The Confessing Animal in Foucault and Wittgenstein by Bob Plant

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THE CONFESSING ANIMAL IN FOUCAULT

AND WITTGENSTEIN

Bob

Plant

ABSTRACT

In

The

History fSexuality,

oucaultmaintains hat Westernman

has

become

confessing

nimal

1990,59),

thus

mplying

hat man wasnot

always

such a creature.

On a

related

point,Wittgensteinuggests

hat

man

s a ceremonial nimal

1996, 67);

herethe

suggestion

s thathu-

man

beings

re,

by

heir

ery

ature,

itualistically

nclined.

n

this

paper

I

examine

his rucial ifference

n

emphasis,

irst

y

reconstructing

ou-

cault's

genealogy

f

onfession,

nd

subsequently

y

exploring

elevant

facets

f

Wittgenstein's

ater

hinking.

hile here re

significant

orrela-

tions etween oucault

nd

Wittgenstein,

n

importantisparitymerges

in

relation o

the

question

f he natural.

y criticallynalyzing

his,

showhow

Wittgenstein's

inimal aturalism

rovides

n

important

or-

rective o Foucault'smore xtravagantlaims.By mplication,e seewhy

any

radical

relativist,

istoricist,

nd/or onstructivist

osition

ecomes

untenable

n

Wittgensteinianrounds,

ven

houghWittgenstein

imself

is often ead as

promoting

uchviews.

key words:

Foucault,

Wittgenstein,

enealogy,

onfession,

istoricism,

naturalism

If

fleas

developed

rite,

t wouldbe basedon the

dog.

-Wittgenstein

1996,

73).

1.

Reconstructing

oucault's

Genealogy

fConfession

Foucaultdescribes

is later work s an

attempt

o

disassemble he

philosophy

f he

subject y

means of

genealogy

f

he modern ub-

ject

as

a historical nd

cultural

eality

that

s,

as

something

hatcan

eventuallyhange

1997a,

176-7).

Although

is

project

akesa number

of hematic

outes,

will focus n his

analysis

ofhow

we have come o

see

sexual desire s

a

key

o

revealing

he

deeply

uried ruth about

ourselves 1990,69; see

also

1982,208).For, ccording

o

Foucault,

his

alleged

truth f ex will

or

so we havecome o

believe)

nableus to

answer

he

question

Who m I?

(1997a, 135;

see also

1990,

61, 64-8,

77; 1996,214),

and

thereby

acilitate

ur liberation

1990,

159).

JRE 34.4:533-559.

©

2006Journal f

Religious

thics,

nc.

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534 Journal

fReligious

thics

1.1 Sex, truth,nd the bligationo peak

At a

timewhen heverbalization

f exual

practices

nd

desires

per-

meates

ontemporary

ife,

oucault's

nalyses

eem

specially

ertinent.

Although

urmass-media onfessional as

displaced

he

traditional e-

ligious

fixation

n

guilt,

t nevertheless ears

witness o our

apparent

need o

pass everything

aving

odowith ex

through

he ndless

mill f

speech

1990,21;

see also

20, 23-5,

32-3).

Still,

he

mplications

fFou-

cault's

genealogy notably

is insistence hatthe

subject

s fundamen-

tally

malleable

opens

his workontobroader

philosophical

orizons.1

For

Foucault he

presupposition

hat there s

something

idden

n our-

selves nd that we are therefore

always

n a self-illusionhat hides

the

ecret

1997a,

247)

constitutes

conceptual eritage

with

rofound

ethical-political

ignificance

1990, 34-5,

69).

Indeed,

n

his

attempt

o

dismantle his

picture,2

oucault

hopes

to

open

the

possibility

or new

forms f

ubjectivity

1982,

216).3

Thus he dreams f future

herewe

no

onger

nderstandthe usesof

exuality,

nd

specifically

ow

we be-

came o obsessedwith

ndlessly forcing

ts

secret,

f

xacting

he ruest

of

onfessionsrom

shadow

1990,

159).

For Foucault

hen,

ubjectiv-

ity

s not

given,

1997a,

262)

but

historically

onstructed

1998,

462).

Assuch,whatultimatelyoncerns im re thevariousways discourses

come o

transformuman

beings

nto

ubjects

1982,

208).

In

this

nterprise

oucault oes

not,however,

epict

he

imple mpo-

sition f

nonymous

iscourses

pon

docile

beings.

Although ppression

obviously

ccurs

1997a, 283, 288-9),

he insiststhat

power

relations,

whenexamined n

their

articularity

1980, 198-200; 1982,211; 1990,

83-5),

are

multidimensional.

t is thereforensufficiento characterize

power

nilaterally

n

terms f

master/slave

1990,82, 90-1; 1997a,

283).

Rather,

oucault

wants to

emphasize

hat

power

s

always present

(1997a,

292;

see

also

1982, 09; 1996,

10).

Although

e was

temporarily

preoccupied ithmethods fdominationand essentially assivesub-

jects),4

n

Foucault's ater

work

ower

s seen as

being roductive

n

our

coming

o

decipher

1997a,

224)

ourselves s

subjects

1991, 11;

see

also

1997a,

290).5

1

See Foucault's

partially)

ositive

valuation f artre

Foucault

997a,

262).

1

Though

his

picture

annot

asually

be dismissed s confused

deas and illusions

(Foucault

990,157;

ee

also

1998,

61-62).

The

problem

is notto discovern

oneself he truth f

one's

ex,

but

..

to use one's

sexuality

encefortho

arrive t a

multiplicity

f

relationships

Foucault

1997a, 135;

see also

135-38,140,

153, 157-60,

163-65,170-71,

182).

Foran account fhowFoucault

enacted his n his own ife, eeMiller 994.

4

See

Rabinow's emarksn

Foucault

991,

1. Note lso Foucault's

cknowledgment

f

this

hortcoming

1997a,

225).

5

Of

entral

mportance

ere s Foucault's

nalysis

fhowboth sceticism

a

process

f

careof he

self

[1997a,

27])

and

aestheticism

the

transformationfone's

elf

[131])







The

Confessing

nimal n Foucault nd

Wittgenstein

535

This hermeneuticsfoneself 1997a,182)is mostpersuasivelye-

constructed

n

the first olume fThe

History

fSexuality.

hereFou-

cault

nvestigates

ow

exuality

as been

discursively

managed

1990,

24;

see also

Dreyfus

nd Rabinow

982,176);

that

s,

how he

discourses

about

exuality

ave facilitated

ertain indsofbehavior nd

language

(1997a,

125-6).

Foucault's

entral hesis

here

s thatour

picture

f he

(allegedly) repressive

ast

(of

society

eterminedo censor

1990,

23]

the discourses

f

ex)

is

essentially

mistaken

1990, 17, 73;

1997a,

126),

for hesediscourses

ave

n

fact

multiplied

1990,

53).

Contrary

o

the

orthodox

icture

hen,

oucault alksof discursive

xplosion

17),

a dispersionf entres rom hich iscourses manated 34), nd a pro-

liferation

f iscourses

hich

gathered

momentumromhe

ighteenth

century

nward

18;

see also

23-4, 33-4, 69,

72).

