The Crown and Maori in Mokau 1840-1911...THOMAS, THE CROWN AND MAORI IN MOKAU 1840-1911 2 The Author My name is Paul Thomas. I graduated with a first class honours degree in history

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The Crown and Maori in Mokau 1840-1911

A report commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal for Te Rohe Potae Inquiry (Wai 898)

Paul Thomas February 2011

Wai 898, # A28

THOMAS, THE CROWN AND MAORI IN MOKAU 1840-1911

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The Author

My name is Paul Thomas. I graduated with a first class honours degree in history from Otago University in 1990. I worked as a researcher and writer for the Dictionary of New Zealand Biography until 1993. From 1995, I was employed by the Crown Forestry Rental Trust as a historian. Since 1999, I have worked as a contract historian on Treaty of Waitangi issues, writing and advising on many different areas. My report on the ‘Crown and Maori in the Northern Wairoa, 1840-1865’ was submitted to the Waitangi Tribunal’s inquiry into the Kaipara district.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the staff at the Waitangi Tribunal for overseeing this report and for their much-appreciated collegial assistance. In particular, Cathy Marr provided expert insight into Te Rohe Potae, as did Dr James Mitchell, Leanne Boulton and Dr Paul Husbands. This report has also benefitted from claimant knowledge shared at research hui, during my trips to the area, and at the oral traditions hui at Maniaroa Marae in Mokau in May 2010. Steven Oliver and Rose Swindells carried out some valuable research, while the translations of te reo Maori material are from Ariaan Gage-Dingle and Aaron Randall. Thanks also to Noel Harris and Craig Innes for providing some of the maps. Lauren Zamalis, Keir Wotherspoon and Ruth Thomas helped with copy-editing. Kesaia Waigth was a marvel of technological competence and general helpfulness while Dr Vincent O’Malley provided a valuable review of the draft report. I would particularly like to thank Katy Thomas for enduring exile and abandonment as I worked on this report.

Cover: Stephenson Percy Smith watercolour of the Mokau River, January 1859 (Alexander Turnbull Library [ATL], Wellington, A-137-005)


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Table of Contents

The Author ................................................................................................................................. 2

Acknowledgments ...................................................................................................................... 2

Table of Contents ...................................................................................................................... 3

List of Figures and Maps .......................................................................................................... 5

Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 6

Chapter One: The People and the Land ........................................................................11

Chapter Two: Early Contact with Europeans ...............................................................21

2.1 Introduction ..............................................................................................................21

2.2 Early Visitors .............................................................................................................22

2.3 Competing Land Deeds ...........................................................................................24

2.4 Relations with Taranaki Maori ................................................................................26

2.5 The Missionaries and Early Settlers .......................................................................28

2.6 ‘The tapu of Mokau’, 1845 to 1846 .......................................................................37

2.7 Growing Optimism, 1847 to 1851 .........................................................................39

Chapter Three: Negotiation and Dispute 1840-1850s .................................................44

3.1 Introduction ..............................................................................................................44

3.2 The Promise of Partnership, 1840 to 1850 ...........................................................49

3.3 McLean’s 1850 Negotiations ..................................................................................57

3.4 Rogan’s 1852 Negotiations .....................................................................................71

3.5 Cooper’s 1852 Visit ..................................................................................................77

3.6 The Awakino Transaction .......................................................................................87

3.7 The Mokau Transaction ..........................................................................................99

3.8 Takerei’s New Policy and the Taumatamaire Transaction .............................. 117

3.9 Rauroa Transaction and the Crown Abandons Mokau ................................... 122

3.10 Aftermath of the Transactions .......................................................................... 130

Chapter Four: War and Confiscation, Mokau in the 1860s .................................... 134

4.1 Mokau on the Brink of the New Zealand Wars ............................................... 134

4.2 Mokau and the Taranaki War .............................................................................. 138

4.3 The Waikato War and the Threat of Confiscation, 1863 to 1864 .................. 145

4.4 The Conquest of Pukearuhe and Confiscation up to Parininihi .................... 149

4.5 Mokau and the Aukati .......................................................................................... 155

4.6 The Pukearuhe Attack .......................................................................................... 161


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4.6 The Aftermath ....................................................................................................... 169

Chapter Five: Attempts at Reconciliation 1870-1875 ................................................ 171

5.1 Peace Without Reconciliation - Relations with the Crown ............................. 171

5.2 Negotiations with Taranaki Maori ...................................................................... 176

5.3 Trade and Control ................................................................................................. 179

Chapter Six: The Aukati Under Pressure 1876-1881 ................................................. 189

6.1 Intensifying Efforts to Encourage Trade, 1876 ................................................ 190

6.2 Establishment of a Settlement and Claims of a Lease, 1877 ........................... 194

6.3 Grey and Sheehan Turn Towards the Mokau ................................................... 202

6.5 The Hall Ministry ................................................................................................... 216

Chapter Seven: The Native Land Court Moves into Mokau ................................. 222

7.1 The Lead up to the Native Land Court ............................................................. 222

7.2 The Native Land Court Hearings, June 1882 .................................................... 257

Chapter Eight: Transition and Trouble 1882-1888 .................................................... 287

Introduction .................................................................................................................. 287

8.1 The Jones Lease ..................................................................................................... 287

8.2 Negotiations and the Forming of the Compact, 1882 to 1885 ....................... 303

8.3 Collapse of a Coal Deal, 1882 to 1885 ............................................................... 325

8.4 Ignoring the Compact, 1885 to 1888 .................................................................. 337

Chapter Nine: Disempowerment and Land Loss 1888-1911 .................................. 367

9.1 Mokau Mohakatino Lost to Joshua Jones ......................................................... 367

9.2 The Return of the ‘Mokau-Awakino Purchases’ ............................................... 387

9.3 The Crown Acquisition of Most of Mohakatino Parininihi ............................ 394

9.4 The Purchase of Mokau Mohakatino No 1 ....................................................... 408

Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 427

Bibliography ........................................................................................................................... 431


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List of Figures and Maps

Figure 1: The focus area for this report and the Rohe Potae inquiry district ..................................10

Figure 2: The Mokau River and its tributaries ...........................................................................13

Figure 3: Places referred to in the text .........................................................................................40

Figure 4: The Mokau-Awakino Crown purchases .......................................................................86

Figure 5: Sketch plan of the Awakino block, 1854 ....................................................................94

Figure 6: Sketch plan of the Mokau block, 1854 .......................................................................99

Figure 7: Sketch plan of the Taumatamaire block, 1855 ......................................................... 118

Figure 8: Sketch plan of the Rauroa block, 1857 .................................................................... 123

Figure 9: Hone Wetere Te Rerenga with his wife and son, circa 1885 ...................................... 172

Figure 10: Overlap between areas claimed by Ngati Maniapoto and Ngati Tama .................... 232

Figure 11: Native Land Court blocks in the Mokau region ..................................................... 286

Figure 12: Joshua Jones .......................................................................................................... 288

Figure 13: ‘Great Chiefs’ at Haerehuka, King Country, 4 June 1885 ...................................... 304

Figure 14: Suggested extent of Mokau Mohakatino no 1 - February 1886 .............................. 347

Figure 15: Suggested extent of Mokau Mohakatino no 1 – October 1886 ............................... 349

Figure 16: Mokau Mohakatino no 1 block – 1888 final survey ............................................. 357

Figure 17: Mokau Mohakatino c.1890 .................................................................................. 384

Figure 18: Mohakatino Parininihi c.1900 .............................................................................. 401


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Introduction

This report has two main aims. The first is to look into the unique and fascinating history of the relationship between Maori and the Crown in the Mokau region. The second is to ask what this history reveals about the wider relationship between the Crown and the hapu and iwi of the Rohe Potae inquiry district.

These questions are closely inter-related. At various times, the Government saw entry into Mokau as the first step towards gaining greater influence throughout the district. Mokau was therefore subject to earlier and more substantial Crown and European pressure than most other parts of Te Rohe Potae. It was one of the few areas to experience sustained Crown purchasing in the 1850s. In the 1860s, conquest and confiscation would bring the Government and its troops to the southern edge of Mokau, and lead to the seizing of land claimed by the Ngati Maniapoto-affiliated hapu of the area. By the 1870s, the Crown was using more peaceful ways to seek control in Mokau and gain a foothold in the wider Rohe Potae. In particular, the presence of a handful of European settlers in Mokau, and the interest of local Maori in trade and improved relations, would be portrayed by many Pakeha as heralding the end of the Kingitanga and the ‘opening up’ of the district.

Such beliefs were simplistic and would be disappointed. Nevertheless, the situation in Mokau was a potent example of how European pressure on the aukati, especially on its outer edges, was forcing major changes and difficult decisions upon local and regional leaders. These pressures would lead, in 1882, to Mokau being one of the first places within the inquiry district where the boycott on the Native Land Court was broken. There would be persistent claims that this event was a pivotal blow to the strength and unity of the Kingitanga.

The Government’s belief that influence in Mokau was of crucial political importance would not last. Its desire to place Europeans on Mokau land would prove more persistent. By the end of the 1880s, considerably earlier than most parts of the region, a large part of Mokau land was under the legal and practical control of Pakeha. This preference for alienation would continue despite the fact that the Crown and Europeans had more land than they could develop. By 1911, local Maori had lost the great majority of their land.

The methods by which this land was lost were varied and the process remarkably complex and confused. But the common theme that emerges is that the Crown consistently failed to ensure that there was genuine communal consent for land alienation. Many local Maori wanted positive, mutually beneficial relations with Europeans. Even after the conflict and violence of the 1860s, local chiefs believed in the possibilities of partnership with the Crown. In order to create that partnership, and to bring new economic and other opportunities to the area, some chiefs favoured granting European rights to land in the area. However, there was no unanimity over this and each proposal set off enormous debate and dissension. In particular, there remained a powerful antipathy to full and final land sales, and tremendous opposition


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to any deals that were seen as being imposed upon local Maori.

As the area was still clearly under Maori control, the Government was cautious about trying to assert practical authority over Mokau land, including land that it claimed to have purchased. But as the power relationship changed in Te Rohe Potae from the 1880s, the Government felt increasingly able to ignore the wishes, protests and interests of local hapu. The Government’s long and ultimately successful efforts to place Joshua Jones on the Mokau Mohakatino block, and to buy the Mohakatino Parininihi block were not based around a shared understanding with local people. Rather, the law and money was used to undermine communal authority. The result was that by 1911, when this report ends, there was little evidence of a positive relationship between Crown and Maori in the region. Instead, local hapu had been marginalised, their land alienated and the opportunity of an accord squandered.

Commissioning background and issues raised by claimants

The possible need for a report on Mokau was identified by Dr Vincent O’Malley in his 2006 review of casebook requirements for the Rohe Potae inquiry. He noted that the 1882 investigation of the Mokau Mohakatino and Mohakatino Parininihi blocks by the Native Land Court was considered ‘an important event in the “opening up” of the broader King Country district’ and in the rift between Ngati Maniapoto and the King Movement. The unique legislation covering the Mokau Mohakatino block that excluded it from the Crown’s pre-emption regime over the rest of the Rohe Potae, and the royal commissions into the block suggested further inquiry could be needed. More generally, he noted that the Mokau area ‘has a distinctive history in many respects that would justify the commissioning of stand-alone research into these blocks’ and proposed a scoping report to investigate this further.1 The research casebook programme was finalised at a judicial conference held on 1 October 2007.

A number of statements of claim specifically refer to the Mokau region and surrounding blocks, including Wai 529, 583, 577, 788, 800, 868, 1004, 1352 and 1747. These claims raise a large number of specific issues related to Mokau and allegations of the breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi. They relate, among other factors, to the Native Land Court and its adjudications in the area; state that the Crown’s policy left local hapu landless; allege that the Crown gave legal standing to the fraudulent dealings of Joshua Jones in the Mokau Mohakatino block; assert Ngati Maniapoto’s mana whenua and mana moana rights over the area; and protest that the Crown’s settlement with Ngati Tama had a prejudicial effect on their interests. The return of Mokau Harbour and River, which has become ‘desecrated, polluted and depleted’ due to Crown actions, was also sought.2

In 2009, I was commissioned by the Crown Forestry Rental Trust to investigate what

1 Vincent O’Malley, ‘King Country (Wai 898): A Review of Casebook Research Requirements.’ Report Prepared for the Research Unit of the Waitangi Tribunal. December, 2006 (Wai 898, ROI 6.2.1), pp55-58, 88-89 2 Statement of Claim, Wai-1352, Ngati Paemate and Maniapoto-Tainui Claim.


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issues the report should cover. Consultation with claimants, including hui in February 2009 and September 2009 in Hamilton and Te Kuiti, suggested that there was considerable interest in a report on the Mokau area. A number of claimants stated that more research was needed as technical reports previously submitted on the two blocks to the Waitangi Tribunal’s Taranaki inquiry did not reflect or consider Ngati Maniapoto’s position. It should be noted that these blocks and this area have considerable contemporary political relevance and were the subject of the Ngati Maniapoto/Ngati Tama Settlement Cross Claims inquiry. During these research hui and subsequent visits to the area, claimants raised specific issues regarding Mokau that they felt need to be researched. In September 2009, I completed a scoping report, commissioned by the Crown Forestry Rental Trust, regarding the scope and focus of a main report. Following this, the Waitangi Tribunal commissioned a main report on these blocks.

Commission questions

The commission identified the following issue and themes to be covered in the report:

Background on the area and its people, with a particular focus on how tribal alliances and rivalries influenced the interaction between local Maori and the Crown

Early contact between Maori and Europeans in the Mokau area, including the impact of and attitudes towards European missionaries, traders, goods and technology

Any early land dealings between Europeans and Maori within the Mokau area

An analysis of Crown-Maori relations in the 1840s and 1850s in Mokau including the Government’s strategy in the area and the attitudes and debates amongst iwi and hapu over land transactions

The Awakino, Mokau, Taumatamaire and Rauroa transactions

The impact of these transactions on local Maori and on the wider political situation

Mokau during war and raupatu

How the establishment of the aukati affected Mokau in the 1870s

Government policy toward Mokau in the 1870s and 1880s and whether there was a concerted effort to open the area to European control as part of its wider aims within the Rohe Potae

Did the negotiations and disputes over the ‘return of Taranaki Maori’ to this region influence Crown-Maori relations?


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The events and influences that led to the introduction of the Native Land Court into the region

The Court’s rulings on the Mokau Mohakatino and Mohakatino Parininihi blocks and attitudes of local Maori towards the Court

The role the Court played in subsequent land loss and in attempts by Maori to use and protect their land in Mokau

The nature of the relationships between local Maori and European speculators, including Joshua Jones, during this period. Did the Government support the speculators and did it adequately protect Maori interests?

The details and events surrounding Jones’ ‘lease’ on Mokau Mohakatino, including the Government’s passing of legislation such as the Special Powers and Contracts Act 1885 and the Mokau-Mohakatino Act 1888 and the holding of a Royal Commission in 1888

Subsequent land sales to the Crown and private purchasers, including the 1911 sale of much of Mokau Mohakatino. The role of the Waikato-Maniapoto Maori Land Board in this sale and the Government’s subsequent investigations should be discussed.

Geographical scope

The geographical focus of this report is the area encompassed by the Mokau-Awakino Crown purchases and the Mokau Mohakatino and Mohakatino Parininihi blocks. While most attention is therefore on the coastal area from Awakino to Parininihi, it also refers, in general terms, to nearby areas when appropriate.


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Figure 1: The focus area for this report and the Rohe Potae inquiry district

PEOPLE AND THE LAND

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Chapter One

The People and the Land

This chapter will provide a brief picture of the area before 1840, although claimants are in the best position to describe the traditional history of Mokau with the requisite depth and insight. A wealth of information was shared with the Waitangi Tribunal at the oral traditions hui at Maniaroa Marae in May 2010 regarding the hapu of the area, their links to each other and to the land. It was explained that Mokau has a deep significance in Ngati Maniapoto and Tainui life. It stands at the south of the Tainui tribal area, which is often said to stretch from ‘Mokau ki runga, Tamaki ki raro, Mokau above and Tamaki below’. The Mokau River was the original resting place of Te Punga o Tainui, the stone anchor of the Tainui waka, which now sits at Maniaroa Marae.1 As one claimant said:

I stand here on my pinnacle of which is said. It is Mokau to the upper region of the fish of Maui and this is the prow of my waka, Tainui. This is the place where the anchor of my canoe was placed and established to identify the southern boundary of my waka. From this point on as Ngati Maniapoto; and their great forest; we, the descendants of Rungaterangi, stand here to welcome you.2

The area is linked to other waka. According to Taranaki tradition, the Tokomaru canoe landed at Tongaporutu and Mohakatino. Ngati Tama took their name from Tama-ariki, one of the navigators of that waka, and the anchor of the Tokomaru lay in the Mohakatino River until the 1890s, when it was moved after Europeans attempted to steal it.3

Many of the place names in the area reflect incidents involving waka and the ancestors who sailed them. Mokau (meaning untattooed) was, according to one tradition, named after a crew member of the Tainui, who drowned there.4 Another story has it that Turi, the captain of the Aotea, slept (moe) and swam (kau) at Mokau, which is how the river and area derived its name.5 Turi apparently performed a haka at Mokau before departing (tino), which led to a river ten kilometres further south being named Mohakatino.6 The Kurahaupo waka would not be the last vessel buffeted by the winds

1 Evelyn Stokes, ‘Mokau: Maori Cultural and Historical Perspectives’, report for the Ministry of Energy, 1988, (Wai 143 record of inquiry, F20L), p12 2 Evidence of Rahera Porou, Te Rohe Potae - Nga Korero Tuku Iho o Te Rohe Potae 5th Oral Traditions Hui, Maniaroa Marae, Mokau, Hui 17-18 May 2010, Final Transcript, 6 December 2010, (Wai 898 record of inquiry, 4.1.5), p109 3 Stokes, pp2-4 and Rawiri Taonui, ‘Canoe traditions – Canoes of the west coast and lower North Island’, Te Ara – the Encyclopedia of New Zealand, updated 4 March 2009. URL:http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/canoe-traditions/7 4 S Percy Smith, ‘Sketch of Mokau History’, Papers Relating to Mokau History, fMS-Papers-9496-1, p1, ATL 5 Stokes, p5 and AW Reed, The Reed Dictionary of New Zealand Place Names (Auckland: Reed Books, 2002), p317 6 Reed, p316


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while sailing down the west coast, the name Tongaporutu is said to have been named by Watonga after the waka drove in (porutu) to a fierce southerly (tonga).7

As Evelyn Stokes discusses, Mokau had considerable strategic, spiritual and economic importance:

The area was rich in food sources and the meeting point of two significant communication routes. It was also an area of intersecting iwi interests … it was a major communication route, providing inland Ngati Maniapoto with access to coastal resources. Further inland, the Mokau River provided Ngati Maniapoto settlements with a ‘main highway, source of food, spiritual sustenance, and focus of tribal settlement patterns and mana.’8

Much of the area was rugged and mountainous. However, there was ‘an inexhaustible supply’ of mussels and other shellfish while both the sea and the river provided ‘a great variety of fish’. There were water fowl in the swamps and plenty of pigeons (kereru), parrots (kaka) and other birds in the nearby forests, which also provided timber, flax and other resources.9

Cultivation was not easy in what was generally a heavily forested area, although by the 1840s, potatoes were common and were planted at ‘convenient points along the Mokau for use by birding and fishing parties, and other travellers’. 10 Much of the more fertile land was in the coastal areas to the north and south of the Mokau River. A European visitor noted that:

the edge of the forest recedes from the coast for a distance varying from a quarter to a half a mile to the foot of the ranges. This open strip of coast land is usually very fertile, and at one time must have been highly cultivated to support the large population that dwelt in the numerous forts that are still to be seen perched on every point of vantage. The sea swarmed with fish, and along the coast are to be found some of the finest mussel reefs on the West Coast of this island, the possession of which was a frightful source of quarrels.11

Europeans, particularly from the 1850s onwards, were more attracted by the mineral resources of the area than its agricultural possibilities. The commercial potential of its gold, timber, iron sand, limestone, and especially coal gripped both Pakeha and Maori imaginations, although, as we will see, the reality would prove to be more modest.

7 Ibid, p525 8 Marr, Cathy, The Alienation of Maori Land in the Rohe Potae (Aotea Block), 1840-1920: Part one, Rangahaua Whanui Series (Wellington: Waitangi Tribunal, 1996) (henceforth referred to as The Alienation of Maori Land …Part one), pp2-3 discussing Stokes, p47 9 Stokes, p28 10 Ibid, p57 and E Dieffenbach, Travels in New Zealand, 1843 (Christchurch: Capper Press, 1974 reprint), vol 1, p170 11 Stokes, p23 and WH Skinner, Reminiscences of a Taranaki Surveyor (New Plymouth: T Avery & Sons, 1946), pp106-108

PEOPLE AND THE LAND

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Claimants have also mentioned the historical and contemporary interest in oil deposits in the area.

But for Maori, perhaps the key traditional resources of Mokau were its west coast harbour, its rivers and waterways and its inland tracks. Although nineteenth century Pakeha thought of Mokau as an isolated and hazardous place to reach, for local hapu it was an essential part of a communication and transport system that linked them to wider regions and linked those regions to Mokau. As Cathy Marr writes, the:

populations could be highly mobile and move long distances to take advantage of various land and resource interests. For instance, iwi and hapu could travel from the Waikato River, the main highway of Waikato iwi, along the Waipa river, which gave access to northern Ngati Maniapoto settlements. At Otorohanga, travellers could canoe further south along the Mangaorewa and Mangapu tributaries of the Waipa. After a portage of about 10 kilometres they could then join the Mokau River as it flowed through the Aria district. This required smaller canoes until about Totoro where travellers could then use large canoes to the Mokau harbour mouth.12

This transport system made it possible for inland and coastal hapu to maintain strong links. Coastal Mokau hapu travelled widely and could generally procure what was not locally produced, while the upriver and inland peoples of Totoro, Mahoenui and Aria were among the frequent visitors to the coast.

Figure 2: The Mokau River and its tributaries

12 Marr, The Alienation of Maori Land …Part one, pp2-3


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The most heavily settled areas were along the Mokau River. According to Stokes these settlements were often fishing villages that were occupied seasonally and were sometimes short-lived. Archaeological surveys reveal ‘a pattern of settlement which consists of regular expeditions, probably seasonal, to particular campsites, perhaps for particular purposes, such as birding, white-baiting, eeling, canoe-building and so on’.13 In later periods, Te Kauri, Te Rainga, the mission station at Te Mahoe and the upriver kainga at Totoro were among the most established settlements.

There are few credible estimates for the number of Maori in the region before Europeans arrived but the general impression is that the population dropped considerably in the first decades of the nineteenth century as a result of tribal fighting, the resultant large-scale population movement and because of European-introduced diseases. For instance, a plague known as Te Ariki is said to have killed many in 1820, progressing through the region following the main Waikato-Maniapoto routes and along the coast south from Mokau to Taranaki.14

The population estimates provided by European observers from the 1840s onwards should be treated sceptically. Accurate information was difficult to collect, as local Maori were highly mobile and often reluctant to participate in such exercises. Consequently, the few estimates available have considerable inconsistencies and uncertainties attached to them.

Nevertheless, the Wesleyan Missionary Cort Henry Schnackenberg’s claim that the ‘permanent’ population was fairly small and decreasing is broadly consistent with what is known about other areas at this time. Schnackenberg inferred that in 1846 there were 400 men, women and children in his undefined parish. In 1850, he estimated about 360 lived in the ‘neighbourhood’, and in 1854 suggested around 360 lived from around ‘Piketoa to Mimi’. In 1855, he wrote that the population had dropped to 300, and believed that in general ‘the Natives are decreasing’ due to low birth rates and the consequences of diseases such as measles.15

An estimate provided by Francis Dart Fenton to the Government in 1859 suggested a rapid jump in population with 1503 Maori living in an undefined region named as ‘Mokau and Ditto’. It is more likely perhaps that Fenton’s census was covering a far wider region than Schnackenberg looked at. Fenton’s 1859 evidence somewhat surprisingly suggested that Mokau was one of the more populous areas in the entire Auckland Province, with a larger population than Upper Waipa, Rangiaowhia or

13 Stokes, p59 14 Stokes, p68 15 Cort Henry Schnackenberg Papers, 1812-1880, 82-174, Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, (ATL Wgt). Schnackenberg to Rev and Dear Sir, no date [1850], Series A, folder 1, pp6-7; Schnackenberg to Henry Trappitt, 12 Sept 1850, Series 1, folder 2, p22; Schnackenberg to Turton and/or Messrs Wallis, Smales, Battle c.Feb 1854, Series A folder 4 pp57-58; Schnackenberg to ‘my dear and honoured mother’, no date [1854], Series A, folder 5, pp7-8; Schnackenberg to ‘Thomas’, no date [1855], Series A, folder 5, p15

PEOPLE AND THE LAND

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Kawhia.16 This does not accord with the general impression left by many sources that the Mokau was not heavily settled.

However, the strong links between the hapu of the wider region meant Mokau was never the isolated, deserted ‘waste land’ that some Europeans imagined it to be. Local hapu travelled widely and had kin links and resource rights in the wider region while groups more associated with other areas would often be at Mokau. For instance, in 1846, at least 1200 Maori made up of approximately 400 each from Kawhia, ‘the interior’ and locally, attended a major hui in Mokau. It is a sign of the resources of the area that considerable hospitality was able to be offered to such a large group for several weeks. In that year, Schnackenberg’s wife Amy claimed that such hui could place a major strain on local food supplies but that in general the ‘climate being so good, and the country abounding with rivers, they [local Maori] are never at a loss for food’.17

According to claimants, ‘in the times of the ancestors’ many hapu were linked to the Mokau area.18 Claimants are better placed to discuss these hapu and their relationships to each other. European sources, such as Percy Smith, identified Ngati Urunumia, Ngati Rakei (who occupied the Mokau Estuary), Ngati Waikorora, Ngati Wai, Ngati Pu and Ngati Ihaia as amongst the hapu living around the Mokau River area.19 However, such lists are not exhaustive. For instance, Haumoana White told the Waitangi Tribunal that the hapu of Poutama include ‘Ngati Waimauke, Ngati Parekarau, Ngati Tumai, Te Ahuru, Ngati Hineuru, Ngati Hinerua, Ngati Taki, Ngati Rakei, Ngati Hinerau, Ngati Wai and Nga-Tarapounamu.’20 Tohe Rauputu suggested that there are many hapu whose names are no longer referred to or known today.21

The links and conflicts between the iwi and hapu of the region, and Mokau’s strategic location and resources, meant it was often caught up in, and was the subject of, broader battles and alliances. This report will not attempt to argue who held rights over the area. However, it is important to note that the coastal area widely known as Poutama – stretching roughly from the Mokau River to around Parininihi – was disputed ‘border’ land between Ngati Maniapoto and Ngati Tama.22 As the main

16 Francis Dart Fenton, Observations on the State of the Aboriginal Inhabitants of New Zealand, (Auckland, New Zealand Government, 1859) 17 Stokes, pp28-32 18 Evidence of Tohe Rauputu, Te Rohe Potae - Nga Korero Tuku Iho o Te Rohe Potae 5th Oral Traditions Hui, Maniaroa Marae, Mokau, Hui 17-18 May 2010, Final Transcript, 6 December 2010, (Wai 898, ROI 4.1.5), p161 19 As cited in Stokes, p17 20 Evidence of Haumoana White, p177 21 Evidence of Tohe Rauputu, p160-161 22 Poutama was a commonly-used term for the general area south of the Mokau River. According to Haumoana White, Poutama was one of the indigenous tangata whenua that became recognised as a matua (evidence of Haumoana White, p176). The Poutama Rock is near the Mohakatino River. According to the Nga Hapu o Poutama statement of claim, the Poutama area ‘extends on the coast from Te Puia up the Mokau River to a Pa named Rerewaka then to Oturi thence inland to a hill Te Parerau O Te Aku thence to Te Ahu to Umukaimata, Mangaroa, Ohura, turning to Maoraora, thence to the source to Te Pakaru, Mangaone, Tangarakau, Rimuputa, Tahoraparoa, turns to Te Horo’ (Statement


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overland route, it was a focal point for the northern defence of the Taranaki tribes, or, seen from another perspective, the southern defence of Ngati Maniapoto and Waikato.23 It was therefore an area of considerable dispute and complexity. As Cathy Marr puts it:

The extent of either’s iwi influence was subject to change over time and varied as a result of war or through alliances ... In addition, local hapu commonly had links to both Ngati Tama and Ngati Maniapoto and varying measures of autonomy. To the south east of the district, in the Upper Whanganui area there were also intersecting interests between the Upper Whanganui, Ngati Tama and Ngati Maniapoto people.24

Major population upheavals took place in the early nineteenth century as the result of a series of battles and alliances between various parties. According to many accounts, when the fighting began to subside in the mid-1830s, Ngati Maniapoto and their allies had gained dominance of Mokau and Poutama, while most of the Ngati Tama and Taranaki-aligned population had been forced into migration, retreat and capture.25

The following is a brief summary of just some of the major battles although it is important to reiterate that there are competing versions of these events and their consequences. For instance, the Native Land Court in 1882 heard radically different accounts, which in part reflected that the Court’s modus operandi encouraged Maori to take a ‘winner-takes-all’ view of tribal history. During these hearings, Ngati Maniapoto witnesses emphasised that they completely defeated and conquered Ngati Tama, and occupied the Poutama region. By contrast, Ngati Tama witnesses denied having suffered such a severe defeat and argued that they always maintained some links to the land.26

What is clear is that Mokau was directly involved in the wider conflicts fought by the Ngati Maniapoto-Waikato alliance against Ngati Toa, Ngati Tama and others. At some point in the early nineteenth century, a combined Waikato taua travelled down the Mokau River and attacked the crucial Ngati Tama pa at Te Kawau, (situated south of Mokau and north of Parininihi).27 Fighting became so widespread and deadly that the

of Claim, Wai 1747, Nga Hapu o Poutama). From the 1880s, the Mokau Mohakatino and the Mohakatino Parininihi blocks would sometimes be described collectively or individually as ‘Poutama’. 23 Stokes, pp15-17 24 Cathy Marr, ‘“The Mokau blocks” and the Ngati Maniapoto urgency claim Wai 788; Wai 800’, (Wai 788 record of inquiry, A1, Wai 800 record of inquiry, A1), pp2-3 25 Vincent O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement, 1840-1863: Scoping Report’, a report commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal, November 2008 (Wai 898 record of inquiry, A15), pp16-18 26 Mokau-Waitara Native Land Court (NLC) Minute Book no 1, pp3-7. For instance, Ngati Tama-aligned witnesses seemed to suggest that they had left the Poutama region not because of defeat but for trading and other purposes. Octavius Hadfield would also argue that some Taranaki Maori were not driven from their lands but left for other regions before the defeat at Pukerangiora. See Vincent O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement, 1840-1863’, report commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal, December 2010 (Wai 898 record of inquiry, doc A23, p111 27 Stokes, p65. It is not clear from this account whether Ngati Maniapoto were part of this ‘Ngati Haua and Waikato’ taua. As O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement, 1840-1863’, p10 explains, the term ‘Waikato’ was sometimes used by Europeans to refer only to those tribes located near the Waikato

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battle near Te Awamutu in 1807 was named Hingakaka because the numbers killed resembled the fall of kaka during the birding season. In this vital encounter, the combined Waikato-Ngati Maniapoto forces inflicted major losses upon a far larger confederation of iwi which included Ngati Toa and Taranaki-affiliated tribes from Poutama and elsewhere.28

Alongside these multi-tribal battles were more specific disputes over Mokau. There were ongoing attacks on Te Kawau and rivalries between Ngati Maniapoto and Ngati Tama over rights to fishing grounds and mussel reefs south of the Mokau river mouth. According to Percy Smith, Ngati Tama and others of the Te Atiawa tribe were in control of the Mokau region from approximately 1812 to 1815. The key battle was around 1812 when a large Ngati Tama group were invited to the Motutawa pa in the Mokau Estuary by Ngati Maniapoto affiliated-hapu for discussions and feasting. However, two boys from the pa were believed to have insulted the Taranaki guests by eating of their food, providing the take for a major attack. The Ngati Tama group killed the boys and drove their hosts from the pa.29

Ngati Maniapoto hapu of Mokau took refuge at Otorohanga and the ‘people would greet and lament over the misfortunes which had taken them so far from their beloved homes. This feeling became so strong at last that the chiefs consulted together, and determined to attempt the reconquest of their lands and homes’.30 According to this account, Ngati Rakei, Ngati Hia and other Mokau hapu aligned with Ngati Maniapoto sent spies who reported ‘the enemy was all over the country at the mouth of the river, and along the coast south-ward, but that the principal number were gathered at a village they had built about half-way between Mokau and Mohakatino’.31 Pretending to be allies of Ngati Tama from the south, a war-party of 280 men led by Te Wharau-roa attacked the unsuspecting but larger Ngati Tama and Te Atiawa forces killing many. The pitched battle was said to have taken place between two flood tides, hence its name ‘Nga-tai-pari-rua (the Twice-flowing Tide)’. Ngati Tama reportedly retreated to Te Kawau and the Ngati Maniapoto hapu of Mokau ‘went off and occupied their old homes on the river’.32

Given Mokau’s importance as a transportation route to the south, north and east, it saw many taua, both advancing and retreating. Around 1821, Ngati Toa, based from around Kawhia Harbour to Marokopa, and their allies, including Ngati Rarua, suffered in fighting against Waikato and Ngati Maniapoto. Migrating south, they travelled through Mokau where Te Rangihaeata’s son drowned, which was why the Ngati Toa

River, but was usually employed more loosely. Ngati Maniapoto were often described as part of the Waikato tribes. 28 O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement, 1840-1863’, pp28-29. As O’Malley notes, claimants have suggested that Ngati Maniapoto may have ‘perished’ if defeated in this battle. However, their victory consolidated the alliance or ‘binding’ of Waikato with Ngati Maniapoto. 29 Stokes, pp66-68 and Smith, ‘Sketch of Mokau History’, p1, ATL 30 Quoted in Stokes, p67 31 Ibid, p67 32 Ibid, pp66-68. See also Smith, ‘Sketch of Mokau History’, p1, ATL


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chief was often known as ‘Mokau’.33 Assisted by the subterfuge of Te Rauparaha, they were able to avoid Ngati Maniapoto attack and take refuge with Ngati Tama and others in Taranaki. However, they were forced further south still by a Waikato and Ngati Maniapoto party led by Potatau Te Wherowhero which also travelled through Mokau.34

These conflicts, while damaging, took place between closely-related groups often determined to limit the scale and extent of casualties. For instance, there are suggestions that Ngati Maniapoto never considered destroying their relatives Ngati Toa, and sheltered or allowed many to escape. The Ngati Maniapoto chief Te Rangituatea is said to have sought negotiations at Mokau with Te Rauparaha and considered allowing Ngati Toa to return to Kawhia. However, Te Rauparaha preferred to leave the region altogether.35

Nevertheless, access to muskets became a crucial factor in inter-tribal rivalries and left Waikato vulnerable to the well-armed Ngapuhi. In 1822, having suffered a crushing defeat in the battle of Matakitaki, large numbers of Waikato survivors temporarily took sanctuary in the territory of Ngati Maniapoto, including in Mokau. Potatau Te Wherowhero, for instance, lived for a period at Orongokoekoea on the upper Mokau River, where his son Matutaera (later King Tawhiao) was born.36

Waikato and Ngati Maniapoto moved quickly to lessen their vulnerability, securing significant firepower by trading with Europeans and through marriage alliances with Ngapuhi.37 By the mid 1820s, sizeable and well-armed Waikato-Ngati Maniapoto taua were able to inflict a series of defeats on their Taranaki rivals. In 1826, thousands of warriors travelled down the Mokau River into north Taranaki forcing heavy migration by Taranaki tribes further south. In late 1831, Waikato and Ngati Maniapoto forces, including from Mokau, were strong enough to carry out a major expedition, taking control of the already largely depleted Poutama area. They then laid siege to Pukerangiora pa, near Nga Motu (later known as New Plymouth) where around 3000 Taranaki Maori had taken shelter. The siege lasted, according to different accounts, from between twelve days and three months before panicked and starving Taranaki Maori tried to flee. It is estimated that around 1200 were then killed or captured. Many of the escapees retreated to Nga Motu where they were able to fight off further attacks from Waikato and Ngati Maniapoto forces.38

Taranaki Maori then made a last attempt to regain Poutama and Mokau. They attacked

33 Angela Ballara, ‘Te Rangihaeata’, Dictionary of New Zealand Biography (DNZB), vol. one, 1769-1869, Wellington, 1990, pp488-491 34 Stokes, pp70-72. Steven Oliver, ‘Te Rauparaha’, DNZB, vol. one, pp504-507 presents a different account of these events 35 O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement, 1840-1863’, pp31-33 36 Steven Oliver, ‘Te Wherowhero, Potatau’, DNZB, vol. one, pp526-528 37 O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement, 1840-1863’, p26 38 Stokes, pp74-75 and Angela Ballara, Taua: ‘Musket Wars’, ‘Land Wars’ or ‘Tikanga’? Warfare in Maori Society in the Early Nineteenth Century (Auckland: Penguin Books, 2003), pp345-347

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the Motutawa pa but after casualties on both sides, withdrew.39 By the winter of 1832, many Taranaki Maori, including from Ngati Tama, were migrating to Te Whanganui-a-Tara (Wellington) and elsewhere.40 They joined many of their kinfolk who had already left in search of arms, new opportunities and security.

At least according to Ngati Maniapoto evidence supplied to the Native Land Court, the result of these years of upheaval and struggle was that nearly all of Ngati Tama, Te Atiawa, Taranaki and Ngati Mutunga were enslaved or migrated. Ngati Maniapoto chiefs and hapu, according to these accounts, took control of and settled as far south as Waitara, including in major settlements and crucial strategic areas such as Mohakatino, Te Kawau, Tongaporutu, Pukearuhe and Te Mimi. By contrast, some European visitors reported that the coastal area from south of Mokau to the north of Nga Motu (New Plymouth) was largely deserted in this period.41

According to a number of sources, Waikato and Potatau Te Wherowhero made peace terms with the Taranaki tribes in around 1834 and ‘promised that the land of the defeated would remain with them on account of their prowess.’ Senior Ngati Maniapoto rangatira did not agree and the following year there were further attacks on south Taranaki.42 It was not until the late 1830s that some Taranaki Maori began to return. These were released captives of Ngati Maniapoto and Waikato rather than those who had emigrated south.43 According to later evidence given by Ngati Maniapoto witnesses to the Native Land Court, few if any returned to Poutama, instead living further to the south.44 Ngati Tama witnesses to the Court argued that these events were part of an agreement that they would eventually be able to return to Poutama.45 Nevertheless, according to most Ngati Maniapoto accounts, until 1840 and beyond, Mokau and Poutama were controlled by their hapu.46

Alongside the long history of fighting between Ngati Maniapoto and Ngati Tama in the region was an equally long history of marriage ties and kin linkages. Haumoana White, a representative of Nga Hapu o Poutama, stated at the oral traditions hui at Maniaroa Marae that, historically, there was never a complete split between the two tribes, and described attempts to establish ‘clear lines of separation’ as a European imposition. He described Ngati Tama as ‘our whanaunga’, and describes the people of Poutama as ‘Ngati Tama-Tapui’ and maintaining the shared ‘whakapapa, the ancient knowledge, the taonga tuku iho’. He said:

39 Stokes, pp74-75 40 Stokes, pp74-75 and Ballara, Taua, pp346-347 41 See O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement’, scoping report, pp16-18 and Stokes, p75 for suggestions that the area was largely depopulated. See Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, pp15-18 for Ngati Maniapoto assertions of their direct possession and occupation 42 O’Malley, pp16-18, Stokes p75 43 Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, pp16-17 44 Ibid 45 This is suggested by Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, p6 although it should be emphasised that the evidence given to the Court did not always follow an obvious chronology of events 46 Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, pp16-18


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The boundaries of the whakapapa between hapu were never ever clear cut. It was not uncommon for an attacking force to call their whanaunga in the opposing pa out to safety. Inter hapu marriages and whangai were a deliberate strategy to secure political alliances, land tenure and whakapapa.47

According to Haumoana White, some local hapu primarily associated with Ngati Maniapoto, such as Ngati Wai and Ngati Tumai, were ‘Ngati Tama hapu in the beginning’.48 A few nineteenth century European observers were aware that the common binary descriptions of local people as exclusively Ngati Maniapoto or Ngati Tama simplified a more complicated situation. Percy Smith described Ngati Rakei, based around the northern mouth of the Mokau River, as a Ngati Maniapoto hapu that ‘were so mixed up with their southern neighbours, the Ngati Tama, as often to be confused with them. Indeed, it would be difficult to separate them, for intermarriage was frequently taking place’.49

The inter-connections are illustrated by the whakapapa of Te Oro, one of the major nineteenth century leaders of the Poutama region. He was from Ngati Waikorara, Ngati Rakei and Ngati Wai, and was part of the Ngati Maniapoto alliance that ‘forced the Ngati Tama from Poutama’. He also had whakapapa links to Ngati Tama-Tapui and Ngati Mutunga of Taranaki.50 Indeed, a number of claimants at the oral traditions hui stated that they themselves had whakapapa ties to both Ngati Maniapoto and Taranaki hapu and that there was a long-standing custom of arranged marriages to ‘hold the peace’, and that there were, and are, kaitakawaenga, individuals ‘whose job it was to try and keep the peace’.51

In short, Mokau was traditionally a place of both dispute and agreement, of strong rivalries and overlapping connections. This report will suggest that later arguments between Maori over rights to the area played a major part in shaping the history of interaction with Europeans and the Crown. These arguments were often described in simple terms, as battles between Ngati Maniapoto and Ngati Tama. There would seem to be a degree of truth in such observations. However, while reading an account based largely on European written sources, it is important to keep in mind the traditions of claimants, which suggest a much more complex and fluid picture.

47 Ibid, p174 48 Evidence of Haumoana White, Te Rohe Potae - Nga Korero Tuku Iho o Te Rohe Potae 5th Oral Traditions Hui, Maniaroa Marae, Mokau, p175 49 Stokes, p17 50 Evidence of Haumoana White, p175. He would seem to have been referring to Te Oro Watihi, who will be mentioned frequently in this report 51 Evidence of Haumoana White, pp206-207 and evidence of Ngawai Le Mieux, pp87-89, Te Rohe Potae - Nga Korero Tuku Iho o Te Rohe Potae 5th Oral Traditions Hui, Maniaroa Marae, Mokau.

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Chapter Two

Early Contact with Europeans

2.1 Introduction

The hapu of the Rohe Potae inquiry district had relatively limited contact with Europeans until 1840 and beyond. Kawhia was the major exception. Possessing one of the best harbours on the otherwise treacherous west coast of the North Island, a flourishing flax trade developed between Kawhia and Sydney, and then on to London.1

Mokau provided less obvious attractions to Europeans traders. Access to its harbour was limited and sometimes dangerous, while the upper reaches of the Mokau River could not be navigated by anything larger than a canoe. Therefore, until the early 1850s and the beginning of serious efforts by the Government to acquire land in the area, the contact between Mokau Maori and Europeans was on a small-scale, personal level. The Crown played a marginal role and its officials rarely visited the area, let alone established a sovereign presence. Rather, Maori interacted with the handful of Europeans who were in Mokau at any one time, and these visiting traders and drifters, plus the occasional more permanent settler or missionary, lived largely if sometimes uneasily under the control of the local chiefs and hapu.

While this early interaction with Europeans did not have a radically transformative effect, it did have a significant impact on local society and its expectations. The early Pakeha visitors brought with them some attractive new resources and knowledge while lacking a threatening degree of coercive power or intent. Local Maori, like hapu throughout the Rohe Potae at this time, came to see a degree of contact with Pakeha as generally beneficial and an important aspect in tribal and chiefly rivalries for mana and authority.

Perhaps the ultimate importance of this period was that it created a determination among some local Maori for a far higher degree of contact with Pakeha. As we will see, this desire was never uncontested or unconditional. However, by around 1850, Takerei and other Mokau chiefs believed towns of Europeans in the area were a realistic possibility that could bring to their Maori sponsors great economic advantages and authority. New Plymouth provided a particularly potent example of what could be achieved but also what was currently lacking. Mokau Maori had witnessed its growth at first hand and the local economy was increasingly tied to this and other Pakeha towns. Indeed, Ngati Maniapoto had long seen access to the settlers of New Plymouth as a critical element in their rivalry with the tribes of Taranaki.

However, New Plymouth was distant, travel was difficult and the relationship with

1 Vincent O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement, 1840-1863’, report commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal, December 2010 (Wai 898 record of inquiry, doc A23), pp25-26 and Andrew Francis, ‘The Rohe Potae Commercial Economy in the Mid-Nineteenth Century’, c.1830-1886’, report commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal, February 2011, pp9-12


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Taranaki Maori was fraught. Takerei and other Mokau chiefs wanted more nearby economic opportunities, ones more securely under their mana. Early interaction with Europeans had given them confidence that such opportunities would strengthen rather than threaten Mokau Maori and their rangatiratanga. This period therefore provides the crucial backdrop to much that would follow in Mokau, including the land negotiations with the Crown of the 1850s.

2.2 Early Visitors

Maori throughout the wider region first came into contact not with the people of Europe but its goods and technology. As Vincent O’Malley points out, inter-tribal trading and gift exchange meant that European food stuffs and items such as potatoes, maize, pigs and, most importantly, muskets were common in the Rohe Potae from the early 1820s.2

It would seem likely that from the late 1820s, the occasional European trader or traveller visited Mokau. However, most early Pakeha in the area were based at Kawhia. Mokau claimants have whakapapa connections to some of these men, including the traders Captain Amos Kent and Tommy Green, who were integrated into local hapu through marriages to women of high standing and were also ‘given several wives to ensure further trading’.3

Within a few years, a small number of Pakeha were living more or less permanently at Mokau. Possibly the first was a sailor named ‘Tommy’, who had apparently been living around Mokau for a number of years before the attack on Motutawa in 1832.4 Another early resident was Thomas Ralph, a representative of the wealthy Sydney merchant Joseph Montefiore.5 By 1832, Ralph was trading flax and other items out of a store on Mokau harbour. Montefiore’s trading agent in Kawhia at this time was Edward William Stockman, who would later play a significant role in land transactions and coal mining in the Mokau.6

Like other Europeans living in the Rohe Potae during this period, Ralph was ‘welcome as a source of trade and goods’, and was quickly integrated into the local Maori community. Marriage was, and would remain, a key method by which local Maori bound valued Pakeha to the region and these Europeans gained rights and standing. Ralph was married to the daughter of ‘the principal chief’ while ‘Tommy’ had at least two local wives.7 The dependence of these early Pakeha on Maori – and that they were considered

2 O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement, 1840-1863’, pp25-26 3 Evidence of Wiki Henskes, Te Rohe Potae – Nga Korero Tuku Iho O Te Rohe Potae 5th Oral traditions Hui, Maniaroa Marae, Mokau, final transcript, 6 December 2010, pp116-123 4 Smith, ‘Sketch of Mokau History’, p2 5 Stokes, p85 and Smith, ‘Sketch of Mokau History’, p2 6 Leanne Boulton, ‘Hapu and Iwi Land Transactions with the Crown and Europeans in Te Rohe Potae Inquiry District, c.1840-1865’, report commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal, October 2009 (Wai 898, A19), pp12-14, p23 and Stokes, p85 7 Giselle Byrnes, ‘Ngati Tama Ancillary Claims’, report commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal, November 1995 (Wai 143, M21), pp8-9


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valuable ‘possessions’ of their host chiefs and communities – meant that they could become the subject of tribal rivalries. Around 1832, Ngati Tama captured Ralph in Mokau from his Ngati Maniapoto hosts and took him hostage. This was apparently in response to Ngati Maniapoto and Waikato forces attacking Taranaki at the time and threatening to take control of Ngati Tama-aligned settlers.8 Another version of the same incident has it that when Ralph’s Mokau protectors were away as part of a Ngati Maniapoto taua fighting in Taranaki, a group from Aotea took the opportunity to plunder Ralph’s store and take him hostage.9

Both versions agree that upon his release, Ralph did not return to Mokau. The European presence in the area for the rest of the decade would consist of a few transients, including deserters from crews and the survivor of a shipwreck who literally drifted to Mokau, and the occasional visit from the Kawhia-based missionary John Whiteley.10 However, cross-cultural contact existed and Mokau Maori travelled widely, including to Kawhia, to trade pigs, vegetables and other items with settlers.

In 1840, Mokau Maori warmly greeted the visit of the New Zealand Company naturalist Ernst Dieffenbach. He was ‘welcomed with a salute of musketry, and conducted in the midst of the assembled chiefs, who were dressed in their best attire’.11 Dieffenbach believed that local Maori ‘retained their unsophisticated virtues’ due to the lack of Pakeha living among them, but found them absorbed in discussions over possible future European settlement. Probably referring to the recent interaction between Maori and the New Zealand Company and their competitor William White (see section 2.3), Dieffenbach reported that the ‘sale of lands, and the colonisation of the country by Europeans, engrossed their whole attention’. Overall, Dieffenbach believed that Mokau Maori ‘seem to be in very prosperous circumstances’ and that the ‘fertile’ area around the Mokau River was well cultivated with potatoes, maize, tobacco and flax.12

Captain Frederick George Moore of the trading ship the Jewess found a similar anxiety for more trade and interaction with Pakeha on a visit the following year:

In all my former travels I never met with kinder or more hospitable natives than those at Mokau. They vied with each other who should be most obliging to me, and there seemed to be a great unity among themselves. I had to taste all the various foods that were offered ... and to listen to some stirring speeches of welcome and good-will of the rangatiras, of which I regret I did not fully understand the eloquence; but the matter and manner and motions closely indicated an unselfish and earnest invite to welcome for myself, my crew, and all Pakeha friends, to visit Mokau shortly.

8 Byrnes, ‘Ngati Tama Ancillary Claims’, pp8-9 9 Stokes, p85 and Smith, ‘Sketch of Mokau History’, p2 10 Stokes, pp85-86, 103 11 Ernest Dieffenbach, Travels in New Zealand: With Contributions to the Geography, Geology, Botany, and Natural History of that Country, (Christchurch: Capper Press, 1974), vol 1, pp169 12 Ibid, vol 1, pp167-170


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Maori traded enthusiastically with the visitors, swapping high quality potatoes, food, carvings and war implements for wool, nails, blankets, tobacco and the like. Moore was impressed by the ‘superabundance of food’ local hapu possessed and by four fine war canoes that allowed travel around the North Island or across to the South Island. The Jewess left loaded with food, with calls to return and with ‘two of the principal chiefs of the Mokau’ on board who had solicited passage to Poneke (Wellington).13

These early visits are indicative of some of the key attitudes that would shape later European attitudes towards involvement in Mokau, including the certainty that more Pakeha settlement in the region would be overwhelmingly welcomed by local Maori. Moore’s belief that the area, although rough for settlement, had considerable commercial potential given its timber, limestone and especially coal would also be shared by later entrepreneurs and Crown officials.

A crucial reason why European settlement was such a major topic of discussion among local Maori was its growing impact on the inter-tribal balance of power. Competing groups and chiefs were highly conscious of the potential material and other advantages of contact with Pakeha, and of the mana and authority it could bring to whoever controlled that contact. The enormously complex and multi-layered rivalry for authority was a constant (and constantly changing) part of Maori society in Mokau. Great caution is needed in describing what was a complicated and fluid situation involving many different actors, overlapping interests and changing alliances.

At the broadest tribal level, and running the real risk of over-simplification, it can be generally stated, at least according to Ngati Maniapoto accounts, that when fighting ceased in the mid-1830s Ngati Maniapoto-aligned hapu were in general control of the Mokau area and had settled as far south as Waitara. Moreover, as O’Malley discusses in more detail, they asserted and would continue to assert that their interests stretched to the Sugarloaf/Ngamotu islands, near New Plymouth.14 Taranaki Maori were mainly in exile or enslaved but were anxious to return – and to re-stake their interests in the northern Taranaki-Poutama region. This, of course, was a matter of considerable relevance and concern to Ngati Maniapoto hapu with connections to Mokau. By the late 1830s, the prospect of significant numbers of Pakeha coming to the disputed region, and European attempts to gain land for these newcomers, added a significant new dynamic in tribal politics and a new source of tension and rivalry.

2.3 Competing Land Deeds

In 1839 and 1840, a number of deeds were signed which Europeans presented as the sale of great areas of land including the Mokau. We need note only in brief that these deeds were a grossly deficient proof of sale, and it is highly unlikely that the few Maori who signed them had any intention or belief that they would result in vast amounts of

13 Stokes, pp86-89 14 Vincent O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Potae War and Raupatu’, (henceforth referred to as ‘War and Raupatu’) a report commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal, December 2010 (Wai 898, A22), p627, see also Stokes, p75 and Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, pp15-18, passim


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land being fully and finally ceded to Europeans. Nor did they have any practical or legal effect on the Mokau area. Their relevance for this report is twofold. First, they were early indications that tribal rivalry could lead Maori to enter into land negotiations with Pakeha, with the intention of asserting and gaining recognition of their continuing interests to the land in question rather than as a means of extinguishing those interests. It will be suggested that this continued to be a factor in the land negotiations of the 1850s. And secondly, these deeds created the framework for the establishment of the European settlement of New Plymouth, a development which had considerable consequences for Mokau Maori.

The first of these deeds was in October 1839 when Colonel William Wakefield of the New Zealand Company claimed to have bought around 20 million acres of land from Te Rauparaha and a few other chiefs. The northern boundary of this mega-‘purchase’ stretched from the south head of the ‘River or Harbor of Mokao [sic]’ to the eastern coast of the North Island and as far south as to the Hurinui River in the South Island. As O’Malley comments, the ‘purported purchase was so preposterous that even the New Zealand Company abandoned any serious claims to land by virtue of it’.15

However, shortly afterwards in November 1839, Wakefield met with some Taranaki Maori based at Queen Charlotte Sound. They entered into an agreement to ‘sell’ all their interests, stretching from the Mokau River into the South Island. It would seem that these Taranaki Maori did not believe that in doing so they were giving up their right to the land. Rather, they apparently hoped that by placing New Zealand Company settlers in the Taranaki region that Ngati Maniapoto and Waikato control would be reduced and they would be able to return to the area without threat. Wakefield stated:

The Natives here, some of the ancient possessors of Taranaki, are very desirous that I should become the purchaser of that district, in order that they may return to their native place without fear of the Waikato tribes.16

Ngati Maniapoto and Waikato, including those most directly affected by any return, Mokau Maori, were outraged by what they saw as attempts by the ‘conquered’ tribes of Taranaki to deal with Europeans over land they claimed rights in. It was believed the matter could lead to warfare. Dieffenbach met some Taranaki Maori at Ngamotu:

I perceived ... how much they stood in dread of the Waikato. A fire had been observed in the direction of Kawia [sic], and the fear that the Waikato were again on the way to Taranaki kept them awake during the greater part of the night.17

Two recently released Taranaki captives of Waikato reported to Dieffenbach that:

[T]he Waikato were prepared to make an immediate descent on

15 O’Malley, ‘War and Raupatu’, p627 16 Extracts for First despatches of Colonel Wakefield ..., AJHR, 1861, C-1 p164 17 Quoted in O’Malley, ‘War and Raupatu’, p628. Note that ‘Waikato’ was often used as a general term for tribes including Ngati Maniapoto


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us, in order to prevent the natives of Taranaki from selling any of the land, which they regarded as their property.18

However, rather than violence, the Company’s manoeuvrings with some Taranaki Maori pushed some Ngati Maniapoto and Waikato chiefs into entering into their own land negotiations with Europeans. On 28 January 1840, the former missionary William White signed a competing land ‘purchase’ deed with some chiefs, none of them apparently closely associated with Mokau, regarding all the lands between the Wanganui and Mokau Rivers. As we have seen when Dieffenbach visited Mokau, local Maori were highly aware and concerned about these events happening around them.

There is nothing to suggest that those Maniapoto and Waikato chiefs who signed the deed seriously imagined that this ended their tribe’s connection with the land and would lead to White having exclusive possession of the land in question. Rather, it was a new form of tribal rivalry. The White deed in turn inspired Taranaki Maori to make another assertion of their rights over the land ‘and to extract more payment from the Company’.19 On 15 February 1840, further deeds were entered into between the New Zealand Company and some Taranaki Maori in New Plymouth purporting to transfer to the company land stretching southwards from the ‘Wakatino’ or Mohakatino River and Hauranga on the coast.20

The great Waikato chief Potatau Te Wherowhero also continued to press for recognition of his interests in Taranaki as a result of his role in the conquests. In 1842, Te Wherowhero and his brother entered into arrangements with the Crown by which they ‘let go and sell these lands of ours’ from Tongaporutu River in the north to Waitotara in the south.21

This suggests again the uneasy position of Mokau hapu in that they were caught on the fault-line of wider and competing tribal claims. As a disputed area, near the south of Ngati Maniapoto interests and the north of Taranaki claims, and with many other groups having passed through, they could not help but be affected by wider events and rivalries. This was by no means the last occasion that Mokau would be included in land negotiations and dealings by Maori seeking to show the furthest extent of their authority.

2.4 Relations with Taranaki Maori

One wider event with important potential ramifications for Mokau was the increasing numbers of Taranaki Maori returning to their former homelands. From the late 1830s to the mid-1840s, Ngati Maniapoto and Waikato released a large number of their former Taranaki captives. In May 1840, for example, the missionary Samuel Ironside accompanied several hundred freed captives through Mokau on their way to Ngamotu.

18 Ibid, p628 19 Ibid, p629 20 O’Malley, ‘War and Raupatu’, p627 21 ‘Deed of sale from Te Wherowhero … dated 31st January, 1842’, AJHR, 1861, C-1, pp167-168


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These releases have been described as a ‘series of competitive grand Christian gestures’, as a Maori response to the influence of Christianity and the missionaries.22 Both Ann Parsonson and Vincent O’Malley interestingly suggest that another motivation was that the released taurekareka (captives or slaves) were intended to serve as a physical reminder to all of Te Atiawa that Waikato and Ngati Maniapoto still claimed rights to Taranaki.23

Although the returnees apparently did not attempt to settle on land north of Pukearuhe, Ngati Maniapoto associated with Mokau were now faced with a strengthened rival who would increasingly express a desire to move further northwards into Poutama. More broadly, Taranaki Maori were in prime position to control interaction with the growing number of Pakeha settlers in Taranaki. In March 1841 the first New Zealand Company immigrants were introduced, by 1843 there were over 1000 in New Plymouth.24

The response of some Ngati Maniapoto hapu was to seek more Pakeha for themselves and to insist on their right to interact with the New Plymouth settlers. In 1843, there were frequent rumours that Waikato and Ngati Maniapoto would attack Taranaki Maori in order to gain more direct contact with Pakeha there. As a New Zealand Company official commented, the principal purpose of an attack:

would be to obtain themselves the advantages of the European connexion, which are enjoyed by the resident Maories [sic], almost all of whom have very lately been slaves to the Waikatos. Their former slaves have now a much better supply of blankets, tobacco and double-barrelled guns than they have, or can hope to procure, except from intercourse with the European settlers.25

However, peaceful interaction with settlers rather than damaging violence with Maori was Ngati Maniapoto’s preference. They demanded – and apparently received – assurances from Crown officials that the Government would endeavour to provide them with Pakeha settlers as a counter-weight to the New Plymouth settlement and its strengthening of Taranaki Maori.26 In 1844, Ngati Maniapoto and Kawhia chiefs instructed Protector of Aborigines TS Forsaith:

You are now going to Taranaki; listen to our parting words. That land is ours. We claim it by right and some part of it by possession. We have power to enforce our claim if we choose, but our inclination is for peace, not war. The Governor who is dead [Hobson] professed to buy the interests of the Waikatos in

22 As quoted by O’Malley, ‘War and Raupatu’, pp629-630 23 O’Malley, ‘War and Raupatu’, pp630. O’Malley, in both ‘War and Raupatu’ and ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement, 1840-1863’, especially pp92-123, discusses in more detail the complex issue of Ngati Maniapoto claims to rights in Taranaki, and the Crown’s response to those claims. 24 Waitangi Tribunal, The Taranaki Report: Kaupapa Tuatahi (GP Publications: Wellington, 1996), p26 25 Enclosure 25. Extract from J.T. Wicksteed, 31 July 1843. BPNZZ, Report from the Select Committee on New Zealand, pp741-742 26 Ngati Maniapoto had also received permission from Governor Hobson in 1842 to occupy lands as far south as Urenui as long as they did not interfere with or claim land rights over the European settlement at New Plymouth. See O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement, 1840-1863’, pp100-101


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the land of Taranaki, and paid Te Wherowhero for them. Te Wherowhero had a perfect right to sell his own or his tribe’s interest, but not ours; he was not the principal man in subjugating Taranaki, many were before him; we do not recognize his sale; we might insist on our right to a payment equal to Te Wherowhero, but we are not so very anxious about that; we want Europeans. You have told us that the Governor will do all in his power to send them to us: now we will wait a reasonable time: if they come, well; if not, we must go to them [in Taranaki].27

According to Forsaith, this threat to take possession of land closer to the New Plymouth settlers was motivated by a desire to assert their rights to land in Taranaki and the belief that Ngati Maniapoto, and not Taranaki Maori, would do more to nurture positive ties with Pakeha:

We sent the present occupants of Taranaki home to the land of their fathers; we did so from the influence of Christian principles, but we did not send them back to assume the airs of superiority they have done, or to molest the Europeans. They have Europeans, but do not know how to treat them; we, who would treat them well, cannot get them. We are therefore determined, in the event of no Europeans coming to us, to go back and resume our rights. We shall not go in hostile mood, though, we shall be prepared to resist opposition. If kindly received and treated with respect by our former captives, we shall simply arrange for our joint occupation of the land; but on the contrary, if opposed, we shall take the matter into our own hands and settle their disputes with the Europeans in our own way. Go and tell the Ngatiawa [Taranaki Natives] that the Waikato Chiefs remind them that the land is theirs, and advise them to settle their disputes with the Eropeans [sic], or the Waikatos will settle it for them.28

2.5 The Missionaries and Early Settlers

The Government did not facilitate the organised settlement Ngati Maniapoto sought, nor did Ngati Maniapoto launch any major move to assume direct control over Taranaki land. Mokau Maori instead focused on increasing their access to European settlements elsewhere and encouraging individual Pakeha to settle and trade in the area.

This encouragement had limited success, most notably with the missionaries. During this period, there was a widespread desire among hapu and iwi throughout the Waikato and Rohe Potae districts to ‘secure their own missionary’.29 In particular, Mokau Maori wanted missionaries to live permanently in their communities and under their authority, and to provide them with a range of benefits and opportunities that were, as O’Malley

27 As quoted in O’Malley, ‘War and Raupatu’, p633 (emphasis added) 28 As quoted in O’Malley, ‘War and Raupatu’, p633 29 O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement, 1840-1863’, p34


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puts it, often more temporal than spiritual in nature.30

In the late 1830s, apart from the occasional visit by John Whiteley of the Wesleyan Missionary Society (WMS), local Maori were unable to bring missionaries in Mokau. To attract their ‘own missionary’ and missionary station, a piece of land was set aside in 1840 at Te Kauri at the head of the Mokau River and a raupo hut built.31 While the WMS wanted to establish a presence at Mokau, it had problems finding someone willing to live in a region that even missionaries saw as depressingly isolated. The Reverend G Buttle, having declined suggestions by the WMS that he move to Mokau, had to be ordered to do so. He arrived at Te Kauri around 1841 but, unimpressed with the locale and his living arrangements, returned immediately to Kawhia. Instructed by his superiors to return, Buttle stayed only briefly before again fleeing.32 Reverend HH Turton shared his colleague’s dislike of the area. He visited Te Kauri in November 1842 and found it a:

horrid locality ... for a Mission Station – no land. No anything but dirt and smoke, dog-barking, pig-grunting and native babble in abundance ... no wonder our poor Bro. Buttle becoming nervous in such a place as this.33

During the early 1840s, visiting French Jesuit priests claimed large numbers of converts and support among Mokau hapu. Fearful that local Maori ‘were in danger from the emissaries of Rome, and the evils of heathenism’, the WMS stepped up its role in the region.34 In 1843, Frederick Miller and his wife started a mission station at Whakatumutumu, on the upper part of the Mokau River. Shortly afterwards, Cort Henry Schnackenberg and his wife Amy re-established the Wesleyan station at Te Kauri.35 Around this time, the Lutheran missionary JF Riemenschneider arrived at Motukaramu on the Mokau River, about halfway between the Te Kauri and Whakatumutumu stations.36

Riemenschneider’s experiences illustrate the determination of local Maori to obtain missionaries and to create lasting alliances with them. Riemenschneider and a companion, Weightman, happened upon Motukaramu in September 1844 as they travelled from New Plymouth to Taupo. There were about 60 to 80 Maori living there, plus a larger number of visitors. They were entreated to stay and told that the kainga would soon grow, thanks to its massive potato cultivations and the new pa and settlement that were being built. The Europeans agreed.

30 Ibid, p34 where O’Malley writes ‘temporal rather than spiritual gains’ were uppermost in the thoughts of Maori 31 GEJ Hammer, Pioneer Missionary: Raglan to Mokau, 1844-1880: Cort Henry Schnackenberg (Auckland: Wesleyan Historical Society, 1991), p1 32 Ibid, p1 33 Ibid, p2 34 Ibid, p2 35 Stokes, p103 36 Peter Oettli, God’s Messenger: J.F. Riemenschneider and Racial Conflict in 19th Century New Zealand (Wellington: Huia, 2008), pp52-54


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The following day a formal hui was held to validate the agreement and to establish the conditions which they would live under. There was unease when the German-speaking Riemenschneider, through an interpreter, insisted he would act as ‘their teacher and pastor’ but not ‘their Pakeha’.37 In particular, he warned that he might leave if instructed by his superiors to do so. Agreement was reached only after he promised to make Motukaramu his permanent home and to bring other Europeans to the area. In return, the many Catholic Maori in the kainga undertook to attend Riemenschneider’s services.38 Local chiefs ‘Te Wati’ and ‘Mukau’ immediately looked to cement the relationship, allowing the missionary to select land where he would live and where a house would be built for him.39

Te Kuri, the major chief at Motukaramu, was absent during these events. As we shall see, Te Kuri would emerge as one of the main opponents of large-scale European settlement in the region. However, he welcomed the presence of Riemenschneider and a more limited European presence, providing his authority over them, and the area, was recognised. When Te Kuri returned to Motukaramu, he insisted that another hui take place so that the relationship with the missionary could again be formalised but this time explicitly under his control. The chief then explained that he ‘owned all the land in the vicinity’ and overruled Riemenschneider’s choice of where the mission station would be, instead allocating a different piece ‘more suited to their needs’.40 All of the missionaries in the Mokau area would live under the influence and protection of their host chiefs. Indeed, when Riemenschneider later decided to abandon Motukaramu, he did so secretly, out of fear that Te Kuri may find out and force him to stay.41

The desire for missionaries did not correspond to widespread acceptance of their religious teachings and attitudes. By the 1840s, many Maori in the region were at least nominally Christian although new beliefs lived alongside traditional ideas and practices. There is evidence, albeit limited, that the impact and acceptance of Christianity varied depending on the area and the degree of exposure to Europeans. The English explorer and writer GF Angas visited the isolated upriver and interior settlements of Whakatumutumu and Paripari in 1844 and reported that ‘I have nowhere seen the law of tapu more rigidly adhered to than amongst these wild inhabitants of Mokau’.42 He noted that after the death of a major chief, ‘Te Ariki’, his widow was tapu for a year and prohibited from directly handling food. Taonui Hikaka was now considered the area’s senior rangatira. Angas described him as one of the most ‘superstitious of the old heathen chiefs’ and ‘scrupulously attached to the religion of the Tohunga’.43 He also reported that Eko, ‘the celebrated witch’ held ‘unbounded sway over the minds of the

37 Ibid, p55. Italics in original 38 Ibid, p56 39 Ibid, pp56, 59 40 Ibid, p59 41 Ibid, p83 42 George French Angas, Savage Life and Scenes in Australia and New Zealand: Being an Artist’s Impressions of Countries and People at the Antipodes (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1847), vol 2, p90 43 Ibid, vol 2, p86


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superstitious inhabitants’ and many locals had died through fear of her powers.44

Although the missionary Miller lived in this community and some local Maori had accepted Christianity, Te Ariki’s death had revealed tensions. Taonui and others were outraged when local Christians attempted to bury Te Ariki in a coffin, instead seizing the body and placing it in a secret cave.45

Further down the Mokau River and especially on the coast with its greater history of interaction with Europeans, there were few obvious signs of unease over Christian influence. When Riemenschneider arrived in Motukaramu in 1844, he found that most local Maori already professed themselves Christians.46 A few years later, Schnackenberg reported that ‘nearly all’ of the coastal hapu ‘profess Christianity’.47

However, even in these communities the missionaries grew frustrated by what they saw as the failure of true Christian doctrine to take deep hold. Schnackenberg was emphatic that he wanted to transform Mokau Maori society and inspire a whole-hearted acceptance of European concepts of religion, individualism and lifestyle. He never hesitated to tell local people to ‘forsake Maoritanga and follow Pakehatanga ... Forsake the Maori ways. Adopt the Pakeha standards’.48 To his disappointment, local Maori did not listen. Instead, they generally took a selective approach to European religion, adapting and integrating some elements of it into their traditional beliefs and culture.49 Even in the lower Mokau, tohunga and tapu remained powerful, and were seemingly able to exist in harmony with newer ideas. This caused Schnackenberg to bemoan a lack of ‘practical Christianity’ and genuine piety among coastal hapu who he believed were in a ‘Transition State’, having cast off some of their more extreme customs that endangered ‘their property, their health, and even their lives’ but ‘without any real exercise or even desire for Repentance, Faith and new Obedience’.50

Schnackenberg was particularly alarmed when Maori seemed to be converting Europeans rather than the other way around. A young friend of the Schnackenberg family lived with them for a period:

Through having been so much with the natives I find he has imbibed all their ideas, and got into many of their disagreeable ways/ This illness, for instance, in his opinion has been brought on by transgressing the tapu maori.51

Another disappointment for the missionaries was that even when kainga and chiefs adopted a missionary, this did not necessarily mean they would adopt his form of

44 Ibid, vol 2, p83 45 Ibid, vol 2, pp81-91 46 Oettli, pp56, 74-75 47 Schnackenberg to Henry Trappitt, 12 September 1850, Series A, folder 2, p22, Schnackenberg Papers, ATL 48 Hammer, p43 49 O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement, 1840-1863’, p35 50 Stokes, p111 51 Schnackenberg to Mrs Jones, 15 Oct 1846, Series A, folder 1, p19, Schnackenberg Papers


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worship. Miller, the Wesleyan, lived among upriver and interior hapu where Catholicism and traditional Maori beliefs were dominant.52 Te Kuri and many of his people were Catholic, leading the Lutheran Riemenschneider to lament that ‘only three of my heathen natives at Motukaramu are .... clearly on my side’. His main convert was Te Kuri’s wife Rangihuia, who apparently turned away from the ‘Papists’ in order to punish her husband for paying too much attention to his other wives.53 The downriver and coastal settlements were divided or perhaps ecumenical in their religious affiliation, with Wesleyans, Anglicans and Catholics numbered among them.54

Despite their religious independence, Mokau hapu nevertheless saw significant benefits in having missionaries living among them. Schnackenberg, in particular, provided many different services, describing himself as ‘preacher, schoolmaster, doctor, carpenter, butcher, gardener, thresher, miller, ... cook etc etc, ropemaker and salesman’.55 Particularly attractive was access to literacy and European education. Schnackenberg ran a small industrial school and was generally impressed by the aptitude and enthusiasm of his pupils, believing that they ‘are apt to learn’ and had more educational ability than an equivalent group of European children. In July 1850, he reported that a young scholar named Ruka or Luke had ‘made such progress in spiritual knowledge, writing, arithmetic and English language, as to excite the admiration and envy of Europeans and Natives’.56 There was considerable initial Maori enthusiasm for literacy. According to Schnackenberg, many in the community could:

write a little, and much letter writing is going on ... Besides paper and slates, they write on flax leaves, trees, stones, houses, kanoes [sic] and often in the sand on the beach.57

However, opportunities for European education were limited and sometimes problematic. Schnackenberg’s school had to turn away prospective pupils as he could only afford to educate (and feed) around 8-10 children at any one time. Moreover, local Maori interest in European education – and indeed in all European introductions – was selective and dependent on whether it was viewed as strengthening the tribal community or not. While Maori sought more educational opportunities in Mokau, they were highly reluctant to send their children to the few schools available to them elsewhere. Auckland was considered too far away while attendance at the school established by George Grey in New Plymouth was limited by the uneasy relationship with Taranaki Maori. According to Schnackenberg, Mokau Maori ‘fancy it would degrade their children to mix with those of slave tribes’ and that:

I fear that their Komiti will end as with former ones with [the] declaration ‘if school alone kapai but we don’t want our children

52 Angas, p86 53 Oettli, pp67, 77 54 Stokes, pp109-110 55 Hammer, p19 56 Schnackenberg to Rev Turton, 7 July 1850, Series A, folder 2, pp11-12, Schnackenberg Papers as quoted in Boulton, p108 57 Ibid, p109


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to go Ngamotu ...’58

The Mokau missionaries were also valued for economic reasons, trading with local hapu and hiring Maori to build their houses and work on the mission stations. Missionaries also played a significant and wide-ranging role in the development of Maori agriculture throughout the wider region, including providing training and assistance and helping arrange the erection of flourmills.59 Schnackenberg was not just an advisor, but also a partner and active participant in Maori commercial enterprises. On first glance, his involvement in commercial enterprises may seem incongruous with his task of spreading the gospel, but local Maori saw no contradiction and indeed expected and demanded missionaries involve themselves in secular activities. Moreover, Schnackenberg and the other missionaries received limited financial assistance from the mission societies. They needed to sustain themselves, their families and their endeavours.

Schnackenberg and Miller in particular were well equipped to do so. Catechists rather than ordained ministers, they did not come to Mokau as highly educated theologians but rather with backgrounds in trade and manual work.60 Schnackenberg had only recently found his Christian calling, after coming to New Zealand as an agent for a mercantile firm. Described by his biographer as ‘above all, a practical man’, he was a skilled carpenter, rope-maker and farmer with a sound business sense.61 Although he saw himself as duty-bound to bring Christianity to Maori, he confessed that he ‘would rather be a Farmer or a merchant than a Parson’.62

In 1846, Schnackenberg arranged for the mission station to move to a more agriculturally promising site at Te Mahoe, a few miles upriver. There he built a house and mission station, erected fences and sheds and began farming. Local boys studied at his industrial school in the morning and made rope, among other tasks, in the afternoon. Mokau Maori would then travel to New Plymouth to sell the rope.63 Schnackenberg later attempted to establish a school that would mix study with farming, hoping that the proceeds would enable local Maori to build their own houses and make their own clothes.64 A lack of funding meant these schemes were small-scale and short-lived.

More long-lasting was his involvement in local commercial life. Schnackenberg acted as a middleman and agent in Maori trading activities, selling and bartering wheat, maize and other produce grown in Mokau to visiting European ships.65 Schnackenberg took, to finance the mission station, a percentage of the profit for such services and there are

58 Schnackenberg to Thomas Skinner, 9 May 1850, Series A, folder 2, p1, Schnackenberg Papers. See also Schnackenberg to Dear Sir, 16 February 1853, Series A, folder 4, pp21-23 59 Francis, p119 60 Hammer, 29. Schnackenberg was later ordained as a minister. 61 Hammer, p6 62 Ibid, p38 63 Ibid, p17 64 Ibid, p27 65 Ibid, p21


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some signs that the WMS was uncomfortable at the extent of his involvement in trade.66 Their unease was not shared by local Maori who welcomed the opportunity to sell pigs, timber and other produce to the missionaries and to use them as intermediaries in their trading and other negotiations with Europeans.

The missionaries were also seen, and presented themselves, as the forerunners of more extensive European settlement. Schnackenberg was increasingly involved in largely unsuccessful attempts to incite relatives and friends to move to Mokau and hoped to establish a German settlement in the region.67 Crown official Donald McLean thought it ‘probable’ that the German missionaries Schnackenberg and Riemenschneider would act ‘as pioneers to the further establishment of a useful population on the Mokau’ and believed the area ‘would suit well for an industrious German peasantry, used to the growth of the onion, which would, from the nature of the soil, be very prolific’.68 The vision of a German enclave in Mokau would not survive the departure of the missionaries although there were reports in the 1880s of a Mokau chief who had been educated in Austria and who apparently owned a German-speaking bird.69

While only a few other Europeans came to the area, they did provide local Maori with sought-after knowledge and opportunities. The handful of Pakeha living at Motukaramu, including Riemenschneider’s two assistants, Weightman and the German ‘agricultural expert’ Trost, are credited with introducing European crops, animals and farming techniques into the Aria district.70 A carpenter and farmer named Jones lived with Te Kuri’s people near Motukaramu. In 1845, it was reported that:

The natives are quickly imitating his mode of agriculture and benefitting by the various kinds of seed he introduces, as well as by his industrious habits.71

Transient Europeans also drifted in and out of the area. Donald McLean in August 1845 believed that a few Europeans dedicated to ‘evil precepts’ were having a ‘baneful influence’ on local Maori but added that most of these ‘worthless characters’ had left the area.72 Schnackenberg also noted that ‘wicked’ Europeans sometimes passed through the region but reported that local Maori were hostile to them and prevented them from menacing the more permanent Pakeha community.73

Those Pakeha who local Maori considered trustworthy were encouraged to stay and

66 Ibid, pp20, 21, 25 67 E.g. Schnackenberg to My Dear Sir, 8 Jan 1855, Series A, folder 4, pp11-12, Schnackenberg Papers 68 McLean Diary and Notebook. MS-1196. Object #1010863, ATL. Extracts from a journal kept during a visit to the interior of the Northern Island of New Zealand. See 6 Dec 1845 69 HR Barr, ‘The Mokau Mines Speculation in Nineteenth Century Taranaki’, MA thesis, University of Waikato, 1979, p8 70 Stokes, pp104-105; Oettli, p72 and Donald McLean Diary and Notebook, MS-1196, Object #1010863, ATL, available online at http://mp.natlib.govt.nz. Extracts from a journal kept during a visit to the interior of the Northern Island of New Zealand. See 6 Dec 1845. 71 Ibid, pp104-105 72 McLean to Chief Protector of Aborigines (George Clarke Snr.), 11 July 1845, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-002, ATL and O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Political Engagement, 1840-1863’, pp82-83 73 Schnackenberg to Henry Trappitt, 12 Sep 1850, Series A, folder 2, p22, Schnackenberg Papers


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were incorporated into local communities, including through marriage alliances. Jones was married to a local woman, and their son Edward was an early example of the dual-descent and bilingual individuals who would serve an important role in Mokau as interpreters and mediators.74 Rangituatahi, the daughter of the senior Ngati Maniapoto chief Taonui Hikaka, was married to Louis Hetet. At different times, they and their large number of children were based at Paripari and Tongaporutu. Hetet is said to have introduced cattle, goats and sheep to the Mokau district by 1844.75 The relationships between Pakeha men and local women did not always match the moral codes of the missionaries. Riemenschneider, for instance, complained that the daughter of a chief was the ‘victim’ of the ‘bestial lust’ of a English medical doctor living near Tongaporutu.76

There were a number of ‘Pakeha-Maori’ in the area, Europeans who had become a full part of tribal communities and had taken on Maori customs and lifestyle. These included a heavily tattooed man with at least six Maori wives who lived near Whakatumutumu and was described as ‘almost more savage than the natives themselves’.77 He has been described as the last of the ‘rangatira Pakeha’ in New Zealand, men who lived, dressed and fought as Maori, and were accorded ‘all the status, privileges and responsibilities’ of chiefs.78

Relations between local hapu and Pakeha during this period were sometimes accompanied by tensions and cross-cultural misunderstandings. Local hapu provided Europeans with protection, land to reside on, food and much more. They expected all Europeans, including Crown officials, to acknowledge this assistance with generous payments for specific services as well as frequent gifts and close contact. Schnackenberg misunderstood this insistence on reciprocity as ‘begging’, and was particularly uneasy about the fact that Maori still considered that the mission house and land they had provided for him was ‘their’ land:

If I cut down a Manuka tree that may be in my way or any other of no value to the natives, I am often reminded that I ought to have got the consent of the owner of the land or in other words ought to pay for it ... If they bring me firewood for sale & I refuse to come to their terms ‘then you shall have no more’ is the answering, the wood belongs to us, If they come to my house, perhaps for no other purpose than to look about or beg, or light their Pipes ... and I tell them not to get in way as I am busy, but to go to their work or else send the idle time in their own places, ‘we are in our own place’ is the reply.79

74 Oettli, p69 75 Angas, vol 2, pp86-87; Trevor Bentley, Pakeha Maori: The Extraordinary Story of the Europeans who Lived as Maori in Early New Zealand (Auckland: Penguin, 1999), p222; Boulton, p14; Schnackenberg to Mr Hoskin, 19 Aug 1850, Series A, folder 2, p19, Schnackenberg Papers 76 Oettli, p52 77 Angas, vol 2, p82 78 Angas, vol 2, p82; Bentley, pp164-165, 199; Boulton, p14 79 Quoted in O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement’ scoping report, p42


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Virtually every transaction between local hapu and Riemenschneider, whether it involved pigs, timber, canoe trips, land or houses, was accompanied by dispute.80 These problems stemmed in part from Riemenschneider’s rather rigid character and his lack of understanding of Maori life and language. The conflicts often centred around his insistence that initial ‘agreements’ over price were a binding contract that could not be renegotiated, while Maori preferred greater flexibility and for the final payment to recognise and strengthen relationships. For example, local Maori built a house for Riemenschneider. The missionary believed that the agreed price was 100 figs of tobacco, with two figs each to go to 50 workers. However, 112 men participated in the building, each expecting their role to be acknowledged by the receipt of two figs of tobacco. Neither side would budge until Te Kuri engineered a clever compromise.81

Perhaps the central root of Riemenschneider’s frustrations was his own lack of influence. Local Maori remained clearly in charge of the Mokau region – and confident enough to take what parts of European culture they considered useful and ignore what was not. Europeans living in the region were often described as the local chief’s own personal ‘Pakeha’, or even as their taurekareka or servants.82 Such descriptions do not perfectly describe the situation given that Mokau Maori made plenty of concessions and offered much to try to bring valued newcomers into their communities.

