149-156.(14) Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007), pp. 135-138.(15) Ghani and Lockhart, Fixing Failed States, p. 84.(16) Ibid., p. 165.(17) Joris Voorhoeve, From War to the Rule of Law, Peace Building after Violent Confl ict (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2007), pp. 91-123.

15

have been ravaged by large-scale confl ict”.18 In this rather broad defi nition, the goal is to lower the risks that a country falls back into violence in an environment in which there is often no clear division between war and peace. The main elements of peacebuilding are: establishing security, renewal of government institutions, (re-)starting the rule of law, possibly sowing the seeds of democracy, and socio-economic rehabilitation and development.19 In the beginning, emergency powers are needed for stabilization. Ru-ined infrastructure needs to be repaired, mines have to be cleared, and refugees need protection and assistance to return safely to their homes. Good governance, based on an internally recognized and legitimate legal order with clearly defi ned powers, accepted by the population, is the basis for lasting internal peace. Peacebuilding is a slow, long-lasting process that requires patience. Quick fi xes, often advocated by donors who think that their electorates are averse to long-term involvement, do not bring about lasting peace and stability. Peacebuilding takes a holistic approach but there is conceptual disagreement on the role and responsibilities of the military, development workers and diplomats. Peace and security operations have added dimensions beyond military security.20 A division into four types of humanitarian interventions; or into the eight components of peace with its related activities; or a division into eight peace-building activities does not solve the friction between the responsibilities of the various actors. In the chaos after a war or long-lasting confl ict, many essential steps need to be taken by local, national and international leaders at the same time. International assistance is urgent and hard to prioritize. But who sets the priorities and sequences activities? Who takes – and who is able to take – responsibility? In failed, pre-modern states, the local government is by defi nition unable to pro-vide the ten functions of a state itself. It lacks the capability and infrastructure and is bypassed as foreign military forces, aid agencies, and Non-Governmental Organisations [NGO] fl ood into the country. Capability-building must take a back seat to service deliv-ery. More often than not, the little capability that exists is undermined by the presence of foreigners richly endowed with both resources and capabilities. But who has to do what? What is the sequence in peacebuilding? A theoretical division of peacebuilding into state-building and nation-building ac-tivities – provided the negative peace is maintained by the military – is a challenge since

(18) Ibid., p. 19.(19) Ibid., p. 23.(20) William Durch and Tobias Berkman, ”Restoring and Maintaining Peace, What We Know So Far”, in William Durch, ed., Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press 2006), pp 5-11; Kimberly Zisk Marten, Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past (New York, NY: Columbia University Press 2004), pp 24-39.

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Europeans often criticize Americans for the use of the term nation-building, refl ecting as it does the specifi cally American experience of constructing a new political order in a land of new settlement without deeply rooted peoples, cultures, and traditions. A na-tion – a group of people who see themselves as distinct in their culture, history, institu-tions, or principles and who aspire to self-rule21 – are not built, particularly by outsiders; rather, they evolve out of an evolutionary historical process. What Americans refer to as nation-building is actually state-building – that is, constructing political institutions, or else promoting economic development. State-building has a functionalist approach in the literature, probably best summed up in Roland Paris’ critical view that in post-con-fl ict situations there should be “Institutionalization”, that is, the focus on institutional capacity-building – such as judiciary, police, army and civil service – as this is consid-ered to be an essential prerequisite for self-government, that is, “Liberalization”.22 The functional capacity of state institutions is given precedence over their representational or policy-making autonomy and is increasingly understood in technical and administra-tive terms.23 If the goal of state-building is to create a functioning state and to restore sovereignty, it is debatable whether an intervener properly has a responsibility or func-tion in the nation-building process. State-building is the construction or reconstruction of institutions of governance capable of providing citizens with physical and economic security.24 Ideally, the long-term goal of state-building should be the restoration of sovereignty, a functioning and effective government apparatus and society, and membership of the international so-ciety. State-building encompasses two different types of activities: reconstruction and development. Reconstruction refers to the restoration of war-torn or damaged societies to their pre-confl ict situation. It requires rapid, massive outside intervention to stabilize confl icts, rebuild infrastructure, and deal with humanitarian issues. Reconstruction is something outside powers have shown themselves historically able to bring about.25 Japan, Ger-many, and Italy, and to a lesser extent Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, are examples of successful reconstruction efforts that meet their goal of stabilizing fragile post-confl ict

(21) Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Confl ict (New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company 2000), p. 23; Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1983), pp. 1-7; Montserrat Guibernau, Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Polity Press 1996), p. 47.(22) Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Confl ict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004).(23) David Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul and Beyond, Human Rights and International Intervention (London: Pluto Press 2006), pp. 48-70, and Voorhoeve, From War to the Rule of Law.(24) Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul, p. 1.(25) Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, Soldiers and Civil Power: Supporting or Substituting Civil Authorities in Modern Peace Operations (Amsterdam: Amsterdam Univesity Press 2005).

17

situations and returning the target countries to an economic state close to what they had been prior to confl ict. Reconstruction is possible when the underlying political and social infrastructure has survived confl ict or crisis; the problem is then the relatively simple matter of injecting suffi cient resources to jump-start the process, in the form of supplying food, roads, buildings, infrastructure and the like. Development refers to the creation of new institutions and the promotion of sus-tained economic growth, events that transform the society open-endedly into something that it has not been previously. It is much more problematic, both conceptually and as a matter of pragmatic policy, but critical since it is the ability to create and maintain indigenous institutions that permits outside powers to formulate an exit strategy. Reconstruction and development are interdependent, which partly explains the lack of conceptual clarity on how to promote institutional development and makes it so diffi cult to transition out of the reconstruction phase. An example is Bosnia-Herzegovi-na.26 More than a decade after signing of the Dayton Accord, the Bosnians are still not capable of governing themselves. The role of the international community in the per-son of the High Representative in Bosnia overturns the results of democratic elections, unseats offi cials, and otherwise takes on governance functions in place of local au-thorities, all in the name of eliminating corruption and promoting good governance and human rights. But this approach undercuts the Bosnian capacity for self-government by making the Bosnian state dependent on outside support. If the goal of state-building in Bosnia is the restoration of its sovereignty and functionality, then the Bosnian state should be a mediating link between the “inside” of domestic politics and the “outside” of international relations. The example shows that a functionalist, problem-solving approach to state-build-ing is too limited. State-building should be considered in the broader context of inter-national politics: is it possible to conduct state-building without politics or war without politics?

InterventionWar-fi ghting is sometimes necessary and pragmatic, but it is rarely, if ever, suffi cient.27 If prevention does not work, intervention may become necessary.28 Intervention is a forc-ible interference in the internal or external affairs of another state, short of declaring

(26) David Chandler, Peace without Politics? Ten Years of International State-building in Bosnia (London: Routledge 2005), Milan Bufon, Anton Gosar, Safet Nurkovic & Andre-Louis Sanguin, The Western Balkans: A European Challenge (Koper: Zalozba Annales 2006).(27) William Zartman, Peacemaking in International Confl ict: Methods and Techniques (Washington, DC: United States for Peace Press 2005), pp. 58-62.(28) Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (4th edition) (New York, NY: Basic Books 2006), pp. 251-255.

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war. The power of the state must yield to a “principle of extreme urgency”. The burden of moral proof rests with the state that intervenes. The case of the Abyssinia crisis in 1935-36 is an example where Western powers refused to act and thereby aided the Italian victory during the Second Italian-Abyssinian war.29 Operation Desert Storm to liberate Kuwait in 1991 is an example where a decision to resist aggression was used as a classic basis for a “just war”.30 Is intervention in the Middle East justifi ed to secure the (existential) fl ow of oil, however? Unlike war situations, interveners have a choice of whether or not to fi ght.31 In-tervention policies lie at the boundary of peace and war in international politics; they defi ne the outer limits of sovereign control. States therefore debate long and hard, both internally and among themselves, whether to intervene and fi ght to secure their inter-ests.32 These debates are harsh if there is no hard evidence that an existential threat is being targeted. Often, there is a very reasonable set of interests that could support the intervention and another equally plausible set that would support non-intervention. More than ever, the discussion centers on a balance between long-term political viability and short-term tactical effectiveness. Martha Finnemore distinguishes among three patterns of intervention behavior.33 First is intervention to collect debts, a practice that stopped in the early twentieth cen-tury because the changed economic structures and the rise of international law reduced the necessity to fi ght for this reason. The second pattern is intervention for humanitarian purposes – a kind of moral duty for liberal democracies – but also for their own benefi t, e.g. for their economies. The third is intervention because the target state presents a threat to international peace and order. The amount of force used and decisiveness of the intervention depends on the interests at stake. Provided the interests at stake are important enough to fi ght for, an intervention has to meet the Jus ad Bellum criteria before an intervention is conducted. In addition, the intervention must meet the Jus Post Bellum criteria as soon as pos-sible. This was demonstrated clearly by the Second World War. Germany and Japan were made susceptible to change after being militarily defeated. This made them ripe for change: both transformed from intensely nationalistic, aggressive and militaristic states into deeply anti-militaristic states. To accomplish this, force had to be tied to an

(29) A. J. Barker, Rape of Ethiopia, 1936 (New York, NY: Ballantine Books 1971).(30) Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Confl ict 1990-1991: Dipomacy and War in the New World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1995).(31) Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2004), p. 5.(32) Jeremy Black, Why Wars Happen (Washington Square, NY: New York University Press 1998), p. 31.(33) Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention, pp. 3-4.

19

extensive array of other tools.34 Intervention is more than a military quick fi x since it has to be coupled with massive political and social support and state-building.35 It covers a vast array of very different sorts of political action with the purpose of bringing about any large-scale process of social change that redirects force in entire countries or groups of countries.36

Intervention, as defi ned at the top of this section, is an accepted practice in inter-national politics if mandated, that is, legitimated by the United Nations Security Coun-cil.37 Since the end of the Cold War, states have actively sought to circumscribe uses of force within a framework of multilateral institutions to get moral support or justifi cation for their actions. The need for a broad social basis and the importance of legal and institutional mechanisms have led most states to realize that collective intervention provides the needed social basis and poses fewer dangers to general peace than unilat-eral action. According to John Hare and Carey Joynt, coercive intervention is acceptable if “…[i]t is a response to the intervention by one’s opponents; in defense of the integrity of the internal political process; a means to reestablish the balance, not to destabilize it; a venture with a reasonable chance of success; a last resort, following humane and constructive efforts to deal with fundamental problems; an undertaking proportional in its means to the value of its end; and not a violation of basic moral principles”.38 From this defi nition, it can be deduced that in addition to changing the behavior of the target state, the intervention has a regional dimension as well. It underlines the need to add the regional dimension in an analysis of intervention. States understand intervention as being different from and less than war. War-fi ghting is, however, a common element in both cases. The difference is the intensity.39 In general, wars are at the high end of the confl ict spectrum, interventions are con-ducted in the gray area between peace and war, often at the lower end of the confl ict

(34) Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson, Transforming For Stabilization And Reconstruction Operations (Washington, DC: National Defence University Press 2004), pp. 3-14; Brocades Zaalberg, Soldiers and Civil Power, pp. 25-44.(35) Francis Fukuyama, “Guidelines for Nation-Builders”, in Francis Fukuyama, ed.,Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press 2006), pp. 231-244; Francis Fukuyama, ”Nation-Building and the Failure of Institutional Memory”, in ibid., pp. 1-16; Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2004); Michael Bhatia, War and Intervention: Issues for Contemporary Peace Operations (Bloomfi eld, CT: Kumarian Press, 2003), pp. 67-122; and Paris, At War’s End.(36) Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention, pp.7-12 and 129-137, and Miall, Emergent Confl ict and Peaceful Change.(37) Durch and Berkman, “Restoring and Maintaining Peace” and Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press 1966), pp. 5-7.(38) John Hare and Carey Joynt, Ethics and International Affairs (London: MacMillan 1982), p. 160.(39) Michael Lund, Preventing Violent Confl ict: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), pp. 38.

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spectrum.40 In an existential war, the goal is to defeat the other party; in interventions, war is functional to make the target state susceptible to societal change and confl ict resolution. The change itself is brought about – after the short war phase – with softer instruments.

Smart PowerThe focus in modern confl ict has to be on winning wars, not battles.41 A short well-defi ned battle can work as catalyst to give up the will to fi ght, while soft power is used to win the “hearts and minds” of the population and make them susceptible to societal change.42 If the overall objective of a war is to win the clash of wills, it follows that every trial of strength must be won in such a way that each success complements and sup-ports the measures to win the clash of wills. Only then does the battle have utility and only then does it support the desired political result. In other words, warfare is more than just winning battles. Hard or transactional power and soft or inspirational power sometimes reinforce and sometimes interfere with each other; the ability to combine the two into an effective strategy is smart power.43 It requires broad political and diplomatic skills and contextual intelligence so that hard and soft power can be successfully com-bined into a smart power strategy.44

Mediation – and similar methods as mentioned in Article 33 of the UN Charter, Pa-cifi c Settlement of Disputes – is an instrument and technique in smart power strategies; it provides a way to bring about the needed social change and to prevent extremism after hostilities have ended.45 Mediation requires the parties to compromise, which is easier if there are mutual gains to be held. Mediation of disputes is legitimate according to the 1907 Hague Convention on the Pacifi c Settlement of International Disputes and therefore used as a foreign policy instrument. Resort to mediation is usually prompted by the perception that other peoples’ confl icts affect one’s own interests – one’s wel-fare and security but not one’s existence.46 According to Jacob Bercovitch, mediation is linked de facto to third-party intervention: “a process of confl ict management, related

(40) Ramsbothan, Woodhouse & Miall, Contemporary Confl ict Resolution, pp. 9-13.(41) Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York, NY: Public Affairs 2004), pp. 5-11.(42) Smith, Utility of Force, p. 277.(43) Joseph Nye, The Powers to Lead (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008), pp. 43 and 83.(44) Ibid., pp. 85-108.(45) Jacob Bercovitch, ”Mediation in the Most Resistant Cases”, in Chester Crocker, Fen Hampson and Pamela Aall, eds., Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Cases of Intractable Confl ict (Washington, DC: United States of Peace Press 2005), pp. 99-121; Crocker, Hampson and Aall, Taming Intractable Confl icts; Deborah Goodwin, The Military and Negotiation: The Role of the Soldier/Diplomat (London: Frank Cass 2005), pp. 19-57.(46) Lawrence Freedman, Revolution in Strategic Affairs (London: Routledge 1998).

21

but distinct from the negotiations, where those in confl ict seek the assistance of outsid-ers to change their perceptions or behavior and to do so but with resorting to physical force or invoking the authority to law”.47

Transition OperationsThe use of hard power and military force needs to be weighed against other options because wars are not won on the battlefi eld, as, inter alia, the third-party interventions in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan have shown.48 Joseph Nye refers to the uses of positive and negative inducements as soft and hard power.49 Hard power – the ability to change what others do, also referred to as command power or transactional power – rests on coercion. It grows out of military and economic might.50 This approach is anchored in a rational-choice view of the world that largely revolves around the use of force to restore order during the actual intervention.51 Soft power– the ability to shape what others want, also referred to as co-optive power or inspirational power – rests on the attractiveness of one’s culture, political ideals, policies and values or the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices during the mediation.52

The hard military force used during a third-party intervention is short and intense to stop hostilities. According to Michael Walzer, any war is an act of aggression but it can be morally right when the legalistic paradigm is applied. The third-party intervention is functional and morally right because it is legalized. The goal is to get the disputants to acknowledge that some outside control over their confl ict is needed to settle the dispute.53 The confl ict must be (made) “ripe” for mediation, however.54 This situation

(47) Jacob Bercovitch, ”Mediation in International Confl ict”, in William Zartman and Lewis Rasmussen, eds., Peacemaking in International Confl ict: Methods and Techniques (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press 1997), p. 130.(48) Richard Haass, Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World (Washington: Brookings Institution Press 1999), p. 70; Smith, Utility of Force; and 2005, Hammes, The Sling and the Stone.(49) Nye, Soft Power, pp. 5-11 and Nye, The Powers to Lead, pp. 37-44.(50) Nye, Soft Power, pp. 30-31.(51) Saadia Touvaal and William Zartman, “International Mediation in the Post-Cold War Era”, in Chester Crocker, Fen Hampson & Pamela Aall, eds., Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Confl ict (Washington, DC: United States of Peace Press 2001), pp. 427-444; Richard Haass, Confl icts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990); James Rubin, ”The Timing of Ripeness and the Ripeness of Timing”, in Louis Kriesberg and Stuart Thorson, eds., Timing the De-escalation of International Confl icts (New York, NY: Syracuse University Press 1991).(52) Nye, Soft Power, pp. 11-15 and Nye, The Powers to Lead, pp. 29-32.(53) Crocker, Hampson & Aall, Taming Intractable Confl icts, p. 134.(54) William Zartman, “The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments”, in John Darby and Robert MacGinty, eds., Contemporary Peacemaking: Confl ict, Violence and Peaceprocess (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2003), p. 19.

22

is known as a Mutually Hurting Stalemate, a condition that exists when neither side feels it can win the confl ict.55 When both parties perceive the costs and prospects of continuing the war to be more burdensome than the gains to be achieved, a settlement has prospects.56 The mediation process that follows depends upon persuasion and ma-nipulation.57 The mediator plays a principal role in the peace-building process by provid-ing confi dence-building measures that reduce the incentives to defect. The mediator’s impartial involvement, moral commitment, economic potential and indirect interest will strengthen the disputants’ confi dence. The various stages of this transition process form a strategic-value chain.58 While ending hostilities sets a short-term goal, confl ict resolution and state-building work to-ward long-term solutions.59 The social-psychological challenges in the transition from war to peace are immense, while the internal capability to move from a state of war to a state of peace is weak.60 The third-party needs to assist and stimulate the state-building process.61

A state that supplies the core functions that only governments can provide creates stability and that is what it is all about. State-building, on the other hand, is a lengthy, fragile, and contradiction-ridden process.62 An integrated approach to winning the peace is needed to prevent citizens from transferring their primary allegiance away from the state to tribes, ethnic groups, religions, gangs, ideologies and so on.63 Matthew Hors-man and Andrew Marshall have pointed out that, in weak states, this localizing dynamic can be seen as part of a much wider process in which liberalization increasingly weak-ens state structures everywhere and pushes individuals towards more tribalist forms of association.64 Where states are strong and societies well developed, they are relatively

(55) Crocker, Hampson and Aall, Taming Intractable Confl icts, pp. 103-104.(56) William Zartman and Saadia Touval, ”International Mediation: Confl ict and Resolution and Power Politics”, Journal of Social Issues 41/2 (1985), pp. 27-45.(57) Thomas Princen, Intermediaries in International Confl ict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1992), pp. 19-21.(58) Ramsbothan, Woodhouse and Miall, Contemporary Confl ict Resolution, pp. 9-13; Louis Kriesberg, “Nature, Dynamics and Phases of Intractability”, in Chester Crocker, Fen Hampson & Pamela Aall, eds., Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Cases of Intractable Confl ict (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press 2005).(59) Voorhoeve, From War to the Rule of Law and Fukuyama, Nation-Building.(60) Crocker, Hampson and Aall, Taming Intractable Confl icts, pp. 166-167.(61) Bhatia, War and Intervention, pp. 123-131.(62) David Last, Theory, Doctrine and Practice of Confl ict De-escalation in Peacekeeping Operations (Cornwallis Park: Canadian Peacekeeping Press 1997), p. 25 and Fukuyama, ”Nation-Building” , pp. 3-8.(63) Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver & Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 1998), pp. 52-53.(64) Mathew Horsman and Andrew Marshall, After the Nation State: Citizens, Tribalism and the New World Disorder (London: Harper Collins 1995).

23

cohesive and stable. The opposite is also true. Since there is a correlation between de-velopment and democracy, it is essential for a “normal” economy to start up soon after hostilities have ended. During the transition from war to peace or better from negative to positive peace, a general decline of the state must be prevented. The political order needs to be re-built and the population is encouraged to participate in governance and government.65 Francis Fukuyama distinguishes three distinct phases.66 During the fi rst phase, outside powers provide the short-term stability. The goal is to (re-)build state authority. The fi rst phase is critical and the military has an important part in it. When operating within the second and third phases, development agencies and development workers take the lead. In the second phase, self-sustaining state institutions are created that survive the gradual withdrawal of the interveners and in the third phase, the institutions are further strengthened with indirect support. Although external powers may provide security and expertise, there are limitations to their ability to create a demand for institutions and democratization. There are physical and moral limitations on the transfer of knowledge about institutional construction and reform.67

Carrots, Sticks and IntelligenceIn the “carrot-and-stick approach”, a mix of positive and negative inducements shapes the preferences of the target population and is functional in a state-building strategy.68 Every strategy is unique since it addresses a specifi c situation. It shares some of the characteristics of tactics. What works in one context may not work in another.69 A leader or commander has to understand and to consider when to – and when not to – use the carrot and when and where to use the stick and in what combination.70 It requires “gut feeling”, intuition, to understand the context and the effect of the hard and soft power means available to be successfully combined into a smart power strategy. Context is the background in which an event takes place. Contexts come in various forms and involve any set of circumstances surrounding an event.71 It is a rudimentary fact that knowing the specifi c context is imperative to a correct interpretation. The context or circumstance

(65) Martin van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999).(66) Fukuyama, State-Building, pp. 100-101.(67) Ibid., pp. 82-91.(68) John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press 2005), pp. 15-34 and Smith, Utility of Force, pp. 267-305.(69) Nye, The Powers to Lead, pp. 82-84.(70) Ibid., pp. 140-145.(71) Matthew Kutz, ”Toward a Conceptual Model of Contextual Intelligence: A Transferable Leadership Construct”, Leadership Review 8 (2008), pp. 18-23.

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is much more than knowing the specifi c work setting, a geographic or demographic situation. Compounding the diffi culty of context is the need to recognize the contextual variables in self as well as of external and internal stakeholders. Smart power and a smart strategy require contextual intelligence: the ability to understand an evolving environment and to capitalize on trends.72 It is an awareness of and ability to adapt to the context and to seize the spirit of the moment to fi t the culture, context or conditions of a specifi c situation or an organization.73 The term contextual in-telligence – also called practical intelligence – was originally identifi ed by Robert Stern-berg as “the ability to adapt well to one’s environment but also to modify this environ-ment in order to increase the fi t between the environment and one’s adaptive skills”.74 The term is often used in business management; it applies to the way that business executives are sensitive to macro-level contextual factors (specifi cally government inter-vention, global affairs, demography, social mores, technology, and labor) in the creation, growth or transformation of businesses.75

Contextual intelligence is one of Sternberg’s three sub-theories of intelligence (others are the analytical and creative intelligence) that “deals with the mental activ-ity involved in attaining fi t to context”.76 This type of intelligence is often referred to as “street smarts”: an ideal fi t between the smart power strategy and the environment is created through the processes of adaptation, shaping and selection. “Adaptation” oc-curs when a change is made within oneself in order to better adjust to one’s surround-ings. It is like the personal adaptation to the weather, when the temperature drops, people adapt by wearing warmer clothing. “Shaping” occurs when one changes their environment to better suit one’s needs, that is, turning up the temperature, an external factor. Shaping is typically done by a combination of positive and negative inducements. “Selection” is undertaken when a completely new alternate environment is found to replace the previous, unsatisfying environment to meet the individual’s goals, such as going indoors when the rain starts. Considering the need to understand, appreciate and recognize the context of a given situation, the smart power strategy and the dynamics of a carrot-and-stick ap-proach, contextual intelligence is the ability to quickly and intuitively recognize and diagnose the dynamic contextual variables inherent in an event or circumstance and

(72) Nye, The Powers to Lead, p. 87.(73) Anthony Mayo, “Contextual Intelligence in Leadership”, Business World (12 June 2006).(74) Robert Sternberg, The Triarchic Mind: A New Theory of Human Intelligence (New York, NY: Viking, 1988).(75) Anthony Mayo and Nitin Nohria, In Thier Time: The Greatest Business Leaders of the Twentieth Century (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School 2005).(76) Robert Sternberg, Beyond IQ: A Triarchic Theory of Intelligence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1985),p. 45.

25

it results in intentional adjustment of behavior in order to exert appropriate infl uence in that context.77 In a carrot-and-stick approach contextual intelligence is essential at all levels; quite literally, decisions must be instant, pragmatic and present real solu-tions for real problems. Fusion of intelligence, strategy and operations is only possible if the empirical research that integrates concepts of diagnosing context and exercising knowledge makes it possible to seamlessly and quickly adapt to a brand new context; failure leads to the risk of becoming obsolete and irrelevant, giving away the initiative in state-building and in a smart power strategy. Diagnosing context requires intentional leadership, a paradoxical devotion to having a global perspective in the midst of local circumstances and a realistic but fl exible and adaptive smart power strategy. A carrot-and-stick approach and a smart power strategy require that the contex-tual intelligence triad be in place: acute awareness of the present contextual variables involves being able to distinguish and detect the attitudes, motivations, and values of many or all of the people who have a stake in a situation; awareness of the relevant history involves being able to reconcile the outcomes of past events and decisions into information that can be leveraged for the present context and for future position; and an intuitive grasp of the preferred future involves an acute understanding and vision of the future.

ConclusionThe transition from war to peace is a sensitive process that can easily be derailed but an impartial military force that fuses contextual intelligence with smart power can help to keep it on track. The less the stick is needed, the more the carrot can be used and the faster the Jus Post Bellum criteria will be met. The interveners must have “full spectrum dominance” and information dominance in order to be successful but they cannot be more than guides: the local government is responsible and must take its responsibil-ity. Confi dence increases when the interveners show their commitment to the cause, not only during the intervention but by taking part in peacemaking, peace-building and state-building processes or better the confl ict transformation. The short war-fi ghting phase is the domain of the super powers and great powers that have full spectrum dominance to win battles with their large sophisticated armies. Since wars are not won on the battlefi eld, the crux is how the peace is won. It is here where small Western post-modern states can make a difference to create a stable and lasting peace. Building a functioning – possibly also a democratic – state as the goal of confl ict transformation is morally correct; it enhances stability because the population takes

(77) Kutz, ”Toward a Conceptual Model of Contextual Intelligence”, pp. 23-24.

