The Confiscation and Disposition of Loyalists' Estates in Suffolk County, Massachusetts

The Confiscation and Disposition of Loyalists' Estates in Suffolk County, MassachusettsAuthor(s): Richard D. BrownSource: The William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Oct., 1964), pp. 534-550Published by: Omohundro Institute of Early American History and CultureStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1923305 .

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The Confiscation and Disposition of Loyalists' Estates in Suffolk County, Massachusetts

Richard D. Brown*

OHN Franklin Jameson's The American Revolution Considered as J a Social Movement turned the course of Revolutionary histori-

ography. Following C. H. Van Tyne's approach, Jameson argued that the confiscation of loyalist lands altered and "democratized" existing American social and economic patterns.' His thesis, radical in I926, be- came orthodox within a generation, so that Robert R. Palmer, in i960,

could present it without argument as evidence of the genuinely revolutionary character of the Revolution.2 Palmer departed from Jameson by arguing that the democratization had been limited and that a "new propertied class" emerged.3 Richard B. Morris, skeptical of the remarkable importance attached to confiscations, quickly challenged Palmer, arguing that the motives behind confiscation were financial and, excepting the "windfall" gains of a few "insiders," the consequences of confiscation were essentially fiscal.4

Both scholars have based their revisions on detailed studies of the confiscation of loyalist estates in New York by Harry Yoshpe and Staughton Lynd.5 These studies have illumined fractions of the total picture, and all

* Mr. Brown is a graduate student, Harvard University. 'Claude H. Van Tyne, The Loyalists in the American Revolution (New York,

i9oi), 280; J. Franklin Jameson, The American Revolution Considered as a Social Movement (Princeton, I926), 9, 34, 40, et passin.

2 Frederick B. Tolles, "The American Revolution Considered as a Social Move- ment: A Re-evaluation," American Historical Review, LX (i954-55), 3; Robert R. Palmer, The Age of the Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe and America, i76o-i8oo (Princeton, I959), I88-i 89.

3 Palmer, Age of Democratic Revolution, 233. 4 Richard B. Morris, "Class Struggle and the American Revolution," William and

Mary Quarterly, 3d Ser., XIX (i962), 23. 5 Harry B. Yoshpe, The Disposition of Loyalist Estates in the Southern District

of the State of New York (New York, i939); Staughton Lynd, "Who Should Rule at Home? Dutchess County, New York, in the American Revolution," Wm. and Mary Qtly., 3d Ser., XVIII (i96i), 330-359. See also, Robert S. Lambert, "The Con- fiscation of Loyalist Property in Georgia, I782-I786," Wm. and Mary Qtly., 3d Ser., XX (i963), 80-94.



LOYALIST ESTATES 535

would agree that a wider, more varied sampling of confiscations is needed. The unique political and geographic circumstances of Suffolk County, Massachusetts, indicate that its experience with the confiscation and disposition of loyalist property may be especially significant. Suffolk, lying south of the Charles and along the coast, and including Boston among its nineteen townships, was a populous, wealthy, and powerful Mas- sachusetts county and the home of nearly all its Revolutionary leaders. Here the confiscations involved men of commerce as well as agriculture, in a county and province where political behavior, articulate and sophisti- cated, might be expected to produce a clear, determined confiscation policy.

Massachusetts's first legislative act relating to loyalist property shows that confiscation was being considered as early as I775; in May of that year the Provincial Congress froze the titles of property belonging to the "refugees" who had fled to Boston.6 Soon after, it directed town select- men and committees of correspondence to sequester vacant estates for the benefit of the state.' When the British evacuated Boston, in March I776,

the exultant House of Representatives ordered a committee to draw up a confiscation bill.8 Meanwhile the General Court, finding itself with more property to administer as a result of the evacuation, erected a committee of sequestration to secure and inventory the Suffolk estates of loyalist "Absconders."9

Unaccountably, nothing came of the anticipated confiscation bill. In- stead, the General Court directed the sale of one-year leases on the loyalist estates.10 This policy of sequestration was formally established in April I777 by the "Act To Prevent the Waste ... and Also for Payment of Their Just Debts. . . ," which placed the estates in the hands of the probate judges of each county, who were to administer them in a manner paral- leling the procedures for cases of intestacy. Thus provision was made for the dependents as well as the creditors of the departed loyalist."

6 Resolve of the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts, May 22, I775, in William Lincoln, ed., Journals of Each Provincial Congress of Massachusetts in I774 and I775

(Boston, I838), 249. 7 Resolve of the Prov. Cong., June 2I, I775, ibid., 368-369. 8 Mar. I9, I776, in journal of the Honorable House of Representatives . .. s9th

July . . . '775 [to May 10, y776] (Boston, I776), i8. 9 Resolve, Apr. 3, I776, in The Acts and Resolves, Public and Private, of the

Province of the Massachusetts Bay (Boston, i869-i922), XIX, 3I0. 10 Resolve, Apr. 23, I776, ibid., 340-341.