Nonetheless, Europeans did live under the authority and sufferance of local Maori. They were subject to tribal law and required to observe and respect the customs of their host communities.83 Hetet, for instance, who lived among Taonui Hikaka and his people, was vigilant in not transgressing their particularly strict laws regarding tapu.84

Most Pakeha in Mokau came to accept, albeit reluctantly, the reality of their inferior position and were reassured by a belief that Maori control provided them with security and much besides. Schnackenberg, for instance, feared what he considered lawless and godless Pakeha drifters far more than local Maori:

I might also add that though we are quite in their power, we are so far from being afraid that we regard the natives as our protectors from wicked europeans [sic] who occasionally travel from one settlement to other. Should any of such characters molest us, and get safe away from a distance of 20 or 30 miles, I have not the least doubt, as soon as the natives knew of it, they would set off like a pack of hounds and fetch them back again. So when I travel, I sleep in the open air, or in the village, quite close or in the midst of a house full of natives, without the least concern either for my life or property that I may have about me. Everywhere I am welcomed and sometimes I am charged with

80 Oettli, pp61-62 81 Ibid, p61. Te Kuri sold a pig to Riemenschneider in return for tobacco and then distributed the tobacco to those involved in building the house. 82 Angas, vol 2, p86 and Bentley, pp74-75 83 O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement, 1840-1863’, pp82-83 84 Angas, vol 2, p90


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being idle or worldly minded because I do not visit them more frequently.85

2.6 ‘The tapu of Mokau’, 1845 to 1846

That Mokau was under Maori control, and that Maori concerns dictated the existence and extent of the European presence in the area, was vividly illustrated by an incident that dominated the region for much of 1845 and 1846. The complex tribal and chiefly issues that surrounded the so-called ‘tapu of Mokau’ are not easily understood or explained. But the incident does once again show how wider tension between Ngati Maniapoto and Taranaki Maori could impact upon Mokau.

In 1845, the Ngati Maniapoto chief Taonui Hikaka and his son Te Kuri placed a tapu on transporting pigs through Mokau for the purpose of trade.86 This developed into a complete ban on any travel by Maori or Europeans through Mokau without their permission. The tapu stemmed from disputes regarding rights to land in Taranaki, which had led to the Taranaki chief, Piritoko, a former captive of Taonui, cursing the Ngati Maniapoto leader. Another factor in the tapu was the disruption, possibly by Taranaki Maori, of a pig-trading deal between the settler ‘Hari’ Halse and Taonui’s people upriver and in the interior who were operating alongside their close relatives at Tongaporutu.87

Taonui demanded utu for the affront to his mana. Revealingly, he demanded it not just from Taranaki Maori but also from New Plymouth-based Europeans and Crown officials, as he considered them to be under the jurisdiction of Taranaki Maori and therefore also required to acknowledge his greater authority. According to Schnackenberg, all Taranaki Maori ‘& even including the Europeans of N.P. are considered guilty for the offence’.88 When the utu paid was judged insufficient, the tapu was intensified and there was talk of war between Taranaki tribes and Ngati Maniapoto. Trade and communication for much of the West Coast, including Government communications between Auckland and New Plymouth, was effectively closed.

Despite their outrage at such an affront to their pretensions of power, Crown officials realised they lacked the coercive means to force the area open. Instead, McLean tried unsuccessfully to arrange for Taranaki Maori to pay an acceptable compensation to Taonui while Henry Turton, his fellow Crown official in New Plymouth, could only write angry but ineffective letters of protest to Taonui and Te Kuri. Schnackenberg was sure any Crown military action would be a mistake and prayed that the Governor ‘will not be too rash in this affair, if he interferes at all’ as it:

is now by many allowed that the New Zealanders are superior to europeans in fighting and in the bush even equal to British

85 Schnackenberg to Henry Trappitt, 12 Sep 1850, Series A, folder 2, p22, Schnackenberg Papers 86 Taonui Hikaka was the father of the Ngati Maniapoto chief of the same name who would play a major role in Te Rohe Potae until the 1890s 87 See Stokes pp77-80; Series A, folder 1 of the Schnackenberg Papers in general and Schnackenberg to McLean, 18 March 1845, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0561 88 Schnackenberg to W.H. Trappitt, 11 May 1846, Series A, folder 1, Schnackenberg Papers


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soldiers... I am aware that eventually the natives must &will be stopped from such unlawful intemperance with travellers as their ignorance cannot always remain an excuse for undeserved annoyance, but they know nothing about the Queen’s sovereignty (at least in this part) in N. Zealand, and are of opinion that they are quite strong enough to drive all the settlers from the island, supposing they wish themselves to be rid of them, but also to defend themselves against any force that can be sent from England.89

But the tapu also posed difficulties and challenges for Mokau Maori. Local chiefs and hapu of Mokau generally enforced the tapu. According to Schnackenberg, this reflected the intimate links between the coastal and interior branches of Ngati Maniapoto and that Mokau hapu looked upon Taonui and Te Kuri ‘as their fathers & superiors’.90 The correspondent for the New Zealander wrote that even though Taonui was based in Te Paripari, a considerable distance from coastal Mokau, ‘such is the fear entertained by Mokau natives of him and his son, that they dare not allow the “Tapu” to be violated’.91

However, as the tapu stretched on, the effects on local Maori became more severe, especially because of the cessation of trade and contact with New Plymouth. Local Maori could neither sell their produce elsewhere nor receive European supplies, including the ever-popular tobacco, sugar and flour. Local Pakeha began increasingly frustrated by the situation, and some began to make plans to abandon the area when travel was again possible.92 Furthermore, some Mokau-based chiefs, including Takerei, were increasingly uneasy about the amount of direct control Taonui and his son were asserting over Mokau. Divisions among local Maori over the tapu and its enforcement led to violence between two Mokau chiefs.93 According to Schnackenberg, by mid-1846 many Mokau Maori were in favour of re-opening the area to European travel. A major chief of Mokau (apparently Takerei) allowed W Swainson, the Attorney General, who was accompanied by Kawhia Maori, to cross Mokau on his way from Auckland to New Plymouth. When close allies of Taonui at Tongaporutu seized Swainson and his Kawhia companions, large-scale violence between Ngati Maniapoto hapu loomed as a possibility.

In July 1846, a massive hui at Mokau was attended by 1200 to 1500 Maori, made up roughly of equal numbers of those from Mokau, ‘interior’ and Kawhia hapu.94 It began with what Schnackenberg described as ‘kei wakakiti’. These ceremonial simulations of battle, in which heavily armed forces comprised of the warriors of Mokau and other coastal Maori confronted a similar force of interior hapu, were sufficiently realistic to alarm observing Europeans.

89 Ibid 90 Schnackenberg to Thomas Skinner, 9 July 1846, Series A, folder 1, Schnackenberg Papers 91 New Zealander, 11 April 1846, p3 92 Oettli, pp77-78 93 Report by Schnackenberg from Mokau 1846, Series A, folder 1, pp11-13, Schnackenberg Papers 94 Oettli, p76


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However, there was no intention of actual violence. Rather, they were a precursor to debate over the tapu and whether it should be lifted. According to Schnackenberg’s account, these debates revealed some of the tensions that would continue to be pivotal in this region, and would shape Maori responses to land transactions with the Crown in the 1850s. Ngati Awa and the Taranaki tribes ‘were sometimes called tauwhakawaka’s [sic: taurekareka or slaves?] who deserve to be taken back into bondage’.95 The complex relationships and power dynamics, including between what could be called the senior but more distant leaders of the interior and the more local chiefs based around Mokau Harbour, were highly evident. Te Kuri, Taonui’s son, ‘declared over & over again, that he alone was Master of this place. Our Mokau people are both afraid of his power & appeared very much offended by his talk’.96

The outcome of the hui was that Taonui and Te Kuri lifted the tapu. Schnackenberg believed that the disquiet from within Te Rohe Potae Maori over the consequences of the tapu had grown too large to ignore and presciently suggested that Taonui would instead turn to a different method by which to assert his authority over the Taranaki area and over Taranaki Maori – through ‘selling’ the disputed land to the Government.97

2.7 Growing Optimism, 1847 to 1851

The more immediate impact for Mokau Maori of the lifting of the tapu was that they were able to strengthen their attempts to trade with New Plymouth and elsewhere. Throughout much of the North Island, the mid 1840s to early 1850s were the peak of Maori involvement in and control of trade.98 The ‘golden age of Maori prosperity’ was especially apparent around Otawhao and Rangiaowhia on the northern fringes of the inquiry district, where tribal economies showed clear signs of substantial progress. Wheat, oat and barley cultivation increased rapidly, as did the amount of Maori-owned mills used to grind local crops. Maori involvement in the shipping trade also boomed, with canoes sailing up the Waipa and Waikato Rivers to supply the Auckland markets while the coastal shipping trade in and out of Kawhia Harbour reaching a highpoint.99

95 Schnackenberg to Thomas Skinner, 9 July 1846, Series A, folder 1, Schnackenberg Papers 96 Schnackenberg to Rev Whiteley, 17 July 1846, Series A, folder 1, Schnackenberg Papers 97 Schnackenberg to McLean, 26 May 1846, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0561, ATL Wgt 98 See Hazel Petrie, Chiefs Of Industry (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2006), p7 99 O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement, 1840-1863’, pp123-126 and Francis, pp3-4. Page 72 calls this a ‘golden age of prosperity’.


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Figure 3: Places referred to in the text Mokau Maori exhibited considerable determination to share in this growth. To a limited degree, they succeeded. Pigs, peaches, flax, wheat and other items were traded with European settlers and visitors while local Maori travelled considerable distances, including Auckland, New Plymouth and, more than likely, Australia to buy, sell and trade.100 The chief Epiha, for instance, spent time gold-mining in Victoria.101

Takerei and other Mokau Maori were among the ‘chiefs of industry’, as Hazel Petrie terms them, who were particularly enticed by the possibilities of the wheat trade and the control of coastal shipping.102 As the wheat trade expanded so did the need for hand mills to grind the wheat into flour. In 1847, local Maori asked for Government assistance to acquire three or four hand-mills.103 It was reported in June of that year that ‘[Takerei] Waitara & nearly all the people have gone to N.P. with pigs to purchase hand mills, as nearly every native has this year a patch of wheat in’.104 By August, Schnackenberg wrote that:

100 Francis, pp68-72 discusses the extent of the trade to Australia and elsewhere 101 Barr, p8 102 Petrie, p7 103 Boulton, p108 104 Schnackenberg to Rev Whiteley, 29 June 1847, Series A, folder 1, p40, Schnackenberg Papers


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The natives here are peaceable and improving. Nearly every one has this year a patch in wheat, and they have purchased two mills at 8 pounds each beside sieves and reaping hooks’.105

Although there were some shipwrecks, Mokau was fairly regularly visited by trading ships, including the Hydrus from Nelson.106 In 1844, Takerei sought to buy this vessel and be in a better position to control and expand Mokau’s crucial trade with New Plymouth settlers (and to lessen interference in that trade by Taranaki Maori).107 However, after receiving 120 of the total payment of 200 pigs, the owner attempted to hightail it overseas in the boat only to be captured by order of Governor FitzRoy.108

The considerable assistance and energy exerted by Governor FitzRoy and his successor George Grey in this incident was part of the Government’s increasing interest in establishing good ties and land transactions with Mokau. It was also just one example of several in which business relationships with Pakeha were far from smooth or successful. There were allegations by Maori of European fraud and dishonesty (and vice versa).109 Inter-cultural misunderstandings often accompanied these dealings, while local Maori efforts to fully participate in the developing colonial economy were also troubled by a lack of capital and experience. Schnackenberg was bemused by their continuing insistence on gaining possession of the Hydrus rather than accepting compensation for the boat as:

I feel assured she will never be of any use to Mokau, as the people are so ignorant & poor that they neither can sail her themselves nor employ others.110

Certainly, the living conditions of most Maori, and the few Europeans who lived among them, remained less than luxurious. The Richmond brothers visited Mokau in March 1851 during their epic walk from Auckland to New Plymouth. They found an English sawyer ‘living in a very uncomfortable manner, in a little tent that was full of invalid Maoris’. The sawyer had to procure food from Schnackenberg in order to offer hospitality to his visitors.111

However, by the early 1850s the Mokau Maori belief in the potential benefits of trade with Europeans had reached a highpoint and there were signs that such optimism was not unfounded. ‘Te Hemara’ and other Maori at Waikawau hired a European millwright

105 Schnackenberg to Mr & Mrs Dawsley, 23 Aug 1847, Series A, folder 1, pp45-46, Schnackenberg Papers 106 Nelson Examiner and New Zealand Chronicle, i.e. 31 Aug 1844 p101, 14 Sep 1844 p109, 12 Oct 1844 p1, 2 Nov 1844 p1, 30 Nov 1844 p153 107 ‘Te Rerenga, Hone Wetere’, The Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books; Department of Internal Affairs, 1993), vol 2, p525 108 Schnackenberg to Wm Donnelly, 26 Feb 1847, Series A, folder 1, pp30-31, Schnackenberg Papers 109 See for example New Zealand Gazette and Wellington Spectator, 28 Feb 1844, pp2, 4 110 Schnackenberg to Rev Whiteley, 29 June 1847, Series A, folder 1, p40, Schnackenberg Papers 111 Stokes, pp95-96. The visitors were HR and JC Richmond, part of what would become a famous Taranaki business and political dynasty. HR Richmond would later be involved in Mokau land dealings, both as a lawyer representing Maori and as a businessman.


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to erect a full-scale flour mill.112 There were some timber millers in the area. Maori were selling produce to local Europeans and using Schnackenberg as an intermediary in trading flax, wheat and timber to visiting traders. In August 1850, he reported that:

Flax also abounds which I purchase at £14 per ton.... I purchased 120 bushels of wheat £50 of maize for the cutter besides perhaps 50 bushels for our own consumption ... I had also two trees – 4000 feet of timber cut. I paid the Natives 10/- for each ton and the sawyers 6/- for Kahikatea and 8/- per 100 feet for Rimu. Flax I may have purchased 6 or £7 worth and sold £20 worth of rope.113

However, the growth in trade tended to make Maori less rather than more reliant on the missionaries. The upriver stations withered. Riemenschneider had hoped that a large permanent population would be maintained at Motukaramu but local Maori continued to be highly mobile, with resource rights and trading opportunities elsewhere. Despondent about his lack of progress, he and his European assistants abandoned the mission station in 1846. They did so in stealth. Fearing Te Kuri’s reaction if he realised that they were breaking the agreement to live permanently in the area, they told local Maori they were going on a journey but would soon return.114 The Whakatumutumu station was left vacant after Miller’s death in 1848.115 By contrast, Schnackenberg’s mission at Te Mahoe saw increased attention, as both Maori and Pakeha were drawn to the Mokau coast and its better access to traders and European shipping.116 Schnackenberg could not help but view the increase in trade and the consequent improvement in the Maori economic position as a decidedly mixed blessing. He was concerned that the rapidly rising prices Maori were receiving for wheat, in part due to a boom linked to Australian gold-mining, would entice Maori away from European education.

The Gold affair in Australia may keep the price of wheat up for a few years, during which it will be impossible to convince the Natives that the benefit of schooling is at all comparable to the value of a horse which they fancy is now procurable for one year’s mahinga whiti [wheat cultivation].117

Like other hapu in the wider region, Mokau Maori were active participants in the new economy while continuing their communal structures.118 This upset Schnackenberg, who believed that that through continuing their cultural traditions such as hui and manaakitanga, they were squandering their opportunity for economic and spiritual

112 Schnackenberg to ‘Sir’, undated [1851], Series A, folder 3, p16, Schnackenberg Papers 113 Schnackenberg to T Trappitt, 1 Aug 1850, Series A, folder 2, pp17-18, Schnackenberg Papers as quoted in Boulton, pp109-110 114 Oettli, pp83, 89. 115 Stokes, p103 116 Barr, p5 117 Schnackenberg to Rev and Dear Sir, undated [November 1851], Series A, folder 3, p15, Schnackenberg Papers 118 O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement, 1840-1863’, p131


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transformation:

Their Temporal condition might be much improved, but too frequently instead of using they only abuse the blessings which are now so richly conferred upon them. There is a great deal of feasting because they have plenty – which is injurious to health, prosperity and also their morals.119

Overall, the first decades of contact with Europeans had not had the radical effects on Maori that many Pakeha had expected. Throughout Te Rohe Potae, hapu and iwi ‘remained firmly in control of their own affairs, and Europeans who settled in the district entered a distinctly Maori world’.120 Mokau Maori had welcomed the few settlers and missionaries who had come to the region, confident they could control and benefit from their presence. This policy of incorporating Pakeha into local society was, in a culture where debate and conflict was common, notably non-controversial. Even Te Kuri, simplistically characterised by some Pakeha as the leader of local anti-Crown and anti-European feeling, sought and protected the settlers at Motukaramu.

By the early 1850s, this policy had created a significant change in Maori economic opportunities and, just as importantly, their economic expectations. By the early 1850s, confidence was high that contact with Pakeha would lead to greater prosperity. Schnackenberg noted in 1851 that ‘Wheat is now 10/- a bushel at New Plymouth and 5/- in this river. Our natives expect to get rich and are buying horses’.121 He too was convinced that Mokau had a potentially rich economic future in wheat, coal and timber.

What was needed to unlock this potential, according to Schnackenberg and more importantly, growing numbers of Mokau Maori, was far greater European settlement, of towns rather than a handful of Pakeha. The attempt to bring these towns about through land transactions with the Crown – and the factors that led to widespread Maori rejection rather than acceptance of these arrangements – is the subject of our next chapter.

119 As quoted in Stokes, pp111-112 120 O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement, 1840-1863’, p131 121 Schnackenberg to My Dear Sisters, undated [October 1851?], Series A, folder 3, p13, Schnackenberg Papers


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Chapter Three

Negotiation and Dispute:

Crown and Maori in the Mokau, 1840 to 1850s

3.1 Introduction

The Crown’s early involvement in the Mokau revolved around two goals: the establishment of good relations with local rangatira and land purchasing. These goals were closely inter-related. Establishing alliances with the chiefs was seen by Crown officials as an essential precursor to the land transactions which, so its officials believed, would help bring about European control of the region. Beginning in the mid 1840s, and especially from 1850, the Crown attempted to acquire large amounts of Mokau lands as the first steps in a land-purchasing push in the wider region. Crown officials frequently expressed confidence that they would shortly achieve this goal and that they were on the verge of acquiring a vast area of land that included not just the entire area that this report is dealing with, but stretched further north, south and inland.1

By 1855, these effort to acquire land and control in the region appeared to have failed. Well before the rise of the Kingitanga and war between Maori and the Crown, the Government essentially abandoned the Mokau and any pretence of direct influence over its people or land. The over-powering opposition of a wide number of chiefs and hapu meant the Crown was unable to acquire either the large areas it sought or the specific pieces – especially the Mokau harbour and its upriver coal resources – that were judged strategically and economically vital. The Crown had obtained deeds of purchase to a handful of blocks, but its claims to this land were not particularly convincing on paper, let alone in reality. The signatures of a limited and steadily decreasing number of local Maori attached to the Awakino, Mokau, Taumatamaire and Rauroa deeds (which will be collectively called ‘the Mokau-Awakino purchases’) did not equate to widespread communal assent to the alienation of the land.

Even Crown officials at this time would seem to have acknowledged that the key transaction, the Mokau block, was legally, and certainly practically, incomplete. There were no attempts to assert practical control over any of the four blocks, in part because of fear of Maori resistance. In 1855, Crown purchase officer John Rogan gloomily acknowledged that the land ‘is not yet ours’ and for more than a generation the colonial government largely withdrew from the area and, it appeared, abandoned any claims to the Mokau-Awakino lands.2

Despite the failure of the Crown to gain communal acceptance for its land purchasing

1 Leanne Boulton, ‘Hapu and Iwi Land Transactions with the Crown and Europeans in Te Rohe Potae Inquiry District, c.1840-1865’, report commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal, October 2009 (Wai 898, A19) also discusses many of the events detailed in this chapter. 2 Rogan to McLean, 16 Feb 1855, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0540

NEGOTIATION AND DISPUTE: CROWN AND MAORI IN THE MOKAU, 1840 TO 1850S

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efforts, some local Maori did show a genuine interest in and support for transactions. Powerful local chiefs such as Takerei Waitara had become convinced that land arrangements with the Crown would bolster their mana and strengthen their people. Through these transactions, they hoped to establish a mutually beneficial relationship, an alliance with the Crown. Most importantly, they believed and were promised that land transactions would bring significant numbers of Pakeha settlers to the Mokau and as a result, far-reaching economic and other opportunities for local Maori. For Takerei and others, it was these settlers and the promise of a nearby town to trade with that were desired as the central payment for land deals. They exhibited little fear of being overpowered by the expected newcomers (or by the Government) – rather they were confident that more Europeans in Mokau would only increase tribal authority while providing new sources of economic development.

However, the wider Maori reaction to the Crown’s land purchasing efforts in the Mokau was of opposition, suspicion and resistance. There are dangers in ascribing cast-iron reasons for this opposition. Simplistic categorisations such as dividing local Maori into pro and anti-land selling camps are quickly rendered inadequate given the complexity and variation of the Maori response. Some of the chiefs and hapu who expressed general or specific reservations about land transactions at other times showed interest in negotiations. Others, who initially seemed enthusiastic about land transactions withdrew their support or, more common still, sought to exclude prime areas from the agreement. The journey for Crown purchasing officials from an initial offer to a genuine agreement was long and difficult.

Evidential shortcomings make the situation particularly blurry. The most important written sources on the land negotiations are by contemporary Crown and European observers who often proved themselves spectacularly incapable of understanding local Maori attitudes to land transactions. When they did make confident assertions, they were generally proved wrong. Crown purchase officer John Rogan’s comment in 1852 to his superior Donald McLean that ‘you have only to come here yourself to buy as much land as you please’ was just one the many misguided predictions that the Crown would be able to quickly gain vast areas of land in the region with virtually total Maori support.3 The Maori world-view was so different from that of its Pakeha observers and their internal political rivalries and alliances so pervasive and shifting, that Europeans were most perceptive when emphasising the uncertainty of the situation. Louis Hetet reported from a major 1850 hui near Te Paripari debating land dealings with the Crown that ‘what I heard was all confusion’.4 Rogan, after attending 1852 negotiations with Mokau Maori admitted ‘It is, however, impossible for me to say with certainly what their real intentions are. Indeed, I don’t think they know themselves.’5 Henry Halse likewise confessed that the nature and leadership of the opposition to

3 Ibid, Rogan to McLean, 20 August 1852 4 Louis Hetet to McLean, 9 May 1850, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0338 5 Rogan to McLean, 13 Sep 1852, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0540


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transactions ‘rather puzzles me’.6

Despite these uncertainties, two major and over-lapping factors would seem to have been at the root of the resistance to land transactions in this area: the first was that many local Maori sought to limit rather than increase interaction with the Crown and with Europeans. The second stemmed from the Crown’s failure to widely and carefully negotiate with all the potential rights-holders to the lands. The Crown’s purchasing tactics made it impossible to gain widespread communal consent to land transactions. Instead, many who claimed rights to the land, from powerful rangatira to local hapu and whanau, were excluded from the negotiations. The tendency of officials to consult only with those groups who it believed would support transactions created enormous resentment towards the Crown and divisions among Maori.

Vincent O’Malley’s comments regarding attitudes within the wider Rohe Potae to land transactions and settlement are particularly relevant to Mokau. He argues that by the 1850s a deep-seated and growing concern that land transactions would threaten Maori control was emerging throughout the North Island. ‘Land transactions which were at one time seen as augmenting the hapu or iwi were thus now increasingly viewed as weakening its influence’.7 While many iwi and hapu desired a few Europeans in their midst (and under their control), there was no agreement over the likely implications for Maori of greater numbers of Pakeha, even towns of them:

Support for further European settlement thus does not appear to have been by any means unanimous. More importantly, perhaps, local Maori views upon the quantity of lands that would need to be set aside, and indeed the number of Europeans who might be invited to live among them, both appear to have been more modest than Crown expectations.8

Anti-land selling sentiment was particularly deep-rooted in Te Rohe Potae and the wider Waikato district.9 From McLean’s visit to Mokau in 1850 until virtually the eve of the Government’s invasion of the Waikato in 1863, Crown purchasing officers attempted to purchase land in the wider region. They achieved comparatively little except for the Mokau transactions which, as we shall see, were both smaller and less popular with local Maori than the Crown had predicted. Elsewhere, there were pockets of Crown purchasing, especially around Whaingaroa in the very north of the inquiry district and in Waipa abutting and just outside the inquiry boundaries.10 Government officers often made initial payments to land but were unable to complete the transaction.11 Even before the creation of the Kingitanga, opposition to land sales was powerful and prevalent in the area.

6 Henry Halse to McLean, 11 Oct 1852, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0312 7 O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement, 1840-1863’, p161 8 Ibid, p167 9 Ibid, p162 10 See figure 4 in Boulton, p101 11 O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement, 1840-1863’, p170


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This was revealed as early as the 1850 hui near Te Paripari which discussed the prospect of land transactions around Mokau. This hui can be seen as part of a wider debate, with those who believed that settlement and transactions in the Mokau would strengthen Ngati Maniapoto and those who thought it would weaken them battling for the support of senior rangatira, in this case Taonui Hikaka. Takerei, according to Louis Hetet, ‘pointed out ably the benefits that would arise if Mokau should be colonised’. He was opposed by many, including by the Mokau chief Te Kaka ‘who stood up and he stoutly refused to consent to parting with Mokau’. While acknowledging that the potential benefits of transaction and settlement should be examined, Te Kaka and other opponent of land transactions tried to persuade:

the old man [Taonui] ... that while he remained peacefully at home and sold no land he would be respected by all Europeans but directly he sold any land they would make a slave of him for he must go here and there where they bid him and result would be that he would be like the old Rauparaha and John Heki and others for when the white people had got all out of him and had no further went [want] of him they would dispise [sic] him, but they say remain as he is at present and he will be respected by all Maories and white[s] the Pakeha ... 12

It is far from clear if Taonui came to a simple position regarding land transactions. However, he, his son Te Kuri and Te Kaka, were increasingly seen by the Crown as bulwarks against land transactions north of the Mokau River and inland and the main figures preventing the completion of the purchase of the key Mokau block.

Opposition to land sales was increasingly expressed by placing wide areas under tapu in the effort to prohibit the alienation of any part of it. In June 1853, there were reports that such a tapu had been laid on the area from Mangatawhiri across to the Firth of Thames.13 More than a year later, much of the Waikato district was still under such a tapu. District land purchase commissioner John Grant Johnson stated that an anti-sale tapu included the ‘whole of South bank of the Waikato from Taupo and the North bank, from its confluence with the Whangamarino and up that river to its source’.14

As will be discussed in more detail below, opponents of land transactions in Mokau used similar tactics. In April 1854, as the Crown was attempting to purchase the Mokau block, Te Kuri and Te Kaka declared the Mokau River under tapu. This tapu would prove to be a key factor in the Crown’s inability to take possession of this block. A few days later, Taonui and 100 supporters gathered in Kawhia for ‘repeated meetings’ to ‘prevent land selling’. According to Crown agent RA Joseph, these hui resulted in ‘Nuitone’, another key opponent of the land transactions in Mokau and elsewhere ‘tapuing the land from Mokau to Hari hari inclusive, by a tuku tuku ki tonoa

12 Louis Hetet to McLean, 9 May 1850, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0338 13 O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement, 1840-1863’, pp168-169 14 Quoted in O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement, 1840-1863’, p168.


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iwi turia’.15 Taonui was then confronted by a young Kawhia chief and proponent of land deals with the Crown named ‘William’. Their korero, as recorded by Joseph, provides some valuable general insight into efforts to prevent or strictly limit land transactions. After several speeches on both sides:

the old man [Taonui] concluded by the modest suggestion, that he William should only give a small piece of land for the ‘pakeha’ and leave the bulk for the natives, as that although a few Europeans might be advantageous, and useful a great many might be dangerous. Mistrust as to the friendly Intentions of the Europeans seems to be the great misgiving with the old people.16

Taonui’s comment that ‘a few Europeans might be advantageous’ is a reminder of an important point. There remained a strong belief among Maori with connections to Mokau, including among those that generally opposed land transactions in the area, that some contact with Europeans was beneficial, perhaps even essential. There was no such uniformity on how much contact was helpful.

Rivalry between Maori, as well as suspicion of Pakeha, impeded the Crown’s land purchasing efforts in the Mokau. All the land negotiations during this period were inextricably linked to multi-levelled assertions and disputes over authority and land rights. Maori frequently seemed to enter into land negotiations with the Crown in order to assert that they, and not their rivals, held authority over the land. When the Crown negotiated with one party only, other competing groups and chiefs inevitably took offence. Their response varied, from seeking break-away negotiations with the Crown over land transactions, to demanding payment and inclusion in the already existing negotiations, or most commonly in this period, to resisting and opposing any transactions.

The high potential for dispute and opposition reflected the large number of competing parties who claimed interests in the Mokau region. At the broadest iwi level, as well as Ngati Maniapoto, a large number of other tribes became involved in or opposed the Mokau land negotiations of this period. These include not only Ngati Tama and Taranaki iwi, but Waikato, Ngati Toa, Ngati Tuwharetoa, Ngati Rarua, Ngati Haua and others. In 1851 the Ngati Toa chief Te Rangihaeata wrote to all the rangatira of the area instructing them not to sell land or to ‘korero kia Karoana [speak to the Crown] should he come this way’.17 The following year, Cooper attributed opposition to transactions in part to local Maori ‘acting under bad advice’ from Ngati Toa chiefs.18 In 1857, it was suggested that Te Heuheu of Tuwharetoa had played a part in preventing

15 RA Joseph to McLean, 6 May 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0361. Suggested translation from Aaron Randall is that Nuitone was using his iwi and the tapu placed on the land from Mokau to Harihari to prevent land sales. 16 RA Joseph to McLean, 6 May 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0361 17 Schnackenberg to McLean, 5 Nov 1851, Series A, folder 3, p14, Schnackenberg Papers 18 Cooper to McLean, 24 Oct 1852, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0227


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transactions around Mokau.19 Multiple assertions of rights were also taking place at hapu, chiefly, community and whanau level as shown by the complex disputes over the Te Mahoe mission station on which Schnackenberg dwelt.

The Crown therefore faced enormous challenges if it wished to secure true Maori agreement for land transactions in the Mokau region. Maori views regarding the nature and purpose of land transactions did not seem to accord perfectly with European ideas. The ever-delicate question of which groups and chiefs the Crown should consult with in land transactions needed to be carefully investigated and openly and appropriately handled.

It has been suggested that during this period the Crown’s own standards for land purchasing included the need for a prior investigation that would identify all rights holders. Maori needed to be given the opportunity to reach agreement between themselves as to the relative distribution of these rights and, if they could not reach an agreement, be referred to an appropriate register or court. The essential requirement was that transactions required the consent of the correct owners, and identifying who these owners were necessitated investigation and care on the Crown’s part.20

It was the Crown’s failure to achieve, or even attempt to achieve, these difficult tasks which doomed the land negotiations of the 1850s to failure and left the integrity of the Mokau-Awakino ‘purchases’ open to question. Indeed, it initially appeared that the widespread Maori refusal to accept these transactions meant that the Crown had abandoned any claims to the land. For more than a generation, local hapu continued to use the Mokau-Awakino lands without Government interference, while the tribes and chiefs of Te Rohe Potae repeatedly included the ‘sold’ blocks within the boundaries of the ‘land still remaining to us ... upon which the European, to the best of our knowledge, has no legal claim’.21

It was only in the radically different situation and balance of power of the late 1880s and 1890s that the Crown began to take control over the Mokau-Awakino lands. It did this, it would seem, not on the basis of any further negotiation and accord with Maori, or any investigation regarding the degree of Maori consent to the earlier ‘agreements’. Rather, the long-forgotten deeds were dusted off and it was simply assumed that over 50,000 acres, including even the Mokau block, was part of the Crown estate.

3.2 The Promise of Partnership, 1840 to 1850

The Crown’s land purchasing prospects in the region initially appeared promising. During the 1840s, some Mokau Maori developed a genuine determination for contact with the Crown, including land transactions. To chiefs such as Takerei Waitara, the central benefit of land transactions was the expectation that they would result in

19 Stokes, p118 20 See for instance, Waitangi Tribunal, Te Tau Ihu o Te Waka a Maui: Report on Northern South Island Claims (Wellington: Legislation Direct, 2008), pp296-297 21 Petition of the Maniapoto, Raukawa, Tuwharetoa, and Whanganui Tribes, AJHR, 1883, J-1, p2


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European settlement and economic opportunities. More generally, land negotiations were seen as the deepening of an alliance with the Government and with Europeans that would bring mana and advantage to its Maori partners. These beliefs were skilfully encouraged by Government officials, who fostered personal relationships with Mokau chiefs and repeatedly emphasised the wide range of benefits, including Pakeha settlement that land transactions and friendship with the Crown would bring.

It took some time for the Crown to exhibit any real interest in the Mokau region. According to some sources, a series of signings culminating on 3 September 1840 made Maori agreement to the Treaty of Waitangi ‘almost unanimous on the west coast down to Mokau’.22 However, as O’Malley shows, these signings took place largely outside of Te Rohe Potae and relatively few Ngati Maniapoto rangatira participated in them. No evidence has been found that chiefs identified as from Mokau, or obviously linked to the area, signed the Treaty.23 For our purposes, the crucial point is that the signing of the Treaty had little impact on Mokau. There was no attempt to impose the colonial government and British law on Mokau or the Rohe Potae in general.24

Under the first governorship of George Grey (1845-1853), the Crown embarked on a massive land purchasing programme throughout the colony that would eventually secure it deeds of purchase to more than 30 million acres.25 The efforts to gain a foothold in the inquiry district centred particularly on Mokau. A number of plausible theories, usually revolving around its strategic location, have been posited as to why land purchasing focused around Mokau. Mokau appears to have been viewed as a gateway between Waikato and Taranaki, giving it importance in the eyes of Crown’s officials, eager to extend their influence into those critical regions.26

The initial purchasing push came from the direction of Taranaki, as the Crown looked to extend its New Plymouth holdings and create, as much as possible, a contiguous area of European control. Taranaki settlers were, and would remain the most vocal proponents of land purchasing in Mokau. As we shall see, the Government’s inability to purchase enough land at Taranaki for the needs and ambitions of local settlers would lead to calls for purchasing at Mokau. Many Pakeha saw Mokau as, potentially at least, an outlying district of Taranaki. For instance, the Mokau River was designated as the northern boundary for the Taranaki province.27

22 Claudia Orange, The Treaty of Waitangi (Wellington: Allen & Unwin, 1987), pp69-70. Note that while Orange in her 1987 work states that the missionaries Whiteley and Wallis secured widespread Ngati Maniapoto agreement to the Treaty, this is not mentioned in her later works including Claudia Orange, An Illustrated History of the Treaty of Waitangi (Wellington: Allen & Unwin, 1990), p34 and Claudia Orange, An Illustrated History of the Treaty of Waitangi (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2004), pp298-302. 23 O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement, 1840-1863’, pp59-75 24 See O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement, 1840-1863’, especially p137-138 and Stokes, p76 25 Alan Ward, National Overview: Volume Two, Rangahaua Whanui Series (Wellington: Waitangi Tribunal, 1997), p136 26 Stokes p133; Giselle M Byrnes, ‘The Mohakatino Parininihi and the Mokau Mohakatino No 1 Block’, report commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal, November 1995 (Wai 143, #M21), p10, and Marr, The Alienation of Maori Land …Part one, pp4-5 27 O’Malley, ‘War and Raupatu’, p654


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The purchase of Mokau was also seen as a springboard for further Crown infiltration into the Rohe Potae and Waikato districts. As envisioned by Donald McLean, the key Crown purchasing officer during the period, the coastal Mokau area was an important first step towards acquiring a vast area stretching far inland to the Waipa valley.28

Mokau had other attractions for Crown purchasing officers. The area around the Mokau harbour was seen as possessing possibilities for trade and settlement, and especially as a sheltered anchorage for coastal vessels that could, among other advantages, make easier the link between New Plymouth and Auckland.

Moreover, Mokau’s coal, limestone and iron-sands excited the European commercial imagination. As McLean would tell local Maori during land negotiations, the Crown ‘desired the limestone and coal’ and believed the exploitation of these resources would bring wealth and settlement to the region.29 Leanne Boulton points out that the growth of European settlements such as New Plymouth made access to Mokau’s potentially rich coal resources particularly important.30 In 1844, the New Zealand Company surveyor at New Plymouth informed a select committee of the House of Commons that Mokau possessed excellent coal and that its iron-sands had considerable potential to be smelted into iron.31 A year later, the Daily Southern Cross reported that ‘within a few miles of Mokau, there is abundance of Coal cropping out of the banks, as well as Limestone’. It believed that the discovery of these ‘valuable materials’, which could be shipped out from the Mokau harbour, was another positive sign ‘that this Colony in future years will become a rich and prosperous state’.32 As we shall see, up to 1911 and beyond, Pakeha acquisition of Mokau land would be driven by a desire for coal which proved enduring if not commercially profitable.

However, the most immediate attraction of Mokau for the Government was that some of its chiefs and people were enthusiastic about the prospect of land deals. The desire for more economic and other contact, which was detailed in the previous chapter, made local Maori particularly receptive to Crown promises that land transactions would bring them new allies and opportunities. As O’Malley writes, the Crown’s purchasing programme during this period, based as it was ‘on the old principle of buying cheap and selling dear’ needed to be allied with ‘a range of other initiatives aimed at securing the confidence of Maori communities’ and encouraging them to part with lands.

Crown officials commonly explained to Maori that the central benefit of selling land was not the small immediate payment but a whole range of direct and indirect advantages. The purchase officer GS Cooper provided a particularly clear example of these promises when he told a chief in 1852 that land sales would result in the Government:

28 McLean to Colonial Secretary, 1 April 1854, AJHR, 1861, C-1, p152 29 Diary [Sir Donald McLean], 22 March – 19 April 1850, MS-1227, ATL 30 Boulton, p134 31 Ibid, p134 32‘Coal and Limestone’, Daily Southern Cross, 26 April 1845, p2


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making roads, in building bridges over the rivers, and in ... Hospitals, in Schools, in churches ... in paying large sums for ships to bring out more Europeans from England that our land may increase in population, in wealth and prosperity, besides which there is always a large piece of the best land reserved for you. These are the real payments the Governor gives for land – not the mere money paid at time of purchase, for that is but a small matter.33

Given that Cooper was attempting to purchase land at this time in Mokau, it is likely that he made similar undertakings to local Maori. Indeed, as Governor Gore Browne later explained, such guarantees were standard Crown policy during land negotiations:

I am satisfied that from the date of the Treaty of Waitangi promises of schools, hospitals, roads, constant solicitude for their welfare, and general protection on the part of the Imperial Government have been held out to the Natives to induce them to part with their land.34

Combined with the close personal relations cultivated by Government leaders with important rangatira, these policies encouraged a belief that the Crown would be a benevolent force in the region that would enhance the status and strength of its Maori partners.

McLean’s visits to Mokau in 1845 and 1846 were crucial early steps in establishing the expectation of alliance and settlement. McLean was not yet involved in land purchasing, rather as sub-protector of Aborigines, his aim was to ‘make friends with all the native tribes and familiarise himself with their ways and attitudes towards the Government and colonists’.35

McLean’s initial trip to Mokau in April 1845 left him with the impression that Mokau Maori were ‘quite unacquainted with European habits and customs and forms of government’ but anxious for further ties.36 During his next visit in December 1845, McLean began to deepen the relationships with local chiefs that would be critical to later land negotiations. At Schnackenberg’s mission station at Te Mahoe, McLean met the man he described as ‘chief of Mokau’, Takerei. He helped Takerei in his efforts to enter into the coastal shipping trade, offering to act as a go-between in the chief’s efforts to buy the Hydrus from a European.37

McLean was generally impressed during these visits by the potential of Mokau for

33 GS Cooper to Parata Te Huia, 26 June 1852, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0676C, ATL as quoted in Vincent O’Malley, Bruce Stirling and Wally Penetito (eds), The Treaty of Waitangi Companion: Maori and Pakeha from Tasman to Today (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2010), p71 34 Governor Browne to Henry Labouchere (Secretary of State to the Colonies), 9 Feb 1857, G/27/7, ANZ as quoted in O’Malley, Stirling and Penetito (eds), The Treaty of Waitangi Companion, p73 35 James Cowan, Sir Donald Maclean: The Story of a New Zealand Statesman (Wellington: Reed, 1940), p16 36 McLean to Chief Protector of Aborigines (George Clarke Snr.), 11 July 1845, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-002, ATL and O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement, 1840-1863’, pp82-83 37 Entries for 6 & 8 December 1845, in ‘Extracts from a journal kept during a visit to the interior of the Northern island of New Zealand’ by Donald Mclean, MS-1196, ATL, as quoted by Boulton, pp128-130


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European settlement and agriculture. He thought the area particularly suited to a settlement of ‘industrious German peasanty’ who would serve as ‘pioneers to the further establishment of a useful population on the Mokau’ and believed the Mokau River to be highly navigable and easier to sail down ‘than any of the rivers I have been to of the same size’. He noted the:

rich fertile ground along the banks of the Mokau, abundantly stocked with pigs. The soil is a dark loam, and I believe very productive.

In January 1846 McLean returned to Mokau, to try to negotiate an end to a tapu that, as we have seen, was preventing Europeans and Maori from travelling through the region. McLean’s account of his visit to Takerei at his settlement on the Mimi River vividly illustrated the determination of the chief to advance his connection with Europeans and with the Crown, and the way that this policy was becoming tied to internal Maori disputes. Takerei had by this time become uneasy about the disruptions caused by the tapu, including to trade with Europeans. At the risk of collision with Taonui and the other sponsors of the tapu, Takerei permitted McLean, and the Government mailman accompanying him, to continue their journey:

[Takerei] Waitara, the principal, seemed cool toward us at first; but after my conversation, he appeared to change in countenance, and said he was pleased with all that was said. What about me? I might go where [I] liked, even to Auckland. My conversation was to point out that Europeans ought never to be stopped from going wherever they wished; that they must distinguish them from themselves; and not being implicated, he ought, and all of them ought, to see them forwarded on their journey.

McLean’s call to Takerei to distinguish himself from his rivals and establish himself as a friend of Europeans and the Crown had a powerful effect on the chief. A few days later McLean returned to Takerei who was:

Very friendly after I read him a letter I had written to Taonui [calling for a lifting of the tapu]. He appeared to acquiesce in the contents, and said there was no more Tapu on the road.

Takerei then invited McLean to visit him again in the near future for further talks:

he should be most happy to see me .... when the feast they were preparing was ready, to partake of part of it, and visit them on friendly terms.38

These actions of Takerei’s were particularly resented by Taonui’s son, Te Kuri, who was upset with the infringement of the tapu and was developing into a leading opponent to closer interaction with the Crown and Pakeha. Schnackenberg portrays

38 Entry for 19 & 24 January in ‘Journal of Journey [of Donald McLean] to Mokau with the Government Mail and Frederick Thatcher Esq.’ From January 19 to January 24 [1846]’, MS-1199, ATL


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Te Kuri during this dispute as ‘very riri [angry] & barkish. He has a whole catalogue of offences from the pakeha – in particular yourself [McLean] & Mr. Turton’.39 Pakeha were ‘called he hunga whakaputa &c. by the Kuri (but nobody else that I know of) who likewise spoke of Hone Heke as a person fit to deal with Pakehas’.40 If Takerei and others were increasingly seeing closeness with the Crown as a key to maintaining authority, Te Kuri seems to have seen distance as critical to preserving rangatiratanga. When told by Schnackenberg that by preventing Crown communications and the mailman from crossing through the Mokau ‘he exposed himself to the anger of the Government’, Te Kuri replied:

There is your Governor (pointing to Auckland) he is the chief of the europeans [sic] and their places, but has no right here; our Governor is inland (meaning his father) who will not allow his tapu to be trodden underfoot by any person!41

To some degree at least, the attitudes towards interaction with Europeans and the Crown expressed during this tapu would continue to be evident in the debates over land negotiations with the Crown in the 1850s. As we shall see, Taonui and Te Kuri would be key impediments to wide-scale land purchasing. Te Aria, identified by Schnackenberg as a supporter of the tapu and somewhat hostile to interaction with Pakeha, also emerged as an opponent of land transactions.42 The missionary considered Te Kaka’s stance in the tapu and to interaction with Europeans in general, as somewhat ambiguous and liable to change depending on political and practical developments.43 Te Kaka would become increasingly uneasy over the land negotiations of the 1850s and lead local opposition to them. Resistance to land transactions would lead these chiefs into tension and arguments over authority with the supporters of the transactions, including Takerei.

The lifting of the tapu in 1846 prevented these chiefly rivalries and differences from spilling over into damaging conflict. But it also heightened the impression among Pakeha that Takerei and Mokau Maori in general were potentially valuable allies, and that the relationship needed to be nurtured. Throughout the tapu, Takerei had in the words of Schnackenberg ‘proved himself the friend of europeans’.44

At the same time, it was reported that Takerei and his people were becoming interested in land transactions. This interest reflected both the desire to bring considerably more Europeans to the area and the confidence that such land deals

39 Schnackenberg to McLean, 1 Sep 1846, Series A, folder 1, Schnackenberg Papers 40 Ibid, Schnackenberg to Thos. Skinner, 9 July 1846. Meaning of Maori terms unclear. Note that Schnackenberg’s spelling and use of te reo is often unorthodox. 41 Stokes, p79 42 Schnackenberg to McLean, 26 November 1846, Series 1, folder 1, p25, Schnackenberg Papers. Te Aria seems to have had Ngati Pehi of Ngati Maniapoto affiliations, and have had considerable influence over the upriver area. Schnackenberg to Rev and Dear Sir, 9 October 1852, Series A, folder 4, p11, Schnackenberg Papers. (Claimants may be able to suggest whether Te Aria is Heremia [or Heremea] Te Aria, a major upriver chief who later opposed the Jones lease) 43 Schnackenberg to McLean, 26 November 1846, Series 1, folder 1, p25, Schnackenberg Papers 44 Stokes, p79


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would not threaten their essential control over the area. Schnackenberg wrote that the local people:

Know nothing about the Queen’s sovereignty (at least in this part) in New Zealand, and are of the opinion that they are quite strong enough not only to drive all the settlers from the island, supposing they wished to be rid of them, but also to defend themselves against any force that could be sent from England. The natives of this place however, are not at all disposed to quarrel with the Europeans, on the contrary they are very wishful to receive a body of settlers to whom they would sell a tract of land, but they never dream that they would lose their chieftainship in the river.45

It would take several more years for the start of meaningful land negotiations between the Crown and Mokau Maori. In the meantime, Governor Grey and McLean would skilfully establish a relationship of trust and closeness with some – although not all – local leaders that would be the foundation for the later land dealings. A major element of their policy was providing gifts and material assistance to chiefs to recognise their mana, reward behaviour they approved of, and as a sign that closer ties would bring more far-reaching material and political benefits.

Takerei and others quickly came to expect that their calls for material assistance would be met by the Crown. After the tapu was lifted, Schnackenberg reported that ‘Nga Waka wants a tent from Mr McLean’ and that Takerei also expected ‘presents for this aroha ki te pakeha [affection/regard shown to the pakeha]’.46 Despite the missionary’s protests that such demands were a form of ‘begging’ to be discouraged by the Crown, Grey and McLean were careful not to disappoint Maori. There are fairly frequent references of gifts, loans and assistance from the Governor and Crown officials to Takerei, his community and his relatives, including £10 to the chief to buy a cow.47

Just as important as these material benefits was the respect and status shown to the chief and his people. Personal contact was central to this. Te Rohe Potae chiefs fairly frequently visited Grey in Auckland (and later McLean in New Plymouth) receiving gifts and declarations of the Government’s friendship, respect and good intentions. Governor Grey showed a particular focus on creating close ties with Takerei, who was often described by Pakeha to be the most senior rangatira in the coastal Mokau area. In 1847, Takerei visited Grey and was ‘highly pleased with the Governor’s korero’ and his presents of literally flour and sugar.48 Grey dedicated a quite startling amount of personal time and energy to assisting Takerei in his troubled efforts to acquire the Hydrus ship, which had been sold to the chief by a private European but not

45 Schnackenberg to WH Trappitt, 11 May 1846, Series A, folder 1, Schnackenberg Papers 46 Schnackenberg to Rev Mr Turton, 6 July 1846, Series A, folder 1, Schnackenberg Papers 47 Schnackenberg to T Trappitt, 1 Aug 1850, Series A, folder 2, pp17-18, Schnackenberg Papers 48 Schnackenberg to McLean, 21 Sep 1847, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0561, ATL


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delivered.49

In 1849-1850, Grey visited the Mokau, strengthening both his relationship with Waitara (as he was then known), and the sense of a wider bond between the Crown and Mokau Maori. Alongside personally delivering £35 compensation to Waitara for his problems with the Hydrus, Grey encouraged local Maori to see him as a partner and protector. It was to honour the Governor’s visit, but also to mark their personal bond and to assert that they were both men of great mana, that Waitara took the name Takerei or Te Kerei (the name Maori called Grey).50

Takerei had by this point gained a reputation among some Europeans as belonging to a small group of elite chiefs who were the pinnacle of their people. Grey made frequent speeches at this time of the possibility of ‘amalgamating’ Pakeha and Maori. He spoke of the great qualities of Maori who he defined as Christian, ‘fond of agriculture, take great pleasure in cattle and horses ... have now coasting vessels of their own ..., are attached to Europeans ..., are extremely ambitious of rising in civilisation and becoming skilled in European arts; they are apt at learning ...; are ambitious of honours, and are probably the most covetous race in the world. They are agreeable in manners and attachments of a lasting character readily and frequently spring up between them and the Europeans’. The Taranaki Herald, in reporting this speech, was in no doubt that Grey was referring not to all Maori but a small handful of individuals such as ‘Takerei of Mokau’.51

Grey’s efforts to establish ties and a sense of mutual respect with Takerei would include appointing him a native assessor, a position suggested by Crown officials to mark his assistance in trying to bring about land transactions and to encourage him to continue to do so despite the disappointments and opposition he faced. Schnackenberg commented bitterly that such marks of inclusion in the Government meant more to Takerei and his people than any honours of the church.52

The missionary was not the only person to note archly Takerei’s closeness to Crown officials and his expectation of largesse and respect from them.53 This is not to suggest that Takerei and others during this period were bribed or seduced by Crown officials into betraying their beliefs and their people. Grey and his officials had by 1850 convinced some Mokau Maori that a relationship with the Crown was more an opportunity than a threat. These chiefs sought something more important and long-

49 Schnackenberg to Turton, 9 Apr 1847, Series A, folder 1, p35, Schnackenberg Papers 50 ‘Te Rerenga, Hone Wetere’, DNZB, 1993, vol 2, p525; Barr p8; Schnackenberg to T Trappitt, 1 Aug 1850, Series A, folder 2, pp17-18, Schnackenberg Papers. Personal communication from William Wetere suggested that Takerei was asserting his equal mana by taking the Governor’s name as his own. 51 Editorial, Taranaki Herald, 20 October 1852, p2. The newspaper was, however, horrified by any inference that Takerei and these chiefs were equal to Pakeha. It asked rhetorically ‘Can any settler in Taranaki conceive it possible that a European could associate on terms of equality or social friendship’ with such chiefs, notwithstanding their ‘property and extensive tracts of cultivated lands’? 52 Cooper to McLean, 24 Oct 1852, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0227; Schnackenberg to Rev J. Buttle, 19 June 1855, Series A, folder 5, p18, Schnackenberg Papers 53 Louis Hetet to McLean, 9 May 1850, McLean Papers, MS-0032-0338


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lasting from this relationship than just a few blankets, coats or pounds. Rather, they sought reciprocity, respect and Pakeha settlement and in the next few years would enter into land transactions with the Crown in order to get them.

However, the success of Grey and McLean’s relationship-building was far from total. Despite being offered presents and promises of friendship and alliance, important interior chiefs such as Te Kuri remained distant from the Crown. This reflected their general position and the considerable fears that existed and would continue to exist over the Crown’s intentions and trustworthiness. But it could also not be easily separated from the ever-present rivalry for mana. There were signs that some chiefs competed for ties with the Crown and the status and authority it inferred. McLean was informed that a jealously existed between Takerei and Te Kaka, another senior Mokau rangatira, ‘because letters are written by you to Te Kerei [Takerei] only’.54

In short, the focus by Crown officials on building a good relationship with Takerei and others was successful but also inspired opposition and dispute. This opposition and dispute would become over-powering in the coming years as the Crown ventured in a self-interested and deeply flawed manner into the enormously complicated issue of land rights and land purchasing.

3.3 McLean’s 1850 Negotiations

Seeking settlers – the negotiations over land north of the Mokau River

It was Maori more than the Crown who initiated the land negotiations of the early 1850s. In particular, Takerei and a group of chiefs associated with the coastal Mokau area began what was essentially an attempt to create European settlements or towns in the area. Their previous interaction with the smattering of Pakeha who settled in or visited the region had suggested the potential advantages of far greater numbers of settlers. But without the help and infrastructure of the Crown – and without large-scale land transactions – significant numbers of Pakeha were unlikely to be attracted to the area with its rough terrain and difficult access.55

In March 1850, Takerei and other Mokau Maori summoned McLean to the area, literally carrying him across the rivers that separated Mokau from New Plymouth. According to McLean, a meeting held with Mokau Maori at ‘Ingarani Pah’ at the Te Kauri settlement found ‘them all favourable to the disposal of the Awakino tract of land, and expressing a desire to have many Europeans among them’.56

These were initial discussions only, for McLean’s land purchasing responsibilities elsewhere meant he was not seeking to finalise any arrangement. However, this visit did establish some of the core principles and promises that would underlie subsequent land negotiations in the Mokau region. Particularly crucial was that, according to both

54 Rogan to McLean, 13 Sep 1852, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0540 55 Of course, legally at least, under pre-emption local Maori could only deal with the Crown in land transactions. 56 Diary of Donald McLean, 22 March – 19 April 1850, MS-1227, ATL, as quoted in Boulton, p133


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sides, land transactions would lead to increased European settlement in the region. McLean informed the Colonial Secretary that:

as the Natives are gradually becoming sensible of the advantages of having Europeans among them, that they will, in the course of the present negotiations, be induced to sell such portions of the Mokau as they do not require for their own present or future wants.57

In his diary, McLean recalled:

I told them I would see the land, and then talk about the purchase; that we desired the limestone and coal, if they desired Europeans.58

In total, McLean spent 13 days in the area during these negotiations, far longer than some of the later rushed visits of Crown officials. This gave him the chance to re-examine the area and its suitability for settlement. Like Crown officials after him, he was largely unimpressed by the quality of land around the Awakino River, the area Takerei had earmarked for a possible transaction.59

Far more promising were the lands abutting the Mokau River. McLean on this visit would establish what would remain the Crown’s primary ambition for land purchasing in the region – the acquisition of the area from the Mokau harbour stretching upriver into the coal rich areas. McLean identified that the purchase should include land on both banks and go at least as far where the ‘Mangaharakeke’, (or Maungaharakeke) creek met the river, some 25 miles upriver.60

This was – and would remain – a far greater area than coastal Mokau Maori wanted or believed they had the right to transact. McLean reported that:

no offers have been made to dispose of the land on the banks of the Mokau, which would be most valuable, from having a good navigable river for vessels of 40 or 50 tons, with abundance of coal, limestone, timber, and flax, which is made into tolerable rope at the mission station, together with several flat of rich land well adapted for agriculture.61

This refusal left McLean in no doubt that the desire of local hapu for European settlement through land transactions, and faith in the intentions and undertaking of the Crown was far from unconditional:

57 Donald McLean, Inspector of Police to the Colonial Secretary, 27 March 1850, Turton’s Epitome, C.XII, Aotea, Kawhia & Mokau, No. 12 58 Diary of Donald McLean, 22 March – 19 April 1850, MS-1227, ATL 59 Ibid 60 See GS Cooper to the Civil Secretary, 24 October 1852, Turton’s Epitome, C.XII, Aotea, Kawhia & Mokau, No. 14 61 Donald McLean, Inspector of Police to the Colonial Secretary, 27 March 1850, Turton’s Epitome, C.XII, Aotea, Kawhia & Mokau, No. 12


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They are evidently willing to have Europeans among them; but they are not so warm and enthusiastic as they would have been some years ago on a similar subject. They call their reflecting powers more to their aid now than they would have done even then.62

Despite these disappointments, McLean’s visit had on his terms been a marked success. He had had the opportunity to explain what he portrayed as the Crown’s benevolent and protective stance to local Maori and to promise that land transactions would not render them landless or powerless but instead provide them with valuable new allies and opportunities. At night, he and Mokau Maori sat by the fire discussing matters, with McLean dispensing advice on how Maori could prosper and providing assurances that the Government was ‘not so avaricious respecting their land as they supposed’.63

The trip had done much to establish close relations with Takerei and his community, which he would continue to cultivate in the following months, for instance by sending them four baskets of seed potatoes.64 The general support of Takerei and some others for land transactions had solidified, given McLean’s indications that they would indeed lead to settlement, industry and alliance. Maori believed McLean would soon return and make a firm offer regarding land north of the Awakino River. The Crown believed it would be able to acquire a far larger area, including the Mokau River area. According to Schnackenberg, the result of the visit was that about ‘ten miles on the banks of the Awakino has been offered for sale. Mr Maclean [sic] has given the natives a hint that he would purchase all between Mokau and Awakino. The people are pleased at the prospect of having a taone [town] and all is smooth at present’. However, Schnackenberg also predicted that land negotiations would inspire opposition and ‘some raruraru [trouble]’, a prediction that soon proved correct.65

The background to the negotiations: tensions over land rights

One of the reasons why the Crown’s land purchasing efforts in Mokau did indeed lead to ‘raruraru’ was the complex and highly tense situation regarding customary rights in the area. This chapter will not attempt to state which groups the Crown should have negotiated with regarding land transactions in the Mokau area. Rather, it will ask whether the Crown adequately investigated who claimed rights in the area and, even more to the point, whether it ensured that its land-purchasing negotiations faithfully reflected these investigations.

As background to this matter, it is important to note that McLean and other Crown officials had long been aware that land rights in the Mokau area were vigorously contested and that these tensions were tied to wider and even more complicated

62 Diary of Donald McLean, 22 March – 19 April 1850, MS-1227, ATL 63 Ibid 64 Schnackenberg to W Halse, no date [1850], Series A, folder 2, p11, Schnackenberg Papers 65 Stokes, p133


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disputes. In particular, throughout the 1840s Government officials reported on the tension between Ngati Maniapoto and Taranaki iwi over land rights in what can be broadly described as the north Taranaki region, stretching from around Waitara to the Mokau River. Which groups held customary rights in this area was a highly contested and difficult to unravel issue. Up until 1848, according to some accounts, Ngati Maniapoto hapu occupied and claimed control over much of this region.66 Although many Taranaki Maori remained in exile, efforts to return were gathering pace while some were already living in the area, including the many captives released by Ngati Maniapoto and Waikato.

The northern edge of this disputed area was especially volatile. Often called Poutama, for the purposes of this narrative we can very roughly define it as the coastal area from around Pukearuhe up to the southern banks of the Mokau River.67 The evidence is unclear and contested as to whether any Taranaki Maori at this stage were resident at Poutama. However, Ngati Tama and other Taranaki Maori continued to assert their links to the area and to look forward to return.68

Crown officials and others frequently suggested that this situation could lead to a resumption of violence, especially given efforts to ‘sell’ disputed territory to Europeans or the Government. We have already discussed how land negotiations with the New Zealand Company and its competitors in 1839 and 1840 were closely connected with tribal rivalries over disputed areas.69 In 1844, George Clarke Junior, the Protector of Aborigines, stated that Ngati Maniapoto-affiliated hapu of Mokau were determined to prevent any further return by Taranaki tribes or any involvement by Taranaki Maori in land transactions regarding the area:

the natives of Mokau and the adjacent country, have expressed their determination to renew the contest with the Taranaki tribes, if they persist in a general re-occupation of the district, or accept of any payment from the Europeans.70

The following year, rumours circulated that Mokau Maori had killed a Taranaki woman. With expectations growing that Taranaki troops would retaliate and attack the region, Ngati Maniapoto warriors from Motukaramu moved rapidly south to strengthen the defence.71

66 O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement, 1840-1863’, pp92-122, especially pp101, 115. See also evidence of Taniora Pararoa Wharau, 6 June 1882, Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, p17 67 As we have discussed earlier, claimants have provided a more detailed version of the area included in the term ‘Poutama’. For this narrative, the key point is that during the 1850s and onwards, Poutama was often the broad term used by the Crown for an area stretching roughly from the Mokau harbour to around Pukearuhe. Poutama was from the 1880s also used as an alternative name for the Mohakatino Parininihi and/or Mokau Mohakatino blocks. See Stokes, pp11, 21, 23, 135 68 O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement, 1840-1863’, p104. See the Native Land Court evidence regarding the Mohakatino Parininihi block in section 7.2 of this report for more discussion of these issues. 69 See section 2.3 70 Quoted in O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement, 1840-1863’, pp110-111 71 Oettli, p74


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This proved a false alarm. However, there continued to be suggestions that Maori saw land negotiations with Europeans as a weapon in inter-tribal rivalries and as the assertion of mana over the land in question. In 1846, Schnackenberg reported to McLean on Taonui’s rivalry with Taranaki groups over the Urenui region just south of Poutama. It was believed that in order to assert his control, the Ngati Maniapoto chief would move south from his interior and northern bases and take possession of the land, and then ‘sell’ it to Pakeha.72

By 1848, relations between Ngati Maniapoto and Taranaki iwi had reached another highly delicate stage as Taranaki Maori currently living in Wellington, Kapiti and elsewhere sought to return to their former homes, while the Government stepped up efforts to purchase land for New Plymouth settlers.

In January 1848, McLean was informed by the Te Atiawa chief Ihaia that the dispute over Poutama and Urenui could lead to war:

The Ngatiawa’s [sic] formerly claimed land as far north as the Awakino a small river about three miles north of the Mokau, this must have been some long time ago. A branch of the tribe known as the Ngatitama were the occupants of these northern territories and their claim till within the last twenty years has extended to the south bank of the Mokau, this they were however obliged to abandon in consequence of the repeated aggressions of the Ngatimaniapoto and Waikato tribes the former now occupying and cultivating the line of coast as far south of Mokau as Tongaporutu 7 miles and even to Urenui about 39 miles this side of Mokau [;] their claim to the latter part of the country is contested by the Ngatiawas who consider it an unfair encroachment which the Ngatimaniapotos will not persist in maintaining unless the large body of the Ngatiawa to the south return to Waitara which would excite in all probability another war between the tribes especially if the expelled Ngatitamas presently at Chatham Islands should also return with them.73

McLean himself believed that matters were highly tense and extremely complicated. In a January 1848 memorandum, McLean drew a distinction between the position of those Taranaki Maori who had gone into exile with those who had been held captive and then allowed to return home. Taonui Hikaka had informed McLean that the released captives were permitted to live in the Taranaki area only as long as they ‘remained quietly in their lands’. On the other hand, Taonui was ‘very emphatic’ that any attempt by those now living in Wellington and elsewhere to return would be fiercely resisted, as ‘when the bird once deserts its nest, it never again returns to it’.74

Taonui had cause to be uneasy, as from around this time significant numbers of

72 Schnackenberg to McLean, 26 May 1846, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0125, ATL 73 Quoted in O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement, 1840-1863’, pp116-117 74 Donald McLean, [Draft letter], 22 January 1848, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0123, ATL


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Taranaki Maori, including Ngati Tama, were beginning to return to the Waitara area. There were, and would continue to be, conflicting accounts of the negotiations resulting in this return. According to one version, the Taranaki exiles had been invited to return by Wiremu Nera Te Awa-i-taia of Ngati Mahanga, an offer later endorsed by Potatau Te Wherowhero of Waikato and other chiefs.75

Many Ngati Maniapoto chiefs and hapu with ties to Mokau greeted these events with trepidation, and were particularly concerned that there would be attempts by Taranaki Maori to occupy and assert authority over Poutama. In April 1848, McLean reported that Taranaki-aligned Maori were planning to return to Poutama but were anticipating ‘disturbance’ from local Ngati Maniapoto hapu.76

Instead of war, there were attempts to peaceably resolve these issues. At Pukearuhe in April 1848, (some sources suggest 1849), Takerei and other Ngati Maniapoto hosted a large number of Taranaki Maori led by Wiremu Kingi Te Rangitake. There are differing versions of what occurred during these negotiations. This is hardly surprising given that they involved complex and important questions and that some of the available evidence stems from later disputes between Ngati Maniapoto and Ngati Tama claimants to the Native Land Court. As we will discuss, evidence given to the Court often asserted land rights in the most absolute terms, while denigrating the claims of competitors. Nevertheless, it is apparent that many Ngati Maniapoto chiefs, including Takerei and others from Mokau, were determined to remain in control of Poutama and remained resistant to any reassertion of Ngati Tama rights in the area.

Schnackenberg reported that the Pukearuhe hui took place in a highly tense atmosphere:

The old chief [Wiremu Kingi] came with about 200 of his men all armed. This circumstance gave offence to some Mokau folks, and for many weeks there was much dispute as to how far the land should be given back to the returning tribes.77

The result of these deliberations, according to later Ngati Maniapoto accounts, was that Takerei and other Ngati Maniapoto hapu established a border between themselves and Taranakia Maori at Waikaramuramu, just south of Parininihi and north of Pukearuhe. (Waikaramuramu is near the Waipingau stream that was also sometimes cited as a boundary between the two groups).78 The prominent Mokau chief Taniora Pararoa Wharau, of the Waikorora hapu, told the Native Land Court in 1882:

75 ‘Waitaoro’, Dictionary of New Zealand Biography (Wellington, Bridget Williams Books Limited and the Department of Internal Affairs, 1993), vol 2, p561; ‘Te Rangitake, Wiremu Kingi’, The Dictionary of New Zealand Biography (Wellington, Bridget Williams Books Limited and the Department of Internal Affairs, 1993), vol 1, p500 and Stokes, p 137. See also O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement, 1840-1863’, pp116-120 for other accounts. 76 O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement, 1840-1863’, pp118 77 As quoted in Stokes, p83 78 The Native Land Court Minute Books provide different spellings of this location. See Interlocutory Judgement, June 15 1882, Waitara-Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, p50 and ‘Native Meeting at White Cliffs’, Taranaki Herald, 25 June 1881, p2


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At the meeting Wiremu Kingi sang a waiata meaning that he was afraid of N. Maniapoto. Takerei father of Te Rerenga replied, Stay on your own land. Then a boundary was given at Waikaramuramu. South was to be for Wiremu Kingi, North of that for us. We have always occupied this and since. Those of us who were South of the boundary removed to the North of it.79

According to this and similar accounts Ngati Maniapoto hapu had retained control over Poutama. However, according to evidence given to the Native Land Court by Paiuru Te Rangikatutu, Ngati Tama believed that their mana as chiefs over Poutama had been restored when Te Wherowhero and others invited them to return to the Taranaki. They did not recall or accept any Ngati Maniapoto objection to this.80

We have only limited and conflicting evidence regarding the practical situation in Poutama following these negotiations. The general impression is that most of the hapu based north of Waikaramuramu were indeed associated with Ngati Maniapoto while Ngati Tama and Taranaki Maori generally settled further south. The ‘border’ did not prevent considerable practical connections, whakapapa links and general overlap between the peoples.81 Indeed, a few years later the Crown purchasing agent GS Cooper stated that most of the people based in Poutama claimed links to both iwi:

The Coast between Mokau and the Pari Ninihi is at present inhabited by a few Natives (numbering probably about 60) belonging chiefly to Ngatimaniapoto, but who are also so much mixed up with Ngatiawa that it is difficult to assign to them any distinctive name.82

While daily relations were therefore as much about amity as enmity, the broader issue of land rights remained disputed. Cooper called Poutama ‘debatable ground’ and reported that the original Taranaki inhabitants ‘still assert their right to the soil, upon which they are gradually encroaching’.83 Crown officials periodically reported on the potential for large-scale clashes between Ngati Maniapoto and Taranaki iwi, including rumours of a Ngati Maniapoto invasion to retake control of north Taranaki.84

However, instead of actual violence, assertions of land rights were increasingly expressed through offers to ‘sell’ land to the Crown. In April 1848, McLean and Grey were sent a letter by Te Teira on behalf of ‘40 men, 50 women and 50 children’ of

79 Evidence of Taniora Pararoa Wharau, 6 June 1882, Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no1, pp17-18 80 Evidence of Paiuru te Rangikatutu, 6 June 1882, Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no1, pp4-6 81 Schnackenberg generally described the people living in the Mokau area as Ngati Maniapoto-affiliated. In 1849 he reported that 14 or 15 Maori who had returned from Waikanae were based in the Pukearuhe and Mimi districts. In 1857 he stated that ‘Mimi and Waiti are chiefly inhabited by the people returned from Kapiti and Chatham Islands’. See Stokes, pp83, 116. That there was practical interaction and overlap between the peoples is the general impression left on me by many different sources 82 Cooper to Colonial Secretary, 29 April 1854 (draft), McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0126, ATL 83 Cooper to Colonial Secretary, 29 April 1854 (draft), McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0126, ATL 84 O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement, 1840-1863’, pp118-120


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Ngati Tama living in ‘Kaiwarawara’ (Kaiwharawhara in Wellington?) offering to ‘sell’ land at Mokau, Mohakatino and Poutama. The translation of the letter stated ‘let the payment be for thousands of pounds for the land; it is sacred land & has now been sold to the White People’. Poutama (which may mean in this context around Pukearuhe) was the southern boundary of the offer, the exact parameters of the rest of the lands offered are even less clear.85

While this offer apparently did not proceed beyond the preliminary stage, matters became even tenser in the months before McLean’s visit. In January 1850, Cooper noted rumours of an imminent Waikato and Ngati Maniapoto invasion of Taranaki and reported that Takerei was threatening that great harm could befall Taranaki Maori, whom he characterised as ‘slaves’. There were also reports that after Ngati Maniapoto had re-conquered Taranaki, they were likely to offer it to the Crown.86

These ongoing disputes meant that McLean would have to proceed very cautiously in his land-purchasing efforts if he was to avoid worsening existing ructions and not jeopardise the integrity of any subsequent transactions. But the unsettled situation also raised the possibility that Crown agents would try to exploit Maori rivalries to achieve lands sales.

There are some signs that Government purchasing officers were not immune to such temptations. At the time that McLean arrived in Mokau, the Crown was embarking on a wider attempt to purchase Taranaki lands. According to Cooper, inter-tribal friction and fears were ‘likely to have a very beneficial effect on the negotiations now in progress’. He reported that Taranaki iwi were living under ‘the dread’ of invasion from Ngati Maniapoto and Waikato tribes who would then sell their lands to the Government. However, some Taranaki Maori believed they could forestall such disasters by themselves entering into land transactions with the Government. They were therefore making urgent requests for payment from Cooper who believed that the end result would be that the Government would obtain valuable lands ‘at a very much cheaper rate’ than otherwise would be possible.87

Such evidence raises some complex questions about how local Maori at this stage understood the end result of land transactions. For instance, this and other similar incidents suggest – but do not categorically prove – that some Maori in the region believed land ‘sales’ validated their rights to disputed land rather than ended them.

What can be confidently stated is that when McLean arrived in Mokau in March 1850, he was highly aware that there were multiple and complex disputes over customary rights to lands in the area. As he travelled to Mokau, he noted in his diary that a

85 See Greg White, ‘Evidence of Ngati Tama presented to the Waitangi Tribunal’ October 1991, (Wai 143, #F19), pp132-137 and Byrnes, ‘The Mohakatino Parininihi and the Mokau Mohakatino No 1 Block’, p10. The immediate spark for this offer may well have been McLean and Grey’s attempts to purchase land around Waitara. See O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement, 1840-1863’, pp117-118 86 O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement, 1840-1863’, p121 87 O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement, 1840-1863’, p121


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Taranaki chief ‘Taringa Kuri’ based in Wellington (apparently Taringakuri Te Kaeaea Te Reweti of Ngati Tama) ‘claims land on Mookotina [Mohakatino] and Mokau. This Chief’s right is generally acknowledged’. He was also made aware that there was also strong opposition to land transactions. McLean arrived in Mokau to be greeted by a message that the Ngati Toa leader Te Rangihaeata asserted rights in the area and opposed any transaction ‘as he eventually intended to get back there. Takerei does not appear to like the interference, although he evidently respects old E Rangi in some respects’.88

McLean, already a highly experienced and knowledgeable purchase officer, would hardly have been surprised that more than one group, and more than one chief were claiming rights to Mokau land. However, during this visit, he made no efforts to consult widely or to investigate these matters in any depth. Rather, the almost exclusive focus of his visit was to build ties with Takerei and his community, who had been clearly identified as the main potential supporters of land transactions in the Mokau region. Those who could complicate the Crown’s land purchasing ambitions were not consulted with.

This Crown reliance on Takerei would grow in following years, as the opposition from other chiefs in the region to land transactions became ever more apparent. With the complicated exception of the Mokau block, all the transactions in the area would be facilitated by Takerei and his group. McLean’s visit served as the blueprint for subsequent Crown purchasing efforts in the region not only because of what he promised – beneficial ties to the Crown and to European settlers – but also who he promised this to. Before or during his land purchasing efforts, McLean failed to carefully examine which groups claimed customary rights to the land. He apparently did not inquire into how local Maori understood land transactions. Nor did he exhibit obvious concern that land negotiations could engender division among groups with ties to the area. All these failings would be copied by other Crown officials. It could be argued that the Crown’s primary focus in Mokau was to find Maori who would agree to land transactions, not to investigate who ‘owned’ the land in question.

Opposition from Taonui and others

The immediate result of McLean’s negotiations with Takerei and others was not just that it raised tensions with those outside of Ngati Maniapoto. For Mokau Maori, the more pressing concern was that it revealed that there was considerable opposition amongst Ngati Maniapoto hapu and rangatira to land transactions with the Crown in general, and more specifically to the Awakino negotiations.

In April, soon after McLean’s departure, nearly all Mokau Maori went inland to meet with interior hapu and chiefs with links to Awakino and the coastal area. After sustained discussions, a major hui was then held on 7 May at Te Paripari (apparently

88 Diary of Donald McLean, 22 March – 19 April 1850, MS-1227, ATL


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located near modern-day Te Kuiti).89 A cacophony of opinions and concerns were expressed at this hui and Louis Hetet, who provided for McLean a written report in somewhat idiomatic English, found matters too uncertain to provide a simple summary of Maori attitudes. However, what most clearly emerged was that there was considerable doubt over the wisdom of land transactions with the Crown and that there was widespread anger at McLean and the Crown’s failure to consult widely over such important issues.

Hetet informed McLean:

The grand error is this that he Takere [sic] did not more fully let know or ask all their opinion before he spoke to yourself and that is the cause of making him so many opposite voices.90

Taonui Hikaka, as a major Ngati Maniapoto rangatira with long-standing connections to the Mokau area, was especially troubled that his mana had not been recognised and his opinion sought. When he heard of McLean’s visit:

and for what cause and the result of that visit in respect of the Natives consent to sell that portion of land the Awakino he Taonui was very much enraged with [Takerei] Waitara for offering any land for sale in that district without first asking his Taonui’s consent.

According to Hetet, Taonui was especially angry that the negotiations with McLean had included land called Wai ihi, given to Taonui ‘during their last wars with the Ngati wai ora tribe for preserving all Mokau’.91 Taonui considered several responses to what he saw as an insult to his mana. He initially threatened to ‘sell’ to the Crown a vast area from Awakino in the north to Urenui in the south as a means of punishing Takerei and others for their unilateral decision to enter into negotiations with the Crown. According to Hetet, Taonui warned that ‘he would not leave them a root of a tree to sit on.’92

This offer was apparently seen by Taonui as an assertion of his authority over the land. In 1844, Taonui had described himself to the European GF Angas in 1844 as ‘the lord of all Mokau’.93 In the following years he continued to proclaim this overall control in a series of disputes with Taranaki Maori. As part of these disputes, he had sporadically considered ‘selling’ land to Europeans apparently to prove his authority over it.94 Now he was again considering using land negotiations to make clear to all concerned, especially Takerei, that he remained in charge.