26

part in governance. They have to take responsibility for their own fate. Coercive interven-tion and confl ict management may create favorable circumstances for a functioning state but the use of those instruments is subject to enormous debates because the very principles of freedom, especially self-determination and sovereignty, are at stake. If the intervention is multilateral and legalized by the United Nations, it is justifi ed. In this case, war has a function but has a different explanation than war in the industrial age. War in the information age is a short phase in which the confl ict intensity is at the high end of the confl ict spectrum with the goal of ending hostilities and shaping the environment to win peace, that is, the war. This phase is therefore preferably carried out by the stron-gest military powers, most likely the USA, with the superior power taking the lead in the mediation process. Since small, Western post-modern states have limited war-fi ghting capabilities, it makes sense that they morally or symbolically support the war-fi ghting phase of the intervention. They can provide a fruitful combination of hard and soft power means to sustain the subtle transition from war to peace which makes them construc-tive partners. It is also in their own interest for the world to be as stable as possible. The acceptable use of force is a critical legal and moral issue, regardless of wheth-er the roots of the networks are attacked.78 The tolerable level of risk and the use of force are related to the interests at stake and values that the intervening coalition stands for. The military objectives in a third-party intervention are limited. The goal is to create a conceptual space for principal mediation so that diplomacy, economic incentives, politi-cal pressure and other measures can create the desired political outcome. Stability is created by providing economic progress, rebuilding the failed state, and improvement in the situation of the people so they can take responsibility for their own and their country’s fate. Confl ict management and confl ict transformation are complex processes that demand commitment and time. They are also an evolution of the traditional roles of soldiers, diplomats and development workers.

(78) Article 2, Section 7 of the UN Charter: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the UN to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.”

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CHAPTER TWO

THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH IN HELMAND PROVINCE - FROM A MILITARY PERSPECTIVE

Peter Dahl Thruelsen, Research FellowRoyal Danish Defence College

For many military and civilian scholars pursuing the development in Afghanistan, 2008 did not bring the positive progress that was hoped for. Insurgents escalated their use of what can be described as asymmetric tactics, including the use of improvised explo-sive devises and suicide bombs, and the political outreach of the Kabul government is still at the nascent stage. The lack of progress has raised the debate in Europe and the United States whether the international engagement is structured, resourced and implemented in a comprehensive manner. Thus, fi ghting an insurgency like the one in Afghanistan is not just a job for the military. Experiences from previous and present insurgencies have shown that a variety of measures including political, economic and civilian play a signifi cant role in achieving progress and success in the process towards creating a stable state. The former British commander of the International Security Assistance Force [ISAF] in Afghanistan, General Sir David Richards, described this fact by stating that “Soldiers will be the fi rst to tell you that military effort alone is not enough. One has to work hard to create conditions that bring all the actors together in a synergistic man-ner. We can set the conditions but are often powerless to implement key parts of the overall plan.”79 In Afghanistan the term “comprehensive approach” has been used to underline the need for a more cross-ministerial interagency approach when fi ghting the insurgency. A report to the United States Congress emphasises the importance of a com-prehensive approach by stating that “success will never be achieved through military means alone, but through a comprehensive approach that involves all elements of power: military, diplomatic, and economic. Above all, it will require a sustained effort to continue to develop the capacity of the Afghans themselves” (Report to Congress 2008: 8). In this article, the focus will be on local capacity building – developing the capacity of

(79) “Full Interview: General David Richards”, The Guardian (22 January 2007).

28

the Afghans themselves – and on the military and civilian crossing point when conduct-ing a counterinsurgency operation. To fully appreciate the role which the comprehensive approach should play in the context of counterinsurgency, this article will commence by shortly describing theoreti-cally what counterinsurgency is and how the different players need to support each other’s efforts. This section will work as the theoretical framework and an analytical focus to guide the following analysis. With this in mind, the context of Helmand Province will be described with the aim of combining counterinsurgency theory with empirical reality. Following the description of the situation in Helmand Province as of 2008, the international setup and approach in Helmand will be analysed.80 Finally, the article will conclude by regarding the crossing point between the military and civilian engagement within the context of counterinsurgency and comprehensive approach.

CounterinsurgencyIn classic counterinsurgency theories81 experts such as David Galula82 describe coun-terinsurgency as “… the battle for the population…” (Galula 1964: 4). This battle for the support or consent of the population – the centre of gravity – was and still is the focal point of any insurgency and counterinsurgency. The prime goal for the counterinsurgent within any affected area is to create a situation in which the local population – without the permanent presence of external forces – actively support the fi ght against the in-surgents and thereby oust the insurgents from the area. Galula describes success as “… the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the population but maintained by and with the population” (Galula 1964: 54). Early lessons from counterinsurgency campaigns show that this is primarily done by providing the population with basic security, economic development and in particular legitimate government. The population, which constitutes the centre of gravity for both parties in the fi ght, can be divided into three main groups: the active minority in favour of the cause, the neutral majority, and the active minority against the cause (Galula 1964: 53). The challenge for the counterinsurgent is to identify the minority that supports the

(80) The data used in this article is based primarily on qualitative empirical data gathered through several fi eld research trips to Afghanistan from 2006 through 2008. Interviews and observations have been conducted in Kabul, Kandahar and in Helmand Province.(81) The term ‘classic’ counterinsurgency warfare points to the post-World War II counter-revolutionary warfare writings of theorists such as David Galula, Roger Trinquier, Mao Tse-Tung, Che Guevara and Robert Thompson (Kilcullen 2006b: 1). (82) As a French Lieutenant, Colonel David Galula fought during World War II in North Africa, Italy and France. Later in his career he was involved in the fi ghting in China, Greece, Indochina and Algiers. He wrote the seminal book Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (London: Praeger 1964).

29

host government, to activate them, and then to use them to mobilise the neutral major-ity of the population, thereby eject the insurgents. To gain the active support of the majority of the population, the counterinsurgent must address the root causes that ignited the insurgency in the fi rst place – causes which often fuel the insurgency. Robust insurgencies are often fuelled by and rely on deep grievances – root causes – in which inequalities between different nations or eth-nic groups exist, and where the legitimacy of the state is low in the eyes of the popula-tion. Grievances about the effectiveness, equality, integrity and especially inclusiveness of the state are often the main triggers of an insurgency, so in order to succeed both the counterinsurgent and the host government need to build an able and accountable government (RAND 2008: xxxii). The fi ght against the insurgents and for the support and consent of the population therefore becomes a fi ght that involves a wide range of military, political, economic and civilian factors, elevating the struggle from the tactical military level to the control of the wider political space. Thereby, the consent winning activities will be focused towards the host government and its legitimacy among the population and not so much towards the international presence. David J. Kilcullen de-fi nes an insurgency as:

“… a struggle for control over a contested political space, between a state (or group of states or occupying powers), and one or more popularly based, non-state challengers. Insurgencies are popular uprisings that grow from, and are conducted through pre-exist-ing social networks (village, tribe, family, neighbourhood, political or religious party) and exist in a complex social, informational and physical environment” (Kilcullen 2006a: 2).

According to the literature on counterinsurgency, the lack of legitimacy of the central gov-ernment in the eyes of the civilian society is one of the most important factors igniting and prolonging an insurgency (Galula 1964, Maloney 2008 and Pirnie and O´Connell 2008). A legitimate government has the capacity to provide basic services for the popu-lation – services such as jobs, education, health care and especially security – a social contract between the people and the state. If the government does not provide these services, the insurgency will enjoy extremely favourable conditions. A government is perceived as legitimate by the population if they can identify advantages in their daily lives that have been provided by the government. In Afghanistan, the wide scale of cor-ruption from the lowest government level in the districts to the ministries in Kabul is an immense problem that needs to be confronted to prevent it from playing into the hands of the insurgents. If the local population regard the government as corrupt, their incen-tive to support it against the insurgents will be undermined. Consequently, the provision of basic services and the creation of stable and sustainable national security forces

30

– military and police – are pivotal to gaining the support of the population. If the local population cannot see a legitimate alternative to the international security presence and an alternative to intimidation by the insurgents, they will not openly support the government. Thus, the success of any counterinsurgency campaign depends ultimately on the ability of the host government to provide accessible, affordable and corruption-free basic services and security for its population. Therefore, the main aim in developing an integrated approach between counterinsurgency and comprehensive approach is to foster a development that will create a national and local host nation administration that is capable of providing security and basic services in a manner, which is perceived as legitimate by the local population, developed and implemented in a manner that does not compromise the various initiatives involved and undermine the overall strategic objectives. This process should include the local provinces and district administration, creating a legitimate partner to which the international players can ultimately transfer responsibility. The comprehensive approach is perceived by the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-tion [NATO] as the desired approach when conducting a counterinsurgency campaign. The relationship between the two can best be understood by the activities implemented. NATO works with four overall military activities that can be applied to different campaign themes:83 offensive, defensive, stability and enabling activities.84 The four activities can be used simultaneously at any given time, but in the complex environment of coun-terinsurgency the fi rst three activities are predominant (NATO ATP-3.2.1: 1-6 and 1-7). In particular, stabilisation has a direct link with comprehensive approach as a crucial element for reaching the civilian-led reconstruction and development [R/D] activities. Stabilisation can be defi ned as “the process by which underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in violence and a break-down in law and order are managed and reduced, whilst efforts are made to support the preconditions for successful longer-term development” (Teuten 2007: 1-2).

(83) NATO works with four different campaign themes when conducting military operations: Peacetime Military Engagement (PME), Peace Support (PS), Counterinsurgency (COIN) and Major Combat (MC) (NATO AJP-3.2 RD2: 1-3 – 1-4). (84) Offensive activities: activities in which forces seek out the enemy in order to attack him; Defensive activities: activities that resist enemy offensive activities; Stability activities: activities that seek to stabilise the situation and reduce the level of violence. They impose security and control over an area while employing military capabilities to restore services and support civilian agencies; and Enabling activities: tactical activities that link, support, or create the conditions for offensive, defensive and stability activities (NATO ATP-3.2.1: 1-6).

31

HELMAND PROVINCE

Based on the above theoretical description of counterinsurgency and the link to com-prehensive approach an analysis of the operational environment in 2008 and available resources in Helmand Province will be conducted. The analysis will be based upon a description of the complex environment within the province. This is done to illustrate the importance of understanding the local complexities of the counterinsurgency when implementing a comprehensive approach – allowing the context to carry the analysis.

The Situation: Insurgents, Opium and Local Power StructuresThe situation in Helmand Province in the summer of 2008 was characterised by uncer-tainty. Although progress was made and a number of small- to large-scale reconstruction programmes were implemented, the local population was still waiting to see who the stronger and more determined party was – the insurgents or the counterinsurgents.85 Throughout spring and summer 2008 large-scale military operations against the Tali-ban were conducted in the province on a regular basis; corruption and opium produc-tion fl ourished;86 a number of local militias were still armed; and the legitimacy of the central and local administration was low (Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste 2008: 39). However, at the provincial level, the appointment of Governor Gulab Mangal was seen as a positive development.87 Local governance at this level was improving and began to show positive signs of increased infl uence at the district level, with enhanced dialogue between districts leaders and the governor. Other early encouraging governance signs in the province were the established presence of defence lawyers – something that did not exist during recent regimes – and the focused pursuit at both provincial and district levels to improve and strengthen the educational sector.88

Helmand Province is currently the biggest opium producer in Afghanistan, with more than 80% of the farming families in the province involved in opium cultivation and 35% of the farmers’ annual cash income coming from opium – indicating a strong dependence in the province on the opium economy (UNODC 2007: 16). The opium pro-duction in the province is not a new problem and it can be traced back to the period

(85) Interviews conducted in Afghanistan in Gereshk on 15 May 2008 with Mayor Said Dur Ali Shah and the at that time Gereshk District Chief Haji Manaf and a survey conducted by Danish CIMIC among key elders in Gereshk in May 2008.(86) From 2007 to 2008 the opium cultivation remained almost constant in Helmand Province. Thereby, the province remains the number one opium producer in Afghanistan responsible for 2/3 of the total production (UNODC 2008b: 5). (87) Governor Gulab Mangal was appointed governor of Helmand Province in March 2008.(88) Phone interview conducted on 28 August 2008 with Lars Jensen Senior Danish Representative at the British PRT in Helmand.

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before the Soviet invasion in December 1979. From 2002 to 2008, production more than tripled in the province, and in 2008 approximately 103,500 hectares of Afghani-stan’s 157,000 hectares of opium production were located in Helmand (UNODC 2008a: 1, 34 and UNODC 2008b: 3-5). This high level of opium production in the province has a variety of implications and challenges for the economy, the local power structures and governance. It also has a strong infl uence on and connection to the insurgency (UNODC 2007: 20, UNODC 2008b: 4 and Thruelsen 2008: 9-10, 12). The cultivation of opium therefore has quite a negative and complicating effect regarding the positive development of the area. Farmers routinely bribe the police to avoid crop eradication, middlemen and insurgents collect taxes to safeguard the fi elds and earn large amounts of money on traffi cking, and it is estimated that government and provincial offi cials are involved in as much as 70% of all opium traffi cking in the country (Government Accountability Offi ce 2008: 40, Glaze 2007: 6, UNODC 2007: 37, 40 and US Department of State 2007: 229). It should be said that Governor Mangal has been very outspoken with regard to poppy cultivation and production and the infl uence of drug barons within the local power structures. Afghan national security forces have apprehended some local criminals and seized more than a ton of opium in the summer of 2008. Also, the governor began work to strengthen his counter narcotics plan in close co-operation with the British Provincial Reconstruction Team [PRT] and Task Force Hel-mand. In the central part of Helmand, the opium cultivation in the “green zone” north of Gereshk city is controlled by a major drug lord called Haji Khan Mohammed, who lives on a large estate on the road between Forward Operation Base [FOB] Price and Gereshk. Haji Khan Mohammed reputedly owns a large part of the arable land in Helmand where the opium is cultivated, and he is believed to be connected with high-level Helmand Taliban commanders and other illegal armed groups in the province. He is also known to be involved in a family blood feud with the family of Abdul Raziq, the Deputy Chief of Police of Gereshk, which frequently results in gunfi ghts between the two sides. On 13 April 2008, the struggle escalated with an attack on a police check point followed by an ambush on a rescue convoy going to reinforce the check point, which resulted in four police offi cers being killed and fi ve wounded. The attack and subsequent ambush are believed to have been planned by Haji Khan Mohammed with the purpose of killing Ab-dul Raziq, who was leading the rescue patrol. The purpose of the attack could be related to Haji Khan Mohammed’s ambition to become Chief of Police in Gereshk, and to his attempt to enrol his own fi ghters in the local police.89

(89) Interview conducted in Afghanistan in Gereshk on 12 and 16 May 2008 with DABG intelligence unit (S2).

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Local militias also fl ourish in Helmand. Two of the most important militia commanders with regard to the Danish engagement in Helmand are Haji Kaduz, who in 2008 con-trolled the road from Gereshk to Lashkar Gah, and Mullah Daoud, who commands the Afghan Security Group [ASG], which guards the outer perimeter of FOB Price.90 The two militia commanders are brothers. Abdul Raziq, the Deputy Chief of Police of Gereshk, was a former member of the ASG before he took up his present position. So, the ASG have participated in the struggle on the side of Abdul Raziq against the drug lord Haji Khan Mohammed. These local and quite complicated power structures fully illustrate that the main problem in the area is not isolated to the Taliban insurgency, but also includes the local power struggle and the fi ght to keep Afghanistan from becoming a narco-state. On the offi cial government level, the local provincial authorities are undergoing a fast development supported by the international commitment; but there still seems to be a long way to go, and intensive international involvement will be needed before confi dence and trust in the local authorities have been established. Public services in the province are underdeveloped because of a history of neglect, and the technocratic competences of the authorities are scarce. The presence of line ministries in Helmand Province is primarily focused on Lashkar Gah, and there is little evidence of ministerial presence allocated through the province capital to the major cities such as Gereshk.91 On the security side, the Afghan army and police are present in most areas. Afghan National Army 5 Corps covering southern Afghanistan has approximately 8,500 soldiers on hand with a brigade stationed in Helmand, and the Afghan National Police is present in all the districts of the province. Whereas the credibility of the army in the province is high, the credibility of the police is comparatively low. According to an offi cial United States government report, none of the Afghan police units are fully capable of perform-ing their role in the country (Government Accountability Offi ce 2008: 31-32). During interviews conducted in Gereshk it was mentioned that the two main challenges to se-curity in Gereshk city were intimidation by the Taliban and by the police.92

The context described above illustrates the current challenges that the interna-tional involvement and the Government of Afghanistan have to counter if success is to be achieved in Helmand. The counterinsurgency and comprehensive approach strat-egy to counter these challenges must address the security challenges, the local power

(90) Interview conducted in Afghanistan in Gereshk on 12 and 16 May 2008 with DABG intelligence unit (S2). Also, the author visited Mullah Daoud in Gereshk on 16 May 2008.(91) The Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development is present in Gereshk.(92) Interviews conducted in Afghanistan in Gereshk on 15 May 2008 with Mayor Said Dur Ali Shah and the then Gereshk District Chief Haji Manaf and a survey conducted by Danish CIMIC among key elders in Gereshk in May 2008.

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structures, the illegal economy and the local political reality, as well as encouraging the development of a legitimate national government. If this is to be done, a variety of activi-ties need to be carried out in a timely and sequencing manner within a comprehensive framework where civilian expertise and backup are fully included in the process.

The International Setup and Approach to the ChallengeThe British assumed control of the Helmand PRT in May 2006. The PRT is considered well-funded and is one of the most “civilian” PRTs in Afghanistan with some 50 civil-ians, carrying out reconstruction, recovery and development activities in the province (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam 2008: 13). The engagement in Helmand is organised with the PRT on one side and a military task force (Task Force Helmand) on the other. The PRT is run by a civilian chief with the Foreign & Commonwealth Offi ce, Department for Inter-national Development and Stabilisation Unit all included within the organisation.93 Task Force Helmand is led by the military and consists of some 7,900 British troops along with Danish and Estonian troops.94 The task force is responsible for facilitating recon-struction and extending the authority of the Afghan government. The task force works in close coordination with the PRT and Afghan security institutions. The British involvement in Helmand is being implemented on the basis of a stra-tegic plan that presents an operational guide for both the PRT and Task Force Helmand. The strategy – the Helmand Road Map – is a two-year plan which is to be evaluated annually.95 It replaces previous British plans, and in contrast to these it focuses on the concentration and prioritisation of all resources. Accordingly, all civil and military activi-ties to be carried out in Helmand will concentrate on and prioritise fi ve main geographi-cal areas or district centres and will be controlled by the concept of a politically-led counterinsurgency campaign. This approach implies that the focus is on gaining the consent and support of the population towards the host government and not solely on winning territory or fi ghting the Taliban and other illegal armed groups. As a result, all the military campaigns should focus on the civilian effects to be achieved.96 The Road Map emphasises the need for a political and intelligence-led approach and introduces

(93) Other institutions such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) are also present within the PRT. Helmand Province is one of the largest recipients of USAID donor money in the world. Interview conducted in Afghanistan in Gereshk on 17 May 2008 with the regional chief of USAID in southern Afghanistan.(94) http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/fco-in-action/uk-in-afghanistan/afghanistan-reconstruction/helmand/task-force-helmand. (95) The Helmand Road Map was approved in the spring of 2008, and it was expected to be implemented in late 2008.(96) Interview conducted in Afghanistan in Gereshk on 17 May 2008 with civilian and military PRT representatives and a representative of the Stabilisation Unit.

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the term “good enough approach” – thereby incorporating the reality of the immense challenges in the province.97 The Road Map places a civilian in charge of the joint efforts in Helmand, giving the PRT a civilian face.98

To lead the implementation of the Road Map, eight strands are in focus, combin-ing the military counterinsurgency approach with the civilian contribution. Seven of the eight strands will lead the development of fi ve chosen districts in the province within a two-year perspective, and they will be used to direct the military involvement. The dis-tricts are Lashkar Gar, Gereshk, Sangin, Garmser and Musa Quala. The strands are:

Politics and reconciliation• Governance• Rule of Law (justice, police and prisons)• Security (military)• Economic development and reconstruction• Counternarcotics• Communications• Regional engagement (engagement with regional players. Not included in the • district development programme)

The implementation of the Road Map constitutes a major challenge to the current or-ganisation within the province, especially with regard to the educational and training background and deployment of the civilian advisors to the PRT and within the Battle Groups responsible of the implementation in the districts. Each strand will ideally re-quire a specialist or at least advisors with great knowledge of the complexity of the area. This build-up of civilian expertise is on-going but will take some time, and it will be crucial for successful implementation. During interviews with representatives from Task Force Helmand and the PRT, it was stated that as many as six to eight civilian advisors in each “Road Map district” will be needed.99 The countries currently present in Helmand has agreed on a division of labour, where each country will have to deliver experts within the sectors for which they have the responsibility for the coordination of foreign aid. As of fall 2008 the British led PRT is staffi ng four stabilisation advisors to the fi ve chosen district centres. With Gereshk as one of the primary focus areas in the Road Map, and

(97) Interview conducted in Afghanistan in Gereshk on 17 May 2008 with a representative of the Stabilisation Unit.(98) Interview conducted in Afghanistan in Gereshk on 17 May 2008 with civilian and military PRT representatives. (99) Interview conducted in Afghanistan in Gereshk on 17 May 2008 with civilian and military PRT representatives.

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referred to as the most promising town in the province, the importance of a stronger integrated civil-military organisation within the framework of comprehensive approach seems to be vast.100

The Helmand Road Map states that it will be “… a politically led, intelligence shaped counterinsurgency [COIN] campaign in Helmand, delivered through a fl exible combina-tion of military and civil effect” (UK Government 2008: 3) and that we will see “… some transition from military to civilian led effort” (UK Government 2008: 5). To make this and the two-year implementation horizon possible, the implementation strategies for each focus district created in accordance with the Road Map by the civilian advisor(s) need to be followed strictly, and the military action needs to be conducted in support of these strategies. As described in the Road Map, “Each District Stabilisation Advisor will need to maintain the District Plan for their area. These provide the over-arching direction for all PRT and Task Force Helmand activity…” (UK Government 2008: 13). So, the civilian advisor(s) in charge of implementation must be formally placed and authorised within the respective Battle Groups, at a level that will enable this process and especially the military support of it to succeed. Importantly, the introduction of the Road Map also highlights the need for continuity.101 The main task of the civilian advisors at present is the planning and implementation of the Helmand Road Map conducted in close co-operation with the district authorities. Individual district development plans within the framework of the Road Map are to be formulated for each of the districts involved.102 These plans will be formulated in a decentralised fashion so that the local context and conditions can be taken into account. The district civilian advisor “should be able to determine what level of PRT support to critical, local level institutions or processes is required in order to maintain momentum towards the political settlement for that area, and to reach the objectives …” (UK Government 2008: 29). The Road Map also challenges the domestic fl exibility to back up and support implementation. According to the British, the seven strands to be implemented in the fi ve district centres will require additional civilian resources in the form of sector matter experts to cover each of the seven strands. The concept behind the Road Map is gover-nance and national ownership as opposed to building parallel structures in support of implementation.103 However, relying on building national capacity and thereby national

(100) Interview conducted in Afghanistan in Gereshk on 17 May 2008 with a representative of the Stabilisation Unit.(101) Interview conducted in Afghanistan in Gereshk on 17 May 2008 with civilian and military PRT representatives.(102) Interview conducted in Afghanistan in Gereshk on 17 May 2008 with civilian PRT representatives.(103) Interview conducted in Afghanistan in Gereshk on 17 May 2008 with a representative of the Stabilisation Unit.

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ownership greatly challenge the expertise and training of the civilian advisors, the con-tinuity of the international setup, and the national “reach back” capacity available to support the work of these within the mission. The expertise of the international advisors will need to be focused within each strand to build up the local civilian capacity of each district. When implementing the Road Map, the civilian resources need to be identifi ed internationally and deployed in Helmand relatively fast if the initial implementation is not to be delayed. Currently, it might be premature to station sector matter experts in all the Road Map districts primarily due to the challenging security situation, but if the military is willing to provide the necessary security details and escort capacity this chal-lenge might be overcome. When appropriate programs and projects are identifi ed, the stabilisation advisors will have to step aside and make room for these sector matter ex-perts and the more capacity building and development oriented activities.104 However, it is imperative that the experts are identifi ed and trained before the need arises, in order to be on top of the development and it is equally imperative that the military forces prior-itise and support this development by allocating the necessary security elements. To a large extent, the formulation of the Road Map reveals the rapid development of the counterinsurgency environment on the tactical level and the need for “real-time” follow-up at tactical and strategic levels to support and strengthen the joint efforts. For example, according to the Danish Battle Group stationed there, the city of Gereshk had undergone a rapid development in relation to security in 2007, and since late 2007 it had to a large extent been ready for an enhanced civilian-led involvement to secure the military progress with longer-term political, economic and civilian initiatives.105 By May 2008 – more than six months later – there was still only one civilian advisor with some support from the PRT available for this job. Only by September 2008 had the PRT up-graded the involvement to four advisors. In particular, the British in Afghanistan gained the same experience early in the build-up of the Helmand PRT. As noted by Richard Teu-ten106 ”…there is no doubt that the speed, as well as the nature of response by the inter-national community, is crucial to success” (Teuten 2007: 2). The British realised that the institutional backup at the embassy in Kabul and in London needed to be strengthened in terms of real-time fact fi nding, evaluation and analysis in order to rapid support of mission implementation.