"Act of Apr. 9, I777, ibid., V, 629-633.



536 WILLIAM AND MARY QUARTERLY

By November I777, when the Continental Congress "earnestly recom- mended" confiscation, Massachusetts had apparently abandoned the idea.12 Though confiscation had a pecuniary appeal, it was competing with a sequestration policy which was also attractive. Sequestration protected the interests of creditors as well as the public, while preventing loyalists' dependents from becoming burdensome to particular towns. Further- more, although it was nowhere spelled out, sequestration preserved for the owners virtually all that was rightfully theirs and would enable them to return and resume their property whenever popular opinion or the return of peace should permit.

Nevertheless, confiscation remained an issue, and in September I778 the General Court began to consider it once more.18 Its opponents, having blocked confiscation earlier, continued to prevent its passage. James War- ren, a Whig representative from Plymouth, found that the confiscation bill "Labours very hard, and if it passes at all will not be very Compre- hensive." He explained that "some People of Influence are against the Principle [of confiscation] and Consequently every part of it, and some other Great Ones, haveing no principle themselves but their own Ambi- tion and popular Applause, will Contend with violence for the Principle and then reduce it to Nothing by the small Number [of loyalists] to be Inserted. the first is to please the Whiggs, the last the Tories, for all are to be pleased, and most people will be pleased." Confiscation, favored in a moderate form by the public, was being thwarted by those who were sympathetic to the loyalists and by those who opposed confiscation as an attack on private property. A third motive for opposing confiscation, according to Samuel Adams, was the fear on the part of men who held credits in England that Parliament would retaliate and confiscate their holdings in England. Such men were not numerous but Adams believed they were influential.14

As a result the confiscation bill continued to labor very hard. It was amended and considered and sent back and forth between the Repre- sentatives and the Council, until it was finally decided to redraft the bill

12 Nov. 27, 1777, in Worthington C. Ford, ed., Journals of the Continental Con- gress, 1774-1789, IX (Washington, I907), 971.

13 Andrew McF. Davis, "The Confiscation Laws of Massachusetts," in Colonial Society of Massachusetts, Publications, VIII (Boston, i906), 57.

14 James Warren to Samuel Adams, Sept. 30, 1778, in Warren-Adams Letters (Massachusetts Historical Society, Collections, LXXIII [Boston, 1925]), II, 48; Sam- uel Adams to James Warren, Oct. 1778, in William V. Wells, Life and Public Services of Samuel Adams ... (Boston, i865), III, 50.




and postpone its consideration until April I779.l5 This delay was a victory for the opponents of confiscation, and Warren saw little hope: "Some times the pendulum swings one way and sometimes the other-I mean with regard to Whiggism or Toryism, but," he said, it "never fails to swing uniformly against all that wont Bow down and worship a very Silly Image."'6

By April 30, i779, the pendulum must have swung sharply in favor of the Whigs, for two confiscation bills were enacted within a single week.17 Just why the pendulum had so suddenly swung remains a mystery. It was not that the composition of the Court had changed, for the same men were sitting in April I779 as had been sitting during the previous ten months. Nor was confiscation a response to any act of Parliament. Th6 deterioration of colonial finances may have persuaded some to favor confiscation, but evidence of this is not apparent. In any case, the General Court, hesitant for so long, was now confiscating loyalist property as thoroughly as the most ardent and vengeful could wish, justifying the confiscations in blatant Whig terms.

The first act, "An Act to Confiscate the Estates of Certain Notorious Conspirators . . . ," cited by name all the leading officers of the late royal government in Massachusetts from Governors Francis Bernard and Thomas Hutchinson to Solicitor-General Samuel Quincy. These "Notori- ous Conspirators against the Government and Liberties of the Inhabit- ants . . . of Massachusetts Bay" had "wickedly conspired to overthrow and destroy the constitution of government of the late province of Massa- chusetts Bay, as established by the charter agreed upon by and between ... William and Mary . . . and the inhabitants of . . . Massachusetts Bay; and also to reduce the said inhabitants under the absolute power and domi- nation of the present king, and . . . parli[a]ment . . . and [they had], as far as in them lay, . . . aided and assisted the ... king and parli[a]ment in their endeavors to establish a dispotic government over the . . . inhabitants." They had therefore "justly incurred the forfeiture of all their property.""8

To Whigs the justice of the act, like the evidence of the conspiracy, 15 Journal of the Honorable House of Representatives, May 27, i778 to May 3,

i779 (Boston, 1778), e.g., 54, 59, 70, 78, 8o, 9i, 99. 16 James Warren to Samuel Adams, Feb. 12, 1779, in Warren-Adams Letters,

II, 87. 17 Apr. 26, 28, 29, 30, I779, in Journal of the ... House, May 27, I778 to May 3,

1779, pp. I95, 201, 204, 205. 18 Act of Apr. 30, I779, in Acts and Resolves, V, 966-967.




was unimpeachable. Others might doubt that these men, many of whom were natives of Massachusetts Bay, had conspired against Massachusetts's liberty; but few doubted that the act was within the power of the Court. However dubious the opening argument, the confiscation was legal, even without process, since it applied only to named individuals who had been prominent in royal government and active in taking its part.19 Thus the "Act to Confiscate the Estates of Certain Notorious Conspirators," if somewhat excessive in its rhetoric, was suitably punitive, pleasing many and giving little cause for alarm.