89 Stokes, p134. Boulton, pp135-139 covers these events in detail 90 Louis Hetet to McLean, Te Paripari, to Donald McLean, 9 May 1850, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0338 91 Louis Hetet to McLean, Te Paripari, to Donald McLean, 9 May 1850, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0338 92 Louis Hetet, Te Paripari to Donald McLean, 9 May 1950, MS-Papers-0032-0338 93 Angas, vol 2, p89 94 See the discussion earlier in this chapter on the background to McLean’s 1850s negotiations.


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Such tactics raise an important point for the chapter as a whole. Land negotiations with the Crown were inextricably linked to internal Maori politics, and considerations of mana. Taonui evidently felt his mana had been slighted by Takerei’s offer of land without first seeking his approval. This would prove a common problem in the region. It sometimes resulted in chiefs trying to prevent stop transactions that they believed were taking place without their approval. In this case, Taonui was considering facilitating an even larger transaction as an expression of his superior position.95

These disputes, although not solely caused by the Crown, meant that it was a difficult or even ‘impossible’ task for the Government to gain genuine consent for land transactions in the Mokau.96 Government officials were, as discussed earlier, knowingly trying to purchase land in an area with a ‘complex overlap of customary rights’ and where land transactions were seen as assertions of land rights.97 This made it vitally important that Crown officers operated openly and transparently and that they consulted widely. Crown officials needed to be vigilant to make sure that local Maori understood and agreed that lands transaction finished their connection to the land, not reiterated it. But most importantly, these chiefly and tribal rivalries and political manoeuvrings made it imperative that the Crown was truly satisfied that all interested parties agreed to any transaction before it declared that the land had been purchased.

Already, by the time of the hui at Te Paripari, it was clear that the Crown faced a massive challenge to gain widespread approval for land transactions. Taonui quickly abandoned his threat of selling a massive area, apparently convinced by warnings from those at the hui that this would damage both him and the tribe.

Indeed, the korero at this hui revealed that a strong opposition to land transactions was emerging. Certainly there were those, represented by Takerei, who believed that Ngati Maniapoto would be strengthened by land transactions and European settlements in the Mokau. He ‘pointed out ably the benefits that would arise if Mokau should be colonised’, but was unable to convince many at the hui. Some took an ambivalent stance, waiting to be convinced either way. A chief, (apparently Te Kaka):

stood up and he stoutly refused to consent to parting with Mokau but there again he says he is not a covetous man he only wants a little in the palm of his hand but after all it remains ... that they must see what will be the benefits that arise for what they have consented to part with.98

But the general feeling at the hui, as expressed by a ‘grand committee’, was hostility to land transactions. Crucially, their views seemed to have a powerful impact on Taonui. According to Hetet, the committee convinced Taonui:

95 See also O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Political Engagement, 1840-1863’, p167 96 O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Political Engagement, 1840-1863’, p167 97Ibid, p167 98 Louis Hetet to McLean, Te Paripari, to Donald McLean, 9 May 1850, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0338


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... that while he remained peacefully at home and sold no land he would be respected by all Europeans but directly he sold any land they would make a slave of him ... 99

Taonui therefore withdrew his threat to travel immediately to Auckland and offer to the Crown a vast area including Awakino and Poutama. Instead, in the following years Taonui, and his son Te Kuri would be considered by the Crown as the major obstacles to land transactions in the Mokau-Poutama area. They would oppose the Mokau-Awakino land transactions and force the amount of land being offered to the Crown to be severely limited before eventually convincing Takerei to cease negotiations altogether. Taonui and Te Kuri would also play a critical role in preventing the Crown from taking possession of the Awakino blocks. Their refusal to enter into land transactions in the wider region helped scupper the Government’s broader land purchasing aims in Te Rohe Potae.

It seems fair to say that Taonui had by 1850 come to the conclusion that the Crown should not be granted substantial land interests in the wider region under Ngati Maniapoto control. However, there are dangers in describing Maori attitudes to land transactions too categorically, and the attitude of Taonui and other rangatira to land transactions with the Crown remained complex and dependent on the specific land that was being discussed and changing political considerations.

In particular, Taonui’s attitude was somewhat different in the disputed land south of the Mokau River, and especially the area south of Pukearuhe, which was increasingly dominated by Taranaki Maori returnees. From the 1850 hui onwards, Taonui would make sporadic offers to ‘sell’ this land to the Crown. These offers were provisional only and never led to serious negotiations, let alone land transactions. It is not clear what Taonui thought would be the practical results of any such agreement. Boulton’s speculation – that Taonui hoped that the Crown and European would control the area at the expense of Taranaki Maori – seems plausible enough.100

But there is also evidence that Taonui’s offers were considered by Maori as assertions of mana over both the land and over the Taranaki tribes living on it. Taonui, who had been involved in the conquest of the area, was like many Ngati Maniapoto chiefs uncomfortable with the return of Taranaki Maori and their increasingly independent behaviour. On 26 May 1850, Taonui had Hetet write a letter to McLean offering land from Pukearuhe southwards to near Taniwha, between Onaero and Waitara. The letter stated:

You have seen it on your travels over that part. I am very upset about this land which I am giving over to you, because the migrations from Ngati Awa returned to happily settle it ... Nga-toto-a-Kupe is the burial ground of my dead.

99 Louis Hetet to McLean, Te Paripari, to Donald Mclean, 9 May 1850, McLean Papers, MS-0032-0338. See full quote above. 100 Boulton, p 139


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Now be quick to give me your view, so I can hear what you have to say about what I am giving over to you.101

When Hetet warned him that Taranaki Maori would react angrily to such an offer, Taonui reacted ‘with contempt merely saying that they have flew [sic] from him before and they shall do it again’. The sense that Taonui was primarily concerned with having his rights over the land recognised, rather than concerned about the practical implications of any transaction, is strengthened by his rather cavalier response to the inquiry as to what were the inland boundaries of the land being offered. He was quoted as saying that McLean and the Government could ‘go as far as you like so long as you did not interfere with Wanganui’.102

Taranaki Maori considered that Taonui’s offer was primarily intended as an aggressive act towards them. In June 1850, Henry Halse in New Plymouth reported to McLean that rumours were rife among local Maori that Taonui had offered to the Government all the land from Mokau to Waitara and that this had given rise to fears of an imminent invasion by Ngati Maniapoto and Waikato.103

In the next few years, the Government would consider whether it could exploit these divisions and make purchases in the southern Mokau/northern Taranaki area. These efforts never got very far, and, unlike north of the Mokau River, did not reach the level of serious negotiations or the signing of deeds. The major difference between the two areas would seem to be that despite sporadic offers by various groups to ‘sell’ land in the Poutama region and elsewhere, no group or chief in this period showed a sustained interest in actually installing the Crown and Europeans upon that land. Many groups flirted with land negotiations and made vague offers but, primarily, these would seem to have been inter-tribal assertions of rights over the disputed land. The Crown, when it would finally enter into negotiations, was unable to find a group genuinely determined to enter into land transactions. However, north of the Mokau River, Takerei and others were determined to create European settlements and were willing to enter into land deals, and endure tremendous opposition from other Maori, to do so.

1850-1852: Takerei rebuffed and opposition mounts

Takerei and other Mokau Maori saw land transactions with the Crown as bringing major political and practical advantages. They would bring, so it was hoped, the economic and other advantages of more access to Europeans, but were also viewed as forming a partnership of equals with the Crown and its representatives. However, there were indications that Takerei’s offer of partnership was neither fully understood nor reciprocated. From McLean’s visit in March 1850 to August 1852, Takerei made a series of efforts to deepen the relationship and advance the transactions without success.

101 Taonui, Waipa to Mclean, 20 May 1850, MS-Papers-0032-0674B-8, ATL 102 Louis Hetet, Te Paripari to Donald McLean, 9 May 1850, MS-Papers-0032-0338, ATL 103 Henry Halse, New Plymouth to McLean, 21 June 1850, MS-Papers-0032-0311, ATL


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He visited Governor Grey in Auckland, then had Schnackenberg write to McLean in July 1850 restating his interest in an agreement over land north of Awakino – ‘kia hahoro te hokimai ki konei – kia hohoro to hoki i Awakino – kia hohoro te noho o te pakeha [to expedite your return here – to accelerate the return to Awakino – to advance the settlement of the pakeha]’.104 In addition, Te Watihi Peketahi had by this stage indicated a deal for land around the Mokau River could be possible, angering Te Kaka who had not been consulted beforehand.105

By December 1850, Takerei was resenting as an insult to his mana the failure of McLean to visit the region or to even reply to his requests. He wrote to McLean:

Perhaps [you] will return to pay for the land you and I spoke of, for Awakino. You announced it for the summer and the days of December are passed, but if January you arrive here to continue the discussion, I would agree to my land being bought.

Young man, don’t let us be laughed at by the people; they say, ‘Whoever gives a sign if right’, they think we go round and round, and the Maori say, ‘McLean won’t come.106

McLean still did not come, and in June 1851 Schnackenberg wrote to him, that ‘At Takerei’s request I beg to inform you that the Natives are very anxious to see you here. They almost despair of your return. A letter from you will be acceptable to them ... They are willing, says T[akerei] to sell as far inland as to Ruakaka.’107

In November 1851, Schnackenberg informed McLean that Takerei ‘was as anxious as ever to sell &c. Do you think there is any probability of you coming here this summer?’108 At this time, the Ngati Toa chief Te Rangihaeata, also known as Mokau because his son drowned in the Mokau River, was writing to all chiefs in the region to warn them to neither sell land or ‘korero kia Karoana should he come this way’.109 In August 1852, the missionary again wrote to McLean that ‘Takerei Waitara is very wishful to know whether you are coming to see him about land, he is very anxious to sell and have Pakehas at Awakino’.110

As Boulton points out, the Government had other strategic priorities during this period and limited resources.111 McLean, hard-pressed elsewhere, sent occasional letters to Takerei to maintain relations and invited the chief to meet him in New Plymouth or elsewhere to discuss land matters. Worried about inland opposition to

104 Schnackenberg to McLean, 22 July 1850, Series A, folder 2, p14, Schnackenberg Papers 105 Ibid 106 Takerei Waitara, Mokau to Donald McLean, 19 December 1850, MS-Papers-0032-00674G-04, ATL, as quoted in Boulton, p140 107 Schnackenberg to McLean, 10 June 1851, Donald McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0561 108 Schnackenberg to Dear Sir, [McLean], 5 November 1851, Series A, folder 3, p14, Schnackenberg Papers 109 Schnackenberg to McLean, 5 November 1851, Series A, folder 3, p14, Schnackenberg Papers 110 Schnackenberg to Dear Sir [McLean], 9 August 1852, Series A, folder 4, pp2-3, Schnackenberg Papers 111 Boulton, pp139-140


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transactions, he also wrote to Te Kuri.112 But he declined to visit the area. For the Government, neither Mokau’s land nor its people were at this stage of vital importance.

3.4 Rogan’s 1852 Negotiations: Great Expectations and Complicated Reality

The prospects of coal helped jolt the Government’s attention back to the Mokau. From June 1852, newspapers were reporting that high-quality coal had been found on the banks of the Mokau River, 30 miles from the river mouth.113 It was claimed that the Mokau coal ‘resembled more than any yet found in New Zealand the Newcastle-upon-Tyne coal, which makes the best coke in the world’.114

McLean was by this time decidedly interested in the Mokau region, but was faced with the problem that Governor Grey, for unclear reasons, did not ‘wish the Mokau to be purchased at present’. However, McLean did not want to damage land purchasing prospects by continuing to ignore the pleas of Takerei and Te Watihi, in particular, for negotiations. In August, he sent John Rogan, a surveyor with a ‘tolerable knowledge of the native language’ and a desire to become involved in land purchasing, to Mokau.115 Rogan’s role was ‘to ascertain what they really wish to sell; leaving the price, and date of purchase’ for the Governor’s [and McLean’s] future consideration.116

Europeans were confident that Rogan’s visit would reveal that vast areas could be obtained quickly, easily and cheaply. As is common with the Crown’s dealings in this region, it is difficult to trace the exact areas that Rogan entered into negotiations over. Many of the place-names used do not appear on modern maps, the written evidence is often oblique and it is likely that the actual discussions were somewhat vague given their preliminary nature. However, it is clear that during this visit there were predictions that the Crown would shortly be able to buy as much land as it pleased and that Rogan investigated the possibility of massive purchases stretching as far north as Moeatoa (near Marokopa), as far south as almost to reach Waitara, and ‘inland heaven knows how far’.117

Schnackenberg was sure that the Maori desire for European settlement would indeed lead to large-scale land sales. Just before Rogan’s arrival, he reported that a komiti had met and ‘[o]ur Natives are inclined to sell almost any part and extents of land’.118 Schnackenberg’s role was not just that of observer, rather he acted as a sometimes overt, sometime covert assistant to the Crown throughout its purchasing efforts in the Mokau. He anticipated that this role would bring him considerable rewards from the

112 Schnackenberg to McLean, 22 July 1850, Series A, folder 2, p14, Schnackenberg Papers 113 ‘Geological and Topographical Sketches ...’, Taranaki Herald, 22 June 1852, p2 114 ‘The Coal Seams of Nelson’, Taranaki Herald, 27 October 1852, p2 115 Evidence of John Rogan, 19 March 1891, Rees-Carroll Native Lands Laws Commission, AJHR, 1891, G-1, p56 116 McLean, Taranaki to Grey, 18 Aug 1852, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-004 117 John Rogan, Mokau to McLean, 20 August 1852, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0540 118 Schnackenberg to Rev and Dear Sir, no date [Aug 1852], Series A, folder 4, pp2-3, Schnackenberg Papers


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Government and that the purchases would quickly lead to settlement and opportunities for Pakeha and Maori alike. Writing to a relative to encourage him to move to the Mokau and share in the expected boom, he stated:

I am the interpreter & medium between the contracting parties, and if successfully carried out, of which I have no doubt, I may perhaps be entitled to some consideration from the government, but waiving that, I certainly possess advantages in this river which I have not got in any other place: I mean, I have influence, knowledge, & property which is of much greater value here, than anywhere else, for the purpose of rendering assistance to a settlement in this river’.119

The belief that land sales would bring far-reaching benefits to local Maori was widely shared. Around this time, McLean had sought advice from the missionary John Whiteley on the degree to which the Crown should seek to buy land in Mokau and elsewhere in the wider region. Preaching to the converted, Whiteley replied:

I am decidedly of opinion that the natives should sell land; and that the Government should buy; and I am so wishful that this should be done that I am ready to say I don’t care extensively and how cheaply you can purchase; only get the land out of the hands of the natives as readily and as quietly as possible. Of course I refer to the vast extent of waste and useless lands, which bring them in no profit, nor ever will. Nine tenths are thus lying dead; whereas if they were to sell it, and with the proceeds, farm the remaining one tenth, they might soon be as rich as noblemen. Therefore, buy away as fast as you, quietly and peaceably.120

Taranaki settlers were also excited about the possibilities of purchase in Mokau, especially as Crown efforts to obtain lands closer to New Plymouth were currently complicated by Maori resistance and obstruction. The Taranaki Herald reported that ‘the increased supply of land required for the demands of this Settlement will, probably, soon be obtained. Negotiations are in progress, under the direction of Mr Commissioner McLean, for the purchase of three considerable blocks’ including at Mokau while the ‘Mokau purchase will include lime and coal fields’.121

McLean’s instructions did not mention the need to investigate which groups claimed rights in the area and there is no evidence that Rogan considered this issue in any depth. In this, he was far from exceptional, for throughout the Crown’s protracted efforts to acquire Mokau land, there is no indication that its officials ever investigated in a sustained or disinterested fashion who’s consent was required to ensure that land purchases were broad and genuine agreements with the rights-holders. Nor did the

119 Schnackenberg to Trappitt, 30 Aug 1852, Series A, folder 4, p4, Schnackenberg Papers 120 Whiteley to McLean, 31 August 1852, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-00634 121 New Zealand Spectator and Cook’s Strait Guardian, 1 Sep 1852, p3 extract from Taranaki Herald, 11, 18 August 1852


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Crown make clear why it dealt with certain groups in the Mokau and not with others. Such decisions in the Mokau negotiations seemed to be made primarily by the Crown officers on the ground, and based mainly on who who they believed would support the land transactions.

It would seem that Rogan at first concentrated his purchasing negotiations around discussions with Takerei and those ‘resident’ Mokau Maori who were identified as supporters of land transactions. It is likely that Schnackenberg played a part in this decision as Rogan, a newcomer to land negotiations and the region, was initially heavily dependent on the missionary.

His initial report to McLean on 20 August certainly echoed the missionary’s blithe confidence that it was only a matter of time before a massive area would be available. Rogan believed that Takerei would extend his offer for land around Awakino greatly, so that it reached up to Waikawau or Moeatoa, with extensive inland boundaries.

Some Mokau Maori, perhaps associated with Te Watihi, had offered a small area around the Mokau River. Rogan was sure that this ‘was a mere commencement of proceedings’ which would soon result in Maori offering the much larger upriver Mokau area which McLean had identified as a Government priority. Although these Maori were ‘most anxious’ to reach an immediate agreement on this smaller block, Rogan declined to survey it or enter into further talks so as to make clear the Government’s demand for far larger areas.

In addition, after hearing from ‘Tikaukau and the Kahaioa’, (who appear to be the Tongaporutu-based chiefs Tikaokao and Te Kaharoa)122 Rogan apparently believed that the Crown could obtain the entire area stretching from the southern banks of the Mokau to the northern banks of the Waitara river.123 Taonui had also recently written to the Governor re-stating his offer to ‘sell’ land from Pukearuhe southwards.124

Rogan believed that completing these transactions would take some time as local Maori ‘will settle nothing in a hurry’. However, he was confident that, after his brief visit had laid the foundations, that McLean or the Crown official GS Cooper could follow on shortly afterwards to finalise the transactions and more precisely define the boundaries. Rogan reported to McLean that:

I am altogether pleased with my trip here because I am persuaded you have only to come here yourself to buy as much

122 See Schnackenberg Papers, i.e. Schnackenberg to Rev and Dear Sir, undated [May 1854?], Series A, folder 4, pp62-63 123 Rogan to McLean, 20 August 1852, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0540. Note again that it is difficult to be completely confident of the areas being discussed, given that many of the place-names are obscure and the evidence cryptic. Schnackenberg to My Dear friend, 24 Aug 1852, Series A, folder 4, pp3-4, Schnackenberg Papers suggests that the Crown considered the original, more limited, offer inadequate 124 Boulton, p142


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land as you please.125

Such confidence came despite the fact that Mokau Maori were insisting that consultation with inland hapu and leaders would be needed before any large-scale agreements could be reached. Rogan and Schnackenberg were however unworried, believing that these talks would inevitably lead to large land sales. Schnackenberg wrote:

We had a Komiti yesterday. The Natives seem disposed to sell almost any part or extent of land, though at present they say let the rohe be at a small creek [Mangaoira or Mangoira?] about a mile back of our house at Mahoe, but I know it is only to consult Taonui ma. Takerei says “haere ki Waikauwau [sic] ki Moetoa [sic] [go from Waikawau to Moeatoa].126

Following these komiti, Mokau Maori sent letters to senior inland rangatira Taonui Hikaka, Te Kuri and Nuitone, apparently raising the possibility of land transactions with the Crown. And following the preliminary talks with Rogan, Takerei travelled inland to meet with Taonui and Te Kuri. Rogan was confident that after the meeting Takerei would ‘extend his boundary to Waikaiou or the Piamoko North and the inland boundary to Mauia or Rua kaka if you wish it. The Motukarauru to the beach you can purchase if you please, and from the other side of the river to the North Bank of Waitara may also be purchased’.127

Within a few weeks, there was evidence that such confidence grossly simplified a much more complex situation. By mid-September, a considerably more seasoned and worried Rogan was reporting to McLean that the ‘Mokau offer has assumed a different hue’.128 Rogan had hoped to leave well before then but he had been ‘detained’ somewhat against his will by Takerei for further talks and in order for Rogan to carry out some surveying that Takerei wanted. He still carried out no serious or sustained inquiry as to who claimed land rights. Nonetheless, in meetings with Maori and in the course of his survey work, Rogan had become exposed to some of the considerable opposition to the mooted land transactions.

Reports had been received of general opposition to land sales from the ‘interior’. While Rogan was keen to dismiss these as ‘mere rumours’, it would seem that Taonui and Te Kuri had refused to support the proposed large-scale transaction the Crown was seeking, and were even objecting to the far smaller sales that Takerei and others had posited. Schnackenberg had also heard of this opposition to land transactions from inland Ngati Maniapoto chiefs, including Te Kuri, Nuitone and Poihipi as well as those

125 Rogan to McLean, 20 August 1852, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0540. Rogan also believed that Mokau Maori would also make an agreement with the Crown’s land purchasing officer at New Plymouth, GS Cooper 126 Schnackenberg to McLean, 20 Aug 1852, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0561. See also Schnackenberg to Rev and Dear Sir, undated [c.21 August 1852?], Series A, folder 4, pp2-3, Schnackenberg Papers 127 Rogan to McLean, 20 August 1852 128 Rogan to McLean, 13 September 1852, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0540


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with connections to ‘Ngatiawa’ and Taranaki Maori.129

Particularly problematic for the Crown were the increasing signs of opposition from coastal and upriver Mokau hapu, led by the chief Te Kaka. The Crown had hitherto relied exclusively on the support, which it assumed to be unanimous and without nuance, of those it apparently considered the ‘resident’ Mokau chiefs and hapu. It was becoming harder to ignore that support even (or especially) at a local level was far from total. Rogan considered these local opponents to land transactions ‘traitors’. Prime among them were Te Kaka and others, who both refused to contemplate a large-scale deal involving the coal areas further up the Mokau River, but were also excluding from sale areas in the far smaller area around the Mokau harbour. Rogan reported that:

[Te Kaka’s] party have, from time to time, gradually withdrawn patches of land from the Block: telling me they intend retaining those as Reserves. I think their present feeling is to oppose the sale of land belonging to those in the district ... This is to be regretted because the banks of the river, inland to the coal district, belongs principally to these people.

Rogan, naively confident upon arrival, was by this point confused and somewhat cynical about the overall attitude of Mokau Maori to land transactions:

It is ... impossible for me to say with certainty what their real intentions are. Indeed, I don’t think they know themselves ... One peculiarity of character I have discovered in the man of Mokau; which much resembles the Feegee Islander, namely, the people making false statements, even when the truth would answer his purpose better.130

Rogan did at least remain certain that Takerei supported large-scale land transactions. Almost 40 years later, Rogan would give evidence to the 1891 Rees-Carroll commission in which he fondly recalled this visit to Mokau as the start of ‘a very successful’ career as a land purchase officer and then Native Land Court judge. Rogan claimed that during this visit ‘I was successful in getting the Natives to agree to a sale of land and in putting everything in train’. Afterwards he and McLean returned to finalise purchases in the region that were characterised by the ‘honour and extreme fairness exhibited’ and the unwavering Maori acceptance of the arrangements.131

Such nostalgic claims don’t accord well with the contemporary evidence. But Rogan’s later recollections are relevant for another purpose. They suggest that the degree of opposition to land transactions in the area led the Crown to rely overwhelmingly on the support and assistance of Takerei. Rogan recalled in 1891 that during this visit to Mokau ‘he called public meetings of the Natives, in order to ascertain whether they

129 Schnackenberg to My Dear Friend, 15 Sep 1852, Series A, folder 4, pp9-11, Schnackenberg Papers 130 Rogan to McLean, 13 September 1852, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0540 131 Evidence of John Rogan, 19 March 1891, Rees-Carroll Native Lands Laws Commission, AJHR, 1891, G-1, pp55-58


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were willing to dispose of any land in that part of the country. Some of them were opposed to any sale being made. But one chief in particular, named Takerei ... was very favourable to the sale’.132 Much of the rest of his evidence focused on the later support Takerei lent him.

However, the priorities and interests of Takerei and his supporters were far from identical to those of the Crown. This was indicated by the fact that they declined to help Rogan survey the northern boundaries of land they were considering offering to the Crown, because they were busy fencing and planting.

More importantly, while Takerei was certainly keen to place settlers on some land, it is far from clear that he was indeed committed to the type of large-scale land transactions Crown officials were envisaging. As we have seen, he insisted during Rogan’s visit that such transactions would require the approval of other Ngati Maniapoto leaders and hapu. All he was willing to discuss was an arrangement for a far-more limited area near the Awakino River.

Furthermore, Takerei did not want to see quick and fragile land deals that would lead to internal tribal division. Rather, he wanted in-depth negotiations both between Maori and the Crown and between Maori and Maori to reach a more durable agreement.133 He ‘positively refused’ to let Rogan depart Mokau until confirmation was received that a more senior Crown purchasing officer, GS Cooper, would shortly visit. Takerei, and indeed Rogan, expected Cooper’s visit to include a general hui (‘Mr Cooper’s Committee’) to be held at Mokau that would be widely attended by local Maori, including key leaders from the interior. This hui would seek some wider consensus regarding land transactions, ‘something like an opinion’ in Rogan’s words, while Takerei told him that it would allow a committee to decide on boundary matters. This was a far slower process than Rogan had envisaged or wanted. But, as he reluctantly conceded, it had ‘one great advantage. The people will have time to consider well the subject’ of land transactions.134

There were plenty of indications that the people from throughout the region were already considering this very subject, even if no consensus had yet emerged. Rogan reported that Te Kaka had been in Motukaramu for ‘some time, discussing the important subject’ while a ‘native of Petone, a great landed proprietor, has gone to Ruakaka, for the purpose of inducing his friends to join him in selling their land’. Takerei and the Maniaroa settlement had received letters from ‘the Pakare’ urging them not to enter into land transactions, although Rogan thought such protests would have little effect on them.135

132 Ibid, p56 133 It is not possible to state precisely which chiefs and groups Takerei accepted had a right to involvement in the negotiations, and which he resented. As we will see, he was certainly concerned with securing the support of senior Ngati Maniapoto rangatira and especially Taonui. 134 Rogan to McLean, 13 September 1852, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0540 135 Ibid


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Despite all the evidence of opposition, Rogan and Schnackenberg still remained confident that the transactions could still go ahead. Both expected that McLean’s influence – and the concomitant promise of alliance with the Government – would go a long way towards breaking down opposition. Rogan, acknowledging that McLean’s reliance on Takerei had created resentment among other chiefs, believed that if McLean spread his attention more widely, resistance would quickly dissipate. Rogan wrote to McLean:

a jealously between the two chiefs exists; because letters are written to you to Ta Kerei [Takerei] only. A note from you to the Kaka might purchase the Coal Mines. You have secured the one: and it is no difficult matter to take the other.136

Schnackenberg believed that a McLean visit - accompanied by cash – would see the transactions completed. He believed the local Maori connection to land had revealed itself to be shallow and that resistance to transactions was petty and unprincipled:

It appears to me the Natives idolatious [sic] attachment to land is not so great as I supposed. Most objections are traceable to animosity & envy - & those of Ngatiawa connexions also to a shrewd selfishness – thinking when pakehas have actually come – their possessions may be sold at a higher price.137

There was much that was errant in such comments. But the apparent acceptance of the need for public hui and wider consultation raised the possibility that the Crown would henceforth move more carefully in determining if, and how much land, Maori wished to transact in the region.

3.5 Cooper’s 1852 Visit

Failed attempts to purchase the area from individual chiefs

The visit of land purchase commissioner GS Cooper would not, however, see the Crown adopt a more transparent policy of public consultation with Maori that revolved around seeking communal agreement for land transactions. Rather, Cooper’s visit would be marked by attempts to cajole and pressure a limited group of chiefs into ‘selling’ far more land than they were willing or believed they had the authority to.

The essential pattern of land negotiations in the area had by this stage become established. The Crown wanted to acquire a large area, especially stretching from the Mokau harbour inland. However, many Maori, both from coastal and interior hapu, were wary of any land transactions. And even those who saw potential merit in land deals, wanted to strictly control the amount and quality of land that the Crown would gain rights to. Takerei and his supporters wanted a deal that encompassed only a limited area north of the Awakino River. Te Watihi, Te Wetini and others were interested – in the face of considerable opposition – in a still smaller land transaction

136 Rogan to McLean, 13 September 1852 137 Schnackenberg to My Dear Friend, 15 Sep 1852 (underlined in original)


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on the north bank of the Mokau River.

Cooper was therefore unable to secure any Maori support whatsoever for a wider transaction. Rather than abandon his efforts, he switched to a highly dubious strategy, attempting to reach an ‘agreement’ with Takerei only over a large area including the valuable Mokau River area. The many other potential rights-holders, some of whom had already clearly expressed their opposition to the transactions, would be ignored or forced to accept a fait accompli.

Takerei’s refusal to countenance the Crown’s proposal illustrated a crucial point. He and other Mokau Maori were attracted to the Crown’s promise of prosperity and partnership, a promise that Cooper made repeatedly and explicitly on this visit. But they were determined to retain enough land so that they could be strengthened by Pakeha settlement, not overwhelmed by it. Furthermore, Takerei and other supporters of land transactions would not exceed their authority and step outside of the wider tribal consensus through ‘selling’ land and in doing so, risk major conflict with their kinfolk. This visit showed that the Crown faced overwhelming resistance in its aim to purchase a large amount of valuable land in the Mokau area.

Cooper and William Halse, the Commissioner of Crown Lands at New Plymouth, arrived in Mokau in early October. To their dismay, they discovered just how little land was being offered to the Crown and that there was deep resistance even to these offers.

The first offer to the Crown was for what would become the Mokau block, on the northern banks of the Mokau river mouth. Cooper reported that a group led by Te Watihi (Peketahi) and his brother Te Wetini wanted negotiations over an area calculated to be around 2500 acres and which went no further upriver than Mangoira (or ‘Mangauira’). As Cooper reported, this offer was made ‘in order to bring Europeans there’.138

However, this area around the Mokau river mouth was relatively heavily settled and particularly important to Maori, with many different groups and individuals claiming rights and interests in it. Even during their limited consultation, Cooper and Halse were told that a significant number of economically and culturally important areas would have to be excluded or reserved from any transaction. Ngati Pehi and their chief Te Kaka demanded to retain ‘a piece of land called Te Kauri, consisting of about 30 acres, with a frontage of nearly a quarter of a mile to the river, and including almost the only available spot for commercial purposes’. This area included both an important settlement and a portion of river bank ‘where loaded vessels can lie alongside and discharge their cargoes as at a wharf’.139 Pakeha settlement would render this area even more economically crucial and Maori were determined to retain control over it.

138 GS Cooper to the Civil Secretary, 24 October 1852, Turton’s Epitome, C.XII, Aotea, Kawhia & Mokau, No. 14 139 Ibid


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Furthermore, Cooper reported that Te Waru of Ngati Pehi ‘reserves 300 acres of the best cultivable land in the block lying at the corner and western boundaries’.140 There were also demands to exclude or reserve ‘an ancient burial ground’, two other small areas and (what would prove to be a major problem for the missionary Schnackenberg) most of the land surrounding the Te Mahoe mission station. In addition, ‘one of the sellers also claims the timber growing on a considerable piece of land, though he stated his readiness to let the land go, after the trees shall be cleared off’. Cooper calculated that after deducting these areas, that the offer included only 2000 acres of which ‘not more than 500 acres would be of any use to Europeans, and that in the least accessible portion of the block, the remaining land being very much broken and thickly wooded’.141 Schnackenberg stated that the chiefs Nuitone and Te Aria of Ngati Pehi had also ‘tapued’ some of the best areas in the block and that, overall, ‘Mr Cooper is not pleased with the offer’.142

Indeed, he was not. He had come with a very different agenda, to acquire at the very least both banks of the Mokau River stretching 25 miles upriver, to a point marked by a creek called Mangaharakeke (or Maungaharakeke). McLean had on his 1850 visit identified this as the necessary extent for a profitable and large block that would include both the valuable harbour area and the potentially rich coal, limestone and timber resources upriver. The group led by Te Wetini and Te Watihi were not surprised when Cooper made this demand but were emphatic that it could not be met as they did not have authority over this inland area and were aware of strong resistance from interior hapu and chiefs to a transaction. Cooper reported:

They replied that the offer they had made comprised all the land they had a right to sell individually; and that the land inland of Mangauira belonged principally to the Natives living in the interior, who were fully represented by Ngataua [Te Kaka]’.

Cooper was told that Te Kaka would not allow any land transactions further upriver at least until the smaller Mokau transaction had shown itself to be a success.143 Cooper and Halse believed him to be under the influence of Taonui Hikaka and Te Kuri ‘who are said to be the chief opponents to the sale of land up the river’.144 The Crown officials therefore resolved to travel to meet Taonui and other ‘chiefs of the interior’ and convince them to allow the purchase. However, Mokau Maori, led by Te Kaka, would not allow them to go upriver and pursue their land purchasing aims. Cooper, enraged if powerless, called the obstruction greatly annoying and ‘extraordinary’.145

140 Ibid 141 GS Cooper to the Civil Secretary, 24 October 1852, Turton’s Epitome, C.XII, Aotea, Kawhia & Mokau, No. 14 142 Schnackenberg to Rev and Dear Sir, 9 October 1852, Series A, folder 4, p11, Schnackenberg Papers 143 GS Cooper to the Civil Secretary, 24 October 1852, Turton’s Epitome, C.XII, Aotea, Kawhia & Mokau, No. 14. It is unclear whether Te Kaka, Te Waru and others were at Mokau for the meetings with Cooper and Halse, or if their demands and views were passed on to the Crown by the group led by Te Wetini and Te Watihi. 144 GS Cooper, Taranaki, to McLean, 24 October 1852, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0227 145 Ibid


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Rather bizarrely, this evidence of Maori resistance to transactions convinced Cooper of the opposite: that Taonui was willing to transact a massive area, including from Mokau south to near Waitara and also the Mokau River stretching far inland. He posited that Te Kaka and others feared that Taonui would make such a deal with the Crown and that was why he was prevented from going up-river.146 Later events would demolish Cooper’s theory about the attitude of Taonui and Te Kuri to land sales.

Cooper was already convinced that Te Kaka and other local Maori were opposed to large-scale land transactions. He blamed this opposition on outside influences including the ‘bad advice’ of both Ngati Toa rangatira and ‘chiefs in the southern portion of the island’, especially Rawiri Kingi (Puaha).147 As we have seen earlier, Ngati Toa chiefs with ties to the region such as Te Rangihaeata had strongly called on Mokau Maori not to enter into land deals.

Cooper attributed particular blame to a trader and ship-owner based in Mokau by the name of Hopkins, who lived under the ‘protection’ of Te Kaka and was believed to possess ‘considerable influence with all the natives on the river’. Hopkins was reported to have told local Maori:

that they were wrong to sell their lands, using the usual argument that they would become slaves to the Europeans &c., and finding that they were determined to sell, he told them to let the land go in small blocks, as they would obtain a much larger payments for it.148

It was also believed that Hopkins had threatened to leave the area unless Te Kaka secured for him land at Te Kauri for ships to dock their cargo.149 Schnackenberg agreed that Mokau Maori were being led astray by Hopkins who he labelled a ‘bad man’; immoral, licentious, dishonest and perhaps worst of all, an opponent of land transactions. Schnackenberg considered himself in a battle with Hopkins for influence among local Maori, and would do his best to run the trader out of the region.150

However, the resistance of local hapu to a sale of the upriver Mokau area would outlive the eventual departure of Hopkins. Facing the repeated refusal of Mokau Maori to ‘sell’ the areas or to allow him upriver to continue the negotiations, Cooper broke off talks, telling them that:

Europeans had already plenty of infinitely superior land on which to go ... until they sold a block which would offer some

146 GS Cooper to the Colonial Secretary, 31 October 1852, Turton’s Epitome, C.XII, Aotea, Kawhia & Mokau, No. 14 147 GS Cooper, Taranaki, to McLean, 24 October 1852, Donald McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0227, and GS Cooper to the Civil Secretary, 24 October 1852, Turton’s Epitome, C.XII, Aotea, Kawhia & Mokau, No. 14 148 GS Cooper to the Civil Secretary, 24 October 1852, Turton’s Epitome, C.XII, Aotea, Kawhia & Mokau, No. 14 149 Ibid 150 Schnackenberg to My Dear Sir, 15 Sep 1852, Series A, folder 4, pp9-11, Schnackenberg Papers


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inducement for settlers to go amongst them, the government would not listen to their proposals.151

Cooper and Halse then went to examine the offer of land further north, near the Awakino River. While it would seem that a number of Maori took part in these negotiations, the Crown officials focused their attentions almost exclusively on Takerei. Cooper stated that this ‘block is offered by Takerei alone, to whom the conduct of the negotiation has been entirely given up’.152 The negotiations centred around Takerei’s desire for settlement and the Crown’s demand for more land than Takerei and his party could or would offer.

Cooper was unimpressed with the roughly 16,000 acre area Takerei was offering. Although he thought ‘no obstacles exist’ to a successful purchase, he was uninterested in ‘a mere strip along the sea coast ... the land is very broken and hilly, thickly covered with wood, and extremely difficult – in many cases impossible – of access’.153 He tried to get Takerei and his party to extend the boundaries to what would become the Awakino block. Despite some interest from Takerei, ‘a majority’ of his party refused and Cooper was forced to concede that the opinion of both the Mokau and Awakino ‘conferences’ was firmly against extending the offer.

Cooper therefore told Takerei that it was almost certain that the Governor would reject the offer for the 16,000 acre Awakino area, especially as the group led by Te Wetini and Te Watihi refused to sell the large Mokau river block that the Crown was demanding. Cooper reported that Takerei was ‘greatly disappointed’ at the break in negotiations:

as he has for years been extremely anxious to have Europeans settled in his district, and has spared no exertion in endeavouring to obtain the consent of the Natives to my proposals.154

The Crown’s efforts to acquire a large part of the Mokau region had therefore apparently been defeated. Cooper and Halse were aware that a number of different parties claimed rights in the wider area including Te Watihi and his group, Takerei and his supporters, Ngati Pehi and their chiefs Te Aria, Nuitone, Te Waru and Te Kaka, the interior hapu led by Taonui and Te Kuri and, as we shall see, Taranaki Maori and Ngati Rarua of Nelson. None of these groups or leaders had consented to the sale of land up to Mangaharakeke, rather there was clear evidence of considerable local and wider opposition.

However, the Crown officials were not yet ready to abandon efforts to secure the land. They instead attempted to establish a deal with Takerei alone for the alienation of the

151 GS Cooper to the Civil Secretary, 24 October 1852, Turton’s Epitome, C.XII, Aotea, Kawhia & Mokau, No. 14 152 Ibid 153 Ibid. Cooper also stated that the ‘reserves asked for were very small, and were in all cases left entirely to my discretion’. 154 Ibid


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wider Awakino-Mokau river area, including all the way inland to Mangaharakeke, setting aside some of the payment to distribute to other groups and chiefs who may later assert rights to the land. This tactic, commonly used by Crown agents elsewhere in the country during this period, destroyed the ability of rights-holder to prevent land being sold against their wishes. The deal would be made without their involvement. All they could hope to receive was payment for their interests in land already sold.155 There is no evidence to suggest that the Crown officials believed that Takerei had, or claimed, the rights to make alone such an important decision. Indeed, Takerei had and would continue to refuse to become directly involved in land transactions near the Mokau River. Rather, having been refused by a wider group, they now sought to pressure a single and susceptible chief, who they believed would do ‘anything’ to bring Pakeha settlement to the region, into an ‘agreement’.

Cooper later explained to McLean the strategy he applied in Mokau.156 He refused Takerei’s offer of the Awakino block, telling the chief ‘I would not accept the piece ... on any terms’. Rather, he made an offer of £2000 if the chief would ‘extend the boundary to Mangaharakeke’. The money would be paid in four instalments of £500. The first would go to Takerei alone, apparently on the signing of the deed.

The second instalment of £500, he proposed, would go to ‘Ngatirarua in Nelson’. As Leanne Boulton points out, Ngati Rarua had, alongside their close relations including Ngati Toa and Ngati Koata, gradually migrated from Kawhia to the northern South Island in the 1820s and 1830s. They had paused in various northern Taranaki (and presumably Mokau) locations for one or more growing seasons. Ngati Rarua were therefore one of the many groups who were potential interest-holders in the area. It is not clear why they were explicitly singled out by Crown officials for payment.157 There is no evidence that this decision came about following an appropriate and transparent Crown investigation into who had rights to the Mokau lands. Nor is there any record of Crown negotiations with Ngati Rarua over Mokau lands. This raises the suspicion that, for political reasons, Crown officials considered it worthwhile to pay this group some money, perhaps in relation to its attempts to purchase land and interests at the top of the South Island.

Cooper planned the third instalment to go to Takerei again, presumably to be paid at some time after the deed-signings in order to secure his support for the post-deed dealings. This was necessary for the fourth instalment of £500 which was, in Cooper’s words, ‘to be divided by him [Takerei] and myself amongst such claimants as might turn up including Ngatiawa’ [of Taranaki].158 Such an arbitrary, post-transaction arrangement suggests how far Crown officials were from accepting their responsibility

155 See for instance, Waitangi Tribunal, Te Tau Ihu o Te Waka A Maui, p525 156 GS Cooper, Taranaki to McLean, 3 April 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0227 157 Boulton, pp155-156 speculates that Takerei and Mokau Maori may have accepted that Ngati Rarua had customary interests in the land. However, it seems likely that the Crown suggested that Ngati Rarua be included in the negotiations. As we shall see, Mokau Maori in 1855 angrily opposed the Crown’s proposal that Ngati Rarua receive payment for the Taumatamaire block. 158 GS Cooper, Taranaki to McLean, 3 April 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0227


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to ensure that land transactions were fully agreed to by the rights-holders who had been identified prior to negotiations. The Crown was palpably aware that many groups and individuals were likely to claim interests in the land it was attempting to purchase. Its aim was to sign a deed with a compliant chief, and leave all the other interested parties, regardless of tribal and hapu affiliation, without an ability to stop the sale of the land. Whether they even received payment for their interests would depend centrally on political considerations and the whims of others, not on an investigation of their rights.

Cooper presumed such an arrangement would be eagerly embraced by Takerei. After all, it offered Takerei enormous authority over a considerable area. While Cooper’s description suggested that the initial deed would be signed by Takerei alone, it can be presumed that the Crown agent envisaged at least some other Maori to be included, if only to make the ‘agreement’ appear more respectable. Takerei would also be given control of a large sum, £1000, to keep or distribute as he saw fit. He would be in the powerful position of being able, with Cooper, to subsequently decide which other groups and individuals would receive payment and have their rights to the land recognised, and which would be denied. However the greatest attraction to Takerei of such an arrangement would be that land transactions would go ahead and bring with them the expected large-scale Pakeha settlement. Cooper believed Takerei would ‘do anything for the sake of obtaining pakehas’159, which suggests that the Crown recognised that it was the desire to bring his people new economic opportunities, more than purely selfish ambitions, which motivated the chief.

However, what Takerei would not do for the sake of ‘obtaining pakehas’ was agree to ‘sell’ vast areas of land without the approval of those he considered to have legitimate rights to be included in the decision. Most importantly, he would not go against the wishes of his fellow Ngati Maniapoto chiefs and kinsmen in the interior and upriver. He told Cooper ‘he could not accept this offer, as the people inland opposed it’.160

Just as the frequently rebuffed Cooper made to quit the Mokau, a new development emerged.161 He and Halse also hoped on this visit to secure a large area south of the Mokau River extending to near Waitara.162 As we have seen, the Crown officials had attempted to meet Taonui in the hope of purchasing both the Poutama district and the inland Mokau river area. Refused permission to even meet him, Cooper and Halse then investigated the possibility of acquiring at least some of the Poutama area from a number of chiefs strongly based around this area. They found total resistance to any

159 Ibid, 24 October 1852 160 GS Cooper, Taranaki to McLean, 3 April 1854 161 Ibid, 24 October 1852 162 The Crown’s general impression was that Taonui had previously offered to ‘sell’ all the land from the southern banks of the Mokau to the Waitara. (GS Cooper, Taranaki, to McLean, 24 October 1852, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0227) However, as discussed above, the actual 1850 offer seemed to specify only lands south of Pukearuhe, i.e. the areas that Taranaki Maori were increasingly controlling to Taonui’s unease. Regardless of its dimensions, the key point regarding this offer was that it was provisional and extremely vague, and no talks were held with Taonui to ascertain what he meant by it


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transaction, Cooper reporting that ‘all the Natives’ including Te Wetini, Te Watihi, Te Kaharoa, Tikaokao ‘&c &c said that they would not sell any part of it especially that offered by the old women, between Mokau & Mohakatino’.163

Cooper suspected that this complete refusal stemmed from disputes over who had authority over the land and from fears that a sale of the Poutama area could also lead to the loss of the upriver Mokau area. But just as Cooper was again planning to abandon his land-purchasing mission, he received news that Taonui was now possibly open to negotiation. Louis Hetet had apparently passed word to Schnackenberg that Taonui ‘would make no objection’ to the purchase of the limited Awakino area that Takerei was offering. We can only speculate on the meaning and accuracy of this message. It is possible that Taonui had decided to no longer actively oppose this small-scale transaction as a sign of respect and acknowledgement of Takerei’s refusal to enter a wider land transaction without his agreement and that of other interior chiefs. However, Hetet believed that Taonui, aside from Awakino, would not allow any more land transactions ‘till he received an answer to an offer which he made some time ago’ to McLean of land south of the Mokau.164 This presumably referred to Taonui’s 1850 letter offering to ‘sell’ the area controlled south of Pukearuhe to near Waitara that was controlled by Taranaki iwi, which the Crown had not responded to. However, Cooper was in no position to find out what was Taonui’s actual position or take negotiations further, given that he was still prevented from travelling inland.

A new Crown commitment to consensus over land deals?

The failure of Cooper’s 1852 visit did not mean the end of the Crown’s efforts to acquire land in the district, and especially the area from the Mokau harbour to Mangaharakeke. To achieve this, Crown officials made ever more explicit the promise to Takerei and other Mokau Maori. If they would bring this transaction about, they would receive a town of settlers, partnership with the Crown and ongoing prosperity.

While this was a continuation of previous Crown tactics, there were also signs of a change in policy regarding whose consent would be needed for these transactions. The problems that had bedevilled Cooper’s visit – including his failed attempt to enter into a deal with Takerei alone – were a clear warning that the Crown could not gain the land it sought without the acquiescence of a wider number of hapu and chiefs, including from the interior. By the end of 1852 it would seem that the Crown’s instructions were that while officials could deal primarily with Takerei and other local chiefs, that wider consent was required before any deal could be reached. These instructions, while somewhat vague, suggested the possibility of a major change in the Crown’s approach.

This possible change was hinted at in two documents. Given the current refusal of Mokau Maori to sell the block the Crown was seeking, Cooper wrote to Governor

163 GS Cooper, Taranaki, to McLean, 24 October 1852, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0227. It is not clear what the offer from the ‘old women’ involved. 164 Ibid


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Grey requesting instruction on how he should proceed. Cooper combined this request with some recommendations – that the Governor reject the offer to the small Mokau and Awakino blocks and continue to push instead for the sale of the area up to Maungaharakeke. To enlist Takerei’s support in this – and to reward him for previous interest in land transactions – Cooper recommended that Takerei be made a native assessor. Cooper stated that:

The chief has exerted himself to the extent of his interest and eloquence to obtain the consent of the Natives to a sale, and the disappointment [that the Crown rejected his offer] will be very great ... I fear that seriously to offend him would have a prejudicial effect upon the purchase of lands in this immediate neighbourhood ...165

The Governor agreed, although the instructions issued on his behalf to Cooper seemingly added a proviso: that although Crown officials could continue to build up relations with Takerei and others, wide support for the land deal was essential. On 29 November 1852, Cooper was instructed that:

it is not desirable that anything further should be done in this matter until the Natives are all agreed to dispose of the extent of country required by Government – the tract now offered being almost valueless – unless a considerable portion on both sides of the Mokau were added thereto.166

Cooper was instructed to write to Takerei and Te Watihi expressing the Government’s policy. On 14 December 1852, he did this, making emphatic that the Crown required the consent of the ‘all the people’ to the transaction. His letter to Takerei read:

You see the Governor’s reply has proved to be as I told you – the offer is too small – Europeans would never think of going upon so small a piece of land. You had better therefore agree the whole of you, men, women, and children, from the North, the South, and the interior – all the people – to extend the boundary to the parallel of Maungaharakeke, as fixed by Mr McLean.

He was equally as emphatic in explaining the Crown’s promise that the transaction of this land would lead to the prosperity of Mokau Maori. Cooper wrote to Takerei:

Both sides of Mokau must be given up at one time, and then I will go down to Mokau and conclude the arrangements, that a town may be built at that place, that it may be cultivated by Europeans, so that the land may be improved; and that we all and our children may dwell together, and that we may grow and

165 GS Cooper to the Civil Secretary, 24 October 1852, Turton’s Epitome, C.XII, Aotea, Kawhia & Mokau, No. 14 166 Civil Secretary to GS Cooper, New Plymouth, 29 Nov 1852, Turton’s Epitome, Enclosure No.1 in C.XII, Aotea, Kawhia & Mokau, No. 15 GS Cooper, New Plymouth to the Colonial Secretary, 13 December 1852 (emphasis added)


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increase in wealth and strength as one people, and that our children may climb together to the summit of worldly prosperity.167

Cooper was very pleased with how he had phrased these undertakings and demands. As he told McLean, Takerei and Te Watihi could hardly complain of the Crown’s refusal to enter into small-scale transactions, having received the undertaking of what a larger transaction would bring. He was therefore confident that ‘before long they will offer to extend their boundaries’ i.e. that all the people would agree to the transaction of the Mokau river area stretching well into the interior.168

Figure 4: The Mokau-Awakino Crown purchases (Stokes, ‘Mokau: Maori Cultural and Historical Perspectives’, p 132)

167 GS Cooper to Waitara Ta Kerei, Mokau, 14 December 1852, Turton’s Epitome, Enclosure No.2 in CXII Aotea, Kawhia & Mokau, No. 15 GS Cooper, New Plymouth to the Colonial Secretary, 13 December 1852 168 GS Cooper, Taranaki, to McLean, 24 October 1852, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0227


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3.6 The Awakino Transaction

The domino theory – Crown strategy in the area 1853-1854

Despite Pakeha predictions, powerful and widespread opposition to large-scale land transactions would continue. For most of 1853, the Government’s land purchasing efforts in the wider region were stalled by this opposition and by its other land purchasing priorities. By late in 1853, McLean and the Government were ready to try again, although its actions and the limited amount of direct evidence available suggested that it had now adopted a somewhat different strategy. The long-term aim remained the same – that the Crown would acquire a huge amount of land in the wider area, including the valuable upriver Mokau area. However, the Crown was forced to concede that this could not be achieved rapidly through a few large-scale purchases.

Instead, it sought to acquire whatever land seemed available, including the Awakino and Mokau blocks it had previously rejected as inferior in quality and inadequate in quantity. The hope was that these small-scale transactions would provide the foundation for further purchasing in the wider area, and that they would set off a chain reaction among chiefs and groups who would come forward to sell land.

After four years of failure and delay, the Crown’s chief land purchasers had become hungry for some success in the region. The Mokau area was now seen as an important step towards acquiring the strategically and economically valuable northern Taranaki region, and in the Crown sweeping further north and into the interior. For Donald McLean, the chief land purchase commissioner, the initial purchase in the region of the Awakino block was not just the acquisition of a small block of mountainous land. It was opening the door to far greater purchasing from Ngati Maniapoto and the broader ‘Waikato’ tribes that, it was planned, would spread to the very heart of their rohe. McLean told the Colonial Secretary:

I am in hopes that the purchase of this land [the Awakino block] from an influential branch of the Waikato tribe will tend to the acquisition of a large extent of country extending inland from Awakino towards the Waipa district.169

However, even the acquisition of the small Mokau-Awakino blocks would prove to be far more difficult than anticipated. Opposition to the purchases and the range of groups and individuals claiming interests in the area meant the Crown quickly abandoned any pretence that it would seek the genuine, communal agreement of ‘all the people’, as Cooper had put it. The Crown had in 1852 received offers of the Awakino block from Takerei and supporters and of the Mokau block from Te Wetini, Te Watihi and party. In 1853-1854, the Crown would sign deeds with these groups, without seeking to ensure that all potential right-holders to the land agreed to its

169 McLean to Colonial Secretary, 1 April 1854, AJHR, C-1, p152. Note that throughout this period, the Crown often referred to a general group of iwi including Waikato-Tainui, Ngati Maniapoto, Ngati Haua and Ngati Raukawa as ‘the Waikato tribe’ or tribes. The term was also used when referring more specifically to the Waikato-Tainui people.


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alienation.

As we shall see, for Takerei and others, the agreement over the Awakino block was a significant and solemn decision that had as its basis the promise and expectation of Pakeha settlement and of mutually beneficial relations between the Crown and Maori. But many others Maori saw this as a dangerous precedent by which the Government sought to take without their consent land they claimed interests in. The aftermath to the transaction would therefore be characterised by resistance, disruption and dispute.

It took some time for the Crown to drop its insistence that if Takerei and others wanted settlement, then they would have to sell large blocks including the coal-rich banks of the upper Mokau River. Although the evidence is somewhat ambivalent, it would seem that in late 1853 and early 1854 McLean sent a series of letters and communications to Maori at Mokau and throughout the wider region calling for them to enter into large-scale land agreements with the Crown.170 He also sent John Rogan to negotiate, to make preliminary payments and begin surveying land he thought could be acquired.

The response to the Crown’s offers was far from overwhelmingly positive. Apparently referring to McLean’s written offers to buy a large amount of land, Rogan reported from Mokau on 2 January 1854 that:

I sent you a number of native letters, all of which are opposed to the large package you sent me some time since; and it is a matter of regret that I cannot bring the matter to a successful issue. I have done everything in the matter that is advisable for the present.171

While there were preliminary and unsuccessful talks about other areas, the only clear offer was from Takerei and his supporters over the roughly 16,000 acre Awakino area that Cooper and the Crown had so forcefully rejected in 1852. Its coastal borders were Purapura in the south and Huikomako in the north with the Mangonui (or Manganui) Stream serving as one of the main inland boundaries. The Crown was still in no doubt of its low quality. Rogan reported that it consisted of ‘terrible mountains’ and nearly did himself a mischief trying to carry out an initial survey of the land.172

The initial 1 January payment for the Awakino block and subsequent complaints

Despite the low quality of the land, the Crown remained determined to purchase the block, albeit at minimal prices. Crown land purchasing policy was in this period dominated by the desire to acquire Maori land as cheaply as possible, so that it could

170 Schnackenberg to My Dear Sir [McLean?], undated [late 1853/early 1854], Series A, folder 4, p48, Schnackenberg Papers and Rogan, Mokau to McLean, 2 Jan 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0540 171 Rogan, Mokau to McLean, 2 Jan 1854 172 Ibid


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later be on-sold to settlers at a considerable profit, thus providing the funds for colonisation. The Awakino block was eventually acquired for only £500, which equated to a mere 7.5 pence per acre, leading to complaints from Maori.

In 1852, Cooper had recommended to Crown officials that no more than £500 to £700 should be offered for the Awakino block if it was decided to continue with purchasing efforts.173 It would seem that the Crown had by late 1853 decided it would pay no more than £500 for the block, for when Rogan was detached to Mokau he had in his possession that sum. On 1 January 1854, he handed over this money to unnamed Maori and then reported to McLean that ‘I paid the £500 yesterday for land at Awakino’.174

However, this was certainly not the end of negotiations and no deed was made at this time. It is possible that the Crown considered this as an advance payment, as a way of gaining a foothold in the land before any fuller agreement was made. It was indeed common Crown tactics during this period to make advance or partial payments to some of the potential rights-holders in the land, allowing the Government to complete the transaction and make any further payments in the future. McLean and Rogan used this approach in various ways in their purchasing in the Mokau and wider region at this time.175

There is little evidence directly regarding the Maori attitude towards this initial payment. However, when McLean arrived in Mokau to complete the transaction, he faced dispute and disagreement over the purchase price. Local Maori apparently believed that the £500 was an inadequate and partial payment only and demanded more. When McLean insisted that no further payment would be made, the negotiations broke down. Schnackenberg, however, remained confident that they ‘will probably come to terms after talking a little more’ and the deed was shortly afterwards signed on 28 March for the purchase price of £500.176 (The deed also stipulated that an additional sum of £30 would be set aside for Ngati Rarua of Nelson.)

Local Maori still remained unhappy with the low payment. Shortly after the deed-signing, complaints were made to the Crown, apparently arguing that they had been promised £2000 for the block when Cooper visited in 1852. Cooper was asked whether there was any credence in these complaints. He responded that while he had indeed offered £2000, this was only for a far larger area that included the upriver Mokau area up to Maungaharakeke.177 His official report in 1852 stated that he had tentatively suggested to local Maori around £500 to £700 for the smaller 16,000 acre Awakino block as a basis for possible further negotiations. However, he had been

173 GS Cooper to the Civil Secretary, 24 October 1852, Turton’s Epitome, C.XII, Aotea, Kawhia & Mokau, No. 14 174 Rogan, Mokau to McLean, 2 Jan 1854 175 See McLean to Rogan, 13 July 1855, AJHR, 1861, C-1, pp153-154 and Boulton, esp. pp294-304 176 Schnackenberg to Rev and Dear Sir, undated [March/ April 1854?], Series A, folder 4, p60, Schnackenberg Papers 177 GS Cooper, Taranaki to McLean, 3 April 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0227


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reluctant to ‘press the question’ of price at that time for he did not want Maori to believe the Crown was interested in this block given its demand for a larger purchase.178

If some local Maori were unhappy with the price paid for the Awakino block, Crown officials were delighted. McLean assured the Colonial Treasurer he had acquired the block for the lowest possible amount.179. Cooper congratulated McLean for ‘obtaining Takerei’s land at so reasonable a price’.180

Once divided among the 70 signatories, the smallness of the immediate payment became readily apparent. Rogan later recalled that Takerei received the money and immediately distributed it to heads of families and hapu.181 Schnackenberg believed the payment was so small that it would be ‘lost like a straw on the dry sand and not worth the time they have spent in commiti [sic] about it’, especially once it was divided among the ‘Mokau, Awakino, Waikawau, Ruakaka and Motueha folks’.182

The expectation that the Awakino transaction would bring settlement – January to March 1854

Alongside the immediate payment, local Maori also sought longer-term benefits from the Awakino transaction. Rogan’s payment on 1 January for the Awakino block set off enormous debate and discussion in the area over the wisdom of land transactions, but also raised hopes that there would soon be Pakeha settlers and new economic opportunities. As we have seen, these expectations reflected the fact that the Crown had long told Mokau Maori that transactions would bring partnership and Europeans.

Such expectations may seem surprising given the quality of the land and that Cooper had explicitly told Takerei, at least in 1852, that the Crown would not buy the Awakino block as it was doubtful it would attract and sustain a significant number of settlers. However, it would seem that the Crown decision in 1854 to change its policy and buy the land had caused both local Maori and Pakeha to believe that settlement and increased trade was imminent.

In March 1854, news spread that McLean would arrive shortly to complete the Awakino transaction. A large group gathered at the Mokau mission station where the sole topic of discussion was land transactions and the dominant expectation – at least among supporters of the transactions – was of settlement and economic opportunity. The missionary was unable to keep any order even among his students and considered Maori so ‘haurangi’ or drunk with the prospect of money and prosperity that they were

178 Ibid, 24 October 1852 179McLean to Colonial Secretary, 1 April 1854, AJHR, C-1, p152 180 GS Cooper, Taranaki to McLean, 3 April 1854 181 Evidence of John Rogan, 19 March 1891, Rees-Carroll Native Lands Laws Commission, AJHR, 1891, G-1, p56 182 Schnackenberg to Turton and /or Wallis, Smales, Buttle, undated [Feb 1854?], Series A, folder 4, pp57-58, Schnackenberg Papers. Schnackenberg was writing shortly before the deed was signed. At this stage, he expected the price to be £400 rather than £500.


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neglecting their work of rope making and apple picking.183

Schnackenberg was highly excited himself. The missionary shared the desire of Takerei and others for settlement, although for somewhat different reasons. He longed for a radical transformation of Mokau and its Maori, and believed a town of Pakeha would help inspire the local people to throw off what he saw as their debased communal culture.

Schnackenberg had initially opposed the Crown’s purchase of the Awakino block as too small to bring about a significant influx of settlers. Rather than acquiring only the small Awakino block on offer, he advocated that the Crown continue its policy of pressuring Takerei and others into selling a much larger portion of the Awakino and inland areas. He believed that, if McLean insisted, ‘Takerei & his party would go ten or even twenty miles inland ... which will give 64,000 or 128,000 acres. Such a large block, through bad land, will be considered valuable I suppose’.184 Even more effective, the missionary argued, would be to demand that a large swath of land near the Mokau River, with its harbour and coal (and mission station) be offered before any other land be considered.185

However, after further reflection, he conceded that McLean knew ‘his business best’ and that the small Awakino purchase would quickly result in large-scale Pakeha settlement and a myriad of benefits for Pakeha, Maori and missionary alike.186 He considered:

The sooner the place is colonised the better ... I cannot think, but that they [Maori] will do right & profit every way, by allowing such land to be occupied by others of which they cannot make any use themselves.187

Like many Maori, he now thought that a town of Pakeha in the Awakino area was a realistic prospect and indeed an almost essential/inevitable corollary to the land transaction. Around the time of the Awakino transaction, he sent off a flurry of letters to relatives and fellow missionaries stating that we ‘shall probably have a kainga pakeha [pakeha settlement] here’. He reported some immediate Pakeha interest in settling on the Awakino block and expected Mokau to become a centre for both Maori and European.188 Currently, many Maori in the area travelled to New Plymouth, Kawhia and elsewhere to trade with Pakeha and to liaise with other hapu. Schnackenberg wrote that, ‘[i]f we get pakehas & kapukes [kaipuke or ships] here, not only will there be an

183 Ibid. 184 Schnackenberg to Turton and /or Wallis, Smales, Buttle, undated [Feb 1854?], Series A, folder 4, pp57-58, and Schnackenberg to Rev and Dear Sir, undated [March/ April 1854?], Series A, folder 4, p60, Schnackenberg Papers 185 Ibid 186 Ibid 187 Schnackenberg to Rev and Dear Sir, undated [March? 1854?], Series A, folder 4, p60, Schnackenberg Papers 188 Schnackenberg to My Dear Brother, undated [March? 1854?], Series A, folder 4, pp60-61, Schnackenberg Papers


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end to this going away, but many Natives from the interior will doubtless settle as near as they can’.189 Settlement would bring not just prosperity but more ‘piety and virtue’ to local hapu. Schnackenberg had by this point grown tired not just of his own personal isolation at Mokau but his lack of influence on local Maori. Land transactions, he believed, would bring towns and towns would transform Mokau Maori, who would cease putting mana and land ahead of religion and individual industry. ‘Poor creatures! I now wish that the thing could be changed all at once and have te kainga Pakeha [the Pakeha town] as soon as possible’.190 In expectation of such a town, he was hastily boning up on his English so that he could deliver sermons to the ‘good pakehas [that will] settle around us.’191

When Schnackenberg talked to local hapu about the results of land transactions, he emphasised the opportunities of new trading partners and towns while tactfully excluding his predictions of Maori subservience and Pakeha control. He did all he could to break down resistance, sometimes keeping strategically quiet during the many debates about land transactions, at other points reiterating to opponents, such as Te Kaka the well-established formula that land transactions would bring settlers, and settlers would bring trade and prosperity to Maori. He reported to McLean:

Kaka seems to take some little delight in letting me know that old Hikaka is of the same mind with himself but when I once put him in mind of the folly of refusing to sell and thus (besides the utu of the land) get 8 or 10/- for his wheat, instead of four which he gets now, he did not say a word in reply & I believe – and almost sure – that I could get him over, but I have been somewhat reserved in this matter.192

While Te Kaka remained unconvinced that land transactions were the best way to secure the advantages of increased trade, many local Maori were influenced by the promise and vision of prosperity held out by Pakeha advocates of land deals. Comparison with Taranaki was also another potent push towards land transactions. While the disputes and violence between ‘sellers’ and non-sellers’ in Taranaki attracted considerable Mokau attention, so, doubtlessly, did the material benefits that their tribal rivals were reported to be deriving from contact with settlers. Even in 1854, at a time of great tension, it was reported that the people at Waitara River possessed ‘35 ploughs, 20 pairs of harrow 40 carts, 300 cattle, 150 horses, a small flotilla of sailing boats, and considerable sums of money’.193 Mokau Maori had far less resources. They also had far fewer settlers. Land transactions were presented by Pakeha and seen by

189 Schnackenberg to Rev and Dear Sir, undated [Feb? 1854?], Series A, folder 4, pp54-57, Schnackenberg Papers 190Schnackenberg to Turton and /or Wallis, Smales, Buttle, undated [Feb 1854?], Series A, folder 4, pp57-58, Schnackenberg Papers 191 Schnackenberg to Rev and Dear Sir, undated [Feb 1854?], Series A, folder 4, pp54-57, Schnackenberg Papers 192 Schnackenberg to My Dear Sir [McLean?], undated [late 1853/early 1854], Series A, folder 4, p48, Schnackenberg Papers 193 Petrie, pp239-240


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many Maori as the only way to remove that imbalance.

The Awakino deed signing 28 March 1854

Schnackenberg also realised that the other great attraction of land transactions for local Maori was the establishment of an ongoing alliance with the Crown based around close personal relationships.194 Both Maori and Pakeha considered McLean’s attendance at the Awakino negotiations and deed signing as a crucial recognition of the importance of the agreement. He had been escorted to Mokau from New Plymouth by Takerei’s sons Wetere and Reihana (Te Rangituataka), and other local Maori. The negotiations and deed signing were marked by a degree of ceremony that suggested that for Maori this was not simply an arrangement over land, but the establishment of a bond with the Crown.

The significance of the occasion was indicated by the formality and public nature of the deed signing. Seventy Maori signed the deed on 28 March 1854, the greatest number of any of the Awakino-Mokau transactions. While, as we shall see, not all local Maori agreed or participated in the transaction, the names attached to the deed suggested a range of support. Takerei and his sons Wetere and Reihana took a senior role, while it seems likely that at least some other prominent local chiefs signed.195 A number of children had their names attached to the deed, perhaps as a symbol that this was seen by the ‘sellers’ to be a lasting agreement or alliance between the Crown and their community, including future generations.

For the Crown and Europeans, the Awakino transaction, as the first in what was hoped to be a series of agreements, also had a special resonance. This was indicated by the larger presence of Europeans than would attend the other deed-signings. Alongside McLean and Rogan, the witnesses included Schnackenberg and three settlers who had apparently travelled to Mokau for the signing, two from New Plymouth and one from the Wairarapa.196

The payment of the money was carried out with considerable ceremony. Although Rogan had earlier made the payment of £500, at some point Maori returned the money to the Crown. According to the deed, the money was then formally ‘paid to us ... by Mr. McLean’ at the time of the signing. Rogan would later write that McLean formally handed over the money ‘in public, in presence of their own missionary’ to Takerei to mark the importance of the chief ‘as he was man of great consequence amongst them’. Takerei then immediately divided the money among those gathered, apparently to the ‘heads of the hapus or families’.197

194 For example, he emphasised that McLean, not Takerei, should try to win over the opponents to land transactions. Ibid 195 HH Turton, Maori Deeds and Plans of Land Purchase in the North Island of New Zealand [henceforth referred to as Turton’s Deeds] (Wellington: Government Printer, 1877-1878), Deed No 452 196 Ibid 197 Turton’s Deeds - Deed no.452 Awakino Block, states that ‘The whole of the payment for the land is the Five hundred pounds .... which we received on this day’ from McLean. Rogan’s somewhat unreliable


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Figure 5: Sketch plan of the Awakino block, 1854 (Turton’s Deeds, Deed No 452) Thirty-seven years later, Rogan still recalled with awe the haka that accompanied the Awakino signing:

there was such a scene on that occasion I shall not forget to the

1891 account states that McLean carried the money to Mokau ‘and the whole of the Natives there agreed to Mr. McLean handing over this £500 – which was the price agreed upon ...’ Evidence of John Rogan, 19 March 1891, Rees-Carroll Native Lands Laws Commission, AJHR, 1891, G-1, p56


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latest day I live. The Maoris were there in their true savage character – they were very wild. After the dance was over, the money was divided amongst them, and there never has been a dispute over the transaction from that day to this.198

While the Awakino deed-signing was clearly an important event, we have relatively little evidence regarding the surrounding discussion that took place between Maori and the Crown. The deed itself was largely a formulaic document, closely resembling in form and content the standard purchase deeds used by the Government at this time. For instance, although it claims to be an agreement between the Crown and the signatories, who are described as ‘us the Chiefs and people of Ngatimaniapoto’, no explanation is provided of how the Government came to consider those who signed their names were the ‘owners’ of the block and capable of its alienation.

Likewise, there is nothing in the deed that mentions whether the coming of Pakeha settlement was an inherent part of the arrangement and a Crown obligation – as local Maori seemed to have believed – or merely a likely subsidiary outcome that the Government had no direct duty to bring about, which was presumably the Crown’s position. The deed, like many deeds at this time, featured wording designed by the Crown to ensure that it was clear, at least legally if not in reality, that Maori were giving up totally and permanently all rights to the land. In its English version, it states that Maori ‘have now transferred to Victoria, Queen of England under the shining sun for ever and ever’ all the lands defined, including ‘all and everything connected with the land’.199 But the deed reveals nothing about whether the Crown actually tried to ensure that local Maori understood and accepted this.

What the deed and surrounding events do suggest is that those who entered into the Awakino agreement were determined to control, limit and benefit from land transactions. Despite predictions and Crown efforts, local Maori including Takerei would not extend the boundaries of the Awakino block. Cooper in 1852 had predicted that there would need to be minimal reserves in the block and that Maori would leave it to the Crown to decide where those reserves may be. However, the 1854 deed included guarantees that local Maori would be able to keep full control over a significant number of areas within the block. Six areas were to be reserved or granted to Maori ‘to live upon’.200 Three of these areas were broadly described in the deed – at ‘Waikato’, ‘Ketekarino’201, and at ‘Ounutae’. No acreage is given and it is not stated to whom these lands would be reserved for. One ‘small piece’ at Rangitoto was designated for Hokipera, who was Takerei’s wife. Two fifty-acre areas were to ‘be

198 Evidence of John Rogan, 19 March 1891, Rees-Carroll Native Lands Laws Commission, AJHR, 1891, G-1, p56 199 Turton’s Deeds, Deed No 452 200 The deed states that there would be ‘five reserves’, although it actually specified six areas. As will be discussed later, this was just one example of the Crown’s carelessness in defining and protecting Maori reserves form the land transactions 201 According to the deed this ‘small piece’ had already had its ‘boundaries fixed by Mr. Cooper and Rogan’.


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granted’, to Takerei’s son Reihana and the other to Takerei’s son Wetere.202

Later in the report, it will be suggested that the Crown, up to 1895 at least, badly mishandled the legal setting aside and protection of these areas. But for the vendors, these reserves were an essential element of the transaction. Although Maori retained considerable land elsewhere in the area, these reserves were presumably of important areas that the vendors wanted unquestioned control of, and were also a means by which they could guarantee close interaction and control of the Pakeha settlers who were expected on the rest of the block. According to Rogan, during the negotiations Takerei demanded ‘very little’ for himself, and distributed nearly all the purchase money to others: ‘The only thing he asked for was two sections of 50 acres each for his two boys’.203 Takerei and his family would continuously press the Crown to survey and acknowledge these areas. In 1857, Government surveyor WN Searancke, in Mokau on other business, would at ‘Ta Kerei’s constantly expressed wish ... mark out the 50 acre sections for his sons at Awakino’.204

Opposition and non-involvement in the Awakino transaction

Rogan was surely correct when he emphasised the deep commitment that Takerei and the other Maori participants felt toward the Awakino agreement. However, many who claimed interests in the block neither participated in the signing nor consented to the transaction. At this time, Schnackenberg emphatically stated that there were close to 360 Maori living in the broader coastal region: “I do not think that I can be out 5 either way – I know all’. Although he defined this region only vaguely as from ‘Piketoa to Mimi’, the 70 names attached to the Awakino deed certainly did not include anything like all of the ‘local people’.205

Moreover, it seems likely that many other Maori from the interior and elsewhere who claimed interests in the land had not heard of the arrangement, or were unable to go to Mokau to make their opinions known. According to claimants, stories passed down among the generations state that many inland Ngati Maniapoto hapu from Piopio and elsewhere were excluded from the negotiations as they were busy harvesting and catching tuna. James Taitoko told the Waitangi Tribunal:

If we look at that time of the year, March, April, May is harvesting season for the crops, corn, potatoes, kumara, you name it ... So rather than miss our harvest we were there [inland], rather than here [coastal Mokau], listening to the sale and the negotiations. Nor did we sign or consent to anything.

202Turton’s Deeds, Deed No 452 203 Evidence of John Rogan, 19 March 1891, Rees-Carroll Native Lands Laws Commission, AJHR, 1891, G-1, p56 204 WN Searancke, Mokau Heads to McLean, 20 January 1857, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0561 205 Schnackenberg to Turton and /or Wallis, Smales, Buttle, undated (Feb 1854?), Series A, folder 4, pp57-58, Schnackenberg Papers.


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The sale still went on.206

It would seem that the only group who attended the Mokau negotiations were those who signed the deed, most of whom were apparently affiliated with coastal hapu. There is a suggestion that a large number of Taranaki Maori attended as observers, but the evidence supporting this is obscure, and there is no indication that they took part in the negotiations or deed-signing.207

What is clear is that the Crown carried out the Awakino deed-signing despite knowing that there continued to be strong opposition both to the specific transaction, and to land transactions in the region in general. Schnackenberg had written to McLean early in 1854 that he had recently been visited by a group of Maori who had the ‘wish to sell’. Although he had ‘little doubt the land will be sold and that you will be able to get it to any extent’, the missionary-assistant purchase officer warned McLean that there remained important opposition to any sales in the region, including from Te Kaka, operating in close alliance with Taonui Hikaka and Te Kuri. Schnackenberg was of the opinion that McLean, and not Takerei, was the best man to deal with ‘the opposition party’, or alternatively that the resisters ‘must be allowed time to come forward with their offer’.208

McLean did not take the advice. The Crown had previously indicated that Taonui, Te Kuri, Te Kaka and Te Aria had significant authority and interests in the area. McLean apparently decided to complete the transaction without even seeking their consent. These chiefs did not sign the deeds and would in the coming months step up their resistance to land transactions.

Ngati Maniapoto opposition – both from the coastal Mokau and the interior – was therefore simply ignored. This largely was the case with other groups that may have claimed rights to the land. As we have seen, earlier negotiations had made clear to the Crown that many groups apart from those associated with Takerei were likely to claim rights to the land. In 1852, the Crown had seemingly withdrawn from its previous reliance on dealing almost exclusively with Takerei and suggested that transactions in the area would only be carried out with the overwhelming support of all the interested parties. However, rather than consulting widely with all potentially interested parties – or even trying to find out who all these parties were – it would seem that in 1854 McLean simply made an agreement with the group who had brought him to the region and excluded all others.

206 Evidence of James Taitoko, Te Rohe Potae – Nga Korero Tuku Iho o Te Rohe Potae 5th Oral Traditions Hui, Maniaroa Marae, Mokau, p30. See also p74 207I doubt Taranaki Maori were present. The only supporting evidence is Schnackenberg’s obscure and barely legible comment that ‘200 of Ngatiamas [sic] have come to Whunga [sic]’. Schnackenberg to My Dear Brother, undated [March 1854?], Series A, folder 4, p60, Schnackenberg Papers. See also Boulton, p154. However, given the tension between the two groups over land rights, the attendance by Taranaki Maori would presumably have merited fuller and clearer comment from Pakeha observers such as McLean, Rogan and Schnackenberg. . 208 Schnackenberg to My Dear Sir [McLean?], undated, [late 1853/early 1854], Series A, folder 4, p48, Schnackenberg Papers


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Facing an extremely delicate and complex situation, McLean chose the path lit by political expediency. He was determined that the Awakino purchase would be deemed fully complete with the signing on 28 March, with no recourse for those excluded. He instructed his officials to reject the expected demands for further payments, reserves or anything else that could be constituted as acknowledgement of their interest in the land. The Crown wanted no further costs or complications. Instead, it wanted more land. In order to secure the support of Takerei and his people for the Awakino transaction – and in the hope that further land could be purchased from this group – McLean agreed to ignore the demands of their rivals, especially Taranaki Maori. Immediately after the signing, McLean wrote to Cooper in New Plymouth that:

Any applications by Natives at New Plymouth, either for payment or reserves within the above purchase, you should not in any way recognise. The best course, therefore, will be for you to refer them to Takerei or myself, stating, as your opinion, that nothing further can be paid as the whole of the amount has been given to the Natives here, who object to any other payment being made, particularly to the New Plymouth Natives. I am aware that several applications will be ...209

Cooper followed these instructions precisely. Just days later, the Te Atiawa chief Hone Rophia approached him ‘much vexed when he heard that nothing had been reserved for the claimants hereabouts’. He demanded payment ‘for his tamariki’ for the Awakino transaction ‘and that in all new purchases he must have his share’. Cooper replied that he ‘had nothing to do in the matter and must refer him to Takerei’.210

As we shall see, other groups, including from ‘Waikato’ would subsequently demand to the Crown that their rights to the land be acknowledged in various ways, including through payment.

The Awakino purchase was the first in the wider region and was seen by Crown officials as a potential ice-breaker. It was expected to lead to more Maori agreeing to sell their land. Even if opposition to sales remained, Awakino showed that the Crown was willing to push ahead regardless, claiming land as alienated without seeking or receiving widespread communal consent. This willingness would again be demonstrated in the even more questionable ‘purchase’ of a key area in the region, the Mokau block.