Here we are

notdeal-

ing

with

single

iscourse n

sex,

butwith

multiplicity

f

discourses

functioning

n suchdiverse ields s

biology,

edicine,

sychiatry,sy-

chology,

thics.

and

political

riticism

33).

No doubt ertain iscourses

were

heavily oliced,

ut venherewe do

notfind

straightforward

im-

position

f ilence.

ather,

ex cametobe talked bout

n

numerous if-

ferent

ays

27).

Moreover,

his discursive

xplosion

as itself riven

by

an

obligation, imperative

20-1),

or

injunction

o

speak

1997a,

224) an institutionalncitementospeakabout sex], nd to do so more

and

more

1990,

8]).

For uch ncitements

ere

imilarly

orchestrated

from ll

quarters, pparatuses

verywhere

or

istening

nd

recording,

procedures

or

bserving,uestioning,

nd

formulating.

n

short,

exwas

driven

utof

hiding

nd

constrainedo ead a discursive xistence

33).

As

such,

Foucault

nsists,

we must

give up thinking

fthe

eighteenth

and nineteenth

enturies s

eras of

unprecedented

exual nhibitionnd

repression

49).

1.2 Confession,ilence,nd the trugglingoul

Whathas

already

ecome

pparent

n

ourreconstruction

f

Foucault's

genealogy

s his

preoccupation

ith iscourse.

exuality

ecame entered

around

verbalization 6

nsofar s

an

imperative

as

established

o

transform

desire

nto

discourse ;

o

pass everythingaving

o

do

with ex

through

he

endless

mill

f

peech

1990,21;

see also

20, 23-5,

32-3).

Accordingly,

oucault urns

is attentionoconfessional

ractices,

and how

thesecame to

permeate

ecular

ife.

n

what

are, believe,

he

key

passages

from he

History f exuality,

e thusdeclares:

figured

n

the

passage

from

agan

culture

through

hewhole f

Christianity,

nd

perhaps

beyond

1998,461;

see also

1997a,191,195,224,261-62,269,271,

279).

6

Indeed,

n immense

erbosity

Foucault

990, 3;

see also

1997a,

126,175-76,

43-

44,

249).









The

Confessing

nimal n Foucault nd

Wittgenstein

537

achievablethesubject ouldneverbecome ompletelyransparent,i-

ther o herself

r

others),

heresultwas a

deep suspicion

f

everything

thatcouldnot

be

expressed

1997a, 248;

see also

Rousseau

1953,

115,

152,

169)

a

tendency

oucault

penly

aments.11

1.3

Confessional

riting

Foucault

nextobserves ow

techniques

fthe careof

the

self

soon

encompassed

he

spoken

nd writtenword nsofar s the self

became

something

owrite

bout,

theme r

object

subject)

f

writingctivity.

However,his constant riting ctivity houldnotbe construed s an

entirely

ew

phenomenon,

ut rather oneof he most

ncientWestern

traditions

1997a,

232):

[A]

1

he so-called iterature f the

self

private

diaries,

narratives f

the

self,

and so on cannot

be understood

nless it is

put

into the

general

framework

f these

practices

f the self.

People

have

been

writing

bout

themselves or wo thousand

years,

but not

n

the

same

way

[T]here

s a certain

endency

o

present

he

relationship

etween

writing

nd the

narrative f he elf s a

phenomenonarticular

o

Euro-

pean

modernity.

ow,

wouldnot

deny

t s

modern,

ut t was also

one

of

thefirst sesofwritingFoucault 997a,277].

Foucault's dmission hat

writing

he

self is

bothmodern nd ancient

is

as

we will see later indicative

f

more

general mbiguity

n

his

work.But his main

point

eems to

be that

while associations an be

made between

for

xample)

Hellenistic

nd

monastic

ractices,

writ-

ing

the elf

predates

Christian onfessional

ractices.

s suchwe must

be sensitive

o the subtle

changesoccurring

nce those

practices

were

assimilated,

dapted,

nd utilized

y

Christianity.

hus,

n

referenceo

a letter

y

Aurelius,

oucault bserves ow

in

the ast

inesthere s an

allusion othe examination f onscience t the endof heday : Aure-

lius

goes

to bed and ooks

n

thenotebook o see whathe

was

going

o do

and how t

corresponds

o whathe did.The etter s the

transcription

f

(248),

nd ikewise s a whole

echnique

or

nalyzing

nd

diagnosinghought,

ts

origins,

its

qualities,

ts

dangers,

ts

potential

or

emptation,

nd all thedark

orces hat an urk

behind he mask t

may

ssume

..

a

suspiciousness

irected

atl

every

moment

gainst

one's

hought,

n endless

elf-questioning

oflush ut

ny

ecret ornication

urking

n

the

inmost ecesses f hemind

195).

11

Against

his

dvancing

emonizationf ilence

a

silencewhich s neither

omoge-

nousnorwithout unction

alongside

he

things

aid

Foucault

990,27;

see

also

1997a,

121]), oucault dvocates Stoic-Pythagoreancultivationf ilence 1997a, 36) thats,

developing

ilence s a cultural thos

something

hich has

unfortunately

een

dropped

from ur

ulture

122,

ee also

121,

130]).

Regarding

the

bligation

f

peaking,

oucault

thus

finally

dmits is failure o

understand

hy

eople

haveto

speak

when ilence

may

be a muchmore

nteresting ay

of

having relationship

121-22).







538 Journal

fReligious

thics

thatexaminationf onscience.t stresseswhatthe ndividual id,not

whathe

thought.

hat s thedifferenceetween

ractice

n

theHellenis-

ticand

mperial eriods

nd atermonastic

ractice

234).

2

Regarding

the transition

romGreek notebooks o Christian onfessional

exts,

Foucault hus

remarks ow the

writing

ownof nnermovements

p-

pears

..

as an arm n

spiritual

ombat,

or while he demon s a force

that deceives

nd makes one be deceived bout oneself.

writing

on-

stitutes test nd

something

ike a

touchstone:

n

bringing

o

ight

he

movements f

thought,

hus

dissipating

the nner hadowwhere he

enemy's lots

re

woven

275;

see also

208).

nsofar s the ct of

writing

divides he elf romtself,13his elf s exposed oth o tself nd others:

writing

stablishes n

(albeit

spectral)

face-to-face

eeting

216).

As

such,

he

constrainthat the

presence

f

others xerts

n

the domain

of

onduct,

riting

ill exert

n

the domain f he nner

mpulses

f he

soul.

Writing

herefore

has a role

very

lose o thatof onfessiono the

director

208).

These

ntrospective

rocedures

ecame

ncreasinglyigorous,

nd the

relation

etween

writing

nd

vigilance

232-3)

is

especially

notable

here.

Thus

Foucaultcites Athanasius's

ecommendationhat we each

write

own ur

ctions nd

mpulses

f he oulas

though

e were ore-

port hem o eachother. hepoint f uchprocedures as clear nough;

that from

tter

hameof

ecoming

nownwe shall

stop inning

nd en-

tertaining

inful

houghtsltogether

207).