The second act, the general act called "An Act for Confiscating the Estates of Certain Persons Commonly Called Absentees," was another matter.20 Whereas the initial act had confiscated the estates of only twenty- nine royal officials, this more general act might touch as many as two thousand people, many of whose relatives and friends still resided in Massachusetts. Furthermore, there was no certainty as to just what crime, if any, these "Persons Commonly Called Absentees" had committed. Dur- ing the previous four years the General Court had betrayed its own un- certainty as to the status of these persons by describing them variously as "refugees," "open and avowed enemies," "persons who have fled," "Ob- noxious persons," "absconders," "Persons who are Inimical," and "ab- sconding enemies."21 For however the Whigs might judge them, the loyalists do not seem to have been deeply hated or widely feared in Massa- chusetts at large. James Warren saw that country towns were reluctant to prosecute absentees, and during the confiscating session of the Gen- eral Court opinion was sufficiently divided to allow the introduction of bills which would have permitted absentees to return with full rights. Such bills were defeated; but the preamble and terms of the general confiscation act suggest that, however severely the Whigs might hope to deal

19"Notoriety" in English law permitted the suspension of ordinary procedure in certain circumstances, allowing summary conviction.

20 May I, i779, in Acts and Resolves, V, 968-97i. 21 Estimate on the number of loyalists is based on figures cited in Lorenzo Sabine,

Biographical Sketches of Loyalists of the American Revolution, with an Historical Essay, 2 vols. (Boston, i864) and James H. Stark, Loyalists of Massachusetts and the Other Side of the American Revolution (Boston, I9I0), 58 ff. and passim. See also E. Alfred Jones, The Loyalists of Massachusetts, Their Memorials, Petitions and Claims (London, I930). For various terms used to describe loyalists see Davis, "Confiscation Laws," 54, 55, 56, 58; and Resolves, May 4, July 4, Sept. i8, i776, Jan. 13, July 8, I777, Oct. I5, Sept. i9, I778, in Acts and Resolves, XIX, 380, 506, 586; XX, 758, 80, 534, 481.




with absentee property, these confiscations had to be justified to constitu- ents who, if they were not opposed to confiscation on principle, at least doubted whether it was merited in the case of absentees.22 In addition there may have been fears of the general consequences of such sweeping confiscations in a polity where partisan politics were firmly established, and where supreme power was vested in a mere legislative majority.

An attempt to justify the confiscation of absentee estates appeared in the form of a preamble to the act explaining the absentees' "crimes." Unlike the "Notorious Conspirators" act, it did not argue that the persons in question were guilty of any conspicuous crime that had thereby rendered their property liable to confiscation. Instead, the preamble argued a proposition which was revolutionary in its implications.

Whereas every government hath a right to command the personal services of all its members whenever the exigencies of the state shall require it, especially in times of an impending or actual invasion, no member thereof can then withdraw himself from the jurisdiction of the government, and thereby deprive it of the benefit of his personal services, without justly in- curring the forfeiture of all his property, rights and liberties, holden under and derived from that constitution of government . . . [Italics added]23

Probably this curious argument was not intended as the basis for a levee en masse, or meant to deny the anterior character of natural private rights in relation to the state. Its aim was merely to provide a legal basis for the confiscation of the absentee estates. Yet, ironically, by seeking to justify the confiscation of private property in a state where such rights were viewed as sacred and indispensable to liberty, the Whigs were driven to the extreme of erecting a theory which ultimately contradicted the natural right to property. That they went to such lengths, however inad- vertently, is evidence of the doubt and concern which the issue of a general confiscation raised in Massachusetts. In New York the straight- forward declaration of "the sovereignty of the people of this State in respect to all property within the same," sufficed as the basis for all confiscations.24 In Massachusetts there was no such bold denial of the natural

22 James Warren to John Adams, Oct. 7, and Sept. 30, i778, in Warren-Adams Letters, II, 52, 48; see also n. 40 below.

23 Acts and Resolves, V, 968. 24Act of Oct. 22, I779, in Laws of the State of New York, 1777-1784 (Albany,

i886), i73.




right to property. "Notorious Conspirators" forfeited their property in a manner recognized in common law, while those who had merely ab- sented themselves were declared criminals, though only after the Whigs had developed the ingenious theory set forth in the general act.