209 McLean to Commissioner Cooper, 29 March 1854, AJHR, 1861, C-1, p151 210 GS Cooper, Taranaki to McLean, 3 April 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0227 and Boulton, pp156-157


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Figure 6: Sketch plan of the Mokau block, 1854 (Turton’s Deeds, Deed no 453) 3.7 The Mokau Transaction

Attempts to secure the Mokau block – March to April 1854

The Crown moved quickly to build on the Awakino deed and achieve more purchases both in the Mokau and the wider region. As Boulton points out, there was a growing belief that further purchases in Mokau could help break open to Government control the vast interior, a region in which it currently held little influence or land. The day after the Awakino signing, McLean instructed Rogan to ‘facilitate negotiations’ with Ngati Maniapoto chiefs that would extend the Awakino purchase ‘inland’ towards the Waipa valley. It was, he stated, of ‘importance that negotiations for the purchase of land from the Natives of this Province should be carried on with as little delay as possible’.211

The Taranaki Herald concurred, believing that the purchase of land in Mokau would:

be of great value to Wellington and Auckland, but especially the latter, as our upper Mokau lands are within easy distance of Waipa, and will render a road necessary between this and Auckland.212

Such strategic considerations tended to overwhelm any Government concerns over the

211 Chief Commissioner McLean to Commissioner Rogan, 29 March 1854, AJHR, 1861, C-1, p151. See also McLean to Colonial Secretary, 1 April 1854, AJHR, C-1, p152 212 Taranaki Herald, 21 March 1854 as quoted by Boulton, p196


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divisions and conflict that land negotiations could cause to Maori. McLean’s instructions to Rogan did not state that negotiations had to be preceded by investigations into who claimed rights to the land. Nor did McLean emphasise that transactions required the wide consent of Maori or provide any indication on Crown policy over these crucial issues. Rather, Rogan was simply told to negotiate over whatever ‘further tracts as the Natives may offer for sale in that neighbourhood’ with the aim of acquiring some initial agreement – or semblance of an agreement – that would be formalised upon McLean’s approval. Advance payments and cultivating the relationship with individual chiefs (especially Takerei) were central to achieving these aims. Rogan was left with a sum of money to be used ‘as an instalment on any fresh blocks that the chief Takerei may offer’.213

However, the Crown’s most immediate focus was on securing an agreement with Te Wetini Ngakahawai, apparently a Mokau-based chief aligned with Ngati Maniapoto hapu. Government purchase officer Cooper in New Plymouth had in 1854 received vague, second-hand information that Te Wetini was interested in selling ‘the land between Mokau and Mohakatino’. Judging that the land ‘breaks into a valuable and desirable district’ and was within the Taranaki provincial boundaries, Cooper wrote to Te Wetini accepting his ‘offer’ despite having no clear idea of what the Crown was accepting. He then asked Rogan to check with Te Wetini ‘and find out all particulars as to opposition if any, inland boundary, extent of the Block, etc. etc’. Cooper was even unsure whether Rogan was already negotiating for the land. If the area was Rogan’s responsibility, Cooper offered to ‘help him with the Natives hereabouts’.214

Such a haphazard method of negotiations and purchasing was highly problematic given the complexities of land rights in the area and the range of views regarding land transactions. Around this time, Schnackenberg confirmed what the Crown had already been repeatedly told: that there was strong resistance and complexities to any purchase involving the coastal and inland Mokau River area. Schnackenberg believed that a five mile strip between ‘Mohakatino & Awakino extending perhaps two miles inland’ and including both heads of the Mokau River ‘may be regarded as offered for sale, I think’. However, he doubted whether an agreement could be completed as key areas were being withheld from sale as ‘our grand folks “tikarohia [pick out]” the most valuable parts for themselves’.215

Furthermore, the Crown and Cooper himself were well aware of the volatile disputes over land rights in the Poutama region. Around this time, Cooper issued a report which provided general information to the Government. Poutama was described as ‘debatable’ land:

The coast between Mokau and the Pari Ninihi is at present

213 Chief Commissioner McLean to Commissioner Rogan, 29 March 1854, AJHR, 1861, C-1, p151. See also McLean to Colonial Secretary, 1 April 1854, AJHR, 1861, C-1, p152 214 Cooper to McLean, 3 April 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0227 215 Schnackenberg to Turton and /or Wallis, Smales, Buttle, undated (Feb 1854?), Series A, folder 4, pp57-58, Schnackenberg Papers


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inhabited by a few natives (numbering about 60) belonging chiefly to Ngatimaniapoto, but who are also so much mixed up with Ngatiawa that it is difficult to assign to them any distinctive name. The land on which they reside is debateable ground, having originally belonged to Ngatimetenga [sic Ngati Mutunga?], a section of Ngatiawa, who still assert their right to the soil, upon which they are gradually encroaching.216

Such a situation required a Government approach to land purchasing based around investigation and caution. However, the Government at this stage was keen to plough ahead and secure whatever land it could gain. Despite Cooper’s ill-informed letter to Te Wetini, McLean and Rogan were in fact already in contact with the chief. Indeed, Te Wetini was edging uncertainly towards negotiations over a small but critical coastal area on the north bank of the Mokau River (what would become the Mokau block).

As we have seen, the Crown had in 1852 entered into negotiations over this area with Te Wetini and his brother Te Watihi but had encountered considerable resistance. With its rich food resources and its access to the sea and the river, the area around the Mokau estuary had long been an important centre of Maori settlement.217 On its northern banks were the important Maori settlement at Te Kauri and the mission station at Te Mahoe. Given that it was at the heart of the wider system of river ‘highways’, rights to the area were particularly contested and complex. In 1852, Cooper had found that even those interested in land transactions had consistently refused to extend the boundaries upriver and demanded a large number of reserves of some of the best land in this small 2500 acre block.

These problems had led the Crown to refuse to consider purchasing this block in 1852. However, with the Awakino transaction completed, the importance to the Crown of even a holding on the Mokau River had grown. The harbour area would clearly be crucial for future trade and transport in the area, for access to the Crown lands in the Awakino and was also the most logical location for a town. Perhaps most importantly, its acquisition was seen as a first step towards moving upriver with its coal and other resources, the area which the Crown’s purchasing efforts were focused on but were meeting most resistance.

During McLean’s visit in March 1854, in which the Awakino deed was signed, he spent much of his time trying unsuccessfully to purchase what would become the Mokau block. His efforts revolved around discussions with a limited group associated with Te Wetini, who had been identified as the leader of a possible ‘selling’ party. McLean apparently did not consult with other Maori who had previously been identified by the Crown as holding rights in the river area but were believed to oppose transactions.

The Crown, although desiring the land, was determined to keep the price low. McLean offered Te Wetini’s party just £200. McLean also refused to exclude the many areas

216 Cooper to Dr Andrew Sinclair, 1 May 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0126 217 Stokes, p28


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that Maori wanted reserved or cut out from any transaction, with the single exception of the Te Kauri settlement.218

When Te Wetini and others rejected this offer, McLean departed the area, leaving Rogan to continue attempts to acquire the block. Rogan was instructed to acquire the entire 2500-acre block except for a clearly defined reserve at Te Kauri. The Crown’s aim was evidently to tempt or pressure Te Wetini and others into a quick agreement and to gain land through creating competition between chiefs. McLean left with Rogan the £200 that the Crown was willing to pay for the block. This meant that the money was readily available and accessible to Te Wetini and his followers. All they needed to do was sign the deed. However, if they delayed, they ran the risk of losing it permanently and seeing all £200, plus an extra £100, given instead to Takerei for whatever land he would offer. McLean instructed Rogan that:

Should ... the chief Wetini decline selling the land on the North Bank of the Mokau, and an eligible block be offered to you by Takerei at the rate of 3d to 6d per acre, you may then, advising me of the particulars, expend the whole of the sum of £300 for such block.219

Rogan then further ramped up the pressure on Te Wetini to rush into an agreement before others took the money. When Rogan temporarily left Mokau he apparently placed all £300 in Takerei’s keeping pending agreement by Te Wetini and others to the transaction.220

There were signs that such tactics were having the desired effect. Schnackenberg shortly afterwards reported that ‘Takerei was about to claim the “moni” but Wetine [sic] may have come down to 300 & may perhaps take 200’. Schnackenberg then wrote on Te Wetini’s behalf, (and Takerei’s) to Rogan, apparently requesting his immediate return to the area as the chiefs were now anxious to enter into further negotiations.221 By late March 1854, Rogan reported he would shortly be on his way to Mokau with the expectation of purchasing the entire Mokau block for £200.

The Mokau deed signing - 1 May 1854

The Mokau block’s more accessible location and the importance of the land to many groups gave at least some of the opponents of the transaction the chance and pressing motivation to attend the negotiations. By mid to late April 1854, some Maori were aware that Rogan would shortly be at the Te Mahoe mission station to attempt a purchase. A significant number of Maori – mainly, it would seem, from coastal hapu with some representatives from interior hapu – gathered to discuss the proposal and

218 Schnackenberg to Rev and Dear Sir, undated [April / May 1854?], Series A, folder 4, p61, Schnackenberg Papers 219 Chief Commissioner McLean to Commissioner Rogan, 29 March 1854, AJHR, 1861, C-1, p151 220 Schnackenberg to Rev and Dear Sir, undated, [April 1854?], Series A, folder 4, pp62-63, Schnackenberg Papers 221 Schnackenberg to Turton, undated [April 1854?], Series A, folder 4, pp61-62, Schnackenberg Papers (underlined in original)


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await his arrival. Unfortunately, Schnackenberg’s description of subsequent events is written in a not always legible or understandable manner, with some highly unorthodox spelling, especially of the Maori phrases he frequently uses. We can, however, gather enough from this and other sources to see that this ‘purchase’ was highly disputed and that even the Crown considered it far from complete.

A major reason why the Mokau transaction was so obviously incomplete was the presence at the deed-signing of opponents to the transaction. There was considerable opposition to all the transactions in the region. However, it would seem – although again the evidence is less than conclusive – that at the lead-up to all the other deed-signings only supporters of the transactions were present, presumably because opponents either boycotted the negotiations or were unaware of them. While officials were well aware that opposition existed, their absence from the Crown-created decision-making process made it easier for the Crown to claim to have made a full and final purchase from willing sellers.

The situation that confronted Rogan was quite different. On April 23, the Mokau rangatira Te Kaka and the major inland leader Te Kuri met with Schnackenberg at Te Mahoe to politely take tea and firmly express their resistance to any sale. Other opponents to the transaction had also gathered at Mokau.

When Rogan arrived at Mokau on 27 April, he was confronted with obvious divisions and opposition to the purchase. He apparently met with Te Kaka and other members of the opposition. Unable to convince them to agree to the purchase, but unwilling to abandon the transaction or await a broader consensus, he put forward a new plan. Rather than buy the whole block for £200, he proposed to Te Wetini and Hone Pumipi that £100 only would be paid to purchase the interests of the selling party. The other £100 would be paid to the opposition when they relented. To Schnackenberg’s great surprise, Wetini and Pumipi indicated that they would accept this arrangement.222

The next day, Rogan and Schnackenberg took part in a hui attended by both supporters and opponents of the transaction. Their initial hope to secure general agreement for the purchase of the whole block was quickly dashed, and opponents of the sale strongly refused to take the £100 allocated to them. Rogan had by this time decided, as he would testify to a 1856 Board of Inquiry on Native Affairs, that the Mokau block was ‘claimed by two distinct sections of a tribe, - one favourable for the sale of land, and the other not’. He therefore put forward to the hui the plan raised with Te Wetini and Pumipi the night before, of initially purchasing just one part of the block. A total of £100 would be paid to Te Wetini’s party who would sign a deed of sale. Only then, would the Government survey and divide the block between the interests of the sellers and non-sellers. According to Rogan, this plan met general agreement: ‘The party favourable [to a transaction] insisted on the payment of 100l., for their portion, the other party not objecting to this arrangement of the payment of

222 Schnackenberg to Rev and Dear Sir, undated [May 1854?], Series A, folder 4, pp62-63, Schnackenberg Papers


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100l., the object being to cut out the part belonging to the party adverse to the sale’.223

The proposal was rife with potential flaws, not the least being the decision to conduct a purchase before distinct and clearly marked areas ‘belonging’ to the sellers and non-sellers had been agreed upon. Rogan should have been aware that that an agreement to subesequntly divide the block into artificial areas belonging to the sellers and non-sellers would be difficult if not impossible to reach. Moreover, despite Rogan’s claim that both parties were in general agreement over the plan, there was some unmistakable evidence to the contrary. On Sunday April 30, most of the gathered Maori, including opponents of the sale, worshipped together in Schnackenberg’s chapel. After services, Schnackenberg was dismayed to be told that Te Kaka and Te Kuri had placed curses or a tapu on the Mokau River, apparently in order to prevent any transaction and render the area shut off from the Crown and Europeans:

Kaka and Kuri had that morning been to the heads, the first to bury some clothes in the sand = “kia” – the other to tie a stone in his cape & sink it in the river – “kia tukariki te ana”.224

Schnackenberg stated in another description that:

Kaka, our second chief, backed by our friend Kuri, are opposed to the sale of this river. Kuri has been down, and sunk his cap [cape?] in the entrance of the Mokau “kia tutakina te awa mo nga pakeha [in order to close the river to the pakeha]”.225

Rogan nonetheless resolved to push on and have a deed of purchase signed. The next day, May 1, he read and presented for signing a deed he and Schnackenberg had quickly drawn up on April 29. This deed included a written definition of the block’s exterior boundaries.226 No survey appears to have taken place by this time. The deed stated that all this land would be the Crown’s except for three places that Maori had ‘not yet agreed to’ sell. The degree of Maori input into these decisions is unclear, although it would soon become apparent that whatever consultation had taken place was inadequate.

The first excluded area was Te Kauri, its parameters described in words. This presumably was meant to be the area McLean wanted reserved for Maori as a place of settlement although the deed does not state this or make clear whether it was to be a permanent reserve, or just one of the places currently excluded from the transaction but which the Crown was seeking to purchase. The deed also did not make clear whether Te Kauri would ‘belong’ to the non-sellers only, or to all local Maori.

223 Evidence of Rogan, District commissioner, April 1856 to the Board of Inquiry into Land Purchasing, British Parliamentary Papers: Papers Relating to New Zealand, Colonies New Zealand, vol 10, 1854-1860 (Irish University press: Shannon, 1969) p550 [276] 224 Schnackenberg to Rev and Dear Sir, undated [May 1854?], Series A, folder 4, pp62-63, Schnackenberg Papers. Meaning of Maori terms unclear. 225 Schnackenberg to My Dear Brother, 24 May 1854, Series A, folder 4, pp67, Schnackenberg Papers 226 Schnackenberg to Rev and Dear Sir, undated [May 1854?], Series A, folder 4, pp62-63, Schnackenberg Papers


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The second area excluded from sale was ‘the Waipuna’. No definition of its location or extent was provided. The third was ‘Tokowhaiti’, which had a written definition of its boundaries.227 These areas were presumably what Rogan and Schnackenberg considered equated with the interests of the ‘non-sellers’. It is unclear how closely they represented the places of economic and cultural significance that Maori in 1852 had insisted be excluded from any purchase.

The upshot of this terribly flawed process was that the Crown had allocated to itself the great majority of the block, and excluded, temporarily it hoped, limited parts which it stated represented the total interests of the unnamed non-sellers. Schnackenberg estimated the total block to be about 2500 acres, of which around 2000 acres was to be acquired by the Crown.228

The deed was read and then signed by 68 Maori who agreed to the transaction. Te Wetini and Hone Pumipi were among the signees. Takerei and his sons Wetere and Reihana were not. It is worth noting that the Mokau block was the only one of the four transactions that Takerei did not sign or play a major part in, although he was listed as a witness to the transaction. The reason why Takerei consistently refused to take a direct part in transactions over this block is not obvious.

Judging by the names, many of the signatories had not signed the Awakino deed perhaps suggesting that different groups claimed rights to nearby lands. It would seem that some Maori affiliated to ‘local’ hapu had signed the deed, while others, including powerful Mokau chiefs such as Te Kaka and ‘Te Hapimana’ [or Te Hapamana], had not. It is not clear whether any Maori more associated with inland hapu signed the deed, although powerful chiefs such as Te Kuri certainly did not sign the deed. The deed states that all the signatories were of Ngati Maniapoto and there is no suggestion that other iwi were included in the negotiations.

Although the entire process had some obvious flaws and would indeed lead to insoluble problems, Crown officials were delighted with the deed and Rogan’s actions.229 The reason for this delight was not complicated – the Crown had apparently acquired 2000 acres of strategically crucial land for what Schnackenberg called the ‘paltry’ amount’ of £100. The money had been handed over by Rogan immediately after the signing. Schnackenberg reported that given the low amount, ‘nearly all the money was taken by children as the Natives said it is only “te kapa”’, pennies or copper coins.230 There is also evidence that at least some of the money was distributed to individuals based around their interests in the land, leading to complaints and

227 Turton’s Deeds, Deed No 453 228 Schnackenberg to Rev and Dear Sir, undated [May 1854?], Series A, folder 4, pp62-63; Schnackenberg to Turton and /or Wallis, Smales, Buttle, undated [Feb 1854?], Series A, folder 4, pp57-58, Schnackenberg Papers and Turton’s Deeds, Deed No 453 229 It is clear that Rogan was the Crown’s representative and that McLean did not take part in the negotiations or deed signing. Only later was McLean’s signature added to the deed. 230 Schnackenberg to Rev and Dear Sir, undated [May 1854?], Series A, folder 4, pp62-63, Schnackenberg Papers and Boulton, p200


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refusals to take such small amounts.231

The Crown was confident that the purchase would soon be completed, either by the opponents agreeing to take the remaining money and selling their interests – which remained the Crown’s preferred option – or with a division of the block between the interests of sellers and non-sellers based around the deed.

McLean authorised Rogan to spend ‘any portion’ of the remaining £100 at his disposal ‘for settling with Te Hapimana, or any of the other claimants that have not participated in the payment ... you have recently made’. He also told Rogan:

The whole of your proceedings in conducting this negotiation have been most judicious, and I have every reliance in your ability to carry out the arrangements with the outstanding claimants satisfactorily. 232

Failing to complete the Mokau purchase – May 1854

In actuality, there were already clear signs that this had been a chaotically handled transaction that would not be easy to complete to even the Crown’s own satisfaction and standards. The powerful opposition party led by Te Kuri and Te Kaka was the most obvious problem facing the Government. Immediately after the deed signing, the two chiefs had sent out letters to Crown representatives and Pakeha ‘warning them not to send a vessel there [to Mokau] as the river was tapu’d’. They also sent letters to major inland chiefs including Taonui, Nuitone233 ‘Neutoni’ (or ‘Nuitoni’) and others informing them of the tapu and of their opposition to the sale and to sales in general.234

While Te Kaka remained in Mokau mustering local opposition and enforcing the tapu, Te Kuri returned inland. In Schnackenberg’s phrase, he ‘komited’ or consulted widely with Maori and found considerable support in his stance against Crown land purchasing both in Mokau and elsewhere in the region. In early May 1854, Te Kuri’s father Taonui Hikaka and other inland chiefs went to Kawhia for ‘repeated meetings’ in order to try to prevent land sales. Given that the account of these hui by Kawhia trader RA Joseph provides some of the clearest insights into Maori efforts to prevent or strictly limit land transactions, it is worthwhile to look again at this evidence which was briefly discussed earlier in the chapter. Over 100 Maori, as well as Rogan, attended these hui which ended, in Joseph’s words, with the chief ‘Nuitone’ ‘tapuing the land from Mokau to Hari hari inclusive, by a “tuku tuku ki tona iwi turia”’.235 This appears to mean that Nuitone used his iwi and the tapu placed on the land from Mokau to

231 See for instance Schnackenberg to Rev and Dear Sir, undated [May 1854?], Series A, folder 4, pp62-63, Schnackenberg Papers, that Te Waru was paid £3, an unsatisfactory amount, for ‘their three places’. 232 Chief Commissioner McLean to Rogan, 8 May 1854, AJHR, 1861, C-1, p152 233 Also spelled as Neutoni or Nuitoni. 234 RA Joseph, Kawhia to McLean, 6 May 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0361 235 RA Joseph to McLean, 6 May 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0361


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Harihari to prevent land sales.236

On his way back inland, Taonui was confronted by a young Kawhia chief and proponent of land deals with the Crown named ‘William’. Joseph writes that after several speeches on both sides:

the old man [Taonui] concluded by the modest suggestion, that he William should only give a small piece of land for the ‘pakeha’ and leave the bulk for the natives, as that although a few Europeans might be advantageous, and useful a great many might be dangerous. Mistrust as to the friendly Intentions of the Europeans seems to be the great misgiving with the old people.237

Taonui’s comment that ‘a few Europeans might be advantageous’ is a reminder of an important point. There remained a strong belief among many Maori with connections to Mokau, including among those that generally opposed land transactions in the area, that some contact with Europeans was beneficial, perhaps even essential. Te Kuri, as we have seen, had from the 1840s encouraged a handful of Pakeha to settle in the Motukaramu region. It is also worthwhile to remember that he, Te Kaka and others were able to make clear their opposition to land transactions while generally retaining cordial dealings with Crown officials and Schnackenberg. However, this did not change the fact that there remained widespread fears that land transactions would hurt rather than help Maori.

Back in Mokau, a dangerous intensity had been added to this debate over land transactions because of the Crown’s purchasing efforts and tactics. Schnackenberg reported that immediately after the Mokau-deed signing the party who had received payment for the block sent a woman ‘kia anihia taipo [to belittle]’ the opposition camp, ‘after which there was another brush and ballying [sic] each other at the Kauri’.238 According to Boulton, the reference to a ‘taipo’, a ghost or goblin, suggests that the confrontation had a supernatural element.239

The dangers of a major confrontation amongst Ngati Maniapoto hapu were elevated by the tapu placed by Te Kuri and Te Kaka over the Mokau River, which was evidently supported by Taonui. Although the available sources don’t specify the exact ramifications of the tapu, it was clearly resented by some Mokau chiefs, including Takerei as an insult to their authority and a threat to the planned economic development of the area. Takerei had already presided over the Awakino transaction and was currently seeking to make a deal over what would eventually be the Taumata Maire (or Taumatamaire) block. He now faced Pakeha fears that they would be prevented by Taonui and others from taking up land in the area or entering the river,

236 Translation suggestion from Aaron Randall 237 RA Joseph to McLean, 6 May 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0361 238Schnackenberg to Rev and Dear Sir, undated [May 1854?], Series A, folder 4, pp62-63, Schnackenberg Papers 239 Boulton, p201


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that their sheep would be killed and their possessions seized.240 The trader Hopkins had by this point left the area. Joseph’s plans to replace him were delayed given that he had been told not to send a boat into the river, and he was uncertain whether the Crown would intervene to protect him and his investments if he chose to disregard the warning.241

Takerei was anxious to demonstrate his authority in the area and show that he would protect Pakeha and the land transactions. Schnackenberg reported that Takerei was ‘resolved to tear down all opposition and remove hindrances’. The chief stated that, if he chose to, he could remove the tapu ‘by putting his hand down’ and seizing the cap [or cape] that Te Kuri had buried near the entrance of the river. Takerei also threatened to retaliate by disrupting Taonui’s own attempts at economic development:

Takerei & Kaharoa threaten that if [Te] Kaka backed by Hikaka ma continue to oppose & annoy them, they will go ka ita [steadfastly to] stop Hikaka[‘s] Mill and the river Waipa.242

These threats were not carried as the two parties, closely related to each other (Takerei’s sister was married to Te Kuri), remained careful to avoid setting off inter-tribal fighting. Nonetheless, the situation remained tense. In the weeks following the signing, daily life continued to be dominated and disrupted by debates and komiti over the land transactions.243 Schnackenberg, at least, was sure that the Mokau transaction would be completed and that more land purchases and settlement would go ahead, supported by Maori. He claimed that:

here the consenting parties is by far the strongest ... Not only is Takerei supported by all his people, but Hapamana, a teina of Kaka[’]s is also with Takerei in this business and so are Kaharoa & Tekawhao[?] of Tongaporutu.’244

Schnackenberg believed that the opposition would soon be won over and that Te Kaka and Te Kuri did not believe their professions that ‘kahore ki nga pakeha’ [there is no benefit from the Pakeha]’.245 Immediately after the deed-signing, Rogan remained in Mokau to try and convince Te Kaka and local opponents of the transaction to accept the £100 and complete the deal. Nothing worked. Rogan, with Schnackenberg, had long, unsuccessful negotiations with Te Kaka while McLean tried to sweeten matters by sending presents to the chief. Schnackenberg thought that once Te Kaka heard ‘the

240 Schnackenberg to My Dear Sir [McLean?], undated [May 1854?], Series A, folder 4, pp64-65, Schnackenberg Papers 241 RA Joseph to McLean, 6 May 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0361 and Schnackenberg to My Dear Sir [McLean?], undated [May 1854?], Series A, folder 4, pp64-65, Schnackenberg Papers 242 Schnackenberg to Rev and Dear Sir, undated [May 1854?], Series A, folder 4, pp62-63, Schnackenberg Papers 243 Schnackenberg to Rev and Dear Sir, 26 May 1854, Series A, folder 4, pp67-68, Schnackenberg Papers 244 Schnackenberg to Rev and Dear Sir, undated [May 1854?], Series A, folder 4, pp62-63, Schnackenberg Papers (underlined in original) 245 Ibid


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result of the inland komities’ he may sell.246 However, given that opinion from the interior was still hostile, Rogan travelled to meet with Taonui but was unable to convince him to support the transaction.247 In mid-May, Rogan returned to Mokau willing to give over immediately the £100 in his possession and apparently with McLean’s permission to offer up an extra £100 to complete the Mokau transaction.248 He could find no takers.

Unable to claim to have bought the entire Mokau block, Rogan then moved towards surveying out the interests of those who had signed the deed from those who had refused. (Presumably, his intention was to survey according to the deeds’ rough guidelines of what areas were sold and what were excluded from the sale.) This proved impossible. Both those who had signed the deed, and those who had not, disrupted the surveys. Rogan told the 1856 inquiry into land purchasing and native affairs that:

The natives who were willing to sell set about pointing out their individual claims, and with a view of obtaining the boundaries of the whole piece to be disposed of. The sum of their several claims forming the piece they would offer to the Government. In the attempt they differed among themselves as to their individual rights, and even when some of them had settled the boundaries and marked them on the ground, the parties adverse to the sale disputed the boundaries.249

Disagreements over specific areas illustrate reinforced that completion of the transaction was a forlorn hope. Overpowering opposition emerged to the inclusion of the Te Mahoe mission station in the Mokau transaction, confronting Schnackenberg with a grave threat to his personal hopes. Schnackenberg had wanted this land to be included in the sale, and for the Government to then provide him with a 200-acre Crown grant that would included the Te Mahoe station and surrounds. This, he suggested, would be partial reward for his efforts in facilitating land transactions, and would allow him to establish a ‘splendid’ mission station, farm and industrial school that would be a centre of development in the area.250

However, in the 1852 negotiations Maori had voiced hostility towards including Te Mahoe in any transaction. Before the deed was signed in 1854, Te Waru, Tamihana

246 Schnackenberg to My Dear Sir [McLean?], undated [May 1854?], Series A, folder 4, pp64-65, Schnackenberg Papers 247 RA Joseph to McLean, 6 May 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0361. The meeting took place in Kawhia. 248 This is my understanding of the rather obscure reference in Schnackenberg to Rev and Dear Sir, 26 May 1854, Series A, folder 4, pp62-63, Schnackenberg Papers 249 Evidence of John Rogan, District Commissioner, April 1856 to the Board of Inquiry into Land Purchasing, British Parliamentary Papers: Papers Relating to New Zealand, Colonies New Zealand, vol 10, 1854-1860 (Irish University Press: Shannon, 1969), p550 [276]. 250 I.e. Schnackenberg to Rev and Dear Sir, 26 May 1854, Series A, folder 4, pp62-63, and Schnackenberg to My Dear Sir [McLean?], undated [May 1854?], Series A, folder 4 pp64-65, Schnackenberg Papers. It is not clear whether Schnackenberg’s application to McLean and the Government was for a personal grant, or for the land to be granted to the Wesleyans. At the same time Schnackenberg was seeking to gain private land for himself and his friends on the Awakino block and elsewhere in the area.


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and others had repeatedly demanded the exclusion of the mission station, or at least three specific places, including some of its fence-line, from any Mokau transaction. They were willing to allow Schnackenberg, who Tamihana termed ‘his pakeha’, to remain on the land, but not to allow its sale.251

Schnackenberg, McLean and Rogan had tried to convince them to allow the purchase of the station. Schnackenberg believed that they had been successful, and was delighted when the deed (which he helped draw up) did not specifically exclude Te Mahoe from the purchase. Schnackenberg argued that ‘most of the principal [Te Mahoe] owners signed’ the Mokau deed, including some of Tamihana’s whanau.

However, it would seem that neither Tamihana himself nor Te Waru signed the deed or accepted the payment.252 Immediately after the signing, Te Waru returned to Schnackenberg the £3 apparently allocated for his party’s interests in Te Mahoe.253 Tamihana also wrote to McLean to deny the inclusion of the area. The Wesleyan Schnackenberg thought that Tamihana, through the combined influence of Catholicism and anti land-selling Maori such as Te Waru, had grown a ‘little ashamed of his pakeha’ [Schnackenberg]. Nevertheless, Schnackenberg was convinced that the whole matter would quickly be fixed through the Crown making some ‘trifling’ additional payments of a few pounds.254

Neither the specific complaints nor the general opposition to sales could be solved so easily. By late May 1854, given armed opposition and disputes, Rogan had ‘found it impossible’ to complete the survey of the Mokau block, including the Te Mahoe station, or to reach an agreement over the boundaries of the sellers and non-sellers.255

Rogan was assisted in his attempted survey by ‘ten or fifteen young men’ assigned to him by Takerei. They ignored written warnings from the ‘Mokau natives who were non land sellers’ to stop, but were confronted by a party armed with spears who were led by the ‘well-known fighting man’ and ‘head chief of the objecting natives’, Te Waru. Rogan recounted that Te Waru:

251 Schnackenberg to Rev and Dear Sir [John Whiteley?], 29 June 1854, Series A, folder 4, pp70-71, Schnackenberg Papers 252 Schnackenberg to My Dear Sir [McLean?], undated [May 1854?], Series A, folder 4, pp64-65, Schnackenberg Papers 253 Schnackenberg to Rev and Dear Sir, 26 May 1854, Series A, folder 4, pp62-63, Schnackenberg Papers 254 Schnackenberg to My Dear Sir [McLean?], undated [May 1854?], Series A, folder 4, pp64-65, Schnackenberg Papers 255 It is unclear what surveying Rogan did complete, and whether the Crown later used these surveys to claim land. The most likely situation is that Rogan made a rough sketch of the exterior of the block and made some efforts to survey out various individual interests and reserves, but was prevented from finishing. In 1856, he made clear he did not finish the survey but offered to furnish the Board with a ‘detailed statement and sketch’ with ‘respect to the subdivision of the land among a number of natives’. Evidence of John Rogan, District Commissioner, April 1856 to the Board of Inquiry into Land Purchasing, British Parliamentary Papers: Papers Relating to New Zealand, Colonies New Zealand, vol 10, 1854-1860 (Irish University Press: Shannon, 1969) p550 [276]. His 1891 account is not clear or convincing on this issue despite his vague statement that he ‘was careful in a rough survey to distinctly mark off all these reserves, and to cut them out’. Evidence of John Rogan, 19 March 1891, Rees-Carroll Native Lands Laws Commission, AJHR, 1891, G-1, p57


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was dressed in a light costume, and had a spear in his hand. I said to him, “Is this land yours?” He said “No,” and then, moving the spear about half an inch “but this is mine. I am going to die here, and these people are prepared to do exactly as I tell them.” I saw at once that it was a very serious matter.

Violence was only avoided, at least according to Rogan’s vainglorious 1891 recall of these events, through his own wise and forceful approach in which he reminded Te Waru that the ‘land is very valuable, but it is not nearly so valuable as the men who are upon it’.256

Given his inability to complete the purchase or the survey, by the end of May 1854 Rogan was instructed by the Government to leave the area. He told Schnackenberg that, until the consent of Te Waru and Tamihana and ‘all other parties / meaning Kaka ma’ was obtained, that the Crown grant of the Te Mahoe station and more broadly the Mokau survey and purchase would have to remain pending. Schnackenberg was bitter, believing that Rogan did not want him to ‘relax his endeavours’ to assist in land transactions so had not pushed hard enough to complete matters. He described these dealings between the Crown and Maori as ‘less & worse than vapour’ and lacking in charity or truth. Local Maori, he believed, wanted only ‘taonga’ and the Crown land. The ‘black hyprocricies’ [sic] of Maori in land negotiations reminded him of someone who ‘did nothing else but tell lies from morning to night’.257

Although, Schnackenberg’s confidence that the Mokau and surrounding areas would be easily and quickly purchased had been somewhat shaken, the Crown remained determined in its land purchasing efforts. Rogan left Mokau in May ‘well pleased with himself’ and assuring Crown officials that the Mokau ‘question was very satisfactory, as he could get more land’ than the Government wanted. There remained ‘much more to do about Mokau’, more ‘than is possible for me to accomplish now’. He therefore looked forward to returning in the summer to make more purchases and, he hoped, to complete the acquisition and survey of the Mokau block.258

Negotiations from afar - May to December 1854

In the following few months, Crown officials prepared the way for these anticipated further purchases in the Mokau and wider area. The tactics adopted were familiar. Once again, the question of who held rights in the area was handled in a haphazard and self-interested manner. The main focus remained on maintaining good relations with chiefs to encourage them to sell land, through emphasising that the long-term returns would be great even though the immediate purchase price may be low. Crown officials continued to misinterpret the willingness of some Mokau Maori to enter into

256 Evidence of John Rogan, 19 March 1891, Rees-Carroll Native Lands Laws Commission, AJHR, 1891, G-1, p57 257 Schnackenberg to Rev and Dear Sir [Whiteley], 29 June 1854, Series A, folder 4, pp70-71, Schnackenberg Papers 258 Rogan, New Plymouth to McLean, 30 May 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0540, and William Halse, New Plymouth to McLean, 30 May 1854, MS-Papers-0032-0318


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select transactions as a sign that it could acquire massive blocks and ignore or overcome opposition and resistance.

During this period, the Crown made some preliminary efforts to purchase land south of the Mokau River which achieved little except to set off conflict and confusion among Maori. The Poutama area’s disputed nature would continue to dissuade the Crown from attempting to complete any transaction.259

More advanced were Crown efforts to purchase further land north of the Awakino River. While in Mokau in May, Rogan had discussions with Takerei and others regarding a large area abutting the Awakino block. Schnackenberg estimated the new block to be 100,000 acres. The land was however of low quality. Rogan tried to prepare Maori for the low price that would be offered by telling them that he would describe the area to McLean as made up of ‘mountains, mountains’. He carried out some preliminary surveying of the block and promised he would be back in the summer to complete matters. 260

The promise of partnership and respect remained an important part of the Crown’s purchasing negotiations. McLean in particular presented himself as a protector and patron of those who would enter into land transactions. In late May, Rogan reported a potentially serious threat to future land transactions in the region: a son of a prominent Mokau chief and supporter of land transactions, possibly Takerei’s son Hone Wetere, was feared lost at sea.261 As the boy was ‘under your [McLean’s] protection’, the ‘superstitious’ among local Maori were saying ‘it’s a judgement, etc.’ against dealings with the Crown. A McLean letter to the father expressing his sympathy and respect was believed to have staved off this possibility; Rogan reported that it ‘arrived in good time’ and that the chief ‘with tears in his eyes, said his heart was light at what you had written; and although he believed that the boy was lost, he would not attach blame’ to McLean.262

Although based in New Plymouth for much of this time, Rogan continued to advance the negotiations through personal contact and presents. Gifts were made to, among others, Takerei’s sister (who was also Te Kuri’s wife) who had shown some support for land transactions, to a relation of Rawiri Te Pote and to ‘Mupeka’, to try to secure support for land transactions in the interior. Rogan was sure that McLean, a master of this practice, understood ‘the good that this will do me’. 263

259 Boulton, pp202-204 260 Rogan, New Plymouth to McLean, 30 May 1854, Schnackenberg to My Dear Brother [Trappitt?], 18 May 1854, Series A, folder 4, pp63-64, Schnackenberg Papers 261 Rogan’s letter, as transcribed by Alexander Turnbull library staff, refers to ‘Takini’ as the father [which is the name they sometimes use for Takerei or ‘Takiri’] and the son as ‘Te Takiu’. At this very time, Schnackenberg was reporting that Wetere was on a ship the ‘Sea Belle’ which had gone missing and was believed to have sunk. Schnackenberg to Rev and Dear Sir, 26 May 1854, Series A, folder 4, pp67-68, Schnackenberg Papers 262 Rogan, New Plymouth to McLean, 30 May 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0540 263 Rogan, New Plymouth to McLean, 30 May 1854, 9 Aug 1854, & 13 December 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0540, and Boulton, p205. It would seem that Takerei’s sister was the wife of Te Kuri.


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Rogan frequently wrote to Mokau Maori or met with them in New Plymouth. He reported that that the ‘Mokau Natives make an occasional descent upon me, I am in frequent communication with them on the subject of land, they have been led to believe I should return when the cultivations are finished’.264 Mokau Maori, or more particularly those who had entered into land sales, were anxious to see the arrival of the promised settlers. This desire was even greater, given the tensions that the land transactions had caused with their kinfolk inland. Cooper reported from New Plymouth that:

A great number of the Mokau people came in last week – they are strenuously urging for settlers to be sent down to occupy the new purchases there. They say if this is not soon done the Natives from the interior will come down and take possession.265

Schnackenberg also continued to expect that the Government would soon follow up on its land transactions and facilitate settlement and infrastructure in the area. Reassured by the negotiations over the supposed 100,000 acre block in Awakino, he wrote to encourage his brother-in-law in Australia to join him in buying land in the region: ‘In other parts of New Zealand large sales are made by Natives and the land is rapidly occupied by settlers’. While much of the land in the region he considered ‘inferior’, ‘the spot I have hit is pretty level’ and had other advantages. Once the fern was burnt and grass and clover sown, each acre should ‘support about 6 sheep or more all the year’.266

Reports of the land transactions in Mokau were greeted positively by Auckland businessmen and politicians interested in increasing the coastal trade with New Plymouth. The Auckland Provincial Council was anxious to improve links with Mokau, in expectation of increased trade and of Pakeha settlement that it believed was already taking place. In November 1854, it passed a resolution calling for £200 to be allocated to ‘open up a bridle road from Kawhia to Mokau’ as this was main route to New Plymouth:

and was also the best and nearest road to Mokau, which district had lately been purchased by the Government, and was already being settled. Opening the road would turn the trade of the District to this [Auckland] Province.267

The Mokau River divided the boundaries of the Auckland and Taranaki provincial districts and there would develop a degree of rivalry between the two provinces over who would reap the rewards of the expected opening up of the area. Schnackenberg was in no doubt that Mokau should look towards linking itself with New Plymouth.

264 Rogan, New Plymouth to McLean, 9 Aug 1854 and Boulton, p205 265 GS Cooper, New Plymouth to McLean, 29 May 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0227 266 Schnackenberg to My Dear Brother [Trappitt?], 18 May 1854, Series A, folder 4, pp63-64, Schnackenberg Papers 267 Daily Southern Cross, 1 Dec 1854, p3


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Upon hearing news of the proposed Kawhia to Mokau road, he wrote to McLean, suggesting that the higher priority was a road between Mokau and New Plymouth.268

Mokau’s strategic importance in European eyes was further increased by the violence and virtual civil-war in Taranaki at this time over land transactions. William Halse in New Plymouth urged McLean to push forward with Mokau purchases as an example to Taranaki Maori of how land agreements would bring industry and settlement. He wrote that this:

is the very best time for pushing the Mokau question; now that all the tribes in and about New Plymouth are absorbed in the Hua Massacre, which will put an end for some time, at least, to land purchasing .... it would be a prudent step, and a diversion, to resume the purchase of land 50 miles off from natives who are willing and anxious to sell. The example must operate beneficially on our own natives in every way.

He considered Mokau a valuable area in its own right. The Crown should acquire more of it while prices remained low:

But even if our own were willing to sell more extensively than they are likely to do, Mokau is necessary to our progress, and should be purchased. It will cost in proportion to the delay. One of “Cashmere’s” people is landing the latest improved steam machinery, for sewing and grinding. This, in New Plymouth, will remain on the beach to rust away. At Mokau, the owner might receive the reward of enterprise and outlay.269

Rogan was so ‘confident of success’ and so eager to return to land purchasing duties that he offered to go to Mokau in the summer and work without any remuneration. He believed that his apprenticeship as a land purchase officer in this area would equip him to ‘attack a more difficult question than Mokau’.270

That this was a gross misunderstanding of the situation should have been clear given the reports coming out of Mokau at this time which showed that land transactions remained fiercely debated and widely opposed. Te Kuri and Te Kaka’s tapu over the Mokau River preventing the Crown taking possession of previously ‘sold’ areas remained in place and was having a major effect. Schnackenberg wrote in September that combined with the disruption caused through fighting in Taranaki, ‘we can neither send or get anything’ from New Plymouth.271

Schnackenberg did consider it a ‘good omen’ that, after a long delay, Te Kaka had

268 Schnackenberg to My Dear Sir [McLean], undated [May 1854], Series A, folder 4, pp64-65, Schnackenberg Papers 269 William Halse, New Plymouth to McLean, 7 Aug 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0318 270 Rogan, New Plymouth to McLean, 9 June 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0540 271 Schnackenberg to My Dear Brother, 25 September 1854, Series A folder 5, pp5-6, and Schnackenberg to My Dear Brother, 25 September 1854, Series A folder 5, p6, Schnackenberg Papers


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finally accepted a gift from McLean of a blanket.272 However, Te Kaka was still considered the leader of the local opposition to land transactions while in September Schnackenberg reported that the Crown’s intention to return to buy the Awakino land offered by Takerei and others was likely to bring a massive influx of opponents from the interior and ‘a summer of trouble’:

there is an opposition here backed by the Natives in the interior and our River is at present under tapu ... It is difficult to conjecture what will be the result. The majority and strength of our people are for selling, but they cannot resist a number of 300 to 400 which are expected to come here this summer. I am afraid that we shall have “he raumati raruraru”.273

There was already plenty of conflict and confusion stemming from the Crown’s previous failures to consult widely and openly before entering into land negotiations – and from the reliance on securing the support of one group only and ignoring the claims and opinions of others. ‘Waikato’ tribes were angry that the Crown had negotiated over the Awakino and Mokau transactions without consulting with them or acknowledging their rights. They were demanding ‘utu’ or payment both for these blocks and for the Poutama land in which the Crown was tentatively seeking to purchase. According to Schnackenberg, ‘Waikato want “utu” for Potama [sic] by right of conquest [over Taranaki Maori] in common with our people, and for Mokau northwards in consideration of their “purupuru I tenei wahi [control in this area]”’.274

Such demands do not necessarily suggest that these groups approved of the land transactions that had taken place without their involvement. Rather, they indicate a desire to have their claims to the land recognised and to share in any payments.

It would seem that the Crown refused to make any payment to these ‘Waikato’ tribes for the Awakino or Mokau transactions. This refusal was presumably based in part on a reluctance to incur the potential costs and complications of re-opening these arrangements. Given that it had predominantly relied on the consent of a group of Mokau-based Maori, the retrospective acknowledgement of the interests of wider groups could have raised many potential problems, including possibly provoking Takerei and others to withdraw from further land transactions. Mokau hapu, seeing participation in land transactions as acknowledgements of authority in an area, had staunchly refused to allow any Taranaki Maori involvement in the Mokau or Awakino transactions, and were emphatic about the lack of Taranaki rights in the Poutama region. While they apparently acknowledged that Waikato tribes had a claim to be involved in any possible transaction in Poutama, stemming from their role in helping conquer the area from Ngati Tama and others, they denied that Waikato had any rights in the area north of the Mokau River. Schnackenberg stated:

272 Rogan, New Plymouth to McLean, 21 Aug 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0540 273 Schnackenberg to My Dear Brother, 25 September 1854, Series A folder 5, p6, Schnackenberg Papers (underline in original) 274 Schnackenberg to My Dear Sir, 1 Sep 1854, Series A folder 5, p4, Schnackenberg Papers


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Our chiefs acknowledge their right to “Potoma” but not to Mokau and Awakino, to which they say Waikato has no more right than we have to the “utu” of land sold near Auckland.275

What is most important for this discussion is that there is no evidence that the Crown made any independent, disinterested or open study of such issues before it entered into the negotiations. Instead, Rogan tentatively suggested to McLean that ‘at least at the present’ the Crown refuse to pay ‘Waikato’ for the previous transactions:

I know from the Mokau natives themselves that Waikato (as they say) is entitled to something for Poutama; but I think not for the land already sold, because the Ngatitama boundary only reached to Mohakatino.276

He asked Schnackenberg to ‘enquire quietly’ of men such as ‘Takiu’ and Tikaokao whether that was indeed the position of Mokau Maori. Schnackenberg apparently confirmed it was.277

However, the Crown never articulated or followed a clear position on these issues. Decisions were more likely to be decided by what was judged useful to securing more land. In August 1854, some Mokau Maori apparently feared that the Crown had paid large sums to Taranaki Maori for their interests in what would seem to be the Mokau block.278 It is unlikely that this particular rumour was correct.

Still, it was impossible for Maori to be sure of the Crown’s position or to know what actions it had carried out. One of the Waikato groups apparently seeking payment for land transactions in the area was Ngati Haua.279 Rogan reported to McLean that he did not believe that they, nor other Waikato groups, had rights in the Mokau-Awakino area north of the Mokau River. However, at some point in 1854 Ngati Haua representatives had met McLean in Auckland ‘to request payment for land recently purchased’ at Mokau. McLean apparently did not grant this request but he did, in order to encourage land dealings in the future, endorse their application for a loan to complete a mill at Matamata.280

Then on 1 August 1854, McLean made a payment of £100 to Ngati Haua chiefs including Wiremu Poukawa and Raihi for a vague area north of the Mokau River. This area was described as ‘all our lands at Awakino at Papaitai and on to Taumata maire

275 Schnackenberg to My Dear Sir, 1 Sep 1854, Series A folder 5, p4, Schnackenberg Papers 276 Rogan, New Plymouth to McLean, 21 August 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0540 277 Ibid and Schnackenberg to My Dear Sir, 1 Sep 1854, and Schnackenberg to My Dear Sir, undated [September 1854?] Series A folder 5, p4, p5, Schnackenberg Papers 278 Schnackenberg to McLean, 13 August 1854, Series A, folder 5, p1, Schnackenberg Papers. “Tikahoa” reportedly stated that ‘the Taranaki chief Nopena had been paid £1, 800 .... in Wetine’s block’. 279 The transcript of Rogan, New Plymouth to McLean, 21 August 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0540, refers to the ‘Ngatihana’ question. While Boulton, p203 suggests this is Ngati Tama, I think from context and other information it is most likely Ngati Haua of the Waikato (not of the Upper Whanganui). 280 Hazel Petrie, Chiefs of Industry, p140


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[sic]’. The area was then described in very rough handwritten sketches and notes. What appears to have been happening here is that McLean, in preparation for the planned purchase of more Awakino lands, had decided to alienate all Ngati Haua’s claimed interests in this area. This was not based on investigation – or on any consistent policy – but on what he judged at the time would assist the transaction. It was a provisional and secretive move, an advance payment. According to the receipt of payment, if the Crown subsequently found in the course of negotiating that the ‘people residing upon’ this land objected to payment of Ngati Haua, Ngati Haua would instead have to give up land closer to its rohe in exchange for the £100 that they had already received. 281

In short, the signs that the Crown would handle its purchasing efforts in the summer of 1854-1855 in a more appropriate way were decidedly unpromising. Chaos and confrontation would continue to accompany the Government’s land purchasing in the Mokau.

3.8 Takerei’s New Policy and the Taumatamaire Transaction

Takerei’s decision to withdraw from future land transactions

By November 1854, Takerei and some other Mokau Maori were repeatedly sending messages to Rogan calling for him to return to the area and complete an agreement over some limited areas in the Awakino region.282 Time was pressing, given both their anxiety for settlers and the highly delicate situation with opponents of land transactions, including from interior and upriver hapu. Rogan was also ‘very anxious’ to complete the transactions but it was not until early December that he was able to leave his duties in Taranaki. He expected all to go smoothly, based upon his previous discussions with Takerei and his supporters over this land, and told McLean he hoped to have finished the transaction, including surveying, within a month.283

This confidence reflected the fact that he was only intending to discuss this land with the party associated with Takerei. Within a day or two of his arrival in Mokau, he had already made the basis of an agreement with ‘Ta Kerei and his people’, including the purchase price of £500. A group of Takerei’s followers then accompanied Rogan as he completed the survey of what was now termed the Taumatamaire block, after which it was planned that the official deed would be signed.

Rogan, as he excitedly reported to McLean on 13 December, had at the same time entered into negotiations with Takerei for a further transaction. Although Rogan’s geographical description of this area was vague, he believed it would go as far inland as

281 ABWN 8102 W5279, box 145, AUC 417, Awakino, Archives New Zealand, Wellington (ANZ Wgt) 282 Rogan to McLean, 21 November 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0540 283 Rogan to McLean, 2 December 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0540


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Figure 7: Sketch plan of the Taumatamaire block, 1855 (Turton’s Deeds, Deed No 454)

‘Piupiu’ (Piopio). The purchase officer cautioned McLean that this was not a ‘decided offer yet because all the people are not yet consulted’. (It is likely that Takerei had added this caution that more consultation was needed.) Nevertheless, Rogan believed that with these two planned purchases accompanying the already complete Awakino deal, the Crown would have acquired a large area. The northern boundary of the Crown estate would stretch from ‘Huikomako’ (Huikomako) just south of Waikawau


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in a more or less straight line all the way inland to Piopio and then southwards towards the Mokau River.284

Furthermore, Rogan had received reports that an offer would shortly be made from Waikawau Maori for the neighbouring land to the north. He reported to McLean that the ‘chief of the Ngatikinokau tribe, with nearly the whole of his people, are said to have decided on the sale of land’ from Huikomako north. Rogan was planning to meet with some of them on this trip to begin negotiations and expected that ‘Wahia and some of his natives’ were likely to visit McLean in Auckland during the summer to move towards an agreement. The Crown had also resumed its stop-start efforts to purchase the Poutama area.

Rogan reported that overall ‘everything here seems to me to progress in a most satisfactory manner’.285 The Crown’s strategy of purchasing the Awakino block as a first step towards wider gains seemed to be bearing fruit.

Given this, Rogan was unperturbed by the clear evidence that the opposition to sales in the region was still highly potent. Ngati Pehi ‘who hold possession of the Black Diamond territory’ (the coal-rich upriver Mokau district) were still, in Rogan’s words, ‘obstinate’ and against any transaction.286 The Mokau transaction, which was the other area prized by the Crown, remained incomplete, and the tapu of Te Kuri and Te Kaka was still in place.

Perhaps most crucially, Takerei had decided, for the sake of peace with his inland relatives, that he would soon withdraw from involvement in land transactions. For months, there had been fears and rumours that large groups of inland hapu were planning to take possession of the coastal Mokau area to prevent land transactions.287 Takerei and others had made a host of diplomatic efforts to stave this off. For instance, Schnackenberg reported in September that Takerei was planning to go ‘see them at their own kainga, less they come here to see him’ and seize control.288 Schnackenberg called these threats an example that ‘might is too frequently called right’.

We do not know what was said in these discussions and what agreement, if any was made. Given subsequent events it is possible some sort of compromise was reached to the effect that Takerei would finish his direct involvement in land transactions after the Taumatamaire and Rauroa negotiations while, in return, opposition to these deals would continue but stop short of actual invasion or physical conflict. Rogan reported that Takerei wished the Crown to understand that ‘he will cease his entire control after [i.e. over] the sale of the land, when the last-named piece [what would be the Rauroa

284 Rogan to McLean, 13 December 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0540 285 Ibid 286 Ibid 287 As mentioned, it is not possible to say exactly which groups were threatening this, given they were usually given the blanket term the ‘Waikato’. 288 Schnackenberg to My Dear Sir, undated [September 1854?], Series A folder 5, p5, Schnackenberg Papers. (Underline in original).


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transaction] is sold’.289

The aged Takerei still believed that limited land transactions were the means of securing strength for his people. There is some pathos in Rogan’s description that the ‘old man is growing blind, and hears about the land being occupied by us’ given that the Crown, for its own reasons, had no immediate plan to open the way for Pakeha settlement. Nor was the chief conceding that he did not have the authority to enter into transactions if he so wished. However, the need for peace and solidarity among Ngati Maniapoto hapu was paramount. According to Rogan, he was withdrawing from transactions ‘not because the land is not his, nor that he could not sell if he presses it, but for the sake of peace with the Interior’.290

Rogan was at this stage not overly concerned about the imminent withdrawal from direct negotiations of the Crown’s most important supporter of land transactions. He still expected to receive the assistance of Takerei as an advocate of the benefits of land transaction and thought that this would lead to sales from the chiefs and hapu of the interior. Takerei, he believed, would ‘use his influence with the natives inland to sell; and will go with me at any future time, when I shall have his support’.291

The Taumatamaire deed signing and negotiations – 1 January 1855

The more immediate Crown aim was the Taumatamaire transaction, especially as Takerei’s agreement had already been secured. The wider group of Maori who may have claimed interests in this land were not consulted by the Crown about this transaction. Rather, it would seem that the deed was secured after minimal negotiations and following consultation with one group only, associated with Takerei and his supporters. Rogan described it simply as an agreement with ‘Ta Kerei and his tribe’.292

The generally pro forma deed was signed on 1 January 1855 by Rogan representing the Crown and 48 Maori.293 Prominent among these were Takerei294, his wife Hokipera, his sons Reihana and Wetere, and, it would seem, Wetere’s wife Mere Peka.295 Taniora, possibly the Mokau chief Taniora Pararoa Wharau, was another signatory.

Schnackenberg, who witnessed the deed along with ‘Harauwhira’, a Maori teacher at the Mokau mission station, emphasised how brief and perfunctory the discussions were before the signing:

289 Rogan to McLean, 13 December 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0540 290 Ibid 291 Ibid 292 Ibid, 19 Jan 1855 293 Turton’s Deeds, Deed No.454 294 Takerei was apparently not present at the signing and had his name attached ‘by his son Wetini’. This was possibly Te Wetini Ngakahawai, who took a prominent role in the Mokau transaction but was not, as far as I understand, Takerei’s son. The other likely possibility is that ‘Wetini’ was a misspelling for Wetere, who was Takerei’s son. 295 ‘Te Rerenga, Hone Wetere’, DNZB, 1993, vol 2, pp525-526 states that Wetere’s first wife was named Mere. The deed includes the name of ‘Mere Peka’, signed for by Wetere.


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I had the pleasure of complimenting the Natives at Awakino last Monday for their good conduct & few words. The “Deed” was read, signed, the 500 paid and divided with less trouble and noise than is sometimes the case about the purchase of a pig.296

Such brevity and lack of debate suggests that the basis of the arrangement had been established in earlier talks between Rogan and Takerei and his followers. Certainly, the actual signing of the Taumatamaire deed did not have the same ceremony and sense of a public agreement as that of the Awakino signing. There were fewer discussions, fewer Maori participating, and only two witnesses while the major leaders of the two parties, McLean and Takerei, were not even present but rather had their names attached by underlings.

These perfunctory negotiations also reflect that many potential opponents, and others who may have claimed rights to the land, were apparently not present. It seems that Rogan started surveying the block in mid-December. Immediately upon completing the survey, the deed was quickly signed at the Taumatamaire block itself, with many of the Maori signatories already present as they had been assisting in the survey.297 It is therefore doubtful whether other groups, from the inland or elsewhere, knew of the signing and had the opportunity to attend. Certainly, Te Kaka, Te Kuri, Taonui and other prominent opponents of land transactions did not sign the deed and there is no evidence to suggest that they were present at the discussions. It would seem that Maori from fairly nearby Waikawau were not present and were upset to learn that the transaction took place despite their lack of consent.298 The deed states that the agreement was with ‘Ngatimaniapoto’ only and there is no indication that other tribes participated in the discussions.

Again, there is evidence that the Crown allowed the issue of which groups would be included in the arrangement to be dictated by political factors (and by the main vendors), rather than by investigation or clearly articulated policy. It would seem that a few days after the deed signing, Rogan tried to put in place an instruction by McLean that Ngati Rarua of Nelson should also receive payment for the land. Judging by the large amount that the Crown was willing to pay Ngati Rarua (£300), it would seem that officials believed that this tribe had substantial interests in the block. However, this payment was abandoned because of complaints by Takerei’s followers. According to Rogan:

I had no difficulty in inducing Ta Kerei to agree to the payment of £300 to the Ngatirarua; but his people opposed it strongly; and he in a fit of passion, destroyed a letter he had written to

296 Schnackenberg to My Dear Brother [Rev JR Riemenschneider], 8 Jan 1855, Series A folder 5, p11, Schnackenberg Papers 297 This order of events is what I infer from Schnackenberg to My Dear Sir [McLean], 8 Jan 1855, Series A folder 5, pp11-12, Schnackenberg Papers and other sources 298 Schnackenberg to My Dear Sir [McLean], 8 Jan 1855, Series A folder 5, pp11-12, Schnackenberg Papers and other sources mentions the Waikawau opposition


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you consenting to the proposal.299

The end payment of £500 for the block again illustrates the Crown’s insistence of low immediate payments for this mountainous area. The survey plan attached to the deed estimated the Taumatamaire block to be 24,000 acres which would equate to a purchase price of just five pence per acre.300 This was low even in comparison to Crown policy. A few months later, McLean issued instructions to Rogan on what prices should be offered for land in the district from Waikato to the Mokau. He considered any land acquired between a minimum of sixpence per acre to a maximum of one shilling sixpence per acre was sure to be a profitable investment for the Crown.301

Claimants today still note with bitterness the low prices the Government paid for all the Mokau-Awakino blocks. The prices paid are termed ‘Thruppence an acre’ and ‘just a deposit’, and they look forward to the day that the Government ‘pay the rest of the money’.302

One reserve was specified in the Taumatamaire deed. It was to be ‘as a landing place for the canoes of the people of the interior at te Piripiri’. This suggests that the ‘sellers’ were determined that Maori, including their inland kin, would retain access to the land and presumably to the settlers who may come upon it. As indicated by the survey plan, this reserve was to be a small area on the northern banks of the Awakino River.303

3.9 The Rauroa Transaction and the Crown Abandons the Mokau, 1855 to 1857

Opposition following the Taumatamaire transaction – January to February 1855

The immediate aftermath to the signing of the deed on 1 January 1855 indicates that many potentially interested Maori had not been consulted about the Taumatamaire transaction, and if they had been asked their opinion, may well have opposed it. A few days later, Schnackenberg suggested that komiti regarding the transaction (and land transactions in general) were inevitable and that Te Kuri was expected to again travel to Mokau to make his protests known. There was some opposition from Waikawau to the Taumatamaire purchase (which Schnackenberg dismissed as ‘weak’) and apparently some complaints over the Crown’s purchasing ‘tikanga’ and tactics.304

299 Rogan to McLean, 19 Jan 1855, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0540. It is possible but unlikely that this payment was earmarked for the Rauroa block 300 Plan of Taumatamaire block, in Stokes, p237 301 Chief Commissioner McLean, Waipa to Commissioner Rogan, 13 July 1855, AJHR, 1861, C-1, p153 302 Evidence of James Taitoko, Te Rohe Potae – Nga Korero Tuku Iho o Te Rohe Potae 5th Oral Traditions Hui, Maniaroa Marae, Mokau, p30 303 Turton’s Deeds, Deed No 454 and Stokes, p237 304 Schnackenberg to My Dear Sir [McLean], 8 Jan 1855, Series A, folder 5, pp11-12, Schnackenberg Papers


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Figure 8: Sketch plan of the Rauroa block, 1857 (Turton’s Deeds, Deed No 455)

Nor were the Crown’s attempts to follow up the Taumatamaire purchase with further acquisitions going as well as Rogan had expected. Upon closer investigation, the adjoining area to Taumatamaire (what would be the Rauroa transaction) that Takerei and his people were interested in ‘selling’ was far smaller and of lower quality that Rogan had hoped for. Rather than stretching all the way inland to Piopio, Rogan reported to McLean it was unlikely to be ‘more than 15 or 16,000 acres’.305 His preliminary surveying had shown the block to be ‘for the most part ... very mountainous and rugged ... and the grass land spoken of by Ta Kerei is a delusion’.

305 Rogan to McLean, 19 Jan 1855, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0540


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Access was poor and those interested in negotiations were determined to exclude considerable areas, including much of the best land, from the transaction:

There are about 3,000 acres of good fern and bush land on the banks of the river, but it is separated from the sea coast by large ranges of hills, and can only be approached by way of Mokau inland at Motukaianu, which is not to be purchased yet.306

McLean had also ordered Rogan to examine the prospects for purchasing in the Poutama area. The Crown’s piecemeal musings, investigations and dealings in recent months had linked, in various unclear ways, a number of groups and tribes to a possible purchase of this land. Individual names mentioned in recent months had included ‘old Haimona’, Tikipoto, Takiu, Tikaokao, Takerei, Taonui, Te Kaka, Tiki, Rawiri, Te Wetini, Wiremu Kingi of Waitara and many others. Crown officials had raised the possible involvement of many iwi, hapu and geographic groups including Ngati Maniapoto hapu from Mokau, and from ‘Waikato’, Taranaki, Ngati Awa and Ngati Tama, ‘coastal Maori’ etc.307 The Crown had not made any transparent investigation of rights to this disputed area or come to any clear conclusions. Rather, in an unsystematic way, it apparently approached some groups or individuals to sound out feelings about a possible purchase.

The response was not encouraging. By mid-January 1855, Crown officials saw no prospect of purchasing Poutama in the near future, given the complexity of the situation and the depth of opposition. Schnackenberg, normally not shy of making bold pronouncements, confessed he was baffled regarding the attitudes of Mokau Maori to the Crown’s offer to purchase the land. He told McLean. ‘I hardly know what to say about Poutama’ and instead attached for McLean’s perusal a wide range of letters from local Maori regarding the proposal.308

Rogan had been unable, despite a number of attempts, to ascertain the opinions of Wiremu Kingi and ‘Kakariki’ at Waitara to a possible purchase of Poutama. He had been able to meet ‘coastal Maori’ but they categorically opposed any transaction. He informed McLean:

I have seen the natives along the coast ... and find they are all unanimous in their opposition to the sale of this land; and they threatened anyone who may attempt a survey of the land ... I regret very much the present determination of the natives to oppose the offer, because I believe the acquisition of it to be most material to New Plymouth, as Mokau.309

Not only was the Government unable to continue its land purchasing, it was also

306 Ibid 307 See Boulton, pp202-204. I am not implying that the Crown stated that these groups and individuals had rights to the land or that these Maori had shown interest in selling the land 308 Schnackenberg to My Dear Sir [McLean], 8 Jan 1855, Series A folder 5, pp11-12, Schnackenberg Papers 309 Rogan to McLean, 19 Jan 1855


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unable to take control of the land it already claimed to have purchased. The Mokau River remained under tapu, seriously impeding access to and the future use of the Awakino and Taumatamaire blocks. Rogan was still unable to get Te Kaka or other opponents to accept payment and the alienation of the Mokau block. Given his previous experiences, he was unwilling to again try to separate the Mokau block between ‘sellers’ and ‘non-sellers’ and was, in Schnackenberg’s words ‘afraid’ to interfere with Maori who were still refusing to give over control of the Te Mahoe mission station.310

The immediate hopes for Pakeha settlement, which remained strong among Schnackenberg and some local Maori, therefore focused on the Awakino block. Schnackenberg was considering encouraging friends and relatives to migrate from Germany and settle on this land. He told McLean that they:

are all farmers, not gentlemen farmers, but superior to most of those at New Plymouth ... If they came here, I believe, they would turn the bush into nice farms – become wealthy themselves and promote the general welfare.311

Schnackenberg wanted to know when the Government would make the Awakino block available for settlement and what assistance it would offer to Pakeha to come to the area.312 However, despite Schnackenberg’s entreaties and the promises made to Takerei and other Mokau Maori, the Government did nothing to facilitate settlement. The Government’s general preference, regardless of what it told local Maori, remained to buy land well in advance of settlement and to on-sell it later at a profit. As yet, it had not been able to acquire the land it needed to make settlement practical and profitable, nor could it be confident that settlement would not incur resistance.

Rogan repeatedly advised the Government in early 1855 not to offer Awakino and other Mokau land for sale to settlers as the Crown did not have control of the crucial Mokau block or the area up-river. The Mokau, he gloomily reminded McLean in February, ‘is not ours yet’, regardless of the deed of a year ago. Settlement and further purchase was likely to be resisted ‘and I fear Ngataua [Te Kaka] and Ngaturi [Te Kuri] would throw every obstacle in our way’.313

Moreover, the land that had been purchased was inaccessible because of the tapu over the Mokau harbour and was of low quality. Of the Awakino and Taumatamaire blocks ‘the greatest part of the land purchased, is very rugged and mountainous and but a small portion along the beach would be available for settlers’. Rogan believed that the Rauroa purchase was imminent but it would not help matters much as access to its limited amount of good land was impossible while the Mokau harbour remained under tapu. Although the Crown officially acknowledged that Takerei ‘is most anxious to

310 Schnackenberg to My Dear Sir [McLean], 8 Jan 1855, Series A folder 5, pp11-12, Schnackenberg Papers 311 Ibid (underlined in original) 312 Ibid 313 Rogan to McLean, 16 Feb 1855, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0540


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have settlers’ he thought that the chief understood these impediments.314

Rogan therefore advocated that the Crown ‘allow the Mokau district to stand over for a time’ until it had gained control of the area and more quality land. He reminded McLean that there were reports that a ‘large area’ north of Huikomako could be ‘purchased easily’ from Wahia and other Waikawau chiefs. If purchase of Poutama, or what Rogan termed, the ‘Ngatitama question were settled, there would be sufficient available land for all purposes’. And the Crown still had its sights on the Mokau River and its coal stretching well into the interior. At some point he hoped that the leaders of resistance to sale such as Te Kaka and Te Kuri would ‘change their opinions and sell us the key to the district’.315

Rogan was not opposed to exploiting Maori poverty and internal rivalries to overcome resistance to land transactions. He anticipated that even with the upcoming Rauroa payment, Mokau Maori by next summer would have exhausted the little money they had received from transactions and – with no Pakeha settlement to boost their economy – would be desperate to convince their inland kin of the case for land sales. He thought that ‘by that time they will have expended the £500 and will be the more anxious to urge their friends in the interior to sell the opposite side of the Awakino’.316

1855 to 1857 – The beginning of the Crown’s long wait

In fact, it would take considerably longer than a year to break down the resistance to land sales or for the Crown to gain control over the Mokau district. Schnackenberg offered a succinct description of the area in 1855: ‘Everything is quiet here. Our natives are waiting for settlers. Deaths are frequent’.317

Although Takerei and others still expected Pakeha settlement, the opposition to completing the Mokau block transaction and to land transactions in general continued. In May 1855, Schnackenberg reported to McLean that Te Kuri had recently visited and ‘he and his party refuse to sell’.318 Schnackenberg was still trying unsuccessfully to convince Maori to allow the transfer of Te Mahoe. With Rogan’s approval, he had offered Tamihana (or Tamihane) a cow to cease his opposition. Tamihana had declined but in 1855, shortly before his death, told his father to try to settle matters with Schnackenberg. His father demanded £100 for their interests in Te Mahoe, which

314 Ibid 315 Ibid 316 Rogan to McLean, 16 Feb 1855. For an example of the hope that Maori political rivalries would lead to land sales, see Schnackenberg to My Dear Sir [McLean], 8 Jan 1855, Series A folder 5, pp11-12, Schnackenberg Papers. Schnackenberg was ‘in hopes that Kaka ma will yet “takauri” and outdo the other party, by offering at least one side of the Mokau’ 317 Schnackenberg to Mr Stannard, undated [March? 1855], Series A folder 5, p13a, Schnackenberg Papers. Note that while Schnackenberg’s diary provides useful anecdotal evidence regarding Maori health and population figures in the Mokau, it is difficult to give a reliable summary of the situation. 318 Schnackenberg to My Dear Sir [McLean?], 23 May 1855, Series A folder 5, p13a, Schnackenberg Papers.


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Schnackenberg rejected as ridiculous.319

Takerei remained determined to bring settlement and continued to honour his commitment to a partnership with the Crown. In June 1855, Takerei, who had been made a native assessor in 1852, received another official position. Schnackenberg believed that such ‘distinctions are more valued by him than anything which has or could be inferred upon him by the Church’. Takerei had promised the Crown that he would facilitate the Rauroa transaction as his final land deal. He called upon the Government to complete the arrangement because, as Schnackenberg put it, he ‘takes hard to get pakehas’.320

It is unclear when the tapu created by Te Kuri and Te Kaka on the Mokau River was lifted. In May 1855, Schnackenberg described Mokau as noa or clear of tapu. However, his comments in July suggest the tapu was still in place.321

Regardless of this, Schnackenberg had already fallen into despair. He no longer believed settlers were imminent or that the opposition to large land transactions would soon fold. He considered the core problem to be resistance to any sale of the upriver Mokau area, a resistance led by both powerful interior and upriver chiefs and senior Mokau rangatira. He correctly concluded that given its inability to acquire this area, the Crown was likely to ignore the region, regardless of its undertakings to Takerei and others. In June 1855, Schnackenberg wrote:

As Hikaka, Nga Tara [Te Kuri] and Kaka continue their opposition to the sale of Mokau (the river, coal &c which is the only really valuable property here and the chief aim of Gov, I do not think we should get setters very soon.322

There were indeed signs that Mokau was becoming less of a priority to the Government. Rogan was appointed land commissioner for an extensive district between Mokau to the Waikato, an area he considered too large for him to adequately deal with.323 His instructions from McLean were to focus on completing the transactions that the Crown had begun in Whaingaroa. No mention was made of Mokau.324

Rogan still believed that there was general support among Mokau Maori for land transactions. He told the 1856 Board of Inquiry into land purchasing that ‘the majority

319 Ibid, p16 320 Schnackenberg to Rev and Dear Sir [Rev J Buttle], 19 June 1855, Series A folder 5, pp18-19, Schnackenberg Papers. Underline in original. It is not clear what this official position was. 321 Schnackenberg to Rev and Dear Sir [Rev J Buttle], 19 June 1855, Series A folder 5, pp18-19, and Schnackenberg to Sir, 16 July 1855, Series A folder 5, p20, Schnackenberg Papers 322 Schnackenberg to Rev and Dear Sir [Rev J Buttle], 19 June 1855, Series A folder 5, pp18-19, Schnackenberg Papers [Punctuation as in original] 323 Evidence of John Rogan, District Commissioner, April 1856 to the Board of Inquiry into Land Purchasing, British Parliamentary Papers: Papers Relating to New Zealand, Colonies New Zealand, vol 10, 1854-1860,(Irish University Press: Shannon, 1969) pp549-550 [275-276]. 324 Chief Commissioner McLean to Commissioner Rogan, Waipa, 13 July 1855, AJHR, 1861, C-1, pp153-154


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at Mokau are willing’ to sell lands.325 However, with the Crown unable to take control of the areas it had ‘purchased’ north of the Mokau River, it remained reluctant to venture into the even more dispute-ridden Poutama region. The complex inter-tribal situation in Poutama was continuing to lead to offers to ‘sell’ land in the area. In May 1856, it was reported that Ngati Tama based in Nelson wished to ‘sell Poutama, a little to the south of Mokau’ and were awaiting a meeting with the Governor and McLean.326 But the Crown was sceptical, based on past experience, of whether such offers would result in actual transactions and Crown control of land. Groups, especially absentee groups, may show occasional interest in Poutama transactions, but opponents would invariably arise and there remained no support from the people ‘on the ground’. As Rogan testified in 1856, between Mokau and Waitara ‘the natives are all opposed to the sale of land’.327

Tying up a loose end - the Rauroa Transaction: January to July 1857

By 1855, the always limited interest of local Maori in lands transactions had diminished further. The Crown had essentially abandoned the area awaiting a change in Maori attitude. The last of the Mokau-Awakino transactions in 1857 did not alter the status quo. Rather, it fulfilled two earlier agreements – one between Takerei and the Crown and the other between Takerei and his inland relatives.

The basis of the Rauroa agreement had evidently been achieved by early 1855 and Rogan promised Takerei that he would shortly return to complete the transaction. Rogan’s expectation was that by the end of the year he would be back in the area handling a rash of more promising land offers from Maori, in the course of which he could complete the Rauroa deal. These offers did not arrive and it was not until January 1857 that William Searancke was ordered to carry out some surveying of the Rauroa block.328

Still, the Crown was in no rush to complete the Rauroa transaction, given that it was a fairly small, mountainous block without other attractions such as coal. Furthermore, access to the block was severely impeded by the fact that the Mokau River area was still not under Crown control. Given that the Crown could not – and was not attempting – to take possession of its earlier purchases in the area, it could be wondered why it bothered to complete the Rauroa agreement at all. However, Rauroa was the only small block available for the Crown at a time when it was impossible to colonise the wider area in great leaps.329 The Government had no immediate plans to utilise the land. Rather, the Rauroa deed would be put in the land bank for another day

325 Evidence of John Rogan, District Commissioner, April 1856 to the Board of Inquiry into Land Purchasing, British Parliamentary Papers: Papers Relating to New Zealand, Colonies New Zealand, vol 10, 1854-1860,(Irish University Press: Shannon, 1969) pp549-550 [275-276] 326 Te Karere: The Maori Messenger, vol 2, no 5, 31 May 1856, p5 327 Evidence of John Rogan, District Commissioner, April 1856 to the Board of Inquiry into Land Purchasing, British Parliamentary Papers: Papers Relating to New Zealand, Colonies New Zealand, vol 10, 1854-1860,(Irish University Press: Shannon, 1969) pp549-550 [275-276] 328 WH Searancke, Mokau Heads to McLean, 20 Jan 1857, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0561 329 See also Boulton, p214


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when a greater Pakeha presence seemed both possible and profitable.

On 30 July 1857, the Rauroa deed was signed between Rogan and 30 Maori.330 This was the smallest number of signatories for any of the Mokau-Awakino deeds, another indication of diminishing local support for transactions. Rauroa was essentially a deal with Takerei and his supporters, including his sons Wetere and Reihana. Rogan described it simply as an arrangement with Takerei and ‘the Awakino Natives’331

The payment for the block was again low, and was tied by the Crown to the size of the block. As with the other Mokau-Awakino transactions, a sketch plan of the exterior boundaries accompanied the deed but there is no evidence of a more detailed survey plan. The examination of the exterior boundaries took place in several stages during those years and the Crown estimated the block to be 12,000 acres. It allocated £500 for the payment, or 10 pence per acre. However, it would seem that shortly before the deed signing Rogan decided that 9000 acres was a more accurate estimate, and decided on a revised price of £400, which equated to 10.6 pence per acre for the block. This was the price finally paid. No evidence has been located regarding negotiations over the price or any other issue. Rogan paid the money over on the day of the signing. In 1891, he would recall that ‘I divided the money myself’ between the signatories. ‘I took a great deal of trouble getting the names of the Natives from the chiefs and in writing them down. They never disputed the boundary’.332 No reserves were stipulated, although it would seem that local Maori had earlier excluded from the purchase some of the better land in the area.333

The Rauroa deed itself is slightly different in language than the earlier Mokau-Awakino deeds. This most likely stems from a change in the Crown’s basic template rather than an attempt to record something specific to this negotiation. Unlike the earlier examples, it does not state that the vendors were of ‘Ngatimaniapoto’, although there is no indication that any other tribes were involved in the arrangement. Only Schnackenberg and his wife Amy witnessed the deed.

With the signing, Takerei and his people had completed the last of their promised transactions with the Crown. The chief still awaited signs of the Pakeha settlement and long-term advantages which had drawn him into these agreements. While Searancke was surveying the Rauroa block, he also marked out, at Takerei’s ‘constantly expressed wish’, the two 50-acre sections reserved in the Awakino agreement for his sons.334 This suggests Takerei continued to expect settlement and imminent changes at Awakino, and was anxious to have legal control of areas within the block to take advantage of these anticipated developments.

330 Turton’s Deeds, Deed No. 455. Other signatories include Te Aria, possibly the Ngati Pehi chief Te Aria who opposed the sale of the upriver Mokau area. 331 Rogan to McLean, 8 Aug 1857, AJHR, 1861, C-1, p160 332 Evidence of John Rogan, 19 March 1891, Rees-Carroll Native Lands Laws Commission, AJHR, 1891, G-1, p56 333 Rogan to McLean, 13 December 1854, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0540 334 WH Searancke, Mokau Heads to McLean, 20 Jan 1857, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0561


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As earlier agreed with inland chiefs, Takerei had by this stage withdrawn from land negotiations with the Crown. It is a matter of guesswork what these chiefs, and other potential rights-holders, thought of the Rauroa transaction given that the Crown had once again sought the consent of only a very few Maori, and from one group only.

3.10 Aftermath of the Transactions

What we do know is that opposition to land transactions in Mokau remained powerful. As we have seen, a general consensus had been reached by this stage among both inland and coastal leaders that there would be no further land deals in the Mokau region. Negotiations therefore ceased in the Mokau region. The Crown remained unable to take control of the Mokau block or the other areas it had earlier ‘purchased’, and unable to stake a claim to the upriver area and its coal. At the local level, Schnackenberg remained frustrated in his attempts to gain legal ownership of the Te Mahoe mission station.

More broadly, Crown hopes that Taonui would swing behind land transactions in the Mokau region had been dashed. Schnackenberg in 1857 considered him the head of the resistance which was particularly strong among the ‘inland chiefs’.335 On the eve of the formation of the Kingitanga, inter-tribal resistance to land transactions throughout the North Island was growing. There were already signs that Mokau was affected by this wider opposition. Schnackenberg believed the great Ngati Tuwharetoa leader Te Heuheu was possibly playing a role in local resistance to land transactions.336 The Crown was alarmed at the hostility of Taranaki-affiliated hapu to land deals.

There were no obvious signs – and would not be for several decades – that the Mokau-Awakino transactions had taken place. The Crown certainly considered itself to have legally secured the Awakino, Rauroa and Taumatamaire blocks containing an estimated 49,000 acres and in 1857 declared native title over these blocks extinguished. It declined at this time to officially proclaim the Mokau block as the property of the Crown, another indication that even the Government considered this transaction incomplete.337

However, the Government would make no attempt to assert any control over any land in the Mokau-Awakino region before the 1880s. Even before the rise of the armed conflict between Kingitanga and the Crown, and the establishment of the aukati, the Crown had abandoned attempts to take charge of Mokau. Officials and settler newspapers would make sporadic and vague reference to a Crown estate in the region but this was Government land in name only (and in the Mokau block perhaps not even that).

Of course, some Mokau Maori had in the 1850s had very much wanted to see a Crown and especially a greater European presence in the region. However, no settlers came

335 Stokes, p118. 336 Ibid, p118. This was presumably Te Heuheu Tukino III, Iwikau 337 Boulton, p217


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and the Government, despite the expectations of Takerei, made no efforts to encourage their arrival. By 1 January 1859, none of the land in the Mokau-Awakino block had been on-sold, and it would seem that the Crown had not made any land available to settlers.338 Rather than increasing, the already minimal Pakeha presence had diminished further with the departure of its most prominent member. Schnackenberg. and his wife did not leave because of fear or hostility. After 14 years in the region, most local Maori, including opponents of land transactions, generally valued their presence. Rather, Schnackenberg had become discouraged by the non-arrival of the towns and settlers he had long looked forward to. Adding to his frustrations was his inability to transform Maori to the degree he had hoped and his failure to gain legal control over the Te Mahoe land Maori had informally granted him. Mokau was not changing fast enough for his liking, and in January 1858 he left what he termed that ‘solitary place’ bereft of ‘European society’ for Kawhia, an area considered of greater importance and growth.339

There were obvious impediments – even leaving aside the possibility of Maori obstruction – to significiant Pakeha settlement in the region. After all, most of the ‘purchased’ land was rough and there were considerable problems of access. In 1859 the Awakino, Rauroa and Taumatamaire blocks were categorised in Government records ‘as mountainous, or of inferior soil, sand, or bare clay’.340 The most attractive resources of the area – coal in particular – remained out of the Crown’s grasp.