(104) Phone interview conducted on 28 August 2008 with Lars Jensen Senior Danish Representative at the British PRT in Helmand.(105) Interview conducted with former commanders and deputy commanders of the Danish Battle Group.(106) Richard Teuten is the head of the Stabilisation Unit which is the former Post-Confl ict Reconstruction Unit (http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/).

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With its new focus on non-kinetic effects, the Road Map challenges the deployment of civilian experts to the mission area. The resources available for strengthening activities in i.e. Gereshk in connection with the implementation of the Road Map will have to be prioritised, so that the civilian expertise to expand the military tactical gains is in place when the need arises. In counterinsurgency warfare, there is a limit as to how far the military assets can sustain a positive development if this development is not expanded by other assets such as civilian ones. As made clear by the Helmand Road Map, the “need to deliver infl uence without having to use kinetic effect” will be in focus (UK Gov-ernment 2008: 3-4).

ConclusionWhen implementing a comprehensive approach as the desired approach in the context of counterinsurgency in Helmand Province, comprehensive approach is about combin-ing military, political and civilian actors to create stability and to assist the local authori-ties in building the capacity to perform governance tasks in the area, thereby support-ing the overall strategic goal in Afghanistan. In 2008 only few local Non-Governmental Organisations [NGO] and constructors107 were present and capable of working in the province, which is a situation that is not expected to change markedly within the near-est future.108 This fact illustrates the urgent need for a focused approach to build local capacity to fi ll this vacuum – a key element of a comprehensive approach. The capacity must be developed by international civilian resources working alongside military actors. So, the main aim of integrating counterinsurgency and comprehensive approach is to foster a development that will create a national and indeed local host nation administra-tive capacity capable of providing security and basic needs and services in a manner perceived as legitimate by the local population. By deploying suffi cient civilian resources and by supporting these with military means, the essential contested “political space” can be fi lled during the limited time available. As described above, in counterinsurgency warfare there is a limit as to how far the military assets can sustain a positive develop-ment if this development is not expanded by other assets such as civilian ones. The analysis conducted focuses on the organisation and on current and coming

(107) The Danish Battle Group in Helmand announced a “constructor’s day” in Gereshk, where local constructors could register for work. During the day only six very small local constructors came to register. (108) Interviews conducted in Afghanistan in Kabul on 9 May 2008 with the Director and the Chief of Policy and Advocacy of DACAAR. During the interview it was emphasised that the lack of security throughout the province made an international NGO present impossible within a reasonable future. Also, a list received from the British-led PRT in Helmand showed 29 registered local NGOs present in the province. Of these 29 NGOs, however, only about two-thirds were implementing projects. In Gereshk in Helmand Province two NGOs – one local and one international – are implementing minor projects.

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tasks in Helmand Province. The tasks at hand are developing at a pace that is hard to follow from a distance. The need to conduct “real-time” fact fi nding to constantly improve and evaluate developments on the ground with the strategic framework and “reach back” capacity needs to be well thought through. As pointed out above, a com-prehensive approach is not just a question of implementing projects in the mission area; it is about getting the military, political and civilian actors to work together in support of each other and to build local capacity. This challenges both the civilian and military set-up and the wide range of knowledge that needs to be available within the organisations involved. To be able to operate in a complex counterinsurgency environment like the one in Helmand Province, both the in- and out-of-mission organisational capacity must be structured for the specifi c task. Building a unit at the strategic level – for the duration of the engagement – that is capable of supporting the tactical level, conducting fact fi nding, providing a “reach-back” capacity for the “in-theatre” level, formulating strategy and benchmarks on the ground of in-depth analysis, ”real-time” evaluations and ongo-ing estimations could be a solution. This could shorten and strengthen the process of developing and especially implementing new initiatives and resources when identifi ed at the tactical level. The “in-theatre” organisation will have to be organised to also have the capacity to support civilian involvement in the campaign. The military intelligence organisation should have the capacity to monitor non-military threats with a view to supporting civilian efforts in relation to understanding the complexity of the local power structures. As seen in Gereshk, this element is essential when engaging in capacity building of local structures. This is needed to ensure that the right local individuals are included in the local capacity building process. The quite complicated local power structures found in a given area can undermine the overall process if they are not fully understood and engaged with awareness. This is needed to construct a reliable under-standing of the local power structures and the local political processes with a view to minimising the possible negative spill-over effects.

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LiteratureAzarbaijani-Moghaddam, Sippi et.al. (2008), Afghan Hearts, Afghan Minds – Exploring Afghan perceptions of civil-military relations,: available at http://www.humansecurity-gateway.info/documents/ENNA_BAAG_Afghanistan_afghanheartsafghanminds.pdf

Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste (2008), Efterretningsmæssig risikovurdering 2008, Danish Defence Intelligence Service, Copenhagen; available at http://forsvaret.dk/NR/rdonlyres/8D312FEA-2304-4512-92B8-464C55747C30/0/Evur_2008.pdf

Galula, David (1964), Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, London, Praeger Security International

Glaze, John A. (2007), Opium and Afghanistan: Reassessing U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy, Carlisle, PA, US Army War College; available at: http://www.strategicstudiesin-stitute.army.mil/pdffi les/PUB804.pdf

Government Accountability Offi ce (2008), Afghanistan Security, Washington DC, Report to Congressional Committees, GAO-08-661

Kilcullen, David J. (2006a), Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency, Remarks delivered at the US Government Counterinsurgency Conference, Washington, DC, 28 September 2006

Kilcullen, David J. (2006b), “Counterinsurgency Redux”, Small Wars Journal; available at http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kilcullen1.pdf

Maloney, Sean M. (2008), “A violent impediment: the evolution of insurgent operations in Kandahar province 2003-07”, Small Wars & Insurgencies 19/2, pp. 201-220

NATO AJP-3.2 RD2 (2008), Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations, Bruxelles, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NATO ATP-3.2.1 (2008), Allied Land Tactics, Bruxelles, North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-tion

Pirnie, Bruce R. and Edward O´Connell (2008), Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006), Santa Monica, CA, RAND

RAND (2008), RAND Counterinsurgency Study -- Final Report: War by Other Means --

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Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency, Santa Monica, CA, RAND

Report to Congress (2008), Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghani-stan, Washington DC, US Congress; available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/Re-port_on_Progress_toward_Security_and_Stability_in_Afghanistan_1230.pdf

Teuten, Richard (2007), Stabilisation and “Post-Confl ict” Reconstruction, Speech de-livered 31 January 2007; available at http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/information_stabilisation_unit.html

UK Government (2008), The Helmand Road Map: Capping Document, London

Thruelsen, Peter Dahl (2008), “Opiumsbekæmpelse i Afghanistan – Er der en farbar vej?”, Danish Institute for Military Studies Report UNODC (2007), Afghan Opium Survey 2007, New York, United Nations Offi ce on Drugs and Crime; available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/AFG07_ExSum_web.pdf

UNODC (2008a), Afghanistan – Opium Winter Rapid Assessment Survey, New York, United Nations Offi ce on Drugs and Crime; available at http://www.unodc.org/docu-ments/crop-monitoring/Afghan-winter-survey-Feb08-short.pdf

UNODC (2008b), Afghan Opium Survey 2008, New York, United Nations Offi ce on Drugs and Crime; available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/publications/Afghanistan_Opium_Survey_2008.pdf

US Department of State (2007), International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Wash-ington DC, US Department of State; available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/81446.pdf

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CHAPTER THREE

THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH DILEMMA: NO UNITY OF COMMAND - NO UNITY OF EFFORT

Dr. William MitchellRoyal Danish Defence College

At fi rst glance, the title of the chapter might indicate optimistic argument for the estab-lishment of a super institution; one that will coordinate both military and non-military assets in the spirit of the comprehensive approach [CA] philosophy. This is not so. To be accurate, the title represents an axiom that should help remind us that there also exists a role that the military should not play in support of developing CA, and it is also worthy of academic focus. Though some CA advocates might immediately cry pessimist, this would also be inaccurate. The views presented here will certainly support the long term goals of CA and share a degree of optimism that eventually we will get there; how-ever, the general thrust of this chapter will be that we do it in a controlled incremental fashion based on research and experimentation that respects the doctrinal complexi-ties of maintaining kinetic effectiveness in the battlespace. So in this sense the main assumption of this chapter is that even though kinetic activity is rightfully treated as a co-contributor to CA, an effective kinetic capacity must also be recognized as the pre-requisite for successful CA. It is the purpose of this chapter to reaffi rm this side of the CA discussion, that the military must not undermine its own kinetic effectiveness (the pre-requisite for CA) in the rush to be a CA co-contributor. It is this principle that the Command and Control [C2] approach adopted in this chapter will attempt to illustrate; that it is in the best interests of CA development that the doctrine that governs the military’s kinetic effi ciency not be treated like a ”recipe of the week” attuned to a single case study such as Afghanistan, or more accurately, certain regions of the Afghanistan theatre under different national responsibilities. Doc-trinal changes that affect our kinetic C2 capacities in terms of analysis and planning should not be context dependent, but based on commonalities from a variety of asym-metric contexts. To understand the C2 approach one must fi rst accept that “Command” is not just about who gives the orders, but entails a variety of functions such as establishing intent, or determining the roles, the responsibilities, and the relationships for the operational

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planning process. It affects the organisation, the philosophy, the principles, the practic-es, the procedures, and the systems necessary to allow timely political and military de-cision-making and to enable military commanders to direct and control military forces in the battle space.109 Therefore it is in the best interests of the military that during the CA development process, it maintains a watchful eye on existing military C2 capacities for operational planning. In the least because it is the command’s evaluative process that determines the feasibility of the plan, but most importantly because the undertaking of infeasible missions can only be recognized as a failure of command. For example, how does sending a team of civilian engineers into a combat zone affect the combat platoon, the company, the battalions, operational capacities, especially when they are reacting to enemy initiatives? Will it not affect logistics, intelligence direction, constraints con-cerning close air support application [CAS], rules concerning engagement of insurgents close to the civilian positions? Will it not create a more complex situational awareness to transmit to local commanders? These are legitimate questions well within the scope of a balanced CA discussion, however very few interested actors, including the military, appear willing to engage a more incremental approach to CA development.110 CA itself has many different interpretations, however most identify the central thrust of CA as an attempt to create more synergy between the military and non-military resources and to maximize the desired effect at all levels of policy and plans.111 In this regard CA represents a desire for a more effective doctrine when dealing with asymmet-ric or complex confl icts.112 Therefore the fi rst part of this chapter offers a perspective of what fundamentally makes asymmetric warfare different from symmetrical warfare? It will draw heavily on social science theory, specifi cally theories used for understanding confl ict from political science and international relations [IR]. The logic being that before we start throwing an array of CA inspired practices and procedures into the kinetic analy-sis and planning processes, there should be a common understanding of the asymmet-ric environment in general and not just a particular set of asymmetric conditions for a particular battlespace. The second part focuses on the emerging CA challenges to military C2 functions, and starts with identifying the central problem with CA when it comes to military and non-military cooperation in a battlespace, known in this paper as the CA C2 disjoint. It is followed by an examination of how this disjoint affects current C2 functions, and

(109) Albert & Hayes (2006):31-48.(110) Based on a year of focus on CA, several international conferences and workshops. In my opinion, it appears that basic C2 concerns often get drowned out by the political climate surrounding CA and the quest for solutions.(111) Fischer & Christensen (2005). (112) UK MOD Doc. (2005):1-1.

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offers a perspective on what are the limitations of military contributions to CA, without compromising our ability to conduct warfare effectively. The third part examines the congruencies between the CA philosophy and current developments within military doctrine. A series of challenges from the current transition process within Western militaries will be presented. This will be done with a special focus on the current effects based approach to operations [EBAO] context, and the military’s efforts to integrate non-military information into the operational planning process. The totality of the chapter should provide some insight, and impetus for discussion, as to what role the military should not have in developing CA, and where the military should draw the line in terms of pursuing doctrinal congruence with the CA philosophy, and understanding how we go about determining those limitations.

The Asymmetric EnvironmentWhat used to be based on simple symmetrical measures for strategic reference within the logic113 of strategic choice for parties to a confl ict is no longer valid. The last 15 years have seen the development of war fi ghting environments that depict two separate domains for strategic reference, one physical and the other cognitive.114 There has been much work done on the characteristics that differentiate asymmetric warfare from sym-metric warfare throughout its rise to rhetorical popularity over the last decade. The view of this paper points to a fundamental ontological115 shift from our previous understand-ing of strategic interaction based primarily on calculations from the physical domain: Today’s interactions in warfare are depicted as two interacting ontological domains, one physical (or material) and the other cognitive (or ideational).If one accepts this view, then the challenges of asymmetric warfare will stem from the fact that continued and primary reliance on the physical domain for strategic reference is no longer suffi cient for managing an intersubjective battlespace consisting of two interacting domains of understanding a complete reality. Broad generalisations of Western strategic reference dominated by the physical understandings are historically many; the arms race leading to World War I, the battle for air dominance over the United Kingdom [UK] in World War II, and nuclear strategies of the Cold War. Intelligence driven planning was primarily based on the comparative meth-

(113) Edward N. Luttwak (2001): 3-50. Luttwak explains the logic of strategic thinking within a the context of war, the paradoxical logic affecting the combatants was linear in terms of material/effi ciency calculations, both sides referred to the same physical domain. However the same logic applies to the onset of asymmetric warfare, the physically weaker side can circumvent the overwhelming physical advantage by changing the terms of strategic reference to the cognitive domain – this choice is also a product of the logic of strategy and human innovation. (114) Nicholson (2006): 133-136.(115) Understood here as simply the nature of reality.

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ods of counting soldiers, artillery, tanks, battleships, aircraft, or Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles [ICBMs] in order to determine strategy. When it comes to historical examples of the cognitive domain primarily informing strategic reference, we have comparatively little to offer ourselves and turn to opponents past and present such as the Serbs in Kosovo, the Taliban in Afghanistan or Al-Qaeda to generate lessons learned. Though an oversimplifi cation, we have found out that engaging the cognitive do-main after having achieved physical domain dominance in not easy. For example, con-sider the diffi culties with establishing variables116 to measure progress with regards to culturally dependent concepts: How can different cultures agree on accurate measures of “democracy” or “liberty”?117 Compare this to the simplicity of establishing “measures of effectiveness” for the symmetry of the physical domain, best illustrated by a body count of the enemy vs. their estimated muster. Consequently, complexity in strategic interaction develops if one side is busy for-mulating strategies based primarily on means/effi ciency calculations, while the oppo-nent might not being using the physical domain as the main terms of reference for their own decision-making, including even their defi nition of victory and defeat. It is the equivalent to sitting at the same game board with your opponent, plotting to beat them in a game of checkers, while they develop strategies to beat you in chess. An example of this shift in strategic interaction understanding comes from the Taliban leadership themselves, where 15 years ago they defi ned victory by the taking of Kabul – today they defi ne victory by a cognitive term roughly translated from several Pashto words as legitimacy. They plan their operations to de-legitimize the Afghan gov-ernment. Conversely, based on a two-pronged strategy promoting security and develop-ment, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] plans operations to legitimize the Afghan government. Social constructivism, as it is used in this paper, is defi ned as the view that the mate-rial world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction dependent on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world.118 This defi nition is devel-oped primarily within IR and carries with it several levels of understanding with their re-spective debates. It is not the purpose here to devalue any particular level of debate – they all have their place.119 However, the instrumental approach used here applies constructiv-ism based on the worldview rationality assumption, therefore the exclusion of certain con-structivist epistemologies that in my opinion threaten pragmatism will not dealt with here.

(116) Canadian Department of National Defence Document B-GG-005-004/Af-023 (1999); Canadian Government Doc (1999); McCafferty (1997); Waltz (1999): 7-14.(117) Nicholson (2006): 139-141.(118) Adler 1997: 322.(119) Adler 2002:104-109.

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The debate within social constructivism concerning metaphysics accompanied by ap-propriate ontological discussions is not only applicable to IR but many other social and natural sciences, including all aspects of military sciences. Constructivists consider in-terpretation an intrinsic part of the social sciences that stresses contingent generalisa-tions, meaning that they do not freeze our understanding but instead open up social world up. The ontological issues currently focused upon originate from the belief that refl exive knowledge (interpretation of the world) when imposed on the material reality of the world becomes knowledge for the world. It is this intersubjective dynamic that sug-gests directly that understanding the world does not just depend on understanding the material but also the ideational.120

Simply put, it suggests that ”social facts” can act as the objects of scholarly re-search endeavours emerging from the interaction between knowledge and the material world (intersubjectivity) – neither of which are fi xed.121 This metaphysical standpoint has been mirrored directly in current confl icts and wartime problem solving. For exam-ple, understanding the strategic impact of the kinetically insignifi cant Abu Ghraib prison scandal, or how in the last 15 years western militaries have developed methodologies to include into their kinetic planning information operations far more advanced than the recognition after the Iraq War of 1992 of the need for an effective Public Relations capacity. The pragmatic constructivist approach used here is built on the belief that this constructivist dynamic can exist within the scope of the main rationalist assumption; as the rationalist assumption itself only suggests that rationality is a subjective feature of

(120) Checkel 1998: 324-348; Reus-Smit 2001: 218.(121) Adler 1997: 327-328. A concept developed from earlier work of Deutsch (1957). See conventional constructivism, e.g. Ted Hopf’s ”Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory” presented in International Security in 1998. IR scholars are presented with a clear theoretical outline of a brand of constructivism fully capable of instrumentally engaging foreign and security policy analysis (Wendt 1995: 72). Conventional constructivist approaches are described by Hopf as drawing on the modernist social constructivist methodology and empirical approaches such as that of Barnett, while maintaining Adler’s pragmatic realist undercurrents (Hopf 1998: 181-185). If we subject the core conventional constructivist concepts of norms and identity to Colemans’ conditions for managing optimality assessments, we can actually see their role for non-material input into optimal preference construction: (1) Actions are optimal with respect to preferences whereby the best action is chosen; (2) Preferences are optimally formed with respect to beliefs and affects; (3) Beliefs are optimally formed with respect to the information available; (4) Available information (collected/processed) is optimal with respect to affects (consequence assessment); and (5) Effects are optimal with respect to the individual autonomy of the unit. The ”fi xed understandings” of conventional constructivism within the functionality of identity and norms may have a direct role to play in formulating optimal preferences, specifi cally in conditions that require an understanding of beliefs and the process surrounding the formulation of those beliefs.

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individual actors, it does not argue that all action is objectively rational.122 Therefore an objective process such as scholarly research aimed at understanding the constitution of a subjective reality of an individual actor may recognise ‘social facts’ that have emerged from the interaction between knowledge and the material world. However, approaches that allow for intersubjectivity must limit their application to within the contextual con-straints which give meaning to the specifi c analysis – for example the military intelli-gence [MI] analyst vis-à-vis both external and internal environments. Only in this manner can it be seen as another tool by which to perform objective assessments of a subject’s rationale; rationality therefore is still understood as primarily a subjective feature of the individual actor. Through the recognition of the non-military domains for appraising strategic in-teraction, an ontological foundation based on a pragmatic application of constructiv-ism within a worldview imbedded in subjective rationality is available for understanding complex confl icts and discussions on how we manage them. The complexity produced by the modern battlespace when understood in terms of in-tersubjectivity provides a suffi ciently concrete position from which to evaluate what is needed in terms of analytical and planning capacities. In this regard, there are three clear challenges. The fi rst challenge is that since intersubjectivity is by defi nition dy-namic and not static, we fi nd ourselves now searching for agility and responsiveness in both sense-making and organization in pursuit of a CA doctrine. The second challenge is also rather straightforward in that systematically engag-ing a second ontological domain for strategic reference will undoubtedly require a signif-icant expansion of the scope of knowledge we develop for use in the planning processes of warfi ghting. It highlights the need for the widening of intelligence collection and pro-cessing, and the need to incorporate non-military information for kinetic planning. We are clearly responsible for establishing an intelligence cycle that can manage both the physical and cognitive domains of a battle space, in terms of direction, collection, pro-cessing and dissemination. At the same time this expansion of the knowledge base must not undermine the functions of Command, as kinetic effectiveness is arguably a physical pre-requisite for ever being in a position of being subjected to the conditions of an intersubjective bat-tlespace in the fi rst place (or recognition by the opposing side of your physical domain dominance). The ability to manage the balance between the two for any particular set of warfi ghting conditions is proving diffi cult. Even if we simplify the requirement for un-derstanding different confl ict situations to some sort of deterministic taxonomy of asym-metry – the dynamic character of the process cannot be as fast as we would like - it is

(122) Kurrild-Klitgaard 1997:9.

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to some degree dependent on experience, especially where it concerns the pursuit of self-synchronisation. The ability to learn quickly from experience is a fundamental cata-lyst for self-synchronisation in itself. But the challenges for analysts and planners do not stop there. By acknowledging the interacting physical and cognitive domains we face a third and arguably most com-plex challenge: We also become responsible for the intersubjective space between them and the complexities produced by this space. Though depicted as two separate onto-logical domains that philosophically cover the full range of possible realities, it does not mean that they are mutually exclusive; far from it, they are so ontologically intertwined that despite 20 years of theoretical development in social science, from anthropology to IR, we are still far from managing the full scope of their intersubjective relationship, despite some progress in security policy with some engagement of issues relating to strategic reference.123 The intersubjective rules of this dynamic space, where the physical meets the cog-nitive, transcends our traditional, if not historical, understandings of the levels of strat-egy and the boundaries of Theatre. The movement between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels becomes very fl uid, with tactical physical events having a cognitive impact of strategic importance, or vice-versa, and everywhere in between. Furthermore, cognitive events physically outside of a defi ned Theatre may have direct impact on physi-cal operations in Theatre – or vice-versa. A central commonality in all of these challenges is the requirement for agility. Firstly, “agility” in terms of sense-making capacities related to any C2 structure in a bat-tlespace, will require an environment that fosters an understanding of both ontological domains, the intersubjective space between them, and the method to manage them empirically. We must not only learn to maximize the exploitation of the intersubjective battlespace within a given environment, but by this admission, we must also be capable of correctly defi ning the pragmatic limitations of exploitation vis-à-vis maintaining effec-tive kinetic planning and robustness. Secondly, the challenge of the complex battlespace transcending traditional divi-

(123) For a basic background see the road Katzenstein chose by organising and leading the research of 1996 on national security cultures. The identity concept was treated in analysis as a domestic attribute that arises from collective ideologies, which directly affected state perceptions of interest and thus state policy (Barnett, 1996). Though some of the authors of the study would later focus on the idea of ‘narrative’ instead of ideology, the affect of treating this understanding of identity as a domestic attribute available for a policy analysis was the precursor to the more instrumental application of conventional constructivism to the analysis presented here. In the same ground breaking study, Michael N. Barnett laid the groundwork in “Identity and Alliances in Arab Politics” for future research that would partially correct these defi ciencies with reference to individual decision-makers and strategic levels of policy providing clearer depictions of the strategy behind the norm affected decision-making. Also see Adler (1997): 318-363; Also Finnemore (2001): 391-416.

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sions of levels of strategy within a military campaign carries with it a referential context that is doctrinal, and by proxy, organizational. When discussing the development of a CA doctrine, there is also a process and organizational element for cooperation and a com-mon C2 structure. However, as the next section will attempt to illustrate, CA inherently works against its own development as a concrete doctrine primarily because of its need for multi-actors within its C2.

CA and the C2 DisjointIn a political response to this complexity, the CA philosophy was introduced here in Den-mark by the Danish Ministry of Defence and The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the 10 of March 2004. The goals of the initiative were to improve the coordination and planning of both the civilian and military efforts in a mission area with special focus on the civilian element within “Theatre”.124 Again, in this regard CA represents a desire for a more effective doctrine when dealing with complex confl icts. 125

Yet the implementation of any doctrine will require a certain degree of capacities to provide C2, whether it is the military, post offi ce, or the Catholic Church. A doctrine provides a common frame of reference for standardizing operations, and establishing common ways of accomplishing tasks – and acts as the organization’s guide to go from political/normative declarations to physical actions. However, it is the C2 capacities that provide the backbone for managing doctrine implementation.126 When dealing with issues relative to leadership and organization within the mili-tary, we are dealing with military command structures and control systems. NATO de-fi nes C2 as “the Organization, Process, Procedures and Systems necessary to allow timely political and military decision-making and to enable military commanders to di-rect and control military forces”. C2 and leadership as a research platform can be easily characterized as an ap-plied theoretical and developmental research program that bridges the gap between theory and practice, between the how and the why (or why not) we do things the way we do them. It is an approach that is intended to build a common language around C2 so that we may better share experience and knowledge where it concerns, for example, taking on the complex challenges produced by asymmetric warfare conditions. In terms

(124) See Danish Gov Doc, Defence Command Denmark Directive FKODIR Pl. 190-1. For some general background material ser, FKODIR PL 190-1 Bilag 1 & Bilag 2; Forsvarfolig 2005-2009; Jan Top Christiansen’s Chairmans Report from 20-21 June 2005 Seminar on CA, hosted by Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence.; For some wider perspectives see Jakobsen (2005); Harboe (2007); Macrae (2007);Ølgaard (2007); Burlin (2004); Nielsen and Larsen (2007); Holt (2006); Slim (2004); Aaronson (2007).(125) UK MOD Doc. (2005):1-1.(126) See Mitchell (2004): 10-12. Also see Luttwak, 2001: 93-112; and Mitchell (2002): 487.

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of military science, it bridges the divide between studies in decision-making, psychology, strategy, operational planning, intelligence, resource management, anthropology, edu-cation, training, and the natural sciences, and draws upon the expertise as required. The political aspirations of CA are inherently resistant to a single C2 structure to manage the interdependence of the various levels of policy implementation. Furthermore, the complexities of modern confl icts ensure there are no two confl icts alike. Without viable C2 capacities providing a coherent framework for fl exibility, experimentation, creative thinking, and new initiatives, a CA doctrine will risk disintegrating into an array of com-peting political interests and objectives. What might have worked for one confl ict relative to the participating actors and their respective interests, might not necessarily work for the next confl ict for reasons as uncomplicated as their geographic location. Without CA C2 capacities lead by a single political master, CA will fi nd it diffi cult to develop as a complete doctrine – and therefore the desired synergetic effect will be very diffi cult to achieve.