Equally important as a measure of the concern which the general act raised was the insertion of a requirement for jury trial to determine in each instance whether the act applied to a particular estate, so that persons accused under it might "have their property defended in the best manner that their situation will admit of." Emphasis in confiscations was shifted from the realm of legislative fiat as in the "Notorious Con- spirators" act-which declared property immediately forfeit to the state- to that of "due process" under the traditionally established system for deal- ing with real property. The fact that confiscations were not immediately effective, but took effect only after judgment was made on estates indi- vidually, gave assurance that property rights would not be extinguished wholesale or in an irresponsible manner. It also provided the relatives and friends of an absentee, or even his agent, with a means to seek to pro- tect the estate.25

In all other provisions the two acts were identical. The acts were to apply to all property held by the conspirator or absentee on or after April I9, I775; all debts they had incurred before that date were to be payable out of their respective estates. Wives and widows who had remained within the jurisdiction of the "United States" were entitled to one third of the estate after all debts had been paid. This dower right was to be fixed by the judges of probate as if the "husband had died intestate, within the jurisdiction of this state." In the meantime judges were "to fix a competent allowance, from time to time," adequate "for the comforta- ble support" of the wife or widow and "having respect to the value" of the confiscated estate.20 In this way the General Court softened the edge of confiscation and rendered it acceptable to the people of Massachusetts by bringing it almost entirely within the ordinary laws governing real property and intestacy.

25The history of the loyalist estates in the courts cannot be written until the records of the Inferior Court of Suffolk for the Revolutionary period are discovered. The only record, the Jedidiah Foster Notebook, I777-79, Library of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Boston, covering the Superior Court, contains no mention of loyalists or their property. The records of the Attorney General, which might show how vigorously the state pursued confiscation are also lost. Quotation is from Acts and Resolves, V, 969.

26This provision also directed the support of noncollateral relatives who were unable to support themselves. Ibid., 97I.




Neither confiscation act made any provision for the disposition of the estates. Their- sale was not even mentioned. But by a resolution of May 3, I779, the same session of the legislature which had passed the acts directed the sale of the Suffolk estates formerly belonging to Governors Bernard and Hutchinson, and Mandamus Councillors Sir William Pepperell, Joshua Loring, and Nathaniel Hatch. These conspirators' estates were to be sold "immediately" for cash at public auction after notice of the time and place of the auction had been given in three Boston newspapers for three successive weeks. Money derived from these sales was to go to the public treasury to be used in recruiting Continental soldiers.27

The first sale under the resolve was made on June I, I779, when Wil- liam Allen, a Dorchester merchant, purchased the Dorchester estate of Governor Bernard for ?8,886 in the depreciated paper currency of Massa- chusetts. In July Bernard's Roxbury estate was sold to Martin Brimmer, a Boston merchant, and by early September fifteen more parcels had been sold, so that a total of /123,784 in depreciated Massachusetts currency was paid into the treasury. The grand Boston mansion of Sir William Pep- perell and the Boston properties of Thomas Hutchinson were not sold, nor would they be sold until after a second resolution ordered further sales of conspirators' estates.28

This resolve, passed on September 23, I779, was comprehensive. All the estates of all the conspirators in every county were to be sold by three- man committees, rapidly if possible.29 In Suffolk the committee was made up of Caleb Davis, Richard Cranch, and Ebenezer Wales, the same men who had sold the estates during the summer. They began immediately and from October on into I780 public auctions were held all over Massa- chusetts, normally on the premises of the property being sold.

By April I9, I780, when the Court abruptly suspended sales in Suf- folk County, the Suffolk sales had netted, all told, nearly half a million (464,8I4) pounds in the depreciated currency. Thirty-five parcels, eight- teen in Boston and seventeen in other Suffolk towns, formerly owned by

27Ibid., XX, 7V6. 28 Unless otherwise indicated, sales records and data on the occupations and

status of loyalists and purchasers given in this paper are taken from conveyances recorded in the Land Registry of Suffolk County, Land Registry Office, Suffolk County Court House, Boston; Records of the Court of Probate, Suffolk County, Suf- folk County Court House; and Journal of the Committee for the Sale of Estates of Absentees in Suffolk County, Massachusetts Archives, Boston.

29 Resolve, Sept. 23, I779, in Acts and Resolves, XXI, I52-I53. Unimproved land in Hampshire, Berkshire, Cumberland, and York counties was specifically excluded from these sales.




eight conspirators, had been sold to eighteen merchants, three mariners, an attorney, a baker, a farmer, an upholsterer, and an inn-holder. These were the only loyalist lands in Suffolk sold for the state's benefit.

The cause for the suspension, applying to Suffolk alone, seems to have been the General Court's dissatisfaction with the amount of revenue the sales were producing. A suspicion prevailed among members of the Court that bidders at the Suffolk auctions had conspired to hold down prices, to the damage of the state and the creditors. In fact, the low prices may equally have been caused by a general scarcity of cash and a conse- quent dearth of investors. But for whatever reason, there was no doubt that the estates had been purchased "on very advantageous terms."30

In June I780, the Court authorized the sales committees all over the state to use the confiscated lands as securities for a state loan so as to help finance the ?400,000 emission which Massachusetts was attempting in ful- fillment of a request of the Continental Congress.3' It is uncertain whether this program succeeded in raising the needed funds.