However, as Leanne Boulton states, this does not answer the crucial question of whether the Crown acted in good faith. There is no evidence that the Crown, which presented itself as a partner and protector to local Maori, warned Takerei and others before the transactions that their hopes of economic opportunities, of towns of Pakeha, were a mirage. On the contrary, officials nourished Maori hopes of prosperity and opportunity. Admittedly, in 1852, Cooper clearly told Takerei that the Awakino and Mokau blocks would not be purchased as they were unlikely to attract settlement. However, the Crown retracted that position in 1854 when it decided to purchase the blocks, leading to continuing expectations by both Maori and Pakeha observers of an imminent influx.

The Government not only failed to encourage this settlement but, as Boulton writes, it ‘actively delayed the opening up of the district to European settlers to the financial benefit of the Crown’.341 As far as we can tell, local Maori were never told that the Crown preferred to delay settlement so that the Crown could purchase more land from Maori while prices remained low.

How far Mokau was from the vision of Takerei and others of towns and prosperity is indicated by the account of Percy Smith who with four comrades visited Mokau in

338 Boulton, p217 339 Schnackenberg to Rev and Dear Sir [Rev Mr Boyce], undated [Jan 1858?], Series A, folder 6, Schnackenberg Papers 340 See Boulton, p217 341 Ibid, 217


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1858 on their way from New Plymouth to Taupo. They travelled by cart to Waitara and then walked along the coastal route to Tongaporutu and Mohakatino. At Mohakatino, they waded through the river with the water up to their necks. After some clambering and a canoe trip they finally reached the settlement at Te Kauri and the mission station at Te Mahoe. They endured an evening of cold before going duck hunting the following day. The hospitality from Maori including Te Kaka and Takerei was warm but their expectations were strong. They offered the Pakeha two guides and a canoe to take them up the Mokau River to Motukaramu but asked for £80 in return. After bargaining, they accepted £10, a price Smith still felt extravagant. A day’s travel up the Mokau River saw them impressed but eventually tired by the ‘picturesque’ scenery which they judged lacked a certain variation and boldness. They came across no people but did see a lot of ‘broken’ land, some potatoes patches, a few horses used by Maori, and a canoe-making area near the Totara river.

After camping at Mangakawhia, they saw veins of coal. Despite their canoe trip having been a difficult one, Smith still believed a steamer could make it to where the coal was clearly visible. Only after another full day’s travelling did they come across a Maori settlement at Motukaramu, where there were about 20 people, mainly elderly women, present.342

The failure to create towns of settlers to the region disappointed some Maori with ties to Mokau but it did not mean that the search for economic opportunities was completely abandoned. Maori economic development and communal solidity had, to some degree, been disrupted by the Crown’s purchasing efforts and the years of associated tension, debate and dispute.

With the end of land negotiations, there was evidence of a return to the pre-1850 situation of a shared desire among hapu with connections to Mokau towards limited, positive interaction with individual Pakeha and with European technology. In 1859, the German geologist F. Von Hochstetter travelled to the Piopio in the Mokau valley where he came across a ‘large company of Maoris congregated there for a festival’. The occasion was a gift exchange between upriver hapu, including ‘the great chief’ Te Kuri and the hapu dwelling on the lower Mokau. Hochstetter described the Mokau as the most important river on the west coast except for the Waikato, and noted the potential for coal mining and the lavish welcome from Maori.343

The previous year, a European mill-builder named Edward Pratt was hired by Maori to build a mill in Mokau. He wrote of a general enthusiasm for his presence and for the mill, both from those based around Mokau and from those who had travelled from the interior, from those who had entered into land transactions and those who opposed them. Indeed he found their interest almost over-whelming:

342 Stokes, pp96-98 343 Ibid, pp99-101. According to Hochstetter, there were four principal settlements from the Mokau estuary to around fifty miles upriver – Te Kauri, Mangakawhia, Mangatama and Motukaramu.


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In this space are congregated the whole or nearly all the Mokau natives 240 in number & the chiefs E Kaka & upwards of 100 of his people from the interior, ourselves with one habitatious [? sic] workshop … The Natives here & especially those from the interior are very unlike those in Taranaki having had but little experience with Europeans & are therefore more ignorant, but in every other respect far better, they have not yet [?] so many of our views. As to their treatment of me so far it has been first rate, they show far more consideration than many Europeans would.344

However, unease about the potential results of land transactions, and suspicion of the Crown’s true intentions, remained powerful. In the following years, Maori with connections to Mokau, including both previous supporters and opponents of land transactions, would increasingly become an integral part of the Ngati Maniapoto and Kingitanga fight against Government aggression, invasion and confiscation.

By the end of the 1850s, resistance to land transactions in the Mokau region had seemingly triumphed. In the final analysis, the strength of this resistance was the most dominant feature of the Mokau-Awakino transactions. The opposition and disputes that preceded and continued after the signing of the deeds suggests that the purchasing process in the Mokau was deeply flawed and that genuine and widespread approval was not sought or given. This opposition, and the confusion that surrounded these transactions, made it crucial that when the Crown did return to the area that it instituted careful investigation and consultation before asserting that these blocks were alienated from Maori ownership. It could be argued that new negotiations and agreements were needed. As we will see, there is no evidence that such consultation and investigation took part. Rather, the Crown’s only justification for claiming this land in the 1880s and 1890s was some highly questionable and divisive dealings a generation earlier.

344 Edward Pratt to wife Sarah, April 1858, Pratt Family Correspondence 1855-1858, MS-Papers-0229, ATL


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Chapter Four

War and Confiscation: Mokau in the 1860s

Vincent O’Malley’s reports dealing with the inquiry district as a whole illustrate some of the most important elements of the impact of war and confiscation on Mokau. This chapter will not attempt a thorough discussion of the key battles or causes of the wars. Given that Mokau Maori were, to an increasing degree, integrated into the wider Ngati Maniapoto and Kingitanga response, such an attempt would be both superfluous and impossible. Instead, the focus here will be on the relatively little evidence available which is specifically connected to local Maori and which helps build a picture of Mokau during the 1860s.

The key point that emerges is that the wars of the 1860s created deep dilemmas as well as considerable hardship and loss for hapu with connections to Mokau. Throughout the 1850s, there had been a real desire among some Mokau Maori to establish a close and mutually respectful relationship with the Crown. The Crown’s actions during the 1860s damaged, even if they did not quite destroy, these hopes.

A rather bald accounting of a complex situation illustrates just how far many Mokau Maori were pushed from their belief in the good intentions of the Crown. Rather simplistically considered by Pakeha as ‘friendly tribes’ on the eve of the fighting, Mokau Maori took an ambivalent and far from unanimous position in the Taranaki wars. However, by 1863, local chiefs and hapu were clearly aligned with the Kingitanga-led resistance to the Crown’s invasion of the Waikato district and to the threat of confiscation. But it was the conquest of Pukearuhe in 1865 and the confiscation of the area up to Parininihi that really brought the wars to Mokau. These provoked the last major incident of the wars in the wider region, the 1869 attack on the Government redoubt at Pukearuhe. That this raid was led by Wetere, rightfully considered in both earlier and later periods as a key proponent of alliance-building with the Crown, was a sign of just how far the Government had alienated Mokau Maori. The staunchest supporters of close ties with the Government and with Europeans remained determined to uphold the authority and protect the interests and lands of their people.

4.1 Mokau on the Brink of the New Zealand Wars

Government officials were initially confident that Mokau Maori would not fight against Crown troops in Taranaki. This reflected the ties between the Government and Mokau chiefs, as well as the support Mokau hapu had lent to the ‘land-selling’ sections of Taranaki Maori in their internal disputes from the mid 1850s. This support reflected whakapapa connections. But Mokau chiefs were also perturbed by violence against participants in land transactions in the Taranaki, given that they themselves were under threat of invasion and attack by inland hapu for their own involvement in land deals.

Some Mokau Maori wanted the Crown to show a clear willingness to protect its allies in Taranaki and elsewhere. In August 1854, a Taranaki chief named Rawiri, who had

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been involved in land negotiations and was described as a native assessor and the ‘Queen’s man’, was shot dead. Schnackenberg reported that Mokau Maori, including Te Wetini, ‘seem to be wishful that the pakehas would ... punish the murderers, especially as otherwise they themselves may be treated likewise by Waikato, for selling land in this neighbourhood’.1

At this time, Te Wetini was reported to be holding off plans to go down to Taranaki and become directly involved in events. However, by the following year, ‘all the male inhabitants’ of Mokau were said to be in Taranaki to aid Arama Karaka in his disputes with opponents to land sales, led by Katatore and Wiremu Kingi. CJ Abraham who, with the Bishop of New Zealand, was travelling from Auckland to Waitara to try to arrange a truce between the parties, reported the cause of the dispute to be Katatore’s involvement in the killing of Rawiri, alongside Kingi’s fears that Arama Karaka would ‘sell land to the English’. Mokau Maori were among those who had gathered in the pa of Arama Karaka. There were also signs that the tensions over Poutama were influencing attitudes. According to Abraham, Taranaki-aligned Maori based just south of Pukearuhe had placed themselves on the opposite side to Mokau Maori and had gone to Waitara to assist Wiremu Kingi.2

On this occasion, the threat of violence subsided and Mokau Maori returned north. However, two major factors continued to draw Mokau hapu back into the conflict: requests from their allies for assistance and their own determination to keep open trading and other links with Taranaki. In May 1856, hapu at Mokau were approached for help as Ngati Ruanui were believed to be preventing travel from Taranaki northwards. Mokau Maori were reported to have promised they would interfere, forcibly if necessary, to stop any disruption as they consider ‘that the road belonging to the Queen is the highway of both Europeans and Natives, and should not be obstructed’.3

By June 1858, Katatore had himself been killed by a party led by Ihaia Te Kirikumara, who was often described as a land seller and ally of the Government.4 Mokau Maori travelled to Waitara to visit ‘the strife and put an end to it’. They helped negotiate a peace settlement, offering Ihaia and his party protection from any reprisal from Wiremu Kingi and others through allowing them to occupy a pa built specially for them at Pukearuhe. While Mokau Maori were presented by European newspapers as peace-makers, the settler press believed that they may enter the fray if Kingi’s party proved too overbearing towards Ihaia.5

These actions strengthened European confidence that Mokau Maori would align

1 Schnackenberg to Cooper, undated [August 1854], Series A, folder 5, p1, Schnackenberg Papers 2 CJ Abraham, Journal of a Walk with the Bishop of New Zealand from Auckland to Taranaki in August 1855 (London: Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, 1856), pp23-26, 32 3 ‘Editorial’, Taranaki Herald, 24 May 1856, p2 4 Waitangi Tribunal, The Taranaki Report, p61 5 ‘Taranaki’, Daily Southern Cross, 11 June 1858, p3 and Ann Parsonson, ‘Land and Conflict in Taranaki, 1853-1859’, November 1998 (Wai 143, #A1a), p163


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themselves with the Government on other issues. In 1859, the Government began to investigate improving the roads between New Plymouth and Mokau as a step towards ‘opening up’ the area and linking the North Island more closely together. In February, its surveyors explored land between the Waitara and Mokau Rivers with the aim of discovering a practicable road between New Plymouth and Mokau. After a bridle path to Mokau was suggested, the Government began preparing to build a tunnel through Parininihi (or the White Cliffs), which remained dangerous and troublesome for travellers to scale and rendered the transportation of stock and goods particularly difficult.6 Plans were also made to create inland routes that would greatly improve communications in the North Island.

Crown official Robert Parris was despatched to Mokau to try to convince local Maori to agree to such plans. He found at least some support, based on the desire for economic development and improved access to markets. In December 1859, it was reported that Mokau chiefs had agreed to a road from the opening of the Mokau heads that would run upriver to Motukaramu, and that they would be employed to help arrange its construction. This, and the expectation that the Parininihi tunnel would soon be completed, led to excited predictions that the time taken to travel overland between Auckland and New Plymouth would soon be halved from ten to five days and that stock could be driven between the two centres within fourteen days.7

Mokau Maori therefore remained, on the eve of the Taranaki wars, generally interested in positive contact with Europeans and certainly not isolationist. This belief was challenged but not directly contradicted by the formation in the late 1850s of the King movement. O’Malley examines the creation and ideology of the Kingitanga in considerable depth and shows that supporting the movement and seeking good relations with the Crown were certainly not mutually exclusive positions. He argues that ‘at no point was the Kingitanga opposed to the Crown (though settler governments and even governors were a different matter), and nor for the most part was it anti-Pakeha’.8 Rather, it sought to improve the situation of the tribes and create greater law and order.9 Alan Ward writes that the Kingitanga’s fundamental concern was that Maori ‘were losing control of their own destinies, and being subordinated to the political and economic power of the settlers’.10 A major concern was that land sales, if not controlled and perhaps prevented, could undermine Maori authority.11

The Kingitanga was seen as giving Maori the strength and unity to exercise authority over their lands and people. Most Kingitanga supporters believed that such rangatiratanga could co-exist with Pakeha authorities. Despite European fears, the

6 Taranaki Herald, 12 Feb 1859, p2 and 14 May 1859, p3 7 Auckland to New Plymouth in Five days, Taranaki Herald, 17 Dec 1859, p3 8 O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Political Engagement, 1840-1863’, pp518-519 9 Ibid, p519 10 Alan Ward, A Show of Justice: Racial ‘Amalgamation’ in Nineteenth Century New Zealand, (Auckland: Auckland University Press and Oxford University Press, 1973, 1983 reprint), p98 11 James Belich, The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict, (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1986, 1998 edition), p78


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movement was not driven by a desire to drive Europeans into the sea or to cease all connection with the Crown. Instead, as Ward writes, most King supporters wanted controlled, selective contact with Europeans and, to ‘continue to enjoy the skills, technology and material resources which settlers were bringing from the wider world’.12

With the selection of the first King in 1858 and growing support for the movement, many chiefs placed their lands under the mana of the King. Cathy Marr’s political engagement report, which was not available at the time of writing, will look at what this meant in more depth. The driving point was that a general, although not precisely defined, area was considered to be the ‘King’s territory’ and remained under Maori autonomy and management. The heartland of the King’s influence was amongst the Tainui confederation, including Ngati Maniapoto. As the famous Tainui saying indicates, this was often considered to stretch from ‘Mokau ki runga, Tamaki ki raro, Mokau above and Tamaki below’.13

While Ngati Maniapoto hapu provided strong initial support for the Kingitanga, this support was not unanimous. In Mokau, there would seem to have been a range of opinions and degrees of closeness and it would take some time – and the radical upheavals in the area from 1863 – to draw Mokau Maori more firmly into the alliance.

Some Mokau leaders, most notably Tawhana Tikaokao, were, from an early point, closely identified with the movement.14 Tikaokao would emerge as one of its key military leaders and in October 1863 was ‘elected general’ of the Kingitanga army.15 Others, including Wetere, seem to have had some ties but were less clearly affiliated, at least initially. Wetere would later claim that he and his people had only bonded with the Kingitanga reluctantly and that:

When the Maori king, that is Potatau, was set up, the Mokau natives never took part in that work. They never liked the work of setting up a king.16

It should be remembered that Wetere made the above statement many years later while he was locked in dispute with King Tawhiao and had strong motivation to downplay historical connections with the movement. Nevertheless, it would seem that Wetere and some other Mokau Maori were initially distant from the King movement. As we have seen, many Mokau Maori during the 1850s considered there to be greater rewards than risks in close contact with the Crown and with Pakeha. They were confident that their authority could be maintained despite the land transactions that some of them championed. The need and benefit of a king may therefore have been less obvious, especially given the movement’s wariness of land transactions and the

12 Ward, A Show of Justice, p99 13 Stokes, p12 14 Tawhana Tikaokao appears to have had especially strong links to the area around Tongaporutu. 15 Belich, The New Zealand Wars, p131 16 ‘Opening Mokau Land’, Taranaki Herald, 22 March 1882, p2


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suspicion and hostility it invoked in the Crown.

Mokau in the first years of the Kingitanga therefore walked a middle road. Cotemporary European observers were uncertain how influential the Kingitanga was in Mokau. This was illustrated by Takerei’s obituary in the Taranaki Herald in 1860 which described him as a key early proponent of the movement (indeed there are claims that he was nominated to be its first head). Shortly afterwards, the paper printed a correction, proclaiming him as one of the Kingitanga’s major opponents.17

JE Gorst’s in-depth report in 1862 on the Kingitanga stated that Mokau hapu were among the many groups who ‘are supposed to have given in their adhesion to the alliance’ but cautioned that ‘whether this supposition is true, or whether they have since repudiated the connexion, I have of course no means of judging’.18 He suggested that the King’s direct influence in areas more distant from the Waikato heartland was minimal. As we shall see, as the Crown more directly threatened Mokau and Ngati Maniapoto, its hapu and leaders would cleave more obviously to the Kingitanga.

4.2 Mokau and the Taranaki War

On the eve of the war between the Crown and Maori in Taranaki, Mokau Maori were sometimes described by Europeans as being part of the ‘friendly tribes’. While such a categorisation would prove woefully inadequate, the opposite conclusion – that Mokau Maori would en masse fight against the Crown in Taranaki – was equally simplistic. Mokau Maori were drawn into and affected by the war in Taranaki between March 1860 and March 1861 but the limited evidence available suggests that they did not take a unified stance. Some fought against the Crown, while others were neutral or took an ambivalent position. Overall, it appears that many Mokau Maori were more involved in trading rather than fighting in Taranaki during this period.

Given that the war initially did not come close to Mokau, the pressing issue was how close would Mokau Maori, and Ngati Maniapoto more generally, come to the war. Takerei and other Ngati Maniapoto chiefs were sent letters by Government sources urging them to stay neutral (no evidence has been sighted that suggests they were ever asked, or ever considered, fighting on the Crown’s side.) They were told not ‘to believe the reports you are receiving regarding the government, but hold to the word of the Governor regarding his love for all Maori people’ and instructed ‘to keep the peace’ and to not take part in the ‘wrongful actions’ of those ‘who fought at Taranaki against the sale of lands to the Queen’.19

There were signs that these expressions of the Government’s love were having the desired effect and it was expected that Ngati Maniapoto would not join Wiremu

17 ‘Death of Potatau, the Maori King’, Taranaki Herald, 7 July 1860, p3; Taranaki Herald, 14 July 1860, p3, and ‘Te Rerenga’, DNZB, 1993, vol 2, p525 for Takerei’s involvement in King movement 18 ‘General Report, By J.E. Gorst, Esq., on the State of Upper Waikato, June 1862’, Taranaki Herald, 2 Aug 1862, p3. (See under ‘2. The King’s Dominion’) 19 Te Rokena to Takerei at Mokau, Outwards letters in Maori, MA 4/71, ANZ Wgt (translation by Mark Derby)


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Kingi’s forces. On 26 March 1860, a letter written by the Mokau Maori missionary Hone Eketone on behalf of Takerei Waitara, Taonui Hikaka, Te Motutapu, Te Kaka, and Te Wetini, was sent from Mokau to Donald McLean. McLean considered it represented the general sentiments of Ngati Maniapoto ‘who muster about 800 good warriors’. The letter stated:

Do not listen to what people may say about hundreds of the Waikatos going there [to Taranaki]. Listen McLean, we the Ngatimaniapoto and Waikato will not be foolish, as we are a great tribe and a tribe of chiefs ... you know also that this tribe is a peaceable one. Let William King work out his own work of error ... we shall sit down and be content with good works, we shall not madly interfere with that evil.20

In early April, there were similar reports that the tribes of the Waikato ‘do not sympathise with W. King[i] at present, and have no intention of assisting him in his rebellious conduct’. A large recent runanga in the lower Waikato attended by ‘natives from all parts’ had raised fears of an attack on Auckland. However, Pakeha were assured that the meeting had been ‘only on King business’ and had no direct relevance to the fighting.21

Indeed, in the first few months of the war few, if any, Ngati Maniapoto fought against the Crown in Taranaki.22 There was a strong mood for continued Kingitanga and Ngati Maniapoto neutrality. Wi Tako Ngatata of Te Atiawa, one of the King’s leading supporters in Wellington, wrote to the major Waikato and Taupo leaders including Tikaokao at Tongaporutu, Te Wetini at Tarariki, Takerei at Te Kauri, Taonui Hikaka at Papatea, Reihana (Wahanui) at Whataroa, Rewi at Ngaruawahia, Tamihana at Tamahere and Te Heuheu at Taupo. The letter, translated, stated that:

the evil comes from Wi Kingi. Taranaki have also committed an evil, which is greater than all the evils of the world ... My friends, listen ... It [the fighting] is not for the King. Be not tempted by the evil spirit.23

At the same time, Waikato Resident Magistrate Henry Halse travelled overland from Auckland to Mokau to gauge Maori attitudes towards the fighting in Taranaki. The steamer the Tasmanian Maid was despatched from New Plymouth to trade with local Maori and to transport Halse and his information to the Taranaki. The steamer almost came to grief upon the bar near the Mokau heads, and with local Maori unable to reach the ship to render assistance, only a ‘miraculous escape’ spared the lives of the six crew members. For the next few days, Mokau Maori ‘behaved with great intrepidity’ and at ‘great risk’ in attempts to re-launch the steamer. On 14 April 1860, they succeeded, and the steamer brought Halse to Waitara to report that Mokau Maori

20 ‘Battle of Waireka’, Taranaki Herald, 31 March 1860, p3 21 ‘Taranaki. (From the Taranaki Herald). Journal of Events ...’, Daily Southern Cross, 20 April 1860, p4 22 James Belich, Making Peoples: A History of the New Zealanders: From Polynesian Settlement to the End of the Nineteenth Century (Auckland: Penguin Books, 1996), p235 23 ‘Taranaki’, Daily Southern Cross, 20 April 1860, p4


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‘are reputed to be steady in their loyalty [to the Government] and aversion to W. Kingi’s cause’ and that the Resident Magistrate thought ‘favorably [sic] of the feeling of all the sections of the Waikato tribes’ towards the war.24

Increasing involvement in the Taranaki wars

However, by May 1860 Kingi and the Taranaki tribes were receiving some limited support from the Kingitanga, including from Ngati Maniapoto. O’Malley suggests that in response to calls from Wiremu Kingi and other Taranaki Maori for assistance, a delegation from Ngati Maniapoto was sent to Taranaki to investigate Kingi’s situation. This delegation passed through Mokau on the way to Taranaki leading to incorrect claims in Pakeha newspapers that this was a group bent on battle. It was suggested that armed forces of 1000 Waikato and 60 Taranaki Maori had arrived in Mokau, led by Rewi and Whaaro, and were intending ‘to hoist the King’s standard’ on land claimed by the Government at Waitara. Both the Mokau chiefs Te Kaka and Takerei were said to have signified their ‘intention to take part in the struggle’.25 However, the Taranaki Herald shortly afterwards reported that the group gathered at Mokau was only one hundred strong and had no intention of joining the fighting, only to korero with Wiremu Kingi.26

While wild rumours remained a common currency of the wars, it was soon apparent that Ngati Maniapoto and many others groups affiliated with the Kingitanga had decided to join those fighting against the Crown in Taranaki.27 O’Malley suggests that this decision reflected a careful investigation of Kingi’s position and the justice of his cause. Moreover, many Ngati Maniapoto leaders, including Rewi, apparently feared that if the Crown was to conquer Taranaki, it would turn next to their lands.28

From June 1860 onwards, large number of Kingitanga warriors were ‘fighting alongside the Te Atiawa defenders of Waitara’.29 According to Belich and O’Malley, this involvement, while substantial, was deliberately restricted so that the ‘tribes were able to supply a continuous series of reinforcements for the conflict without jeopardising their ability to continue cultivating crops with which to feed their warriors and which cash could be earned for the purchase of arms and ammunition’.30

Overall, they estimate that between one-third and half of all the military forces available to the Waikato tribes took part at some point in the Taranaki war. Mokau’s location, close to the battlefields but distant from Crown control gave it special importance, including as a place of recuperation and sanctuary for wounded Waikato

24 Ibid 25 ‘Continuation of Journal of Events’, Taranaki Herald, 5 May 1860, p2 26 Ibid, 12 May 1860, p2. O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement, 1840-1863’, pp324-328 has more on this sequence of events. 27 O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement, 1840-1863’, p388 28 Ibid, p388 29 Ibid, p388 30 O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement, 1840-1863, scoping report’, p130. See also Belich, New Zealand Wars, pp102-103.


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warriors.31 Moreover, the Mokau River and the path through Pukearuhe were crucial for transporting men and resources to the fight.32 On 20 October 1860, there were reports that 80 ‘Waikatos’ under Rewi were in Mokau, preparing to leave immediately for Waitara.33

Some of these warriors were from Mokau. On 1 December 1860, 200 Waikatos were said to be at Mokau on their way to Waitara and that ‘part of Mokau ... are either in arms or ready to take them up’.34 A couple of weeks later, it was reported that ‘100 Waikato’ had joined ‘the ranks of the rebels’ situated at Mimi just south of Pukearuhe and that the anti-Government forces had been boosted by ‘the important addition’ of two Mokau chiefs, Tikaokao and Tati.35 Tikaokao in particular would establish ‘a very impressive record’ of fighting and leadership, for instance taking part alongside other Mokau Maori in the long battle at Te Arei, one of the last in the Taranaki wars before the Government troops were forced to settle for a military stalemate.36 The Mokau chief was said to have ‘held the rifle pits at Te Arei pah most tenaciously’ and to have been instrumental in rallying the forces resisting the Crown.37 Mokau Maori doubtlessly suffered casualties during the Taranaki fighting. For instance, Tikaokao and others from Mokau were part of a January 1861 raid on a Government redoubt near Huirangi, to the south of the Waitara River. The attack went disastrously wrong, with at least a quarter of the Kingitanga contingent of 140 killed.38

There is other evidence of a considerable Mokau presence at the battles. In 1862, the missionary Schnackenberg visited Mokau Maori. He was shocked at ‘the quantity of Taranaki plunder of every description’ they possessed, including soldiers’ coats, belts, caps, swords, ‘carts and ploughs &c &c’ taken from settlers. Local Maori offered to buy his ‘vessel’ from him for £20 but he refused as he believed the money had been taken from a Pakeha shot at Waiwakaiho in Taranaki. He called for the Government to impose a ‘blockade’ on Mokau but ‘no war, shed no blood’.39

Even after the main fighting in Taranaki ceased, some Mokau Maori remained heavily involved in assisting the ‘rebels’. Schnackenberg, during his 1862 visit, was ‘surprised at the number of armed men’ that were still going to Taranaki.40 There are also indications that some Mokau Maori were preparing to defend themselves from possible Government attack. Gorst was told in 1862 that Mokau hapu were among the

31 ‘Continuation of Journal of Events’, Taranaki Herald, 9 Feb 1861, p2 and Schnackenberg to His Excellency the Governor, 16 April 1861, Series A, folder 7, p1, Schnackenberg Papers 32 Tom Gibson, The Maori Wars: The British Army in New Zealand, 1840-1872 (Wellington: Reed, 1974), p139 33 ‘Continuation of Journal of Events’, Taranaki Herald, 20 Oct 1860, p2 34 ‘Continuation of Journal of Events’, Taranaki Herald, 1 Dec 1860, p2 35 ‘The Native War’, Nelson Examiner and New Zealand Chronicle, 26 Dec 1860, p2 36 Editorial, Taranaki Herald, 15 Feb 1862, p2; O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement, 1840-1863’, pp338, 364 and Belich, New Zealand Wars, pp110-113, 131 37 O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement, 1840-1863’, p364 38 Ibid, pp338, 364 39 Schnackenberg to My dear Sir, undated [between 2 Aug – 2 Sep 1862], Series A, folder 9, p11, Schnackenberg Papers 40 Ibid


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many in the wider Waikato area who had formed companies of the ‘King’s soldiers’ that were ‘drilled, armed, and dressed in uniform, in imitation of our regular troops’. These troops were apparently established not to fight in Taranaki but as part of a system of self-government and defence.41

At this stage, the Mokau chief Tikaokao was reported to be playing a prominent part, as a key leader in the Kingitanga movement, in liaising with and advising Taranaki chiefs.42 For good reason, roads were now seen by at least some Mokau Maori as more of a military threat than a practical advantage. While the Government’s 1859 plans to build roads and a tunnel through Parininihi had been stalled, Tikaokao in 1862 issued a warning that the Governor was planning roads stretching north from Waitara into Mokau to assist a possible military campaign. He instructed Hakari, a Mokau chief at Pukearuhe, to stop all Pakeha ‘who may come up that way, and turn them back, as they may be surveying the line of a new road.’43 Schnackenberg, visiting Mokau in April 1863 as war resumed in the south, found ‘a good deal of sympathy’ for Wiremu Kingi’s faction of Taranaki’.44

The limits of Mokau participation

Despite this wide sympathy and some active participation, it would appear that many Mokau Maori were essentially neutral, or at least not directly involved in the conflict in the Taranaki. The decision of Mokau Maori over whether to fight in the wars in Taranaki was far from a clear-cut one. Among the many factors to consider was the continuing tension with Taranaki tribes over rights to the Poutama region. Many Waikato overlooked their traditional enmity with Taranaki to make common cause against the Crown and its expansionist tendencies. However, Mokau Maori may well have been perturbed by the fact that Wiremu Kingi and those Taranaki Maori drawn into conflict with the Crown considered Poutama one of ‘their’ areas that they were seeking to protect. For instance, in 1859 Wiremu Kingi and a Taranaki runanga declared their rights over the area between Waitara Stream and the Mokau River, and prohibited any land sales within it.45

Another factor was that many Mokau Maori continued to see good relations with the Crown as vital to their economic development and political strength. This is suggested by the activities of Takerei’s son, Hone Wetere, who after his father’s death in 1860 assumed a major leadership role in the area. Some non-contemporary sources unconvincingly claim that Wetere had by 1860 emerged as a staunch supporter of the most bellicose wing of the King movement, that he fought against the Government in Taranaki and as a consequence had his schooner, the Parininihi, seized and

41 ‘General Report, By J.E. Gorst, Esq., on the State of Upper Waikato, June 1862’, Taranaki Herald, 2 Aug 1862, p3. (See under ’3. The King’s Officers’) 42 Taranaki Herald, 15 Feb 1862, p2 and 22 Feb 1862, p2 43 Untitled, Taranaki Herald, 22 March 1862, p2 44 Schnackenberg to Rev and Dear Sir, 9 April [1863], Series A, folder 10, p7, Schnackenberg Papers 45 Keith Sinclair, The Origins of the Maori Wars (Wellington: New Zealand University Press, 1957), pp275-276


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confiscated.46

However, primary evidence suggests that Wetere’s main focus in this period was to carry on his father’s policy of expanding trade and economic contact with Pakeha. Wetere did not clearly take sides in the Taranaki fighting and maintained close ties with both Crown and ‘rebel’ leaders. He and other Mokau Maori owned, skippered and crewed the Parininihi which rather than being confiscated during the fighting, traded regularly with Waitara, New Plymouth and elsewhere. The large amounts of Maori produce they were transporting suggests that trade with New Plymouth and other pakeha towns remained central for the Mokau economy which was both vibrant and outward-looking during the early 1860s. It also raises the possibility that Mokau hapu – with their boat and open access to New Plymouth – were bringing the produce of other groups to market, and were in effect acting as trading agents for those fighting against the Crown. Overall, it may well be that the Taranaki war, and the new economic possibilities it raised, was something of a high-water mark for Mokau trade.

Some examples will suggest the scale of this war-time trade. On 8 September 1860, the Parininihi sailed from Mokau to New Plymouth with 4 tons of bricks, 3000 feet of timber, 388 bushels of wheat, 10 bushels of maize and 6 bushels of apples. On 13 October, it took 631 bushels of wheat and four Maori passengers to New Plymouth. On 24 November, 4000 feet of sawn timber, 3000 bricks, 6 pigs and 100 small kits of produce were on board.47 The little 16-ton schooner must have been literally packed to the gunnels to carry such quantities of cargo.

The benefits of good relations and a ‘friendly’ reputation were seen in multiple ways. In December, the Parininihi struck dangerous conditions on a trading trip to Waitara and was almost driven ashore. However, the Tasmanian Maid, a Pakeha trading vessel often used by the Government to transport troops, towed it to safer waters. Wetere and three or four of the Maori crew left the ship in Waitara and proceeded back to Mokau by land while the rest of the crew waited with the boat for better conditions.48

The boat soon resumed its trading. It was in New Plymouth on another visit on 6 February 1861.49 On 21 July 1861, it deposited 6000 feet of timber, 1 ton of potatoes and a European passenger in New Plymouth. There was substantial shipping of timber from Mokau to New Plymouth with 7400 feet of sawn timber in December 1861. It is unclear if the timber was being cut and sawed by Maori or by Pakeha. Most likely it was being done by both, as Mokau Maori worked alongside and for European saw-

46 James Belich, I Shall Not Die: Titokowaru’s War, New Zealand, 1868-9 (Wellington: Allen & Unwin and Port Nicholson Press, 1989), p221, Dick Craig, The Realms of King Tawhiao (Tauranga: D Craig, 1995), p45. It is possible that the Parininihi was indeed seized by the Government but only later, sometime between 1865 and 1871. ‘Mr Civil Commissioner Parris’s Visit to Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 13 May 1871, p2 47 ‘Shipping Intelligence, Taranaki News, 8 Sep 1860, p2; 23 Sep 1860, p2; 20 Oct 1860, p2; 24 November 1860, p2 48 ‘The Native War’, Nelson Examiner and New Zealand Chronicle, 26 December 1860, p2 49 ‘Shipping Intelligence, Taranaki News, 9 Feb 1861, p2; 27 July 1861, p2; 17 Aug 1861, p2; 20 Dec 1862, p2; 21 December 1861, p2


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millers in the 1850s.50

The trade was two way. The Parininihi would bring back to Mokau European produce and goods such as flour, sugar, salt, beer and the highly popular ginger beer while some other ships occasionally visited Mokau. The Parininihi was also active in other ports, for instance transporting trade and Pakeha passengers between Kawhia and New Plymouth. While Wetere was usually the skipper, at times other Mokau Maori would take control. Occasionally, Pakeha crew were used.51

The Parininihi remained busy during 1862 and 1863, although the ongoing tensions in Taranaki could impact on trade. In June 1863, the boat was laid up in Waitara for repairs. Wetere planned to hire some Pakeha to help re-launch it but decided the area was too dangerous for Europeans to visit at the moment.52

At least some Pakeha continued to live and visit Mokau, providing valuable economic and other opportunities for Maori. Particularly important was John Shore, who from 1859 used local clay to establish a fairly successful brickworks in partnership with local Maori. In one year the Parininihi shipped an estimated thirty thousand bricks to New Plymouth.53 The relationships between Mokau Maori and ‘their’ Europeans continued to be close and mutually beneficial with chiefs providing crucial protection from the disruption and insecurity of the war. Shore was issued with a ‘pass of safe conduct’ so that he could travel overland between Mokau and New Plymouth without the risk of harassment from other Maori. In September 1860, he was on his way to New Plymouth when he met a group of Waikato warriors returning from the Waitara battlefields. At first, they took a threatening stance towards Shore before deciding that it would be ‘unwise to incur the hostility’ of Mokau Maori, especially as they needed to travel though the area on their way back to the Waikato.54

For trader-chiefs such as Wetere, staying out of the war and maintaining cordial relations with the Crown was critical in the continuing search for prosperity and partners. During his trips to New Plymouth, Wetere would regularly supply information to Government officials and Pakeha regarding the war, including reports on the possible involvement of Ngati Maniapoto and Kingitanga troops in the fighting.55 It does not seem that this intelligence was of a particularly sensitive nature or that Wetere was viewed by Kingitanga as a ’collaborator’, as illustrated by the fact that he maintained close ties with Waikato and Taranaki leaders fighting against the Government. But such assistance ensured that Pakeha did not view him as a threat, and that the trading avenues with New Plymouth remained open. In May 1860, Te Wetini is said to have saved the life of Robert Parris by informing the Government of

50 I.e. Schnackenberg to James McConochie, 11 Sep 1851, Series A, folder 2, pp20-21, Schnackenberg Papers 51 ‘Shipping Intelligence, Taranaki News, 12 July 1862, p3 52 ‘Continuation of Journal of Events’, Taranaki Herald, 27 June 1863, p2 53 Stokes, p188 and Barr, ‘The Mokau Mines Speculation in Nineteenth Century Taranaki’, p13 54 ‘Waitara’, Nelson Examiner and New Zealand Chronicle, 5 Sep 1860, p3 55 ‘Continuation of Journal’ Taranaki News, 20 Oct 1860, p2; 12 Mar 1861, p1; ‘Untitled’, Taranaki Herald, 8 Mar 1862, p2; ‘The Native War’, Nelson Examiner and New Zealand Chronicle, 26 Dec 1860, p2


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‘the diabolical intentions’ of some Taranaki Maori to kill the Crown official. This intervention was still remembered and praised by Pakeha newspapers many years later.56

Mokau Maori expected this assistance to be reciprocated. In 1861, Wetere applied to the Government to supply him with guns and ammunition. He wanted weapons neither to fight for or against the Crown in Taranaki, but to maintain his people’s independence and strength in a time when both Maori and Pakeha were widely armed. (He also wanted to arm a European under his patronage). Governor Gore Browne refused his entreaties. He knew that Wetere would not use these guns in the Government’s cause and worried that arming the chief and his supporters would ‘give grounds for fear among’ Maori rivals. He therefore urged Wetere to ‘remain living peacefully and properly’.57

His replacement, Governor Grey found other means to strengthen and personalise ties with Wetere, and to ensure his continuing neutrality. In 1862, he offered to appoint Wetere, along with Karauiti Hikaka of the upper Mokau, Native Assessors with a government salary, just as he had done with Wetere’s father. This honour was made because:

The Governor has heard of your distinguished work to organise the conditions in your part of the country, and your determination to see your people improve. The Governor’s heart is warmed by this news ... carry on strongly with your work, as though you were a hundred men, so that before long the evil will pass away and goodness will again prevail in the land. That is what the Governor’s hopes for, and that is why we wish to celebrate your work.58

4.3 The Waikato War and the Threat of Confiscation, July 1863 to April 1864

The Crown’s invasion of Waikato and confiscation of land, including areas crucial to Mokau Maori, would provoke a more united, unambiguous response from local chiefs. Such actions shattered the long-held belief that the Crown was committed to partnership and the protection of Maori interests. Wetere and local hapu joined the wider resistance and took action closer to Mokau in order to protect what remained of their rohe.

While we have relatively little specific information on the activities of local hapu in the first stages of fighting in the Waikato, Mokau and its people were widely considered an intrinsic part of the Kingitanga-led resistance. Although less well-known that some of the famous names of the Kingitanga movement, Tawhana Tikaokao was by 1863 one

56 ‘Retirement of Mr. Civil Commissioner Parris’, Taranaki Herald, 24 July 1875¸ p2 57 Te Mete to Wetere Takerei at Mokau, 16 Feb 1861, Outwards letters in Maori, MA 4/71, ANZ Wgt (translation by Mark Derby) 58 Te Hareti to Wetere Takerei and Karauiti Hikaka at Mokau, 27 Nov 1862, Outwards letters in Maori, MA 4/71, ANZ Wgt (translation by Mark Derby). It is not clear but would seem that Wetere at least accepted the offer.


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of its leading generals. It has been suggested that he acted as a ‘kind of chief of staff’ to Rewi during the wars and was involved in many of its key battles.59

On 5 September 1863, a correspondent for the Taranaki Herald reported that ‘all the Mokau natives have gone, or are going, to the scene of war’.60 Ngati Maniapoto of Mokau were said to be among the ‘kohinga tangata’, a 100-strong force made up of different tribes including Tuhoe, Whakatohea and Ngati Porou who fought 30 or 40 Pakeha, possibly at Mauku in the Waikato. It was reported by Maori participants that that six of their number, including both a son and a nephew of Tikaokao, were killed in this battle alongside 15 Europeans (which the Taranaki Herald thought likely to be an exaggeration.) A Pakeha woman was killed while attempting to escape, provoking European condemnation although it was said that the King disapproved of her killing. Taniora (possibly the Mokau chief who had been involved in the land transactions of the 1850s) took part in the battle and immediately afterwards was believed to be in the Poutama-Mimi region recruiting more troops.61

Such anecdotal evidence cannot provide a clear indication of how many Mokau Maori joined the fighting, nor how many were wounded or killed. However, judging from the wider situation, it seems likely that a high percentage of Mokau men participated in the war and that casualty rates were heavy. O’Malley wrestles with the difficulties of defining exactly the size of Kingitanga forces during the Waikato wars before concluding that the total Maori mobilisation was likely to have been at least 4000 warriors. This meant that perhaps one-third of the total Kingitanga manpower was mobilised during the war, a ‘staggering’ level.62

Not all these forces were available at any one time and there was a ‘constant turnover of personnel – small groups came and went all the time’.63 Overall, Kingitanga troops were heavily outnumbered by the British troops and suffered high levels of killed and wounded which O’Malley ‘conservatively’ estimates as around 400 killed and 400 wounded in the Waikato wars alone. He argues that the core tribes of the broader Waikato district, including Ngati Maniapoto, suffered remarkably high casualty levels of perhaps 7.7 percent of their total population with just under 4 percent killed.64

It can be presumed that Mokau hapu were amongst the many casualties. Certainly, the whanau of Tikaokao suffered terribly. After his son and nephew died in battle, a ‘favourite daughter’ was killed by the Crown during the siege at Rangiriri. Following her death, there were (apparently unsubstantiated) reports that Tikaokao had taken a group of warriors and was seeking to ‘obtain utu ... by the murder of some outsettler’.65

59 Belich, The New Zealand Wars, p131 60 ‘Native’, Taranaki Herald, 5 Sep 1863, p2 61 ‘Native’, Taranaki Herald, 21 Nov 1863, p2. See also ’Another Brutal Murder by the Rebels’, Taranaki Herald, 14 Nov 1863, p3 62 O’Malley, ‘War and Raupatu’, p37 63 Belich, The New Zealand Wars, p129 quoted in O’Malley, ‘War and Raupatu’, p37 64 O’Malley, ‘War and Raupatu’, p184 65 ‘Ngaruawahia’, Taranaki Herald,19 Dec 1863, p2


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The limited evidence available suggests that as the war went on, and positions hardened, Mokau Maori as a whole increasingly affiliated strongly with the Kingitanga cause. Even previously neutral chiefs such as Wetere drew close to the Kingitanga and, like many in the movement, embraced Pai Marire.66 Wetere would later explain that his and his people’s initial distance from the Kingitanga was overcome by the need for unified resistance:

It was not until blood had flowed through the fighting of the pakeha and Maori, that the Mokau natives joined themselves to the king party, Not that they agreed to a king, but through the love they had for the people, in order that they should perish with the whole of the people.67

Certainly, there was a marked change in European attitudes towards Mokau and its people, who were now, like Ngati Maniapoto as a whole, commonly seen as the most extreme part of a violent rebellion, and meriting severe punishment. Mokau was presented as a ‘dangerous’, ‘forbidding’ area beyond Government control or civilisation. The Daily Southern Cross was of the opinion that:

The tribe most deserving to be punished is the Ngatimaniapoto, whose lands lies at Kawhia, and far inland of that part as well as along the coast to Mokau ... at Mokau the Government have long had forty thousand acres of land of their own, but have never settled it owing to the forbidding nature of the country itself and its ruthless inhabitants.68

The Otago Witness portrayed Mokau as a once-peaceful area with great prospects and a ‘thriving settlement of Europeans’ that was now insecure and almost deserted.69 The Wesleyan Missionary Society considered it to be ‘in the hands of the enemy’.70

Most damagingly, the Government began developing plans to confiscate vast areas of Maori land. Unlike much of the rest of the Ngati Maniapoto rohe, part of the Mokau area was earmarked for confiscation from the very beginning. A key step in the road to confiscation was in October 1863, when Premier Alfred Domett summarised his ministry’s confiscation plans. The scheme at this stage was based around creating a system of roads, totalling 927 miles, through the centre of the North Island. Around these roads, settlements would be formed on which 20,000 military settlers would be placed. A massive area of Maori land was planned to be confiscated, totalling 2,792,000 acres in the Taranaki, Waikato and Thames districts, some to be retained by the Crown and some to be sold. The Crown presented these ‘just and reasonable’ measures as a punishment for past ‘rebellion’, and a means of ensuring the future security of the Island by placing large amounts of settlers in the midst of Maori. It would serve as a warning of the consequences of fighting against the Crown. Perhaps

66 Belich, I Shall Not Die, p221, 67 ‘Opening Mokau Land’, Taranaki Herald, 22 March 1882, p2 68 Daily Southern Cross, 10 Dec 1863, p3 69 ‘The Mokau River’, Otago Witness, 12 Aug 1864, p1 70 ‘Anniversary Meeting of the Wesleyan Missionary Society’, Taranaki Herald, 18 November 1865, p3


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most importantly, it was intended to facilitate and fund European colonisation and Government control. Domett estimated that the money for this massive scheme would be raised in large part by the sale of 1,492,000 acres of confiscated Maori land.71

An integral part of this plan was the Government’s control and confiscation of Pukearuhe. Whoever controlled the Pukearuhe plateau, which loomed high above the Parininihi beach, effectively controlled the main route either south towards Taranaki or north towards Mokau (and onwards and inland). It had long been viewed (and disputed) by different tribes as a central strategic point. It was now a key area for Mokau hapu and for the southern defence of Ngati Maniapoto. The Crown was determined to take it, to protect its conquest and confiscation in Taranaki, and presumably as a base for any extension northwards.

In order to prevent Government holdings in Taranaki from possible attack from the Waikato, Premier Domett stressed the importance of placing forces at Pukearuhe followed by the building of a thirty mile road from New Plymouth to Pukearuhe.

Taranaki is cut off from Waikato by the exceedingly rugged and densely wooded country stretching from Kawhia and Mokau on the North ... But the Waikato and Taupo Natives can get round the country ... coastwise through Mokau ... The Northern road could be, by all accounts, completely commanded by possession of Pukearuhe a pass on the Coast, fourteen miles north of Waitara, which cannot be avoided by any Natives taking that road. It could be held by 200 men in a stockade (or less) against any Native force whatever; and would easily be provisioned by sea, there being a good landing place there. A road thence should be made to New Plymouth.72

It was far from clear that the Crown’s aim to seize land near Mokau would stop at Pukearuhe. The Government, at this stage, did not define the exact areas it intended to confiscate. O’Malley argues that the scope of its confiscation ambitions were essentially limited only by the extent of its military success – any land that was conquered was liable to confiscation.73 In March 1864, there were rumours that the Government’s terms for peace would include confiscation of the Taranaki area stretching all the way to the mouth of the Mokau River and inland.74

By April 1864, the Government had, in O’Malley’s words’ ‘managed to take forcible possession of a substantial portion of the Waikato district, clearing the way for confiscation and European settlement’. However, the Crown’s military leaders declined to push beyond the Puniu River and face the full might of Ngati Maniapoto and

71 Michael Allen, ‘An Illusory Power? Metropole, Colony and Land Confiscation in New Zealand, 1863-1865’, in Richard Boast and Richard S Hill (eds), Raupatu: The Confiscation of Maori Land, (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2009), pp115-120 72 ‘Memorandum on Roads and Military Settlements in the Northern Island of New Zealand’, in Taranaki Herald, 12 Dec 1863, p3 73 See O’Malley, ‘War and Raupatu’ 74 ‘General Cameron’, Taranaki Herald, 12 March 1864, p3


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others.75 The threat to Mokau, however, was just beginning. The danger would come from the south, rather than from the north, as Government troops, no longer needed in the Waikato were relocated to aid the push first into central and then into northern Taranaki.

4.4 The Conquest of Pukearuhe and Confiscation up to Parininihi

In April 1864, advancing Crown troops in Taranaki struck a major blow. A 200 strong Maori force, led by Pai Marire prophets, attacked the government redoubt at Sentry Hill but were cut down in droves, with about 50 killed.76 Although most of the casualties were apparently affiliated to Taranaki tribes, Mokau Maori were well aware of the threat that was now being posed to them. Wetere and Tikaokao were prominent at the Pai Marire-oriented tangi held for the casualties, supplying two memorial statues or atua.77

Increasingly, the King Movement looked at Mokau as crucial to protecting its people and its land. There were regular visits by Kingitanga and Ngati Maniapoto leaders and in August 1864 it was reported that King Tawhiao, who was born in the Mokau area, was visiting and was considering taking up residence ‘in the neighbourhood’.78

Rather than considering Mokau a disputed area between the Waikato and Taranaki tribes, the Government was increasingly alarmed that it could be a means to link these two powerful groups together. In August 1864, there were rumours that 600 of the ‘enemy’ including Rewi and Wiremu Kingi (who was at this stage living with Rewi in Kihikihi) were in Mokau on the way to an attack on Taranaki.79

However, no evidence has been sighted that Kingitanga troops planned a mass move into Taranaki. Strategy, internal political issues and the desire for peace all stood in the way such a dramatic action. Indeed, Government troops met little resistance either from local Maori or from the Kingitanga as they pushed into the lower Waitara and then further northwards.80

The main consequence of continuing reports of planned Maori violence and mass attack was that they served as useful justification for Crown plans for military occupation and confiscation. On 17 December 1864, the Crown announced its intention to confiscate much of the Waikato district as well as ‘such land belonging to the Rebels’ in the Taranaki province that the Governor saw fit to take.81 On 31 January 1865, the first confiscation in the Taranaki district, involving lands north and south of

75 O’Malley, ‘War and Raupatu’, p177 76 Waitangi Tribunal, The Taranaki Report, pp94-95 77 ‘The Natives’, Taranaki Herald, 30 July 1864, p2 78 Evening Post, 12 Aug 1864, p1; Evening Post, 5 Jul 1865, p2, 10 Jul 1865, p2; North Otago Times, 6 Jul 1865, p1; New Zealand Spectator and Cook’s Strait Guardian, 12 Jul 1865, p5; Schnackenberg to Rev and Dear Sir, 8 Aug 1864, Series A, folder 11, p7, Schnackenberg Papers 79 ‘Military’, Taranaki Herald, 6 Aug 1864, p2 80 Waitangi Tribunal, The Taranaki Report, pp94-95 81 O’Malley, ‘War and Raupatu’, p625


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the Waitara River, was formally proclaimed.82

By April, the Taranaki Herald was expecting that Pukearuhe would soon be conquered and confiscated. Military settlements were being planned at Waitara and Te Arei, and Pukearuhe was seen as the inevitable next conquest that would link the military settlements, and planned intermediary redoubts, into a triangular area of ‘valuable land’. Pukearuhe had additional strategic appeal:

The possession of the White Cliffs is very important as stopping all communication from the northward by the coast, and therefore will be an effective check against any incursions by the coast; so that the occupiers of the block, some of whom will no doubt be friendly natives who have possessions in it, will not only be able to enjoy their own in comparative quiet, but will give great additional security to the settlement generally.83

The Taranaki Herald was either prophetic or very well informed for almost simultaneously Crown troops were sailing from New Plymouth to Pukearuhe. According to Assistant Native Secretary Robert Parris, reports had been received that some Ngati Maniapoto, including ‘Wetere la Kerei’ (presumably Wetere Ta Kerei), ‘Kaharoa’ and ‘Ngatawa Ia Kerei’ had been near Urenui during the Government’s recent attacks there and had then ‘left for the north, with a promise to bring down reinforcements ... from Waikato’.84

Upon hearing these unverified reports, Colonel Warre and the Defence Minister ‘determined to take possession of Pukearuhe, the occupation of which place completely intercepts the passage from Mokau to this [Taranaki] district’. On Monday 24 April, the Phoebe was despatched with a detachment of the 70th regiment, a company of Bushrangers, Parris and two pro-Government Maori. Large contingents of Taranaki Maori were also travelling overland from Urenui and Mimi to assist the forces. Clearly the Crown expected substantial resistance.

However, no opposition was visible when the steamer moored just offshore from Pukearuhe. Parris and the two Maori were instructed to form a reconnaissance party and go ashore, an order that alarmed Parris who feared of ambush. He solicited the accompaniment of a group of 12 soldiers, (but was disappointed that more did not volunteer their services). They hastily made their way to the top of the plateau as delay would ‘only increase the chance of opposition had there been any rebels near the place’. With the coast clear, almost 100 soldiers landed ashore during the day carrying with them some tents, two bags of biscuits and some pork. Parris was therefore astonished and anxious when the Phoebe abruptly departed leaving the men ‘without a single spade or axe’ and limited ammunition. Reinforcements arrived that evening in the form of some of the Mimi Maori that Parris had earlier arranged to assist in the

82 Ibid, p625 83 Editorial, Taranaki Herald, 22 Apr 1865, p2 84 Parris to the Native Minister, 18 May 1865, AJHR, 1865, E-8, p1


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conquest. They were despatched back to Mimi to bring food. On 26 April, with still no sign of the return of the Phoebe, Parris hurried overland with his native allies to New Plymouth and arranged further ammunition and supplies to be immediately shipped to the invading force.

With still no sign of the expected opposition, Parris was free to participate in the seizing of Maori land near Opunake, which again took place without resistance. On 9 April, he returned to Pukearuhe to withdraw a group of pro-government Maori stationed there and noted that Captain Ralston and his men had almost ‘finished a very fine redoubt’.85 Pukearuhe had been seized without a shot fired.

Senior Crown officials were delighted with the conquest. Neither Governor Grey nor the British Commander, Lieutenant General Duncan Cameron, had been informed prior to the attack, Cameron being offended to only learn about it while reading his morning newspaper. However, Grey stated that ‘it has been long intended to occupy that position as being one of the most important points in the country’. He praised Colonel Warre for acted wisely in ‘anticipating’ his likely orders, especially given rumours that ‘Kawhia natives’ were marching towards Taranaki.86 Grey ordered a permanent post to be established ‘at that important point’ and believed that Warre’s skilful and successful initiative ‘will go very far to bring to a close the war which has so long prevailed in the Taranaki district’.87

Grey and Cameron, in the context of their broader disputes as the colonial government gradually assumed self-government, argued over how many and what types of troops would be needed to be stationed in the area. Grey eventually agreed that they would be not imperial troops but about 250 members of the Taranaki Militia and ‘loyal natives’ who would be paid by the Colonial Government.88 In the following months, Taranaki militia settlers would be gradually shipped to the redoubt with the expectation that they would soon be granted land in the area.89

The Taranaki Herald was predictably delighted with the conquest. In the last month, Colonel Warre had extended the Government outposts around 20 miles northwards and 25 miles southwards, rapid progress it contrasted favourably with General Cameron’s excessive caution. While acknowledging that the ‘rumoured approach of Ngatimaniapoto’ led by Rewi had not yet taken place, it believed ‘it cannot be denied that the move is a most judicious one looking to the absolute command it gives of the only direct route from Waikato’. Taranaki Maori were quoted as acknowledging the significance of the taking, the Government ‘have put up your gate [between Taranaki

85 Ibid, pp1-3 86 Grey to Cameron, 12 May 1865, AJHR, 1865, A-4, p37 87 Grey to Cameron, 12 May 1865, AJHR, 1865, A-4, p37 88 Grey to Cameron, 13 May 1865, AJHR, 1865, A-4, p38. See also Grey and Cameron’s correspondence on this subject in AJHR, 1865, A-4, pp32-40 89 ‘Shipping Intelligence’, Taranaki Herald, 2 Sep 1865, p2. It is not clear how many troops were stationed at Pukearuhe at its peak


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and Waikato] at last’.90

The question remained: what action would Kingitanga and Ngati Maniapoto in general, and Mokau Maori more specifically, take in response to this blow? In July 1865, Tawhiao and Rewi and a party of Kingitanga leaders travelled to Mokau for discussions with the local people. The importance of this matter was indicated by the fact that Rewi and Tawhiao apparently demanded that major talks with the Crown over the possible end of all hostilities be delayed while they discussed what actions be taken regarding Pukearuhe. There is no clear evidence of what was decided but there are inferences that the King and Rewi tried to convince Mokau Maori not to attack the redoubt.91

If so, this caution by Kingitanga leaders was possibly because they hoped to regain the land by more peaceful means. But Maori hopes that the Crown would withdraw from Pukearuhe were soon dealt a shattering blow. On September 2 1865, all the land between Waitara to Parininihi was proclaimed confiscated. The northern part of the confiscated area (named the ‘Ngatiawa district’) had as its northern boundary the tunnel that the government had begun at Parininihi, (about 3 miles north of Pukearuhe) and stretched in a straight line for twenty miles, before heading southwest at a 39 degree angle.92 In short, all Ngati Maniapoto interests south of Parininihi had been summarily confiscated.

As O’Malley points out, we know very little about how the Crown came to define what land it would confiscate and why Parininihi was chosen as the northern-most point of the Taranaki confiscation area and not somewhere closer (or more distant) to the Mokau River.93 The Waitangi Tribunal in the Taranaki inquiry convincingly argued that the Crown simply took whatever area it felt was under its military control, without any considerations of Maori interests or tribal boundaries:

The evidence suggests that the Government simply defined an area, being all the land for several miles inland from the whole coasts, with the northern boundary fixed purely to accommodate a stockade at one frontier, the eastern boundary running as parallel to the coast as convenient trigonometrical lines allow, and the southern boundary being simply the most southerly point possible. The centre was taken for no greater reason, it seems, than it fell within those northern and southern extremities. In brief, the confiscation districts bore no relationship to the theatre of the ... war or to tribal aggregations according to appropriate geographical divisions.94

The same argument would seem to apply to the issue of why Parininihi was specified

90 ‘The Month’, Taranaki Herald, 6 May 1865, p7 91 ‘The Native Negotiations’, Evening Post, 5 July 1865, p2 which states Rewi and the King ‘have gone to Mokau to prevent their people fighting’ 92 ‘Order in Council’, The Taranaki Herald, 16 September 1865, p3 93 O’Malley, ‘War and Raupatu’, pp654 94 Waitangi Tribunal, The Taranaki Report, p128


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as the northern confiscation boundary and not the Pukearuhe redoubt three miles further south. The Crown believed that the redoubt gave it effective control up to Parininihi. The tunnel that the Crown had begun (but did not complete) at Te Horo near Parininihi served as a useful geographic marker for the Crown in marking out ‘its’ territory and its takings.

As will be discussed elsewhere, Mokau Maori would later protest bitterly not just about the confiscation in general but also that the area between Pukearuhe and Parininihi, including the Waipingau gully, had been taken, as it had particular strategic, political and cultural significance for them. However, until 1881, they were apparently unaware that the Crown had confiscated land north of the Pukearuhe redoubt given that the Crown in the immediate years did not survey the confiscation line or obviously assert its ‘ownership’ of the confiscated land.95 Instead, as evidence below indicates, Mokau Maori continued to occasionally occupy the Waipingau area despite the fact that it was officially confiscated by the Crown.

It was therefore the Pukearuhe redoubt that served as the practical manifestation and enabler of the confiscation. Its presence symbolised that Mokau stood under the shadows of Crown’s coercion and under the threat that the conquest could be expanded. As the historian James Cowan wrote, the Pukearuhe redoubt was more than just an impediment to the travel and trade of Mokau Maori, it was also ‘a continual source of annoyance’ as ‘it was regarded by them as a direct challenge’.96

Almost immediately after the announcement of the confiscation, there were reports that Rewi Maniapoto was considering an attack against the redoubt.97 Frequently harassed by local Maori, the Government troops were rarely allowed to venture far from the garrison as their commanders did not want to risk an open engagement. Mokau Maori continued to live at times near Waipingau (just a mile or so from the redoubt) and enjoy the ‘uninterrupted command of the [Parininihi] beach’.98

As long as Maori stayed out of the range of the redoubt’s rifles, and did not attempt any major actions or a mass crossing through to Taranaki, this standoff continued. However, on November 25, Maori moved closer to the redoubt and the Crown reacted violently. It is possible that this was part of a coordinated movement by ‘rebel’ groups, albeit with strong local components. Around this time, Maori ventured ‘to show themselves at several of the outposts between Taranaki and Wanganui, exchanging shots with the occupants of the redoubts, and rendering travelling from camp to camp exceedingly dangerous’.99

There are somewhat conflicting accounts of the most serious of the encounters at

95 I am referring here specifically to the Crown’s apparent failure to assert any control over the area north of the Pukearuhe redoubt 96 James Cowan, The New Zealand Wars: A History of the Maori Campaigns and the Pioneering Period, (Wellington: Government Printer, 1922-1923, 1983 reprint), vol 2, pp304, 307 97 O’Malley, ‘War and Raupatu’, p656 98 ‘White Cliffs’, Taranaki Herald, 10 Feb 1866, p3 99 ‘The West Coast’, Daily Southern Cross, 5 Dec 1865, p4


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Pukearuhe. It would seem that an armed party of Maori gathered at the beach in sight of the redoubt, some 500 yards away. Most remained under cover, although one, who appeared to be a Pai Marire priest ‘came out and began to circulate round a rock – instead of a pole in the usual Pai Marire fashion’. Another Maori (probably Te Roro) then stood up and was promptly shot dead by a member of the garrison. Shortly afterwards in reprisal, a group of military settlers gathering fern just outside the redoubt were fired upon by Maori. No-one was hurt. A more ‘sustained’ attack on the redoubt, carried out ‘with considerable vigour’ was then driven back by the military settlers. The only reported casualty was a military settler, who in order ‘to save his life’ jumped from a 150 feet high cliff into the river and broke both his legs, although ‘his life is not despaired of’.100

After the brief violence, the uneasy status quo returned. For a time, Maori camped at Waipingau but much to the frustration of settler newspapers, the troops did not attempt to engage them. There were some temporary reinforcements of the redoubt from a company of Bushrangers, but they did little except cut scrub before returning further south. Local hapu took care not to risk another conflagration.

In February 1866, the Crown decided to venture slightly further afield. Between January and February, Cameron’s replacement as head of the British troops, Major-General WCT Chute had devastated the southern Taranaki area, despite brave but decentralised resistance from local tribes.101 The success of his efforts emboldened Government troops to a somewhat less dramatic move further north. A party commanded by a Captain Page, and including a surveyor, a medical officer and 84 rank and file soldiers, was sent to Pukearuhe. Accompanied by a few of the troops permanently stationed there, they ventured warily out of the redoubt on a reconnaissance mission, declining to travel far toward Mokau. They encountered no Maori although they discovered some old Maori tracks.102 Around this time General Chute himself led a one-day expedition on the Ahuriri to view Tongaporutu and Mokau, seeing no pa and few Maori and declining to go ashore.103

These cautious moves nevertheless excited European hopes that the Crown was about to embark on a campaign in Mokau that would lead to a ‘speedy termination of the war’ through a:

series of rapid and well-directed blows from every quarter – rooting out the enemy from his lairs, and proving to the Maori that no position of theirs is safe from our assaults or able to withstand our arms when ably directed.104

The Pakeha interest in extending their control further into Mokau was as much based on the desire for colonisation and commerce as security concerns. The Taranaki Herald

100 ‘The West Coast’, Daily Southern Cross, 5 Dec 1865, p4 101 Belich, The New Zealand Wars, p208 102 ‘White Cliffs’, Taranaki Herald, 10 Feb 1866, p3 103 ‘War on the West Coast’, West Coast Times, 8 Feb 1866, p3 104 Ibid


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repeatedly called for further confiscation, a military settlement to be planted on the banks of the Mokau River and uninterrupted European possession of the entire area between there and Pukearuhe. It predicted this would come about ‘before we have done with Rewi and the Ngatimaniapoto’.105 This demand for more land reflected the complaints of the military settlers who were not being granted the areas south of Pukearuhe they had expected. Only a handful of military settlers were farming near Pukearuhe and the colonisation of the area was considered to be taking place at a pitiful pace. Further confiscation, it was claimed, would create more protection for northern Taranaki, punish the ‘still belligerent’ Mokau Maori and in general be of ‘almost incalculable benefit’ to the development of the province.106

It would also give control over the resources of Mokau, which were the subject of excited speculation from Government officials and European speculators. There was talk of the supposedly rich potential for petroleum off its coast, for clay and brick making, for gold, iron sand, and especially for coal.107 In 1866, the first definitive survey of the resources of North Taranaki was carried out by the colonial geologist James Hector. Forced to stop at Pukearuhe, he could only speculate that it was ‘very probable’ that Mokau had extensive coal, iron sand and other resources and to suggest that any investigation into the geology of the area would attract ‘great interest’.108

However, the Government did not want to risk any further large-scale conflict with Ngati Maniapoto and no efforts were made to extend the confiscation line. Nor was it able to venture into the Mokau to test the validity of these reports of its substantial resources. The Government’s highly fragile control ceased at Pukearuhe. The rest of the Mokau area was now generally recognised as beyond the aukati.

4.5 Mokau and the Aukati

Other reports will look more closely at the gradual formation during the 1860s of the aukati, the protective borders of what was increasingly termed Te Rohe Potae, the King Country or alternatives thereof. For our purposes, a few central – albeit complicated – points can be stressed. The Rohe Potae was the name later given to the vast area that constituted the King’s remaining territory. It was, in Belich’s words, a ‘state within a state’, where the Queen’s writ did not run. The territory it encompassed varied over time and, as Cathy Marr suggests, it was more a zone of influence than a precisely defined area bordered by clear lines on the ground. However, it gradually began to take on somewhat more defined boundaries, which encompassed around 22 percent of the North Island.109

105 Local and General News, Taranaki Herald, 3 Mar 1866, p3 106 ‘White Cliffs’, Taranaki Herald, 10 Mar 1866, p3 107 Editorial, Taranaki Herald, 3 March 1866, p2; ‘Local and General News’, Taranaki Herald, 7 Jul 1866, p3; ‘Petroleum in Taranaki, Taranaki Herald, 14 Jul 1866, p2; ‘Local and General News’, Taranaki Herald, 12 Jan 1867, p3; ‘Geology of Taranaki’, Taranaki Herald, 7 Dec 1867, p3; Editorial, Taranaki Herald, 19 Sep 1868, p2 108 ‘Geology of Taranaki’, Taranaki Herald, 7 Dec 1867, p3 and Barr, p9 109 Belich, Making Peoples, p263 and personal communication from Cathy Marr


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Mokau was at the aukati’s south-western tip. Pukearuhe, as the main pass from the south, symbolised for both Crown and Maori a sort of checkpoint. It was difficult, although not impossible, for Te Rohe Potae Maori to go south of Pukearuhe. It was highly unwise for the Crown to go north of it.

However the aukati was not an iron curtain. There are claims that during these years ‘Mokau Maori retreated behind’ the aukati to live in complete isolation, that Mokau was regarded as a ‘dangerous place for Pakeha’ and ‘remained closed to Europeans’ for many years.110

Such claims make too absolute a highly fluid situation and perhaps exaggerate the changes the aukati wrought. Even before the aukati was created, Mokau was not completely ‘open’ to Europeans and afterwards it was not completely ‘closed’. Arguably the aukati’s most notable effect in Mokau was that it symbolised the separation between Crown and local Maori. The Government was forced to recognise that it had no rights or influence inside the aukati.

Even before the war, and especially following the essential collapse of the land negotiations in 1855, the Crown played a minor practical role in the Mokau region. From 1865 it had virtually no role, at least north of the redoubt. Crown officials did make a few desultory efforts to try and gain some standing. In May 1866, it was reported that the Government had entered into land negotiations with a small number of Kawhia, Aotea and Raglan Maori. This raised Pakeha expectations that, among other areas, ‘all the land at Mokau will possibly be in the market’.111 Shortly afterwards, it was stated that it was ‘more than probable’ that a purchase of the ‘whole line of coast’ from Raglan to Mokau, including ‘two harbours and fine back country, containing much rich agricultural land’ would shortly be completed.112

However, such negotiations did not proceed very far while no attempt was made to take control of the land it claimed to have purchased in the 1850s. There were some suggestions that the Government should offer financial rewards to local Maori to allow the prospecting of their land for gold and other resources, but this too was soon abandoned.113

Mokau Maori were happy to keep the colonial Government at a distance. On the wider political front, Mokau Maori would seem to have been in harmony with overall Kingitanga and Ngati Maniapoto policies. There were, for instance, no separate attempts to warm up what was a decidedly cold peace through renewing ties or negotiations with the Government. Like Ngati Maniapoto as a whole, it would seem that Mokau Maori refused to accept the confiscation or to participate in its institutions, including the Taranaki Compensation Court.114 They remained, in the eyes of the

110 Stokes, p130, Barr p6 111 ‘Auckland’, Taranaki Herald, 5 May 1866, p5 112 ‘Auckland, Taranaki Herald, 2 June 1866, p6 113 Editorial, Taranaki Herald, 19 Sep 1868, p2 114 O’Malley, ‘War and Raupatu’, p637


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authorities, ‘unsurrendered rebels’.115

If the colonial Government was essentially absent beyond the aukati, this did not mean that all Europeans were unwelcome. Mokau may have been within the ‘King’s territory’, but it was local chiefs who retained considerable authority over what happened in, and who entered, their area. While any Europeans who came into the Mokau without permission from local hapu ran real risks, Mokau Maori, with Wetere prominent, continued to invite and incorporate individual Pakeha into their community.

Despite claims to the contrary, Mokau after the aukati had its attractions to Pakeha given its resources and because of the assistance and protection of local Maori. For instance, the brick-maker John Shore, who had moved to New Plymouth, maintained close ties with Wetere and others and continued to make visits to Mokau even ‘during war when it was not safe’.116 Mokau also attracted some Pakeha precisely because it was considered a place beyond European law. Renegade Pakeha came to the area, taking shelter from the colonial authorities and living among the local people and under the control of local chiefs.

For example, David Cockburn (also known as Rewi Coburn) deserted from the Pukearuhe garrison in 1865. According to some accounts, he was either kidnapped by or attracted to a local woman who offered him a basket of peaches. She was thereafter known as Kete Pititi (basket of peaches). According to claimant Wiki Henskes, he was ‘given several wives’ and had twenty five children, reputedly earning Cockburn the national title as the ‘most prodigious breeder’ among Pakeha Maori. His descendants are still prominent in many Mokau hapu.117

Living in the wider Mokau region for many years, Cockburn’s English became rusty. Although he later denied it, it was claimed he took a prominent part in the 1869 attack on the redoubt and his former comrades. Considered by some to be a ‘very firm friend’ and by others the taurekareka of Wetere, he was apparently well treated and mourned the chief’s death, despite some tension over their respective roles in the raid on the redoubt.118 Other European deserters from colonial troops lived and remained in the area, included one at Te Kawau, who was ‘practically a slave to his nominal master, an elderly chief’.119

Not all the Pakeha were fleeing the Government. In March 1866, four Europeans passed by the Pukearuhe redoubt on their way to Mokau. The government troops

115 O’Malley, ‘War and Raupatu’, p637 116 ‘Lease of Certain lands at Mokau’, AJHR, 1888, G-4C, p11 117 Evidence of Wiki Henskes, Te Rohe Potae – Nga Korero Tuku Iho O Te Rohe Potae 5th Oral traditions Hui, Maniaroa Marae, Mokau, final transcript, 6 December 2010, pp122 118 See Bentley, pp74-75, 136-137, Cowan, The New Zealand Wars, vol 2, pp126-127 and Belich, I Shall Not Die, p221. Also the evidence of Wiki Henskes, Te Rohe Potae – Nga Korero Tuku Iho O Te Rohe Potae 5th Oral traditions Hui, Maniaroa Marae, Mokau, final transcript, 6 December 2010, pp122. His name was also spelled Colburn or variants thereof. 119 Skinner, Reminiscences of a Taranaki Surveyor, p82


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made no efforts to prevent them from crossing over into ‘hostile territory’, and the Europeans apparently possessed transit passes from a senior Crown military figure. One of them, Jack Phillips, had lived in Mokau previously, and had ‘left behind a native woman and other properties, whom he now goes down to seek and repossess’.120 A member of his group sprained an ankle scrambling up the Pukearuhe path and was left at the redoubt to recover. When his mates were tardy at returning from Mokau to retrieve him, a Taranaki Herald correspondent assumed they would not be seen at the redoubt again ‘as they may have found congenial ties more agreeable than those that bound them to a civilised life’.121

Especially congenial to many Pakeha men were ‘the graces of the Maori females’. Just as had occurred in the 1840s and 1850s, Europeans were swiftly integrated into tribal society through marriage alliances. Wetere took a leading role in arranging these marriages and in protecting the Pakeha who lived under his patronage. Shortly after the arrival of the Phillips’ party, three Europeans set out to walk from New Plymouth to Alexandra. Although they tried to make clear their pacific intentions by carrying a white flag, they had not sought permission to cross the aukati. Only a few miles from Pukearuhe, Maori threatened to tomahawk them. However, Wetere reportedly placed the travellers’ hats on his head and indicated ‘that if a hair of their heads were injured he would have to take up the fight, as they came peaceably and unarmed’.

He then took custody of the Pakeha, escorting them to Mokau, where two of them remained and were speedily partnered with local women. The other wished to complete the intended journey, so Wetere lent him a horse and accompanied him on a three day ride to near Alexandra. The chief declined to enter the military camp there, instead depositing the Pakeha with a nearby settler, telling him ‘I have now delivered the man to you, and I have kept my word’.122 Wetere’s reputation among Europeans for ‘noble conduct’ was further enhanced when in 1865 he saved the life of military officer Charles Hutchinson who was attempting to deliver a proclamation to ‘insurgents’.123

If some Pakeha were allowed into the aukati, more Maori still went out of it. Despite considerable suffering and deprivation in the wake of the wars and confiscations, the iwi and hapu of Te Rohe Potae staged an impressive socio-economic recovery in the late 1860s. Crucial to the economic recovery was that King supporters frequently crossed the aukati to trade with pakeha, for instance at Alexandra.124

Even the so-called impenetrable blockade to the Taranaki, the Pukearuhe redoubt, was frequently breached, albeit in the interests of commerce and communication rather than conflict. Maori in small numbers were able to ‘creep past the post by the

120 ‘White Cliffs’, Taranaki Herald, 10 March 1866, p3. Other sources give his first name as Frank. His son Henry was involved in the Pukearuhe raid. 121 White Cliffs’, Taranaki Herald, 10 March 1866, p3 122 ‘Noble Conduct of a Maori Chief’, Taranaki Herald, 21 April 1866, p3 123 ‘Te Rerenga’, DNZB, 1993. pp525-526 124 O’Malley, ‘War and Raupatu’, pp197-199


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circuitous and difficult bush tracks’.125 At times, larger parties used the Waipingau gully as a thoroughfare. In December 1866, a party of 60 to 80 ‘Waikatos’ were reported to have travelled along the beach at Parininihi, turned up ‘the usual track’ at the Waipingau Gully, and travelled southwards. They were under orders from their leaders ‘not to interfere with pakehas ... if the pakeha did not interfere with them’.126

It is likely that the coastal shipping trade with New Plymouth, so prosperous during the first part of the war, declined. It would seem that at some point between 1865 and 1871, the Parininihi was seized by the Government because of the connections of Wetere and Mokau Maori with the Kingitanga, which if correct, must have been a considerable blow to the economy.127

However, trade with both Europeans and Maori in northern Taranaki was by early 1868 open and increasing and Mokau hapu were driving their pigs and cattle to market. The soldiers, under orders to avoid conflict except if attacked, watched as ‘the Maoris passed and re-passed in considerable bodies to and from the Mokau, by the easy road through Pukearuhe and by the beach’.128 Indeed, Mokau Maori began to freely trade with the redoubt itself. The contact was generally cordial although pleas from military settlers to be allowed reciprocal visits to the homes of Mokau Maori were not surprisingly rebuffed.129

European complaints of inequality began to be heard. How could it be that the ‘turbulent aboriginals at Mokau’ could freely sell their produce in Pakeha-controlled areas and ‘procure those articles which the white man alone can furnish’ while Europeans had no such pass into the aukati?130

However, Crown officials were most struck by the apparent stability of the situation. By 1868, after several years without fighting in the wider region, the Pukearuhe redoubt began to be seen as an unnecessary expense. Proposals were floated to withdraw the full garrison.

The changing responses to this proposal from the Taranaki Herald serve as a good example of how European views regarding Mokau were often simplistic and based more on strategic concerns than on informed assessment. Initially both its editorial stance and its correspondents were horrified. The newspaper demanded more confiscation, more military in the Mokau region, not less. It warned that the King Movement and local hapu remained a military threat, un-committed to peace with the Government and believed that Mokau was a gathering-point for Maori militants of all kinds:

125 ‘White Cliffs’, Taranaki Herald, 1 Feb 1868, p3 126 ‘Local and general news’, Taranaki Herald, 22 December 1866, p3 127 The decline in the trade is indicated that from around 1864 previously common newspaper reports of Mokau ships at New Plymouth shipping reports cease. ‘Mr Civil Commissioner Parris’ Visit to Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 13 May 1871, p2 mentions the seizing of the Parininihi. 128 ‘White Cliffs’, Taranaki Herald, 1 Feb 1868, p3 and Editorial, Taranaki Herald, 7 March 1868, p2 129 ‘White Cliffs’, Taranaki Herald, 1 Feb 1868, p3 130 Editorial, Taranaki Herald, 7 March 1868, p2


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At the Mokau the Maoris are known to be in force. There the King holds his mimic court, attended by Rewi and other potent chiefs – the notorious and blood stained Kereopa [wanted for the killing of the missionary Volkner] is there also; and dwelling in security on our very borders are these turbulent agencies for mischief who rally around them – the disaffected from all quarters.131

Mokau hapu, it was argued, had never ‘submitted to the Queen’s Government’ or accepted the ‘new order of things brought about’ by the war, especially confiscation. Without military strength at the redoubt, Mokau Maori may retake Pukearuhe and the confiscated land. Rather than retrenchment from Pukearuhe, the Taranaki Herald called for advancement, placing a military settlement at Mokau so that the business of colonising the north of Taranaki and the Poutama region could speed ahead.132

This opinion changed abruptly in mid-1868 when Titokowaru began to achieve stunning military successes in the south of Taranaki. The Government’s great fear was that the Kingitanga forces would back Titokowaru. However, in July 1868, Rewi reiterated the Kingitanga policy of ‘armed peace’. The movement would not intervene in the current fighting and Titokowaru would be left to his fate.133

This announcement and reports of positive talks between Crown officials and Kingitanga leaders convinced the Taranaki Herald to take up a markedly less belligerent stance towards Mokau. Belich has argued that the Pakeha ‘assault on Maori independence’ was balanced between ‘carrots’ – trying to seduce Maori with the rewards of good relations with the Government – and ‘coercive sticks’ such as war and confiscation. In mid 1868, the newspaper suddenly stopping advocating the ‘stick’ of armed redoubts in Mokau in favour of the ‘carrot’ of more trade and political authority for Maori.