Quoting

pictetus,

oucault

similarly

ighlights

here he

relationship

etween

writing, igilance,

and

risk s

expressly

onnected

o death:

May

these

be

my

thoughts,

these

my

tudies,

writing

r

reading,

whendeath

comes

upon

me Let

these

houghts

e at

your

ommand

prokheiron]y

night

nd

day:

write

them,

ead

them,

alk of

them,

o

yourself

nd to

your

neighbour

.. if

some

o-called

ndesirable vent

houldbefall

you,

he first

mmediate

relief o

you

will

be

that t was not

unexpected

209;

see also

195).

What

isbeing dvocated ere s a certainwatchfulnessecessitatedy hefact

12

Likewise,

n

Seneca

there re

only

eeds,

not

houghts;

ut

t does

prefigure

hris-

tian

confession

The

examination f

conscience

egins

with his

etter-writing.iary-

writing

omes

ater. t

datesfromhe

Christianra andfocuses n

henotion f he

truggle

of he oul

Foucault

997a,

234).

n

a

particularly

triking assage

Foucault eflects n

thefunctionf

correspondence

riting

n

relation o

theGreek

upomnemata

defined

s

account

ooks,

ublic

egisters,

r

ndividual otebooks

erving

s

memory

ids books

of ife

209]).

Therehe

warns hat

despite

ll these

points

n

common,

orrespondence

should ot

be

regarded

imply

s an extension

f he

practice

f

hupomnemata.

t s some-

thingmore han trainingf neselfymeans fwriting,hroughhe dvice ndopinions

one

gives

o the other:

t also

constitutes

certain

way

of

manifesting

neself o oneself

and

to

others.

he atter

makes he

writer

present'

o

the one to whom e

addresses

t

(216).

13

The

author

s,

after

ll,

always

her

ownfirst eader

Foucault

997a,

214).







The

Confessing

nimal n Foucault nd

Wittgenstein

539

thatdeath s,notmerelynevitable,utcapableofbefallingne at any

moment

Derrida

1993,4, 26, 49,

65).

Although

he

unpredictability

f

death's rrival

annot e

evaded,

Epictetus uggests

hat,

by

means

of

writing

and

reading

nd

verbalizing

hat nehas

written),

neneednot

be

totally nprepared. igilant

elf-regulation

nd self

writing elps

manage

he advent

f

death,

hus

rendering

t but

one

albeit erminal)

event

n

thenarrative

f ne's ife

Foucault

1998,

206).14

1.4

Continuity

nd

rupture

I previouslyuggestedhatFoucault's entral laim s that Western

societies

ave established he confession

s one of

he main ritualswe

rely

n for he

production

f

ruth,

nd as such Westernman has be-

come

confessing

nimal

1990,

58-9).

Now,

lthough

ome ommenta-

torswarn

hatFoucault

s

not

eeking

he

historicalmoment at which

the

confession

merged

ull-blown

Dreyfus

nd Rabinow

1982, 174),

there

nevertheless emains tension etween

is

emphasis

n

the in-

gularity

f

certain onfessional

ractices notably

hose

developed y

the Church

Foucault

1982,214; 1990,

58)-

and the

continuity

etween

these

practices

nd their

pagan

forebears. n this

reading

Foucault s

notclaiminghatprior o this historical poch onfessional iscourses

were

noperative,

ut that

only

n

this

period

did confession

ecome o

highly

egulated

nd

all-encompassing technique.

hus,

ccording

o

Dreyfus

nd

Rabinow,

t was not that confession

tself

was realized t

this

time,

ut rather

hat

[s]ystems

f classification ere

elaborated,

vast

descriptionscrupulously

ollated,

nd

a

confessional

cience,

ne

dealing

with

hidden nd unmentionable

hings,

ame nto

being

1982,

176).

Still,

oucault's

llegation

hat Western an became

confessing

animal 15

aises the

question

fhow

great disparity

xisted

etween

the old and newconfessionalechnologies.t is hereworth oting ow

Foucault

himself

egotiates

his

mportantuestion.

Regarding

historical

ontinuity

hen,

Foucault claims that

pagan

philosophers

proposed

sexual ethics that was

very

similar

to

the

alleged

Christian

thics

1997a,

179).

Indeed,

we

must concede hat

Christianity

idnot

nvent his odeof exualbehaviour ut

rather

ac-

cepted

t,

reinforced

t,

and

gave

t a much

arger

nd more

widespread

strength

han t had

before,

nd that Christian

morality

s

nothing

14

Although

willnot

discuss

t

here,

here s a

story

obe told bout

oucault's

nalysis

of onfessionnd Descartes'sMeditationsFoucault 997a,278).In particular,have n

mind

opkin's

econstructionf he atter

n

the ontextf he1634 rial f

UrbanGrandier

(Popkin

979,

180-81)

and howthe

question

f estimonialruth

igures

t the birth

f

modernWestern

hilosophy.

15

Not o

mention

reyfus

nd Rabinow'sllusion owhat came nto

eing

1982,

176).









The

Confessing

nimal n Foucault

nd

Wittgenstein

541

an ideal continuity380), 7Foucault's mphasis at least inhis later

work)18

eans more oward

continuity

hesis

than one of

radicalhis-

torical

upture.

s

such,

his ownallusion o

clear-cutontinuities

nd

discontinuitiess rather

nhelpful.19otwithstanding

oucault's

er-

sistent eferenceo the

development

1990, 58),

dissemination

61),

and transformation

63)

of confessional

iscourses,

closer

reading

reveals that between hese

technologies

hereexists

only

veneerof

diversityovering omething

more

primordial; amely power

nd its

hazardous,

endlessly epeated lay

of

dominations

1998,

276-7).

Given

that Foucault eeks to master

history

o

as

to turn t to

ge-

nealogicaluses (385),his precise ttitude owardhistoricityemains

ambiguous

1996, 213,

301).

Likewise,

whether oucault's

foremen-

tioned

hifting

etween

continuity

nd

discontinuity

hesis

roves

atal

tohis

project

must,

or ur

purposes,

e set aside. But what s

significant

here s that imilar

uestions merge

rom

Wittgenstein's

ater

hinking.

As we have

seen,

what

problematizeseading

oucault s a

discontinuity

theorists his

repeated mphasis

nthe

developing

ature f

onfessional

technologies

rom

agan

culture

hrough hristianity

nto ecular

oci-

ety.

ust s Foucault s often

hought

o

be a

philosopher

f adical

histor-

ical

rupture, ittgenstein

s

frequentlyerceived

o be a

philosopher

ofradical inguistic-conceptualplurality. 20ut suchcharacterizations

misrepresent

oth

philosophers.

We have

already

een

why

his s

the

case with

Foucault,

nd later

will show

howthe

Wittgensteinian

ar-

rative

unscounter o such

pluralistic eadings.

ut in

both ases it is

their

respective)uspicion

f nd

appeal

to the natural

hat s

pivotal.