Figure 1: The CA - C2 Disjoint

Copyright CCRP

MilitaryResources

MilitaryResources

Non-MilitaryResources

Non-MilitaryResources

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The Functions of Command and Control vs. the C2 DisjointC2 should not be seen as an end in itself, but rather as a means toward creating some value, such as the accomplishment of a mission. Academic studies in C2 have a slightly broader interpretation than NATO’s formal defi nition above and see C2 more as an um-brella term that encompasses the concepts, issues, organizations, activities, processes, and systems associated with the NATO defi nition but also focus on general collabora-tive and consultative processes that are an inherent part of other sorts of coalition operations.127 As stated in the introduction “Command” is not just about who gives the orders, but entails a variety of functions such as establishing intent, or determining the roles, responsibilities, and the relationships. It affects the organisation, the philosophy, the principles, the practices, the procedures, and the systems necessary to allow timely political and military decision-making and to enable military commanders to direct and control military forces.128 From the fi eld of C2 studies it is possible to identify some generic functions that can be used in this chapter to highlight some of the superfi cial challenges which the development of a CA doctrine entails vis-à-vis existing kinetic C2.

Command Function 1: Establishing the Intent This function is probably the most important, as C2 makes no sense without establish-ing intent, or establishing the goal or objective of the mission. Included in this assess-ment will be a specifi c consideration of how one specifi es the objective, how the topic of acceptable risks in pursuing the objective is addressed as well as the integration of uncertainty. It is important as the Command’s evaluative process determines the feasi-bility of the plan, as the undertaking of infeasible missions is a failure of Command. Key sub-functions include assessing the sense-making capacities including quality of infor-mation aspects that include supporting military intelligence organization with regards to maintaining situational awareness for planning. Without a unitary command structure, the analysis, the planning structure, the sense-making ability and capacities for both military and non-military actors are sig-nifi cantly reduced in the battlespace where kinetic success is still a pre-requisite. Until the CA C2 disjoint is solved there will be a problem of who commands what, when, and where? In the best case scenario it will result in slower planning cycles, and in the worst case scenario completely undermine situational awareness for analysts and planners, the kinetic effectiveness in the fi eld, and slow down battlespace response to enemy initiatives. Internally, the issues concerning the intelligence cycle, the operational plan-

(127) Czerwinski (1996): 121-132.(128) Albert & Hayes (2006): 31-48.

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ning cycle, timeliness, and synchronisation, and how they are resolved in a non-unitary C2 structure, will determine how effective the CA doctrine is.

Command Function 2: Determining roles, responsibilities, and relationshipsC2 research also acknowledges the existence of more than one individual or entity within the command structure, and thus recognizes that the different roles, delegated responsibilities, and relationships have a direct effect on behavior. This may include promoting, allowing, or constraining behaviors. When researching this function special attention is given to determining the pre-existing environment that has resulted from patterns of interaction within the command structure. By doing so it provides a stable baseline model for evaluating any proposed changes and for iteratively integrating new information into the model for evaluation. Progress on solving the CA C2 disjoint should be monitored here through research and testing, leaving the military at all times in a position to protect its analytical and planning processes as it sees fi t with regards to maintaining kinetic effectiveness. For example, how to manage the problem of information sharing between the military and non-military actors? How to help maintain the high levels of situational awareness nec-essary in the battle space? What new responsibilities and relationships have to be es-tablished to manage the cooperation?

Command Function 3: Establishing rules and constraints Rules and constraints govern and shape decision-makers within the Command structure and organization. When applying C2 method to this function, it sub-divides both rules and constraints into two categories, the fi rst being “fi xed”, and the second attributed to the “variable” category. The “fi xed” category refers to rules and constraints attributed to culture (social, organizational, and/or professional.) The ‘variable’ category refers to those rules and constraints that are attributed to a particular situation. The inherent problems with the CA C2 disjoint and with the existence of a non-unitary command structure in a battlespace can only be exacerbated by the clashing bureaucratic cultures held by different participating actors. We can possibly compensate for loss of kinetic effectives (again, especially where it concerns situational awareness) through the establishment of rules and constraints that may give some solace. However, the process of agreeing on the appropriate rules and constraints between different ac-tors involved in a C2 structure in a battlespace could itself become an insurmountable challenge.

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Command Function 4: Monitoring and assessing the situation and progressC2 assumes that plans are developed and then executed, and therefore quite naturally assumes that there is a necessity for monitoring and assessing the situation. The im-portance of this function cannot be overstated when considering the necessity of both synchronization and fl exibility within the operational environment at the same time. It will in principle be the impetus for changing roles and responsibilities, or for making changes to the rules or constraints. It is even more essential where it concerns planning cycles that are effects driven. As an example, consider measures of effectiveness [MoEs]. The challenge for uni-tary actors agreeing internally on the appropriate MoEs are daunting enough, so to get multi-actor agreement will be an achievement that will undoubtedly require some ener-gy.129

Command Function 5: Leadership Component I (ability to inspire, motivate, and engen-der trust) This function concerns understanding how we develop leaders that inspire, motivate, and engender trust for warfi ghting. Particularly where it concerns evaluating the sense-making aspects of Command that touches on individual characteristics, behaviors, and relationships. There are distinct traditions attached to most militaries in terms of esprit de corps that do not exist at least in other types of actors that one could imagine becoming involved in a CA driven C2 structure. It raises certain questions concerning eventual relationships and behaviors. For example, in a CA driven C2, if “outsiders” are not seen by the military as pulling their weight in the battlespace or costing military lives, a clash of cultures will ensue.

Command Function 6: Leadership Component II (Education and Training)Education and training are a vital function of Command, especially when done proac-tively and combined with monitoring and assessment, to implement lessons learned quickly. At present the military is in a transition period where normal kinetic analysis and planning is under scrutiny within the context of establishing effects based approaches. This will be discussed in much greater detail shortly; however, to hear that further com-plexities will be added at the moment in terms of non-unitary actor driven analysis and planning process certainly sounds undesirable. It will give rise to questions about just

(129) After participating in three workshops in the fall of 2008 in DK for the sole purpose of discussing MoEs, the participating government ministries and military commands could not reach agreement on which MoEs were appropriate, nor who should put up the resources to collect data.

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how much non-military actors within a CA driven C2 structure will be willing to learn about the roles of their military counter-parts and vice-versa. To close this part, even with this superfi cial subjection of the C2 disjoint to the generic functions of C2, it is easy to envision a great many questions that need to be answered in order to understand the effects of a CA doctrine on the kinetic C2 capaci-ties of the military. If things are to be done properly, one should expect the number of sub-issues to be considered and tested for to be in the thousands. Yet this process of solving the C2 disjoint cannot even begin before the military dimension itself completes a transition process that allows it to doctrinally integrate non-military information into the kinetic planning processes.

The Effects Based Approach to Operations [EBAO]The military dimension has not been standing idly by and ignoring the onset of the “complex” battlespace. To the contrary, there exists over ten years of military science research that focuses on the transition within the operational planning process [OPP], for implementing incremental doctrinal changes to manage complexity. The OPP is the overarching process that guides force commanders in developing plans for the employ-ment of military power. It can take many forms depending on the confl ict environment. Therefore the OPP has to be an adaptive, collaborative process that can be iterative to provide actionable direction to commanders and their staffs across multiple echelons of command. The OPP provides the pivotal doctrinal bridge between the principals and practices – and between the practices and procedures. When considering the effects of the CA – C2 disjoint it is here, within this process, that any major changes will directly affect the military kinetic planning processes. It can be no surprise then that if the nature of warfare was to be redefi ned in terms of asymmetry, resulting in a requirement for managing greater complexity, that traditional military doctrine framing the OPP would have to be re-examined. The result of this re-examination has been the development of EBAO as kinetic planning doctrine to be applied in theatre. To date, EBAO is one of the boldest military attempts to try and doctrinally manage the complexity of the asymmetric environment described in Part I. Furthermore the congruencies between the non-military efforts in terms of CA develop-ment and the military’s own efforts with EBAO have not gone unnoticed by the militaries themselves.

“The Comprehensive Approach and effects-based philosophy together offer more sophisticated ways of analyzing complex situations and planning operations, as well as the means of incorpo-rating and coordinating the efforts of all instruments and agencies required to counter irregular activity.”

Joint Doctrine Note (JDN2/07), March 2007, MOD, UK

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In terms of military science, EBAO represents in itself the meeting place between the social sciences and the long dominate natural/physical sciences of the time and space dimensions managed by the OPP.130 EBAO attempts to manage the complexities of an asymmetric battlespace by dividing it up into different dimensions for strategic refer-ence when planning. Instead of just a military dimension, planners must now system-atically consider the political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information dimensions of their battlespace [PMESII].131

It is the development of PMESII as a system of analysis that physically connects the kinetic planning doctrine of the military to the non-military capacity aspects of the CA philosophy. It does so by forcing the C2 analytical and planning elements of the mili-tary’s kinetic capacities to systematically consider the non-military dimensional effects of their actions before they are undertaken. However, at this time the military is still in a testing and experimentation phase, where there is a great many questions left to an-swer in terms of determining the extent to which PMESII will be applied down the chain of command to how we actually measure/understand the effects produced. Current research within NATO and in the United States of America is focusing on the analytical aspects of applying PMESII effectively within a kinetic planning process, with a great deal of attention being paid to the intelligence cycle and the establishment of MoEs. A short examination of what these challenges present within a unitary C2 structure might help clarify the enormous challenges faced by the CA philosophy in overcoming the C2 disjoint in a non-unitary C2 environment. The following are just some of the current transition challenges the military is grappling with in regards to analysis and planning in an asymmetric battlespace; how-ever, once these challenges have been resolved, one would expect to move into an extensive list of problems related to the actually execution of actions in the battlespace where it concerns the use of typical kinetic capacities (CAS for example), logistical plan-ning (do we need pre-fabricated schools in our supply lines?), and information sharing issues such as the cost of counter intelligence at the tactical level.

Transition Challenge 1: Expanded Analytical Focus RequiredTo employ PMESII properly requires a great deal of background and current knowledge concerning the reality in which the actions will take place. To provide that knowledge, the military has its own supporting intelligence organisation. Historically, military intel-ligence has been geared primarily to the military dimension and symmetrical confl icts; however, the requirements being set by EBAO will necessitate fundamental changes in

(130) Phister et al. (2004): 1-2; Czerwinski (1996): 121-132; Owens (1995): 35-39.(131) Bi-Strategic Command Pre-Doctrinal Handbook (2007): 5-3.

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MI organisation. Intelligence cycles132 and supporting collection platforms are extremely important to the operational planning process – they drive it and in turn are driven by it. Failure to prepare MI to exploit the principles of EBAO will therefore mean that those principles will not come to drive the OPP. For example, if “taskings” or direction are/is not generated by the OPP to support the development of social intelligence, then the OPP will not be able to properly integrate the social dimension into the kinetic planning. The MI structure also has to operate within an established doctrine that has to manage a variety of time vs. space challenges. Fully implementing the principles of EBAO within the military intelligence cycle in terms of the non-military dimensions of the bat-tlespace will be the key to ensuring an effective implementation of EBAO. It is important to add here that equal representation in the assessment process does not necessarily mean there must be an equal representation in the fi nal plans. This expansion has not yet taken place within the military dimension. When con-sidering that the military as the key unitary actor in battlespace decision-making has not yet the capability to effectively engage the non-military dimensions of a battlespace in terms of information processing for plans and operations, in light of the CA-C2 disjoint it is hard to imagine how that process can be fi ne tuned by adding more actors.

Transition Challenge 2: Expanding the Scope and Nature of MIWhen assessing the MI requirements for the incorporation of PMESII in the intelligence cycle, the knowledge base has to be substantially expanded from the traditional focus on the military dimension to focus on a variety of non-military dimensions as well. Cur-rent MI structures have to begin “gearing up” to provide social, political, and economic, intelligence to support the non-military dimensional analysis in the OPP. Specifi cally there has to be more to focus on other than Order of Battle Reports133 [ORBATS]. OR-BATS are one of the traditional products of military intelligence output in terms of basic intelligence – or what constitutes the intelligence that is used for baseline referencing to support planning as well as grounds for initiating new taskings (direction). It covers the tracking of such aspects of the opponent’s equipment, capabilities, performance134, as well as some relatively light socio-political matters relative to leadership or logistical support.135 It goes without saying that for the implementation of EBAO to be effective, it must be supported by relevant intelligence collection and processing. This means that the collection, processing, and dissemination of non-military intelligence will come

(132) Clark (2004): Ch.1; Herman, (2004): 293-296; Mitchell (2002): 486.(133) UK MOD Doc (1999): 1A-2.(134) Libicki & Johnson (1995): 48-49 (Good example of the comparative tech focus).(135) Military intelligence output is divided generically into basic and current intelligence – current intelligence is situational and not referential in character.

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to play a pivotal role in the development of the knowledge base necessary to ensure that the non-military dimensions can be properly exploited in the OPP. The competition between asymmetric and symmetric thinking within the OPP is only just beginning. At present symmetrical thinking still dominates the OPP. To illustrate, consider the understanding of the Taliban’s area of operations. Tradi-tional symmetrical thinking had our Signals Intelligence [SIGINT] capacities trying to get lucky waiting for a Taliban to make a signals related mistake to help determine Taliban movement – a method providing very little in the way of fi xed SIGINT targets. Asymmetric thinking would have employed an anthropologist to explain the local rules of the Pash-tunwali – a Pashtun tribal code that has very specifi c rules where it comes to the move-ment of “foreigners” through tribal territory - especially about who has to get permission from whom. The Taliban try to follow those rules in the name of promoting their own legitimacy locally. Understanding those rules and the local tribal structure would allow us to exploit our SIGINT capacities with a wider range of fi xed non-Taliban targets - to help build a picture of Taliban movement. Within regards to a military contribution to CA, on a more strategic level we have to get our operational planners to plan and prioritize more asymmetrically. For example instead of thinking how to push physical front lines out from district centers in the prov-inces, the legitimization strategy would be better served by identifying strategic loca-tions for eventual clinics or hydro plants – and then prioritize kinetic planning to secure those locations fi rst. However, the military has yet to fully integrate the meaning of intersubjectivity into kinetic planning; therefore, the creation of a non-unitary C2 environment with ac-companying non-military capacities to be managed within the same battlespace will not facilitate the transition process.

Transition Challenge 3: MI Focus Must Shift From Description to PredictionTo drive the EBAO process there must be a desired end state for denoting the end of both military and non-military operations determined by the political leadership. In order to move towards that end state, a series of desired effects and sub-effects have to been determined. Effects themselves are the physical and/or behavioural state of a PMESII system within the confl ict environment that result from military or non-military, actions, or sets of actions within the PMESII defi ned battlespace. Actions resulting from the EBAO process and then executed within the battlespace, represent both military and non-military activity directed towards the achievement of a specifi c effect or effects. To do all this properly requires a great deal of knowledge concerning the reality in which the actions will take place as well as sound predictive method. Traditionally known as Intel-

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ligence Preparation of the Battlespace [IPB],136 its purpose is to keep the commander aware of recent, current, and near term events in the battlespace. However EBAO re-quires a great deal more Predictive Battlespace Awareness [PBA]137 for the commander, and will require a shift from a focus on descriptive analysis to predictive analysis.138This has direct methodological implications for the production of estimates and analysis – and education of our military analysts. As far as integrating and exploiting the non-military dimensions of PMESII are con-cerned, the cognitive skills developed in applied social science method are paramount. Specifi cally, it is the ability to systematically produce relevant mental models to increase the overall effectiveness of the OPP output. Until the military has fully adapted to the integration of non-military information into its unitary kinetic planning process, it would be a direct threat against the maintaining of kinetic effectiveness in the battlespace if a non-unitary C2 planning and analysis began to set conditions or requirements on a system that had not already adapted its ability to execute its primary purpose to the asymmetric battlespace. It is here where the argument is strongest that the develop-ment of CA is best served by letting military complete the transition process with regards to understanding the affect of incorporating the non-military dimensions on effective kinetic C2.

Transition Challenge 4: Timeliness The OPP cycle is determined by the time-space dimensions of the kinetic environment and structures and functions within that process therefore must be responsive to these requirements. Timeliness is affected by the kinetic C2 requirements of the battlespace as well as synchronisation between the OPP and the supporting MI regime. If there is no synchronisation, proper MI analysis is not completed to support the OPP process, and specifi cally where it concerns EBAO, effects related analysis quickly becomes a ques-tion of how polemic a Commander decision will be - without any method or research to support it. The resulting choice is to base effects analysis on these Staff polemics, or to artifi cially slow down the OPP process at the cost of kinetic realities. From a warfi ghting stand point both situations are unacceptable. If we begin to complicate the existing OPP with more decision-makers with different political interests as well, as more resources of a non-kinetic nature must be integrated in some way or form into kinetic planning, the strain on maintaining timeliness will be enormous.

(136) Phsiter (2004): 2.(137) SAB-TR-02-01 (2002).(138) Mitchell (2002): 481-485.

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Transition Challenge 5: Commanders Intent & Maintaining FlexibilityThe United States [US] Department of Defence [DoD] defi nes Commander’s Intent as the concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired end state that serves as the initial impetus for the planning process. It may also include the command-er’s assessment of the adversary commander’s intent and an assessment of where and how much risk is acceptable during the operation. Current research focuses on the fl exibility factor of Commander’s Intent as it relates to implementing EBAO as a military contribution to CA. Flexibility as it pertains to Commander’s Intent comes from desire to ensure that the Commander has just as many, if not more, courses of action avail-able as compared to the enemy commander. The Commander with more courses of action deemed viable has an advantage in the battlespace. Furthermore, the message to subordinates must not be so methodologically precise that it limits their fl exibility, or the synchronisation process so deterministic that it limits fl exibility – the result will be trading assurance of self-induced action for assurance of control. The intention of EBAO and PMESII is to provide guidance on integrating non-mili-tary dimensional analysis relative to the OPP through effects analysis that is completed within a framework of kinetic requirements of the battlespace - thereby increasing the number of courses of action available. Furthermore, it should also be able to identify mitigation activities to support desired kinetic courses of actions by identifying possible courses of action to mitigate any expected negative effects in non-military dimensions. However, if the OPP is driven by a non-unitary C2, then what will the effect on Com-mander’s Intent be? It would likely become much more complicated to establish, or for the different actors to agree on, in the fi rst place as individual interests consciously or sub-consciously make their way to the forefront. Solving this problem would be a tell-tale sign that we were on the right track to solving the CA-C2 disjoint. At the moment, however, the military dimension itself has not resolved issues with Commander’s Intent where it concerns the implementation of EBAO.

Transition Challenge 6: Synchronisation Within the OPP there is need to ensure a coherent timeline for establishing the rationale and details for all actions, disseminating orders to action, and incorporating methods to track progress status and workfl ows before the next planning cycle. This is also known as the Commander’s “battle rhythm”. Synchronisation must strive to be responsive to both the analytical needs of this cycle as well as the actual time and space dimensions of the battlespace, partially dictated by the enemy. Therefore an overzealous application of EBAO may result in incomplete analysis being provided to the OPP – or forcing a battle rhythm that does not match the kinetic realities.

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These current problems exist within a unitary decision-making environment; in light of the CA-C2 disjoint, one would only expect that any forced doctrinal introduction of a multi-actor decision-making environment would complicate the process even more. Where it concerns effective warfi ghting, the result would an even greater challenge to maintaining an effective and responsive synchronisation process.

Other CA Challenges to Military C2One challenge to the operational chain of command originates from the multi-actor co-operative environment that has come to characterize CA discourse. There are many different actors with resources to bear under the banner of security and development. The result is, and rightfully so, that the different actors wish to retain C2 over their own resources. It is here problems develop as the only way to actually do that in a confl ict requiring military operations is to give them access to the OPP. Suddenly the C2 disjoint between non-military resources management and military resource management takes on a more sinister character with regards to the military chain of command for kinetic planning. Other solutions in relation to resolving the CA-C2 disjoint problem have been put forward, whereby all the resources necessary for non-military activities within Theatre be placed at the disposition of the military and managed by the OPP. However, this will also create a new set of challenges to kinetic effectiveness that should be tested both theoretically and practically before hand, further stressing an OPP in transition in terms of maintaining timeliness and fl exibility, as well in the more basic aspects such as logis-tics and force protection. To illustrate, with the addition of the non-fi ghting capacities to the OPP, C2 drag increases as the synchronization process becomes more complex with regards to the analysis, tasking, and dissemination of multi-dimensional information between the OPP components. This will also negatively affect timeliness with regards to the requirements of the OPP cycle, and reduce situational awareness, and create a whole new regime of restrictions on kinetic fl exibility. Seen from the Commander’s perspective in the bat-tlespace, the challenge would be daunting, having to incorporate logistical and security requirements that have to be coordinated in a battlespace where the OPP cycle will vary between four weeks for whole theatre the size of Afghanistan, and less than one day for a combat platoon in the fi eld.

ConclusionWhere it concerns the OPP, it is reasonable to expect that before we ever start to in-tegrate CA practices and procedures of the non-kinetic nature, that there is suffi cient congruence of principles within the military’s OPP and the CA philosophy and principles.

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Implementing EBAO and PMESII will provide some congruence but we have not yet de-termined the limitations of that congruence and further experimentation is required. In terms of philosophical congruencies, CA and EBAO both acknowledge the existence and importance of the non-military dimensions of the asymmetric battlespace. In terms of principles, there is also some congruence if we accept PMESII as a military recognition of those non-military dimensions as a viable general guidance for kinetic analysis and planning, while CA sees the dimensions as guidance for multi-actor cooperation and respective contributions to capacity building in the multi-dimensional environment. However, it is here doctrinal congruence ends, and the C2 disjoint comes into effect where it concerns the establishment of coherent practices and procedures to complete the doctrine. At present the military dimension has not completed the full im-plementation of PMESII, particularly where it concerns practices and procedures within its C2 structure. Therefore any pre-mature attempt to force the military dimension into a CA driven C2 structure sends our management of kinetic processes into the unknown, particularly where it concerns effective warfi ghting. Instead we should focus on identify-ing and establishing the limitations of what the military dimension should contribute to the development of the CA philosophy. Based on the examples presented in this chapter, for example, a military contribution at this point in time would be the implementation of EBAO as well as the systematic application of PMESII (or some system of systems analysis) within the OPP. This should help better synchronize the knowledge collection and exploitation of the intersubjective battlespace. This chapter will come full circle by restating the title; there can be no unity of effort if there is no unity of command. The argument had been that effective kinetic C2 is a prerequisite for CA development and must be preserved. If you have a war fi ghting machine that does not work - the develop-ment and application of the CA philosophy is a moot point.

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CHAPTER FOUR

EFFECT-BASED POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILISATION

Frederic Labarre, MABaltic Defence College

This paper addresses the post-confl ict Stabilisation and Reconstruction [S&R] short-comings in failing and failed states. It is argued here that “effects-based” thinking, as part of a “comprehensive” or “whole of government” approach, can stimulate effective and effi cient planning in situations where “Hobbesian” social conditions prevail; where the war of all against all is predominant. The declaratory aim of international policy and intervention is to establish secure conditions for the purpose of reconstruction to such a level as to turn a Hobbesian soci-ety into a Rousseauian paradise, where human relations are governed by “contract”.139 The overthrow of warlords and dictators, the activity deployed and the resources poured into emergency and development aid by NGO workers in support of this aim is being challenged by what the Brahimi Report calls “spoilers”; bandits, criminals, insurgents, terrorists and warlords who have an incentive in instability.140 A model for undertaking S&R makes general consensus; it has been comprehen-sively laid out for the US State Department’s Offi ce of the Coordinator for Reconstruc-tion and Stabilization [SCRS] in April 2005 as a list of Essential Tasks called the SCRS Matrix.141 The literature on S&R suggests that its sequence of “intervention, transforma-tion and sustainment” be universally accepted as a best practice. The SCRS Matrix is a model of intervention planning that incorporates the lessons learned and revealed in many more national aid reports. This paper is not an attack on the SCRS Matrix. However, because it encompasses and summarizes the wealth of activity of NGOs and

(139) Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams & Stuart Griffi n, Understanding Peacekeeping (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2006), p. 165.(140) United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, (hereafter the Brahimi Report), A/55/305, S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, pp. 8-10.(141) Offi ce of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Post-Confl ict Reconstruction Essential Tasks, (Washington DC, State Department: April 2005), referred to as SCRS Matrix. http://www.state.gov/s/crs/c12936.htm.

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International Organizations [IOs] and myriad corollary agencies, it is used here to un-derscore a problem of strategic formulation. The hypothesis is that the S&R capability gap, its ineffectiveness, is a problem of semantics and coordination, not a problem of comprehensiveness of actors. The other problem has to do with the sheer enormity of any program of S&R. The quantity and quality of tasks to accomplish outlined in the SCRS Matrix are simply overwhelming for a weak polity to undertake, and therefore outside assistance is almost automatically required, with the consequences that charges of neo-colonialism are not far off the mark. The paper will demonstrate (in that order) that a) military action cannot be di-vorced from S&R operations, b) S&R operations must take place following a framework of analysis and planning that not only integrates all the tools of statecraft, but also considers the cultural implications of coercive and humanitarian activities within S&R. This can be called an EBAO to S&R (EBAO is often associated with an Effects-Based Ap-proach or Effects-Based Operations, and betrays the confusion of concepts, as well as bureaucratic infi ghting in its defi nition. To lighten the text, however, the acronym EBAO will be used throughout.). EBAO may be perceived as a device to promote liberal-demo-cratic ideals.142 The importance of familiarising ourselves with EBAO is essential. The fi rst part will therefore give a brief defi nition of this proto-concept. Effects-based concept devel-opment over the last decades has been tortuous precisely because of a confusion of terms. It must be noted that General James Mattis, commanding offi cer of US Joint Force Command (and NATO Allied Command Transformation) has recently issued a pol-icy statement stopping further conceptual development (but he cannot stall the devel-opment already done in various NATO member states) along the lines of effects-based approaches. Clarifying terms is therefore vital. The second part will briefl y attempt to outline some shortcomings of the SCRS Matrix, stressing how certain well-intentioned portions in fact may yield unexpected or contrary effects. The main problem of the SCRS Matrix is that it is designed as a starting point for stricken states that represent the end result for countries that have benefi ted from decades if not centuries of uninterrupted economic, social, political and philo-sophical growth. The postulate here is that reverse engineering is impossible. Instead, Maslow’s scale of human needs is used as a theoretical and methodological starting

(142) United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, “Incorporating and extending the UK Effects-Based Approach”, Joint Doctrine Note (JDN 7/06), September 2006, p. 3-6. Such decisive conditions and effects required of the British approach call for “achieving political plurality”, “transitional government establishment”, etc. which are all noble goals, but perhaps culturally inappropriate.