All Government forces, it considered, could now be safely withdrawn from Pukearuhe. Although this would leave northern Taranaki ‘open to attack if the Mokau natives were aggressively inclined ... we are no longer apprehensive on that score’ as ‘the object of the King party is peace’. In this ‘new and hopeful phase of the King movement’, the newspaper pushed for some concession to the Maori desire for political authority such as the creation of ‘a Maori province or county, with a Maori Superintendent and a Council divested of legislative foundations’. Rather than extending European control in Poutama, Mokau and beyond through planting military outposts in advance positions to protect settlers, local Maori should be encouraged to open up the area through their own volition.134

Rewi had recently made clear that the King movement remained opposed to land

131 ‘White Cliffs’, Taranaki Herald, 1 Feb 1868, p3 132 ‘White Cliffs’, Taranaki Herald, 1 Feb 1868, p3 and Editorial, Taranaki Herald, 7 March 1868, p2 133 James Belich, I Shall Not Die, pp75-77 134 Editorial, Taranaki Herald, 22 Aug 1868, p2


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leasing, surveying, prospecting for gold, roads, and the Native Land Court.135 The paper believed that this stance could be undermined, gradually, but emphatically, through making Maori ‘alive to the advantages which would accrue to them in consequence of the discovery of gold on the native land, or its occupation by graziers and agriculturalists’. The promise of prosperity, not the threat of war would ‘utterly break down’ the ‘visionary scheme of Maori seclusion’.136

Crown officials were more ambivalent. The Pukearuhe redoubt would remain, but was often manned by only a shadow force of a handful of soldiers, with potential assistance from the few military settlers scattered around farms in northern Taranaki and a couple of Maori scouts. The prime motivation, it would seem, was to cut expenditure, rather than rebuild relations with Mokau Maori. It was believed that there was no danger of the redoubt being attacked. Within months, they were to be proved wrong.

4.6 The Pukearuhe Attack

The attack on the Pukearuhe redoubt is still an issue very much alive in claimant memories and traditions, as indicated by the different accounts heard at the fifth Te Rohe Potae oral traditions hui held at Maniaroa Marae in May 2010. It has also attracted considerable historical attention, the most evocatively written being by James Belich.137 Despite this, there is much we do not know about what happened and, equally as importantly, why it happened. The written evidence at least is full of gaps and contradictions. No Pakeha members of the redoubt’s garrison survived to give eyewitness accounts, no thorough investigation ever took place, and there is only very limited and conflicting written records recording the views of Maori who took part.

The basic details are clear enough. The Crown’s seizing of the crucial Pukearuhe area and stationing of soldiers was a source of much resentment. On 13 February 1869, Wetere and a group from Mokau, presumably acting out of both local concerns and as part of the Kingitanga, attacked the redoubt, killing seven Europeans.

The attack should not have been the complete surprise it was to the under-prepared garrison. Wetere, despite having friendly personal relations with the officer in charge of the redoubt, Lieutenant Bamber Gascoigne, had repeatedly warned the military settlers that their lives were in danger if they did not leave.138

In December 1868, William Searancke in Alexandra reported that there was talk that ‘the Ngatimaniapotos’ will ‘very likely’ attack the lightly defended Pukearuhe. However, given the lack of fighting in the area in recent years, neither the military settlers themselves, nor Robert Parris, the Taranaki Civil Commissioner, were unduly concerned about this report. Parris was confident that the two Maori scouts stationed at Pukearuhe would be able to ‘watch our frontier, and to guard against anything like a

135 Belich, I Shall Not Die, p76 136 Editorial, Taranaki Herald, 22 Aug 1868, p2 137 Belich, I Shall Not Die, pp221-228 138 AJHR, 1878, G-3, p59 and ‘The White Cliffs Massacre’, Taranaki Herald, 12 Aug 1882


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sudden surprise’.139 By January 1869, the scouts had been dismissed by the military settlers as an unnecessary expense.140

On February 13, Wetere and an armed party of around fifteen warriors, including Te Oro, Pene (Ben), Manuera (Manuel), Tukerau (Takirau), Tatana (Torton), Tanui, Herewini, and Haupoe set out to attack the redoubt. They were then joined by four Mokau Maori including Henry Phillips (also known as Henry Phillip or Henare Piripi), Titokarangi, Johnny Pihama and Richmond.141

According to Phillips, Wetere was blunt that the aim of the mission was ‘to kill the whole of the Europeans at Pukearuhe’.142 While most of the warriors and their firearms lay in hiding, Wetere, Phillips and five of the men made their way up to the redoubt. The only two military settlers present at the time – John Milne and Edward Richards – were well used to being visited by Mokau Maori offering pigs and peaches for sale. Unarmed, they left the redoubt to examine the produce but on their way down to the beach Tukerau suddenly struck and killed Richards with a taiaha. Milne met his end through a tomahawk wielded by Manuera and a taiaha by Pene.143

The entire taua then took possession of the redoubt. Shortly afterwards Lieutenant Gascoigne, along with his wife and three young children, returned from a morning walk. Gascoigne was killed first, before his five year old daughter Laura had the upper part of her head almost severed by a tomahawk. Annie Gascoigne and their other two children were killed as they attempted to hide.

As the taua were eating and dividing the plunder, they spied the Revered John Whiteley, who commonly visited the area to mission to both soldiers and Maori, on his way to the redoubt. He was shot dead. The taua killed the redoubt’s pets, and finished the looting, cutting off Annie Gascoigne’s finger to secure her wedding ring. Wetere took her husband’s revolver, watch and opera glasses. The other possessions were shared. The Gascoigne family was placed in a whare, lightly covered with earth, the others left where they were killed. The redoubt was then set on fire and the taua returned to Mokau.144

There would later be much discussion over who was directly responsible for killing the ‘non-combatants’, Reverend Whiteley and Mrs Gascoigne and her children. This issue remains a matter of considerable sensitivity for claimants. Tohe Rauputu informed the Waitangi Tribunal in 2010 that there are different traditions on who shot Whiteley. He was translated as saying that ‘it is widely thought and accepted that it was Te Rerenga

139 Searancke to Pollen, 1 Dec 1868 and Parris to Cooper, 14 Dec 1868, AJHR, 1869, A-13, pp21-22 140 Testimony of Tamati Makarati, ‘The Maori Rebellion’, Taranaki Herald, 27 Feb 1869, p2 141 See the 1882 accounts of Piripi and Wetere in Stokes, pp125-129. Also testimony of Tamati Makarati, ‘The Maori Rebellion’, Taranaki Herald, 27 Feb 1869, p2 142 Stokes, p127 143 The account until here is based on those parts of Phillip’s recorded statement that were not contradicted by Wetere. See also Belich, I Shall Not Die, pp226-227; Stokes, pp125-129 and Cowan, vol 2, esp. pp540—542 144 Belich, I Shall Not Die, pp226-227; Stokes, pp125-129 and Cowan, vol 2, esp. pp540-542


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[Wetere]’ but a family hui in 1957 had suggested that ‘it was a half caste’ who’s name was not specified ‘because the descendants of that man are still in the King Country’.145

The killings of the civilians horrified Pakeha and, it would seem, were widely regretted by Maori. The Court inquest immediately afterwards simply ruled that all seven victims were killed by ‘unknown natives’. However, Wetere was quickly identified by Government officials and the press as the leader of the raid and it was therefore assumed that he was directly involved in the killings and was culpable for what took place. For instance, a report by resident magistrate William Searancke shortly after the attack suggested that the ‘actual murderers’ were Henry Phillips, Herewini, Te Tana, and Wetere himself. Wetere was identified as having killed Reverend Whiteley.146 European newspapers mixed their condemnation of Wetere with expressions of surprise, given that he that had long been praised for his attitude towards Pakeha. As one reporter put it, Wetere was ‘about the last man I expected that would have acted in the barbarous manner he has done’.147

Wetere for his part never denied that he led the attack, which he presented as a legitimate military action, preceded by warnings and carried out on the orders of the King movement.148 However, neither he nor anyone else ever acknowledged involvement in the killing of the missionary, or Mrs Gascoigne and her children. After the initial flurry of speculation and calls for the punishment of Wetere, and Mokau Maori in general, the issue of direct responsibility faded from view. It was only raised again in earnest almost ten years later when Wetere was seeking to re-establish close ties with the Crown. Even then, most of the very limited and unsystematic ‘inquiry’ revolved around who killed Whiteley.

In June 1878, Wetere met with Governor Grey and others in Waitara for discussions about, among other issues, a possible running of the railway line through Mokau. Given that Wetere was now viewed as a crucial potential ally to the Crown, Government officials were inclined to let bygones be bygones and did not seek to raise, let alone threaten him over past events. However, newspaper reporters were fascinated by the issue. The New Zealand Herald correspondent repeated the earlier Government report identifying Wetere as one ‘the actual murderers’ and the shooter of Whiteley.

Someone – a government official perhaps – hastened to inform the correspondent that Wetere had tried to save, rather than kill the missionary. The reporter was inclined to believe this given that Wetere was a ‘fine looking, frank fellow’ who, most importantly, ‘has now come in, and is desirous of aiding in the opening of the Mokau’. Therefore, a corrective article was written the following day. It was apparently based on a discussion with Wetere although it featured no direct quotes and it is difficult to tell

145 Evidence of Tohe Raupatu, Te Rohe Potae Nga Korero Tuku Iho o Te Rohe Potae 5th Oral Traditions Hui, Maniaroa Marae, p 168-169, from translation 146 Searancke to Pollen, 4 March 1869, AJHR, 1869, A-10, pp11-12 147 ‘Wetere of Ngatimaniapoto the murderer’, Taranaki Herald, 6 March 1869, p3 148 I.e. Parris to McLean, 10 May 1871, AJHR, 1871, F-6B, pp15-16


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when it is paraphrasing Wetere and when the reporter has added his own comments. The article stated that ‘frequent warnings’ had been given to the settlers to leave Pukearuhe before the attack, and claimed that ‘the party went out to kill them’. However, Wetere denied ‘he was in any way responsible’ for the killing of Whiteley. Instead, he claimed to have tried to prevent Whiteley’s shooting, but was unable to as ‘the blood of the Maoris was up’. The journalist was not dismissive of Wetere’s account, stating that an ‘injustice’ should not be done to Wetere even though as far as ‘parliamentary papers are concerned, he is still set down as the actual murderer’ of Whiteley.149

Matters rested there until August 1882, when at the very height of Wetere’s importance to the Government, a relative of the Reverend Whiteley tried to have the chief arrested while visiting Wellington. At the same time telegrams claiming to be Wetere’s confession to killing the missionary, but apparently forged by Whiteley’s avenging grandson, were circulated.150 Wetere fled Wellington and returned to Mokau.151 He was assisted in his escape by Government officials and there is no evidence that the Government was ever interested in seeing Maori arrested for these killings, and risk upsetting the Kingitanga, Wetere or the many local Maori who became alarmed when hearing of his harassment in Wellington. (This incident will be discussed in more detail later in this report while Cathy Marr will analyse Wetere’s inclusion in a general Government amnesty shortly afterwards.)

Wanting to remove these threats to himself and his contact with Pakeha, Wetere then made a statement to Captain Messenger of the Armed Constabulary. The chief apparently intended it as a precursor to him visiting Wellington and offering evidence in a Court, providing that ‘the Government would hold him harmless’. Wetere discussed only Whiteley’s killing. He claimed that after others shot Whiteley’s horse, he pleaded with the missionary to flee. Whiteley refused, wanting to investigate ‘what bad work’ had been done. Finding he was ‘powerless to prevent the murder, Wetere then turned away in horror as others shots the missionary as ‘dead men tell no tales’. Wetere named the ‘whole party who fired’ as the army deserter David Cockburn, Henry Phillips, Pene [or Ben], Titokorangi ‘and other natives’.152

Not surprisingly, some of those identified by Wetere as the killers of Whiteley were alarmed at this development. Cockburn considered moving to the ‘interior’ while Phillips made a counter-statement recorded at Mokau by two settlers, John Shore and Thomas Atkin. In it, Phillips states that he, Titokorangi, Richmond and Johnny

149 AJHR, 1878, G-3, p58 re-printing New Zealand Herald articles of 20, 21 June 1878 150 See the extensive coverage in the Taranaki herald, 15-18 August 1882 and ‘Mr J Whiteley King and the White Cliffs massacre’, Taranaki Herald, 20 Sep 1882, p2 151 Note that while this seems to me the most likely chronology, there is some confusion about when Wetere’s statement to Messenger took place. The original account has not been located but Cowan, vol 2, p540 indicates it was in July 1882, i.e. before the attempted arrest of Wetere, but the context and my reconstruction through multiple newspaper accounts in the Taranaki Herald suggests it was actually afterwards. Note also that both Wetere and Phillip’s evidence are not direct quotes but instead statements written in English by the Pakeha witnesses. 152 Cowan, vol 2, pp540-542 and Stokes, pp125-126


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Pihama had no intention to attack the redoubt but were innocently returning from a trading visit when Wetere forced them against their will to accompany him to the redoubt. He identified Wetere as the driving force behind all the killings. Pene and Te Oro had killed Captain Gascoigne, while Manuera [Manuel] had killed the baby Louisa. According to his account, Te Oro and Manuera then pursued and tomahawked the rest of the Gascoigne family, before informing Wetere who exclaimed ‘ka pai’ at the news. Piripi claimed that Wetere then ordered the shooting of Whiteley, to prevent any witnesses, the shooting being carried out by Tanui, Te Oro, ‘Torton’ and Manuera.’

Put somewhat crudely, Wetere sought to shift the blame for Whiteley’s killing away from himself. Phillips had done the same thing. It is therefore hard – and perhaps pointless – to offer a conclusive opinion. It is probably better, as claimants at the oral traditions hui pointed out, to emphasise that there are many different accounts as to whether Wetere was directly involved in Whiteley’s killing or not, and to whether he took responsibility for it as a leader.

As we have seen, the question of individual responsibility for the killings was of limited interest to the Crown in 1869. The far more pressing concern was whether the Pukearuhe attack would signal the start of a general war by the Kingitanga against the Crown. Although Taranaki provincial authorities attempted to reassure panicked settlers that it ‘does not indicate any general rising of the King movement’, many were unconvinced.153 ‘No-one supposes that this will prove to be an isolated incident’ wrote the Taranaki Herald.154 Northern Taranaki settlers fled to Taranaki ‘in a great state of alarm’ while militia and volunteers hurried to Pukearuhe.155

Belich argues that the Pukearuhe attack was indeed intended as a ‘declaration of war’, and the start of a general uprising by Kingitanga leaders such as Wahanui and Tikaokao, with Wetere acting as their subordinate. The aim, he believes, was to break the movements’ neutrality and thrust it into a full-bodied support for Titokowaru’s fight against the Crown in Taranaki.156 Cathy Marr’s upcoming report will consider a somewhat different possibility, that the attack reflected a new Kingitanga policy on how to enforce the aukati.

However, the evidence is less emphatic as to whether King Tawhiao supported and consented to the attack. Shortly afterwards, Tawhiao was reported to have been angry at the killings, ‘they being committed in direct defiance of his wishes and authority’.157 It was also claimed that he disapproved in particular of the deaths of the civilians.158

At the Mokau oral traditions hui in May 2010, a number of claimants recited differing versions and understanding of a whakatauki or saying regarding the attack: ‘Kua mate i

153 ‘Massacre at the White Cliffs’, Taranaki Herald, 20 Feb 1869, p3 154 Quoted in Belich, I Shall Not Die, p228 155 ‘Massacre at the White Cliffs’, Taranaki Herald, 20 Feb 1869, p3 156 Belich, I Shall Not Die, p221 157 Searancke to Pollen, 27 Feb 1869, AJHR, 1869, A-10, p12 158 Belich, I Shall Not Die, p228


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au te kau momona o te tau, ko nga toto, kua pania ake ki te ra o Pareninihi’, which was translated as ‘I have killed the fattened cow and the blood I have daubed on the forehead of Pareninihi [Parininihi]’.159 Hinekahukura Aranui believed that Tawhiao made the statement after learning of the attack, and that its meaning was that the King was saddened by the news, that he took responsibility for the attack although he had not planned it, and that he sought a way to cleanse the transgression.160

However, in 1871 both Wetere and Wahanui claimed that Tawhiao had ordered the attack. Parris quoted Wetere as saying, ‘It was the King who said “rise and kill”, and Mr. Whiteley was slain; let that be upon him’.161 In 1871, a correspondent with the Taranaki Herald claimed after talking with Wetere that:

Notwithstanding the professions of sorrow which the King was said to express at the murders at the White Cliffs, it is now known he ordered them, and that he sent a packet of kokowai (war paint) to Tuiri, of Ohinemuri, who sent it back; it was then sent to Te Wahanui, whose Christian name is Reihana, who, in conjunction with Wetere, proved to be a more ready instrument in the hands of the double dealing chief of Waikato [Tawhiao].162

The ambivalence of the evidence suggests a main point: that there was considerable Kingitanga and Mokau Maori unease about the attack and a desire to distance themselves from the killings. There was also apparently opposition beforehand. Rewi is said to have led a large group that tried to prevent it and did succeed in stopping a simultaneous attack on Alexandra that had been launched by Wahanui. It was reported that Rewi led a large group of Ngati Maniapoto and Waikato who ‘divided into three parties of about 200 men in each party, by different routes, to intercept Reihana [Wahanui], and, if possible, stop Wetere and the party going to the White Cliffs. Unfortunately they were too late to do so’.163

Despite the uncertainty that surrounds these questions, it can be confidently said that the raid was carried out by Kingitanga supporters and leaders as part of a broader resistance to the Crown’s invasions and confiscation. It also reflected some very specific Mokau concerns. The evidence suggests that Mokau Maori were seeking to defend their lands from the Government and from the Government’s Maori allies.

This was expressed very clearly by Haumoana White to the Waitangi Tribunal in 2010. He believed attempts to label the affair as a ‘massacre and a murder’ were ‘Crown propaganda’. In his view, Poutama chiefs and others had successfully and legitimately

159 Evidence of Hinekahukura Aranui, Te Rohe Potae Nga Korero Tuku Iho o Te Rohe Potae 5th Oral Traditions Hui, Maniaroa Marae, and simultaneous translation, p129 160 Evidence of Hinekahukura Aranui, Te Rohe Potae Nga Korero Tuku Iho o Te Rohe Potae 5th Oral Traditions Hui, Maniaroa Marae, and simultaneous translation, p129 161 Parris to McLean, 5 May 1871, AJHR, 1871, F-6B, p12. See also Belich, I Shall Not Die, p222. 162 ‘Mr Civil Commissioner Parris’ Visit to Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 13 May 1871, p2 163 Searancke to Pollen, 4 March 1869, AJHR, 1869, A-10, p12. See also O’Malley, ‘War and Raupatu’, pp656-657


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defended Mokau from invasion and confiscation. Government troops, he stated, ‘were notorious for their holocaust and ethnic cleansing’ in Taranaki, something that local Maori were well aware of having fought in the region. Poutama rangatira, including Epiha, Te Oro, Takirau and Paneta were deeply disturbed by the Crown’s military presence at Pukearuhe and believed it would serve as the base for further confiscation and land grabs. With Tikaokao and Wetere, they ‘planned a raid on the Pukearuhe garrison to pre-empt an intrusion into the Poutama lands and further’.164

According to Haumoana White, the missionary Whiteley had been identified as part of the threat to Mokau lands. He described Whiteley as an ‘honorary land commissioner and a spy with the military’ who had come ‘to effect compulsory purchase of the Poutama whenua. Poutama rangatira burned the military garrison ... to prevent this’. He recounted claimant traditions that Whiteley had brought to Pukearuhe two saddle bags of coins to assist the Crown in its land ambitions. After he was killed, local Maori threw the money into the sea. According to this claimant, Whiteley was the fattened cow who had been killed and his blood daubed.165

That local Maori had some cause to suspect Whiteley is confirmed by other sources. The missionary indeed acted as an unsalaried Crown purchase officer and during the war sent military information to the Government. He became well-known as a vocal supporter of the Government’s military aims and as a critic of Pai Marire and the King movement.166

The Pukearuhe raid was also closely connected to the disputes between Mokau Maori and Taranaki Maori over rights to the Poutama region. We have seen that Pukearuhe stood on the very fault-line of these tensions. In the late 1840s and 1850s, Ngati Maniapoto hapu had, at least according to some accounts, claimed rights to land north of Waikaramuramu near Pukearuhe. However, tribal relations and ‘boundaries’ came under new tension in the late 1860s as greater numbers of Taranaki Maori returned to the area. There were increasing reports that they would attempt to settle around Pukearuhe and further north and that the Crown was aiding them in this ambition.

The process started in 1866, when it was reported that Ngati Tama and Ngati Mutunga and others in the Chatham Islands were ‘making active preparations for a speedy return to their original settlement, Mokau’.167 By 1868, the return was gathering pace, as were negotiations over where the returnees would live and on what basis. Although the chronology is unclear and the details disputed, it would seem that attempts by a Taranaki group led by Tamati Makarati to gain permission to settle north of Pukearuhe were rejected by Wetere and other Mokau chiefs. Many of the returnees therefore

164 Evidence of Haumoana White, Te Rohe Potae Nga Korero Tuku Iho o Te Rohe Potae 5th Oral Traditions Hui, Maniaroa Marae, pp174-180 165 Evidence of Haumoana White, Te Rohe Potae Nga Korero Tuku Iho o Te Rohe Potae 5th Oral Traditions Hui, Maniaroa Marae, p179 166 Belich, I Shall Not Die, p223 and Graham Brazendale, ‘John Whiteley’, DNZB, vol 2, pp590-591 167 ‘Local and General News’, Taranaki Herald, 10 Nov 1866, p3


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based themselves in the Mimi district, just south of Pukearuhe.168 Daily relations between them and Mokau Maori were said to be generally good, with considerable communication, commerce and inter-marriage. A crucial step towards reconciliation between the two peoples seemed to have been achieved in 1867. The Mokau chief Tikaokao sent his daughter ‘as a peace offering’ to Waitara to be married to Eruera, son of a prominent Taranaki leader Rawiri Rauponga.169 However, as Parris put it, the lurking problem remained that Ngati Tama ‘have been very desirous for a long time to repossess themselves of Poutama’.170

Making things more delicate still was that the Kingitanga and the Government were vying with each other for the allegiance and assistance of these returnees, with the Government in the ascendancy. Given that Tikaokao was a major Kingitanga leader, the marriage of his daughter to a Taranaki leader may well have been intended to help strengthen links between the two. Kingitanga movement leaders are also said to have approached Tamati Makarati, seeking the support of his group for the King Movement and offering them in return some rights north of Pukearuhe. Importantly perhaps, in light of later events, many Mokau and Poutama Maori, including Wetere were apparently strongly opposed to allowing this to occur.171

Although there are suggestions that some Ngati Tama on this basis did embrace alliance with the Kingitanga and return to Poutama, it would seem that Tamati Makarati and others believed that their aims would be more greatly advanced by establishing close ties with the Crown.172 Haumoana White believes they agreed to act as ‘kupapa scouts’ after the Government promised them the Poutama lands.173 No written evidence has been found regarding any explicit promise of land in return for support. However, it is clear that Robert Parris, the Civil Commissioner for Taranaki who played a key role in this affair, wanted to establish a buffer of ‘pro-Government’ Maori between Ngati Maniapoto and the Pakeha of Taranaki. It was he who enlisted Mimi and Urenui Maori to assist in the capture of Pukearuhe in 1865. Certainly some Europeans believed these ‘pro-Government’ Maori would live more permanently on the land. For instance, in 1865, the Taranaki Herald suggested that settling ‘friendly natives’ near the Pukearuhe redoubt would be an ‘effective check against any incursions of Ngatimaniapoto’ in north Taranaki.174

In 1868, the Taranaki Herald predicted that the return of ‘the natives so long resident at the Chatham Islands’ to their former homes would ensure that the Pukearuhe redoubt

168 ‘Waitaoro’, DNZB, 1993, vol 2, p561 and ‘The Maori Rebellion’, Taranaki Herald, 27 Feb 1869, p2 169 See for example, Parris to Native Minister, 19 May 1870, AJHR, 1870, A-16, pp20-21 170 Parris to McLean, 22 Nov 1871, AJHR, F-6B, p11 171 ‘Waitaoro’, DNZB, 1993, vol 2, p561 and ‘The Maori Rebellion’, Taranaki Herald, 27 Feb 1869, p2. See also Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, passim 172 See the discussion on this in section 7.2. It should be emphasised that all these events are highly complex and were subject to very different interpretations. 173 Evidence of Haumoana White, Te Rohe Potae Nga Korero Tuku Iho o Te Rohe Potae 5th Oral Traditions Hui, Maniaroa Marae, p179 174 Taranaki Herald, 22 Apr 1865 cited in O’Malley, ‘War and Raupatu’, p655


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worked as a barrier and surveillance point against the Kingitanga.175 In that year, Parris hired Tamati Makarati, ‘Epiha’ and ‘Watson’ to serve as Government scouts based at Pukearuhe, and to travel north to keep abreast of the situation.176

The Civil Commissioner believed that the support and presence of Ngati Tama was crucial to ensuring that northern Taranaki would not be attacked. When reports came in late 1868 of a planned attack on Pukearuhe, Parris rejected calls from military settlers for reinforcements as he believed ‘the Chatham Islanders are a great protection to us’. For Parris, they served another value, as a kind of human shield for the military settlers. He believed that Ngati Maniapoto would not want to risk damaging their improved relations with Taranaki Maori, including Ngati Tama, by launching an attack on the redoubt.177

However, by 1869, there were reports that Ngati Tama were about to settle on Poutama. It is likely that Wetere and Ngati Maniapoto attacked the Pukearuhe redoubt to assert that they, and not the Government or any other tribe held primary rights over the area. Certainly, Taranaki Maori understood the attack in this way. Almost immediately afterwards, it was reported that the ‘Chatham Island natives have been threatened by the Mokau Natives, so have left that district, and come this side of the Urenui’. Taranaki Maori gathered in mass at Te Whiti’s settlement at Parihaka to discuss events. Parris reported that:

the only conclusion they can arrive at is, that the take or cause of it is the return of the Ngatitamas from the Chatham Islands; and that the Pukearuhe massacre is intended by the Ngatimaniapotos as a declaration of their intention not to surrender Poutama to the Ngatitamas.

He continued:

It is difficult to explain why they should murder Europeans as a warning to the Ngatitamas not to occupy any part of Poutama, but that is the decision of the whole of the Ngatiawa and Taranaki tribes. It is true ... that the Ngatitama, although they had not as yet gone on to the land, were intending to do so, which Ngatimaniapoto had no doubt heard of.

Ngati Tama had apparently declared their intention to fight against Ngati Maniapoto and predicted a ‘reunion of the whole of the Ngatiawa tribes to defend their tribal rights’.178

4.6 The Aftermath

The Pukearuhe raid did not lead to war between Maori and Maori or between Maori

175 ‘White Cliffs’, Taranaki Herald, 1 Feb 1868, p3 176 Taranaki Herald, 27 Feb 1869, p2 177 Testimony of William Bazire Messenger, ‘The Maori Rebellion’, Taranaki Herald, 27 Feb 1869, p2. Also Parris to McLean, 19 May 1870, AJHR, 1870, A-16, pp20-21 178 Parris to Richmond, 4 March 1869, AJHR, 1869, A-10, p51


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and the Crown. No side had the strength or the stomach for another prolonged and costly conflict. If the Pukearuhe raid was, as Belich suggests, intended as the start of military alliance between Titokowaru’s forces and the Kingitanga, it was inopportunely timed. Titokowaru’s internal support suddenly collapsed and, with most of his warriors deserting him, any Kingitanga consideration of joining his fight was abandoned.

Shortly after the Pukearuhe attack, the King did detach 1300 warriors to various parts of his territory, including between 400 and 600 Ngati Maniapoto led by Tikaokao, Wahanui and Wetere to Mokau.179 Despite rumours that they would make a major push towards New Plymouth, their intention was defensive. Their role was to deter the Government invasion that many feared would inevitably follow the Pukearuhe killings.

In this they were successful. In March and April 1869, Taranaki settlers excitedly predicted that a major military campaign in the Mokau would be launched that would lead to the total and ‘speedy destruction of Te Wetere and his followers’.180 However, Government leaders, faced with the continuing strength of Ngati Maniapoto and the Kingitanga, were forced to curb their ‘rage’ and make do with a single symbolic act. On 9 April, Colonel Whitmore cruised up to the Mokau heads on a large steam ship, fired ‘four token shots’ and then promptly returned to New Plymouth.181

In the months after the destruction of the redoubt, Pukearuhe became a form of no-man’s land. Mokau Maori were rarely seen in the area, while most Taranaki Maori had moved southwards. The Crown also considered it sensible to move its troops and defences a little further south, especially to the Waiti redoubt, although it sent a small number of troops to Pukearuhe occasionally and hired some Taranaki Maori to patrol the area. In June, a party of these Taranaki Maori led by Ihaia made a raid five miles north of Pukearuhe. They burnt some whare but saw no opposing forces and returned to be reprimanded by the Government for their unauthorised expedition that could have provoked a breaking of the ceasefire.182

If the fighting was over for Mokau Maori, the ramifications of confiscation and conflict were not. Among these ramifications was that the attempts by many Mokau Maori to create a peaceful, beneficial relationship with the Crown lay in tatters. The following years would see some of the chiefs of the Mokau cautiously but determinedly attempt to rebuild that relationship. They would again face the central problem that the Crown was more interested in domination than partnership. In the coming decades, it would be the law and the political process, not invasions and armies, which would emerge as the real threat to the hapu of Mokau, and to their land.

179 Warnings were also issued to other tribes to stay out of the dispute. Belich, I Shall Not Die, p228 180 ‘The Mokau Campaign’, Taranaki Herald, 10 April 1869, p2 and 17 April 1869, p2 181 Belich, The New Zealand Wars, pp273-274 182 ‘Latest from Taranaki’, Daily Southern Cross, 22 July 1869, p5 and Taranaki Herald, 26 June 1869, p2

ATTEMPTS AT RECONCILIATION, 1870 TO 1875

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Chapter Five

Attempts at Reconciliation

1870 to 1875

5.1 Peace Without Reconciliation - Relations with the Crown

The early 1870s saw cautious but sustained attempts by Mokau Maori to re-establish stronger economic and strategic ties with the Crown, with Europeans and with their tribal neighbours. The importance of some improvement in these relations was readily apparent given the upheavals of the wars and the ramifications of the raid on the Pukearuhe redoubt. The plans to develop the local economy had largely stalled, while Crown troops remained worryingly close and in possession of Maori lands.1 Despite a tradition of seeking peaceful and positive links with the Crown and Europeans, Mokau Maori were now commonly considered ‘outcasts’ and rebels.2 There were still European fears that an attack on Taranaki could be launched from the Mokau and outrage over the attack on the redoubt. While the Government did not attempt to apprehend him or push further into the Mokau, Wetere and quite possibly a significant number of other Mokau Maori apparently took refuge for a brief period in the interior, perhaps at Mahoenui. It was during this time Wetere took the name Te Rerenga (the fugitive or escapee).3

Wetere and other Mokau Maori soon returned to the coast and sought to ease the tension with the Crown, while maintaining their demand that their authority over the region be recognised and respected. In the next few years, they sought to re-build relations with Crown officials as the first step towards necessary deeper reconciliation and agreement. They refused to accept the confiscation of their lands or to disavow their ongoing connections with the Kingitanga. Nevertheless, Mokau Maori sought to replace the distance and mistrust that had grown between them and the government with dialogue.

Crown officials largely ignored these opportunities for communication. They showed little interest in Mokau Maori except for one matter. The Government hoped that Mokau Maori would abandon the Kingitanga and swear fidelity and submission to the Crown. This policy of attempting to ‘detach’ tribes from the Kingitanga was particularly associated with Donald McLean, Native and Defence Minister from 1869 and his officials were on the constant look-out for divisions within the movement.4

1 Government troops were based in 1870 at Waiiti before also being garrisoned at Pukearuhe when the redoubt was rebuilt a few years later. 2 ‘Taranaki Native Matters’, Daily Southern Cross, 28 November 1870, p3 3 ‘Te Rerenga, Hone Wetere’, DNZB, 1993, vol 2, pp525-526; Parris to Native Minister, 19 May 1870, AJHR, 1870, A-16, pp20-21; ‘Taranaki Native Matters’, Daily Southern Cross, 28 Nov 1870 4 Personal communication from Cathy Marr. See Marr’s upcoming report for more on Crown policy in Te Rohe Potae during this period.


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Figure 9: Hone Wetere Te Rerenga with his wife (probably his second wife Te Ata Hoani) and son, circa 1885 (ATL, PAColl-7081-39) Increasingly, Europeans considered Mokau a potential weak point in the aukati and a possible launching pad for asserting Government control in the wider region. Mokau Maori were decreasingly seen as a military threat. Instead, their interest in trade and good relations with Europeans was consistently interpreted as signalling an imminent secession from the Kingitanga and/or the start of the radical transformation and colonisation of the area. This view, which would become something of a Pakeha obsession in the late 1870s, was in the earlier part of the decade essentially a fantasy.


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Local Maori remained in charge of the Mokau and closely involved with the Kingitanga. They were interested in a gradual improvement in their relations with the Crown and Europeans but certainly not submission. With little signs of turning its hopes into reality, Crown officials tended to think the best policy with regards to Mokau was to ignore it.

By late 1870, Wetere was sending Taranaki Civil Commissioner Robert Parris repeated invitations to visit Mokau alongside declarations of a desire for peace and good relations with the Government. He wrote to Parris:

I have done with this work, which has brought trouble upon me. It was the King who said, “Rise and kill”, and Mr. Whiteley was slain; let that be upon him. Now therefore, if Parris comes here, I shall return to my former work (allegiance to the Government).5

Parris initially shrugged off Wetere’s invitations until he saw the possibility of furthering the Crown’s wider strategic aims. In May 1871, after being informed that ‘a large gathering of the various Ngatimaniapoto chiefs’ including Rewi Maniapoto and Tawhana Tikaokao would be present, Parris, Member of the House for New Plymouth Thomas Kelly and a newspaper correspondent set off for Mokau. Parris’s aim was to investigate whether a ‘large section of the Ngatimaniapoto could be detached from the King party and establish friendly relations with the Government’ so that ‘a great step would be taken to secure the permanent peace of the North Island’.6 He was accompanied by around thirty Taranaki Maori, as Parris remained keen on settling pro-Government tribes in the Poutama region to bolster the security of north Taranaki settlers.7

Parris found the visit a great disappointment despite the clear desire of local Maori to move towards reconciliation. The visitors were escorted into the village with considerable ceremony but also by some firing of guns, which the newspaper correspondent very much hoped were shooting blanks. Enormous amounts of food ‘at least a fortnight’s supply’ and tobacco were offered to the guests although no handshakes or hongi were exchanged. For the around sixty Mokau Maori that had gathered, trust needed to be restored.

According to Parris, ‘the purport of all their speeches, except Wetere Te Kerei, was a friendly welcome’. Parris was convinced that Wetere’s intentions were peaceful. However, Wetere showed no signs of submission, blamed the Crown for the ongoing tensions and was clear that no European interference in the region was acceptable without Maori approval. Wetere impressed his European visitors with his ‘considerable talking powers’, ‘intelligent’ countenance and decent knowledge of English, but

5 Parris to McLean, 5 Jan 1871, AJHR, 1871, F-6B, p12 6 ‘Mr Civil Commissioner Parris’ Visit to Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 13 May 1871, p2 and Parris to McLean, 10 May 1871, AJHR, 1871, F-6B, pp16-17 7 ‘Mr Civil Commissioner Parris’ Visit to Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 13 May 1871, p2 and Parris to McLean, 10 May 1871, AJHR, 1871, F-6B, pp16-17


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dismayed them by making clear his allegiance to the Kingitanga and acceptance of their core policies.8 He was quoted as stating that the King:

says stop road making, telegraph wires, looking for gold, surveying land, &c. The governor continues to carry on those works, and Tawhiao gives instructions to stop them – this is the cause of all evil.

According to Wetere, full peace and partnership could still be achieved but it was dependent on the Governor returning all the confiscated lands as Rewi and the Kingitanga had recently demanded. It was the Crown’s ‘own work’, the infringing on Maori land and authority, that was the cause of the trouble throughout the North Island:

You only have to stop such works and there will be peace and the country and the people will be yours.

Wetere did not discuss or apologise for the raid on Pukearuhe, except to say that it was not the act of an individual but that of the King Movement. He condemned Government calls that he and others should be handed over to the authorities for murder. The Europeans were upset that many of those who had carried out the attack were present at the hui and reacted to the Crown officials with ‘indifference’ rather than ‘fear’.9 Wetere finished with the demand that Crown troops be removed from the region: ‘Send away the soldiers – what are you keeping them for’. If the Government would do these things, ‘everything will be settled’.10

Parris reacted dismissively, rebuking Wetere for his assertiveness:

it was not what I had expected from him, because he talked as a boasting man talks, instead of showing signs of repentance for his evil deeds.11

The Civil Commissioner stated that the confiscated land would not be returned as ‘you cannot exhume what has been buried and raise it to life again’, and asserted that the Government would position troops near Mokau as long as it saw fit. Road-making without Maori permission ‘will continue’.12 Frustrated that Rewi and Tikaokao had not yet arrived, and wishing to ‘avoid hasty friendly overtures from a lot of people who committed the massacre at the White Cliffs’, he decided to abruptly terminate the korero. His party simply stood up and left Mokau, ‘without shaking hands or doing anything else which would encourage them to come in amongst our settlers before the Government has sanctioned such a course.’ His sudden departure inspired his hosts to

8 Note that Cathy Marr’s upcoming report will discuss in more detail Kingitanga positions during this period. 9 ‘Mr Civil Commissioner Parris’ Visit to Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 13 May 1871, p2 10 ‘Mr Civil Commissioner Parris’ Visit to Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 13 May 1871, p2 and Parris to McLean, 10 May 1871, AJHR, 1871, F-6B, pp16-17 11 Parris to McLean, 10 May 1871, AJHR, 1871, F-6B, pp16-17 12 ‘Mr Civil Commissioner Parris’ Visit to Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 13 May 1871, p2


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cry out ‘“E horo pea he mataku” [“You have run away because you are afraid”]’.13

Despite his brutal cessation of the discussion, Parris emphasised to the Government that there were potential advantages in reaching ‘satisfactory terms’ with Mokau Maori. Disregarding Wetere’s words, Parris sensed that ‘there is a strong desire ... at present’ among Mokau Maori to secede from the ‘Tokangamutu league’ [the Kingitanga]. This, alongside the return of Taranaki Maori to the region, could make Mokau a buffer zone for the security of European Taranaki and ‘would be the most satisfactory arrangement that could be effected’.14

Within a year or two, the Crown’s security fears – that Mokau would be used as the springboard for an attack on New Plymouth and that Mokau Maori may take up arms against the soldiers and settlers of northern Taranaki – had largely dissipated. This was not because of any split in the Kingitanga but instead because it was increasingly clear that the New Zealand wars were over. Even when rumours were heard of possible violence in the Waikato, Mokau Maori were quick to assure the Government and Taranaki settlers that they had nothing to fear. For instance, after Timothy Sullivan was killed in Maungatautari in 1873, Mokau Maori sent letters to Parris in New Plymouth stating ‘that whatever may be the result of the Waikato affair, the Europeans need not fear that it will in any way affect this district’.15

Such reassurances were largely accepted and Crown officials no longer looked towards Mokau as a military threat. But if the government and Pakeha had security, they did not yet have dominance in Te Rohe Potae while hopes that Mokau Maori would secede from the King Movement consistently proved delusional. A ‘great meeting’ at Tokangamutu in September 1872 again asserted that Mokau remained solidly part of the territory of the King Movement.16 Mokau Maori continued to be involved in the Kingitanga and the Kingitanga involved in Mokau. Local hapu travelled to Tokangamutu and elsewhere for major hui while Tawhiao himself visited Mokau.17

Mokau remained an area in which European law had no sway while those who the Crown viewed as its ‘enemies’ had considerable influence. In 1872, Te Kooti took refuge from Crown pursuit in the Upper Mokau, where he busied himself planting and cultivating. Although Crown officials were confident that his desire was ‘to live at peace’, they viewed with unease his growing influence in the area.18 Te Whiti, the Taranaki prophet and opponent of confiscation, was likewise an important figure in

13 Parris to McLean, 10 May 1871, AJHR, 1871, F-6B, pp16-17 14 Parris to McLean, 10 May 1871, AJHR, 1871, F-6B, pp16-17 15 ‘Native Intelligence’, Taranaki Herald, 7 June 1873, p5 16 BJ Edwards to Lieu-Col Lyon, 26 Sep 1872, AJHR, 1872, F-3A, pp16-17 17 I.e. ‘Otorohanga’, Evening Post, 6 May 1873, p2 and Bush to Native Minister, 22 Nov 1873, AJHR, 1874, G-2B, pp6-7 18 Parris to Native Minister, 6 July 1872, AJHR, 1872, F-3, pp12-13; Mair to Native Minister, 12 June 1873, AJHR, 1873, G-1, p22; ‘Telegraphic News’, Wellington Independent’, 3 Sep 1872, p2


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the Mokau region.19

Therefore, the Crown continued to take a frosty attitude towards Mokau Maori. Parris was emphatic: until Mokau Maori showed more definite signs of breaking from the Kingitanga and submission to the Government, their efforts to put relations on a more positive footing should be rebuffed. In 1873, he acknowledged that since the attack on the redoubt, Mokau Maori have ‘been quieter, and seem disposed to be friendly’. Despite that, Parris recommended that ‘it is as well to leave them [Ngati Maniapoto at Mokau] to themselves’ until ‘they give us some substantial proof of their sincerity to become friendly’.20

The following year he reported a further ‘marked improvement’ in the attitude of Mokau Maori ‘so far as friendly relations may be called an improvement’. But Parris was uninterested in such matters. The more important question, he reiterated, remained whether Mokau Maori, and all those connected with Ngati Maniapoto and the Kingitanga would continue down the:

path of disaffected sullenness, or whether they will free themselves from the unhappy disillusion and return to their former allegiance to the Government.21

It is striking that in Government reports regarding Mokau during this period, virtually every discussion and every issue – be it trade, security, land issues, tribal relations – was analysed according to one over-riding concern: did it assist in the extension of Crown control over Mokau and more importantly the wider Rohe Potae. It is hard to discern in these documents a genuine concern for Mokau Maori or a serious analysis of what they wanted and needed. Rather, Crown officials tended to reduce Maori decisions and Maori debates into a Manichean choice between, in Parris’s words the ‘disaffected sullenness’ of the King Movement or ‘allegiance to the Government.’

Mokau Maori were trying to steer a far more subtle and constructive course. They occasionally looked to Crown officials to act as intermediaries and mediators between themselves and Pakeha.22 They wanted to explore the possibilities of increasing contact with the Crown and Europeans while remaining part of the wider Ngati Maniapoto and Kingitanga consensus on how much interaction was allowable. They were therefore unable to achieve any meaningful reconciliation with the Government during this period.

5.2 Negotiations with Taranaki Maori

Arguably more successful, at least initially, were inter-tribal negotiations. The dealings

19 Parris to Native Minister, 6 July 1872, AJHR, F-3, pp12-13. Judith Binney, Redemption Songs: A Life of Te Kooti Arikirangi Te Turuki (Auckland: Auckland University Press and Bridget Williams Books, 1995), pp270-272. Although Binney suggests Te Kooti remained in Mokau for a year, until May 1873, he continued to play a role in the area for quite some time afterwards 20 Report from Civil Commissioner Parris on Taranaki District, AJHR, 1873, G-1, pp14-15 21 Parris to Under Secretary, Native Department, 26 May 1874, AJHR, 1874, G-2, pp12-13 22 RM Harsant to Native Minister, 19 April 1875, AJHR, 1875, G-1, p7


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between Ngati Maniapoto and Kingitanga leaders with Ngati Tama and Taranaki iwi were so complex and disputed that they forced a degree of modesty on even the most over-confident of contemporary European ‘experts’. Despite his problematic legacy in the Mokau region, it is hard not to sympathise with Native Land Court judge Francis Dart Fenton’s bewilderment during the 1882 Native Land Court Mohakatino Parininihi claim. After hearing a raft of different versions over the negotiations of the late 1860s and early 1870s, Fenton commented that because of the:

remarkable conflict of evidence ... and the impossibility of acquiring a perfectly correct knowledge of the order in which events happen, and of their effect upon and relation to each other, it is impossible to determine with absolute certainty the amount of truth in all the statements made.23

However, because Crown-Maori relations in the Mokau cannot be completely divorced from inter-tribal issues, some tentative summarising efforts must be made. The key point is that after a series of hui with some Ngati Maniapoto and Kingitanga leaders, a group of Taranaki Maori had by around late 1870, received permission to return to what we may imprecisely call the Poutama region.24

The exact nature of the ‘agreement’ would later be vigorously disputed. During the 1882 Native Land Court hearings, Ngati Maniapoto witnesses presented a number of different interpretations, but their consistent emphasis was that Ngati Maniapoto chiefs had not given up their ultimate authority, their mana over the land. They argued that the Taranaki returnees were at most granted more limited rights of occupancy. They claimed that these rights were conditional on the returnees’ support of the King Movement. Taniora Wharau told the Court in 1882:

They have some of them returned to the land ... we said come under the mana of Ngatimaniapoto. They had no right to come: they came to join the King movement.25

Crown officials also reported in 1875 that Ngati Maniapoto believed that they had never ‘surrendered the “mana”, but only permitted occupancy by’ Ngati Tama.26 It may be worthwhile to speculate on what led to this apparent change of view by at least some Ngati Maniapoto and Kingitanga chiefs. We have seen evidence that around the time of the attack on Pukearuhe that there was considerable unease regarding any return of Taranaki Maori to Poutama. Much of this opposition apparently centred around the perception that Ngati Tama were trying to assert their control over the land, and that they were seeking to return without permission but instead in alliance with the Government. The raid and subsequent tension may well have spurred efforts to rearrange the relationship onto a better footing. Extensive inter-tribal negotiations and ceremonies of reconciliation took place and the Crown was removed from the

23 See Fenton’s final judgement of 20 June 1882, Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, p71 24 See also O’Malley, ‘War and Raupatu’, pp656-660 25 Evidence of Taniora Wharau, 6 June 1882, Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, pp3-4 26 Parris to Under Secretary, 25 May 1875, AJHR, 1875, G-1, p10


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process. An understanding, at least according to Ngati Maniapoto and Kingitanga perceptions was reached, that the returnees would not carry out unapproved actions such as attempting to sell or lease Poutama lands or allowing roads to be built.27

Not all the unease about a return had disappeared. Wetere apparently did not participate in this ‘agreement’ and remained highly determined to maintain authority in the area. He would later tell the Native Land Court that he had never allowed the full return of all land rights to Ngati Tama. Any who returned lived as ‘visitors’.

I said they [Ngati Tama returnees] might be under us. They might have expected to get back their land; but we should never have consented.28

It would seem that Ngati Tama understood the nature of their return somewhat differently, as indicated by Parris’s 1871 summary of their view:

the Northern tribes have consented to restore to the Ngatitama the long-disputed territory known by the name of Poutama, from which they were ejected many years ago ... The proposal emanated from Reihana Whakahoehoe [Wahanui] ... and was supported by Tawhiao. Rewi, and other chiefs, without enjoining any conditions more than a voluntary surrender of the land to the original owners; but Tikaokao (Tawhana) proposed that they should be united as one people, as a condition of the surrender of the land to Ngatitama.29

There would later be considerable disputes over what was, and was not agreed to during this period. Even in the early 1870s there are some signs of tension and different interpretations. Nevertheless, Ngati Tama and other Taranaki Maori gradually re-settled in Poutama and enjoyed generally good relations with Ngati Maniapoto hapu and leaders. Tupoki Te Herewini Ngapiko, for instance, apparently took a group of around 35 Ngati Tama returnees to Rapanui near Tongaporutu.30

While Maori considered that the Government had no say over these arrangements, Parris was concerned over the implications for the Crown’s wider strategic priorities. He began to fear that this return would indeed bring about an alliance between Ngati Tama and the Kingitanga, and that Ngati Tama would consequently cease to be ‘friendly’ to the Government’s cause. According to Parris, Ngati Tama had in late 1870 delayed their return to Poutama, as they were wary of the Government’s reaction. But by February 1871, he believed that events were moving beyond the Government’s control:

When the first overtures were made by Ngatimaniapoto to give

27 See O’Malley, ‘War and Raupatu’, pp656-660 for evidence of these negotiations 28 Evidence of Wetere te Rerenga Takerei, 6 June 1882, Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, p29. Also p26 for the statement that they lived as ‘visitors’ 29 Parris to McLean, 22 November 1870, AJHR¸ 1871, F-6B, p11 30 ‘Waitaoro’, DNZB, vol 2, 1993, pp561-562 and Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, pp40-41. Note that Wetere would later emphasise that few Ngati Tama returned and did so only for brief periods.


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back Poutama, the Ngatitama declared they would never settle north of the White Cliffs until the Northern tribes had made peace with the Government; but now they say that they are afraid that if they did not take possession and occupy it, the Ngatimaniapoto will consider the agreement void...31

Parris considered ‘it very difficult to foresee’ whether the return that was taking place would indeed see Ngati Tama ‘ally themselves to the King confederacy or will maintain allegiance to the Government’.32 Ever obsessed with the Kingitanga, he suggested that the ideal result would be if both Ngati Maniapoto and Ngati Tama hapu in Mokau divorced themselves from the King and reached ‘satisfactory terms’ with the Government.33

Regardless of these grand political considerations, the evidence suggests that daily relations between Mokau Maori and the recently returned groups were generally positive. Gift exchanges, intermarriage and shared trading enterprises suggest a degree of cooperation.34 Ngati Tama, for instance, frequently acted as intermediaries for Mokau Maori as they tried to rebuild relations with the Crown and in commercial efforts in Wellington, New Plymouth and elsewhere.35

In 1872, there was tension caused by the arrival of some Pakeha gold prospectors in the region. They were ordered from the region by both Tawhiao and Wetere, but before they left, entered into encouraging discussions with Ngati Tama and Ngati Mutunga. In retaliation, Te Wetere threatened to attack the Taranaki groups, enlisting the support of Te Kooti before being persuaded to desist by Tawhiao. Despite rumours that this incident could potentially destroy the agreement, a complete breakdown would not come for a number of years, if ever.36 Indeed, in 1873, Parris was reporting that Ngati Maniapoto hapu had very ‘friendly’ ties with Ngati Tama at Tongaporutu and frequently relied on them to pass on their letters and messages to Crown officials in New Plymouth.37 There was also important economic cooperation, for instance in tobacco trading and supply, and most profitably, in the timber trade that developed in Tongaporutu.38

5.3 Trade and Control

The Tongaporutu venture reflected the fact that the need to find new trading and economic opportunities was a central concern for Mokau chiefs such as Wetere during

31 Parris to McLean, 11 Feb 1871, AJHR, 1871, F-6B, p14 32 Ibid 33 Parris to McLean, 10 May 1871, AJHR, 1871, F-6B, p17 34 Parris to McLean, 10 Nov 1870, AJHR, 1870, F-6B, p10. Also Daily Southern Cross, 7 July 1875, p2 35 See for instance, Parris to McLean, 5 Jan 1871, AJHR, F-6B, p12; ‘Taranaki Matters’, Daily Southern Cross, 28 Nov 1870, p3; Taranaki Herald, 22 Oct 1873, p2 36 Binney, Redemption Songs, pp270-271, ‘New Plymouth’, Evening Post, 25 April 1872, p2, ‘Telegraphic News’, Wellington Independent, 12 Oct 1872, p2 37 Report from Parris on the Taranaki district, AJHR, 1873, G-1, pp14-15 38 ‘The Tongaporutu River’, Star, 24 Dec 1874, p2 and Evidence of Wetere te Rerenga Takerei, 8 June 1882, Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, p26


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these post-war years. By the end of the fighting, Mokau Maori had lost their prominent role in the coastal shipping trade. They were less than welcome in Pakeha ports and even if they were, they had no vessel as the Parininihi had been seized. As part of the efforts to protect their territory, Mokau Maori and the Kingitanga prohibited European ships from entering into the aukati.

Furthermore, the attack on the Pukearuhe redoubt led to a roughly two-year period in which the overland trade with both the Europeans and Maori of northern Taranaki was almost completely curtailed. When Parris and other Pakeha visited Mokau in early 1871, they were struck by the poverty and economic isolation of the area.39

Following that visit, Mokau Maori began to rebuild economic contact with Pakeha (and with Taranaki Maori), although, like many Kingitanga supporters, they proceeded cautiously and selectively. The tobacco trade was one of the big hopes of the early 1870s. Maori took pride in their locally-grown tobacco, providing it to guests to illustrate their mana and generosity.40 By July 1872, it was reported that hapu in the wider region were growing nearly all the tobacco they used and that ‘even Hauhaus’ were cultivating it in quantity. Mokau Maori were sending tobacco to New Plymouth, and – exhibiting an awareness of early advertising techniques – were providing newspapers with free samples. Initial European reviews were not uniformly positive, one critic writing that Mokau tobacco ‘more resembles smoking hay than anything else; and is quite as hot’.41 However, the following year, Wellington connoisseurs were pronouncing that they had received ‘an excellent sample of tobacco, cured at Mokau ... of extremely good, mild quality’. Tikaokao, the Mokau and Kingitanga leader, had sent the tobacco via Taranaki Maori, who used their kinfolk in Wellington to sell it to local Pakeha.42

Local hapu were also importing hop seeds, then cultivating and selling them to Europeans towns. In 1873, it was reported that Maori from near Mokau had sent six bags of hops to Ngaruawahia:

for which they received £15 and some odd shillings, being at the rate of half-a-crown a pound. They were so pleased with the result of their venture that they have promised to grow large quantities next year, and have desired Mr Innes to send to Auckland for better plants, as somebody has told them that a larger sort can be procured there. The natives who have grown the hops are Kingites, and we have little doubt they at least are somewhat convinced of the advantage of peace over disturbance.43

Although sending produce (or proxies) to European towns was easy enough, visiting in

39 Mr Civil Commissioner Parris’ Visit to Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 13 May 1871, p2 40 Mr Civil Commissioner Parris’ Visit to Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 13 May 1871, p2 41 Taranaki Herald, 24 July 1872, p2 and 22 Oct 1873, p2 42 Taranaki Herald, 22 Oct 1873, p2 43 Waikato Times, 7 Jun 1873, p2


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person the Pakeha settlements of Taranaki was more fraught given the hostility resulting from the Pukearuhe raid. By 1873, tensions were diminishing and Mokau Maori had resumed trips to New Plymouth, even if some of their ‘leading men are doubtful as to the proprietary’ of doing so.44 Contact would increase in the coming years, and in 1874 even the commander of the armed constabulary in the area was noting the improving relations with local Maori and their interest in trade.45

Local Maori were also willing to interact with Crown officials to help with their economic development. In 1875, they were using the Resident Magistrate in Raglan to purchase flour mills on their behalf, the fact that they were able to provide upfront the purchase price a suggestion that their trading ventures were having some positive outcomes.46

Mokau hapu, like many Kingitanga supporters, were therefore keen to do business outside of the aukati. More problematic – and potentially more lucrative – was permitting Europeans into their territory for larger-scale commercial deals. The greater advantages and threats of bringing Pakeha traders into the region meant that there is no evidence of a blanket policy either for or against such interaction. Instead, each case had to be considered on its own merit. The greater the potential contact, the more likely it was that a degree of approval would be required from Kingitanga and Ngati Maniapoto leaders as whole.

Pakeha gold exploration was a step too far during this period. The European mania for gold rushes briefly threatened to sweep up Mokau in the early 1870s following reports of findings near the Tuhua ranges. Although around fifty miles away, the Mokau and Tongaporutu Rivers were identified by European newspapers as the ‘nearest and most convenient point to the gold-field’ and the potential hub for roads, boats, produce and settlement that would flow from large-scale prospecting.47 There were also predictions that the Mokau region itself possessed large amounts of gold. These led to European hopes that the prospects of gold-fields would break Maori in Mokau and elsewhere away from ‘their late exclusive habits’ and lead to the ‘great opening up’ of the King’s territory.48

However, neither the Kingitanga nor Mokau Maori would consider allowing Pakeha into their territory without permission, and in the case of gold, without a more wide-ranging compact with the Government. Rewi was said to have visited Tuhua to examine the gold findings and to be refusing to allow ‘large numbers of Europeans into the district to work the newly-found treasure’ before a decision was made by

44 Report from Parris on Taranaki District, 30 April 1873, AJHR, 1873, G-1, pp14-15 45 ‘The Armed Constabulary’, Taranaki Herald, 15 Aug 1874, p3 46 RM Harsant to Native Minister, 19 April 1875, AJHR, G-1, p7. It is possible that Mokau Maori were also involved in gathering and shipping fungus out of Raglan. Bush to Native Minister, 5 May 1875, AJHR, G-1, p9 47 ‘Gold Discovery in the Tuhua Ranges’, Taranaki Herald, 1 May 1872, p2. Also Taranaki Herald, 11 May 1872, p2 48 Taranaki Herald, 11 May 1872, p2


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Tawhiao and the Kingitanga.49 Mokau Maori assisted by stopping any Pakeha who tried to jump the gun. On 25 April 1872, it was reported that European prospectors, apparently on their way to Tuhua, had ‘been turned back by the Mokau natives, who say they will not allow prospecting until the Government comes to terms with them’.50 Shortly afterwards, Wetere travelled to near Tuhua ‘to prevent Europeans proceeding there to dig’.51

Reports of gold findings near Tongaporutu brought the issue more close to home. Ngati Tama and Taranaki Maori had apparently found some gold and ‘intend to open the field’. As we have seen, this led to considerable tensions between them and Ngati Maniapoto and the Kingitanga. The Taranaki groups apparently requested permission from Tawhiao for European prospecting in the area. His refusal, and the ejection by Wetere from the area of some European gold prospectors, led to talk of a potential break between the King Movement and the recently returned Ngati Tama.52 There was no clear rupture at this point however, and no significant European gold prospecting in the Mokau region was allowed.

In 1874, the prospects of allowing European trading ships to come to the Mokau region as the start of business partnerships began to be seriously considered and debated by local Maori. Such interaction with Europeans had long been seen as crucial if Mokau Maori were to achieve economic development. During this period, Wetere voiced interest in rejoining the coastal shipping trade through building his own boat. However, access to the expensive new steamers that were increasingly central to trade required partnership with Europeans. It also required Maori control and consensus.

In 1874, some Mokau Maori travelled to New Plymouth to invite Europeans, including John Shore, their former partner in brick-making, to visit the area and discuss business prospects. Shore, accompanied by EM Smith visited Mokau in April. They encountered a friendly welcome and evidence of some economic improvement, including an ‘abundance’ of food’, new blankets and numerous pigs and pheasants. But what they were most interested in was the evidence of large supplies of coal and limestone up river, which local Maori escorted them to see. They returned to New Plymouth most satisfied with the visit, and stated that Wetere was on his way to consult with Tawhiao before he intended to ‘send a letter to town’ which would act as a passport for a boat to visit Mokau.53

Following such visits, comments from Pakeha began to circulate that the ‘Mokau natives are apparently getting tired of their isolation’ and were anxious to trade.54 More Europeans began to look towards the area and to present their trading ventures to the Government as an opportunity to pave the way for the eventual colonisation of the

49 ‘Gold Discovery’, Taranaki Herald, 11 May 1872, p6 50 ‘New Plymouth’, Evening Post, 25 Apr 1872, p2. See also Otago Witness, 25 May 1872, p16 51 ‘Gold Discovery’, Taranaki Herald, 11 May 1872, p6 52 ‘Telegrams’, Star, 12 Oct 1872, p2 53 ‘The Mokau Natives’, Taranaki Herald, 2 May 1874, p2 54 Ibid


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area. The Webster Brothers trading firm announced their intention to set up within six months a trading route between Waitara, Urenui and Mokau and suitable places in between. They applied for a £300 grant from the Taranaki Provincial Government to help fund the steam tug the Waitara so that they could ‘open up communication with Mokau as soon as possible’.55

Civil Commissioner Parris’s was sceptical that such contact would take place in Mokau while local Maori remained, as he saw it, trapped under the yoke of the Kingitanga. He acknowledged that:

Europeans are allowed to visit them [Mokau Maori], and have been received kindly and hospitably; but ... on returning have a tendency to mislead the public as regards the extent to which their friendship can be called into account in the way of exploring and developing the resources of this district, where it is known there is coal and limestone, but which will not be available to Europeans until the more important questions with which the Ngatimaniapoto and Waikato have for a long time been occupied with are disposed of, viz., whether their future line of conduct is to be disaffected sullenness, or whether they will free themselves from the unhappy disillusion, and return to their former allegiance to the Government.

Parris believed the hapu of Mokau wanted to resolve this great issue of ‘allegiance to the Crown’ but ‘feel that they themselves are not free to make choice until the question is disposed of at Tawhiao’s head-quarters.’56

Parris’ report and others similar to it reveal how many Pakeha, including Crown officials, understood economic contact between Maori and Pakeha. Trade was commonly seen as a first step, a lever towards European control of the wider Rohe Potae, not as a means of interacting with Maori on their own terms. It is telling of Crown attitudes towards Mokau that Parris rendered ‘trade with Europeans’ and ‘allegiance to the Government’ as interchangeable terms.

Local Maori, and the Kingitanga, understanding how uncontrolled economic interaction could indeed have unwanted consequences, proceeded slowly and deliberately. The Webster brothers requested permission from Wetere that their steamer, the Waitara, be allowed to visit the Mokau. It would seem that visits from steamers, which had greater power and capacity for trade, were viewed by some within the Kingitanga as a potentially significant new development that therefore required caution. After discussions between Wetere and Tawhiao, the request was declined for the time being. In June 1874, it was reported that ‘the Kingites had written to the Government refusing to allow vessels to enter Mokau’.57 Wetere then wrote to the Webster brothers. Translated, the letter stated:

55 ‘Provincial Council’, Taranaki Herald, 28 March 1874, p2 56 Parris to Under Secretary, Native Department, 26 May 1874, AJHR, 1874, G-2, pp12-13 57 Alexandra, Evening Post, 23 June 1874, p2


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It is not good; remain away. It is a bad year; don’t you two listen to the words of anyone, but listen to mine, don’t come.58

Mokau Maori were, however, well used to schooners and other sail boats and to contact with John Shore. In July, Shore made another overland visit to the area and received permission from Wetere for his party to return again with a trading vessel, providing it was not a steamer. It was also essential that the visit was strictly a private one, for Government ships were not welcome either in Mokau or in any of the ports of the aukati.59 Shortly afterwards, Shore, with his partner Smith and some other Pakeha, set out for Mokau on the ketch the Go Ahead. The visit attracted a large degree of settler comment including trepidation ‘that the boat would never be allowed to leave the Mokau again’ and its crew would meet a ghastly end. 60

However, the actual result of the visit reinforced the sense that Mokau chiefs were moving cautiously and gradually towards commercial contact, providing that it did not provoke dissension among their kinfolk. Before the boat entered, a ceremony to remove a tapu on the river was performed. Local Maori were at first suspicious as the flimsy and poorly crewed ketch had needed to be towed within two miles of Mokau by a steamer. After being reassured that this steamer was not a Government ship sent to assist the visit, Wetere and ‘a Waikato chief’ were among those who greeted the visitors with food and ‘every provision’ necessary for their comfort.

The Pakeha were then shown the timber and coal abutting the riverbanks. Mokau Maori expressed potential interest in arrangements to extract these resources but said that this would require more consideration and the sanction of the King, a consent they were confident of eventually receiving. They also required more time to determine to what degree the Mokau River would be open to Pakeha vessels. In the meantime, they happily traded with the Pakeha, including 25 pigs and a large amount of fungus. In return, they received European goods and technology, including, according to some reports, the most advanced equipment for distilling alcohol, destined for a Pakeha-Maori manufacturer operating out of the upper Mokau region. Local Maori wanted Shore or another Pakeha to start a store in the Mokau village and gave their permission for a future visit by a trading vessel, although they again insisted it not be a steamer. When a few local Maori said that they had no opposition to a steamer, Wetere ruled that ‘until the question was agreed to unanimously’, a steamer ‘should not come’.61

Wetere then wrote to Parris to ensure that the Government and Europeans more widely understood that his people would not be rushed. The key point he emphasised was that any ‘opening up’ of the area must come under his management and through Maori initiative and consensus, and not because of European pressure. He told Parris:

58 ‘The Proposed Visit to the Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 1 July 1874, p2 59 ‘The Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 11 July 1874, p2. Private communication from Cathy Marr that the ports of the aukati were generally closed to government ships. 60 Shore travelled overland, the rest by boat. 61 ‘On Thursday last ...’, ‘Taranaki Herald, 29 July 1874, p2


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Listen to what I say; do not agree to what others say, lest our district be disturbed. Stop allowing Europeans to come here; rather let them wait until I write to them, then it will be all right. Don’t you allow the Europeans to come here, but wait for my letter, then it will be all right.62

While trade in the Mokau River was therefore progressing slowly and carefully, local Maori were happy to see the start of a successful timber trading enterprise in the Tongaporutu River. By December 1874, the Webster brothers’ steamer, the Waitara, was regularly visiting Tongaporutu to pick up timber sleepers cut and split by Tamati Makarati’s Ngati Tama people.63

This was apparently a joint commercial enterprise between Ngati Tama and Ngati Maniapoto hapu, with Wetere taking a prominent role.64 The steamer moved between Waitara, Urenui and Tongaporutu, collecting timber, fungus and fish and other produce from Maori, and providing them with a wide range of cargo including flour, sugar, beer, axes, nails, pipes and crockery. Maori and Pakeha passengers also used the Waitara for transport.65 Despite the sometimes difficult access into the Tongaporutu, the trade was generally successful and popular with local Maori, who gained a reputation for assisting the crew of the steamer.66

The Tongaporutu trade served as an example of the far greater benefits that could potentially be achieved through allowing steamers and Pakeha to visit the larger Mokau River, with its coal and other resources. A series of hui and korero took place in 1875 as local Maori, discussed among other issues, the level and conditions of any future trade. In February, Wetere was in Tongaporutu to discuss with Taranaki tribes and the Webster brothers the successful opening of that river to trade. After many congratulatory speeches on their joint enterprise, there were general predictions that the Websters’ steamer would shortly be able to visit the Mokau with Wetere reportedly predicting that wider consent from ‘the natives inland’ was imminent for the Websters’ steamer.67

Wetere then left for the inland and a series of discussions with Kingitanga leaders about trade in the Mokau. In May 1875, it was reported that he had been successful. It was claimed that:

After a hard struggle on the part of Te Wetere, the King’s consent has been given to the opening of the Mokau River to traders, including sailing vessels, or boats. It is not desired that any white settlement shall be established, but there shall be

62 ‘The Late Visit to Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 1 Aug 1874, p2 63 ‘The Tongaporutu River’, Star, 24 December 1874, p2 64 Evidence of Wetere te Rerenga Takerei, 8 June 1882, Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, p26. Wetere claimed Tamati was a ‘Ngati Tama working for me’, and that he supplied Tamati with the sleepers and that Tamati ‘took half in return for his work’. 65 Taranaki Herald, 13 March 1875, p2, 10 April 1875, p2, 26 May 1875, p2 66 ‘The Tongaporutu River’, Star, 24 Dec 1874, 67 ‘Native Meeting at Tongaporutu’, Taranaki Herald, 24 Mar 1875, p2


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freedom in regard to trading.68

This general permission however was intended as merely the forerunner to further consultation between all involved groups, including the Crown. A major hui was planned for Tongaporutu in June where expected to attend were some of Tawhiao’s most senior advisers, as well as local Mokau and Ngati Maniapoto leaders. Wetere’s son and a ‘Waihi’ chief were sent down to New Plymouth to invite Parris and other Taranaki officials. Also coming were Ngati Tama and Taranaki Maori more generally from north of the Waitara.69 In total, between 1500 and 1800 Maori were expected and vast supplies were being shipped to Tongaporutu from Urenui in preparation for the long-planned hui.70

The hui was expected to discuss some of the most crucial issues involving the Mokau region. These included the search for an agreement over the extent and nature of Ngati Tama’s rights in Poutama. Broad discussions between Crown and Maori were planned. There were predictions that the hui would see the announcement of an agreement regarding the opening of the Mokau River to European trade, to start with a visit by the Webster brothers’ steamer. After the hui, it was envisioned that further meetings would take place between Maori and the Crown so that the Government was under no illusions about the limits and conditions of this contact:

Letters will then be sent [after the Tongaporutu meeting] in to the Government ... intimating the wishes of the natives, and appointing a time and place of meeting for the arrangement of conditions. The action of the Maoris is said to be quite voluntary, and will only be made known ... on the letters being bought in to town, and on which occasion a request will be made for a steamer to be taken up the Mokau with the party.71

Taranaki settlers were excited by the news of the meeting and responded with what would become something of a settler mantra: the Mokau and its rich resources were on the verge of being completely opened up to European control. Maori authority and limitations could easily be overcome. There would soon be ‘free and unrestrained’ access to the Mokau River and its coal. Pakeha newspapers considered ‘moonshine’ the talk of Maori opposition to European settlements in the area. The Crown’s purchases of the 1850s, abutted by navigable water and containing ‘vast deposits of coal, limestone, fireclay’ and other ‘minerals of commercial value’, would simply be occupied. ‘We have over 60,000 acres of land there open for settlement, which will have Europeans located on it by-and-by’.72 The Taranaki Provincial Government was therefore urged to send its most senior and skilful politicians to the upcoming hui.

68 ‘Proposed Opening Up of the Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 19 May 1875, p2 69 Ibid. See also Parris to Under Secretary, 25 May 1875, AJHR, 1875, G-1, p10 70 ‘Native Meeting at Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 9 Jun 1875, p2 71 ‘Proposed Opening of the Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 19 May 1875, p2. See also Parris to Under Secretary, 25 May 1875, AJHR, 1875, G-1, p10 72 Daily Southern Cross, 3 Jun 1875, p2


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Remarkably, considering the potential importance of the negotiations, and the fact that senior King leaders were attending, neither the colonial nor provincial government sent representatives to the hui which took place in Tongaporutu in early July. This possibly reflected a wider Government refusal to meet Kingitanga leaders at this time unless they abandoned their demands for the return of all confiscated lands.73 Whatever the cause, Mokau Maori were upset at this non-attendance (as were settlers) and it was reported that the discussions on ‘land and other questions’ were rendered ‘utterly useless’ as a result.74

Nevertheless, some important discussions did take place and it would seem the hui was widely attended by Maori, including by ‘leading chiefs’ such as Wetere, ‘Tatohana’ and Te Kooti. It is not clear what, if anything, was agreed about the extent of Ngati Tama’s rights in the Poutama region. However, it would seem that close contact, including trading deals between the two groups was still taking place, as illustrated by the fact that a large present ‘to the value of £500’ including ‘flour, sugar, blankets, wearing apparel, &c.’ was made by northern Taranaki hapu to Mokau Maori.75

There was general and apparently unanimously favourable talk regarding future European trade in the Mokau River. A Pakeha observer claimed that Te Kooti was ‘more in favour of trading than even the other chiefs. He is willing that both coal and gold should be worked ... Te Kooti now appears to be the best friend the pakeha has got, and has thrown in the weight of his influence on the side of opening the country generally.’76

Despite such Pakeha excitement, the Tongaporutu hui did not result in any grand ‘opening up’ of the Mokau. Rather, local Maori were taking more incremental, controlled steps. The Mokau chief Epiha Karora travelled to New Plymouth to inform Crown officials of the hui’s decision. The Websters’ steamer would be permitted to come to the Mokau River for a single trading visit as there ‘is plenty of produce in the river which the natives are anxious to sell or exchange for European wares’.77 Local Maori were also still seeking dialogue with the Crown, despite having been essentially rebuffed for their last five years in their attempts to talk. Epiha requested that the Government Native Officer be sent to Maori on the Websters’ steamer, and they also telegraphed Native Minister Donald McLean, stating that they wanted talks with the central Government about trade in the Mokau, and were upset that officials in Taranaki authorities had ignored them.

73 O’Malley, ‘War and Raupatu’, pp671-672 explains that in February 1875 McLean told Tawhiao and other Kingitanga leaders that their demand for the return of all confiscated lands was impossible. There does not appear to have been another high-level meeting for more than a year, raising the possibility that the no-show at Mokau was part of a wider Government reluctance at this time to meet those associated with the movement 74 ‘Rumoured Opening of the Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 30 Jun 1875, p2 75 Daily Southern Cross, 7 Jul 1875, p2 76 Daily Southern Cross, 3 Jun 1875, p2 77 Daily Southern Cross, 7 Jul 1875, p2 and ‘Rumoured Opening of the Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 30 Jun 1875, p2


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Overall, the early 1870s in the Mokau is perhaps best viewed as a recovery period following the wars of the 1860s. It also served as a lead-up to the late 1870s and early 1880s when Mokau Maori elevated their efforts to achieve productive ties with Europeans while safeguarding their lands and authority. It illustrated how local rangatira were required to balance a delicate range of considerations and relationships, not just with the Crown and Europeans, but with Maori kinfolk and rivals. These skills would be even more in need in the coming years.

THE AUKATI UNDER PRESSURE – 1876-1881

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Chapter Six

The Aukati Under Pressure

1876 to 1881

Pakeha had long seen trade and economic interaction in the Mokau as a first step in a chain that would inevitably lead to land transactions, the triumph of the Native Land Court, and ultimately to Crown control and colonisation. While this claim would prove to have a degree of validity, the process would take far longer and be far more difficult than most Europeans predicted.

The second half of the 1870s saw Maori efforts to positively engage with the Government and with European settlers and businessmen intensify. A small European settlement was created in the region, and there were some significant steps towards the creation of joint business ventures with Pakeha, including the start of a potentially profitable coal trade.

These developments directed the Government’s attention towards Mokau. Between 1877 and 1879, Premier George Grey and Native Minister John Sheehan identified Mokau as potentially a vital weak-point in the aukati. They dedicated a remarkable degree of resources and energy into ‘opening up’ the Mokau and expressed great confidence that these efforts would rapidly lead to the ‘breaking down of the border’ and the peaceful conquest by the Crown of the Rohe Potae.

Such confidence turned out to be misplaced. A few local chiefs, under considerable and often combined pressure from the Crown and European speculators, did tentatively consider land leases with Pakeha, Government surveys of their land and involvement with the Native Land Court. However, opposition to such steps generally remained too strong and Mokau remained an intrinsic part of a still intact aukati.

Certainly, this period did see some important changes in Mokau and in the aukati as a whole. Many rangatira were becoming convinced that interaction with Pakeha and the Crown would invariably grow. They sought to control and manage this interaction so that it helped rather than undermined their society and their authority. These years were therefore marked by negotiations, at both a Kingitanga level and more locally, with the Government on how this could be achieved.1

The failure of these negotiations prevented any radical change in this period. It is worth noting that a rather different impression was created by one of the major written sources for this period: settler newspapers. They tended to be convinced that major changes were afoot in Mokau, and that the Kingitanga was being irrevocably destroyed by dramatic splits. However, the reality was considerably more nuanced and slow moving. The multi-levelled system of decision-making (and delay) favoured debate, consultation and consensus rather than radical and unrepresentative action. In

1 Marr, The Alienation of Maori Land...Part one, pp8-9


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Mokau, the key overall questions, including whether the Native Land Court would be allowed into the aukati, remained unanswered. Crown pressure was, however, ensuring that these questions were being increasingly, and more urgently, asked.

6.1 Intensifying Efforts to Encourage Trade, 1876

As we have seen, European trading vessels were occasionally allowed into the Mokau River from 1875, albeit under strict conditions. Coastal hapu and rangatira took the lead role in seeking to increase these visits which they saw not only as business transactions but as the start of ongoing relationships.

In January 1876, the Webster brothers’ steamer the Waitara made another visit. Local Maori guided the ship into the Mokau River before escorting the Websters and their crew onshore via canoes. The visitors ‘were provided with food and ... shown over the place; and altogether were very hospitably treated. A general good-feeling seemed to be shown them by all the natives residing at the mouth of the river’. Fifteen or twenty local people then boarded the steamer, expressing ‘great surprise and pleasure at the steamer running so easily down their river’. The steamer then returned to Waitara after a twenty-four hour round trip, leading to European predictions that Mokau could soon be a place not just of much trade but also a ‘favourite resort for excursionists from New Plymouth’.2

But the prospect of Pakeha day-trippers did not please all hapu with connections to Mokau. There continued to be debates over the wisdom and frequency of interaction with Pakeha. In particular, inland and upriver groups demanded that their permission was needed for future visits by trading vessels. These debates regarding trade established what would be a common pattern during this period: one group would facilitate increased interaction with Europeans, which would inspire protests from others, followed by wider consultation and debate to try to come to an acceptable solution. It was reported that inland chiefs were greatly displeased at the Waitara’s latest visit as they feared that:

it was a movement of Europeans to create confusion and disturbance by hastily taking liberty to take a vessel by Mokau, but that if they consented it would be right.3

Following these protests, a massive hui took place in June 1876 at Mokau River attended by between 1200 and 1400 Maori and hosted by, among others, Wetere and Te Kooti. Relations with Ngati Tama and Taranaki Maori were further strengthened with extensive gifts offered by Ngati Maniapoto hapu. As we have seen, Taranaki Maori had earlier provided local Ngati Maniapoto leaders with gifts, which suggests that the custom of reciprocal gift-giving remained an important method in maintaining or re-instigating cordial relations between the two groups. Indeed, the scale of hospitality shown on this occasion led the Taranaki Herald to argue that the custom of

2 ‘Visit to the Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 2 Feb 1876, p2 3 ‘The Late Trip to the Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 19 Feb 1876, p2


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large-scale hui and provision of gifts was economically unsustainable. But local Maori saw the hui as serving another key purpose: the establishment of economic and personal ties with Pakeha. A number of settlers from New Plymouth and Urenui were invited. There was ‘great eagerness shown on the part of natives to trade with the white men. Purchases of wheat and pigs were made’. Upriver hapu were active participants in this trade, as indicated by the fact that they had brought around 100 high-quality pigs to the hui in one large canoe.

The general opinion of those at the hui was that more visits by European ships were both desirable and necessary, given that overland trade with New Plymouth and other Pakeha settlements was often restricted by the weather and lack of roads:

This is the reason why the natives are anxious about the opening up of the river to trading vessels. With regular communication they would get better prices for such commodities as they had to spare.4

Trade visits to the Mokau River were also increasingly uncontroversial among the leaders of the Kingitanga. Soon after this hui, Wetere met with King Tawhiao and, according to newspaper reports, formally ratified a previous agreement that Europeans may visit Mokau. They also apparently agreed that wider decisions regarding land and the future of the aukati should not be made locally, but rather take place only within the framework of a more general agreement between the Kingitanga and the Government. There were some hopes that this agreement would be reached in Waitara in December, when Tawhiao and a large number of Kingitanga supporters were expected to discuss with senior Government leaders, including Donald McLean, the critical ‘question of the relations between the pakeha and the natives’ in the aukati as a whole. In the meantime, no ‘land transactions of a permanent character will be entered into’ and the question of whether Pakeha could occupy land in the aukati would also be deferred.5

While other reports will look at the wider negotiations between Crown and Te Rohe Potae Maori in this period, the key point is that no understanding was reached during these years.6 In the absence of any overall agreement, local decisions and pressures would play a significant role in what was, and was not acceptable, in the aukati.

In Mokau, the most ultimately destructive pressure was inflicted by Joshua Jones. Jones, who would come to be widely known among Europeans as ‘Mokau’ Jones, would play a long, crucial and not altogether admirable role in the subsequent history of the district. This report will repeatedly return to his extraordinary personality and his determination to obtain legal title to vast areas of the district, regardless of the wishes of local Maori. It was the support that he received from the Government over more than three decades that, more than anything else, would undermine Maori

4 ‘Native Meeting at Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 3 Jun 1876, p2 5 ‘Rumoured Visit of Tawhiao’, Taranaki Herald, 30 Aug 1876, p2 6 See for instance Marr, ‘The Waimarino Purchase Report’, p99


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control of the Mokau.