For while both

Wittgenstein

nd Foucault

express

certain eticence

toward

tepping

utsidetheir

respective

reas of

expertise

Wittgen-

stein

1958, 230; 1996, 72;

Foucault

1997a, 142),

the

spirit

fthis self-

restraints rather ifferent

n

each case. For Foucault t

spawns

from

the

genealogical

onfines e

operates

within.21 ue to the

essentiallyhistorical-culturalconstructivist)

rajectory

fFoucault'swork he

very

notion f

he natural

must

tself

e

subjected

o the same sort

f on-

textual

nalysis

s

(for

xample) exuality.

hiscan be

clearly

eenwhen

17

That

s,

rather han

liberatingivergence

nd

marginal

lements

Foucault

998,

379).

18

Concerning

he

uestion

f

is/continuity

n

TheOrder

f

Things,

ee

Foucault's ome-

what

ryptic

emarks

n

1998,

79-95.

19

On at

least oneoccasion oucault

mplies

hat t

s confession

tself

hat

bridges

he

gap

between

hesehistorical iscontinuities

1980,

211).

20See, for xample,Gier1981, 117-33; Pitkin1993,323-26; Scheman1996, 384;

Greisch

999, 4-61;

Trigg

999,176-79;

Mouffe

000.

Despite

his debt o

Nietzsche,

oucault

eglects

heformer's

aturalism.

ikewise,

it s

not

lear hatNietzsche

houghtgenealogy

nd

history

o be different

hings

Ni-

etzsche

000,Preface;

eiter

002,

specially hapters

and

5).









The

Confessing

nimal n Foucault nd

Wittgenstein

543

possibilitiesfgenealogicalnalysis.24ikewise,nvocationsf he nat-

ural an be used for nsidious

thical-politicalurposes;

acism, exism,

and

homophobia

re

ust

three bvious

xamples.

Nevertheless,

he

ues-

tion f ur natural

istory

annot

imply

e

ettisoned

as

the

product

f

wholly

ontingent

istorical

onditions)

n

favor fFoucauldian

geneal-

ogy.

With

pecific

eference

o the ater

Wittgenstein,

therefore ant

to

inquire

ntothe

primitive

nderpinning

fthe more

ophisticated

confessional

echnologies

oucault escribes. orwithout

n

underlying

capacity, ropensity,

r inclination

o

confess,

pon

which

hose more

regulated

onfessional

ractices

ouldbe

deployed,

oware we to make

senseof hese atermanifestations? ithWittgenstein'selp will here-

fore

rgue,

not thatwe became

confessing

nimals,

ut that

n

some

sense we

always

were.

2.

Wittgenstein

nFrazer ndthe

Primitive

2.1

Preliminary

emarks n

Foucault nd

Wittgenstein

As we have

seen,

Foucault

lleges

that

we inhabit

singularly

on-

fessing

ociety

nsofar

s the onfessionas become

one f hemain

rit-

uals

we

rely

n

for he

production

f ruth.

n

short,

Westernman has

become confessingnimal 1990,58-9).Through complex istorical

development,

he

Christian onfession

as

appropriated

y

the secular

scientia

exualis,

which

has

subsequently

ound

place

n

such diverse

areas

as

justice,

medicine, ducation,

amily elationships,

nd overe-

lations.

rom themost

ordinary

ffairs f

everyday

ife

o the most

solemn

ites

59),

confession

as

proved

o be an

exceptionally

ervice-

able ritual.

o much

o,

Foucault

uggests,

hat we

no

onger erceive

t

as

the effect

f

power

hat

constrains s. So accustomed

o this

have

we become

hat t now

eemscommonsensical

hat he truth

odged

in

our

most ecret

ature

60)

can

only

e

mediated

hrough

omeform

of onfessional

utpouring.

t s here hat want o turn o

Wittgenstein,

and

n

particular

is Remarks

n Frazer's

Golden

ough.

or t s there

that

we find he

rudiments f n alternative

o the Foucauldiannarra-

tive.

While

Wittgenstein's

ritique

fFrazer's

nthropology

annot im-

ply

be

mapped

onto

Foucault's

work,

s their

Frazer's

nd

Foucault's)

projects

re

very

different,evertheless,

xaminingWittgenstein's

n-

gagement

withFrazer

raises a number f

points

worth

eveloping

or

the

purposes

f

reflectingritically

n Foucault.

24Foucault bscures number f ssueswhenhe refers o theproductionftruth

(1990, 58;

see also

59, 60, 65),

effectsftruth

1980, 118),

games

1997a, 281),

and

' general olitics'

f ruth

1980,131;

see also

1997a,289-90,

296,

298).

After

ll,

even

f

we concede

oth

hat

truthsn't utside

ower

1980,

131)

and that he

oncept

f

truth

has a

history,

t does

notfollow hat ruths

historically-culturally

onstructed.









The

Confessing

nimal n Foucault nd

Wittgenstein

545

As indicated bove,Wittgensteininds razer's endencyowardn-

terpretation

nd

explanation wrong

61).

Indeed,

he

insists hat one

must

nly

orrectlyiecetogether

hatone

knows,

without

dding ny-

thing

Here one can

only

describe nd

say:

this s what human ife

is like

62-3).

Echoing

numerous

assages

from

is later

writings28

Wittgenstein

ere

highlights

othhis own

ontological-

ethodological

commitment

egarding

he

givenness

f

anguage-games

and

corre-

sponding

forms

f

ife ),

nd how his

ught

oorient

hilosophical

rac-

tice.

Having put

he

question

marks

eep enough

own,

r

having one

right

own o the

foundations,1994b,

62)

explanatory

nd

ustifica-

tory iscourse comes o an end 1999,§204).For all onecan say is:

where hat

practice

nd

theseviews ccur

ogether,

he

practice

oesnot

spring

rom

he

view,

ut

they

re

both

ust

there

1996,

62).

That the

practice

oesnot

pring

rom heview s a recurrentheme

in

Remarks

n Frazer'sGolden

Bought Wittgenstein

hus

perceives

Frazer's cardinaloffense

o be his treatment f the

magical-religious

views fmankind

s

pseudoscientific

errors

r

pieces

f

tupidity.

For

Wittgenstein,

eligious

nd

magical

ituals an

only

e

erroneous o

the extent

hat

they

set

forth

theory

61)

or

put

forward

ypotheses

(68, 72-3; 1999,

§477,

538).

But,

he

insists,

[n]o

opinion

erves s the

foundationor religiousymbol. ndonly nopinionan nvolve n er-

ror

1996,

4).