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point. This approach is then merged with effects-based methods to redress the short-comings of the SCRS Matrix.

Military force cannot be divorced from civilian S&R : A critique of EBAOEBAO has gained some measure of acceptance because the corresponding planning process had been successfully employed in the fi rst Gulf War and in the 2003 Iraq inva-sion, following which other countries began exploring the concept more deeply, perpetu-ating the controversy, and sometimes the dispute over terminology.143 The NATO defi nition summarises that of most of the Alliance members, thus incor-porating the general notions found in the understanding of the concept of most of the member states.

“The Effects Based Approach to Operations is the coherent and comprehensive application of the various instruments of the Alliance, combined with the practical cooperation along with involved non-NATO actors, to create effects necessary to achieve planned objectives and ultimately the NATO end-state”144

EBAO refers to a way of thinking about planning operations where tasks are planned concurrently to create effects that are assessed and re-assessed during implementa-tion, as part of a comprehensive approach linking military and non-military means and actors to modify the adversary’s behaviour. CA is not synonymous with EBAO. This distinction unfortunately is not only se-mantic, it is disciplinary as well; effects-based methods are tied to the military, which brings into question the ability to integrate civilian end-states (and desired effects) into the equation. Action is synchronic, not sequential. The application of military solutions must provide for future reconstruction.145

(143) David A. Deptula, Effects-Based Operations: Changes in the Nature of Warfare (Arlington, VA: AEF, 2001), p. 18. An important semantic problem for military and civilian planners, whether in war and in post-confl ict reconstruction, is the distinction between effect and effi ciency, often confused. When Deptula speaks of F-117 fl ying less than 2% of sorties in the Gulf War achieving 43% of target elimination, that is effi ciency, not effectiveness.(144) Notes of the author on a presentation, Effects-Based Approach to Operations conference held at Baltic Defence College, Tartu, Estonia, 12-13 March 2008; see http://www.bdcol.ee/index.php?id=welcome &tx_mininews_pi1[showUid]=75&cHash=bdef9baf8d.(145) Andrew M. Dorman, “Transforming to Effects-Based Operations: Lessons from the United Kingdom Experience” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: SSI 2008), p. 17. Also refl ected in notes of the author from a presentation at the Effects-Based Approach to Operations conference held in Tartu, Estonia, 12-13 March 2008.

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Figure 1: The sequential approach146

Effects are intermediary to the directed policy aims. They are not ends in themselves.147 Philip Farrell has sought to illustrate mathematically the instrumentalisation of effects, saying that “output variables can be expressed as a function of input variables. Also output variables may become input variables for another function.”148 The diffi culty with EBAO is identifying the inputs that will have positive and in-tended effects. This is because adversaries, agents and innocent bystanders are not systems; they are organic agents, and no planning can ever predict every contingency.149 Hence the essential feature of EBAO has to do with the prior assessment (intelligence picture), and recurring re-evaluation in a spirit of sharing and communion with non-military actors. In a sequential approach, such as that employed in the Balkans and other similar peace support operations (PSOs), manifestations of lessening tensions, such as military troop reductions and their replacement by police forces are tangible indicators of mis-sion success. Post-confl ict reconstruction takes place in “traditional” internal confl icts under conditions where the state in which intervention is to take place fi nally yields to international pressure. For this to happen, some modicum of central control needs to be present, which it was in the Western Balkans, East Timor, etc. in the late 1990s.

(146) This model is taken from a presentation at the Effects-Based Approach to Operations conference held at the Baltic Defence College, Tartu, Estonia, 12-13 March 2008. (147) Milan Vego, “Effects-Based Operations: A Critique”, Joint Forces Quarterly 41/2 (2006), p. 52.(148) Philip Farrell, Control Theory Perspective of Effects-Based Thinking and Operations (Defence R&D Canada: Technical Report TR 2007-168 (2007)), p. 7. (149) Vego, “Effects-Based Operations”, p. 53.

Post-conflict

stability

time

development

violentconflict

military

conflict of interests crisis

violence/ casualties

diplomacy

In theater involvement

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In failing and failed states, however, the state of war is similar to a state of nature. Martial activity is depoliticized. It has become the expression of predatory drives more than the means of last resort of a group or individual. Because there is no central authority and because the functions of society have completely broken down, re-establishing order requires a lot of commitment from the intervening agency, and a lot of coercive power. But in order not to perpetuate the cycle of violence, the functions of the state need to be reinstated from outside, and this requires a signifi cant civilian presence. Together, mili-tary and civilian elements must rapidly fi ll the “authority vacuum” in the failed state, and demonstrate legitimacy by getting results. Therefore time is of the essence. The faster and the most completely those results are felt, the better the odds that the country will escape its Hobbesian fate and be directed a “Rousseauian” outcome. More than ever, the civilian response must come sooner in the post-confl ict reconstruction and stabilisa-tion phase, and its performance must take place in exceedingly hostile conditions. The symbiosis between civilian and military must be complete. Bearing in mind that in most cases, the application of EBAO thinking has yielded a quick (initial) victory over potential spoilers, can the same approach be used for the post-confl ict (post-military, if we must speak strictly) phase as well?

Figure 2: Comprehensive Approach as a model of response150

(150) This model is taken from a presentation at the Effects-Based Approach to Operations conference, held at the Baltic Defence College, Tartu, Estonia, 12-13 March 2008.

time

violence/ casualties

conflict of interests crisis

violentconflict

Post-conflict

stability

Effects of instruments

diplomacy

military

economy Strategic

objectives

Strategic vision

Decisiveconditions

Decisionto intervene

End state

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We see here not only a complete overlap of disciplines (diplomatic, socio-economic and military), but the coordination of efforts between them to achieve decisive conditions. The difference between fi gure 1 and fi gure 2 is that in the former, the presence of the military is an effective deterrent actor to enable humanitarian intervention to take place. The level of violence decreases independently of the presence of the military or the effectiveness of development work. In the latter example, however, the decrease in vio-lence is dependent on the combination of agents’ activities, their collaboration and co-ordination. Hence, the application of destructive force cannot be dissociated from that of constructive skill. As Joshua Ho and Milan Vego have remarked, however, it is illogical to believe that effects-based approaches contribute to the modifi cation of behaviour of the adversary.151 Collaboration and coordination across actors depends on the careful distinction between activities, tasks, actions and effects. The former two belong to the tactical level, and the latter two to the operational level. According to an EBAO experiment as-sessment run 27-29 February 2008 in Stavanger, Norway, the planning of activities and tasks are linked by the operative conjunction “in order to”. For example, the activity “de-ter improvised explosive devices” is performed “in order to” bring about the condition of “secure local lines of communication”. This becomes an action (what Farrell would call an output which acts as an input for later functions) that at the operational level reads “secure local lines of communication so (not in order to) that roads are traffi cable”.152 The operative conjunction “so” is not so readily distinguishable from the previous “in order to”, but the tactical and operational fl avours are preserved. This can be translated into a strategic end-state such as “making roads traffi cable in order to facilitate trade, so that stability can become based in collective prosperity.” “Making roads traffi cable” would also provide the effects required to ensure free-dom of movement for military operations. One of the critical shortcomings of EBAO is that it tends to exclude civilian input in planning and execution. From the critique that has been levelled both against EBAO and the SCRS so far, perfect coordination would see civilian and military assets working together (not in parallel projects) towards the achievement of the same effects. That is, the civilian counterparts must understand that traffi cable roads are an essential part of the provision of physical security (patrols)

(151) LCol Joshua Ho, “The Dimensions of Effects-Based Operations: A View from Singapore”, Australian Army Journal 2:1 (2003), p. 102, and notes taken by the author from a presentation at the Effects-Based Approach to Operations conference, held at the Baltic Defence College, Tartu, Estonia, 12-13 March 2008. (152) Private presentation made to the author 7 March 2008, based on “Findings from Operation ENABLER 2007”, discussed 25-29 February 2008 at the NATO Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) in Stavanger, Norway; emphasis added.

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and the military counterparts must understand that the same roads are an essential part of the provision of human security (humanitarian aid delivery). Providing services as per a Rousseauian “social contract” is impossible in a Hobbesian climate. The initial conclusion is that post-confl ict S&R can be conceptualised in effects-based thinking if there is proper coordination (understood as inter-agency/inter-disciplin-ary/inter-cultural communication) along proper semantic lines. The dichotomy between “in order to” and “so that” illustrated above stresses the need for planners to develop the proper semantic linkages. Semantics are based in rigorous problem defi nition and logical concept linkages. Another critical observation to make is that the implementation of S&R cannot take place sequentially. Time and commitment being of the essence, suc-cess in post-confl ict S&R depends on the ability of intervening parties to maximise their effort through their numbers and proper coordination between actors. The quality, reach and imprint of their collective work depend furthermore on a common understanding of the end-state, which suggests that a single “central” authority should orchestrate the implementation of plans. All actors must agree with the stated end-goals, and with the way to reach those goals. The next section uses the SCRS Matrix planning and implementation tasks to demonstrate the value of semantics against a successful case study.

The cultural implications of coercion and reconstruction in S&R: Re-tasking the SCRS Matrix Effects-based thinking is a way to bring about the conditions (including third-party be-haviour alteration) whereby operational or strategic success will take place. According to David Cavaleri,

“…legitimacy, security, and situational understanding are so critical to the long-term success of any stability operation that… [every] operational decision made, every resource commit-ted, every negotiation conducted, and every policy implemented should be done only af-ter considering the long-term effect of that action on legitimacy, security, and situational understanding”153

Cavaleri lists six other planning themes for S&R, including economy and infrastructure, which are closely related to each other. But the three most important are legitimacy (here taken as primary enabling factor), security (the enabling condition and end result) and situational awareness (a fundamental element in any effects-based approach).

(153) David Cavaleri, “’Stay the Course’: Nine Planning Themes for Stability and Reconstruction Operations”, Military Review July-August (2005), p. 37.

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The other planning themes (commitment, unity of effort, media, and planning effort) are included in detail in the SCRS Matrix. The SCRS Matrix aims at precise deliverables, measured mostly for the benefi t of bureaucratic of philanthropic control. For example, the SCRS suggests in part IV, “Eco-nomic Stabilization and Infrastructure” to stimulate micro and small enterprise, and provide skills training and counselling. Judging by the benefi ts of a Rousseauian life-style, such prescriptions seem to make sense, as if a market orientation made universal consensus. In fact, little thought seems to be applied as to whether such solutions are appropriate, whether a rural/agrarian society would benefi t to the same degree as an industrialised or urbanised one is ignored. This is a critical shortcoming of a planning tool that seeks to apply general prescriptions without the benefi t of intelligence analysis on a case-by-case basis. The metrics to quantify success are inadequate to an effects-based approach to planning S&R because they do not allow for correctives. For example, the “rebuilding of a school” in Afghanistan may be an excellent indicator of success on paper (infra-structure is physically measurable), but not if parents remain afraid to let their children out of their sights because of security reasons. Clearly, the proper indicator of success is the number of children free to go to school (and going), not the quality or number of classrooms. The SCRS perpetuates the problems of coordination so often mentioned in project assessment reports from other nations and agencies in its call for the drafting of laws and codes including customary and traditional rights.154 This is incredibly short-sighted. For one, custom cannot be codifi ed. Second, what does that say of “Weberian sover-eignty” when foreigners decide what a host nation’s laws should look like? Clearly the legitimacy of the statutes thus enacted will be called into question. Rather than jumping towards the accomplishment of a Rousseauian society immediately from the Hobbesian reality, planners should return to basics. Abraham Maslow’s famous Theory of Human Motivation is an appropriate starting point, because the SCRS Matrix is a list of human drives, but they are presented out of context; in Maslow’s words, “the situation or the fi eld [author: environment] in which the organism [author: individual] reacts must be taken into account but the fi eld alone can rarely serve as an exclusive explanation for behaviour.”155

The SCRS Matrix uses the end results of decades if not centuries of political, social, philosophical and economic development as a starting point for states that have been prevented from proceeding on the road that leads to these ends. No model can be

(154) Offi ce of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Post-Confl ict Reconstruction Essential Tasks, (Washington DC, State Department: April 2005) Matrix, p. IV-10 (155) Abraham H. Maslow, “A Theory of Human Motivation”, Psychological Review 50/4 (1943), p. 371.

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applied in these circumstances. Behaviour is culturally and geographically determined also.156 These cultural and situational contexts must be factored into the conception of the model, so that planning integrates the quality which Joshua Ho said was so cruelly missing, when he referred to “the development of a cultural-military-economic model of [EBAO].”157 The SCRS Matrix should be built around the basic human drives, which are, by or-der of priority a) physiological needs, b) personal and group safety, c) individual love and belonging, d) esteem from self and others, and e) self-actualisation. Clearly, the fi rst two are most closely related to the fundamental planning themes outlined in Cavaleri, and are recurrent themes in the literature. The satisfaction of these two needs is a matter of common sense, but also, they are not culturally loaded. The three subsequent needs are more so.158 Love and belonging, esteem and self-actualisation are closely linked together, and can only be satisfi ed in a climate of safety and relative abundance, which represent the fi rst steps out the “state of nature” in which a failed state’s society is plunged. Because they are more culturally-loaded, it is better if the emerging society itself decides the de-vices it will develop to bring the satisfaction of love and belonging, esteem and self-actu-alisation needs about. But once this process is undertaken, we can say it is because the society has freed itself from the state of nature, and embarked on a Rousseauian path, having comprehensively answered the safety and physiological needs that, unresolved, perpetuated the earlier conditions. At the strategic level, then, “effects-based S&R operations” are taking place be-cause safety and the meeting of physiological needs are having the effects of allowing subsequent needs to emerge, because individuals will be naturally motivated in devel-oping the means towards self-actualization. It can be said that the SCRS Matrix as it is presented reverses the hierarchy of needs, or introduces concurrent (but uncoordinated) processes. It unconsciously takes the satisfaction of basic needs for granted. “People who have never experienced chronic hunger are apt to underestimate its effects and to look upon food as a rather unim-portant thing.”159 This quote exaggerates the planning oversight of the original SCRS conceivers, but the point is made, especially in consideration of local culture. A revised S&R Matrix would translate each need into activities that are effects-based, and com-prehensive in approach (meaning that many actors would be involved in the satisfaction of these needs). There remains, therefore, a form of sequence; military actors establish

(156) Ibid., p. 371.(157) Ho, “The Dimensions of Effects-Based Operations”, p. 103. (158) Maslow, “A Theory of Human Motivation”, p. 392(159) Ibid., p. 387.

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basic stability (using effects-based approaches, wittingly or not) and civilian actors take over to complement the comprehensive approach.

Figure 3: Effects-Based Approach to S&R

This model is not complete without the understanding from fi g. 2, which emphasises the synchronicity (not the sequence) of activities, effects, decisive conditions, and op-erational objectives, from the diplomatic, political, and civilian actors. To benchmark the model, the “combined action platoon” [CAP] concept of the US Marine Corps in Vietnam is used as a form of case study.160

Table 1: USMC “effects-based approach” applied to basic physiological and safety needs

Activity Task/Effect Decisive conditions Operational objectives

Kinetic Defend local villagers

Ensure stability/security

Food security (har-vesting)

Maintain social fabric

Manoeuvre Disperse teams to villages

Deny village to Viet Cong

Push VC into jungle Isolation of VC

Infl uence Long-term pres-ence

Build trust Sustain legitimacy De-legitimization of VC

These operational objectives are inferred from the relative success obtained by the Ma-rine Corps during the Vietnam War. The SCRS Matrix makes some of these operational

(160) Scott S. Gartner, Strategic Assessment in War (London, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 147-153.

Activity Effect Decisive condition Operational objective

Military activities are KineticManoeuvreInfluence

Tactical Operational

MILITARY DOMINANT CIVILIAN DOMINANT

CONFLICT/COMBAT POST-CONFLICT

COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH=EBAO+POST CONFLICT S&R

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objectives and activities explicit. It is therefore relatively easy to rearrange them into an effects-based cycle. The “kinetic”, “manoeuvre” and “infl uence” parameters are taken from fi gure 3 above, but there is no reason why the same terms could not denote similar orders of activities as performed by civilians in the post-confl ict (CA) phases. Subsequent illustra-tive tables use these terms to bring the point home that a military EBAO understanding of problem solving can be applied in post-confl ict phase (so as to make action consistent and predictable). It is also a measure of the ability of the civilian agencies and actors to reconcile their action with the military actors. Clearly, then, kinetic action refers to a tangible impact on the ground, and suggests a form of confrontation. Manoeuvre is a military term harking back to the indirect approach, but I would argue translates into actions that have the prospect of being misunderstood by the population. Infl uence evi-dently refers to the less tangible results sought. It is at the manoeuvre and infl uence categories that there is the greatest risk of triggering unintended effects.161

Additional examples using the SCRS Matrix’ activities marry the kinetic, manoeu-vre and infl uence categories with elements of Maslow’s scale of human needs to pro-duce a sequence of activities, intermediary conditions and effects that has the prospect of being more readily achievable. Again, the postulate is that the satisfaction of basic needs fi rst, and in an effective manner, will yield quicker results on the ground, and will generate the material conditions and provide the time for constituents to develop local solutions to their needs, especially the needs of a higher order along Maslow’s scale. The advantage of the model is that by establishing objective limits to foreign interven-tion, S&R activities benefi t from input from greater numbers of actors at the level of ba-sic need satisfaction, and by trusting in Maslow’s analysis of human behaviour, enables the preservation of cultural specifi city and identity development by letting the higher orders of individual and group needs to be satisfi ed by the host nation itself, according to its own timeframe. This model, while elaborate, requires rigorous attention to termi-nology and semantics to work. It is from this process that planners can best determine the types and limits of activities to be carried out, and benchmark their success against an honest appreciation of whether they have helped meet intermediary and decisive conditions.

(161) When applied to the diplomatic actor, the operative terms “kinetic”, “manoeuvre” and “infl uence” are obviously misapplied as they are taken from the military lexicon. They are kept here to provide a sense of consistency from actor to actor. As this model still needs refi nements, better semantics are certainly available to illustrate the kind of activity, task, condition and objectives that will be yielded by the qualities of action displayed in the left-hand column of this model. The author trusts the judgment of the reader to recognise performance equations between civilian, diplomatic and military actors.

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Table 2: Civil humanitarian effects-based approach for basic physiological and safety needs

Activity Task/Effect Decisive conditions Operational objectives

Kinetic Provide food aid, emergency medicine, potable water

Prevent food riots, clashes between groups

Absorption of mini-mal caloric intake for normal day’s activities per person

Prevent population displacement

Manoeuvre Airlift emergency aid personnel

Demonstrate commitment

Predictability of rela-tions with locals or stricken groups

Relations of mutual trust

Infl uence Make contact with local leaders (Track 3 diplo-macy)

Empowerment of local leaders

Creation of local allies

Legitimization of aid effort and local leaders

In the tables that follow, items in italics are taken directly from the SCRS Matrix, and placed in their proper context in this Maslowian/EBAO model. Undertaking this process shows how the SCRS Matrix confuses goals, activities and analysis. For example, in p. III-1, Humanitarian and Social Well-being, the operational terms “estimate”, “assess”, “awareness”, and so on, denote the necessity to build an information picture of the situ-ation on the ground. This is clearly knowledge development, and should be performed in cooperation with intelligence services from the military actor. These actions within the EBAO process do not belong to “activities” or “goals” at all, but to the knowledge development or analysis part. The activity that needs to be performed needs to be located in the proper order, or else, the verb that denotes an activity needs to be changed according to where the planners need the activity to occur within the model. For example, active verbs denote performance of precise effects-yielding actions; “ensure”, “provide”, and “maintain” would be activities or tasks, they should not be operational objectives.162 The application of SCRS terms to an EBAO process highlights the confusion of ways and means in the SCRS. “Providing for emergency humanitarian needs” as stated in p. III-1, is not a goal, it is a means, to which end is the “prevention of population dis-placement”. There are too many other examples of such confusion to list them all, but the SCRS Matrix is not alone in fostering this confusion; its activities are listed as short-hand, and other agencies in other countries often make the mistake of taking mental shortcuts. EBA thinking forbids this. The paper supplies a few more examples of the application of the model for other agencies and actors within the comprehensive approach phase.

(162) Offi ce of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Post-Confl ict Reconstruction Essential Tasks, (Washington DC, State Department: April 2005)Matrix, p. III-1.

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Table 3: Diplomatic effects-based approach to governance (safety need)

Activity Task/Effect Decisive conditions Operationalobjectives

Kinetic Send Ambassa-dors, diplomatic staff

Make international recognition of country manifest

Maintenance or establishment of national legitimacy

Reciprocal rela-tions

Manoeuvre Establish diplo-matic and consular relations

Create a basis for negotiations and consultations

Participation to bilat-eral and multilateral exchanges

Good neighbourly relations

Infl uence Display diplomatic clout, capabilities, promote values and interests

Empower national leaders in their capacities to rule

National govern-ment not a threat to population

Provide disincen-tives to insur-gency

In p. II-1, Governance and Participation, the confusion in the SCRS is even more tan-gible. It lists concrete objects which are diffi cult to reconcile within EBAO schematics. For example, the “goal” of determining “governance structure” is in fact an analysis activity which should take place well before the establishment of citizen participation. In fact, in the “transitional governance” fi elds, there is not a single knowledge develop-ment activity required, merely activities to achieve with foreign experts or local actors. This furthers the point made in the second part of this paper that foreign intervention in national governance systems can be damaging especially when it is as incompe-tently conceived as in the SCRS Matrix. It is furthermore unwise to “establish rules and timetables for interim national government”, “deliver administrative support systems”, “ establish transitional political authority”, or “provide technical and legal advisors”163 when using a Maslowian approach.

Table 4: Military EBA applied to governance (border/territorial security)

Activity Task/Effect Decisive conditions Operational objectives

Kinetic Deploy troops to border areas

Demonstrate presence

Enforce sovereignty Confi dence in solidity of territorial control

Manoeuvre Control and monitor border

“Establish” border

Regional and inter-national recognition of borders

Good-neighbourlyrelations

Infl uence Deter illegal crossings

Reduce or elimi-nate import or export smuggled weapons or people

Competent and predictable border monitoring

Safety from spoilers

(163) Ibid., p. II-1-2.

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In the “Security” section, the SCRS makes suggestions (demobilization, disarmament) better left for the military sphere (in the confl ict/combat phase of the comprehensive approach).164 These suggestions, furthermore, were carried out in Iraq by the US military to disastrous effect. Generically suggesting such tasks overlooks strategic and opera-tional needs, and should be taken out lest they be equated to a “civilian” doctrine at odds (uncoordinated) with military or political experts. A defeated country is nonetheless home to people and soldiers who served proudly. To deny that status to the defeated is to invite the denial of “esteem” and “self-actualisation”, in addition to removing an ele-ment of “safety”. Provided that there is a legitimate (even if previously hostile) authority in control of the population, occupation will be easier by the gradual re-affectation of existing personnel, even to the risk of their keeping weapons. In conditions where physiological needs are addressed, but where governance comes under challenge, insurgency is the result. Here, it is suggested to use host capac-ity associated with few but capable advisors to conduct the activities outlined. These activities must be, or appear to be, programmed by a central authority perceived as legitimate, and not upon the diktat of the international community or the occupying forces. Even the presence of advisors should be as invisible as possible, or requested by the government, and not offered or suggested by the occupiers, lest legitimacy comes into question. This way, the government can gain legitimacy with the population by dem-onstrating it can get its wishes obeyed by the forces that defeated the country in the fi rst place. In the model that has been put forward so far, the intention is not only to ensure cooperation and coordination, but also a common understanding and agreement as to what types of effects will bring the decisive conditions for operational success. The fol-lowing example of inter-agency EBAO to cooperation is proposed for indicative purposes only.

Table 5: EBA to interagency or bilateral cooperation (Military and NGO)

Activity Task/Effect Decisive conditions Operational objectives

Kinetic Provide material support

Enable actor with lesser capabilities

Professional cooperation

Increased capacity and resolve

Manoeuvre Send liaison offi cers

Establish contact Interdependence of actors

Consistency and unity of effort

Infl uence Deploy capabili-ty/demonstrateskill

Develop trust in substance of solutions

Interdependence of means

Effi ciency andeffectiveness of effort

(164) Ibid., p. I-2.