In November the Suffolk sales committee was directed to resume at its discretion sales of all the confiscated estates, both conspirator and absentee.32 It was not until five months later, in April I78i, that the new sales began. The delay is puzzling in view of the General Court's im- patience to begin. Many of the estates were under lease; but leasing cannot be the sole cause for delay, since a number of the estates had not been rented. A better explanation may be that, at least in the cases of estates belonging to absentees, the state had not yet perfected its title and was prevented from selling the estates under the law as it stood. At any rate, the "Act to Provide for the Payment of Debts due from the Conspirators and Absentees," enacted on March 2, I78i, enabled Massachusetts to sell estates whether or not the title had finally passed into its hands; and it provided a mechanism for determining which estates would be sold, and when. Under the act, certified creditors could require that the sales committees "immediately proceed to advertise and make sale" of sufficient real estate to discharge the debts of a conspirator or an absentee. Because

30 Resolves, Apr. i9 and Jan. I4, I780, ibid., 45I, 364. Quotation is from Richard Cranch to John Adams, Jan. i8, I780, manuscript draft copy, Cranch Papers, Mass. Hist. Soc., Boston. See also Cranch to Adams, Apr. 26, I780, ibid. Cranch suggests that Adams may be able to interest French investors in the purchase of readily available Suffolk loyalist estates.

31 Resolve, June I9, 1780, in Acts and Resolves, XXI, 557-558. 32 Resolve,,Nov. 28, I780, in Acts and Resolves, 1780-81, pp. i83-i85.




the Court feared that bidders might again take "undue measures . in order to get . . . estates struck off under their real value," the committees were empowered to sell estates privately to the highest bidder after the private sale had been publicized, "if they find it for the benefit of the creditors or government."33 In Suffolk, however, most of the estates were sold at public auctions on the premises. In effect this measure gave creditors the initiative in all subsequent sales of confiscated land in Massa- chusetts.

Of the two restrictions placed upon the sale of estates to discharge the debts of conspirators or absentees, the first-a provision that one third of an insolvent estate could not be sold until the death of the original owner's wife or widow, who was to retain its use without regard to the indebtedness of the estate-provoked no dissatisfaction. But the second, which involved the security-holders of the earlier state loan who could, by re- fusing to consent to the sale of estates on which they held securities, prevent their sale, operated "greatly to the damage of the creditors," and led to the Court's giving creditors greater power to force sales. By exhibiting their certified claims, creditors could thereafter force an appraisal of the estate in question, and the security-holder was then given the choice of buying it at the price set, or seeing the sales committee sell it.34 In either case, creditors would be paid out of the proceeds. This procedure eliminated the last impediment to creditor-inspired sales, permitting the sales which had begun in May I78i to continue freely under the "Act to Provide for the Payment of Debts" until news of the Peace arrived in March I783.

Proceeds from sales went primarily to the creditors of the loyalists as the act had intended. In the frequent cases where the returns from a sale more than covered the creditors' claims, the excess went to the state.

This policy of selling confiscated estates for the benefit of creditors aroused little comment, apparently giving satisfaction. The public, ap- proving the justice and propriety of these sales for debts, was content that

33"An Act to provide for the Payment of Debts due from the Conspirators and Absentees, and for the Recovery of Debts due to them," Mar. 2, I78i, in Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts ... I78o to . . . i8oo (Boston, i8oi), i06i-i067. Certification was obtained by presenting sworn evidence before the judge of probate or his claims commissioners.

34 "An Act in Addition to an Act, entitled 'An Act to provide for the Payment of Debts due from the Conspirators and Absentees, and for the Recovery of Debts due to them,'" June 15$ I782, in Acts and Resolves, 1782-83, pp. I77-179.




only estates on which private claims could be proved would be sold. The sale of estates to provide for debts was a familiar, conventional practice; and the administration of the estates was analogous to the usual procedure for the disposal of intestate estates. Punishment and revenge may have been the aims of confiscation, but neither motive was apparent in a policy which left sales to the initiative of creditors and which left most of the confiscated property unsold.85

The only complaints about the sales policy came from men in the army who were irritated because the sales, being held immediately for cash, made it difficult for them to purchase. Angry and sarcastic, General William Heath asked: "if the ability of the commonwealth will not admit of making payment [of wages] at present, ought not the sales of the lands be postponed till the officers can have an equal opportunity to purchase with the others? Or are we to be considered as aliens ?"36 Instead of postponing sales the General Court resolved that "officers and soldiers, and their agents" could use their depreciation notes in paying amounts in excess of claims against an estate when they purchased one of the confiscated estates. This would make it somewhat easier for officers and soldiers to purchase without damaging the creditors. Later the army received further compensation when the Court decided that all residues from sales would be used "solely for the purpose of paying the Massa- chusetts line of the army, their depreciation notes ... and their three months' wages."37 It appears that in Suffolk the policy of selling loyalist estates immediately and for cash did effectively deprive members of the army from "partaking" in the confiscated property: only eight of the purchasers actually served in the army or navy, and not one was in service at the time of his purchase.38

The volume of sales under the "Act to Provide for the Payment of Debts" in the years I78i through I783 was nearly four times greater than

35 Judgments based on a reading of Massachusetts's Acts and Resolves, the Boston Gazette, I775-84; and on the fact that only 50 of 97 absentee probates in Suffolk had real estate sold. If Sabine's estimate of the number of loyalists in Suffolk is cor- rect (see n. 2i above), then less than half of them were ever registered as absentees in the Probate Court.