He continues

o

ay

hat,

ontrary

o

Frazer,

I

believe hat

the characteristic

eature

f

primitive

an s thathe does notact from

opinions

71;

see also

1999,

538).

f

we resist he

temptation

o

explain

such

phenomena,

nd instead

restrict urselves o

description,

razer's

hypothetical

loss

becomes

ncreasingly

ntenable. or the

primitive

man o whom

Wittgenstein

lludes does

not

merely

efer

o the

foreign

Other

fFrazer's

nthropology.

ather,

Wittgenstein

s

referring

o the

primitive

n man. We

can see this

clearly

n

On

Certainty

for here

Wittgenstein

sks us to

bear

n

mind hat he

anguage-game

s

..

not

based ongrounds.t s not easonableorunreasonable).t s there like

our ife

1999,

559),

nd

similarly,

hat

hewants o

regard

manhere s

an

animal;

s a

primitive

eing

owhich ne

grants

nstinct utnotrati-

ocination. s a creature

n

a

primitive

tate,

or

[a]ny ogic ood nough

for

primitive

eansof

ommunicationeeds

no

apology

rom s. Lan-

guage

didnot

merge

romomekind f atiocination

§475).

0

Here hen

a

question

f

primacy

eemsto arise: does

reason

ground

ction

r

vice

versa?

AlthoughWittgenstein

ends o stress

he

imultaneity

f eason

28See,for xample,Wittgenstein958, 109,126,217,654,656,224;1999, 204, 59.

29

This theme s also

present

n

Lectures

n

Religious

elief

(Wittgenstein

994a,

53-72).

30

Compare

with oucault's

emarks n

thought

nd action

1997a,117,200-201,

43-

44,

264).







546

Journal

fReligious

thics

and action1958,§656;1996, 2),onecan discern certain rioritization

in

his ater

writings.

o,

for

xample,

n

Culture nd Valuehe maintains

thatthe

origin

nd the

primitive

orm f he

anguagegame

s a reac-

tion;

only

from his can

more

omplicated

orms

evelop. anguage

I

want

to

say

is a

refinement,

in

the

beginning

as the deed '

1994b,

3

1).31

Wittgenstein

ppeals

to the

primitive

n numerous

ccasions,

but

what

exactly

s thisterm

upposed

o

pick

out?

n

order

o answer

this

question

we need to ook

briefly

t

other

f

his ater

writings.

First,

n

Philosophicalnvestigations, ittgenstein

peculates

nhow

sensation

words

such

as

pain )

re earned:

Here s one

possibility:

ords re

connected ith he

primitive,

henatu-

ral,

expressions

f he sensation nd used

n

their

lace.

A

childhas

hurt

himself

nd he

cries;

nd then dults alkto

him

nd

teach

him

xclama-

tions

nd,

ater,

entences.

hey

eachthe childnew

pain-behaviour.

So

you

are

saying

hat the word

pain'

really

means

crying?

On the con-

trary:

he

verbal

xpression

f

pain replaces rying

nd does not

describe

it

[Wittgenstein

958,

244].

Although

his

seems tentative

Here

s one

possibility

),

in

Zettel

Wittgensteinevelops

he same

point

s follows:

[R]emember

hat t s

a

primitive

eaction o

tend,

o

treat,

he

part

hathurtswhen omeone

else is

in

pain;

and not

merely

whenoneself s

..

But what s the word

'primitive'

eant o

say

here?

Presumably

hat his ort fbehaviours

pre-linguistic:

hat a

language-game

s based on

t,

that t is the

proto-

type

f

way

of

hinking

nd not

the result f

hought

1990,

§540-1).

And

likewise:

Being

ure that

someone s

in

pain, doubting

whether

he

is,

and

so

on,

are so

many

natural, nstinctive,

inds of

behaviour

towards ther

human

beings,

nd our

anguage

s

merely

n

auxiliary

to,

nd further

xtension

f,

hisrelation.Our

anguage-game

s an ex-

tension fprimitiveehaviour.Forour anguage-ame is behaviour.)

(Instinct)

§545).

According

o

Wittgenstein

hen,

both

reasoning

nd

language

have

theirroots

n

prelinguistic,

nstinctive

ehaviors,

nd

can

thus be

understood

s a

refinementf these natural

phenomena

(1994b,

1; 1999,

505).

Language

does

not

merely eport

uch

reactions,

but

rather

evelops

n

an

auxiliary

ole,

ither s an

extension f uch

natural

behaviors

r

by

replacing

hem.What

such

passages

therefore

suggest

s

that

behavior

recedes

anguage.

But

Wittgenstein

s reluc-

tant o

speak

n

such

clear-cuterms.

Why?

ecause there s no

essential

31

And

imilarly:

I

really

want o

say

that

cruples

n

thinkingegin

with

have

their

roots

n)

instinct. r

again:

a

language-game

oes not have

ts

origin

n

consideration.

Considerations

part

of

language-game

Wittgenstein

990,

391;

ee also

1958,

546;

1994b,

6).







The

Confessing

nimal n Foucault nd

Wittgenstein

547

differenceetween onlinguisticnd inguisticehavior.32 e are there-

fore

rged

o

[l]ook

n the

anguage-game

s the

primaryhing

1958,

§656),

nsofar s

[c]ommanding,

uestioning,ecounting,hatting,

re

as much

part

of urnatural

history

s

walking, ating, rinking,lay-

ing §25).

3

In

this

wayWittgenstein

alts

philosophicalnquiry

t the

sheer

givenness

f

anguage-games

nd their

ncompassing

orms f

life.

Any mbiguity

etween is claims

hat,

n the one

hand,

anguage

and behavior ccur

imultaneously

nd,

on the

other,

hat he

atter

re-

figures

he

former,

ust

be

understoods

part

ofhis

attempt

o

confine

philosophy

o the

therapeutically

riented

escription

f

anguage-in-

use.34 husWittgensteinoncedes hathe is certainlynterestednthe

relation

etween

oncepts

nd

very eneral

facts f

nature,

ut adds

thatthis nterest

s notone of

imple

ausation.After

ll,

he is noten-

gaged

n

natural science

or natural

history

sincewe can also

invent

fictitious atural

history

or ur

purposes

230).

5

Wittgenstein's

autionwith

regard

o

prioritizing

ehavior ver an-

guage

or

vice

versa)

s therefore

wofold:

1)

such

prioritization

ssumes

an essential

divisionbetween

inguistic

nd

nonlinguistic

ehavior;

and

(2)

this sort

of

hypothesizing

elongs

n

the realm of

the natural

sciences

a

discipline

whose

boundarieshe has no

aspiration

o

tra-

verse.Althoughn thisquestionWittgensteins farfromransparent,

the

depth

f his

ambiguity

eed notconcern s

unduly.

or he is clear

that

anguage

s

not different

n

kind from hose

primitive

ehaviors

it

replaces.

What s

important

orus is the essential onnectednessf

linguistic

nd

prelinguistic

ehavior

n

Wittgenstein's

ater

writings

a

point

onveniently

verlooked

y

radical

pluralist nterpreters.

2.3 Between he

rimitive

nd

modern

AccordingoWittgensteinheexplanatoryharacter fFrazer's n-

thropology

isrepresents

he

primitive's

eligious

ituals.

ndeed,

har-

acterizing

uch

practices

n

pseudoscientificarb inevitably

enders

32

This

s,

of

ourse,

hyWittgenstein

oins he erm

language-game,

hich

s meant

to

bring

nto

rominence

hefact hat

he

peaking

f

anguage

s

part

f n

activity

1958,

§23).