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ConclusionThe SCRS Matrix confuses ends and means, activities and effects. The EBAO is a plan-ning tool that has revealed this critical shortcoming. It further takes ownership of mili-tary tasks which is at odds with a harmonious comprehensive approach where some form of military/civilian sequence of action needs to be preserved. More research also is needed into the measures that need to be taken to ensure that military action does not prevent future reconstruction needs. This research has not fully answered the question as to how to bridge the military and civilian operational gaps. The interviews have yielded that, in large part, the problem remains one of profes-sional culture.165 The few examples that have been developed in this paper show promise, but much success seems to depend on the correct interpretation of some terms of the English lan-guage. In the end, we may need to remain satisfi ed that the EBAO is a way of thinking and planning operations, maybe not one of conducting them. This research has shown that tentatively at least, basic human needs could be codifi ed into a plan for operations and strategy provided that proper semantics are used and clear intentions are expressed. Planners and philanthropic agencies must have the honesty to prepare their plans with a view of completing them according to the indicators and results which will benefi t the group receiving the aid. Aims cannot be confused with activities; if the aim of an agency is to build a road, then the incentive is to build a bad road that will need to be rebuilt later on. If the aim is to provide secure and reliable communications infrastructure to create ulterior (effects) conditions of facilitated trade, then this is already an improve-ment that carries with it different indicators (kilometres of paved roads, vs. tonnage of imports and exports per year) which in turn have a different signifi cance for the locals. More research needs to be done into human motivation. Using Maslow as a start-ing point for conceiving of post-confl ict S&R is certainly discouraging to many practitio-ners in that it is normal to hope for the betterment of living standards rapidly for many in failed states. It is also an unfamiliar theoretical tool for many political scientists and aid workers. There is no doubt that it offers a more realistic set of assumptions and plan-ning benchmarks to guide action. Basic human needs should be alleviated fi rst never-theless, and social development can come later, and not by Western agency but by local communities themselves. Stabilisation and reconstruction in post-confl ict situations is about ensuring at the very least, the command of a central authority over a give territory, a contributor to international life, and an actor with which other powers can engage in dialogue with to resolve disputes and fi nd solutions together.

(165) Dorman, “Transforming to Effects-Based Operations”, pp. 23-24.

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ANNEX 1: Pages from the SCRS Matrix (April 2005)

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CHAPTER FIVE

THE ”DUTCH APPROACH” ANDTHE EXPEDITIONARY FORMULA

Dr. Rene Moelker, Associate ProfessorNetherlands Defense Academy

In a 2004 interview166 James Fearon stated that “peacekeeping operations to civil war-torn countries with low state capabilities are likely to fail unless “peacekeeping” becomes successful state building. Where civil war was caused by, or facilitated the destruction of central government institutions, mediating social and policy differences among different groups may be insuffi cient to bring about a viable peace”. According to the statistical analysis by Fearon (2003) civil war is not caused by ethnic rivalry, but it refl ects the success of rural guerrilla warfare in weak states and is predicted by low per capita income, large populations, recent independence, mountainous terrain, oil production and recent changes in the level of democracy. In an even more impressive publication in American Sociological Review Wimmer, Cederman & Min (2009) defi nitely proved that exclusion is one of the most important causes of civil war, whilst rejecting the popular hypothesis that new wars are fuelled by ethnic strife. Ethnically diverse na-tions do not have more confl icts than ethnically homogeneous nations, but “it will result into fi ghting when one group of people excludes the other from political power”. In Afghanistan all the causal factors, save oil production, are responsible for caus-ing turmoil. The notion not to attribute internal confl ict to ethnic diversity is an eye open-er because in order to reconstruct a working civil society in Afghanistan all ethnic groups should be included in the process of state building. Especially the Pashtun, the ethnic group that harbours the Taleban movement and was in the past (and to some extent still is) affi liated with Al-Qaida, will have to be included in the state building process. To exclude certain ethnic groups, especially if they are large and political key players, would be disastrous.

(166) In Essential Science Citations – special topics James Fearon answered questions about his “fast breaking paper in the fi eld of Social Sciences”, October 2004; in www.esi-topics.com/fbp/2004/october04-JamesFearon.html; accessed 7 January 2007.

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Operations therefore are fought not only with traditional weaponry, but with understand-ing and empathy as weapons. According to the retired United States [US] general Robert Scales (2006) future confl icts

“will cause a shift in classical centers of gravity from the will of governments and armies to the perceptions of populations. Victory will be defi ned more in terms of capturing the psycho-cultural rather than the geographical high ground. Understanding and empathy will be impor-tant weapons of war. Soldier conduct will be as important as skill at arms. Culture awareness and the ability to build ties of trust will offer protection to our troops more effectively than body armor”.

Also the Dutch senior offi cers Vermeij and Soldaat (2007: 65) defi ned the Centre of Grav-ity of the operations in Afghanistan as “acquiring the trust of the Afghan population”. By using the term “centre of gravity” the colonel and lieutenant colonel, who returned from their Afghan mission in October 2006, declared the hearts and minds operation as the key success factor in reaching the military, political and societal objectives. The assign-ment “assisting the Government of Afghanistan in building its capacity, authority and infl uence by prioritising and synchronising reconstruction and development programs with security operations, with full engagement of the Afghan National Security Forces, in order to set the conditions for a secure and stable Afghanistan” (Vermeij and Soldaat, 2007: 63) can only be realised by winning the support of the local population. Reconstruction is the key word in modern confl ict resolution theory (Ramsbotham, et al, 2005) and this type of confl ict resolution is even coined “fourth generation” to distinguish it from approaches from the past. Scholars (e.g. Junne en Verkoren, 2005) agree that reconstruction starts with providing security, followed by public order manage-ment, national and local governance and building state institutions, justice, economic reconstruction and reconciliation of rivalling parties, but there is little consensus on the instruments by which reconstruction can be brought about. Foreign military intervention is important in providing security as its main task, but by what means can security be implemented whilst gaining or retaining legitimacy in the eyes of the local population. Using coercion to forcefully implement security could easily frighten the population into the arms of warlords or, in casu Afghanistan, the Taleban. The opposite effect of the ob-jectives is the result of using too much force and of losing legitimacy amongst the local population. The Netherlands’ philosophy of winning the hearts and minds of the local popula-tion and thus contributing to security is termed the “Dutch Approach”. In contrast to the repellent instrument of forceful coercion this approach refrains from using an excess of violence; it is meant to display full professional military capacities whilst only using force in the last resort. It is meant to win over hearts and minds by reconstructing the society,

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by method of “smile and wave”, and by enabling local authorities to take over public order issues themselves. Using a minimum of force in order to gain trust is risky to the Dutch soldiers themselves for they are often more exposed to danger than they would be otherwise. They do not wear mirror sun glasses in order not to remind the Afghan population of the Russians, they prefer to patrol on foot if possible, wear the minimum of protective clothing and when driving the soldiers use open roofed vehicles or lightly armoured cars that allow the soldiers to show themselves. The Canadian newspaper Globe and Mail stated:

“The Canadians and Americans establish forward operating bases in unstable areas, often building them into fortresses of giant sandbags and razor wire, and using them as a launch-ing point for operations. The Dutch prefer to build mud-walled compounds they call “multi-functional qalas”, using the Pashto name for house, designed with a traditional-style guest room for visitors”. (Smith, 2006)

The British newspaper The Times states that the Dutch “aim to beat Taleban by invit-ing them round to tea” and the “Military H[ead] Q[uarter] is run as open house” (Page, 2007). In contrast to the British who hide in fortresses, the Dutch are building clay huts in which they receive Afghan guest and host them with tea, nuts and dried fruits. A quote from the news clipping:

“You don’t want it to look like a fortress — there has to be a balance between accessibility and defensibility”, Colonel Vleugels [the commander of the Dutch Task Force Uruzgan] said. “You have to be among the people to infl uence them. By offering them help and work, they can make a choice. If they then decide to fi ght, we’ll fi ght back, but that should be a last resort”.

This “Dutch Approach” meets criticism, amongst others from British and Canadian167 troops who have lost many soldiers already and who would approve of a more martial approach, whereas the lucky Dutch so far have suffered only a few deaths (one suicide, one casualty of fi re) and some heavyly wounded and therefore do not see any reason to change their approach. In fact this “Dutch Approach” is in line with what the Dutch were training for. In preparation of the deployment the troops switched to an experimen-tal and relatively extensive cultural awareness168 training programme (Gooren, 2006; Ooink, 2006; 2008). The effectiveness of the “Dutch Approach” remains to be seen.

(167) The canadian commander brigadier Fraser denies there being a Dutch Approach in fi ghting the Taleban. Not having mortal casualties in Uruzgan is because the Dutch have not penetrated the areas under control of the Taleban. (Boogaard, 2007). (168) For an overview of mostly American sources regarding cultural awareness see Diana Simpson (2007).

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Besides the question regarding the effectiveness of the ”Dutch Approach”, there are many more open-ended questions. In fact, this article will not conclude by answering questions; it will conclude by raising questions. First of all the genesis of the “Dutch Approach” will be discussed. To better un-derstand the differences with other national military styles of nation building and recon-struction the historical roots of the “Dutch Approach” must be excavated. After digging for historical roots, international comparisons are in place in order to shed light on dif-ferences in styles of nation building. More specifi cally the national styles of “occupation” will be studied. Next, the challenging case of the Dutch mission in Uruzgan, a province in South Afghanistan, is discussed. In Uruzgan the “Dutch Approach” is put to test. The Dutch military in Uruzgan face the most diffi cult task they have been assigned to since the mid-1990’s. The shared national consensus is that the Dutch have been given a second chance after the humanitarian disaster of Srebrenica in 1995. Therefore the mission draws extraordinary attention from the media. There is a lot at stake for both the Armed Forces and the society at large who wish to eradicate feelings of collective guilt. The question is not whether the Dutch face an enemy in Uruzgan. The questions instead are “is there an enemy?” and “is the population benevolent towards foreign interven-tion?”. Another essential question deals with security issues. Can the Dutch provide secu-rity to the local population and can the Taleban be separated from the local population? More pregnant questions relate to the topic of reconstruction such as “can the Dutch offer economic alternatives for the ‘poppy’ culture’?” and “what strategy is most effec-tive to implement forms of local governance?” All these questions cannot be answered fully because reconstruction in Afghanistan is an ongoing process. All that can be done is to give tentative answers and raise questions that will hopefully make people refl ect on the policies they develop for reconstruction and for nation building in Afghanistan. Before dealing with all the above questions, a word on method is in order.

Method The method used differs from most studies in confl ict resolution. Neither survey nor qualitative methods like interviewing are applicable because of the ongoing character of the reconstruction process. The “theatre of operations” is not easily accessible and the risk for civilian researchers is deemed too high for the Dutch authorities. The fi eld of study is closed except for embedded journalists. Yet, the openness is high regarding the military character of the tasks. The embedded journalists are hardly censored, only op-erationally relevant information that could threaten the security of the troops is fi ltered out. Interviews with soldiers in general demonstrate a surprising candour and the media are well informed and critical. The Dutch Armed Forces are co-operative regarding the

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media because they know that public support is crucial for the success of these kind of operations, even when there is bad news to report (such as casualties). The media provides the main source of information for the study presented here. The data can be checked by other scholars because the references and/or internet sites are given whenever possible, and the data given on the internet will probably be acces-sible for quite a long time. Embedded journalism is known to be biased (Moskos, 2000) and these sources should therefore not be taken for granted. An exceptional example of biased journalism is provided by the otherwise very professional journalist Vic Franke who, after exhausting the battery of his camera, decided to help out the soldiers who where under fi re by emptying a Diemaco at the Taleban.169 This clearly was not standard procedure! Because of the possibly biased character of the information provided by embedded journalists, the sources are weighed against independent sources. Some independent journalists, but not that many, do manage to gather news by venturing into Uruzgan solely protected by hired bodyguards.

Genesis and spread of the term “Dutch Approach”The term “Dutch Approach” is not reserved for the military domain. There is a “Dutch Approach” to almost anything including the internationally renowned cannabis policies of the Netherlands. But the approach relevant to military operations fi nds its roots in the tradition of community policing introduced in the 1960’s after a decade of repressive police operations in the 1950’s. Police practices were introduced in the military fi eld in 1977 during a Molucan hostage taking action (Roelofs, 2000). 45 train passengers were held hostage in a train at “De Punt”, forcing the authorities to a policy of “talking them down and out”. The plan was to talk until the Molucans would surrender. The policy failed because in the end the military were ordered to intervene, causing the death of six out of the nine Molucans and two train passengers. However, foreign commentaries praised the method in use, which then was termed “The Dutch Approach”. The Dutch used force in the end but saved the lives of most hostages by patiently talking and buy-ing time. In contrast to the Russian Approach in the 2002 Moscow Nord-Ost Theatre siege and the 2004 Beslan siege resulting in 118 and 330 civilian deaths, respectively, the “Dutch Approach” to hostage taking is both effective and hostage friendly. But nowa-days there is nothing specifi cally Dutch about this approach because it has become standard operating procedure in policing literature (Fuselier, 1991). During the cold war the “Dutch Approach” was never used again by the military. The advent of peace support and enforcing operations changed matters. During the op-erations in Iraq a Dutch commander, Lt. Col. Richard Oppelaar, drew international media

(169) NRC Handelsblad (15 November 2006). The incident happened on 11 October 2006..

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attention by putting forward the concept of the Dutch “softly, softly” Approach (Blanford, 2003). Quotes from this interview explain the “Dutch Approach” more clearly:

“I expect a professional conduct during all our operations and activitities, during which the population should be approached in a friendly and respectful manner. … it is important to win (and keep) the hearts and minds of the local population and their leaders ... It’s all about respect. Respect for the locals and other cultures and their values, …If you don’t grab the culture, you won’t grab the problem”.

When Moelker and Van Horssen (2004) interviewed Oppelaar upon his return from de-ployment it struck them that the commander operated more like a diplomat talking to local authorities, that is, the sheikhs, assisting at local elections, doing civil-military work, reconstruction projects (roads), training local policemen, etc. One of Oppelaar’s successors Lt. Col Kees Matthijssen elaborated upon the best practices in Iraq and made it into the New York Times (2004), comparing the “Dutch Approach” to the approach used by the USA.

“Part neighborhood police offi cers, part social workers, the soldiers managed to practice in Iraq what the Netherlands has come to call the Dutch approach to patrolling. … Instead of ar-mored vehicles, the Dutch drive vehicles that leave them exposed to the people around them. To encourage interaction with residents, they go bare-headed and are forbidden to wear mir-ror sunglasses. Making soldiers accessible and vulnerable to their surroundings increases their security, they contend. … Lieutenant Colonel Kees Matthijssen, the commander of the Dutch force in Iraq, said he could not say whether the Dutch approach would be feasible in a place like Baghdad. ‘On the other hand, it might have helped,’ he said. ‘Everybody is aware of how the Iraqi population is looking at the Americans now. They are happy that the Americans liberated them from Saddam Hussein, but I wonder if the population is still happy with what the Americans are doing now’”.

The Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Ben Bot more or less declared the “Dutch Ap-proach” to be the offi cial policy in a speech before parliament on 7 April 2006. Maybe even more importantly he defi ned the “Dutch Approach” more narrowly and brought it down to a specifi c trinity of politics, security and development. In Uruzgan, too, so he explained, “we will endeavour to preserve the trinity in our approach” (Bot, 2006). It is politically signifi cant that not only the Minister of Foreign Affairs supports this policy but also the Minister of Development and the Minister of Defense. The three power ministries that steer the actions of the Armed Forces even succeeded in translating the “Dutch Approach” into a policy that both the man in the street and the soldier in the foxhole could understand: The 3D approach. When the Netherlands took over Regional Command/South from Canada, the three ministers declared to parliament that they

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wanted to strengthen the 3D approach, meaning Defense, Diplomacy and Development. (Bot, Kamp, Van Ardenne-Van der Hoeven, 2006: 3). Regarding Uruzgan stey stated that:

“From the description of the social-economic, security, political, ethnic and cultural context above, a number of priorities are clear. These are ordered following the three ‘D’- dimensions of the ISAF mandate for the province: defense (security), democracy (governance)170 and de-velopment (reconstruction)”. (Bot, Kamp, Van Ardenne-Van der Hoeven, 2006: 41)

Robert Gooren (2006) managed to catch the attention of the American military estab-lishment by publishing his views on the “Dutch Approach” in Military Review. The point Gooren is making refers to pre-deployment training in cultural awareness. This kind of training indeed is fundamental to training for reconstruction missions because it is all about respecting and understanding the cultures of the people that soldiers will encoun-ter. The US military is well enough informed about this topic (Simpson, 2007), and have already changed their training methods accordingly. But strangely, internationally the Dutch promote cultural awareness training as something different, something special, a typical “Dutch Approach”. It is as if the Dutch are inventing a new tradition in reconstruc-tion approaches (Hobsbawn and Ranger 1983).

International Comparisons: nothing “Dutch” about the “Dutch Approach”But nothing is really new. When one googles for the 3D approach or the words “de-fence, diplomacy and development” one easily fi nds Canadian and US policies. The trin-ity of the “Dutch Approach” is probably a cornerstone of the foreign policy of many more states. Much depends on how policies are put into practice. We should therefore look at the phenomena of reconstruction, assistance to governments and nation building from a historical point of view. Cor Lammers (2005) wrote an interesting book entitled ”Vreemde Overheersing”171 [Foreign Rule] on differences in national styles of occupation and even though this concerns a contribution to historical sociology, the relevance for today’s reconstruction missions is baffl ing. Especially concerning the occupational style of the USA, the comparison is most interesting (Lammers, 2010). Lammers’ theory in a nutshell comes down to the interplay of concepts like “oc-cupation”, “coercion”, “legitimacy”, “rewards”, and “indigenous versus loyal elites”. Oc-cupations always involve the use of force or coercion, but force is to be used sparingly because it affects legitimacy negatively and consequently occupations will – varying to the degree of force used – always provoke resistance. Occupations cannot do without

(170) Sic: The D for Diplomacy has been replaced here by Democracy (governance). (171) English speaking readers are referred to Lammers (2003).

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legitimacy and rewards. Sometimes the reward is simply the fact that an occupant can bring rest to a war torn society. It may even take centuries, but the foreign occupiers will eventually be swept out of the country. The success of occupations therefore depends on how the occupant wheels and deals with elites in the occupied society. This was true of colonial times, just as much as it is true of modern times. There are never enough troops, civil servants, merchants and so on to occupy regions another country as the British and the Dutch found out in countries as vast as India or Indonesia. Therefore elites must be used, but there are different sorts of elites and they differ in willingness to cooperate as well as in legitimacy. Indigenous elites are legitimised from below; they enjoy the trust of the people. Loyal (preferred groups by the occupant like the Dutch half-breed segment of the population) elites are legitimised from above, by the occupy-ing power. Whichever elite is used, in the end they will lose legitimacy and they will have to choose sides between the forces that propagate independence and those who favour the occupant (who will eventually be the losing side). The French have mostly resorted to a style of direct rule when occupying a foreign country. It is an imperial style of occupation that only worked reasonably when they succeeded in turning the occupied country into a province of the French Empire. With this direct style of rule comes a centralist style of governance. To exaggerate a bit: Most things are decided in Paris. A large bureaucratic apparatus is needed to govern territo-ries in this manner, making human interaction rigid and coagulating all change. The German style of occupation during World War II [WWII] in Western Europe depended much on creating loyal elites, like the Vichy Regime in France or the Dutch NSB-party (National Socialist Movement: a Nazi sympathetic Dutch party) in the Nether-lands. These collaborating elites enjoyed little popularity and ”collaboration” was seen as a “dirty word”, but Lammers comes to a reappraisal. Yes, these elites may have col-laborated, but in doing so they kept their own societies from a greater harm, such as the one that befell the East European countries. The sociological point is that as these loyal elites are not legitimated from below, the population will be tempted not to play by the occupant’s rules. And when the population breaks the rules, the instrument of coercion will be used (Lammers, 2005: 322). The occupant feels it has no other choice. Legitimacy will spiral down as a consequence, making resistance an even more attrac-tive option, the more when the occupant cannot use rewards to regain legitimacy. Although Lammers’ analysis of the German style of occupation is only applied to times long past, it is interesting because of its resemblance with the present day American style of occupation (Lammers, 2010). The style “play along with our rules and we will treat you decently” seems to apply to post-war Iraq and other examples of US oc-cupation. The difference is that the USA does not really want to be an occupying power. It wants other nations to comply with its will, but it never wants to stay and become a

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territorial occupant. Even in the case of the Philippines the USA were reluctant occu-pants. The USA never wanted colonies and it does not need colonies to be an economic and military superpower. When forced the USA will invent Civil Affairs units like they did during WWII, but they never wholeheartedly embraced the instruments of occupa-tion because it meant getting entangled in public order management and dealings with civilian authorities. To quote General Dwight Eisenhower “The sooner I can get rid of all these questions that are outside the military scope the happier I will be!” (in Brocades Zaalberg: 2005: 11) The British and Dutch styles of occupation look very much alike and stem from co-lonial times. India and the East Indies (Indonesia) could not be governed by direct rule in French occupational style. The territories were too large, the populations too diverse and the distance from the mother country too far. The British and the Dutch had to govern by indirect rule making use of loyal and indigenous elites. The British and Dutch also had to use coercion but they succeeded at the same time to offer rewards to the indigenous elites (who as a result became loyal) and to gain legitimacy. In the end resistance to the occupancy grew, indigenous elites lost their legitimacy from below the more they were legitimised from above, rewards were no longer suffi cient to buy compliance and the battle for independence forced the old colonisers to retreat. In an interview Lammers (2006) pointed at a contemporary example of operations in Afghanistan where the Dutch also try to establish good relations with the indigenous population. The method that is used is called “Smile and Wave” (Jongbloed, 2003). Soldiers posted in Kabul are supposed to be friendly, polite and show as little aggres-sion as possible. The method is incorporated in a pre-deployment training with role play-ers. However, in 2003 the soldiers were not yet trained to be culturally sensitive which was demonstrated in the documentary by Jongbloed showing footage of a soldier giving porn movies to one of the interpreters. Nowadays, from the beginning in pre-deployment training as well as later on, the emphasis is on respect for the culture and religion. Knowledge of local habits and training of how to behave respectfully, for example at road blocks, makes part of the training (Schwerzel, 2005; Gooren, 2006; Ooink, 2006; Bosman et al, 2007; McFarland, 2005). To summarise the lessons learned from Lammers that are relevant for present day nation building and reconstruction missions: Occupational regimes are inherently instable; they are dependent on indigenous elites in which case less use of force will be necessary; collaboration with local indigenous elites, even when they are former Tale-ban, is a precondition for success; meaning that governance must be supplied by the indigenous population itself (if possible). Benevolent occupations, that is, occupations for the better good of the war struck country, need to be temporary affairs otherwise they will lose legitimacy and occupants will resort to force.

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The “Dutch Approach” is rooted in colonial history. Another piece of colonial history which the Dutch share with the British is the approach towards counter insurgency. The British experience in Malaya provided the basics of a counter insurgency doctrine; a doctrine that is also adopted by the Dutch in their “doctrine for irregular adversaries”. The British general name Thompson (1966) formulated fi ve principles as preconditions for success:

1) Find a political solution2) Act in accordance with the law and use minimal force3) Fight the cause of the insurgency4) Separate the fi sh from the water/offer safety to population5) Support the government

The British Approach in Malaya should not be glorifi ed for it often was harsh and bru-tal. To illustrate, it required that Chinese squatters be forcefully resettled in order to separate them from the communist insurgents. But after 12 years of hearts and minds campaigns (1948-60) and the combined effort of 300,000 soldiers, the outcome was positive. The basic needs of the Chinese squatters were met by giving them land in possession, creating decent living conditions and citizenship. Insurgents were offered the opportunity to be rehabilitated. A committee system was implemented in the new villages where the efforts of military, police and civil institutions were be coordinated. The political solution offered was independence for Malaya. Thomas Mockaitis (2003) effectively argues that the principles derived from the Malayan experience apply also to the present war against terrorism in general:

“Unfortunately, then as now the formula for defeating insurgents is far easier to state than to apply. Intelligence remains the key to victory. … Defeating insurgents/terrorists consists very largely in fi nding them.172 Garnering accurate and timely information requires winning the trust of the general population who support the insurgents, tacitly or actively. Trust and cooperation depend in turn on recognizing and as far as possible addressing the real needs and addressing the legitimate grievances on which the insurgency feeds. Good intelligence allows the security forces (military, paramilitary, and police) to use force against the terrorists in a limited and fo-cused manner so as not to further alienate the general population.173 This strategy has gener-ally been described as ‘winning hearts and minds’. A hearts-and-minds strategy is as essential to defeating Al Qaeda today as it was to routing Communist guerrillas in Malaya fi fty years ago”.

(172) Frank Kitson, Low-Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping (London: Faber and Faber 1971), p. 65.(173) See Thomas R. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency, 1919-60 (London: Macmillan 1990) for a detailed discussion of this approach.

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The counter insurgency approach formulated by the British resembles the “Dutch Ap-proach” from colonial time, but also it resembles the present day approach as it is in-tended, which leads to the question “is the Dutch approach effective in Afghanistan?”.

The “Dutch Approach” put into practice: The challenging case of UruzganReconstructing Afghanistan is estimated to take 25 years. Whether or not this enter-prise will be successful depends on the way in which the intervening states deal with countervailing forces; are they treated as an enemy or as a potential ally? It also de-pends on whether Western troops can contribute to security and whether economic reconstruction can provide an alternative to the drug economy, weapons trade etc. The last question relates to governance and the question whether political solutions can be found. The fi ve Thomson principles are hard to implement. The “Dutch Approach” im-plies the use of a minimum of force but even the Dutch could be cornered and forced to fi ght. The use of force must at all times be legitimate and lawful. But mistakes happen, collateral damage is always a possibility and even when force is de jure lawful, it need not be perceived as legitimate by the population. The other principles are even more problematic which we will see when dealing with the questions below.