38 William Heath to Caleb Davis, Feb. 23, 178i, reproduced in C. Davis Papers, X, Mass. Hist. Soc.

37 Feb. II, I782, Mar. 8 and May i5, I78i, in Acts and Resolves, I78o-8s, pp. 846,

347-348, I23-I25. 38 Compiled from Massachusetts Soldiers and Sailors of the Revolutionary War,

17 vols. (Boston, i896-i908).




in the earlier sales of I779-80. They included one hundred ten parcels, seventy-nine in Boston and thirty-one in other Suffolk towns. The Boston property had been owned by four conspirators and thirty-nine absentees; and it was purchased by thirty-five merchants, fourteen "gentlemen" and "esquires," seventeen artisans, and two physicians, two distillers, two mariners, two widows of absentees, and a ship-builder. They paid a total of C40,167 in the new Massachusetts currency for the seventy- nine parcels. The loyalist property sold in the other towns of Suffolk totaled 663 acres, had belonged to a conspirator and two absentees. It was purchased by three "gentlemen" and "esquires," two merchants, and two yeomen for a sum of /5,98i in the new currency.

In all, the Suffolk sales of loyalist real estate under both acts had netted ?57,768 in the new Massachusetts currency. This new currency established in 1780-8i, was forty times more valuable than the paper of I779 and early I780, and approximated the value of specie.39 Thus the nearly half-million pounds yielded by the conspirators' sales of I779-80

amounted to only /Ii,6oo by the new valuation. Contemporaries considered this sum to be small indeed compared

with the "true" value of the properties which had been sold. Comparisons of the prices paid in the earlier sales with those in the later suggest that in the years I78i to I783 prices were slightly higher, with Boston parcels averaging ?455 in the earlier sales and nearly /470 later; but such a rough comparison can be meaningless since the sales were never of sufficient volume to counterbalance the individual circumstances of each parcel. More persuasive, if less precise, is the impression derived from surveying all of the prices paid that prices were higher for comparable properties in the sales for debts but that they were still modest in the minds of contemporaries.40

Creditors holding claims on insolvent estates stood to lose by low prices if the revenue from the sale of confiscated property was less than the amount of the original owner's indebtedness. But as Massachusetts's entire return was based on proceeds over and above the claims, the princi- pal loser by the low prices was the state. By the Suffolk accounting made in I784, the state appears to have received about 40 per cent of the proceeds from the sales for debts; its total return from the sale of loyalist

39 Oscar and Mary F. Handlin, "Revolutionary Economic Policy in Massachusetts," Wm. and Mary Qtly., 3d Ser., IV (1947), 21.

40 See Richard Crancl to John Adams, Jan. i8, 1780, Cranch Papers.




estates in Suffolk was about /30,IOO in the new currency. As the state's expenses ran into hundreds of thousands of pounds during the war, and as its return was spread out over several years, the revenue from the confiscation sales in Suffolk could have been only a very minor factor in Massachusetts's finances.4'

If the fiscal consequences of the Suffolk confiscation sales were almost nil, what of their social consequences? What did the disposition of loyalist property in Suffolk mean in terms of "democratization" and the crea- tion of "a new propertied class?" First, confiscation did not broaden the base of agricultural landholding in a county where farming was the pre- dominant mode of livelihood. The most striking feature of the Suffolk sales was the fact that 67 per cent of the parcels amounting to 82 per cent of the total value of the estates, were located in Boston, the smallest, most populous, and least agricultural township. The 1,202 acres of land located outside of Boston amounted to less than one sixth of i per cent of the total area of Suffolk.42 These rural properties, of little agricultural signifi- cance, had belonged to eleven loyalists, nearly all of whom had been royal officials only incidentally engaged in farming. After their sale they were owned by ten merchants, two gentlemen, two esquires, and three yeomen.