33

It s

incidentalhat

Wittgenstein

oesnot nclude

confessing

n

his

brief

nventory

of the

multiplicity

f

anguage-games

although,

e does nclude

[ajsking, hanking,

cursing,

reeting,raying

1958,

23).

64

For detailed

nalysis

f his

ee Plant

2004; 2005,

specially hapter

.

35Wittgensteinroceeds:if nyone elieves hatcertain onceptsreabsolutelyhe

correct

nes,

nd that

having

ifferent

neswouldmeannot

realizing omething

hatwe

realize then

et

him

magine

ertain

ery eneral

acts fnature

obe

differentrom hat

we are used

to,

nd the formationf

oncepts

ifferent

rom

he usual oneswill

become

intelligible

o him

1958,

230).







548

Journal

fReligious

thics

them s pieces f tupidity1996,61).Mindful fWittgenstein'sonti-

nuity

hesis

egardingprimitive

ehaviours nd

anguage,

we

begin

o

see how

his ownwork

voids

drawing

razer's onclusion. his becomes

clear

when

Wittgenstein

peculates:

onecould

begin

bookon anthro-

pology y

aying:

When ne examines

he ife nd behaviour

f

mankind

throughout

he

world,

ne sees

that,

except

forwhat

might

e called

animal

ctivities,

uch

as

ingestion,

tc.,

tc., tc.,

men lso

perform

c-

tions

which ear a

characteristic

eculiar

o

themselves,

nd these ould

be called

ritualistic

ctions

67).

Here

Wittgensteinffectively

loses

the

gap

between

he so-called

primitive

nd modern uman

being.

Moreover,hisfundamentalommonalityetween he primitive nd

modern s

something

razermust

albeit

acitly) resuppose,

or the

principle

ccording

o which

hese

practices

re

arranged

..

is a much

more

general

ne than n

Frazer's

xplanation

nd it is

present

n

our

own

minds,

o that

we ourselves

ould think

up

all the

possibilities

(65-6).

In

other

words,

f

Frazer's

explanations

id not

n

theend

ap-

peal

to a

tendency

n

ourselves hen

hey

would ot

really

e

explana-

tions

66)

at all.

Wittgenstein's

ontinuity

hesis

thus

highlights

wo

methodological

points

mentioned

reviously,

uthereworth

ecalling:

1)

Wittgenstein's

characterizationfhis newphilosophicalpproach s consistingn see-

ing

he

onnections

69)

or

interrelations

1994b,

2)

between

henom-

ena;

and

(2)

his

differentiation

etween his

approach

nd the natural

sciences

1958,

230).

As he later

comments:

Once

..

a

phenomenon

s

brought

nto

onnection ith n

instinct

hich

myself ossess,

his s

precisely

he

explanation

wished

for;

hat

s,

the

explanation

which

e-

solves

this

particular

ifficulty.

nd

a further

nvestigation

bout the

history

f

my

nstinct

moves

on

another rack

1996,

72).

Frazer thus

fails o

recognize

he

kinship

etween

those

avages'

behaviour

68)

and

any

genuinely

eligious

ction of

today

64).

This crucial

point

Wittgensteinutsto work gainstFrazer as follows:Frazer: . That

these

observances re

dictated

y

fearofthe

ghost

fthe

slain seems

certain

But

why

hen

does

Frazeruse the

word

ghost'?

e thusun-

derstands his

uperstition

ery

well,

ince

he

explains

t to

us with su-

perstitious

ord

he s

familiar

with.

Or

rather,

his

might

ave enabled

him

to see

thatthere

s also

something

n

us which

peaks

n

favour

f

those

avages'

behaviour

68;

my mphasis).

And ikewise:

I

should ike

to

say:

nothing

howsour

kinship

o

those

avages

better

hanthe fact

that razer

has

on hand

a word

s

familiar

o

himself

nd tous as

'ghost'

or

shade' n

order o

describe he

views

f

these

eople

and much

oolittle s madeofthefact hatwe count hewords soul' and

spirit'

s

part

ofour

educated

vocabulary

70;

myemphasis).

What these

prac-

tices

herefore

how s

not the

derivation

f ne

from he

other,

utof

common

pirit

80;

see

also

1958,

206).

Thus

f

one

wanted o

nvent









550

Journal

fReligious

thics

he does this n a tonewhich hows hathe feels, nd wantsus tofeel,

that

omethingtrange

nd

dreadful

s

happening

63).

Wittgenstein's

caution

here

s,

I

believe,

qually applicable

when

reading

Foucault's

genealogy

nsofar s the atter's ttitude oward onfessionalechnolo-

gies

s

clearlynegative.

his is not to

say

that Foucault's

nalyses

re

simply

actually

rroneous

which,

f

ourse,

heymay

be).

Indeed,

ne

distinguishing

eature fFoucault'swork s his

acknowledgment

hathe

is not

attempting

o

provide

comprehensive

istorical

icture

1980,

212;

1997a,

202).

Nevertheless,

hen

eading

is

history

f he

present

(Dreyfus

nd Rabinow

1982,

174)

it is

important

o

keep

n

mind hat

thesense of somethingtrange nd dreadful appeningmight otbe

due

to

anything eyond

oucault's

way

of

electing

nd

assembling

he

data

Wittgenstein

996,

69).

I

have

already

noted he

ambiguity

etween oucault's

mphasis

n

the

historical

ontinuity

fconfessional

ractices

nd the fundamental

discontinuitiesherein. ut what

first ooks

ike a

sensitive ccount f

the

multiplicity

1990,

33)

ofconfessional

iscourses,

ltimately nly

traces he

ripples

n the

urface f

power.

More

pointedly,

f

ll relation-

ships

are

necessarily

nfused

with

power

1997a,

167,

283, 291-2, 298);

namely,

f

[p]ower

s

everywhere

because t comes rom

verywhere

(1990,93;see also Said 1996,150)then hispivotal oucauldian oncept

is

in

danger

f

becoming

aturated

o the

point

f

vacuity Wittgenstein

1994b,

6;

Said

1996,

151-2).

Furthermore,

here re

tangible

thical-

political

onsequences

t

stakehere.For

lthough

oucault

may

be

right

that t

is

necessary

o

expand

he

dimensions f definition

f

power

(1982,

209)

beyond

hefamiliar

pposition

f

domination/freedom,

o ex-

pand

the

notion oo far

eads to

obvious

roblems.

hus,

responding

o

the

question

whether he

conception

f careof he self

remains ssen-

tially

goistic

and

even

potentially

eads to one'sdominationf

thers),

Foucault

etorts:

No,

because

therisk f

dominating

thers nd exercis-

ing tyrannicalower ver hem risesprecisely nlywhen nehas not

taken

are of

he self nd

has become

slave ofone's

desires.But

f

you

take

proper

are of

yourself

you

annot buse

your

ower

ver thers.

Thus,

here s

no

danger

1997a,

288).