Is there an enemy out there? Afghanistan of course has experienced occupation by the Soviets and is therefore not fond of foreign intervention. The province of Uruzgan, where the population consists of a Taleban friendly Pastun population, is particularly anti-modernist and while there may not be strong anti-Western feelings174 there is also no experience with the Western way of life and people are content to be left to their own. Moreover, Uruzgan is a developing region at risk of being dependent on donors. It is only natural that the population is not benevolent regarding Dutch soldiers. Legitimacy will depend on whether the reconstruc-tion mission is successful and the Dutch are fully aware of this critical fail or success factor. In gaining trust the soldiers will have to overcome the local population’s natural feelings of distrust and scepticism. One local, interviewed shortly before the arrival of the soldiers, was asked what he though about the possible contribution of the Dutch military. He answered that “we do not hold the foreign soldiers in high esteem” and he smiled sceptically to the journalist. The smile said more than his words (Kleijn and Wijnans, 2006). In 2008 a Dutch journalist asked a young boy whether he could “see differences between Dutch and American soldiers”. As honest as only children can be, the boy frankly answered “No”. The journalist, convinced of the superiority of the Dutch

(174) There are strong anti-USA and anti-UK feelings, but those feelings do not necessarily include antagonistic feelings towards other Western states.

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Approach, almost desperately continued his line of questioning and asked whether the boy “liked the Dutch soldiers better than the Americans?”. “They just kicked in our door” the boy answered, shattering the journalist’s culturally biased prejudices (Nova/NPS, 2008). Yet, the “Smile and Wave” attitude does pay off. The population does not perceive the Dutch as the enemy, nor as an occupant. Neither does the population perceive some kind of eagerness for fi ghting in the Dutch and they are more or less surprised at that and ask themselves “why won’t the Dutch fi ght?”. The Dutch are considered culturally sensitive. The population knows that the Dutch objective concerns reconstruction:

“Local perception of the Dutch in areas where the Netherlands has a presence (either per-manent, in the case of Deh Rawud and Chora, or through development projects in the case of Khas Uruzgan) was generally positive. Overall, people feel that the Dutch presence has resulted in increased security and development, with locals understanding the link between the two”. (The Liaison Offi ce, 2009: 29)

The local population is not the enemy either. The war against terrorism by the USA was initially directed at Al-Qaeda and indirectly at bringing down all those that offered ref-uge to Al-Qaeda, such as the Taleban government of Afghanistan. But the Taleban are predominantly Pashtun and the Pashtun make up 44 per cent of the Afghan popula-tion. In the South the Pashtun are the dominant ethnic group. In Uruzgan the majority is Pashtun (57,5 per cent Zirrak Durrani, 18,5 per cent Panjpai Durrani, Ghilzai 9 per cent, 6 per cent other Pashtun, 8 per cent Hazarra, 1 per cent other) (The Liason Offi ce, 2009: 5). The present governor of Uruzgan, Asadaulla Hamdan, is a Pasthun. The roots of the Taleban lie in this province as it is the place of birth of Mullah Omar. It is the place where the Taleban originate. All this makes it extremely diffi cult to distinguish the local population from the Taleban. Is the image of the “enemy” correct if it is so diffi cult, if not even impossible, to distinguish the population from the Taleban? Is it correct to use the concept of “enemy” in a situation where winning a war is not the objective, but reconstruction is? Should not the Taleban be convinced that Western troops are there only for reconstruction and not for occupation and that they do not have the intention to stay forever and be a colonial power? The population does think that the Dutch will indeed leave (as is staged to hap-pen in 2010), but that does not mean that they trust the Dutch more than the Taleban. The continuity factor is one of the reasons why the population cannot afford to let the Taleban down, for the people know that the Taleban is there to stay and the “smiling” Dutch will “wave” goodbye.

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Can you offer security, can we separate Taleban from the population, and can one beat the Taleban?If we are not sure that the Taleban is the enemy, the more uncertain even is the question whether the Taleban can be defeated. If they are one with the population, it will be dif-fi cult to separate the Taleban from the population as counter-insurgency theory dictates. Even the question “how many are the Taleban” cannot be answered with certainty. In 2006 estimates by government offi cials showed either blatant ignorance or a deliberate attempt at misinforming the Dutch electorate. Foreign Affairs Minister Ben Bot told the Dutch on television that there were no more than 200 Taleban fi ghters in the province of Uruzgan. In the same footage by Schaap et al. (2006) Afghan members of parliament estimated there to be 1,500 fi ghters. Another expert mentioned several tens of thou-sands. Acknowledged counter-insurgency expert David Kilcullen (2009: 48-49) gauges the number of insurgents in 2008 to be between 35,000 and 40,000. 8,000 - 10,000 (400-500 per province) are full-time fi ghters and the others are part-time fi ghters or “accidental guerrillas” who join the fi ghting out of sympathy for the Taleban or simply because they have no other fun pastime to engage in. Maybe 4,000 are hard core Tale-ban that cannot be convinced but the others might be open to persuasion, negotiation and dialogue. According to The Liaison Offi ce (2009) security in the province of Uruzgan has in-creased, especially in the regions that are controlled by the Dutch (Tirin Kot, Deh Rawud & Chora). And security is organised according to the inkblot method by which the Dutch strive to increase their infl uence; the larger the inkblot, the larger the terrain where the Afghan National Army, the Afghan National Police and the Dutch can provide security. But unfortunately the inkblot of the Taleban seems to be larger and some estimate that the insurgents control 60 per cent of the province.

“The Taliban currently control about 60 per cent of Uruzgan province, particularly in the ru-ral areas, whereas the government has some control in the cities. Extortion and roadside violence make transportation throughout the province very diffi cult. Most non-governmental organizations do not venture into any of the districts on account of the security situation. Shahid-I Hassas district in the west and Khas Uruzgan district in the east are the most trou-blesome areas in the province. In Shahid-I Hassas, the terrain is hilly and the population sparse, making is an ideal spot for the Quetta Shura Taliban to hide. Additionally, the Hazaras and the Kuchi nomads in the area also engage in confl ict over land. Khas Uruzgan district has been a traditional Taliban stronghold and has experienced anti-coalition attacks and regroup-ing of insurgents”. (Institute for the Study of War, 2009)

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The Dutch government says that 70 per cent of the population lives in the area that is Dutch controlled. The Liaison Offi ces (2009) doubts this percentage and mentions a more modest 50 per cent. In the end military solutions will not prevail. Afghan National Army and Police [ANA/ANP] troops are trained, their number is growing (ANA from approximately 600 in 2006 to approximately 2000 in 2009; ANP estimated force is between 800 and 1800), but this increase will not be suffi cient to beat the Taleban militarily be it because of incompetence (Afghan troops are known to fi ght the Taleban when they are stoned and drugged; Anderson, 2008), bad equipment or corruption: “Underlying the corruption is the simple fact that ANP are still not receiving regular wages; as one police offi cer in Chora put it bluntly: ‘For the past fi ve months I haven’t been paid. I’ve got to demand bribes. I have no other source of income’”. (The Liaison Offi ce, 2009: 20). The ANP is more prone to corruption because it has tribal roots. The ANA is not tribal, therefore they are more neutral in confl ict resolution and less tempted to accept bribes. Many troops only exist on paper and never show up (offi cially 1,657 policemen are on the pay roll). The only chance of beating the Taleban lies in economic development and good govern-ance. Can we offer economic alternatives?Uruzgan in particular is mountainous, dry, underdeveloped and therefore poor, cling-ing to traditional forms of clan security and clan ties and is the last place in Afghani-stan where modernity will be accepted. The independent journalist Karskens (2006) criticised the Dutch government’s use of the term “reconstruction” because in Uruzgan there is nothing to reconstruct. The journalist referred to the image of Uruzgan still living in medieval times where robber bands and warlords hold sway. This image is partly true, as Uruzgan clearly has a long way to go, but it is also partly exaggerated. Uruzgan is not some medieval anachronism, but it is a war torn so-ciety with tremendous problems. Problems can be solved by wise policies on economic reconstruction and governance. Development will not happen overnight, but the situa-tion is far from desperate. Equally important, attempts at development will have to be perceived as sincere. The journalist and consultant Christof Hörstel worked 20 years among the Pashtun in southern Afghanistan and he remarks: “When the mission is predominantly military in character, or the Taleban see the development projects as a cover up for violence, than they will accept none of the projects. They will destroy them and sabotage those projects. You can build a school on the one side of the village whilst at the other side another school is blown to shreds” (Schaap et al, 2006). But there are many projects and many interesting initiatives that do demonstrate a sincere commitment and a benevolent intent. For example, Dick Scherjon (2009), a

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banking director and a colonel of the reserve troops, initiated the Integrated Develop-ment of Entrepreneurial Activities [IDEA]. Being a banker of one of the Netherlands’ most established fi nancial institutions, he knows how the economy works and that it is built around trust. Without trust, you get an imploding banking system, causing crisis, resulting in confl ict. With peace, governance and trust, you get development. Small en-terprises will seize opportunities and fuel the economy. Scherjon used his network of reserve offi cers, who all of them have – since their time as conscripts – become big in private enterprise. The reserve offi cers are called upon to help, inform and teach small Afghan entrepreneurs in their attempts to establish their businesses. It is safe for these businessmen to assist in Afghanistan because they are uniformed and protected by the army; they are all offi cers of the reserves. It is not so much with money that these reservists support the Afghan entrepreneurs, but by teaching in a course, giving advice, distributing knowledge and by networking. 170 Afghans entered a course on account-ing, personnel management and coaching. It is interesting that this initiative stimulates ownership; it is not NGOs or development workers who take the lead, but the Afghan entrepreneurs are themselves responsible for the economic development. They have an interest in doing business. For the military the initiative is important as well. When they go out on a social patrol they talk to the local inhabitants and offer them the possibility to enter this course and to improve their businesses by profi ting from the experience of the Dutch reservists-businessmen. In Bosnia the IDEA network helped 400 businesses getting started. Now the network tries to do the same in Afghanistan. Opportunities for agriculture in Uruzgan are ample. Rivers can supply water for ir-rigation. The irrigation channels are already there, but need to be repaired after the mis-hap from past confl icts. Most crops are perennial and take two years to harvest. Almond trees take fi ve years to harvest. The Dutch also have contributed to seed improvement. Hard-line Taleban commanders who wanted to sabotage the program sometimes hin-dered distribution of improved seeds. Achievements are yet too small to be visible, but farmers have high expectations. The German Gesellschaft für Technische Zussamen-arbeit distributed 760,000 fruit trees. Other NGOs planted 280,000 trees. Some 280 farmers successfully planted and harvested saffron (The Liaison Offi ce, 2009: 15). Whether these promising initiatives suffi ce as alternatives for poppy cultivation remains to be seen. World prices for opium are falling and the stockpile of opium is such that it is larger than the world demand. Uruzgan does not produce nearly as much opium as Kandahar or Helmand, but the 9,703 ha under cultivation is not negligible. Considering the fact that a large territory is fi rmly under the control of the Taleban, it will be diffi cult to diminish poppy cultivation. The vicious circle of drug profi t paying for the insurgents’ need for weapons will have to be broken.

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“Eighty four per cent of the opium cultivated in 2009 was concentrated in Hilmand, Kanda-har, Uruzgan, Day Kundi, and Zabul provinces of the Southern region. These are the most insecure provinces where security conditions are classifi ed as high or extreme risk by the United Nations Department of Safety and Security. Most of the districts in this region were not accessible to the U[nited] N[ations] and NGOs”. (United Nations Offi ce on Drugs and Crime, 2009)

How to (re)construct governanceImproving good governance will be one of the challenges for the future. Power is un-equally distributed amongst tribes, giving rise to envy and possible friction. Government offi cials and ANP are renowned for corruption. Widespread illiteracy amongst offi cials makes effective administration even harder. The judicial system is underdeveloped and understaffed and often the judicial system that is run by the Taleban is preferred over the offi cial government system. In Taleban controlled areas the monopolies of violence and taxation is in the hands of the insurgents.

“The insurgency has an established and recognized government in every district except Deh Rawud. In the Pashtun areas of Gizab, insurgents rule uncontested, while in other districts they operate parallel to the [Government of Afghanistan]. Taliban Islamic courts are often the preferred means of solving disputes among the people because they are seen as less costly, less corrupt, and more accessible than the formal justice system (which in many cases has no presence)”. (The Liaison Offi ce, 2009: 22) Returning to the argument of Cor Lammers (2005; 2010) above, a different approach to governance seems desirable. Not exclusion, but inclusion and cooptation should be the preferred strategies. Exclusion would, as argued in the study by Wimmer, Cederman & Min (2009), only lead to violence. The Taleban should not be coerced into crime, be-cause that is the vicious circle they are forced into now, but they should be included in government and governance. It will be diffi cult to convince Taleban commanders to give up their lucrative positions as warlords and to enter the less profi table political arena. But the strategy should be directed at creating indigenous elites that are loyal to the central authorities in Kabul, and the only way to achieve this strategy is give people an interest in local government and in the state. After visiting Afghanistan in 2006, Republican Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist proposed that the Bush administration should consider bringing the Taleban back into the power equation in Kabul.

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“You need to bring them (Taliban) into a more transparent type of government …Approaching counterinsurgency by winning hearts and minds will ultimately be the answer. Military versus insurgency one-to-one doesn’t sound like it can be won. It sounds to me... that the Taliban is everywhere”. (Krane, 2006) Frist was criticised by Democrats and Republicans for suggesting to welcome Taleban member into a coalition government “as if 9/11 had never happened”. But if the Tale-ban really cannot be beaten, one can wait till the movement dissolves like many social movements do. Or, one can recognize that the Taleban has more time on its hand than Western intervenients do, who impatiently expect reconstruction to happen overnight, with minimum costs and with minimum loss of the lives of Western soldiers. The last three assumptions are not happening. Reconstruction takes time, money and lives and the Western coalition is running out of time and out of public support.

Going Dutch or going native? A preliminary evaluationThe Liaison Offi ce is positive in its overall evaluation of the progress that has been established in Uruzgan. And one of the success factors could very well be the “Dutch Approach” to this mission: “Despite initial scepticism from larger NATO powers when the Dutch took command of Uruzgan in August 2006, the troubled Province is now widely seen as one of the only positive developments in Afghanistan’s increasingly insecure South” (The Liaison Organisation: 2009: 2). Even the USA, once skeptical of the Nether-lands-led mission, is now considering the integrated “whole of government” approach, that is, combining military might with development as followed by the Dutch in Uruzgan, worth replicating.

“Dutch soldiers and civilians have done excellent work,” Mrs. Clinton said (spring 2009) after meeting her Dutch counterpart, Maxime Verhagen, in Washington. “In fact, the Dutch ‘3D’ approach - defense, diplomacy, and development pursued simultaneously ... is a model for our own efforts and the future efforts in Afghanistan.” … “Over time, there’s been a focus on pure development” in the Dutch forces, said Col. Gert-Jan Kooij, chief of operations for the Royal Netherlands Army’s 13th Mechanized Brigade, which is deployed in Uruzgan. “We need to provide defense, but the priority is on development and diplomacy”. (Solomon, 2009)

The Dutch Approach is not something new, because it has roots in colonial strategies of dealing with indigenous people. It does seem to fi t the Dutch culture easily as the Dutch have the habit of talking until the adversary surrenders (for example during hostage negotiations). And the Dutch Approach does seem appropriate in the circumstances of Afghanistan where there is not really an enemy, but only the population … a population that by majority is Pasthun and therefore in part sympathising with the Taleban.

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“Going Dutch” is a good approach if this means “going native” at the same time. As it is impossible to beat the Taleban militarily (that would be the same as war on the popula-tion) counter-insurgency approaches are bound to fail. Hearts and minds can only be won by co-opting the Taleban and giving the Taleban its place in the power equation. The Taleban does have the moral legitimacy that Western intervenients lack. This is not a plea for bringing fundamentalists to power so that they can establish a theocracy. The discussion of power sharing should be open only for moderate politicians who do acknowledge other people’s right to be different and yet live in the same state. Counter-insurgency theory dictates that a political solution be found. Improving economic devel-opment and government is helpful, but political solutions are not yet in sight because the Western coalition is too much focused on combating terrorism in a kinetic way, whilst they should instigate a political dialogue between all stakeholders.

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ReferencesAnderson, Ben, Inside Afghanistan - Fighting Alongside Stoned Afghan Soldiers (2008); in www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kc8w0IX4UQc; accessed 1 November 2009

Blanford, Nicholas, “Dutch take a ‘slowly’ tack in Iraq”, The Christian Science Monitor (19 December 2003); in www.csmonitor.com/2003/1219/p06s01-woiq.html; acces-sed 8 February 2007

Boogaard, Raymond van der, ”Generaal voorziet strijd in Uruzgan”, NRC Handelsblad (7 February 2007)

Bosman, Femke, Rudy Richardson & Joseph Soeters, “Multicultural Tension in the Mili-tary? Evidence from the Netherlands Armed Forces”, International Journal of Intercul-tural Relations 31/3 (2007), pp. 339-361

Bot, Ben, The Dutch Approach: Preserving the trinity of politics, security and devel-opment (2006); in www.minbuza.nl/en/news/speeches_and_articles,2006/04/the _dutch_approachx_preserving_the_trinity_of_politicsx_security_and_development.html#a4; accessed 8 February 2007

Bot, Ben, Henk Kamp & Annemarie van Ardenne-van der Hoeven, Kamerbrief inzake ac-tuele stand van zaken over Afghanistan 20 October (2006); in www.mindef.nl/binaries/Kamerbrief_%20Afghanistan_ tcm15-68397.pdf; accessed 8 February 2007

Brocades Zaalberg, Thijs, Soldiers and Civil Power: Supporting or Substituting Civil Au-thorities in Modern Peace Operations, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2005)

Coles, Harry, and Albert G. Weinberg, Civil-Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors, (Wash-ington DC: Centre of Military History 1964)

Fearon, James, D. and David D. Laitin, ”Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”, American Political Science Review 97/1 (2003), pp. 75-90

Fuselier, G. D., “Hostage negotiation: Issues and applications”, in R. Gal & A. D. Mangels-dorff (eds.), Handbook of military psychology, (London: Wiley 1991), pp. 711-723

Gooren, Robert, “Soldiering in Unfamiliar Places: The Dutch Approach”, Military Review 86 (2006), pp. 54-60; also available at www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil/search/arti-cles/Gooren2.pdf.

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Hobsbawn, Eric John and Terence O. Ranger, The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: CUP 1983)

Jongbloed, Marieke, Smile & wave (Amsterdam: NPS Film 2003)

Junne, Gerd and Willemijn Verkoren, Post Confl ict Development: Meeting New Challeng-es (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers 2005)

Lammers, Cor, J., “Occupation Regimes Alike and Unlike”, Organization Studies 24/9 (2003), pp. 1177-1202

Lammers, Cor, J, Vreemde overheersing. Bezetten en bezetting in sociologisch perspec-tief (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Bert Bakker 2005)

Lammers, Cor, J., ”Wim Brands ontvangt Prof. dr C.J. Lammers” (2006); in boeken.vpro.nl/afl everingen/25328302/; accessed 15 February 2007

Lammers, C.J., “The American Occupation Regime in Comparative Perspective: The case of Iraq”, Armed Forces & Society (2010), forthcoming

Krane, Jim (2006): “Frist says Taliban can’t be defeated. Senate leader urges role in Government”, Chicago Tribune (3 October 2006)

Kleijn, Tom and Monique Wijnans, “Nieuwe Gouverneur Uruzgan Gevaar voor Nederlan-ders”, Nova Den Haag vandaag (3 April 2006)

Kilcullen, D, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (Oxford: OUP 2009)

McFarland, Maxie., “Military Cultural Education”, Military Review (2005), pp. 62-69

Mockaitis, Thomas, R., “Winning Hearts and Minds in the ‘War on Terrorism’’, in Thomas Mockaitis and Paul Rich (eds.), Grand Strategy in the War on Terrorism (London: Frank Cass 2003)

Moelker, Rene and Bert van Horssen, ”Richard Oppelaar, Militair-diplomaat in Irak”, in Rene Moelker and J. Kuklinski. (eds.), Kernvraag themanummer De rol van de militair, Jrg 35 (1) no. 132 (2004), pp. 60-67

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Moskos, Charles, The Media and the Military in Peace and Humanitarian Operations (Chicago IL: Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation 2000)

“Dutch soldiers fi nd smiles are their best protection”, New York Times (26 October 2004)

NOVA/NPS, Clipping shown on De Wereld draait door (10 August 2008); available at cgi.omroep.nl/cgi-bin/streams?/id/VARA/serie/VARA_101163355/VARA_101176908/bb.20081008.asf?start=0:26:34.077&end=0:34:10.135;accessed 1 September 2009

Ooink, Bas, Van Soepjurk tot Gesprekspartner. Cultural Awareness training ten behoeve van de missie naar Uruzgan (Breda: Unpublished thesis 2006)

Ooink, Bas, Van, The Cultural Backpack. Training soldiers to operate in unfamiliar envi-ronments (Nijmegen: Thesis 2008) Page, Jeremy, “Dutch aim to beat Taleban by inviting them round for tea”, The Times (6 January 2007)

Ramsbotham, Oliver, Tom Woodhouse & Hugh Miall, Contemporary Confl ict Resolution (Cambridge: Polity Press 2005) Rajghatta, Chidanand, “US set to cut deal with Taliban”, The Times of India (5 October 2006)

Roelofs, René, Dutch Approach (2000 documentary); available at www.vpro.nl/pro-gramma/dokwerk/ afl everingen/3175971/; accessed 8 January 2007

Scales, Robert H., “Clausewitz and World War IV”, Armed Forces Journal (July 2006)

Schaap, Kees, Manon Blaas & Piet Hein van der Hoek, Zembla - Een levensgevaar-lijke missie (1 June 2006); at cgi.omroep.nl/cgi-bin/streams?/tv/vara/zembla/sb.20060601.asf; accessed 1 November 2009

Simpson, Diana, Cultural Awareness and the Military (Maxwell, AL: Muir S. Fairchild Re-search Information Center 2007); at www.au.af.mil/au/aul/bibs/culture.htm; accessed 15 January 2007

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Schwerzel, Jeffrey, “Transforming Attitudes”, Nato Review 2 (2005)

Scherjon, Dick, Business in post-confl ict countries (Amsterdam: Rabobank Economic Research Department 2009), at www.envirosecurity.org/sustainability/presentations/Scherjon.pdf; accessed 2 November 2009

Solomon, Jay, “U.S. takes Dutch Military as Role Model in Afghanistan”, The Wall Street Journal (4 May 2009)

Smith, Graeme. “Doing it the Dutch way in Afghanistan”, Globe and Mail (2 December 2006)

Thompson, Robert, Defeating Communist Insurgency. Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam (London: Chatto and Windus 1966)

The Liaison Offi ce, Three Years Later. A socio-political assessment of Uruzgan Province from 2006 to 2009 (2009); in www.nrc.nl/multimedia/archive/00250/TLO_Uruzgan_Assessm_250835a.pdf; accessed 1 February 2009

UN Offi ce on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009; in www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_opium_survey_2009_ summa-ry.pdf; accessed 3 November 2009

Vermeij, A.T. and P.B. Soldaat, “Wederopbouw in Zuid-Afghanistan”, Militaire Spectator, 176/2 (2007), pp. 61-72

Wimmer, Andreas, Lars-Erik Cederman & Brian Min, “Ethnic Politics and Armed Confl ict: A Confi gurational Analysis of a New Global Data Set”, American Sociological Review 74/2 (2009), pp. 316-337

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CHAPTER SIX

TOWARDS AN EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE CORPS OF ENGINEERS: SUPPORTING INTERAC-TIONS BETWEEN EDUCATION, RESEARCH AND PRACTICE

Dr. Edwin Dado,Dr. Almer van der Stoel,Cpt. Sjoerd Mevissen, MSc &Jody Borgers, MScAll at the Netherlands Defense Academy

Like all other public organisations, the Dutch Defence organisation is continuously forced by society and government to provide more value for money. In fact, they are forced to increase the effi ciency and effectiveness (and quality) of the current military processes, services and products in general as well as the operability of the military personnel working under high pressure and ever-changing circumstances during expe-ditionary operations more specifi cally. What is true for the Dutch Defence organisation as a whole is also true for the Corps of Engineers. In order to cope with the increasing demands, the Corps of Engineers is (slowly) adopting new techniques and technologies in the fi eld of management, organisation, manufacturing and information, communi-cation and knowledge technologies.175 This adoption of techniques and technologies places heavy demands on the competence of the Corps of Engineers and its employ-ees – a new type of competence that is not the same as it used to be. These types of changes require a change in ways of “deciding, doing, acting and responding”, that is, it requires a continuous process of change of the skills and knowledge of employees work-ing in today’s Corps of Engineers but it also requires the transformation of the Corps

(175) Often built upon the developments that can be witnessed in comparable sectors of the non-military Civil Engineering industry.

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of Engineers into a learning organisation176 as a whole. This poses a real challenge for the (academic) educational and research institutes within or associated with the Dutch Defence organisation in terms of supporting interactions (or bridging the gaps) between education, research and practice, that is providing a comprehensive approach which will allow an integration of these elements. This process is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Bridging the gaps between education, research and practice

In the Netherlands, the educational academic programme for Corps of Engineers of-fi cers is coordinated and delivered by the Faculty of Military Sciences [FMS] of the Neth-erlands Defence Academy [NLDA] in cooperation with the Faculty of Civil Engineering of the University of Twente [UT]. Military Civil Engineering research is partly coordinated and conducted by the FMS. In addition, research is also partly coordinated by the Centre of Expertise of the Training Centre for the Corps of Engineers [Dutch: OTCGenie] and

(176) Learning organization is a term used in knowledge management and it refers to an organization which systematically learns from its experience of what does and what does not work. In most of the literature, learning organization is associated with organizational learning and individual learning. Individual learning in this context can be defi ned as the ability to build knowledge through individual refl ection about external stimuli and sources and through the personal re-elaboration of individual knowledge and experience in light of interaction with others and the environment; see Emily Dickinson, “Learning with Computers”, Web publication (2000); available at: http://hagar.up.ac.za/catts/learner/2000/ scheepers_md/projects/loo/theory/theories.html. Most of the educational programmes are developed and designed to help students to develop these abilities - initially delivered as part of their regular educational programmes at higher educational institutes and during working life as part of their lifelong learning programmes. Although individual learning alone is not suffi cient for a learning organization, it must be used to create organizational learning; see Jennifer Rowley, “The Library as a Learning Organization”, International Journal of Library Management 18/2 (1997), pp. 88-91.