In Boston, however, the real estate which changed hands was more substantial, amounting to about 8 per cent of the town's area, and perhaps ii per cent of the value of all Boston realty.43 Thus the turnover was sufficient to have affected the pattern of ownership; and the sales statistics on their face do seem to indicate that a diffusion of property occurred, since the estates of forty-six loyalists were divided among ninety-two purchasers. Furthermore, since a dozen loyalists owned half the property sold, its disposal to ninety-two purchasers would seem to indicate a real democratization in landholding. But these figures are misleading; they

41 See Handlins, "Revolutionary Economic Policy," 9. 42This indicates that there were few Suffolk loyalists outside Boston, or that

there was a reluctance to sell their property outside Boston, or that non-Boston loyalists were not in debt. No reliable figures for the numbers of Boston and other Suffolk loyalists are available. It may well be that non-Boston loyalists, not being engaged in commerce, had few debts outstanding. On the other hand there is a suggestion in James Warren to John Adams, Oct. 7, I778, in Warren-Adams Letters, II, 52, that the country towns were reluctant to coerce or ruin loyalists in any way. In Hampshire County, John Worthington, a Tory from Springfield who had fled to Philadelphia in late 1774, was able to resume his place as moderator of the Town Meeting by I778. See Mason A. Green, Springfield, z636-1886 ... (Springfield, i888), 278, 294.

43 Estimates based on Boston Assessment of I78i, Mass. Archives, CLXI, 325.




represent no actual diffusion of ownership, but rather a division of loyalist property among people who already owned land. Fifty-seven of the purchasers had previously owned land in Suffolk and only thirty-five had not. Measuring these thirty-five against the forty-six dispossessed Suf- folk loyalists, one can conclude that a moderate concentration of property occurred.44

Harry Yoshpe found that in New York an initial pattern of concentration in both urban and rural lands changed as the lands were resold, so that after a decade or two a diffusion of realty finally took place.45 But in Boston investigation of the secondary and some of the tertiary sales re- veals little or no alteration in the pattern of ownership. Because the original sales had been one-unit parcels, generally one to each purchaser, further diffusion was unlikely. Clearly, the Suffolk sales produced no dra- matic democratization of land ownership.

Nor did the sales prove especially beneficial to "insiders." None of the estates was purchased by members of the General Court, nor were any of them sold to the half dozen men who at various times served on the Suffolk sales committee. A few of the agents on the estates did purchase; but it is significant that Richard Cranch, chairman of the sales committee for two years, an agent on an estate, and brother-in-law to John Adams, not only failed to purchase the estate he coveted but was also prevented from obtaining a five-year lease on it by the outcry of his Braintree townsmen.46 Since the agents generally lacked cash, and since 70 per cent of the sales were made at public auction after several weeks of publicity, the so-called insiders had little opportunity to take advantage of their posi- tion. Cash, not connections, proved to be the ultimate determinant in the disposition of the estates.

Because the loyalist property went to people possessing cash in the years I779 to 1783, people who for the most part already owned land, it is certain that the sales strengthened a "propertied class." But was it a "new propertied class" as Palmer maintains, or did the sales strengthen the "new merchants," the "aggressive newcomers" whom Robert East and the Handlins portray ?47 How significant were the sales in relation to social change in Suffolk?

44 Compilation made from index of "Grantees," Land Registry of Suffolk County. 45 Yoshpe, Disposition, II7. 46 Richard Cranch to John Adams, Jan. I8, 1780, Cranch Papers; Resolves, Jan. 4

and Apr. 7, I780, in Acts and Resolves, XXI, 329, 427-428. 47 Robert A. East, Business Enterprise in the American Revolutionary Era (New

York, i938), 220, 228; and his "Massachusetts Conservatives in the Critical Period"




Contemporaries, acutely aware of alterations in the social and economic structure, had no clear answer: James Warren informed John Adams that "fellows who would have cleaned my shoes five years ago, have amassed fortunes, and are riding in chariots. Were you to be set down here you could not realize what you would see. You would think you was upon enchanted Ground in a world turned topsy turvy... ."48 At the end of the war James Bowdoin told Thomas Pownall that: "When you come [to Boston] you will scarcely see any other than new faces . . . the change which in that respect has happened within the few years since the revolution is as remarkable as the revolution itself."49 But neither War- ren nor Bowdoin mentioned the confiscation sales as agents of Boston's "remarkable," "topsy turvy" revolution.

Nonetheless investigation of the social characteristics of the purchasers shows that the confiscation sales did have an impact, giving some support to the views of Palmer, East, and the Handlins. In the first place more than half the purchasers had not previously owned land in Suffolk or had only acquired it after 1775, indicating that the sales did in fact strengthen a new property-holding class. This is most dramatically illustrated by the purchases of the six mariners, none of whom had owned land in Suffolk prior to 1775, and by the twenty-four artisans and manufacturers, two thirds of whom had not held land in Suffolk before 1775. Among the fifty-five merchant purchasers, the evidence is less one-sided as more than half (twenty-nine) had been Suffolk landowners before 1775. Apparently the sales strengthened "old" merchants as well as "new." Yet "newcomers" mentioned by East and the Handlins, like Mungo Mackay, Richard Devens of Charlestown who moved to Boston as Commissary-General, Martin Brimmer, and John Coffin Jones of New- buryport are conspicuous among the merchant purchasers.50 Furthermore, only three purchasers had been among the one hundred forty-eight mem-

in Richard B. Morris, ed., Era of the American Revolution (New York, I939), 350, 35I; Oscar and Mary F. Handlin, "Radicals and Conservatives in Massachusetts after Independence," New England Quarterly, XVII (I944), 353.