This

rejoinder

s not

only

ncon-

vincing,

t

sits

uncomfortably

longside

oucault's

hypothesis

hat

it's

all

against

ll

..

Who

fights gainst

whom?We all

fight

ach other. nd

there

s

always

within ach

ofus

something

hat

fights

omething

lse

(1980,

208).

Of

ourse,

t s

not

difficulto see

whatFoucaulthas

in

mind

when

haracterizing

ecular

onfessional

echnologies

s an

extension f

the

inister

tribunals f

nquisition,

hich ad

previously

ituated he

confessiont the heartof civil nd

religious

owers

1990,

58).

Nev-

ertheless,

peaking

f

for

xample)

he over's

onfession

n

the same

breath

s

these

tribunals an

only

ead

to confusion.

fter

ll,

those

confessions

wrung

rom

person

y

violence r

threat

59)

are

hardly







The

Confessing

nimal n Foucault nd

Wittgenstein

551

archetypalorms f onfessionaliscourse.36twouldbe more ppropri-

ate

though

oubtless ess useful o

Foucault)

o

simply ay

that onfes-

sion

has turned

ut

to be a

particularly

esilient nd

malleable

practice.

But then

n

investigation

nto theconditions f

its]

emergence

73)

could

ake an

altogether

ifferent,

nd much ess

sinister,

rajectory.

Leaving

his

side,

a more ritical

oint

needsto

be made here.

n

an

astonishing assage

Foucaultmaintains hat

every

entiment,

articu-

larly

henoblest nd

most

disinterested,

as a

history.

We believe

n

the

dull

constancy

f nstinctualifeand

imagine

hat t

continueso exert ts forcendiscriminatelynthepresent s itdid nthe

past.

Buthistorical

nowledgeasily isintegrates

his

nity

We

believe,

in

any

vent,

hat he

body beys

he xclusiveaws of

physiology,

nd

that

it

escapes

he nfluencef

history,

ut his oo s false.The

body

s

moulded

by great

many

istinct

egimes Nothing

n man

not venhis

body

is

sufficiently

table s thebasis for

elf-recognition

r for

nderstanding

other

men

Foucault

998,

379-80].

7

This,

I

believe,

s

what

ultimately

urns on Foucault's

genealogical

project.38

ut can such

extravagant

laims

be

sustained?

n

order o

answer

his would

again)

iketo turn o

Wittgenstein,

nd

specifically

a few assageswhich sefullyupplementRemarks n Frazer'sGolden

Bough?

In

Philosophical

nvestigationsWittgenstein

rites:

Suppose you

came

as an

explorer

nto

an unknown

ountry

ith a

language

quite

strange

o

you.

n

what circumstances

ould

you say

that the

people

there

ave

orders,

nderstood

hem,

beyed

hem,

ebelled

gainst

hem,

and so

on? The common ehaviour

fmankinds the

ystem

f

ef-

erence

by

means of

whichwe

interpret

n unknown

anguage

1958,

§206).

Further

n we are toldthat

[o]nly

fwhat behaves ike a

hu-

man

being

can

one

say

that t has

pains

[§283].

39

As we saw

earlier,

Wittgensteinikewisemaintains hat it s a primitiveeaction otend,

to

treat,

he

part

hat

hurtswhen omeone lse s

in

pain;

and not

merely

whenoneself

s. He is also clearthat

primitive

eremeansthat

this

sort f

behaviour s

pre-linguistic:

hat a

language-game

s based on

it,

36

On the

necessary) ossibility

f

fferingpurely

mechanical

onfessionee Derrida

2002a,134-35,

158. On the over's onfessionee Barthes 990.

37

A

similar laim

oncerningain

s made

by Caputo

1993,

208-209).

Butler

1999,

308)

also notes

his

passage

n

Foucault.

38

Foucault s clear hat

he does not

believe here

s a

universal

orm

f

ubject

hat

onecould ind nywhere,nd as suchremainsvery ostile 1996, 52)towardny uch

universalist

onception.

39

And

ikewise:

only

f

living

uman

eing

ndwhat esembles

behaves ike)

living

human

eing

an one

say:

t has

sensations;

t

sees;

s

blind;

ears;

s

deaf;

s conscious r

unconscious

Wittgenstein

958,

281).









The

Confessing

nimal n Foucault

nd

Wittgenstein

553

to t.Forno matterwhere isgenealogical azecomes o rest driven,f

course,

y

his

alleged skepticism

oward ll

anthropological

niversals

(1998,

461)

Foucault's oncern emains

firmly

n

the

realm of

finite,

vulnerable,

mbodied uman

beings.

s this

anthropological

niversal

merely

ne historicalonstruct

mong

o

many

therswhich

needs

to

be

circumvented

462)?

Or

rather,

s it not

precisely

his acit

recogni-

tion hat

provides

the

asis

for

elf-recognition

nd for

nderstanding

other

men

380)?

As we

have

een,

Foucault reats onfessional

ractices

ith

uspicion.

That the discourses fconfession ave

played

formative

ole

n

even

themost rdinaryffairs f verydayife 1990,59) is not,forhim,

merehistorical act.

ike

Nietzsche's

enealogy

f

eligion

nd

morality,

Foucault's

enealogy

f onfession

ossesses

normative

imension. f

course,

his

does not

n

tselfwarrant

eproof.

he

problem

rises

n

the

way

Foucault's

uspicion

istorts he confessional

echnologies

e docu-

ments.

ne

strikingxample

f his

ppears

n The

History f

exuality,

wherehe writes:

[C]onfession

s a ritualofdiscourse that unfoldswithin

power

ela-

tionship,

or ne does not confesswithout he

presence

or

virtual

pres-

ence)of partner ho s not implyhe nterlocutorut he uthorityho

requires

he

confession,

rescribes

nd

appreciates

t,

and

intervenes

n

order o

udge, punish, orgive,

onsole,

nd

reconcile;

ritual

n

which

the

expression

lone,

ndependently

f ts external

onsequences,

ro-

duces ntrinsic

modifications

n

the

person

who articulates t: it

exoner-

ates,

redeems,

nd

purifies

im;

t unburdens

im

ofhis

wrongs,

iberates

him,

nd

promises

im

alvation

..

Its

veracity

s not

guaranteed y

the

lofty uthority

f he

magistery,

or

by

the traditiont

transmits,

ut

by

the

bond,

hebasic

ntimacy

n

discourse,

etween heonewho

peaks

nd

what

he is

speaking

bout.On the other

and,

he

agency

f

domination

doesnot eside

n

theone

who

peaks

for

t s he who

s

constrained),

ut

n

theonewho istens [a]nd hisdiscourse f ruth inallyakeseffect,ot

in theonewho eceives

t,

but

n

theonefrom hom t s wrested

Foucault

1990,61-2].