DUCATION RESEARCH

PRACTICE

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also partly conducted by the Netherlands Organisation for Applied Research [Dutch: TNO]. After successfully completing the educational academic programme, students will apply for their fi rst (operational) job as a Corps of Engineers offi cer at one of the compa-nies of the 101st Corps of Engineers Battalion, the 11th or 41st Armoured Engineering Battalions or 11th Air Assault Brigade. After they reach the rank of Captain, they can apply for jobs at non-operational or supporting departments such as OTCGenie, Infra-structure Agency Group [Dutch: Dienst Vastgoed Defensie] and Civil Works Department [Dutch: Bureau Geniewerken]. In this study we will mainly focus on the interactions between education and re-search coordinated and delivered/conducted by FMS and the practice related to the specifi c Corps Engineers organisational units within the Dutch Defence organisation. In the fi rst part of the study we will give a brief overview of the history of Corps of Engineers in the context of its changing role and tasks to perform. In the second part, an overview of the current Civil Engineering [CE] educational and research programmes at the FMS is given. In the third part of the study we will discuss the main mechanisms for support-ing the interactions between education, research and practice which are currently sup-ported or should be supported in the future.

History of the Corps of EngineersEven in the middle ages the Army had the so-called pioneers, who constructed roads us-ing shovels and pickaxes, as well as the miners, who undermined castles and city-walls. With the arrival of gunpowder the miners started to occupy themselves with destroying constructions and left the digging to the sappers. When in the 16th century the empha-sis of warfare turned more and more to conquering fortifi cations, as a response the emphasis came more on building bridges. The Dutch Corps of Engineers was offi cially established in 1748. In the more than 260 years which has passed since then, the Corps of Engineers has known a large num-ber of reorganisations. Despite general cuts in the organisation, often these reorgani-sations meant a broadening of the scope of activities and the increase in the number of companies. After the Second World War the Corps of Engineers went on a mission abroad in Indonesia (then Dutch-Indies). In contrast to earlier tasks of the Corps of Engi-neers, where the emphasis was put on thoroughness and sustainability, speed and im-provisation now became critical. Later the Corps of Engineers went on a mission abroad for UNIFIL in the South of Lebanon, and it had its fi rst experience with mountainous and impassable areas, which would later be repeated in Afghanistan. These activities were in stark contrast with the tasks of the Corps of Engineers during the Cold War, which focussed on contra-mobility and were characterised by an extremely good knowledge of the environment.

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The end of the Cold War, the suspension of national service as well as the many mis-sions outside of the Netherlands together commenced a period of enormous change for the Corps of Engineers. In Bosnia, Cambodia and Angola much specifi c experience was acquired concerning mine awareness. Also, military operations such as Provide Com-fort in Northern Iraq and Dessert Storm required a rapid and fl exible response, using construction materials and equipment that could be applied under all, and sometimes extreme, circumstances. Instead of waiting for “the Soviets” to come, mobility support had to be granted and the construction task became more and more important.177 As a result of this development, the four main tasks of the Corps of Engineers can now be summed up as (1) mobility, (2) contra-mobility, (3) protection and (4) general CE tasks.

Educational programme After fi nishing their basic military education and training programme178 in the fi rst year, future Corps of Engineers offi cers will follow a Bachelor of Science [BSc] CE programme. The BSc level, achieved after a fi rst study cycle of three academic years, is a proof that fundamental knowledge and skills have been acquired. This allows the pursuit of most Master of Science [MSc] studies in the fi eld of CE at any university, though for some combinations of specifi c BSc and MSc programmes small bridging courses may be re-quired. Moreover, the BSc level guarantees that the future Corps of Engineers offi cers’ skills match the specifi c traits of the military CE profession. They should be able to un-dertake theoretical or desk work on an engineering basis in a supervised situation. “En-gineering” implies competence in design/synthesis beyond analytical skills. However, a true professional-level qualifi cation for a university-trained engineer is only attained at the MSc level in a particular subject.179

As mentioned earlier, the BSc programme is coordinated and delivered by the FMS of the NLDA in cooperation with the Faculty of CE of the UT. The CE students at the FMS will meet the same qualifi cations as CE students at the UT, that is, the two versions of the BSc programme are almost identical. The only difference lies in the fact that dur-ing the implementation some courses of the BSc programme at the FMS will be added (for instance courses on explosion effects) or slightly modifi ed (for instance design ori-ented courses) and put into a military context with respect to the main four tasks of the Corps of Engineers the role of its offi cers after they reach the rank of Captain. Therefore, special attention is given to the ever-changing circumstances during expeditionary op-

(177) Martin Elands, Christ Klep, & Herman Roozenbeek, 250 jaar genietroepen (Den Haag: SDU Uitgevers: 1998).(178) During this basic military education and training programme, future Corps of Engineers offi cers will follow a number of academic courses that together form the “minor” for the BSc CE programme.(179) QANU, Assessment Civiele Techniek (2007); available at http://www.qanu.nl.

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erations including peace operations, emergency aid at calamities, natural disasters and war situations. In the context of design, construction, management and maintenance of CE (military) engineering objects or systems, both technical and non-technical (envi-ronmental, socio-economic, legal etc.) aspects are of vital importance. Hence, appropri-ate CE requires high-level knowledge and skills both in the technical (construction) and some non-technical domains. However, within a three-year BSc programme one cannot expect students to attain such a high level of knowledge across the full range from construction skills to multidis-ciplinary approaches of infrastructural problems. Within the existing BSc programme, clear priorities are laid at construction process management, (military) constructions and water (management).180 According to these general CE requirements and the spe-cifi c requirements related to the military context, a three-year BSc programme is offered to the future Corps of Engineers offi cers. During the fi rst year of the BSc CE programme, most of the education is delivered by lecturers from the FMS. At the end of the fi rst year of the BSc CE programme the students will physically move to the location of the UT in Enschede, where they will continue with the BSc programme. The involvement of lectur-ers from the FMS is on an ad-hoc basis during the second year. After the second year, students move back to the location of the FMS in Breda, where they fi nish their BSc CE programme (including a BSc graduation project).181

Research programme The main objective of the research programme, which is partly coordinated and con-ducted by the Civil Engineering section of the FMS, is to provide solutions for the afore-mentioned increasing demands from society and government for more effi ciency, effec-tiveness and quality of the current CE processes, services and products in general and the operability of military civil engineers working under high pressure and ever-changing circumstances during expeditionary operations more specifi cally. In order to reach this objective, solutions, provided by the civil CE practice and research, will be made applica-ble for the Dutch Defence organisation by adapting and modifying these solutions to the specifi c needs and characteristics of the Dutch Defence organisation. If needed, new techniques, methods, concepts and much more will be developed instead of existing solutions. The research programme basically consists of three main research topics:182

(180) University of Twente, Civil Engineering Bachelor Study Guide (2008); available at http://www.cit.utwente.nl. (181) More details about the BSc CE programme can be found on: http://www.cit.utwente.nl/ or http://tgbd_nts32/ (restricted access). (182) Robert-Jan Smits (Ed): NLDA/FMS Research Plan (2008), restricted access.

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Military (underground) construction1. . This subject mainly focuses on different as-pects of military underground construction, including guidelines for ground investi-gation techniques to optimise compound design, improvement of bridge foundation design for ad hoc bridge constructions, ground improvement techniques for runway construction and maintenance, underground ammunition storage and command centres and possibilities of pile foundations in out of area construction.

Increased protection of personnel and structures2. . This subject focuses on techni-cal, organisational, and strategic solutions to increase the protection of people, equipment, and structures against external threats like war related violence, ter-rorist attacks, and natural disasters. Current research includes mass-evacuations in dike ring areas, safety concrete to reduce the effects of spalling, shock wave prediction model and shock tube blast testing facility and computational modelling of damage development in heterogeneous materials under plane impact load.

Process and system innovation (including ICKT).3. This subject mainly focuses on the adaptation and modifi cation of solutions for process and system innovation provid-ed by the Process and System Innovation in Building [PSIBouw] and to some extent by other CE national and international reform programmes. PSIBouw is an initia-tive by the non-military CE industry to fundamentally reform the Dutch CE indus-try through process and system innovation. The PSIBouw programme is built upon fi ve relevant research themes, each of which covers a large number of research subjects including: (1) client orientation (2) strategic procurement, (3) assessment models, (4) tendering law and (5) integrity and transparency. In addition to this, the research theme also focuses on the application of advanced information, com-munication and knowledge technologies [ICKT] (and management) applied in the context of the fi ve relevant research themes of PSIBouw (that is, ICKT serves as an enabler).

Due to the relatively small number of researchers currently working in the CE section of the FMS, only a limited number of research projects are currently conducted, obviously mostly according to the specifi c expertise of the individual researchers. Example 1 gives a short description of an ongoing PhD project on “mass-evacuation in dike ring areas”.

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Supporting interaction between education and researchAs a consequence of the requirements for university degree courses set by the Quality Assurance Netherlands Universities [QANU] organisation and the evaluation criteria set by the Accreditation Organisation of the Netherlands and Flanders [NVAO], most higher educational institutes have established a connection between education and research in their bachelor and master programmes. This connection is mostly established by the teaching staff, most of whom are active in research.183 Although many of the theory courses in the fi rst year of the CE programme are an introduction to the new discipline, new theories or insights are introduced during the lectures and/or delivered to the stu-dents as part of their mandatory reading list. In addition, many theory courses are sup-ported by guest lecturers and they make use of relevant real-life cases and excursions. The main goals of these theory courses are twofold. On the one hand, students become familiar with existing scientifi c knowledge in relevant engineering disciplines and have the competence to increase and develop this through study. On the other hand, it adds to students’ scientifi c mindset and systematic approach characterized by the develop-ment and use of theories, models and coherent interpretations, critical attitude, and insight into the nature of science and technology. As consequence of the characteristics of the (civil) engineering discipline many courses are design-driven in stead of research-driven. In the context of CE, designing is a synthetic activity aimed at the realisation of new or modifi ed artefacts or systems with the intention of creating value in accordance with predefi ned requirements and desires. This type of courses (that is project based courses) refers to the academic competence of students to be familiar with existing scientifi c knowledge and to be able to increase

(183) According to the QANU-protocol (F12: Requirements for University) most of the teach ing should be provided by researchers who contribute to the development of the subject area.

Example 1. PhD project “mass-evacuation in dike ring areas”

The role of the Dutch Defence organisation within national security (other than war) must change from a “safety net” to an active partner with civil emergency organisations, as put forward in the interdepartmental project “intensifying civil-military cooperation”. The subject of this research project is vulnerability of the road network for mass-evacuation during fl ooding. Besides the development of a method to measure this vulnerability, stra-tegic and operational solutions to decrease the vulnerability will be examined. The pos-sibilities of the Dutch Defence organisation in general and the Corps of Engineers more specifi cally, to provide personnel, equipment and knowledge to implement the solutions, will form the concluding piece of the research.

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and develop this through study and research. The latter refers to students’ ability to acquire new scientifi c knowledge through research. We defi ne research as “the develop-ment of new knowledge and new insights in a purposeful and methodical way”. In terms of design competences, it also refers to students’ ability to reformulate ill-structured design problems, to have creativity and synthetic skills with respect to design problems, to be able (with supervision) to produce and execute design plans, to be able to work at different levels of abstraction and to understand, where necessary, the importance of other disciplines and to be aware of the changeability of the design process through external circumstances or advancing insights but also with the skill to take design deci-sions and to justify and evaluate these in a temporal and social context.184

During the course “Designing a Research Project”, students get insights and skills in doing scientifi c research. These skills are, in particular, how to formulate a research aim, to derive research questions and (sub) questions from this aim and to translate the research questions into a research plan for their individual research graduation project. Special attention is given to fi nd the most optimal research design to fi t the objectives of their BSc graduation project, to reduce the project to a feasible size (i.e. work plan) and to some extent to critically analyze existing scientifi c literature. During the BSc gradu-ation project, the student must apply herself in a creative manner, through a scientifi c way of working, to the solution (or design) of the problem(s), all based and/or extending the expertise and skills acquired so far. During the graduation phase there must be a number of interim meetings with the examination committee to gauge the progress be-ing made. Before a presentation date is agreed to for the graduation work the student must send (or present) a draft report to the committee and wait for the approval. After the student has received the approval of the examination committee185, he or she must then arrange a presentation date. When it comes to the task of assessing the gradua-tion work, the fi nal result will, to a large degree, be determined by the work content and process but the reporting style and public presentation will also play a part. Example 2 gives a short description of a recently fi nished BSc graduation project on an EU strategy against terrorist explosive devices.

(184) Anthony Meijers, Kees Overveld & Jacob Perrenet, Criteria for Academic Bachelor’s and Master’s Curricula (Eindhoven: 3TU: 2005).(185) The examination committee is composed of at least three members: chairman (full professor), vice chairman (assistant of associate professor) and member(s) that is/are preferable the “owner(s)” of the problem.

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Supporting interaction between education and practiceIt is generally known that the CE practice relies heavily on the interactions between civil engineers and other disciplines. As discussed in the previous section, project based courses are meant to develop competences to understand the importance of other dis-ciplines and to enable operations in the context of a multidisciplinary team (and to act as a project leader). The key to this approach is to work on realistic problems (case stud-ies) in project groups. This project-based and problem-based learning [PBL] approach186 has been described as one of the most signifi cant developments in professional educa-tion in the last few decades.187 At the time of the introduction PBL, it brought a funda-

(186) In most education literature the terms “project-based learning” and “problem-based learning” are used separately from one another. Part of the diffi culty is the range of forms that both project-based and problem-based learning can take. Problem-based learning can make use of projects, but does not have to. Project-based learning can make use of problems but does not have to. Both can be group-based, but neither has to be. In civil engineering the similarities between the two approaches may well be greater than in some other disciplines. Engineering projects will typically address a real world problem; this may not be true of projects elsewhere. In this context, case studies are a particular form of PBL, and modelling lectures and assignments around actual, real-world projects can be an effective bridge to the practice; see Ban Seng Choo (Ed), PBLE: Project Based Learning in Engineering, Web publication (2003); available at http://www.pble.ac.uk/guide-fi nal.html. (187) Note that current trends in education such as ‘action learning’ and ‘task based learning’ are forms of PBL.

Example 2. Graduation project “European strategy against terrorist explosive devices”

Most graduation projects are performed in cooperation with external parties, like for ex-ample the Royal Military School in Brussels (Belgium), the Department of Civil Engineers of the Dutch Army, etc. The following example of a graduation project is performed in coop-eration with the Munitions Safety Information and Analysis Centre at NATO headquarters in Brussels (Belgium). This project described the European Union [EU] strategy for the protection of public structures against terrorist explosive devices. Different programmes in this area were studied as well as the organisations and research groups involved. Be-sides the strategy from an organisational perspective, a review of the current standards and guidelines is presented. From documents such as the European Security Strategy [ESS] and the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy [EUCTS] it can be seen that the EU is primar-ily focusing on the prevention of terrorism by pursuing actors in any possible way and by ensuring that explosives are not available to terrorists. The technical expertise is available in certain Member States, but this knowledge is not yet transferred to the higher EU level. Protection measures against effects from accidental explosions are well documented in existing standards but different protection guidelines are needed against deliberate at-tacks. Recommendations for improving the EU strategy are given.

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mental shift from a focus on teaching by means of traditional lecturing to a focus on self-learning. The advantage of this shift becomes clear if we take a closer look at the Learning Pyramid of Bales (Table 1).

Method of learning Average retention (%)Traditional lectures 5Reading 10Audio-visual 20Demonstration 30Discussion group 50Exercise 75Self-learning 85

Table 1. Pyramid of Bales188

The Learning Pyramid of Bales indicates the average retention of knowledge with re-spect to several methods of transferring knowledge and learning modes. Bales has re-vealed that the traditional lecture as mode of learning provides the least retention of knowledge. This is a rather passive way of learning; its usefulness decreases in particu-lar as the number of students increase and as dialogues are replaced by monologues. This has always been partly compensated for by the incorporation of other modes of learning such as reading, audio/visual/live demonstrations, discussions and exercises. PBL is unique in that it fosters collaboration among students, stresses the development of problem solving skills within the context of the professional practice, promotes ef-fective reasoning and self-learning, and is aimed at increasing motivation for life-long learning. Central to this concept is the importance of students developing their prob-lem-solving abilities from an early stage so that they are capable of enhancing their knowledge as their studies progress. To facilitate this, students have to be exposed to an assessment strategy that not only carefully considers the interrelationship between the educational programme at each level, but also explores mechanisms for promoting this so that students become increasingly aware of course (subject) integration [8]. In the CE programme at FMS this strategy is implemented as a number of interrelated de-sign courses, consisting of both theory and project-based and problem-based courses, form a so-called ”design line” together. The design line has been programmed in such a way that students can apply knowledge which has been acquired in other (engineering) courses. In the fi rst year when student still lack engineering knowledge, the emphasis

(188) Robert Bales, Social Interaction Systems: Theory and Measurement (Edison, NJ: Transaction 1999).

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is laid on the feasibility and early design phases. Students use reference material of dif-ferent kinds. In the second year when students possess basic engineering knowledge, the design process is completed.189 In the third year when students master engineering knowledge at a relative high level, special attention is given to the fi nal design phase and problem-solving and decision-making processes in multidisciplinary design teams. Example 3 gives a short description of the third year B3 design project.

As stated in the introduction section of this study, the change in ways of “deciding, do-ing, acting and responding” requires a continuous process of changing the skills and knowledge of offi cers working in today’s Corps of Engineers. It poses a true challenge for a traditional educational institution such as the FMS in terms of education delivery. In-stead of delivering very static (and traditional) educational programmes, the FMS need to adapt their academic programmes dynamically to the demands arising from the new developments within both military and civil CE and to the specifi c needs of individual of-fi cers as part of their lifelong educational programmes. Lifelong learning or continuous learning has become a very popular topic at the FMS recently. Like other higher educa-tional institutions in the Netherlands, the FMS is slowly transforming itself from a tradi-tional learning institution into a lifelong learning institution. The application of e-learning and e-training, that is, an all-encompassing term generally used to refer to computer-

(189) In CE the design process is divided in fi ve successive design phases: (1) initiative, (2) feasibility, (3) preliminary design, (4) fi nal design and (5) detailed design.

Example 3. B3 design project

An example of design project carried out by third year students is the B3 project. In their third year, the engineer cadets carry out a design project over fi ve intensive weeks. Within a military context and environment they have to fi nd a solution for a multi-disciplinary design problem. The project environment is mostly situated in a mission area like Af-ghanistan. The most important goals of the project are: (1) working in a team, (2) manag-ing a complex environment and (3) managing confl icting interests. The problem is mostly derived from a recent real-life situation. Sometimes a problem is provided by one of the Engineer battalions. In that case, the cadets are in fact working out a solution for an ac-tual or future problem. In the fi rst two weeks they are provided with a lot of information and restrictions given in a mixture of lectures, role plays, literature and meetings with experts. With this information, which refl ects different and confl icting point of views and interests, the cadets go through a design and military decision process simultaneously. At the end of the fi ve weeks they have to present a report, a program of requirements, and a construction plan.

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enhanced learning or training, is seen as one of the key enablers for this transformation process. In order to overcome the most important weakness of the current e-learning and e-training approaches, that is, the reduction of face-to-face contact with lecturers and trainers, higher educational institutes started to embrace the concept of blended modes of learning and training.190

Supporting interaction between research and practiceAs discussed earlier, the main objective of the CE research programme at the FMS is to provide solutions for the increasing demands from society and government for more effi ciency, effectiveness and quality of the current CE processes, services and products in general and the operability of military civil engineers during expeditionary operations more specifi cally. In research we distinguish between two types of research approach-es: (1) demand-driven and (2) development-oriented research. The demand-driven re-search approach is focused on short-term and mid-term solutions for problems arising from the daily activities of military civil engineers. In this research approach, most of the knowledge gained is directly shared with the problem “owners”. This process of knowledge sharing between research and practice is well supported at the FMS, for ex-ample through BSc and MSc graduation projects as discussed earlier. The development-oriented research approach is more focused on long-term solutions for fundamental CE system problems. In addition, this type of research also focuses on the exploration of new technologies and concepts which leads to innovations instead of solutions for iden-tifi ed problems. However, knowledge sharing in this context is currently inadequately supported at the FMS for two main reasons:191

Cultural differences between military civil engineers and FMS researchers.1. Cultural differences between research and practice have been reported by a large number of authors. The main factors standing in the way of effective partnership between research and practice might be roughly categorised as institutional, communicative and philosophical differences. Signifi cant institutional differences exist in the man-ner by which the two types of institutions work towards achieving their goals and in terms of the intended benefi ciaries which these efforts target. Signifi cant commu-nicative differences exist in the manner in which research results are articulated

(190) Blended learning and training, in the strictest sense, are the combination of e-learning and e-training with traditional face-to-face learning and training. (191) Other reasons are related to the differences in mindset between researchers and responsible Corps of Engineers offi cers (i.e. short-term versus long-term mindset) as a consequence of the job rotation scheme of military personnel or related to the typical organizational structure of the Dutch Defence organisation.

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and communicated (i.e. in terms of differences in the targeted audience and read-ership). The need for researchers to publish in academic journals to gain academic credentials makes it less attractive for them to spend their time and energy in (re-)articulating their ideas for practitioners. Signifi cant philosophical differences are primarily related to the interpretation of the question “what is knowledge”.192

The lack of adequate knowledge management2. . Since the late 1990’s, knowledge management [KM] has become an important issue within the Dutch Defence or-ganisation and thus has lead to a number of KM initiatives, each with their own goals, motivations and approaches.193 As a result of this, the current state of KM within the Dutch Defence organization can be characterized as fragmented, redun-dant and overlapping, not clear about its effectiveness as well as suboptimalising. An integral KM approach is a prerequisite for the transformation of the Corps of En-gineers into a learning organisation and the knowledge transfer or sharing between research and practice. In fact, the development of an integral KM approach is itself a good example of a development-oriented research project in terms of solving fundamental system problems. Example 4 gives a short description of a research proposal in this area submitted by a member of the CE section of the FMS.

(192) Julie Ferguson, “Bridging the gap between research and practice”, Knowledge Management for Development Journal 1/3 (2005), pp. 46-54.(193) The cause of this lies partly in the scientifi c approach of KM. The scientifi c interpretation of KM is characterized by a strong multi-disciplinary conceptual approach which hardly gives any attention to the way an approach must be implemented in the organisation and the measurement of its effectiveness or how it adds to the aims and objectives of the organisation.

Example 4. Research proposal “A Holistic model for effective KM within CE departments of the Dutch Defence organisation”

The main objective of this research proposal is to develop the theoretical basis for a holis-tic model for effective KM within the CE departments of the Dutch defence organisation. From this objective the following four subordinate research questions arise: 1. Is it possible to develop a theoretical model that integrates the different conceptual ap-proaches to KM from different scientifi c disciplines into a single, holistic model? 2. Is it possible to “parameterize” the holistic model into a set of “value” parameters that provide a basis for valuing the performance of KM initiatives? 3. Is it possible to develop a general method for valuing the performance of KM initiatives? 4. How can we use the results of this research for effective KM within the CE departments of the Dutch Ministry of Defence?At the time of writing, the research project has been proposed and is awaiting approval.

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ConclusionsIn this paper we discussed the existing interactions between CE education, research and practice in order to bridge the gaps between these. As a consequence of the require-ments for university degree courses set by the QANU organisation and the evaluation criteria set by the NVAO, the interaction between education and research is currently adequately supported. This is not the case with the interaction between education and practice. The change in ways of “deciding, doing, acting and responding” requires a continuous process of changing the skills and knowledge of offi cers working in today’s Corps of Engineers. It poses a true challenge for a traditional educational institution such as the FMS in terms of education delivery and the academic competences of fu-ture offi cers. In this respect, solutions such as PBL, e-learning, blended learning and lifelong learning programmes have been discussed in this paper. Regarding the inter-action between research and practice, we distinguish between two types of research approaches: (1) demand-driven and (2) development-oriented research. In the case of the demand-driven approach (that is, fi nding short-term solutions for daily problems) there are currently adequate mechanisms for the knowledge transfer between research and practice. In the case of the development-oriented approach (that is, fi nding long-term solutions for system problems or technological innovations) knowledge transfer between research and practice is hampered by cultural differences between military civil engineers and mostly civil FMS researchers and the lack of adequate KM within the Dutch defence organisation.

Recent years have witnessed a development whereby Western troops have been deployed to still more complex and volatile theatres. As part of this development, the traditional and prima-ry task of the troops, that is, to defeat or neutralise an armed adversary, increasingly has to go hand-in-hand with a secondary task of creating conditions favourable for the re-building of weak or even collapsed states. This refl ects the recognition that these states, even if geographically quite distant, may pose a serious threat to the West.

The challenge for the troops is not only how to fi ght and to assist in the re-building at the same time, but also how to work together with other branches of the government machinery, with international organisations and with national non-govern-mental organisations to bring stability to a war-torn and fragile state. It is this combined endeavour on part of both military and civilian actors which is termed “The Comprehensive Approach”.

The articles in this book discuss the challenges and prospects of the Comprehensive Approach. They offer an in-sight into the state-of-the-art thinking on the issue, especially in light of the lessons learned in Afghanistan, and they give valuable advice on the future design of a Comprehensive Approach that will support the complicated task of creating favourable and lasting political, social and economic change.

With contributions from:

Allard Wagemaker Peter Dahl ThruelsenWilliam MitchellFrederic LabarreRene MoelkerEdwin DadoAlmer van der StoelSjoerd MevissenJody Borgers

Royal Danish Defence College

Challenges and Prospects

Royal Danish Defence College Publishing House

Edited by Flemming Splidsboel Hansen

The Comprehensive Approach