48 June I3, I779, in Warren-Adams Letters, II, I05. 49 Nov. 20, 1783, in Mass. Hist. Soc., Collections, 7th Ser., VI (Boston, 1907), 22. 50 It seems worth noting that 22 of the purchasers were substantial investors in

privateering ventures. Nineteen of these were merchants, i2 of whom had not owned land in Suffolk prior to 1775. Two were mariners, also "new" landowners, and one was an attorney, Perez Morton. These figures on privateering were compiled from Gardiner Weld Allen, ed., Massachusetts Privateers of the Revolution (Mass. Hist. Soc., Colls., LXXVII [Boston, 1927]).




bers of the trade club formed in Boston in i763, and only three (a dif- ferent three) had been among the sixty-three Boston enforcers of the Continental Association chosen in I774.51 Thus, though the evidence is partly circumstantial, it seems clear that the purchasers were in large part members of a new propertied class. At the same time it is clear that the Suffolk sales of loyalist property did not of themselves change the social structure, but merely provided a means for a rising group of men to stabilize their wealth in urban, and to a much lesser extent rural, real estate.

But if the confiscations had not brought revolutionary results, even less had they been revolutionary in their intent. For if the confiscation in Massachusetts or the sales in Suffolk were intended to alter the structure of society or politics, then no evidence of either intention survives. The evidence, as we have seen, supports the contrary view, that the confiscations and the sales were meant to alter Massachusetts as little as possible. Under the rules established by the General Court, although a maximum number of estates were confiscated, a minimum amount of property was sold, and that mostly to satisfy debts owed by the original owners. Massa- chusetts unlike New York did not limit the quantity of realty a purchaser could buy; and the cash requirement for sales, while providing equal opportunity for all, certainly gave no advantages to the propertyless purchaser.52 Clearly social aims were not part of Massachusetts's confiscations.

To Morris the cash sales policy is clear evidence that fiscal need was the motive behind the confiscations.53 But Massachusetts's finances were strapped long before April I779, and the sales policy was not oriented to- ward the realization of a maximum sum to the treasury but rather to satisfy the legitimate demands of private creditors. It is Palmer who, by seeing confiscation as a sign of political ardor, comes nearest the truth, for the confiscation acts, as opposed to the sales policy, were Whig documents intended to punish their Tory foes.

Shall those traitors who first conspired the ruin of our liberties; those

51 "Merchants and others concerned in commerce . . .," E. Price Papers, 24 if., Mass. Hist. Soc.; Boston Gazette, Dec. i2, 1774. The Handlins found that only 27 per cent of the purchasers had served as officials or committee members for the Town of Boston before 1774. Handlins, "Radicals and Conservatives," 353n.

52 Staughton Lynd, "Who Should Rule at Home?" passim. 53 Richard B. Morris, "Class Struggle," 22 if.




who basely forsook their country in her distress, and sought protection from the enemy, when they thought him in the plenitude of power, who have been ever since stimulating and doing all in their power to aid and comfort them, while they have been doing their utmost to enslave and ruin us,-shall these wretches have their estates reserved for them and restored at the conclusion of this glorious struggle, in which some of the richest blood in America has been spilled... ?.4

These words, written by Samuel Adams in private to a close friend and political ally, crackle with indignation at the Tories, the same sense of outrage which is found in the confiscation acts. But such fervor cannot be called radical, or social; it was moral.

In contrast, the sales policy on confiscated estates suggests that the confiscation acts had been the last great gesture in the General Court of the group of men who had led Massachusetts into the Revolution. The vehemence with which the loyalist property was confiscated was not sus- tained in the policy adopted for its disposal. Eighty per cent (in value) of the sales was carried out under the conventional "Act to Provide for the Payment of Debts" on the initiative of creditors and wholly in conformity with the conservative views of property rights which dominated Massa- chusetts. As a result, confiscation proved an inefficient vehicle for "Pa- triot" revenge. Except for a few conspirators, none of the loyalists was ruined by confiscations carried out for purely, or even principally, political reasons. Nor were the state's own finances ever buttressed by general sales as they were in New York; nor did the property serve as largess for a discontented opposition or an enthusiastic majority. The property rights of the creditors and perhaps even the loyalists were too sacred for that. The General Court's most active concern, both in sequestration and confiscation, was always the protection of creditors. Confiscation, potentially a most radical weapon, served as an instrument of justice in Suffolk County, Massachusetts; it provided Whigs with a righteous revenge and creditors with payment.

54 Samuel Adams to James Warren, Oct. I778, in Wells, Life and Public Services of Samuel Adams, III, 49-50.



Documents

The Confiscation and Disposition of Loyalists' Estates in Suffolk County, Massachusetts