Within

pecific

onfessional cenarios his

may

be a

just representa-

tion,

ut t

is

inadequatebeyond

hosenarrow

onfines.

aradoxically,

given

is

emphasis

nthe

multidimensionality

f

power,

egarding

on-

fessional

iscourses oucault ften

resents markedly

nilateral

ic-

ture.44 ot

only

re there nnumerable

ossible

motives or

onfessing,

how

one confesses

to

whom ne

confesses, here,when,

nd what

one

confesses) laysa part n determininghe power elations etween

44

Although

will

notdiscuss

his

here,

nenotable

xception

anbe foundn

Foucault's

positive

emarks

n theuse of

strategic ower

n Sadomasochism

1997a, 165-66,

169).







554

Journal

fReligious

thics

confessorndconfessee.45 hat s noteworthyere s howtherecipient

can be

implicated

y

the

other's onfessiono offer confession

often

f

greater xposure)

in

return. 46he

recipient

f confessionhuswalks

treacherous

ath

between,

nthe

one

hand,

cknowledgment

even

rein-

forcement)

f

he other's

uilt,47

nd,

on the other

and,

ompassionate

reassurance.

One

must,

s it

were,

permit

he

other

he

right

o their

guilt

without

hereby

urdening

hem

unnecessarily

Pascal

1996, 45,

49-50).

Arguably

t is the

possibility

f

being

drawn nto n

escalating

confessional

xchange

a sortof

pologetic otlatch

thatnecessitates

the

mposition

f

egulations,

uch s we find

n

bothChristian nd

psy-

choanalyticonfessionals. llof hesefactors,would rgue, recrucial

for

roperly

nderstanding

hat

Foucaulthimself eferredo above as

thebasic

intimacy

fdiscourse

1990,

62).48

t is therefore

uestion-

able that

for

xample)

he

recipient

f

confession

f ove

necessarily

constitutesthe

authority

ho

requires

he

confession,

rescribes

nd

appreciates

t,

and

intervenes

n

order o

udge,

punish,

orgive,

on-

sole,

nd

reconcile.

ndeed,

t s not ven

lear hat

religious

onfessions

need

take thisform.

We should ikewise e

mindful

hatnotall

confes-

sions re

prompted y

whatwe have

actively,reely,ntentionally)

one

(Bok

1986,76;

Derrida

1999,6-7, 33-5, 56;

2002b,

380-98).

Neither s

theconfessionecessarilyinkedto salvationorredemptionDerrida

2002a, 88, 101,

104).

9

Foucault's

haracterizing

ll

the

aforementioned

discourses

s

confessional verlooks hat a confession

eed

not

com-

municate

nformationr

knowledge.

confessions notmere

eportage

concerning

past

event r inner

rocess

Wittgenstein

958,222;

see

also

Derrida

1999,70; 2000c,38;

2002a, 108-9, 190),50

ut rather on-

sistsof n

apology

remorse,

uilt,

ppeal

for

orgiveness,

nd so

on),

nd

thereby promise

o not

repeat

the

transgression

Derrida

1997a,

19-

20;

2000a, 110,

140).

1

If

there s

anything

evelatory

boutconfession

45

The

confession

an,

after

ll,

merely

ound thers.With his n mind ee

Derrida's

remarks n the

poisonous

ift

1992,

12,

62-64).

4b

See,

for

xample,

ousseau

1953, 4,

114-15;

Foucault

980,198-200;1990, 4-45,

61-62,

71.

47

The

recipient's

unloading

lame nto nother

n

[her]

elf

(Derrida

002a,

97).

48

People

who

give

us their

omplete

rust

elieve hat

hey

hereforeave a

right

o

our

own.This

conclusions false:

ights

re notwon

bygifts

Nietzsche

994,

311).

Bok

refers

o the natural

mpulse

f

he

recipient

f

confessiono

respond

n

kind

1986,

80).

49

On

extra-linguistic

onfessionee

Derrida

999, 8-99; 2001,

47-48.

50

Contrast his

with oucault

997a,

182-83,

23-24.

51When onfessingnemakes n implicitppealto therecipiento believe he incer-

ity

nd

veracity

f he

confession

Wittgenstein

990,

558).

Even

f,

ike

Rousseau,

ne

explicitlyppeals

Believe

me,

tell hewhole ruth

1953, 1,65, 134,136,

176)

there ies

a tacit

ppeal

n

this

very

vowal

f

truthfulness

Derrida

996,82; 1997b, 2-23; 1998,

63; 2000a,

418; 2000b, 7; 2000c,59,

75; 2002a, 111-12,

140,

166,

173,

189).

Foucault's







The

Confessing

nimal n Foucault nd

Wittgenstein

555

it concerns, otthe act or offensetself ofwhich herecipientfthe

confession

ay

be

only

oo ware

Augustine

998,

72)

butrather ne's

remorse t

having

cted

n

that

way,

nd

one'sfuture

ommitmentonot

reproduce

t. This s

why,

s

Wittgenstein

otes,

confessionas to be

part

of

your

new

ife

1994b,

18;

see also

46;

Bok

1986, 75-6;

Derrida

2005,

23).52

4. Conclusion

It s

fashionable,

t east

n

some ntellectual

ircles,

o nsist

hat

con-

tingencyoes ll thewaydown Dooley 001,43)53; hat here snothing

confining

hedramaofhistorical-ultural

orces. ut

Wittgenstein,

ho

is often

harged

with

promoting

uch

deas,

counters his

tendency y

maintaining

hat cultural-historicalnd

individual differences not

radical.

Rather,

s we have

seen,

human

ife s

circumscribed

y

very

general

acts fnature

1958,

230)

pertaining

o the

natural

history

f

human

eings §415).

4

In

this

paper

have therefore

anted o

suggest

that

t is

only

n the basis

ofour sharednatural

history

nd

primitive

behaviors

hat Western

man ould become

confessing

nimal

Fou-

cault

1990,

59).55

project

might

hereforee more

ccurately

escribeds a

genealogy

f estimonial

ractice

rather han

onfession

trictlypeaking.nterestingly,

errida

uggests

hat

estimony

n

general

resupposes

confessional oment:Since

can

always

ie and since he

ther

an

always

e thevictim

f his ie

.. I

always egin,

t east

mplicitly,y onfessingpossible

fault,

buse,

or

violence,

n

elementaryerjury,

n

originaryetrayal. alwaysbegin y

asking orgiveness

hen address

myself

otheother even

f

t s

in

order o

say

to

him

or

her

things

hat re constative

s,

for

xample:

You

know,

t's

raining'

2002a,

112).

have

rgued

lsewherehat oth

errida ndLevinas re

fundamentally

reoccupied

ith

existential

uilt

Plant

2003a;

2005).

52

On

repetition

ee

Derrida

000c, 2-33,

40-42.

53

The

specific

ontext f this

remark s

Dooley's

eading

fDerrida.For a detailed

criticismf his, ee Plant2003a.

54

Winch ollows

Wittgensein

n this

point.

ee

especially

Winch

960,239, 242-43;

1964, 09,318,322,

324.

55

I

am

grateful

otwo

nonymous

eaders

or heir

omments

n

an earlier raft f his

paper.

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Documents

The Confessing Animal in Foucault and Wittgenstein by Bob Plant