However, his initial impact was less dramatic, although still significant. Jones was an Australian miner and speculator who arrived in New Zealand in 1876 and was ‘looking out for land’ and opportunities.7 In New Plymouth he met with John Shore, the former Mokau brick manufacturer and his son George, who were keen to return to Mokau and had contacted (or been contacted) by Wetere about possibly setting up a store there. In June, Jones, the two Shores, and another recent arrival from Australia, Robert McMillan, set off overland for Mokau to examine business and land prospects there. Their first visit was largely occupied by the establishment, or the in the case of the Shores, the reestablishment, of relations with local people and apparently ‘not a breath was said about any negotiations’.8

However, the Pakeha entrepreneurs were convinced that there was potential profit to be had from the area and especially from its coal, limestone and timber. The next contact came when a few Mokau chiefs, including Epiha Karoro, Te Oro, Takirau Watihi and Taiaroa met the men in New Plymouth.9 We will look below at the claims by Jones and his party that this meeting culminated in the signing of a lease to Mokau land. At this point, the relevant issue is that these chiefs invited the Pakeha to pay another visit to the Mokau, amid suggestions that they may be able to live in the region and be involved in business arrangements with local hapu.10

In August 1876, Jones, Shore and party returned to the Mokau. The nature of their visit suggested that they could bring many benefits to the region while respecting the rules of their hosts. The Pakeha had hired the steamer the Waitara for the occasion, a potent symbol of the promise of future improved communications. They brought with them many provisions for trade and gifts, including grass seed and other mechanisms of economic development. They were greeted with the customary feasting and generous hospitality. Wetere was absent, on the ‘mission to the Maori king’ mentioned above.11 It therefore fell to the ‘head chief present’, ‘Takerau’ (possibly Takirau Watihi) to remind the visitors of the twin messages that Mokau Maori generally delivered on such occasions: that the local people desired friendship but demanded authority. The chief:

did not fail to impress on his hearers with loud eloquence the importance of his powers, rights, titles, penalties, &c., his friendship for the pakehas and enjoining all his tribe accordingly.12

Some observers at the hui believed that the Pakeha had already been asked to ‘come

7 Evidence of Joshua Jones, 10 Aug 1888, ‘Lease of Certain lands at Mokau’, AJHR, 1888, G-4C, p34 8 Ibid, p34 9 Epiha Karoro is sometimes spelled Ephia Karora or variations thereof. Takirau Watihi may be the ‘Te Watihi’ involved in the 1850s negotiations over the Mokau block 10 Evidence of John Shore, 9 July 1888, ‘Lease of Certain lands at Mokau’, AJHR, 1888, G-4C, pp8-10 11 ‘Rumoured Visit of Tawhiao’, Taranaki Herald, 30 Aug 1876, p2 12 ‘Visit to the Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 30 Aug 1876, p2


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here and live’ and, in return, had brought the local people the steamer. In fact no final permission was granted.13 As always, acceptance took time, personal contact and considerable debate.

In October 1876, the ‘pioneer settlers’, as newspapers were rather prematurely referring to them, were again invited to visit on the Waitara. This time, the Pakeha were ordered by ‘Wetere and a number of king natives’ not to come ashore until the approximately 150 Maori gathered had discussed whether they would indeed be allowed to settle in the region. The korero took a considerable time, stretching into the next afternoon before ‘the king party, headed by Wetere, came to the conclusion that if the white man wanted to settle there he could’.14

It is perhaps indicative of how Wetere viewed his position in the relationship with these Europeans that he then took the helm of the Waitara and piloted the party upriver, barking commands to the Pakeha crew all the way. Jones and the others then returned to New Plymouth to prepare for their move to the Mokau. They pronounced themselves ‘well satisfied’ as did the Wanganui Chronicle which thought that wide-scale and profitable colonisation of the supposedly fertile Mokau had now been launched:

The Mokau bids fair ... speedily to offer a most attractive field for settlement and colonization. Few of the essential elements indispensable thereto seem to be wanting. Safe and navigable river communication, a fine climate, rich soil, friendly disposed aboriginals, and a large extent of level and fertile country.15

In reality, Mokau boasted none of these attributes, except perhaps ‘friendly disposed aboriginals’. However, European predictions of the inevitable success and expansion of settlements tended to be based more on faith than empirical evidence. As we have seen, a few Pakeha had been living quietly and under Maori control in the Mokau area throughout the period of the aukati. However, the settler press, and the Jones’ party themselves, presented this new enterprise as something quite different, as the heroic endeavour of pioneers to open up first the Mokau and then the entire aukati.16 The newspapers wished:

The enterprising pioneers every success, and trust to hear of the colonization scheme proving profitable to themselves and beneficial to the province and colony at large.17

It was thought that only ‘unforeseen contingencies’ could mar such a future. However, there were signs that not all local Maori were happy with the prospect of a European

13 Ibid 14 ‘Another trip to the Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 18 Oct 1876, p2. Note Wetere in 1888 and in a rather different context would say that Takirau took the lead in allowing them to settle and that he was not directly involved in the initial decision as ‘I was a Hauhau at that time’. Evidence of Wetere Te Rerenga, 21-23 July 1888, ‘Lease of Certain lands at Mokau’, AJHR, 1888, G-4C, pp8-10 15 Wanganui Chronicle and Patea-Rangitikei Advertiser, 17 Oct 1876, p2 16 See ‘Visit to the Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 30 Aug 1876, p2 for one of many examples 17 Wanganui Chronicle and Patea-Rangitikei Advertiser, 17 Oct 1876, p2


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settlement in the Mokau, and that this was also provoking opposition to trading visits. There were claims that the crew of the Waitara had been threatened with the forfeiture of their vessel if they returned.18 Furthermore, in November 1876, there were reports that a hui near Te Kuiti, attended by Tawhiao and his adviser Manuhiri, was considering what steps could be taken to ‘prevent the steamer returning again to the Mokau River, and to prevent or remove Europeans from settling there.19

Given this unease, Wetere decided caution was the wisest policy. European newspapers reported that Wetere, ‘lately regarded as the guide, counsellor, and friend of the Mokau pioneers, has for some reason veered round, and is now moving heaven and earth, and Tawhiao to prevent the return’ of the steamer the Waitara to the Mokau.20 The Taranaki Herald, which often accused Crown officials of deliberately hamstringing efforts by European settlers to force open the area, suspected the malevolent manoeuvrings of Government agents had led to Wetere’s change of mind. However, it is more likely that internal Maori debate and pressure was the key factor.

While the Jones party delayed their move, amid reports that ‘the Ngatimaniapoto’ will not allow the tangata hou or new people ‘to settle at the Mokau’ the Waitara was able to make a trading visit to Mokau in December. Treated with ‘much civility and hospitality’ from Wetere and his people, the steamer was also welcomed by a ‘large and influential party of natives from Te Kuiti’ who travelled on it.21 However, there were again reports that some Maori had threatened to burn the steamer if it returned. The key sponsors of these visits, including Epiha Karoro, angrily denied these reports or that there were any threats to continued and expanded trade.22

At the end of 1876, the Taranaki Herald reviewed what progress had been achieved in the bid to colonise Mokau and other ‘purely native districts’. It opined that great steps had been made given that ‘commerce is the best and cheapest civiliser’. In particular, Mokau Maori were showing a disposition towards trade that ‘bids fair to lead to closer relationship’ although efforts to ‘open up’ the region were ‘to some effect restrained by the jealously sown by the king natives of the Upper Mokau’.23 Put another way, there was increasing trade in the Mokau River, and some local Maori wanted the Jones party to be able to settle in the area. Everything else, including the terms on which they would live in Mokau, remained unclear.

6.2 Establishment of a Settlement and Claims of a Lease, 1877

It was not until July 1877 that the ‘pioneer settlers’ moved to Mokau. John and George Shore, plus McMillan brought their families, while Jones who was based in New Plymouth, visited occasionally. The overall indication is that they were welcomed by

18 ‘The Recent Trip to the Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 25 October 1876, p2 19 ‘Alexandra’, Evening Post, 1 Nov 1876, p2 20 Taranaki Herald, 11 Nov 1876, p2 21 ‘Waitara’, Taranaki Herald, 20 Dec 1876, p2 which mentions the ‘tangata hau’. 22 ‘False Statements ...’, Taranaki Herald, 30 Dec 1876, p2 23 Taranaki Herald, 30 Dec 1876, p2


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their local patrons and protectors but not by all Maori with connections to the region. At first, the decision by local hapu to allow them to settle on the southern banks of the Mokau Heads seemed well-founded. Their very arrival on a steamer suggested that they could bring multiple benefits to the area, including access to shipping. They brought with them a number of other visitors, both Maori and Pakeha, including a photographer to record the historic occasion. The ship was met by a ‘large concourse of Natives’ who:

vied with each other in welcoming the strangers. They helped to run the boat in, and exhibited every demonstration of joy at the news of their arrival. They told the captain of the steamer that the Mokau was henceforth open to them for ever.24

The early days of the little settlement resembled the type of integration of Europeans into local society that Mokau had previously witnessed. The newcomers bought pigs and cattle from local hapu and traded with them, as well as providing frequent gifts such as flour, rice, tea and clothes. They lived in houses built for them by the local people. John Shore opened a store and, like his son George, was said to have lived a Pakeha-Maori existence with close ties to the local people.25 McMillan brought cattle to the area and farmed, passing on to local people his skills in making cheese and butter. He and his family were said to be on particularly good terms with local hapu, and the ‘Natives repeatedly said ... that McMillan was a good man, because he was working and showing them what to do’.26 While the settlers, unlike their predecessors, did not marry into tribal society they did have close social and other ties. The sense of continuity and growth was boosted when the first European child was born in the district and by August 1877 McMillan was reporting that the settlers now numbered nineteen, ‘all well off and comfortable .... for the natives are most friendly to all there’.27

The early success of the settlement raised the possibility that more substantial opportunities for local Maori could follow. Although nothing firm had yet been decided, local chiefs were apparently weighing up the prospects of joint involvement in coal, timber and limestone extraction with the settlers. Jones, based at this stage in New Plymouth, was described to local leaders as ‘a first-rate pakeha’. On his visits to the Mokau, he presented himself as a man of wealth and power, able for instance to secure secondary education and jobs in the public service for the deserving sons of local chiefs.28 He did, as we shall see, indeed have close ties with many colonial leaders, which local Maori would seek to exploit in the following years.

Wetere was emphatic that the settlers were under his authority and protection and that reports of opposition and threats to them should be ignored. Shortly after their arrival a telegram to the central government was received from Waikato purporting to be a

24 ‘Auckland’, North Otago Times, 13 July 1877, p2 and ‘Commission of Enquiry’, Taranaki Herald, 2 Aug 1877, p2. See also Nelson Evening Mail, 9 Sep 1876, p2 25 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, pp11-12 26 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, p12, see also pp8-11, p34 27 Taranaki Herald, 2 Aug 1877, p2 and 12 Jan 1878, p2 28 New Zealander, 3 July 1878 in AJHR, 1878, G-3, pp54-55


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warning from Tawhiao that if the Mokau settlers:

will not move off at once they will be forcibly expelled by the Ngatimaniapotos, their goods taken, and their houses burned.29

Although the supporters of the settlement denounced the telegram as a hoax, the central Government felt it credible enough to caution local Europeans of the possibility of an attack. Wetere responded angrily, writing to the Native Minister that he, not the Government or anyone else, had the power to ‘settle matters regarding the Europeans being at Mokau’ and that the Government should consult only with him regarding the settlers.30

Despite such denials, it is possible that some chiefs, both in coastal Mokau and especially elsewhere, were uncomfortable with the creation of a small European settlement and especially its implications for the future of the aukati. But no attack came, and the settlers lived comfortably under the patronage of Wetere and the local people.

If the settlers’ presence was debated but tolerated, attempts by Pakeha in this period to gain legal title to land within the region ran the risk of provoking direct action. While land sales were legally and practically inconceivable in Mokau during this period, Jones and his party were from an early stage pressing for large-scale land leases, in the hope that these would gain legal standing once the land had been surveyed and put under the Native Land Court system. This placed them in conflict with overall Kingitanga policy which was built around a general opposition to land sales and leasing, and to not allowing the Native Land Court within its boundaries.31

It also thrust them into an uneasy position with their local patrons, who clearly wanted to encourage their presence in the area, but were hesitant about breaking the boycott on land transactions and the Court. Around August 1876, up to four Mokau Maori signed a document in Waitara with Jones and his party. While our knowledge of this no-longer extant document is limited, the Jones party claimed it was a 21 year exclusive lease to a significant amount of land.

The European ‘lessees’ named in the document were Jones, McMillan and John Shore plus possibly the sons of both Jones and Shore, as well as the dual descent interpreter George Stockman, and the ship-builder James Holmes.32 The land itself was apparently on the south bank of the Mokau River stretching eastwards from the sea although the specific area remains unclear and disputed. In 1888, McMillan recalled that the land was ‘supposed to be around forty thousand acres’ with a first option for land upriver if Maori agreed to lease. Jones claimed that the land extended even further east than the

29 Taranaki Herald, 25 July 1877, p2 30 Taranaki Herald, 28 Aug 1877, p2. Also ‘The Settlers at Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 14 Aug 1877, p3 31 See for instance Ward, A Show of Justice, (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1995 reprint), pp201-202 and Marr, ‘The Waimarino Purchase Report’, p82 32 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, pp.8, 10, 16. 21, 31-32, 34


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boundary of what would become the Mokau-Mohakatino block.33 There is no evidence of what money was expected to pass hands, although a later newspaper account suggested the payment for the first five years was nominal.34

This document was certainly not recognised by local Maori as giving the Europeans exclusive control over any land. Only a handful of Maori had signed the document or had even heard of it. One chief who did know of the negotiations and refused to participate was Wetere. This was because he shared in the general opposition to land transactions, or as he later explained it, ‘I was a Hauhau at that time’.35 Local hapu continued to use and control this land in largely the same manner as they had before the document’s signing. No surveys were carried out and there were no attempts made by the Europeans to assert control over the land.

Even the four local chiefs – Epiha Karoro, Takirau Watihi, Te Oro and Taiaroa – who signed the document do not seem to have considered it a final agreement involving exclusive control of the land. This is indicated by the fact that, three years later, the Jones group met with some of the same chiefs and tried to get a more binding confirmation of the supposed lease. The chiefs refused, insisting that wider negotiation and consultation would be needed for any agreement.36 There is no clear evidence what Epiha and others thought they were doing when they signed the 1876 document. We do not know if debt was factor, although it is worth noting that during this period, speculators, especially if, like Shore, they were also storekeepers, frequently took advantage of Maori indebtedness to gain signatures to land transactions.37 However, the key factor may well have been that Epiha and the others were seeking positive relationships with settlers. It is possible that they saw the document as a form of encouragement to Jones and the other Pakeha to come to the area and discuss land and other issues.

However, Jones and his party intended to use the document for quite different purposes, as a first step towards a 21 year lease (the maximum period for a lease of Maori land at this period). They may well have intended, as indeed would eventually happen with this Mokau land, of using a lease as a springboard towards purchase. This was such a common occurrence during this period that a Pakeha commentator informed the Government that ‘Native Leases are ... potent weapons by use of which the speculator sees his way to wrest the freehold before 21 years expire from the Native Landlords’.38 More fundamentally, Jones and his partners were following the common tactic of speculators of trying to get first claim on the land before other Europeans and the Crown arrived. They key to speculators making money in the type

33 Ibid, pp10, 21, 34 34 Taranaki Herald, 7 Jan 1879, p2 35 Ibid, p21 36 Evidence of Edward William Stockman, 13 July 1888, ‘Lease of Certain Lands at Mokau’, AJHR, 1888, G-4C, pp10-11 37 Waitangi Tribunal, Turanga Tangata Turanga Whenua: The Report on the Turanganui a Kiwa Claims, (Wellington: Legislation Direct, 2004), p483 38 Ibid, p483


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of land rush situation that Jones expected and hoped for, was usually to get in first.39

To achieve these aims, Jones and his partners adopted many of the techniques used elsewhere by speculators. Even before land went before the Court, speculators would frequently gain a ‘lease’ from a handful of Maori. That Jones and the others had the so-called lease witnessed by a New Plymouth lawyer, G Hamerton, was a clever but not infrequent method of grafting legal solemnity on to what was at this point a document without legal standing. The document was legally ‘void’ as the land in question was still in customary title and therefore could not be legally transacted. And, of course, Epiha and the others who signed the ‘lease’ were not the legal owners of the land.

Jones and his partners therefore faced the challenges of getting the land before the Court and having their ‘lease’ legally recognised. In the following years, Jones and his partners pressed the Government, the NLC and local Maori to have the land surveyed and Court hearings granted. The Jones party hoped that this would lead to the land being awarded to Epiha and to the others who had signed the ‘lease’ and were apparently aware that Maori who took the lead in applying for Crown grants were generally named by the Court as the primary legal ‘owners’.40 The Jones party therefore frequently forwarded applications from these ‘lessees’ for surveys and Court hearings. Once the barrier of Court hearings was crossed, the path towards having the lease recognised as legally valid was far from impossible.

Seeking legal title from an informal lease signed by a bare handful of local Maori was therefore a calculated risk that the speculators were willing to take. Although Jones was only recently arrived in New Zealand, he had done his research into the dark arts of land speculation in the colony. Before he signed the document, Jones had agreed with his partners and his solicitor Hamerton that with the expenditure of a little more time and money, that they would soon possess a legally recognised lease. According to Jones, the solicitor had advised him that the document:

was a title which I would find would come right eventually. I [Jones] said to Shore, ‘I want some understanding about this; how long will it take, and what amount of money will it require?’ He said it might take from two to three months to complete the thing, and it would take, perhaps, two or three hundred pounds in money.41

Another partner, the interpreter George Stockman, ‘was sure’ that they would gain legal title within six months. ‘On that understanding’, the speculators decided to sign the 1876 document and begin their attempts to obtain the land.42

For a long period they would be frustrated by resistance from Mokau hapu. Shortly

39 Thanks to Vincent O’Malley for suggesting this point. See John C. Weaver, The Great Land Rush and the Making of the Modern World, 1650-1900 (Quebec City: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003), pp63, 76 40 Waitangi Tribunal, Turanga Tangata Turanga Whenua, p417 41 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, p35 42 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, p35


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after the document was signed in 1876, Jones tried to have the land surveyed and put through the Court. However, he faced so much opposition from local Maori, that even the Government and his fellow lessees warned him off what they considered an impossible and dangerous endeavour. In September 1876, as news of the supposed lease began to be printed and praised in Pakeha newspapers, Rewi travelled to Mokau to investigate the matter.43 There were reports that many inland Maori were angry at the rumours of a lease and that major Kingitanga leaders were threatening to eject the settlers from Mokau if they tried to enforce it.44 As Jones himself acknowledged, it ‘was all Hauhauism at the time’.45

This is not to say that the boycott of the Native Land was not already under some threat in the Mokau region and indeed in the wider region. The Court and the land loss associated with it had, since around 1873, started to penetrate some of the vast areas that the Kingitanga considered their territory, including in the Thames and Coromandel areas. This was despite the widespread condemnation of the Court from inside and outside the Kingitanga as leading to the uncontrolled alienation of lands, and transforming customary and collective tenure into an alien and destructive form of title derived from the Crown.46 But it was no easy matter to avoid the Court. As discussed above, speculators had many methods to kick-start the Court process, and often entrapped through debt or enticement a handful of key figures to apply for a Court investigation.47

Maori were commonly told, both by the Crown and private parties, that the Court would allow them to gain legal control over their land and protect it from others. This, as we shall see, was a major concern for Mokau chiefs, given their delicate relationship with the Taranaki tribes in particular. Pre-emptive application was often considered the best form of defence because, as Cathy Marr points out, the Court generally favoured those who made the initial application and were therefore designated the prime claimant. Those who came later and were cross-claimants, or who did not participate in the process altogether, ran a great risk of being denied any legal link to the land.48

All these factors may have played a role in leading Epiha and Wetere in 1877 to apply for Court hearings in the Mokau region. In particular, the constant pressure from Jones, and the desire to have their role over the land legally recognised, would seem to have been paramount. In that year, Epiha deposited a rough, hand-written plan of land south of the Mokau River with Judge Fenton, apparently as part of an application for a Court hearing.49 By July, Wetere had written to Daniel Pollen, the Native Minister,

43 ‘Rewi’s Visit to the Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 16 Sep 1876, p2 44 ‘Alexandra’, Evening Post, 1 Nov 1876, p2 45 AJHR, 1888, G-4, p34 46 Marr, ‘The Waimarino Purchase Report’, pp39-43 47 Ibid 48 Personal communication from Cathy Marr. See also, Waitangi Tribunal, Turanga Tangata Turanga Whenua, p417 49 J Jones for John Shore, New Plymouth to Native Minister Sheehan, 7 April 1878, in Papers Relating to Land at Mokau, MA 23/6*7, Hannah Mokau Special File 124, ANZ Wgt


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requesting a Court hearing.50 These chiefs would not quickly give up on the belief that a Court hearing could be necessary to protect the land, and a business relationship with Jones the best way to strengthen their people. Nevertheless, both Epiha, and particularly Wetere declined to follow up on their initial moves towards the Court in the face of clear opposition from their people and senior tribal leaders.

Joshua Jones was less concerned by the issue of genuine consent or tribal unity. Basing himself in New Plymouth, he continuously lobbied the Government for a Court hearing. In July 1877, he wrote to the attorney general Frederick Whitaker and claimed that those at ‘Te Kuiti’ (presumably meaning the wider Kingitanga and Ngati Maniapoto) had said they would not stand in the way of a Court hearing at Mokau as the local ‘owners of the land could do, as they liked’.51

Jones’ efforts were unsuccessful. Government officials were only too well aware of the depth of resistance within the aukati to the Native Land Court. Any attempt to implement the Court in Mokau without the backing of senior leaders was deemed too dangerous. In particular, both Government and Court officials would consistently demand clear evidence of the approval of Rewi.52

Elsewhere in the country, the Government typically showed less reluctance about introducing its land tenure system and far less sensitivity to Maori opposition to the Court. However, Te Rohe Potae was a highly delicate area where Maori remained in control and opposition to the Court was particularly powerful. Strategy rather than a heavy hand was called for, especially as the Government was involved in crucial negotiations over the future of Te Rohe Potae as a whole. Officials evidently did not want to risk these negotiations by prematurely forcing a Court upon Mokau. The ‘opening up’ of Mokau was less important than the ‘opening up’ of the Rohe Potae and would not be allowed to impede this greater aim. This reinforces a major theme for this report as a whole: that the Government considered Mokau a stepping stone towards larger ambitions, more than a vital priority in itself.

Such caution was necessary for at both the regional and more local level there was powerful opposition to any Pakeha interference with Maori land. Jones was particularly troubled by the need to have some form of survey carried out in order for title to be granted to the land. However, surveys provided a prime opportunity for opponents to disrupt matters. During this period, Jones regularly visited the Mokau in failed attempts to find some local acquiescence for a survey of the area he claimed to have leased. His willingness to continue to push the matter in the face of such clear local opposition alarmed his fellow Pakeha ‘lessees’. McMillan and the Shores, while desiring legal standing for their claimed lease, lived on the land with their families and were under no doubt of the depth of hostility to any survey, especially from upriver hapu.

50 J Jones, New Plymouth, to Hon F. Whitaker, 9 July 1877, in Papers Relating to Land at Mokau, MA 23/6*7, Hannah Mokau Special File 124 51 J Jones, New Plymouth, to Hon F. Whitaker, 9 July 1877, in Papers Relating to Land at Mokau, MA 23/6*7, Hannah Mokau Special File 124 52 ‘Visit of Sir George Grey’, Taranaki Herald, 12 Feb 1878, p2


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McMillan later testified that the visits of Jones ‘always ended in a squabble with us or the Natives’:

The principal cause of the trouble was that Jones was pushing to get the survey made, which we knew the upper river Natives would not allow, and that it would be dangerous to attempt it. The Natives at Mokau heads told us that if a survey was attempted the upper river Natives would most likely come and turn us all off. After Jones’s visit it often took us two or three weeks to pacify the Natives, who used to get much excited about it.53

Despite such problems, settler newspapers felt the very existence of a few Pakeha in the Mokau was a major blow to the existence of the aukati. The Taranaki Herald trumpeted that Tawhiao was now surrounded by ‘European settlement close up to the confiscation line in the Waikato, with settlement extending into and from the east, and from the southeast by way of Lake Taupo, and with the formation of European settlement in the Mokau district.’54 What was now needed was the more active involvement of the Government, to give ‘every encouragement’ to the settlers, and bring the Court and far greater number of Pakeha to ‘one of the finest districts in New Zealand’.55 The Wanganui Chronicle agreed that it was a political and economic priority that ‘the Mokau should become a European district’.56 The Crown should move towards placing large numbers of settlers on the ‘magnificent’ land ‘purchased’ in the 1850s while acting judiciously and honourably towards Maori as ‘[w]e do not want any native complications’ in an area destined to flourish.57

Such expressions, while commonplace in the press, had hitherto failed to stir much of a response from Crown officials. Some Government officials had encouraged Jones’ party through vague statements that they would like to see the Mokau district ‘peaceably opened’ to Europeans.58 However, the Government had, to this point, shown little interest in Jones’ endeavours to have a Court sit in Mokau and have his claims to a lease legally recognised. In a characteristically wild claim, Jones alleged that this lack of assistance stemmed from a conspiracy between corrupt politicians and the Taranaki settler elite, who had their own designs on the area and viewed his party as competitors and ‘poachers upon their preserves’.59 The intermingling of profit and politics was certainly not unknown in nineteenth century New Zealand. But a more convincing explanation was that Crown officials had a realistic understanding, born from hard experience, of the continuing strength of Rohe Potae hapu and iwi and of their leadership. They understood that the demand for authority and the opposition to

53 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, p10 54 ‘Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 18 Aug 1877, p2 55 Taranaki Herald, 10 Sep 1877, p2 56 Wanganui Chronicle and Patea-Rangitikei Advertiser, 22 Aug 1877, p2 57 Wanganui Chronicle and Patea-Rangitikei Advertiser, 22 Aug 1877, p2 58 Petition of Joshua Jones to Parliament, 11 June 1885, in LE 1, Box235*, 1885/9, Papers Attached to Public Petitions Committee into Joshua Jones Petition 17/1885, pp1-2, ANZ Wgt 59 AJHR, 1878, G-3, pp54-55


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the land court and to land transactions remained powerful. In areas outside the heartland of the Kingitanga, the Government could afford to be more aggressive. But Mokau was clearly within the aukati. The Government therefore trod warily.

6.3 Grey and Sheehan Turn Towards the Mokau, September 1877 to October 1879

Government policy towards Mokau would change with the accession of George Grey to the premiership in October 1877. After largely ignoring the area, Mokau suddenly became an area of disproportionate Crown interest. This change reflected the wider aims of the Grey’s administration. It is beyond the scope of the report to discuss this policy except in brief. Put simply, the Grey administration made a series of failed attempts to negotiate an agreement with the leaders of the Rohe Potae.60 While the Government sought some form of reconciliation with the Kingitanga, more fundamentally its policy aimed to undermine it, and to pave the way for its central aims of large-scale settlement and land alienation, the dominance of Pakeha law and rule, and the establishment of a main trunk railway line through the district.

Grey and his Native Minister, John Sheehan increasingly saw Mokau as a crucial step forward towards these wider goals. The main attraction of Mokau was the enthusiasm of local leaders for European trade and settlements, and for positive ties with the Government. Moreover, some had shown tentative interest in having a Court sit in the area. Grey and Sheehan tried to turn this tentative interest into a reality. Once the Native Land Court had sat in Mokau, it was believed, other parts of the Rohe Potae would follow. Particularly crucial in this was the permission of Rewi, both for ensuring that the Court could take place in Mokau without overpowering resistance, and also in bringing about wider divisions among the tribes and leaders of the Kingitanga leadership. Mokau, it was hoped, could be the start of a major crack in the aukati.

The Crown therefore was playing for high stakes in the Mokau, especially as it was considered the most likely route for the main trunk railway line.61 To forward their goals, the Government used a combination of promises and pressures. Much as he had done when trying to purchase land in the Mokau in the 1850s, Grey established personal relations with chiefs and sought to convince them of the Government’s benevolent intentions and beneficial capabilities. The Government entered into negotiations, promised Mokau Maori further settlement and assistance, and poured money into the area to encourage local trade. Native Department expenditure was disproportionately directed towards the Mokau.62

60 Marr, ‘The Waimarino Purchase Report’, p29. See also Ann R Parsonson, ‘Te Mana o te Kingitanga Maori: A Study of Waikato-Ngatimaniapoto Relations during the struggle for the King Country, 1878-1884’, MA thesis, University of Canterbury, 1972 especially chapter 2. 61 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (NZPD), 1875, vol 17, pp314-315 62 For instance, the Native Department expenditure for the Taranaki district between June 30 and September 30 1879 was dominated by £1018 4 shillings spent on the Hannah Mokau and £250 paid to Joshua Jones, plus lesser payments to Wetere and to the Webster brothers. ‘Expenditure on Natives’, Taranaki Herald, 13 Jan 1880, p2


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At the same time, Grey and Sheehan were not above underhand tactics, including the employment of Joshua Jones as its ‘secret agent’ in the area. In particular, they sought to encourage and assist Jones’ dubious land claims and his efforts to bring the Court into the region.

Despite the Grey Government’s years of effort and quite considerable expenditure, its successes in the Mokau were reasonably minor. The Court did not sit and Jones and his party were little closer towards gaining legal control over Maori land. Local Maori certainly welcomed the opportunity to negotiate with the Government and rebuild relations damaged by the years of conflict, confiscation and then neglect. But more radical steps, they insisted, would require greater trust and more guarantees. Most importantly, local leaders stressed that they would not step outside of the wider tribal consensus. Mokau, despite the Crown’s efforts, could not easily be split off from the rest of Ngati Maniapoto or from the aukati.

George Grey was an early supporter of the efforts of Jones and his partners to gain land in the Mokau, although he remained realistic of the challenges they faced. Jones had approached the then Superintendent of Auckland Province in 1876. Despite receiving various assistance, the support was tempered by the cautionary advice not to take ‘our families to Mokau until we were conversant with the feelings and temper of the Natives’.63

As Premier, Grey would frequently entertain claims from Jones that a Land Court could be successfully introduced into the Mokau, and just as frequently be forced to concede that Maori resistance remained too strong. In November 1877, Grey received a telegraph, apparently sent by Jones on behalf of Wetere, that ‘Mokau natives want a Land Court held here’. He replied that Native Minister Sheehan would be instructed ‘at once to consider the question’.64 After some contemplation, Sheehan, like his predecessor Pollen, rejected the application as too risky without the guaranteed support of the wider leadership, especially of Rewi.65 The Government, using the Joshua Jones group as its proxy, would focus in the following years on trying to secure Rewi’s permission for the Court to sit in Mokau.

Jones and his partners in turn would spend much of their time unconvincingly claiming that they had indeed secured Rewi’s approval. In February 1878, John Shore met with Sheehan and called for a Court to sit in Mokau as the ‘native owners ... hav[e] consented to attend’.66 He had recently met Rewi and claimed that the chief had said that it was up to Mokau Maori whether they wanted a Court. Rewi had given his permission to open the Mokau River for ‘navigation’ although he demanded that any question over the ‘sale of land’ rested with him alone. The Taranaki Herald thought that this removed any impediment to the introduction of Crown grants and the Court in

63 AJHR, 1878. G-3, pp54-55 64 Taranaki Herald, 15 Nov 1877, p2 65 ‘Visit of Sir George Grey’, Taranaki Herald, 12 Feb 1878, p2 66 ‘Auckland’, Evening Post, 7 Feb 1878, p2


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the Mokau.67

However, Sheehan and Grey were fresh from unsuccessful meetings with Tawhiao, Rewi and many other Kingitanga Maori at Te Kopua. While Rewi at least had been keen for more dialogue with the Crown, he had certainly not indicated an acceptance of the Court.68 Grey therefore took a sober attitude regarding the immediate prospects in the Mokau area. When speaking to a large meeting of Taranaki settlers in February, he stated that with Rewi’s consent, the Mokau could be generally considered open for European trade. However, the purchase of land in the area was not yet a realistic prospect ‘as the native mind had not yet sufficiently advanced to realise the benefit that would accrue to themselves by parting with’ some of their unused land.69 Only when the Government was satisfied that ‘the native population themselves feel that an advantage will accrue to them’ from land transactions, should efforts be made to purchase land in the area.70

Shortly afterwards, the Premier and the Native Minister, along with a number of other central and local politicians met with Wetere, Epiha, Takirau, Taiaroa and about a half a dozen other ‘principal natives’ in New Plymouth. It was the first time for many years that the Government had sought the views of Mokau leaders. The discussions revealed the determination of at least this section of Mokau chief to create positive ties with the Crown based around negotiation and respect while remaining committed to the wider policies of Ngati Maniapoto and the Kingitanga.

This was the first occasion Wetere had visited New Plymouth since the raid on the Pukearuhe redoubt. He had, he said, not come for the sake of making policy but rather to carry on his father Takerei’s belief in personal relations with the Crown and with Grey. He vividly recalled as a boy witnessing his father carry the then Governor Grey across the Awakino River. He called for Grey to again visit the Mokau to renew that link.71

The korero then switched to matters of land. Epiha, on Wetere’s instructions had recently gone to Rewi to discuss the major issues of the day. He had returned with a letter to the effect that: ‘I (Rewi) have given to Epiha the power of Mokau. There are to be no sales of land. I have the management of that’.72 This letter was quoted in various forms by Epiha and Wetere during the meeting as the policy of Mokau Maori. Their understanding of it was that no major moves over land in the Mokau, including sale, lease, or Court hearings could be considered without the consent of Rewi and the wider leadership more generally. Grey explained to Mokau Maori that a major hui between the Crown and Tawhiao, Rewi and others was being planned for Hikurangi. Therefore, each question regarding land was answered by Epiha and Wetere in the

67 ‘Reception of Sir George Grey’, Taranaki Herald, 8 Feb 1878, p2 68 Parsonson, ‘Te Mana o Te Kingitanga’, pp25-26 69 Taranaki Herald, 9 Feb 1878, p2 70 ‘Sir George Grey’s Visit’, Taranaki Herald, 11 Feb 1878, p2 71 ‘Visit of Sir George Grey’, Taranaki Herald, 12 Feb 1878, p2 72 Ibid. Note that the actual quote spells name as Eaphia.


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same manner, it must be decided at Hikurangi, it must be decided with Rewi.

Grey, for instance, asked whether a Court hearing over Mokau land was acceptable at this time. Epiha explained that he had previously wanted a Court sitting and had applied for one. But he had now been instructed by Rewi to ‘leave all matters for the present’. Wetere reiterated the same point; there could be no Court at this stage. Sheehan thought the matter so important he repeated the question, and got the same answer.

On the question of land sales, Wetere was emphatic: Rewi had control over the issue and had stated that there would be none. On leasing in the Mokau, Epiha explained that Rewi had said little but the answer was ‘understood’, there would be no leasing at this stage.

The discussions then switched to the issue of whether some roads might be acceptable. Grey apparently suggested a road from Pukearuhe to Mokau, the completion of the long-delayed cutting of a tunnel at White Cliffs (Parininihi) and various other improvements. Here the response was somewhat less clear and less unanimous. Taiaroa answered a general no. Epiha said he favoured roads because many horses were lost fording the streams. Wetere stated that his previous policy had been ‘no leasing; no selling; no roads; no telegraphs’. Land sales, roads and ‘all kinds of work’ had caused dispute and trouble in the past. Therefore he had nothing to say now about roads except that the matter must be discussed with Rewi. He later added that regarding the issue of a road at White Cliffs, ‘I have nothing to do with that part. I have returned that land to Nga-te-tama’. Grey concluded this discussion by instructing the settlers and the assorted local politicians present that they should begin the process of roads but only if it met with ‘the wish of the natives’.

While major land moves were not to be made, the Mokau leaders were emphatic that controlled and increased European settlement and trade was acceptable. Both Epiha and Wetere were clear that they wanted trade with Europeans in Mokau, that the river was open to European vessels and that they had the authority to make such decisions. Wetere explained that he wanted European settlers to live in the area under his protection and patronage. He pointed to the four settlers present, Jones, John and George Shore, and MacMillan and named each in turn before saying:

These are my pakehas ... I want them to settle at Mokau, and it is for them that I agreed to open the river to carry goods.73

Indeed, Wetere wanted more settlers. Grey stated he would like to see ‘many Europeans living among you, and, if good men, I would like to see you guard and befriend them’. Wetere concurred that ‘is just what I wish’.74

There was also a desire for more European vessels and trade. Wetere, along with the

73 Ibid 74 Ibid


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settlers, expressed dissatisfaction with the few trading boats that were currently coming to the area. Grey asked whether placing a customs officer in the Mokau might increase traffic. While Mokau Maori wanted better relations with the Government, the relations needed to be carried out at an arm’s length. Jones therefore replied that a Government official in the region was ‘scarcely advisable at this moment.’

If the Government could not come to Mokau, Grey suggested Mokau might, in a sense, come to the Government. He suggested that Epiha, or another of the attending chiefs, and perhaps a settler, could be appointed as assessors ‘in connection with lands, customs, and general matters’ and draw a small Government salary as an ‘inducement’.75

The korero finished with Epiha and Wetere repeating their invitation for Grey to visit the Mokau, and with Grey promising he would indeed do so, health permitting, around the time of the upcoming Hikurangi meeting. Grey and the other Crown figures praised the nature and success of the meeting, and the good feeling between Maori and settler in the Mokau. Grey was assured by the various local and colonial politicians present that they would do all they could ‘to assist the Government and the settlers in Mokau’.76

In preparation for Hikurangi, a large proportion of Ngati Maniapoto and other chiefs gathered at Te Kuiti in March 1878 to discuss the policy they would present to the Crown. One of the subjects was land leasing, and in particular the interest of some in Mokau in leases. The general prohibition against land transactions was emphatically reiterated:

This meeting resulted in an agreement by all the chiefs of Ngatimaniapoto and several of the Ngatituwharetoa, for Taupo, not to part with an acre of land anywhere, on any pretence whatever.77

Nor would the Hikurangi meeting permit a Court hearing in Mokau, or anywhere else within the aukati. Tawhiao demanded the return of all the confiscated lands and claimed authority over all the lands ‘from Maungatauwhia to Mokau, and the control over all living within his boundaries’ He demanded ‘that if any lands were to be surveyed or leases, or roads made, he alone must be consulted, as he was the only authority’.78 Grey responded with the best proposals ‘Waikato would ever receive’, but which still fell short of Tawhiao’s demands.79

Although many Ngati Maniapoto, including from Mokau, were at the Hikurangi hui, Rewi and some other senior leaders were not.80 Instead, their focus was on the separate

75 Ibid 76 Ibid 77 Mair to Under Secretary, Native Department, 4 May 1878, AJHR, 1878, G-1, pp6-7 78 ‘New Zealand Telegraphs’, Taranaki Herald, 13 May 1878, p2. 79 O’Malley, ‘War and Raupatu’, pp778-780 80 ‘Alexandra’, North Otago Times, 27 March 1878, p2 and O’Malley, p778


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negotiations that they were about to enter into with the Crown in Waitara. These talks would take place under the background of restlessness by Jones and some Mokau Maori, principally Epiha, over the continued prohibition against surveys, leasing and the land court. Jones was still pressing for a Court hearing and claimed, evidently incorrectly, that Rewi had given his consent. Rewi had recently been in Mokau, expressing his ‘great pleasure’ in the presence of the settlers there and had called for more trade.81 Jones wrote to Sheehan to claim that Rewi had also ‘sanctioned’ a survey and the Land Court at Mokau, with Epiha empowered to handle the case. Epiha was at this point in New Plymouth, allegedly preparing for a Court hearing. Chief Judge Fenton remained unconvinced, rejecting a hearing on the basis that ‘it was not safe to hold a court’ over Mokau land, and that the few local chiefs calling for one were ‘powerless’ compared to the opposition they faced. He was also sceptical of the claims by Jones and others to have leased the land, apparently believed that the ‘settlers were only allowed to remain at Mokau on the old system’ of living on Maori land.82 Around this time, the Native Land Court in New Plymouth abandoned plans to hear a separate claim involving land on the north bank of the Mokau River.83

There were no signs that the resistance to the Land Court was diminishing. The talks at Waitara in June 1878 were seen by Rewi as the start, rather than the culmination, of the negotiations and there were little substantive discussion on the future of the aukati.84 However, Rewi and Wetere did put forward to the Government some specific policies regarding Mokau. Revealingly, they did not call for a Court hearing, or offer backing for a land lease to Jones. Rather, the chiefs told Grey, they were seeking reconciliation with the Crown, trade and new opportunities.

Rewi, Wetere and others reiterated, this time more formally, that the Mokau River ‘was open for European traffic’ and trade.85 They wanted the Government to help them be full partners in that trade. In recent weeks, the Jones’ party had arranged for the building of a small steamer, the Hannah Mokau, to trade between Mokau and other ports. A number of Mokau Maori were considering becoming shareholders in the boat and Wetere was contemplating skippering it.86 Rewi and Wetere requested Government support for this venture.

Grey and Sheehan jumped at the opportunity. Especially given the current impasse

81 ‘New Plymouth’, Wanganui Chronicle, 7 March 1878, p2 82 J Jones for John Shore, New Plymouth to Native Minister Sheehan, 7 April 1878, and Jones to Sheehan, 21 April 1878, in Papers Relating to Land at Mokau, MA 23/6*7, Hannah Mokau Special File 124 83 It would seem that the intended hearing was for land on the north bank of the Mokau called Rua Pua or Pua pua. ‘Native Land Court’, Taranaki Herald, 22 March 1878, p2; J Jones for John Shore, New Plymouth to Native Minister Sheehan, 7 April 1878; and Jones to Sheehan, 21 April 1878, in Papers Relating to Land at Mokau, MA 23/6*7, Hannah Mokau Special File 124 84 Parsonson, ‘Te Mana o Te Kingitanga’, p40. Rewi seems to have primarily seen these talks as a chance to formally make peace. He noted the symbolic significance of holding peace talks at Waitara, the place where fighting began. 85 ‘Waikato and Waitara Native Meetings, AJHR, 1878, G-3, p46 86 ‘Shipping Intelligence’, Wanganui Herald, 22 June 1878, p2; ‘New Steamers for the Coast’, Taranaki Herald, 25 June 1878, p2


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with Tawhiao, they considered it a matter of ‘political importance’ to encourage trade and good relations with the Ngati Maniapoto chiefs.87 The Government would pay for Rewi and Wetere to have shares worth £100 each in the boat. The steamer would also receive an annual subsidy of £300 so long as Sheehan was convinced it was providing a satisfactory service and trading regularly between Mokau and other ports.88 The Government also acted speedily on the request to reopen the mail service between New Plymouth and Mokau, with Mokau Maori to be employed to carry the mail.89 Epiha, who had spent time in Australia, apparently requested that the Government supply some Murray codfish which he believed would be suitable for the Mokau River.90

Taranaki Pakeha greeted these talks with great joy, viewing them as a confirmation of peace and heralding the opening up a vast new area to commerce. A public holiday was declared in New Plymouth so that people could travel to Waitara and take part in the occasion. In front of a large crowd, Grey stated that the isolation of Taranaki settlers from their fellow colonists ‘was now, he hoped, all over, and Taranaki would now make real progress’. Rewi inferred that, while he was happy with the positive nature of the discussions, that the real questions remained unanswered, ‘Sir George Grey and I have been made one at Waitara, and we will remain together to make arrangements so that the laws shall be one throughout the land’.91 European newspapers printed favourable stories about Wetere, and were inclined to exonerate him from responsibility for the killing of Whiteley.92 Even an interminable speech from Jones was not enough to dampen the good feelings.

Rewi remained in Waitara for much of the rest of the year, in the hope of moving towards a more substantive accord with the Government. While there, he was subject to enormous pressure from the Native Minister, speculators and even his own relatives to agree to the Court and to land leasing in Mokau. Rewi stayed in Waitara with his niece, Annie Walker and her husband Nevil Walker, a Pakeha speculator who was trying to secure a lease of land on the north side of the Mokau River. The Walkers pushed Rewi to give his consent for a Court sitting. Their efforts were not divorced from those of the Government. Sheehan was in ‘constant communication’ with the Walkers, encouraging them to use their influence ‘with Rewi to get the King country, including the Mokau District, opened up’.93

The Government was also, by this stage, paying Jones substantial and secret sums to forward its interests. He received £390 in total, an amount that was later condemned

87 Lewis to Native Minister, 28 Feb 1879, MA 23/6*7, Hannah Mokau Special File 124 87 ‘Waitara’, Evening Post, 19 June 1878, p2 88 MA 23/6*7, Hannah Mokau Special File 124 89 Taranaki Herald, 29 June 1878, p2, 3 Aug 1878, p2 90 ‘The Masonic Ball’, Taranaki Herald, 27 Jun 1878, p2 91 Native Meeting at Waitara, Taranaki Herald, 2 Jul 1878, p2 92 AJHR, 1878, G-3, pp58-58 93 Evidence of Nevil Septimus Walker and Annie Walker, 7 July 1888, ‘Lease of Certain Lands at Mokau’, AJHR, 1888, G-4C, pp31-32, 33


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by the political opponents of Grey and Sheehan as excessive.94 Jones would visit Rewi ‘three or four times a week’ in Waitara, using Annie Walker to try and ‘persuade Rewi to consent to a Court for Mokau’.95

Another service Jones was providing was facilitating contact between chiefs and officials. In November 1878, with Grey too unwell to attend, Sheehan met with Rewi, Wetere, and others at Waitara and New Plymouth. It would seem that these talks were again primarily focused around public declarations of friendly intentions and the arrangement of further negotiations. It was agreed that Sheehan would meet Rewi and other major leaders in Te Kuiti in the upcoming months.

A public banquet at New Plymouth gave the opportunity for settler leaders, such as Mayor Standish, to praise Sheehan for his great and unique achievement of opening up the ‘terra incognita’ of the Mokau and inducing ‘Rewi to come near the centre of civilisation’. However, rangatira felt the need to dampen settler enthusiasm, to remind them that no agreement with the Crown had been reached and that the aukati remained in place. The prominent chief Taonui Hikaka, (son of the Ngati Maniapoto leader of the same name) replied to Standish to the effect that Pakeha must not rush things but instead ‘leave the interests of the district in the hands of Rewi and Mr. Sheehan’.96

As Sheehan told the banquet, the Government’s major aim was for an agreement that would forward the creation of the main trunk line. The Railway Construction Act 1878 had authorised a line from Te Awamutu to Inglewood in Taranaki, which by necessity would pass through or near the Mokau and was intended to be part of one great line running down the west coast from Auckland to Wellington.97 Sheehan told the audience that he had already organised ‘an exploring party to search’ north of Taranaki for the best route, all that was required was the permission of ‘Rewi and his friends’.98 Sheehan and European newspapers were confident that this permission would soon be received, and the survey, starting with the area between New Plymouth and the Upper Mokau would begin.99

Such permission would not be offered without a fundamental accord with the Government. However, Rewi and Mokau chiefs did sanction at these Taranaki meeting a preliminary exploration under their supervision of the coal resources in the region. Government geologist Dr James Hector and his surveying party were escorted by Wetere and Jones to the Mokau where Rewi quickly arrived, after a hasty return to consult with Ngati Maniapoto and Kingitanga leaders over recent developments.100

On 15 September, using the Hannah Mokau and canoes, the party travelled twenty

94 MA 23/6*7, Hannah Mokau Special File 124 95 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, p33 96 ‘Banquet to the Hon. J. Sheehan and Native Chiefs’, Taranaki Herald, 30 Nov 1878, p2 97 See also AJHR, 1878, E-1, pv 98 ‘Banquet to the Hon. J. Sheehan and Native Chiefs’, Taranaki Herald, 30 Nov 1878, p2 99 Ibid and Taranaki Herald, 7 Dec 1878, p2 100 Parsonson, ‘Te Mana o Te Kingitanga’, pp42-45


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miles upriver, where they encountered high quality and easily extractable coal. At one place, with ‘very imperfect tools’, five tons of coal was evacuated in a few hours. Hector’s immediate opinion that the coal was of very good quality was later confirmed by more in-depth testing.101 These findings reportedly convinced Rewi and the other chiefs to consider the prospect of using Europeans to work the coal, although, as always, further debate and consultation was needed.102 Local Maori also pointed out some mineral springs on the Mokau River, samples of which were sent to Wellington for analysis.103 From Mokau River, Hector’s party accompanied by Rewi and other chiefs travelled all the way to Te Awamutu, at all points receiving an ‘exceedingly friendly’ reception from local hapu.104

However, there continued to be pressure on the blanket policy against land leases, surveys and the Native Land Court. In December 1878, Jones forwarded an application on the behalf of Epiha and unnamed others for a survey of land on the southern banks of the Mokau Heads. The Surveyor General approved the application and assigned a surveyor, before reports of likely opposition forced the survey to be suspended.105

With local chiefs such as Epiha threatening to go independently to the Court, the aukati’s wider leadership sought to re-assert their overall authority. Both Tawhiao and Rewi claimed, in parallel and separately, that Mokau fell under their mana. In January 1879, Rewi stated that he would resume control over the vast area, including Mokau which ‘he had originally handed to the King’. Within these boundaries he ‘would make all the laws for Maoris and Europeans alike’.106 While Rewi’s claim is sometimes considered to herald a ‘virtual break’ between himself and Tawhiao, there were few signs of a split on a local level and Mokau Maori continued to have close ties with both great chiefs. Rewi’s statement is therefore perhaps better seen as addressing places like Mokau where the pressure for independent action and more contact with Pakeha was growing. He was reminding local chiefs and settlers, and the Government, that Native Land Court hearings or leasing without wider consent would not be tolerated.

Despite these concerns, and the pressure they were under from the Government and settlers, most Mokau Maori remained wary of going outside of the wider consensus. They remained heavily involved in the King movement and in its negotiations with the Government. Wetere was still considered an important figure in the Kingitanga while another chief with strong ties to Mokau, Wahanui, was by this point considered one of the movement’s most powerful leaders. In March 1879, it was reported that Rewi and Native Minister Sheehan planned to meet in Mokau as a fore-runner to high-level talks

101 ‘Dr. Hector’s Visit to Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 17 Dec 1878, p2, and ‘Mokau District’, Taranaki Herald, 26 Jan 1880 102 ‘Dr. Hector’s Visit to Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 17 Dec 1878, p2 103 Ibid 104 ‘Te Awamutu’, Evening Post, 27 Dec 1878, p2 105 Evidence of Thomas Humphries, 6 Jul 1888, ‘Lease of Certain Lands at Mokau’, AJHR, 1888, G-4C, p26 and Jones to Surveyor General, 29 Aug 1879, MA 23/6*7, Hannah Mokau Special File 124 106 Parsonson, ‘Te Mana o Te Kingitanga’, pp48-49


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between the Crown and the Kingitanga at Te Kopua.107 Rewi and his people had just concluded a ‘Parliament’ and were advising ‘all the tribes over the Island ... to arrange matters’ which would ‘be settled at a final meeting with the Government’ at Te Kopua. The hui at Mokau was expected to be widely attended, and supplies were being shipped in from Waitara while Te Whiti and Waitara Maori were also collecting food for it.108

While this Mokau gathering was apparently cancelled, at least 40 Mokau Maori still travelled on to what Pakeha thought might be the ‘final meeting’ at Te Kopua.109 However, no major agreement was reached at Te Kopua, as symbolised by Wahanui’s stinging accusation that it was Grey himself who had been the prime cause of the wars.110 It is not clear whether this hui directly discussed issues specific to Mokau, except for Grey’s attempts to convince Maori of the benefits they would gain from a railway running from Waikato to Mokau.

One of the consequences of the continuing impasse between the Government and Te Rohe Potae hapu and iwi was that Jones was no closer to gaining control over Mokau land. In return for undefined ‘services’ in ‘opening the country, and securing the good will of the natives’, he had been receiving unofficial payments and undertakings from Sheehan that the Government would help him gain legal title over the land. By April 1879, Jones was demanding these promises be put down on paper. He wrote to the Native Minister reminding him of his claims to have entered into a lease ‘between the Mokau and the Mohakatino rivers’ and stating that although the lease had no legal validity, it was not ‘contrary to the spirit’ of the Native Lands Acts.111

Sheehan had only a hazy concept of what land Jones was actually claiming, and he showed no concern over whether Maori had consented to this so-called ‘lease’. He was more interested in how Mokau could forward the Government’s wider aims, and in particular bring the Land Court and land transactions into the aukati. As Jones told the Native Minister, the main beneficiary of the Court and Pakeha title in the Mokau would be the Government. Jones and his party, the main agents working to bring this about, were now threatening to abandon their mission if they did not receive the Government’s ‘assurance of its support in eventually securing a title’.112

Sheehan agreed. Jones and his party had, in his view, ‘acquired a footing in the Mokau River, which, till then was sealed territory’.113 He therefore wrote to the speculator to

107 Taranaki Herald, 7 Mar 1879, p2, 13 Mar 1879, p2 108 ‘New Plymouth’, Star, 25 Feb 1879, p2 109 ‘Alexandra’, Evening Post, 27 Mar 1879, p2; ‘The Native Meeting’, Waikato Times, 27 Mar 1879, p2 110 Reports etc respecting the Te Kopua meeting, AJHR, 1879, Session I, G-1, pp15-17, Parsonson, ‘Te Mana o Te Kingitanga’, p65 111 J Jones on behalf of Mokau settlers to J Sheehan, 26 April 1879, in Papers Relating to Land at Mokau, MA 23/6*7, Hannah Mokau Special File 124 112 J Jones on behalf of Mokau settlers to J Sheehan, 26 April 1879, and ‘Returns Showing amounts paid to Jones – Mokau by the Native Department’, 11 Oct 1879 in MA 23/6*7, Hannah Mokau Special File 124 113 J Sheehan memorandum for Native Minister John Bryce, 16 Oct 1879, NO 79/5127, MA 23/6*7, Hannah Mokau Special File 124


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reaffirm the ‘promise already made to you’ that the ‘Government will not interfere with yourself, and partners, in the occupancy of a lease of the Block of land on south side of Mokau River now under negotiation by you’. This guarantee related only to a lease and not to any attempt to purchase freehold and it ‘must not be deemed to cover a larger area than that mentioned in previous correspondence’.114 Sheehan was no fool, and his ‘concession’ to Jones was deliberately and artfully vague. He managed to reassure Jones but at little cost to the Government. He did not promise that Jones and his party would gain legal title over the land. Rather, it would seem that he was only guaranteeing that the Government would not buy for itself the area that Jones and his party were attempting to lease. Given that the Government had no immediate prospect of purchasing land at Mokau, this was hardly a major sacrifice.

However, the ultimate ramifications of this letter would be far-reaching, and for local Maori, disastrous. It was understood by many Crown and legal officials as a Government promise to grant land to Jones as a reward for his services in opening up the King Country. As we shall see, this letter would be a crucial factor in Jones gaining legal title over the Mokau-Mohakatino block, in the face of protests from virtually all its Maori owners.

More immediately, rangatira were under increasing pressure to loosen the prohibition against any contact with Pakeha over land. By early May 1879 it was reported that Rewi and Wetere had decided to allow Epiha’s request for a survey to be carried out.115 Their reasoning for this, after previous resistance, was not made explicit. However, it would seem to have been a limited concession to the continuing demands of Epiha and others for a survey of ‘their’ land, presumably in preparation for a Court hearing and a possible lease with the Jones’ party. Rewi and Wetere were apparently seeking to delay and control this process. A small survey, under the careful supervision of Wetere and others, would be allowed. But no permission was given for a Court hearing and Jones’ desire for a large-scale lease continued to be rejected.

It should also be kept in mind that Rewi and others were beginning to consider surveys as a potential way of protecting Maori land from Pakeha control. Rewi and other Ngati Maniapoto rangatira would later embrace the idea of marking out their external boundaries to ensure Government recognition of their authority and their territory. As early, as May 1879, there were reports that Rewi was considering a giant survey of the aukati, stretching as far south as Pukearuhe and inland to mark out its borders.116

It would therefore seem that Rewi and Wetere saw the survey as a necessary concession to demands from local chiefs, while continuing to preserve unchallenged Maori authority over the Mokau. Pakeha could mark out some land, and bear the cost,

114 J Sheehan, Auckland to J Jones, 29 April 1879, in Papers Relating to Land at Mokau, MA 23/6*7, Hannah Mokau Special File 124 115 Taranaki Herald, 20 May 1879, p2 116 ‘Kihikihi’, Wanganui Chronicle, 21 May 1869, p2 and Marr, ‘The Waimarino Purchase Report’, p129


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but the land would remain under customary control. In August, Wetere and others requested that Sheehan send immediately a surveyor to ‘survey the lands of Epiha’, Takirau Watihi and Titokurangi Rawhiri.117 Shortly afterwards, Jones telegraphed the Government that Rewi had agreed to the survey.118

The Government and Jones saw the survey in a very different light, as a crucial breakthrough. Jones confidently informed the Government that the surveyed land would afterwards be leased to him, and that a far larger survey would follow in due course.119 Sheehan was likewise sure that it would soon lead to Native Land Court hearings and land leasing. He believed, given Rewi’s involvement, that the survey heralded a breaking up of the aukati. Although it was only a small private survey without clear legal ramifications, he immediately ordered a survey party to be sent to Mokau with the Government bearing the initial costs.120 Sheehan explained to his successor as Native Minister, John Bryce that it:

was worth the outlay to break the “aukati” which prevailed in the King country and the survey is now being made, and the Native Land Court will be held, with the approval of Rewi himself.121

Sheehan would later justify to Parliament the costs of the survey on the exact same grounds:

The reason was, that the land lay alongside the King-country, and ... it was a favourable opportunity for breaking down the border.122

To assist in the aim of breaking down ‘the border’, the Government sent a native interpreter, Edward Stockman (son of George, one of the partners in the Jones consortium), to help negotiate a lease of the land. Sheehan personally instructed him to proceed cautiously and not to risk inflaming Maori opposition. Stockman was to offer all ‘assistance in my power’ to Jones and his party so that they could secure a lease, but to be careful of provoking ‘trouble with the natives’.123

The head of the surveyor party, WH Skinner, was likewise clear on the wider implications of his task. He later recalled that the purpose of his survey was ‘of obtaining a lease’ for Jones, who had been permitted by Grey and Sheehan to deal with

117 Wetere, Epiha, Takirau, Titokurangi Rawhiri to Sheehan, 1 Aug 1879, in Papers Relating to Land at Mokau, MA 23/6*7, Hannah Mokau Special File 124 (English copy of letter only) 118 Jones to Chief Surveyor, 29 Aug 1879, in Papers Relating to Land at Mokau, MA 23/6*7, Hannah Mokau Special File 124 119 Jones to Sheehan, 9 Aug 1879, in Papers Relating to Land at Mokau, MA 23/6*7, Hannah Mokau Special File 124 120 Lewis to Jones, 2 Sep 1879, in Papers Relating to Land at Mokau, MA 23/6*7, Hannah Mokau Special File 124 121 Sheehan memo to Bryce, 16 Oct 1879, NO 79/5127, MA 23/6*7, Hannah Mokau Special File 124 122 ‘Hannah Mokau’, NZPD, vol 32, 1879, pp300-301 123 Evidence of Edward William Stockman, 13 July 1888, ‘Lease of Certain Lands at Mokau’, AJHR, 1888, G-4C, pp10-11


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the ‘hitherto hostile tribesmen of the King Country’:

The King Country natives had consistently opposed the leasing or selling of their lands which had been tapu against the entry of the surveyor, and as this was the first survey to be permitted, the outcome was viewed with considerable anxiety.124

This attempt by the Government to mediate a land transaction for Jones was a decided failure. The interpreter Edward Stockman put forward Jones’ proposal for an absolute lease for 21 years for land and minerals. Like the earlier ‘agreement’ it hoped to supersede, the exact parameters of this proposed lease are somewhat unclear but it was for a substantial area between the Mokau and Mohakatino rivers. Its western boundary was to be near the sea, its eastern boundaries were disputed. Jones claimed that they stretched even further east of would later become the Mokau-Mohakatino no.1 block.125 Stockman and others state that the proposal was for a smaller area, finishing at ‘Koatututahi’ on the Mokau River.126

However, no agreement for a lease of any size could be reached. The negotiations took place with a small group of ‘some of the principal natives’ at Mokau heads, including Wetere, Takirau Watihi, Te Oro and several others. (It is likely Epiha was also present). Edward Stockman, on behalf of the Jones’ group, could achieve ‘no final agreement’ as more negotiations and consultation with ‘all necessary parties’ were needed.127

While no lease could be agreed on, it was only after enormous difficulty and considerable negotiations that Skinner was able to carry out a survey of a minimal area. His difficulties once again revealed how complex it was to achieve agreement with Maori over land issues in the Mokau. More important still, they showed the continuing and widespread unease regarding surveying or any Pakeha involvement in Maori land. The start of the survey was delayed as Stockman considered it unsafe to begin without checking again that Rewi had given his permission.128 There was then considerable discussion among coastal hapu about which areas could be included in the survey and whether it would be allowed to begin at all. Although the precise details are unclear, the result of this discussion was that Wetere and others, including Takirau Watihi and Epiha, insisted that the area that would be surveyed would be smaller than what Jones wanted.129

On 13 September, the survey was then begun with an ‘important ceremony’ in front of a large group of Maori as Skinner, Epiha and Takirau drove in a ‘stout ponga peg’. Skinner and his assistants, with the two chiefs and Jones acting as guides, then began

124 Skinner, Reminiscences of a Taranaki Surveyor, p35 125 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, p34 126 Ibid, pp10-11 127 Ibid, pp10-11 128 Evidence of Edward William Stockman, 13 July 1888, ‘Lease of Certain Lands at Mokau’, AJHR, 1888, G-4C, pp10-11 129 William Henry Skinner Diaries 1877-1886, Diary entries Sep 1879, Diaries & Papers, Box 2, ARC 2001-165, Pukeariki Museum, New Plymouth


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cutting a ‘very rough’ line. Skinner would later describe the two months of surveying in awful weather and rough terrain as ‘the most unpleasant I encountered during all my years in the bush’.130

The atmosphere was not helped by the conflict caused by Jones’ attempts to extend the area of the survey.131 The survey was stopped on a number of occasions by Maori, including by a message sent by ‘the big chiefs from inland’ such as Heremia Te Aria and Te Rangituataka, Wetere’s brother. Heremia, according to Skinner, was ‘very averse to the Survey of the land’.132 Skinner was summoned to a korero:

to decide whether the survey would be allowed to be proceeded with. The whole disturbing question of permitting surveys within the King Country was brought up for discussion and decision as far as the Maoris of coastal and inland Mokau were concerned. It was a gathering of all the important chiefs of the district and in the Maori way the talk went on for some days until finally it was decided that I should complete the survey.133

Officials like Robert Parris were even surprised that Skinner’s survey party had made it out of the area alive.134 Such fears were exaggerated, and following the 1869 raid, there would be no violence, despite considerable provocation, against Pakeha in the Mokau. Instead, it would seem that local Maori strictly limited the area that could be surveyed. The chief surveyor finally received only an ‘incomplete recognizance survey’ for 1780 acres on the seaward part of the land from Waipapa to Koatututahi. As the chief surveyor pointed out, this was, ‘only a small portion’ of the area Jones claimed.135 Jones tried to use the survey as evidence that a Native Land Court could safely sit regarding Mokau land, but the Government refused, citing Rewi’s opposition as the crucial factor.136

By the time that Skinner’s survey had been completed, the Grey Government had lost power and was under attack from political opponents for spending large amounts of money secretly and, worse still, unsuccessfully on trying to open up the Mokau. Grey was defiant, claiming that through the focus on the Mokau, and the use of Jones, he had made crucial progress towards the destruction of the Kingitanga, the eventual opening of the aukati and the creation of the main trunk line:

With regard to Mr. Joshua Jones, he did not believe that any person in New Zealand had rendered greater service to the

130 Skinner, Reminiscences of a Taranaki Surveyor, pp38-39 131 Ibid 132 WH Skinner Diary entry 11 Oct 1879 133 Skinner, Reminiscences of a Taranaki Surveyor, pp40-41 134 Ibid, p41 135 Evidence of Thomas Humphries, 6 July 1888, ‘Lease of Certain Lands at Mokau’, AJHR, 1888, G-4C, p26. Again, it should be emphasised that much of the evidence regarding the size of the survey etc is highly unclear and often contradictory. Some of this confusion stems from the fact that it is not clear, to me at least, where ‘Koatututahi’ was. 136 Petition of Joshua Jones to Parliament, 11 June 1885, in LE 1, Box235*, 1885/9, Papers Attached to Public Petitions Committee into Joshua Jones Petition 17/1885, p3, ANZ Wgt


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country for eighteen months or two years ... If the railways were ever made from Auckland to Taranaki, as he had no doubt would be the case, the obtaining of the line would be due to two people – one at the Auckland end of the line, and Mr. Jones at the Taranaki end.137

Such statements were more wishful thinking than reality. The aukati, and its Mokau border, still appeared able to withstand the pressure on it from the Government, from speculators and from some local chiefs. For Maori with connections to the Mokau, Grey’s brief administration had been primarily marked by some promising developments. For the first time in 25 years, the Crown had entered into positive, if very preliminary negotiations regarding the Mokau and provided some valuable assistance to local trade. These small but promising steps would abruptly stop under the new Government.

6.5 The Hall Ministry

Under the Hall Ministry that took office in October 1879, the Government largely withdrew from involvement in Mokau. The developing relationships between Crown officials and Mokau chiefs, the promises of ongoing negotiations and assistance, and the reality of considerable Government interest in the region were abandoned. Native Minister John Bryce adopted a policy of severe financial retrenchment at the Native Department, and advocated an end to the system of patronage and close personal ties with chiefs that had been a feature of the Grey-Sheehan years.138

The key instrument for Maori trade effort in the region, the steamer the Hannah Mokau, was a victim of this retrenchment. The boat had been built and was owned by Jones’ consortium as part of their guarantee to local Maori that they would boost trade in the region. Her maiden voyage in 1878 was to Waitara where she was met and boarded by Rewi and a large group of Mokau Maori who proceeded to take ‘stock of everything, calling her the Mokau boat, and saying that they could get anything they wanted from Auckland now’. Rewi instructed the crew to ferry him to Kawhia, with Wetere, who provided coal for the steamer, stating that her next journey would be to take him to North Shore. Rewi called the boat part of the promise made by the Jones consortium ‘to bring the steamers’, and stated that if ‘the Government carry out their promises as well, everything will be right between us’.139

These Government promises to support the Hannah Mokau were, as we have seen, a major element in Grey and Sheehan’s dealings with Rewi and Wetere. The Grey Government certainly endeavoured to fulfil its undertakings, becoming effectively the third partner and major funder of a joint trading enterprise. It not only subsidised the running of the steamer and purchased shares for Rewi and Wetere in the boat but

137 ‘Supply’, NZPD, vol 34, 1879, pp1034-1035 138 RCJ Stone, ‘The Maori Land Question and the Fall of the Grey Government, 1879’, New Zealand Journal of History (NZJH), vol 1, no1 (April 1976), pp54-55 139 ‘Opening of the Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 27 Aug 1878, p2


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assisted in other ways. In 1878, customs officials prohibited the Hannah Mokau from entering into certain ports due to not meeting safety regulations. Upon Rewi’s request, Sheehan instructed officials that ‘our steamer’ should not be subjected to such bureaucratic requirements.140

The following year, the Government further invested in the boat to prevent it being sold for debt. Sheehan ordered that its substantial debts of £864 be paid, with the Government taking over the mortgage of the ship and the responsibility for ongoing insurance and other costs. Sheehan explained that this was:

as Rewi, and other Natives held shares in her, and it was a matter of political importance that she should be kept in the trade and not pass out of their hands.141

Sheehan believed that the boat’s value to the Government wider goals was far greater than the money that had been poured into her. He was sure that Rewi and Wetere’s involvement would open the way for the boat to trade at Mokau, Kawhia Harbour and ‘other places which, for some years past, have been closed to Europeans‘. Rewi and Wetere would have a financial stake in encouraging trade within the aukati, while tribes at Kawhia Harbour and elsewhere would allow the Hannah Mokau to enter knowing that the boat was partly owned by the two chiefs.142

This Government support meant that the Hannah Mokau traded fairly regularly between Mokau and other West Coast ports, helped in the start of coal extraction and transported Maori on political and tribal business.143 Mokau Maori exercised a significant, although not complete, influence over the boat’s running. In January 1879, it was reported that Wetere for an unknown reason had placed an ‘embargo’ over the boat and was threatening to stop her running. However, shortly afterwards the Hannah Mokau was being used by Maori to transport supplies from Waitara to Mokau in preparation for a large hui to discuss political matters.144

Aside from a frequently drunk Pakeha captain, the Hannah Mokau’s main problem – and indeed the primary handicap for trade in the region more generally – was that the Mokau River could be difficult and sometimes dangerous for ships.145 Increasingly, Wetere and other chiefs sought Government assistance to aid travel both on the river and overland.

140 Sheehan to Rewi, no date [12 Aug 1878], in Papers Relating to Hannah Mokau, MA 23/6*7, Hannah Mokau Special File 124, and ‘New Zealand Telegrams’, Taranaki Herald, 19 Sep 1878, p3 141 Lewis to Native Minister, 28 Feb 1879, in Papers Relating to Hannah Mokau, MA 23/6*7, Hannah Mokau Special File 124 142 J Sheehan memorandum for Native Minister John Bryce, 16 Oct 1879, NO 79/5127, MA 23/6*7, Hannah Mokau Special File 124 143 Brown to Under Secretary, Native Department, 8 Nov 1879, NO 79/4784, MA 23/6*7, Hannah Mokau Special File 124. It is not clear how often she traded with Kawhia Harbour 144 ‘New Plymouth’, Star, 25 Feb 1879, p2 145 Lewis memorandum, 14 April 1879, attached to NO 79/1330, in Papers Relating to Hannah Mokau, MA 23/6*7, Hannah Mokau Special File 124


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However, Bryce was not interested in supporting the infrastructure of the Mokau and, ignoring complaints from both local Maori and settlers, decided to cut all Government funding for the Hannah Mokau. By June 1880, the boat owners were unable to pay their debts to the Government. She was seized, and on Bryce’s orders, sold.146 Grey and Sheehan protested but Bryce was explicit that his administration did not consider itself bound by the verbal promises they had made to local Maori to support the boat.147

Rewi and Wetere initially took different responses to Bryce and the new Government. Rewi was furious about the dismissal of Grey, who he had hoped to arrange a far-reaching accord with. The chief was now inclined to reject any roads or Government involvement in Mokau and briefly threatened complete isolation from the Hall administration:

I will never consent to see the present Government, nor will I again return to dwell amongst Europeans. I leave it with those important persons who have abused Grey to see how they can manage affairs in my absence.148

Wetere, on the other hand, tried unsuccessfully to reach out to the new Government for continued negotiations and for economic support for the area. Retrenchment, and the declining importance of Mokau in Crown eyes, meant his requests, which would once have been seized upon by senior Government leaders, were now ignored. Wetere travelled to Hawera in January 1880 to meet Bryce and request Government funding for roads and improved river access.149 Mokau Maori then travelled to Alexandra in the hope of meeting Government officials, but after two days waiting, ‘had to return without interview’.150 Wetere wrote letters to the Crown without reply.151 In desperation, and as a sign of the personal relations that remained at the heart of Maori political life, Mokau Maori called on the aged and now out of office Grey. They asked him to ‘assist them’ to obtain a steamer to replace the Hannah Mokau so that they could again enter into the shipping trade.152

All these efforts were unsuccessful. Trade in the Mokau area failed to develop, largely because of the poor roads and difficult river access. Wetere angrily blamed the Government for this. He wrote to the Taranaki Herald complaining that Europeans were refusing to send steamers as the Mokau ‘is a troublesome river’:

If so, whose fault is it? I have written to the Government, asking that the Mokau River might be improved, and also that the road might be made between White Cliffs and this place,

146 ‘Auckland’, Evening Post, 18 Jun 1880, p2 147 Petition from Rerenga Wetere and others, 19 April 1880, NO 80/2149, MA 23/6*7, Hannah Mokau Special File 124. The Grey Government had first delayed payment of the subsidy out of concern that the boat was not visiting Mokau enough; Bryce decided to abandon it altogether. 148 Parsonson, ‘Te Mana o Te Kingitanga’, p78 149 ‘The Waimate Plains’, Wanganui Herald, 29 Jan 1880, p3 150 ‘Alexandra’, Waikato Times, 9 Mar 1880, p3 151 ‘Mokau River’, Taranaki Herald, 16 Oct 1880, p2 152 ‘Sir George Grey and the Natives’, West Coast Times, 17 Jan 1881, p2


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but I received no answer. What more can be done? I wish it clearly understood that there is no obstruction here either for Maori or European.153

With few signs of economic development in the Mokau, the European settlement that Wetere had created failed to grow. Instead it disintegrated. Maori had thought that they were gaining a peaceful, pliant and prosperous group of newcomers. However, they turned out to be a heavily indebted and fractious bunch. The Jones consortium, frustrated by the slow progress in gaining a legally recognised lease, feuded among themselves over money matters and over their respective rights to Maori land. Jones, possessor of such a remarkably aggressive and offensive disposition that he was often described as ‘half mad’, was at the centre of many of these disputes.154 McMillan left the area after allegedly assaulting him with intent to murder.155 McMillan, along with all the rest of the consortium including George Stockman, John Shore, James Holmes and the widow of George Shore accused Jones of financial improprieties and of defrauding them out of their rights to Mokau land.156

Local Maori continued to try to maintain a protective and close relationship with the few settlers that remained. When George Shore drowned in the Mohakatino River, ‘every native at Mokau’ attended his funeral. He was buried in a spot ‘selected specially’ by local Maori who were reported to be planning on ‘providing for his wife and family’.157

The decline of the settler community and the lack of Government involvement made the unpleasant if dynamic Jones more rather than less important to local Maori. Jones was now one of the very few Pakeha still active in the area. It was he who presented a vision of economic development for Maori, centring on a joint coal extraction deal, in which he would arrange the major European backers and Maori would provide the coal.

As we have seen, Rewi, Wetere and other Maori had for some time been considering establishing a Mokau coal trade under their control but with Pakeha assistance. Apart from its potential economic benefits, the coal trade had other attractions to chiefs such as Rewi. If managed correctly, it could bring about economic development without intensive Crown involvement in the area. It would seem likely that Rewi was interested in an enterprise in which local Maori extracted the coal, and with European assistance if necessary, shipped it out of the area without ushering in radical change or a mass of Pakeha miners and speculators to the aukati.158

There was, however, no guarantee that the coal trade would lead to such an ideal scenario. Local Maori therefore proceeded cautiously, determined to maintain control

153 ‘Mokau River’, Taranaki Herald, 16 Oct 1880, p2 154 WH Skinner Diary, 14 Oct 1879 155 ‘New Plymouth’, Evening Post, 15 Apr 1879, p2 156 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, pp8-10, 11, 12, 21 157 ‘New Plymouth’, Taranaki Herald, 7 Feb 1879, p2 158 Private communication from Cathy Marr on Rewi’s economic aims at this point.


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over what was increasingly understood to be a crucial resource. No clear decision regarding the extent of any future coal trade was reached. Rather the usual multi-levelled, complex and, to European eyes, infuriatingly slow process of consultation and consensus began.

At the same time, some small-scale but promising experiments regarding a potentially larger venture were taking place. Local hapu occasionally arranged for European boats to collect coal extracted by Maori.159 For example, in January 1880, local Maori, assisted by an experienced European miner, worked a rich coal seam about 28 miles up the Mokau River. They gathered around 20 tons of coal which was then transported by canoe to six miles downriver, which was as close as Wetere, known as the most expert pilot of the difficult Mokau River, had been able to guide a steamer. A Pakeha crew then took the coal to Waitara where it was sold and proclaimed to be of excellent quality, ‘equal to any ... seen in England or the Colonies’.160

Taranaki newspapers were soon predicting that this enterprise ‘will be a great step towards the opening up of that district’ and that, with a little Government investment in snagging the river, a rich trade could begin.161 Mokau coals were sent to the Melbourne Exhibition as an example of the mineral wealth of Taranaki.162

However, matters reached a more urgent stage in September 1880 with reports that some Europeans had formed a coal company in New Plymouth for the intention of working the coal deposits at Mokau. It was claimed that the company was ‘making arrangements for commencing operations’. It is unclear whether they had received any encouragement from local Maori. Rewi then rushed to warn both Pakeha and Maori that he had not given authority for any such operation and warned them to stop.163

In December 1880, a hui at Mokau attended by, amongst others, ‘some influential chiefs from Waikato’ discussed coal, roads and other matters.164 A European journalist reported rumours that the hui had adopted a ‘satisfactory’ approach ‘respecting coal’ that would lend to the ‘opening up’ of the Mokau country.165 However, no emphatic decision was reached as illustrated by the fact that a number of local chiefs who apparently favoured coal deals in the region, including Takirau, Titokarangi and Te Oro, wrote to the settler newspaper to warn Pakeha that no final permission had been granted to the recently formed coal company to proceed with mining.166

Rewi in March 1881 then called on all Maori and Europeans to cease working the coal in Mokau until a great hui called by the King and to be attended by ‘all the people of the island’ had met. The Government was warned in the meantime not to send any

159 Another example is Taranaki Herald, 28 Jan 1881, p2 160 Taranaki Herald, 6 Jan 1880, p2; ibid 15 Jan 1880, p2; ‘Waitara’, Evening Post, 13 Jan 1880, p2 161 Taranaki Herald, 15 Jan 1880, p2; ibid 26 Jan 1880, p2 162 Taranaki Herald, 13 Feb 1880, p2 163 Taranaki Herald, 25 Sep 1880, p2; ibid, 5 Oct 1880, p2 164 ‘Urenui’, Taranaki Herald, 28 Dec 1880, p2 165 ‘Urenui’, Taranaki Herald, 28 Jan 1881, p2 166 This is my debatable understanding of ‘A Correction’, Taranaki Herald, 25 Feb 1881, p3


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Europeans to Mokau or try to encourage land leases.167

As we shall see in the next chapter, this meeting at Hikurangi would be part of a series of efforts that would be unable to resolve satisfactorily the key questions facing Mokau. This failure, combined with the inability of the Kingitanga to reach an overall accord with the Government, would lead to increasing dissension within the movement. Mokau would be at the forefront of this tension, as chiefs and hapu continued to try to balance between local pressures and wider allegiances. By June 1882, the boycott on the Native Land Court would be broken by a hearing on Mokau lands as chiefs sought legal title to protect lands threatened by the Government, European speculators and rival tribes.

167 ‘Rewi Closes the Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 5 Mar 1881, p2 and ‘Rewi and the Mokau Coal-Workings’, Marlborough Express, 8 Mar 1881, p2


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Chapter Seven

The Native Land Court Moves into Mokau

7.1 The Lead up to the Native Land Court

Introduction

In June 1882, Mokau Maori sought Crown title to the Poutama lands, an event considered of far-reaching significance not only for Mokau but for the Rohe Potae as a whole. Historians have variously described the hearing as the first time Ngati Maniapoto had placed their lands under the Native Land Court and ‘one of the first instances where Kingitanga leaders broke the Native Land Court boycott’.1 Some commentators, both at the time and more recently, have argued that it dealt a crucial blow to the strength and unity of the Kingitanga.2

This chapter will leave to other reports the wider discussion on whether it had such a radical effect on the Kingitanga, and on the Rohe Potae. Rather the focus here will be on examining the specific causes that forced local chiefs to the Native Land Court. It will argue that Mokau Maori and others did not seek a court hearing in order to rebel from or weaken the King Movement. Rather, they were seeking legal title to their land to protect it from the Government, from Pakeha speculators and from tribal rivals.

The situation in Mokau therefore provides a case study of the pressures on the aukati, and especially on its outer edges, that were forcing major changes and difficult decisions upon the leaders of Te Rohe Potae. In particular, it shows how the resistance towards using the Court, while remaining strong, was beginning to give way.

Perhaps most importantly, this chapter will focus on the disparity in motivations between those Maori who sought legal control over Mokau lands and those Europeans, especially the Crown officials, who encouraged them to use the Court. Chiefs such as Wetere and, most importantly, Rewi Maniapoto eventually came to see the Native Land Court as a necessary evil that would allow them to preserve their lands, their communal structures and the aukati. For the Crown and for many Pakeha, the purpose of the Court was the very opposite – it was designed to undermine and eventually destroy the things that local Maori were seeking to protect.

A survey to protect against trespass and confiscation

By July 1881, Wetere and other Mokau Maori were increasingly considering surveying and seeking Crown title to the Poutama area. The prime reason for this was not, as some Pakeha presumed, because they wanted to open their land up to uncontrolled European involvement, or that they were seeking to sell their land or individualise their

1 Parsonson, ‘Te Mana o Te Kingitanga’, p137; Marr, ‘The Waimarino Purchase Report’, p103. 2 See Parsonson, ‘Te Mana o Te Kingitanga’, pp105-118 and the many newspaper reports arguing this, some of which are quoted below.

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land tenure and society. On the contrary, the major push towards the Court was to gain legal control over their land to protect it from unwanted European and Crown interference.

As we have seen, Mokau Maori were certainly not isolationists, and remained keen on facilitating more positive interaction with Pakeha. In general, Mokau chiefs during this period maintained a policy of welcoming and allowing Pakeha visitors as long as they acted appropriately and were seen as bringing benefits rather than threats to local people. Possible joint coal extraction arrangements with Europeans were increasingly seen as a crucial economic opportunity for local society. Although no large-scale coal deals had yet been reached, potential business partners were invited into the region to examine, under Maori supervision, the coal seams.

There were also occasional tourist excursions from Waitara and New Plymouth. Mokau chiefs sometimes provided passes or permits allowing visitors to travel further on through the aukati, with local people acting as their paid guides.3 Permission to enter Mokau was not automatic and some would-be visitors were turned back if their presence was judged as threatening.4 These general conditions were well known by Europeans and the Government, especially as Wetere would write to settler newspapers to try to ensure that the situation was understood and infringement and tension was avoided.5

This system seemed to be working smoothly enough until the unauthorised stealing into the Mokau region in February 1881 of a group of Pakeha prospecting for gold and coal. Wetere was reported to be ‘astonished’ when told of the incursion. Maori alarm was deepened by apparently incorrect claims that the prospectors were acting with Government backing.6 Rewi and others complained to the Government while Mokau Maori warned the intruders to leave. The prospectors refused, claiming to be ‘on Government land’. Reports were then circulated that an armed party was searching for the prospectors who would be taken out of the aukati by force.7 While violence was occasionally used elsewhere to enforce the aukati, in Mokau the post-war imperative to avoid damaging confrontation with Europeans remained inviolate. Local Maori sought economic development and peaceful development, and had in the confiscation and turmoil of the 1860s a still vivid reminder of the disastrous consequences of physical conflict with the Crown and Pakeha. The Government’s invasion of Parihaka later in 1881 would serve as a more contemporary warning. Wetere therefore gave his ‘young men’ strict instructions:

3 For example Taranaki Herald, 18 Nov 1876, p2; 15 Dec 1877, p2; 31 December 1879, p2; 3 Jones to Sheehan, 21 April 1878, Papers Relating to Mokau Lands, Hannah Mokau Special File 124, MA 23/6*7 mentions the provision of passes 4 ‘Maori Troubles Ahead’, Star, 19 Dec 1879, p3; ‘More Maori Humbug’, Grey River Argus, 18 Feb 1882, p2 5 Esp. Taranaki Herald, 3 Jan 1880, p2. Also, ‘Gold Mining at the Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 8 Dec 1879, p3 6 Taranaki Herald, 15 Feb 1881, p2 7 ‘Barry the Prospector to be Turned Back’, Hawera and Normanby Star, 26 Feb 1881, p2


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not to strike or ill-treat the Europeans, who persist in gold prospecting our land – not even to strike them, but to take their food away: and then they will be compelled to return for want of sustenance. We do not want to hurt them.8

But the lack of recourse to violence meant that Mokau Maori, their resources and their authority were highly vulnerable, especially given that the Government was unwilling to arrest the prospectors or to promise to prevent future episodes as it argued no law has been broken.9 This particular group of interlopers was able to continue to search for gold in the region for a number of months, while some of the armed constabulary garrisoned nearby also took part in unauthorised prospecting.10 These incidents – and the fear that they could lead to more damaging incursions – were critical in pushing Wetere and other local chiefs towards the Court and especially towards creating a clear, legally recognised boundary between Maori and Government land.

Another great push towards survey, and towards the Native Land Court, was the threat and fear of the Crown. While Mokau Maori, like the Kingitanga in general, had long opposed the confiscation of their lands, it was only in 1881 that they became aware of the extent, and the specific areas, that had been legally seized. As discussed in chapter four, the Crown had in 1865 declared the northern boundary of the Taranaki confiscation area to run in a straight line 20 miles inland from the Te Horo tunnel at Parininihi. The confiscation line was some three miles north of the Pukearuhe redoubt, which meant that the area around Waipingau Stream and Gully was included in the legally confiscated area. This highly significant area for Mokau hapu was a transport route and entry point into and out of the aukati and a place of whare and urupa.

It was also a vital tribal boundary point. Many Ngati Maniapoto chiefs, including Wetere, argued that Waipingau was the border that had been established between themselves and Ngati Tama from the late 1840s.11 Waipingau was also considered by local Maori to be the border between themselves and the Crown with the nearby Pukearuhe Redoubt marking the beginning of Crown control and confiscation, which was called by local Maori ‘Captain Messenger’s district’, after the head of the armed constabulary.12 The importance of this area as a boundary line, which announced that you were entering an area under the control of Ngati Maniapoto hapu, is further suggested by the fact that the famous ‘Wahanui line’ of 1883, establishing the lands to be legally secured to Ngati Maniapoto and their allies, also used Waipingau as its south-western boundary.13

It was only around June 1881 that local Maori began to hear reports that the Crown was claiming this crucial area. Their previous lack of knowledge is not surprising, as

8 ‘Native Meeting at White Cliffs’, Taranaki Herald, 25 Jun 1881, p2 9 Ibid 10 Ibid 11 Waipingau is near to Waikaramuramu, also often mentioned as the boundary in this agreement. See Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, i.e. p19-20 12 Native Meeting at White Cliffs’, Taranaki Herald, 25 Jun 1881, p2 13 AJHR, 1883, J-1


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the Crown had not surveyed the legal confiscation line, or informed local Maori of it. Indeed, many Crown officials and Native Land Court judges were apparently also unaware of the precise parameters of the confiscation area.14

In June 1881, a large group of Ngati Maniapoto chiefs demanded a meeting at Pukearuhe with the Native Minister Rolleston to discuss the exact extent of the confiscation area. Rolleston refused to attend, deputising Robert Parris in his stead. Upper Mokau and other Ngati Maniapoto rangatira waited for Parris for several weeks, the delay forcing them to return home.15 However, when Parris did finally arrive, brandishing a map of the confiscation area, coastal Mokau leaders left him in no doubt of their refusal to accept that this land had been taken by the Crown. They condemned the fact that the confiscation boundary had been set without consulting them. Wetere and others repeatedly stated that the law must be changed and the area north of Waipingau be acknowledged as Ngati Maniapoto land. He and Ngati Maniapoto had returned the area south of Waipingau to Taranaki Maori; now the Crown must legally redraw the boundary and acknowledge Ngati Maniapoto rights north of Waipingau.16 Hone Periopa was emphatic that the confiscation of land north of Waipingau would not be recognised or accepted and that the Crown’s claiming of this land was damaging its standing with Mokau Maori:

My law says that the boundary is at Waipingau. Now let it be as I say, that it may save disputes. You say you have no power to alter your law; neither have I power to alter my law.

While the discussion with Parris revolved primarily around repeated demands to redraw the confiscation boundaries, it also provided insight on some of the other grievances and demands of Mokau Maori. Many of the comments inferred a more general condemnation of the Government’s confiscation of Maori land. Wetere remarked that it ‘seems as if your confiscation went everywhere, right up to Auckland’. Te Huria asked:

Why did you take land that did not belong to you? We received the Gospel, not knowing that it and the law came together. You concealed that from us; now the law has taken the land.17

Tiki stated, ‘You are taking the land off others. Which is stealing’. Epiha condemned the fact that even the land of those who were committed to good relations with the Crown had been seized. ‘Is it right’, he said, ‘that if one in a house sins that you should take the goods of all in the house as payment?’

14 See comments by Epiha and Parris reply in ‘Native Meeting at White Cliffs’, Taranaki Herald, 25 Jun 1881, p2. It is possible that at least some Taranaki Maori were aware by 1879 of the exact confiscation area and that it included up to Parininihi, as suggested by the ploughing protests around Parininihi in that year (‘Native Affairs’, Poverty Bay Herald, 30 Jun 1879, p2). However, Takerei and other Mokau leaders seemed to have demanded the 1881 meeting with Parris because they had just become aware that Waipingau and Parininihi were included in the confiscation area 15 Taranaki Herald, 9 Jun 1881, p2 16 Native Meeting at White Cliffs’, Taranaki Herald, 25 Jun 1881, p2 17 Ibid


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Parris’ reply was to state that the confiscation and the confiscation lines had been set by law and would not be reversed. He also gave the common Crown response to Ngati Maniapoto complaints about confiscation. They had been in rebellion and ‘had always joined in hostilities against the Government’.18 They were therefore lucky not to have had more of their lands seized.19 Such statements were perhaps also intended as a coded warning to Ngati Maniapoto that more confiscation in the future was not impossible. Nevertheless, the Mokau chiefs were unbowed. They wanted good relations with the Crown but did not accept the confiscation of their land. Taniora complained that unjust law, and the confiscation line, were imposed on Maori:

Set the law right, but do not uphold what is wrong ... Who of us here assisted in making that law? ... My law is we find anything wrong in the law, we alter it ... If your law is wrong alter it ... I belong to the Queen now, and intend to live quietly, but still I say, let the work of the law be undone.20

Parris acknowledged that Mokau Maori were ‘well-inclined’ and peaceful, and promised to look into a specific dispute that they had with a Pakeha ship-owner, an undertaking he would fulfil.21 However, his prediction that the Crown would be unbending on confiscation and the confiscation line proved correct.

Mokau Maori would continue to refuse to recognise the confiscation line and to petition Parliament to alter it.22 At the same time, local Maori considered another response to the Government’s confiscation of the Waipingau area. There was increased interest in carrying out their own survey that would more clearly establish the boundary between themselves and the Crown. It would seem that they intended to draw this line at Waipingau. But a survey, as Wetere explained to Parris, served other purposes. The Crown’s claiming of Waipingau, and the gold prospectors trespassing on this territory, had convinced him that a clearly recognised and accepted boundary was essential to the protection of land and the avoidance of conflict. Until then, there would be conflict and uncertainty: ‘That is the reason I want the boundary fixed to know my own land from Government lands, lest disputes arise’.23

Immediately after the hui with Parris, some Mokau Maori began to mark out boundaries, perhaps to make clear to the Crown and to Pakeha the areas they claimed under their authority. However, as the confiscation and the gold prospectors had proven, such markings, and the aukati in general, had decreasing power given its lack of legal recognition. Having the land surveyed and granted to them under the Native Land Court system could provide that recognition. On September 9, Epiha made another application for a Court hearing. However, both Judge Fenton and the Government remained unwilling to risk a Court hearing without the consent of more

18 Ibid 19 See O’Malley, ‘War and Raupatu’ 20 Native Meeting at White Cliffs’, Taranaki Herald, 25 Jun 1881, p2 21 Memo from W Rolleston, 27 Sep 1881, NO 81/3340, MA 23/6*7, Hannah Mokau Special File 124 22 Taranaki Herald, 13 Jul 1881, p2 23 Taranaki Herald, 9 Jun 1881, p2


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major rangatira.24

Legal title to prevent the Government and Pakeha buying it without consent

Ultimately, what forced a wider group of Ngati Maniapoto leaders into requesting a Court investigation of the Poutama region was the belief that this was the only way to stop the Government and Pakeha from buying or seizing it without their consent. In 1881, the Government entered into secret negotiations with Ngati Tama and other Taranaki chiefs to buy land at or near Mokau. There were also talks about opening the area around Tongaporutu to Pakeha gold-miners, apparently without Ngati Maniapoto consent or control, and with the revenue to go to Taranaki Maori. Furthermore, it was believed that Ngati Tama chiefs were about to seek legal title to the Poutama area as a precursor to land arrangements with the Crown and Pakeha.25

As these discussions took place largely in secret and did not proceed to a final agreement, we have little precise information about the attitudes and considerations of the Taranaki chiefs who were involved. They were evidently seeking some form of land arrangement with the Government in order to gain initial payments but also gain some form of joint control and ongoing revenue from future gold mining. Inter-tribal rivalries and disputes over land rights also likely played a part. These Ngati Tama chiefs may well have viewed with alarm the growing interest of some Mokau Ngati Maniapoto to gain legal title over the region and to enter into coal deals, and resolved to beat them to the punch.

The pressures and promises of Pakeha land speculators seem to have also played a powerful role. As discussed in chapter four, Ngati Tama chiefs had earlier shown interest in gold deals with Pakeha but been forced to abandon their efforts by Tawhiao and Wetere. The European gold prospectors of 1881, who had so outraged Wetere and Ngati Maniapoto with their unauthorised visit, found a warmer reception among Ngati Tama groups based around Tongaporutu. The prospectors left the area in June 1881, having found few signs of gold but claiming to have received permission to return for further prospecting.26 It would seem likely that one of the prospectors, Isaac Downs, maintained close ties with Ngati Tama chiefs and acted as their representative in the subsequent land negotiations.27

It was around this period that Ngati Tama chiefs Taringakuri Te Kaeaea Te Reweti

24 While the right to call a Court hearing rested with the Chief Judge of the Native Land Court, the Government, under section 20 of the Native Land Act 1873, had the legal ability to prevent a hearing if it saw fit. For this reason, Fenton announced the Mokau hearing in 1882 only after receiving assurance from Bryce that he would probably not cancel the hearing. Fenton to Bryce, 24 Mar 1882, and Bryce minute, 25 Mar 1882, NLC 82/1267, pp202-203, in BBOP 4309, box 11a, Archives New Zealand, Auckland 25 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, pp20-22 26 ‘Resident Magistrates Court’, Wanganui Herald, 14 Jun 1881, p2. Note that this article states that they had received permission to prospect in the Tuhua area 27 ‘The Mokau District’, Taranaki Herald, 21 Sep 1881, p2. There is some suggestion that Downs (or Down) was from Ngati Tama. However, ‘Resident Magistrates Court’, Wanganui Herald, 14 Jun 1881, p2 mentions that one of the Pakeha prospectors was named Downs.


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and Paiuru Te Rangikatatu contacted the Government and Native Minister Rolleston regarding possible land sales or agreements.28 By September 1881, these Ngati Tama chiefs were urging the Government that now was the time to make a more definite arrangement. They sought an advance payment ‘so that we may be able to go before you to discuss the matter and place it on a more satisfactory footing’. Downs was sent down to Wellington to seek a meeting with Native Minster Rolleston to explain their conditions and move the deal closer to completion. The chiefs sent a letter from Tongaporutu, signed and witnessed by two Pakeha, calling on members of the House of Representatives to push Rolleston and the Government to:

Make haste and contract a marriage with one woman that there may be born unto us a male child. The woman we refer to is land, and the child the Poutama territory. The courting days are over and something definite should be arrived at.

The letter repeatedly emphasised that a firmer agreement must be speedily reached, quite possibly because the Ngati Tama chiefs feared opposition from Ngati Maniapoto and the Kingitanga once they became aware of the negotiations. A critical demand was that the Crown immediately settle Pakeha on the land, presumably because Ngati Tama saw them as providing a physical sign to their tribal rivals that agreement had been reached and could not easily be altered:

Be speedy and open this district while we are strong to give it to you ... Let the first thing be to send Europeans on the land ... The fish of the winter season will not take the bait which is the fish of the summer season, so do you be quick while there is a calm. This is a good fish, and our giving up this land will considerably advance the country. Delays are dangerous ... Waste no time.29

This letter took the negotiations onto a more urgent and more public level. Shortly afterwards, there were reports that Ngati Tama chiefs were seeking a conference with Rolleston at Waitara:

when definite arrangements will be made for giving up the land to the government for the purpose of having it proclaimed as a goldfield. The natives are excited over the matter, having been led to believe they will reap a golden harvest from the revenue to be derived from the land if it is proved to be a payable field.30

Parliamentarians took up Ngati Tama’s call for an immediate agreement. The Native Minister was asked in Parliament to confirm that the Government had already made an advance payment of £2000 for the ‘Tangarakau’ area near Mokau, which was believed

28 ‘A New Goldfield’, Wanganui Herald, 15 Sep 1881, p3 The fuller names of the Ngati Tama chiefs are given in Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, pp4, 7 29 ‘The Mokau District’, Taranaki Herald, 21 Sep 1881, p2. The immediate provision of settlers, apart from the economic benefits, may also have been desired to help ensure that the Crown would defend Ngati Tama if there was ensuing conflict with Ngati Maniapoto affiliated hapu. 30 Taranaki Herald, 24 Sep 1881, p2


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to contain gold, and was in the process of completing the purchase.31 He was urged to make an arrangement with the Ngati Tama chiefs for further gold prospecting of the Poutama block and confidence was expressed that the ‘Government would have no problem in opening up’ the Poutama area. Rolleston was also asked whether he was aware that a representative of Ngati Tama was in Wellington seeking to complete negotiations.32

Throughout these negotiations, and subsequent Ngati Maniapoto protests, the Government was secretive and ambiguous over what arrangements, if any, it had entered into with Ngati Tama. In Parliament, Rolleston replied that it would not be in the public interest to specify exactly what lands the Crown were in current negotiation for. However, he did acknowledge that the Government was well aware of the general ‘expediency’ of ‘opening up’ this area and was endeavouring to do so.33

Pakeha newspapers were delighted with the prospect of a purchase and a new goldfield. They were confident the Government would ‘strike while the iron is hot’ and purchase the land.34 There were the typical exaggerations of the scale of the offer, including suggestions that Ngati Tama were proposing to ‘throw open’ around a million acres of gold rich country from Mokau to Taupo.35 However, the reality was shocking enough for the Ngati Maniapoto-connected hapu of Mokau. It was the news of these dealings that convinced many previously ambivalent Ngati Maniapoto chiefs, both in Mokau and in the wider region, that gaining legal title was the only way to prevent the land being sold or lost without their consent. Wetere and others began to urgently demand a Court hearing. Ngati Tama chiefs were also apparently making their own applications for a Court hearing over the Poutama lands.36

It is not clear which group was the first to seriously consider using the Court but it is likely that each report of one group moving towards seeking Crown title forced their rivals to consider a counter move. The race to the Court was therefore a race to protect the land that also had some of the unmistakable characteristics of inter-tribal rivalry. Disputes over authority and land had always been potent; the prospect of Crown title and land deals with Pakeha gave them a new urgency and vehemence.

These rivalries were taking place even though, in many spheres, the relationship between Ngati Maniapoto and Taranaki hapu based in or around the Mokau region remained close during this period. It is not possible to give clear population figures for

31 It is not clear where this land was. It was possibly the Tangarakau area (later known as the Taumatamahoe block) in the upper Whanganui district near the Mokau Parininihi block. Thanks to James Mitchell for this suggestion 32 ‘Tangarakau and Pautama Blocks’, NZPD, vol 40, 19 Aug to 24 Sep 1881, p674 33 Ibid. Certainly, some advance payments were made to Ngati Tama and Taranaki Maori around this time for nearby land. See Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, pp43-46 re the ‘Pohokura’ block. 34 Taranaki Herald, 26 Sep 1881, p2 35 ‘The Mokau District’, Taranaki Herald, 21 Sep 1881, p2 36 Evidence of Charles Brown, 6 June 1882, Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book No. 1, pp13-14; AJHR, 1888, G-4C, pp20-22 mention Ngati Tama applications for Court hearings. It is not clear if these applications were the same as those found in Kahiti O Niu Tireni, 23 May 1882, No 18, p99 (translation by Ariaan Gage-Dingle)


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each group at this time, given the mobility of the people, the inter-marriage, and the complex and multiple tribal affiliations. Moreover, the Government’s population and tribal estimates at this time were deeply flawed, in part because its census enumerators were not welcome in the aukati.37

A few very tentative suggestions, backed by some rather confusing data, can be offered. It would seem that the population of the various Ngati Maniapoto and Taranaki hapu was fluctuating but always fairly small, and that a far greater number of Maori had connections to the Mokau region than resided in it at any one time. In 1878, WG Mair suggested 1070 Ngati Maniapoto lived in the broader interior area between Puniu and the Upper Mokau, a number higher than the 1874 estimate which he believed was inaccurate.38 However in 1878, another Government official, RS Bush, argued that the 1874 estimate that 1290 Ngati Maniapoto lived in the coastal area from Mokau north to Whaingaroa was likely to have been a major exaggeration. He now believed that there were only 176 Ngati Maniapoto in the coastal settlements, including 40 in ‘Mokau’, which was perhaps a reference to the area north of the Mokau River.39 In addition, 96 Maori from Ngati Maniapoto hapu were based in (southern?) Mokau, while 32 Ngati Tama were recorded as residing between Tongaporutu and Parininihi plus 194 Ngati Tama and Ngati Mutunga were living between Parininihi and Urenui.40

There are some suggestions that the number of Maori based in the region, both Ngati Maniapoto and Taranaki-affiliated, had diminished somewhat by 1881. WG Mair estimated a total population of 1200 Ngati Maniapoto in the Upper Waikato District, including coastal and interior settlements until the Awakino River.41 However, W Rennell suggested only 23 Ngati Rakei of Ngati Maniapoto were ‘usually resident’ at Awakino, while between Mokau and Tongaporutu there were 20 Ngati Rakei of Ngati Maniapoto and 2 ‘Ngatipa’ of Ngati Maniapoto. Rennell also listed 4 Ngati Tama and 26 Ngati Mihi of Ngati Awa living between Mokau and Tongaporutu, plus 45 Maori of various Ngati Awa hapu from Pukearuhe to Mimi.42 The Native Land Court hearing in 1882 also included some discussion on the various populations living in the area, although the material is at least as confusing, contradictory and dubious as the Government estimates. It does however confirm that the local population was highly mobile, and that by 1882 there were very few Ngati Tama currently resident in the Poutama area, with many of them based at Parihaka.43

The populations shared some common political interests, most notably in the

37 O’Malley, ‘War and Raupatu’, pp208-210 38 Upper Waikato Return, AJHR, 1878, G-2, p17 39 RS Bush to Native Department Under Secretary, 22 May 1878, AJHR, G-2, pp4-5 40 AJHR, 1878, G-2, p18 41 AJHR, 1881, G-3, p15 42 AJHR, 1881, G-3, p16 43 The Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book No 1 has many references to population, witnesses from each group tending to deny that the other had substantial numbers living on Poutama. Judge Fenton on pp73-74 stated that by 1882 no Ngati Tama were living on the land, although he would not commit himself to whether they had been driven by the region from Wetere and other Ngati Maniapoto, or had gone voluntarily to Parihaka to support Te Whiti


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resistance to confiscation. Ngati Tama and other Taranaki Maori from around the Tongaporutu area southwards were closely associated with Te Whiti-o-Rongomai and Tohu Kakahi and their protests against confiscation. Not surprisingly, the attitude of Ngati Maniapoto hapu of Mokau was more complex. Both local and Kingitanga leaders publicly distanced themselves from the Taranaki prophets, and there is no evidence, despite continuing Pakeha suspicions, that Wetere was active in these protests. However, at least some Mokau Maori were. In June 1879, Te Whiti’s supporters ploughed land at Parininihi and elsewhere as an act of resistance towards the confiscation. According to newspapers reports, Ngati Tama and other Taranaki Maori who had returned from the Chathams were heavily involved in the ploughing and indeed ‘have long since become fanatic and believers in Te Whiti’.44 Tupoki Te Herewini Ngapiko, a Ngati Tama chief with strong ties to Tongaporutu, was arrested for his ploughing activities, and imprisoned in Otago.45 Some Ngati Maniapoto from Mokau were also reported to be supporting Te Whiti and to have warned local settlers to leave.46 Wetere, although initially suspected by Government officials to be a supporter of these activities, warned his followers not to join the ploughing as, ‘We are Manga’s [Rewi’s] people, and as long as he gets on with [the] Government, we are not going in any path but his’.47 Despite Wetere’s call, in July a Ngati Maniapoto man apparently based in Mokau was arrested for taking a leading role in organising ploughing near Waitara.48 Rewi was reported to be coming to Mokau to reprimand local Maori for harassing settlers as part of the protests.49

In 1880, the Government considered that Te Whiti’s influence from Parininihi southwards had grown and was at its peak.50 There were disputed claims that Wahanui was collecting men at the Mokau Heads to back Te Whiti while Wetere was reported to have briefly visited Te Whiti’s settlement at Parihaka in Taranaki.51 By 1881, considerable numbers of Ngati Maniapoto had gathered at Parihaka. There were (perhaps dubious) claims that in April of that year 23 Maori from Awakino were living at Parihaka while the 1881 census recorded a total of 116 Ngati Maniapoto living at the Taranaki settlement.52 Pakeha suspicions about Wetere grew and Taranaki settlers reportedly regarded ‘with great suspicion all Te Wetere’s movements, his reputation being that of an extremely cunning and treacherous Maori’.53 However, rumours that he made a secret visit to Parihaka at this time are unlikely to be correct and seem to instead reflect the increasing fear and belligerence of Taranaki settlers. More credible

44 ‘Native Affairs’, Poverty Bay Herald, 30 Jun 1879, p2 45 Evidence of Tupoki Te Herewini Ngapiko, 9 Jun 1882, Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, pp34-35 46 ‘Ploughmen Arrested at Punake’, Taranaki Herald, 30 Jun 1879, p2; The Mokau Scare’, Taranaki Herald, 2 Jul 1879, p2 47 ‘The Mokau Scare’, Taranaki Herald, 2 Jul 1879, p2 48; The Native Difficulty’, Wanganui Herald, 24 Jul 1879, p2. This was Pitami, who may have participated in the 1869 attack on the Pukearuhe redoubt. 49 Ibid 50 AJHR, 1880, G-4, p17 51 ‘Native Affairs, Star, 29 Jan 1880, p2; ‘The Waimate Plains’, Taranaki Herald, 6 Feb 1880, p2 52 ‘Maori Population’, Hawera & Normanby Star, 3 Oct 1881, p2 53 ‘Our Native Trouble’, Taranaki Herald, 1 Oct 1881, p2


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are claims that significant numbers of Ngati Maniapoto were at Parihaka when it was invaded by the Armed Constabulary on 5 November 1881.54 As we shall see, Te Whiti, Tohu and their ideas would remain influential in Mokau for another generation and more, and would inspire ongoing resistance to land loss.55

If some Ngati Maniapoto joined in Taranaki-led protests against confiscation, some Ngati Tama supported Ngati Maniapoto-driven efforts to reverse the losses. The Ngati Tama chief Paiuru Te Rangikatatu attended the June 1881 meeting with Parris in which Ngati Maniapoto chiefs from Mokau protested over the confiscation of the Waipingau area, offering them advice on which politicians they should lobby.56

Figure 10: Overlap between areas claimed by Ngati Maniapoto and Ngati Tama

These common bonds did not mean that the disputes over rights to the Poutama area had disappeared. From the mid-1870s onwards, the major impetus for these disputes was the increasing contact with Pakeha and Government land agents and officials. As local Maori looked toward land and business ties with Europeans, the disputes over who had the right to enter into these ties worsened. The Court, according to Pakeha

54 O’Malley, ‘War and Raupatu’, p207 55 See section 9.4 on Maori attitudes to sale during the purchase of Mokau Mohakatino No 1. 56 ‘Mr. Paris’s Visit to the White Cliffs’, Taranaki Herald, 23 Jun 1881, p2


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speculators and the Government, was the only way to solve these issues. There is no evidence to suggest that the tribes of the Mokau considered the Court a valuable mechanism to mediate their own internal or inter-tribal disputes which was superior to more traditional forums, such as runanga or the Kingitanga. As Wetere explicitly stated, ‘It was not to end our dispute [with Ngati Tama] that I sent in a claim to this Court’.57

Rather, the issue was which forum could deal with the tension and unease stemming from dealings with Pakeha. As we shall see, it was increasingly difficult for the Kingitanga, or other tribal and inter-tribal methods, to deal with these disputes because they lacked control over the Pakeha institutions and individuals who were at the heart of the problem. Only the Court had the legal power to say who could, and equally as important, who could not deal with Pakeha over land matters. Therefore some, although certainly not all, Mokau Maori looked towards the Court as legal and Pakeha protection for what was a legal and Pakeha problem.

The attempts of Paiura and others to ‘sell’ Poutama were a vivid warning to Ngati Maniapoto leaders of the risk, if they did not gain legal title, that the land could be ripped from their control. In September 1881, after reading in newspapers about the Government’s negotiations to buy the land, Wetere rushed to Wellington to protest to Native Minister Rolleston. Rolleston agreed that the Government would not make the advance payment on Poutama that Ngati Tama were seeking but advised Wetere to seek legal title over the block if he wanted to control its fate.58 He apparently also told Wetere that the Government would not stand in the way of any application for a Court hearing.59

Wetere took Rolleston’s advice. He immediately applied for a Court hearing which Rolleston forwarded to Judge Fenton for consideration. As Wetere repeatedly explained in the coming months, he had been reluctant to apply to the Court but saw no other choice to protect the land from sale and loss. It would seem that Wetere and others also hoped that the Court would reverse the confiscation and grant them title over the Waipingau lands.60 However, Judge Fenton remained unsure whether the Court could safely sit in regards to Mokau land. He repeatedly failed to reply to Wetere’s applications or to his telegrams.

European pressure and Government resistance for a Court hearing

Increasingly concerned that time was running out to save the land, Wetere and other Mokau Maori attempted to gain wider Ngati Maniapoto and Kingitanga consent while

57 Evidence of Wetere Te Rerenga, 8 Jun 1882, Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, p30. As we will see, some chiefs did see the Court as potentially playing a constructive intermediary role in their dealings with Pakeha. 58 RS Bush to Native Minister regarding Tawhiao’s Meeting at Whatiwhatihoe, in May 1882, AJHR, 1882, G-1, p2. Also Taranaki Herald, 24 Sep 1881, p2 59 ‘Opening of the Mokau Country’, Wanganui Herald, 11 Nov 1881, p2; ‘Opening of the Mokau Country’, Hawera & Normanby Star, 14 Nov 1881, p2 60 ‘Opening of the Mokau Country’, Wanganui Herald, 11 Nov 1881, p2


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also lobbying European politicians and the public. In November, Wetere, Takirau Watihi, Epiha and Heta travelled to New Plymouth to press Member of the House of Representatives Thomas Kelly to ‘obtain the sitting of a Court without delay’.61

The meeting illustrated the differing visions that shaped Maori and European support for the Court. The Mokau chiefs wanted the Court to protect their land, this was their priority and they refused to make any other commitments or promises. Kelly, on the other hand, believed that the Court would pave the way for a railway line through Mokau and the opening up of the aukati to European control. When he tried to tie his support for a Court hearing with negotiations over a railway line, the chiefs fended him off with assurances that the issue of the railway could only be considered after they gained legal control of their threatened land.62 Wetere and Takirau assured Kelly that there ‘would be no trouble’ if the Court sat and that Rewi had given them permission ‘to manage all the affairs of Mokau with the Europeans’. The meeting finished with Kelly promising to do all he could to facilitate a Court hearing, including contacting the Native Minister.63

Europeans would in the following months demand a Court hearing. Many Taranaki settlers and politicians were growing impatient with the lack of progress in their district, and were looking towards Mokau and especially a railway line running through there to kick-start development. Mokau was a campaign issue on the Taranaki elections for the House of Representatives. Kelly stumped for re-election by stating that he had worked actively to bring the Court to Mokau. Citing his meeting with Mokau chiefs as (very dubious) proof, he claimed that a railway line from Taranaki to Auckland via Mokau was achievable and that Mokau Maori were ‘not only willing, but they were anxious, that the railway should be constructed through their land, and that the district should be taken up’.64 His opponent, Mr. Brown, likewise presented himself as an expert on Mokau and called on the Government to get local ‘natives to individualise their claims to land’ although he warned that Rewi’s unambivalent consent would be crucial to the process.65

Other Europeans were not inclined to wait and there was considerable settler condemnation of the Government and the Court for not immediately facilitating a hearing. The Urenui correspondent for the Taranaki Herald stated that with ‘Parihaka cleared out’, the Government’s focus should be on getting Mokau Maori to ‘individualize their title’.66 In late December 1881, Wetere and a large number of followers went to Waitara to again call for a Court hearing and to announce that they would petition Parliament ‘respecting their applications’.67 Taranaki settlers responded with a petition, supported by parliamentarians and local leaders, demanding a meeting

61 Opening of the Mokau Country’, Wanganui Herald, 11 Nov 1881, p2 62 Ibid, and ‘Opening of the Mokau Country’, Hawera & Normanby Star, 14 Nov 1881, p2 63 Ibid 64 ‘Election Addresses’, Taranaki Herald, 23 Nov 1881, p2; ’Land Court at Mokau’, 10 Jan 1882, p2 65 Election Addresses’, Taranaki Herald, 25 Nov 1881, p2 66 ‘Urenui’, Taranaki Herald, 24 May 1881, p2 67 ‘Latest News’, Waikato Times, 10 Dec 1881, p2


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with the Native Minister so that they could express their anger that he was not doing enough to facilitate a Court hearing. Europeans debated who was responsible for the delays. The Taranaki Herald suggested the Government in general was not doing enough, and had irresponsibly delegated its political responsibility to facilitate a Court to Judge Fenton, who was needlessly delaying matters. The Auckland Evening Star held the Native Department to blame.68 William Grace, a private land purchase agent employed by Joshua Jones, thought the Government the ‘main stumbling block’ and in particular the recently reinstalled Native Minister John Bryce, who he believed wanted to acquire the land for the Crown and shut out Jones and private purchasers.69 The suggestion that Bryce favoured Crown purchase of Mokau was certainly credible, as the Native Minister consistently exhibited hostility towards speculators in general, and to Jones in particular.

These different views were accurate in that they infer that there was no one Crown position towards a land court in Mokau. The chief judge’s consent was needed while Government attitudes varied depending on who was in power and their wider strategic considerations.70 By late 1881, John Hall was Premier and Bryce was back as Native Minister. Bryce’s primary worry was that instituting a Court at Mokau at this stage could provoke violent opposition from Maori and damage the Government’s overall ambitions. Bryce wanted to enter into negotiations with the leadership of the Rohe Potae and gain their support for a main trunk railway, which could not be built in the face of sustained resistance from Maori. Therefore, the Government needed to appear as a trustworthy partner and convince the leaders of the area that the railway would serve their peoples’ interests.71 Instituting a Court in the face of widespread opposition from senior Kingitanga leaders would hurt rather than help the chances of a railway. A degree of caution and patience was considered preferable.

In January 1882, Kelly led a delegation of Taranaki settler leaders (including Joshua Jones’ solicitor) to call upon Premier Hall to cease this policy of caution. They demanded a Government focus on opening up Mokau through the Land Court, and also for Government surveys of Mokau in preparation for the main trunk line and land purchasing. These actions, they believed, would hasten the end of the Kingitanga, and lead to European ownership of what they optimistically claimed was potentially rich pastoral and agricultural land, as well as the coal and various minerals that they believed abounded in the district.72

68 Taranaki Herald, 31 Dec 1881, p2; 12 Jan 1882, p2 (reprinting Auckland Evening Star), 14 Jan 1881, p2; 26 Jan 1881, p2, 10 Feb 1881, p2 69 Grace to Joshua Jones, 12 Dec 1881, pp184-185 and Grace to Jones, 19 Feb 1883, p 396, Grace Letterbook 1880-1892, MSY-4506, ATL. Grace’s suggestion that Bryce favoured Crown purchase of Mokau is certainly credible. Bryce often exhibited hostility towards private speculators in general, and towards Jones in particular. However, at this point his policy towards Mokau would seem to have been largely focused on political rather than land purchasing issues 70 Note that there is little clear evidence on what guided Judge Fenton regarding whether a Court hearing would be allowed, and the interaction between him and the Government over this issue 71 Marr, ‘The Waimarino Purchase Report’, pp99-100 72 ‘Opening up of the Mokau District’, Taranaki Herald, 28 Jan 1882, p2


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While the Prime Minister shared these aspirations, and showed a particular interest in the coal of Mokau, he emphasised to the settler delegation that prudence rather than rashness would be the best method to achieve them. He told the delegation that while the railway line was of a central importance to the Government, a survey of the Mokau area that inspired resistance would not help achieve it but could ‘possibly create another native difficulty’. It was the Government’s duty to be ‘very discreet in pushing on this work, not only in what it does, but in what it says’. Hall saw the issue of the Court hearing and land transactions in Mokau district in the same light. It:

was part and parcel of the question of making a railway through the district, and the same difficulties had to be guarded against ... the Government was showing itself very desirous of opening the land for settlement ... and would continue to open the land, except where there was reason to believe that the opening of it would cause a native difficulty.73

Hall rejected claims that the Government was uninformed or in any way deliberately holding back a Court hearing for Mokau. Crown pre-emption versus a free market in Maori land remained a potent Pakeha political issue while Jones’ claim that there was a dark conspiracy among Government officers and business interests to control the Mokau region for their own benefit was getting wide play during this period. However, the Prime Minister denied that any such sinister ‘undercurrent’ was at work. Rather, the key issue was that Kingitanga and Ngati Maniapoto acquiescence to a Court hearing could not be guaranteed, especially given the continuing doubts over Rewi’s position. The Premier made clear that the Government was therefore guided by ‘simply the question of caution’. Its actions in Mokau would continue to be guided by its wider ambition – the effort to open the Rohe Potae to European control.74

Maori debate: September 1881 to March 1882

The Government had good cause to be wary of the reaction of Te Rohe Potae iwi and hapu towards a Native Land Court hearing in Mokau. Despite the enormous pressures on Maori to put their lands through the Court, antipathy towards it remained strong. Fear of the sales, costs, and lack of communal control commonly associated with the Court combined with the powerful desire to stay within the framework of the broader Kingitanga and Ngati Maniapoto consensus, which included a shunning of the Court.

However, this boycott was increasingly under threat, especially in places such as Mokau on the edges of the aukati where speculator and Government pressure, and the rivalry with other tribal groups, was particularly acute. Wetere and other Mokau Maori increasingly felt that only Government-recognised legal title would allow them to protect and develop the Poutama lands. Although they argued, at least to some degree, that they had the right to make the decision to go to the Court if they so chose, they nevertheless were highly reluctant to do so without the consent of the senior leaders of

73 Ibid 74 Ibid.


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the Kingitanga and Ngati Maniapoto.

From September 1881 – when the Government’s negotiations with Ngati Tama over Poutama became public – until March 1882, Wetere and other Mokau leaders were unable to gain that backing. King Tawhiao took an increasingly close interest in the Mokau situation. Outraged by the efforts of Pakeha speculators and Government officials to alienate the land, he nevertheless wanted to prevent or delay any Court hearing over Mokau, and elsewhere, until he and the Kingitanga could negotiate a broader solution on a number of different fronts.

Most broadly, the Kingitanga were searching for an overall agreement with the Government over the future of the aukati that would acknowledge continuing Maori authority while allowing an increased but carefully controlled degree of European involvement.75 Until such an agreement had been reached, Tawhiao and his followers wanted to prevent Court hearings, surveys and land transactions.

Tawhiao was also seeking what Ann Parsonson describes as a ‘new compact’, an agreement among the tribes and the chiefs on the governing structures of the area that would preserve the Kingitanga as a unified and powerful movement.76 This led to tension in Mokau and elsewhere over how much authority Tawhiao may exert over their lands.77 But Tawhiao’s most direct recommendation regarding Mokau was that the Kingitanga, not the Native Land Court, mediate the question over who held rights in the disputed Poutama area. As he told the Government when expressing his opposition to any Court hearing in Mokau, ‘the whole of the disputes should be left to me for settlement’’. He and the Kingitanga would ‘arrange matters’ to an ‘amicable conclusion’.78

It was the inability of the Kingitanga to speedily achieve these enormously difficult aims that compelled Wetere and other Mokau Maori to push for the Court and brought them into tension with Tawhiao. To portray this dispute as the Kingitanga versus Mokau Maori is far too simplistic. Chiefs with ties to Mokau such as Wahanui remained key figures in the Kingitanga. Taniora Pararoa Wharau, who would take a leading role in the Native Land Court hearing, informed the Court of the continuing authority of the King in Mokau, and the ongoing ties between Tawhiao and local chiefs. He presented the relationship as based around a respect for the authority of the other, and the need for mutual agreement.79 The failure to find mutual agreement over the Court had not finished the relationship.

Certainly, the disputes over the Court damaged the ties between Wetere and Tawhiao. The unusual nature of their debate, in that it was largely fought out in European newspapers, convinced many Pakeha that a far-reaching and total rupture had

75 Marr, ‘The Waimarino Purchase Report’, p102 76 Parsonson, ‘Te Mana o Te Kingitanga’, pp105-109 77 Marr, The Alienation of Maori Land ...Part one, p16 78 ‘Tawhiao and the Mokau Lands’, Waikato Times, 2 Mar 1882, p3 79 Evidence of Taniora Pararoa Wharau, 6 June 1882, Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, pp20-21


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occurred. However, what the debates most vividly reveal are the specific pressures and tensions facing Wetere. Tawhiao’s demands for patience and to wait for a grand agreement with the Crown sat uneasily alongside Wetere’s need for a specific and quick method to prevent Mokau land from being sold or granted to others. While a Kingitanga-mediated solution would have been welcomed, it was increasingly unlikely given that the other parties involved – the Government, Pakeha settlers and speculators, and the chiefs of Ngati Tama – showed no interest in it and were neither connected nor controlled by the Kingitanga.

This suggests a related point. It could be argued that by the early 1880s the Kingitanga’s influence in Mokau, while far from disappeared, was under increasing threat and that there was growing tension between some Mokau and Kingitanga leaders. Some of the underlying causes for this tension were not new, such as the distance between Mokau and the main power centres of the Kingitanga, and the heightened opportunities of Mokau hapu for contact with Pakeha that sometimes brought them into conflict with those calling for more isolation. An important more recent development was the pressure in Mokau from the Land Court and land agents. The Kingitanga had proven itself a powerful and effective influence in Mokau in the period of the wars and their more immediate aftermath. But, like Maori communal structures throughout the country, it was finding it hard to maintain its authority when faced with the corrosive pressures of the Court and secret land dealings. With the Kingitanga unable to solve these issues, Mokau hapu were increasingly seeing no alternative to the Native Land Court. Certainly, the attitudes of some Mokau chiefs strained and tested the internal structure of the Kingitanga. However, the issue was not so much that these chiefs wanted to break away. Rather, it was that the Native Land Court had found a way in.

Given Tawhiao’s opposition, heightened attention and pressure was focused on Rewi. The Government, Jones and his partners, and Mokau Maori all saw Rewi’s consent as crucial to whether the Court would be permitted to adjudicate on Mokau lands. Given his suspicions of the Court and his role as a senior Kingitanga leader, but also his fears that Ngati Maniapoto land was being claimed and sold by other tribes, Rewi was in a particularly complex position. From September 1881 until his crucial decision in March 1882, Rewi refused to take a clear position, leading to much speculation and contradictory claims regarding his attitude.

As soon as Wetere decided in September 1881 that Government title was essential to protect Poutama, he wrote to Rewi, as well as apparently to King Tawhiao, seeking their written permission for a Court hearing. Rewi refused to commit himself, stating that ‘he has nothing to say for or against’ Mokau land going through the Court. Rather, he handed Wetere’s request over to Tawhiao to decide on.80 We don’t have any record of Tawhiao’s reply to Wetere at this time, but it was presumably negative.

Pressure was coming on Rewi from elsewhere, and especially from Joshua Jones and

80 Grace to Joshua Jones, 27 Oct 1881, pp175-176, Grace Letterbook 1880-1892


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his partner, the land purchase agent, William Grace. In September, Grace sought confidential talks with the chief in order to ‘get him if possible to write to Native Minister approving of land Court’.81

Grace was unsuccessful and by December, there were claims that Rewi had written a letter to the Government opposing a Court hearing in Mokau. He was also being linked to reports that violence had been threatened against Wetere and Hitiri, a Ngati Raukawa chief considering a Court hearing over land near Taupo. Grace denied that Rewi had made these threats, stating that Rewi had instead been informing Government officials of a wider risk. According to Grace:

Rewi speaking of things in general said that the Hauhau disapproved of Hitiri[’s] actions as chief of Taupo and of Wetere’s and that perhaps someone, a Maori, would get shot. Rewi never said he disapproved of what Wetere and Hitiri are doing.82

Indeed, Grace believed that Rewi had been in contact with Judge Fenton over Hitiri’s desire for a survey of a large area of land near Taupo. If Fenton satisfactorily answered his concerns, it was predicted that Rewi might approve of the survey.83

Be that as it may, by January 1882 neither the Government nor the Native Land Court believed a Court hearing could be safely held regarding Mokau. Government officials received a telegram signed by Tawhiao telling them to ignore any calls for a hearing.84 Tawhiao had also sent an envoy (‘a man of the Ngatimahuta’) to inform the Government of his opposition.85 Reports of Rewi’s opposition had also reached John Bryce. The Native Minister stated:

Both Tawhiao and Rewi protest strongly against a Court being held at present in respect of Mokau lands, and in such circumstances it would be worse than useless to force it on. Courts are now fixed, not by Government, but by [the] Chief Judge; he telegraphs me that there is no intention of ordering one at present.86

Tawhiao’s opposition to the Court led to tension with Wetere. As early as the Hikurangi hui of May 1881, Europeans had been errantly announcing the complete and unanimous break of all Mokau Maori from the Kingitanga.87 This hui revealed a general determination from the Kingitanga to avoid land sales, although there was an increasing willingness to consider leasing.88 As discussed in the previous chapter, it would seem that some Mokau Maori had also expected this hui to result in an

81 Grace to Joshua Jones, 22 Sep 1881, p171, Grace Letterbook 1880-1892 82 Grace to Joshua Jones, 12 Dec 1881, pp184-185, Grace Letterbook 1880-1892 83 Ibid 84 Taranaki Herald, 29 Dec 1881, p2 85 ‘Opening of Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 14 Feb 1882, p2 86 ‘Land Court at Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 10 Jan 1882, p2 87 ‘Native Intelligence’, Taranaki Herald, 27 Apr 1881, p2 88 Mair to Under-Secretary, Native Department, AJHR, 1881, G-8, p4


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agreement allowing them to enter into coal deals with Europeans. However, the issue of coal and the specific pressures facing Mokau were apparently not considered in any detail. Tawhiao, Wahanui and others were instead focused on the need to strengthen the central authority of the King. All the chiefs present were called upon to reaffirm that the King had ‘sole control’ over their lands. Although it is not easy to say precisely what this ‘sole control’ meant in practice, the key point is that Wetere refused to agree, instead leaving the meeting.89 Wetere was seemingly determined to maintain a degree of independence to deal with the specific challenges facing Mokau, as well as zealously asserting his mana.

In January 1882, Tawhiao and Wetere were again in dispute. Their debate is not easy to understand but at its root was whether Mokau land could be passed through the Native Land in the face of opposition from Tawhiao. In January 1882, it would seem that Tawhiao sent a letter to Crown official Robert Parris opposing a Court hearing over Mokau. A translated version of the letter was apparently printed in the New Zealand Herald which offended Wetere and other Mokau Maori as they understood the King to be asserting a ‘right over our people, our village, and our lands’.90

A translated version of a letter Wetere wrote to Taranaki newspapers was then published calling for the Court hearing to be granted despite Tawhiao’s opposition:

the work is for us to carry out, that is to say, to bring it before the Court. No one has a right to say leave it alone. Tawhiao has nothing to do with us – his village is at Waikato, ours is at Mokau.91

While some historians described this as a ‘blanket denial of kingship’, it is questionable whether either Wetere or Tawhiao considered it in such stark terms.92 Dispute did not necessarily mean dissolution especially as the debate was over the specific issue of the Court. By February, Mokau Maori had been informed by the Government that a hearing would not be granted at this time, largely due to Tawhiao’s opposition. Both Takirau and Wetere wrote to newspapers in protest. Takirau argued that Rewi had earlier given them the power to administer their own lands and:

We people of Mokau have applied that our lands may be passed through the Land Court, so that we may be in a position of ownership ... No one outside of ourselves has any right to interfere with this land. The consent lies with us.93

Wetere complained that the Government’s decision damaged the economic

89 Parsonson, ‘Te Mana o Te Kingitanga’, pp105-106; Donald M Loveridge, ‘The Crown and the Opening of the King Country: 1882-1885’, a report for the Crown Law Office, 2006, p27; ‘Opening Mokau Land’, Taranaki Herald, 22 Mar 1882, p2 90 ‘Native Land Court at Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 27 Jan 1882, p2 and Parsonson, ‘Te Mana o Te Kingitanga’, p106. Tawhiao’s letter has not been located. 91 ‘Native Land Court at Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 27 Jan 1882, p2. Note that only the translated versions of the letters written in Te Reo were published. 92 Parsonson, ‘Te Mana o Te Kingitanga’, p106 93 ‘Opening of Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 8 Feb 1882, p2


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development of Mokau and in effect gave Tawhiao the ‘management of our lands’. He rhetorically asked Europeans whether they would permit Tawhiao to rule over them:

Do you agree that Tawhiao will be your King, and rule over your lands and goods, that you will not agree to what the people of Mokau ask? Because we wish that the Court should sit, and that Mokau should be opened.94

In March 1882, Tawhiao wrote to Wetere explaining his position. It would seem that Wetere never received this letter but instead saw only a translated version that was presented to the Auckland newspapers by CO Davis, a Pakeha with ties to the King. The letter, although ambiguous in parts, suggests that Tawhiao was proposing to both the Government and Mokau that he would preside over a hui to settle the issues revolving around the Mokau lands. He had told the Government not to allow a Court hearing because the Kingitanga would resolve ‘the whole of the disputes’. A great meeting would decide which groups held rights over the disputed lands:

Now, should the affair be decided as suggested by me, a day will be seen [fixed], and when my plan is carried out the result will be satisfactory, for this one will go forth with his portion [of land], and the other with his portion; and these will be in possession, and those will be in possession.95

Davis explained that Tawhiao was making a ‘modest’ request to the Government and to all other parties, that the Mokau disputes be resolved in a Maori, not Pakeha forum, and that the claimants to the Mokau land ‘should be allowed the privilege of adjusting their disputed land claims prior to an investigation of title by the Land Courts’. The hui would ‘raise up’ the issues of the land, of the people and the agreements of the past to find an ‘amicable conclusion’.

Tawhiao envisioned that the hui would help establish a positive agreement regarding the relationship between Maori and European in the Mokau:

I say, therefore, let me arrange this matter, so that our perceptions may become lucid, and the relations between the pakehas and the Maoris confidingly established.96

To achieve this, Tawhiao called on Wetere to halt his efforts to bring the Court and to instead rely on his traditional and tribal links to the Kingitanga to find a solution:

This is my word to you all – be peaceful, end the litigation; come back, all of you, to your great placed of assembly – to the pillar [pou] were rested your fathers, and grandsires, from time immemorial. The word still lives, and is still cherished ... Cease: look directly to me, and wait till you know the result of my plan.

94 ‘Opening of Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 14 Feb 1882, p2 95 ‘Tawhiao and the Mokau Lands’, Waikato Times, 2 Mar 1882, p3 96 Ibid


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Tawhiao addressed Wetere’s published complaints that the King had overstepped his authority in preventing a Court. Tawhiao replied that that he had a connection to the Mokau that should not be ignored. Mokau would remain part of the territory of the Kingitanga, and of the King:

The land is mine and the people are mine. Firstly, on account of the word [kupu]; secondly, on account of old pledges [owhaki]; thirdly, ancestral descent [kawei].

But Tawhiao was also addressing his calls to the Government and to the speculators such as Jones who he rightfully considered were pushing for Court hearings and the dissolution of the Kingitanga. Despite this, he wrote to the Pakeha settlers of Mokau, assuring them of his peaceful and warm intentions and inviting them to attend the hui. But the King was also making clear to the Pakeha that he would continue to have some authority in the Mokau. He had already told the Government that after he had mediated a peaceful and productive resolution of the Mokau affair, he would continue to play a role and not ‘become a mute [ihupuku]’. After a hui had reached a decision over Mokau, it would be publicly announced, and both Maori and Pakeha, it was implied, would be expected to abide by it.97

Tawhiao’s vision for Mokau was part of a wider ‘plan’ regarding the future of the aukati, based around a productive interaction with Pakeha and good relations with the Crown while preserving Kingitanga and tribal authority. According to Parsonson, Tawhiao at this time was planning a great meeting at Whatiwhatihoe to be attended by Maori, Government leaders and Pakeha that would ‘herald the coming of peace not only between him and the Government but between the races’. Tawhiao’s vision for a productive amity would be announced and major steps towards an overall agreement would be reached.98

It would seem likely that Tawhiao intended the Mokau discussions to be part of the Whatiwhatihoe hui or attached in some way to it. Certainly, Tawhiao’s desire for a peaceful and productive Maori control over Mokau that would be recognised by all could only be achieved within the framework of wider agreement with the Government.

However, while Tawhiao was calling for patience and a bypassing of the Court, Mokau Maori were hearing the opposite from European businessmen who were backing their message with the promise of substantial business partnerships. In late 1881 and early 1882, a variety of speculators and their intermediaries, including Edward and George Stockman, Charles Brown, Nevil and Annie Walker, and Arthur Owen and his brother, were attempting to lease land or enter into coal agreement on the north bank of the Mokau River.99

97 Ibid 98 Parsonson, ‘Te Mana o Te Kingitanga’, pp103-104 99 AJHR, 1888, I-3A, I-3B, Stokes, p188


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On the south bank, Jones and Grace had found in EB Walker a potential investor in their plans for a coal extraction and land deal. In March 1882, they toured the Mokau coal reserves and entered into talks with local chiefs, including Wetere, Epiha, Te Oro, Takirau and Hone Pumipi. Their message that Crown title would allow Mokau Maori to protect their land and enter into profitable business relationships with Pakeha apparently found a favourable response. Grace reported that there was anger at the Government’s refusal to grant a Court hearing and towards Tawhiao’s role in this, which was viewed as interference in Mokau land. There were signs that powerful figures who had previously stayed aloof from calls for a Court hearing, such as the upriver chief Heremia, and Te Rangituataka, Wetere’s brother, were re-considering their position. On 7 March, a hui was held at the upriver kainga at Totoro. Grace expounded on the nature of Crown grants and the advantages of putting land through the Court, ‘which seemed to satisfy’ those in attendance. Wetere was then deputised to travel with Grace to Kihikihi to seek Rewi’s approval for a Court hearing.100

The crucial decision – Rewi and the Court, March 1882

As we have seen, Rewi had for some time been concerned with how to protect Ngati Maniapoto-claimed lands from being granted to other iwi and/or sold by them. By early 1882, he had resolved to act. The Land Court and land agents were encircling the aukati from Waikato in the north, to Taupo in the east, and to Whanganui and Mokau-Taranaki in the south.101 In February 1882, a private land agent, Alexander MacDonald began to deal with Ngati Haua in an effort to bring about Court hearings, surveys and sales of land around Maungatatauri, near Rewi’s base of Kihikihi. Government officials, and agents such as Grace, sought to convince Rewi that he could only protect the land through use of the Court. On 17 February 1882, he was visited by Resident Magistrate Mair who wished to speak to him about ‘the opening up of the Mokau’.102 The upshot of the meeting was that Rewi invited Native Minister Bryce to a hui at Kihikihi, held a few days later, on 22 February.

These discussions would have considerable significance for the future of Mokau, and arguably for the Rohe Potae as a whole. They suggested that a strong relationship could be achieved between the Crown and the tribes of the Rohe Potae, which would protect their lands and lay the groundwork for development. The hui started with Rewi laying out his key position – his determination to prevent land loss. The aukati was under threat, the chief said, and it was time that he and the Government worked together to save Maori land. The metaphor Rewi used was of the land as a tree. A grub (apparently Pakeha land buyers and the Courts) had got into the tree, now he and the Government must together water its roots and save it.

Bryce too stated his bottom line – that there could only be one sovereign authority in New Zealand, the Crown. Within this parameter, the Crown, he promised, would

100 Diary entries 27 Feb 1882-14 March 1882, Grace Diary 1882, Msx-4741, ATL 101 Marr, ‘The Waimarino Purchase Report’, p103 102 Taranaki Herald, 17 Feb 1882, p2


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protect Maori and their land, and it would be the canoe on which the Maori people rode to safety.

Rewi, while declining to talk about the issue of sovereignty, discussed the framework and essential precondition for a positive relationship with the Crown.103 The chief called for the Rohe Potae as a whole, including Poutama, to be permanently placed under Maori authority:

He was anxious that the land belonging to his people should be secured to them, and both races would live under one law. The land he wished to be so secured was included in these boundaries: Pirongia, Kakepuku, Puniu river, Tongariro and White Cliffs [Parininihi].104

This call had been frequently made before. The crucial new development was Bryce’s promise, and Rewi’s increasing acceptance, that the Native Land Court would, in some form, be the mechanism to protect these lands and to mark out its boundaries. Rewi repeatedly complained about the activities of land speculators in the area and that other tribes were attempting to sell, survey or gain Crown grants to his people’s land. While Bryce did not want to specifically discuss ‘such intricate questions’, he told Rewi that only by gaining legal title could this be prevented. The policy of boycotting the Native Land Court allowed other tribes to claim and sell their land. Therefore, Bryce advised that:

the only cure for the evil complained of was to ascertain and fix the ownership of the land, not necessarily for sale, but in order that the question of ownership might be set at rest.105

Rewi responded that he:

had made up his mind to go to the Court in respect of lands adjacent to his boundary ... He was going to have the boundary of his country fixed.106

As Don Loveridge points out, the Native Minister sought to reinforce Rewi’s decision by emphasising that the Court need not be the mechanism of sale and land loss, rather it was the way to preserve Maori control. The Crown, he promised, would not follow up the granting of title by pressuring the iwi and hapu of Te Rohe Potae to sell their land:

I really believe the only way to prevent difficulties such as have occurred lower down, is to have the title to the land definitely determined according to our law, and you need never fear. I say positively that none of the Maoris will be compelled to part with their land. If they make use of it in that way it will be at

103 Loveridge, pp23-24 and footnote 39 104 ‘The Native Minister at Kihikihi’, Waikato Times, 25 Feb 1882, p3 105 Ibid 106 Ibid


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their own instance, and not from any pressure from the Government. [“I firmly believe that”. Rewi interjected] ... The question of right will be determined when the land has been before the Court and the title investigated. The title, so far as can see, can never definitely be determined until that is done. Of course, now that you have determined to appear before the Courts to make good your title, the difficulties which formerly existed on that point will no longer exist, because you will be there to make good whatever title you possess.107

Bryce assured Rewi that there would be ‘no danger’ of losing their lands if they used the Court. After Crown title was granted, they could lease the land if so chose, under ‘proper’ and advantageous conditions. Bryce did not recommend selling it and again promised that ‘you need not fear that you will either be urged to let or sell by the Government. We will not be the cause of your disposing of your land’.108

The hui finished with Rewi toasting the Native Minister with a glass of wine. He had been told that the Native Minister was a ‘hard man’. Now, he believed that they could work together in ‘nourishing the tree’. As he told Bryce and Premier Hall the following day, he welcomed further negotiations ‘to cement a union of friendship and confidence between the two races’. This friendship would be achieved as long as Te Rohe Potae land was protected rather than purchased.109

While these talks had important ramifications, they were understood by the parties in almost diametrically opposed ways. The Government and Pakeha saw Rewi’s interest in using the Court as a major step towards gaining control over the Rohe Potae and in splitting the Kingitanga. Loveridge suggests that Bryce’s policy towards the area altered from this point. Rather than dealing with Tawhiao, he saw a way of resolving all the problems facing the Government ‘in one fell swoop’, simply by offering Rewi and the Kingitanga tribes the ‘promise of security for their lands’.110

This report will not attempt to answer whether Bryce, and other Government officials, were acting cynically and deceitfully when advising Maori that the use of the Court would protect rather than threaten their lands. But European observers at least, despite Bryce’s promises to Maori, were confident that the Native Land Court would inevitably lead to the alienation, not the preservation, of the Rohe Potae and that Mokau would be a first step in a larger conquest. The editor of the New Zealand Herald believed that if the lands within Rewi’s boundary were taken to the Court, ‘[t]his would hand over to the Europeans the whole centre of the island’. To assist in this, the Crown should ‘open’ Mokau, including by taking possession of the lands the Crown had ‘purchased’ in the 1850s but never occupied. The New Zealand Herald was sure this could be achieved without any problems, indeed it would be welcomed by Mokau Maori for this land was ‘undoubtedly ours, and we apprehend that neither Tawhiao

107 As cited in Loveridge, p23 108 Ibid 109 Ibid, p24 110 Ibid


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nor Rewi would for a moment question our right to do what we like with it’.111

But Rewi’s intention was, as we have seen, quite different. He wanted to protect the Mokau and other under-threat lands, including possibly by use of the Native Land Court. Moreover, only after the necessary precondition of securing to Maori all the lands of the Rohe Potae had been achieved, would it be possible to work together a fuller agreement with the Government.112 He did not present his policy as designed to undermine Tawhiao and the Kingitanga. Indeed, he later complained that newspaper reports had omitted his statements to Bryce on the Kingitanga’s ongoing role.113 One Ngati Maniapoto chief explained that Rewi was simply suggesting his ‘old idea of having a well-defined line of demarcation between the Kingite territory and the territory of the Europeans’.114

Nor is there any evidence that Rewi was advocating the uncontrolled opening of the Mokau, including that the Crown take possession of the lands it claimed to have earlier purchased. Rather, Rewi seems to have seen gaining Court title over the threatened Mokau lands as a way of ensuring that all the Mokau remained Maori controlled and part of the aukati. Rewi, when giving the boundaries of the area that he demanded must be ‘secured for us’, included the entire Mokau region and stated that none of these lands had been ‘dealt with by Europeans’, that is to say, that Europeans had no interest in any of these lands. In the coming years, neither he nor Ngati Maniapoto more widely acknowledged that the Crown had a right to the ‘purchased’ lands, and indeed they seemed unaware of any possibility that the Crown would claim them.115

Rewi was therefore moving selectively and cautiously. This was far from a blanket acceptance of the Native Land Court determining title to all the Rohe Potae. Rather, he appeared to have signalled a determination to selectively use the Court to secure legal control over the threatened border areas, including Mokau that encircled the aukati. As will be discussed further below, he seems to have seen this as a method not only to save these lands, but to help mark out clearly in practice and in law the boundaries of Te Rohe Potae as a whole, which would remain under Maori authority.

Of course, going to the Land Court had real risks, not the least being that they may not be awarded the land. Interestingly, Rewi does not seem to have been concerned by that risk, or in the case of Mokau at least, he may have felt it was a risk that had to be taken. It may well be that Bryce’s promises had strengthened a sense that they would be successful, and that the Court was would rubber stamp their applications. If so, this may have eased the unease regarding the symbolic consequences of going to the Court. Kingitanga tribes had long stayed aloof from the Court in part because it was seen as acknowledging and allowing a form of Crown authority into the aukati. This unease

111 Ibid, pp24-25 112 Ibid, p22 113 Ibid, pp23-24, including footnote 59 114 As cited in Loveridge, p23, footnote 39 115 ‘The Native Minister at Kihikihi’, Waikato Times, 25 Feb 1882, p3 Petition of the Maniapoto, Raukawa, Tuwharetoa, and Whanganui Tribes, AJHR, 1883, J-1, p2


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had not, by 1882, suddenly disappeared, as evidenced by how reluctant Rewi and other chiefs were to use it. Indeed, it would seem that some Mokau chiefs who had applied to the Court could not bring themselves to attend.116 But it may have lessened somewhat and these is no sense in the available sources that Rewi, Wetere and others considered they were bowing to the Court’s authority. Rather, they presented the decision as ultimately, a pragmatic and necessary, if far from ideal step.117

The crucial point is that Rewi understood and the Crown presented the Court as a way of preserving Maori lands and control. Shortly afterwards, Rewi reiterated that:

All my references to surveys and the Native Land Courts referred to the project I have always had in view – viz. The reservation of the whole of the King country, to preserve dishonourable Maoris leasing or selling and to prevent the inroads of Europeans under any authority [b]ut that of Maori mana.118

It was these considerations that guided Rewi in his subsequent decisions regarding Mokau. Soon after the meeting with Bryce, Wetere and Grace arrived in Kihikihi seeking consent for a Court hearing over the threatened Mokau lands. Rewi was convinced of the danger and on 14 March wrote to Bryce, demanding that it be recognised that the land was under his wider authority and under the more immediate control of Wetere. He ordered that the Government not make any advance payments over these lands and stop its negotiations with Ngati Tama. One translation of Rewi’s letter stated that Ngati Tama:

has no claim to that land [between Mokau and Waipingau]. I have all to do with it and the authority over that land; they have no authority over it. This is something different: you support and further the work of Wetere te Rerenga about Mokau lands.119

If Wetere called for them, Rewi was anxious for discussions with Bryce over the Mokau area so ‘that we may grow well (flourish) and not be destroyed by fire or the grub’. Although he did not explicitly consent to a hearing, the context and certainly how others interpreted his comments suggested he would not stand in the way of Wetere using the Court to safeguard the land.

The area he sought to keep under Ngati Maniapoto control and protect from sale went to the ‘Government line at Waipingio [Waipingau]’ which suggests he did not recognise the Government’s confiscation line at Parininihi, and perhaps hinted that they were seeking to have the confiscated lands granted back to them through the Court. But the essence of Rewi’s demand to Bryce was that he and Mokau Maori were

116 Heremia Te Aria is a possible example, as will be discussed below. 117 Private communication from Cathy Marr raised some of these issues. 118 As cited in Loveridge, p23, footnote 39 119 ‘Rewi and the Opening of Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 25 Apr 1882, p2. A copy of the original letter in Te Reo is in Rewi to Bryce, Kihikihi, 14 March 1882, p217, WH Grace Letterbook 1880-1892


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determined to protect the entire Mokau. They would work with the Government, and, if need be, the Court to ensure this happened.120

After meeting with Rewi, Wetere wrote to Bryce renewing his call for a Court hearing and arguing that Rewi had now clearly given him permission to do so. Wetere stated that Rewi had since last April given him authority to ‘arrange about the lands of Mokau’. Despite this, the requests by him and Mokau Maori for a Court hearing had been rejected by Bryce and Judge Fenton. However, the recent meeting with Bryce had shown that Rewi in principle permitted use of the Native Land Court to protect threatened lands. Now, according to Wetere, he had given specific permission that if Mokau Maori so wanted, they could use the Court:

This day Rewi has written a letter to you ... to consent to my work, my work about Mokau, You have seen Rewi and know what he means about the Maori Land Court. This is what I say to you – do not disappoint our tribes at Mokau about the Native Land Court, but rather, friend, consent to our requests often made about lands at Mokau, that it may be adjudicated upon.121

The Government backs the Court

Bryce’s response was prompt. He promised Rewi that the Government would not make advance, secret payments to Ngati Tama on Mokau lands. Rather, the Government would support a Native Land Court hearing so that Rewi and his people could seek to make the Mokau lands ‘permanently theirs’. He advised Rewi how an application could be made. The Native Minister again presented the Court as the method by which Maori could gain control over their lands for their future generations, and stop the current insecurity and threats of land sales without their consent. A Court hearing would herald the growth, and eventually the partnership with the Crown, that Rewi was seeking:

The govt will not advance money on Mokau lands ... The govt will not take a course underg[roun]d but above ground where everyone can see ... The govt will not prevent nor will it delay the sitting of the Court for I am earnestly of the opinion that the best thing for the Maoris is to have their lands passed through the Court “so that the land may become permanently theirs” and be in a satisfactory position in all generations to come. My opinion is the same as yours that you and I should water the tree of good thoughts. Thus strengthening the roots and making the leaves grow.122

120 ‘Rewi and the Opening of Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 25 Apr 1882, p2 121 ‘Rewi and the Opening of Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 25 Apr 1882, p2. A copy of the original letter in Te Reo is in Wetere to Bryce, Kihikihi, 14 March 1882, pp207-208, WH Grace Letterbook 1880-1892. 122 Grace to J Jones, Kikihiki, 20 March 1882, pp213-214, WH Grace Letterbook 1880-1892. This is Grace’s translation of a letter written by Bryce to Manga (Rewi), Native Office, Auckland, 17 March 1882


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It was Rewi’s letter that convinced Bryce that a Court hearing for Mokau would help, rather than hinder, the Government’s overall objectives. Claims that Bryce decided not to stop the Court only because he feared Pakeha public outrage, and that ‘there would be such a cry made that he would lose his seat as a Member of Parl[iament]’ are unconvincing.123 Certainly, Bryce was aware of the public clamour to ‘open up’ Mokau. But his concerns regarding Mokau were primarily strategic, and despite the suspicions of Grace and Jones, the Government was not obsessed with acquiring the land for itself and closing out private purchasers.

What Bryce and the Government were preoccupied with was weakening the Kingitanga and gaining control over Te Rohe Potae. As Loveridge plausibly suggests, Rewi’s agreement to support a Court hearing for Mokau, despite Tawhiao’s opposition, convinced the Government that there was now a real opportunity to create weaknesses and divisions within the Kingitanga.124 The Government was increasingly disinterested in negotiations and seeking agreement with Tawhiao. Its new focus was for the Court hearing in Mokau to proceed, in the hope that this would provide a lever for a more ‘vigorous’ Government policy designed to bring Maori under the control of the Crown.

A Mokau Court hearing, the Government hoped, would not just damage internal Maori cohesion. Crown officials had long insisted that Tawhiao’s was an ‘imaginary’ kingship, and his territory an ‘imaginary’ kingdom that must not be legally acknowledged. A Native Land Court ruling which legally denied that Tawhiao and the Kingitanga had any connection to Mokau land was seen as an important step towards breaking their power and establishing that the ‘so-called’ King had no more legal power than any other chief. It would be a major step towards a time in which individual Maori were the legal owners of land in the Rohe Potae, and could sell their interests without interference by customary and collective structures.125 A secret Cabinet minute at this time identified a Court hearing over Mokau as a key opportunity to ‘break up Tawhiao’s power in the future and assert rights of other Natives to deal with their lands’.126

Further encouraging this hope that a Mokau Court hearing could be the means of splitting the Kingitanga asunder was a letter written in English by Grace on behalf of Wetere and sent to Pakeha newspapers. Wetere, through Grace, replied to Davis’s letter printed earlier in newspapers which expressed Tawhiao’s opposition to a Court hearing for Mokau. Wetere instructed Davis to keep out of what were Maori affairs and reiterated his desire for a Court to settle the disputes and threats to the Mokau lands. What really attracted Pakeha attention was the evidence of tension between Mokau Maori and Tawhiao. Wetere emphasised Tawhiao did not have the authority to

123 Grace to J Jones, 19 Feb 1883, p396, WH Grace Letterbook. Grace and Jones considered Bryce the chief impediment to their acquisition of the Poutama lands 124 Loveridge, pp28-29 125 Marr, ‘The Waimarino Purchase Report’, pp37, 41 126 Loveridge, pp28-29


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stop him from appearing before the Court and had no direct rights over the land: ‘Tawhiao has no interest whatever in Mokau lands. The land belongs to us who live on it.’

The letter inferred that Mokau Maori had affiliated themselves to the King Movement in the 1860s somewhat reluctantly out of a ‘love’ for the people threatened by the Crown and a desire to share in their struggle. Moreover, Wetere referred to past disputes he had had with Tawhiao and especially what he presented as Ngati Maniapoto’s refusal in the Hikurangi hui of April 1881 to place their lands under the King’s authority.127 There was still no complete split between Wetere and Tawhiao, but the tensions between them were real and growing, and fed a European belief that they could be manipulated, or would inevitably lead into something more significant. The Taranaki Herald could now see no barrier to a Court hearing in Mokau and the marginalisation of the ‘so-called Maori King’. There was no need to fear any military response from the weakened Kingitanga and Maori. Therefore the Court should sit and Mokau should be opened up as ‘the natives are so thoroughly in our power and can be made to be to the Europeans’ will’.128 The Timaru Herald likewise saw a Court hearing in Mokau as part of the inevitable end to the threat of Kingitanga and the aukati:

Rewi and Te Wetere have applied for a sitting on the Land Court at Mokau with a view to exchanging the native title of the land there for a Crown title. In short, the ‘native difficulty’ in the King Country is settling itself in a most satisfactory manner and only needs to be let alone for a little time longer in order to pass away altogether.129

The previously glacial process of facilitating a Court hearing now moved rapidly. Within days of the letters from Rewi and Wetere, and Bryce’s decision not to stand in the way of a hearing, the Native Land Court announced that a sitting would be held ‘shortly’ in Mokau and called for applicants to forward their claims as soon as possible.130

This decision had been reached after consultation between Bryce and Chief Judge Fenton over the potential ramifications of a Court hearing. Whether the Court, as a rule, acted as an independent judicial body or as an arm of Government policy is the subject of historical dispute.131 It is perhaps fair to say that the degree of impartiality varied depending on the case and the judge. In the case of Mokau, there seems to have been little dissonance between the overall objectives of the Crown and the Court. Both were now anxious to see a hearing in Mokau as soon as possible. And, as we shall see, the Court and Judge Fenton shared the belief of Government officials that this hearing

127 ‘Opening Mokau Land’, Taranaki Herald, 22 Mar 1882, p2 128 Editorial, Taranaki Herald, 22 Mar 1882, p2 129 ‘The Native Minister’, Timaru Herald, 23 Mar 1882, p7 130 New Zealand Gazette, 1 April 1882, No 31, p535, notice given on 21 Mar 1882 131 Richard Boast, Buying the Land, Selling the Land: Government and Maori Land in the North Island 1865-1921 (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2008), p99


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provided an important opportunity to deny that Tawhiao and the King movement had authority over the Rohe Potae lands.132

Fenton’s awareness of the political sensitivities of a Mokau hearing was indicated in the lead-up to the announcement that a Court hearing would shortly take place. Fenton had, independently of Bryce, decided by this point that a hearing should be called. However, he did not want to announce a hearing and then have the Government cancel it due to its own political plans. Fenton was particularly aware that Tawhiao’s upcoming hui at Whatiwhatihoe could have considerable political impact.

He therefore wanted to make sure that he and the Government were on the same page. He wrote to Bryce explaining that it would be less disruptive if he could have some private inkling of the Government’s intentions. Bryce thanked the chief judge for his discretion and assured him that it was ‘improbable in a high degree’ that a situation would arise that would inspire the Government to stop the hearing.133 Quite clearly, Bryce had resolved that with Rewi’s support, a hearing must take place regardless of the opposition of anyone else, including Tawhiao and the Kingitanga.

Fenton then set off to the Waikato to inquire regarding ‘the feasibility and expediency’ of holding a Court at Mokau.134 It would seem that Fenton’s primary concern was to define the most politically appropriate time to call a hearing. As he told Bryce, he believed it wise to allow a decent period after the completion of the Whatiwhatihoe hui had finished, so settled on the date of June 2.135

Pakeha newspapers were delighted with the news of an impending Court hearing which they viewed as an important victory against the Kingitanga. Tawhiao and the King Movement would be forced either to submit to European authority and break its boycott of the Court or stand by and watch Europeans gain a foothold within the aukati. Either way, it would be legally demonstrated that Tawhiao and collective political entities such as the Kingitanga had no rights over land. The editor of the New Zealand Herald commented:

If Tawhiao has any claim according to native custom, he will have to make it before the Court. If he prefers any claim, he is welcome, and our object will be gained in his submission to the adjudication of a European Court. No right which he may set up in virtue of his kingship, and the handing over of the lands to Potatau, will be regarded for a moment, and if that is his reliance he will utterly fail. The Court will award the land to Wetere, or whoever can prove a right, according to Maori usage.136

132 Marr, The Alienation of Maori Land...Part one, pp16-17 133 Fenton to Bryce, 24 Mar 1882, and Bryce minute, 25 Mar 1882, NLC 82/1267, pp202-203, in BBOP 4309, box 11a, Archives New Zealand, Auckland (ANZ Akl) 134 Taranaki Herald, 29 Mar 1882, p2 and ‘New Zealand Telegrams’, Taranaki Herald, 23 Mar 1882, p2 135 Fenton to Bryce, 11 May 1882, NLC 82/2148, p190, in BBOP 4309, box 11a, ANZ Akl 136 New Zealand Herald, 28 Mar 1882, as cited in Loveridge, p27


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Court hearings over Mokau land were therefore a ‘matter of great importance, as breaking up the King’s authority within the district which he has hitherto regarded as particularly his own’.137

According to the editor of the Poverty Bay Herald, it was widely accepted that the gazetting of a Court hearing at Mokau was ‘one of the most effectual steps which has ever been taken for the purpose of disuniting the powerful sections of the Waikato tribes composing the King party’. Tawhiao had hitherto ‘exercised his mana’ and pursued a policy of isolation, now influential Maori such as Rewi and Wetere were estranged and antagonistic towards him, as shown by their willingness to go to the Court. A Court hearing at Mokau would ‘be the beginning of the end of the King movement’, forcing Tawhiao to yield authority and be seen just as an ‘ordinary chief, unrecognised by any except his own particular hapu’. A hearing would have a domino effort, and others in the Rohe Potae would follow Wetere’s lead and apply to the Court. Therefore, he called for the Government to support and encourage Wetere’s efforts, and in doing so bring about the fragmentation of collective land tenure and society.

It is only by policy such as this that the King movement will be ultimately overcome. It is carrying out the axiom of ‘divide and govern’ by which ... empires have been won.138

In April 1882, Wetere wrote to European newspapers calling on all Maori and Pakeha not to delay the sitting which was part of ‘the good works that I have commenced’. He and the Mokau people were, Wetere stated, working as part of the programme of Rewi. They sought not trouble, rather to ‘do justice for the people’ and to protect ‘our own lands at Mokau’. He again criticised Tawhiao and Davis for their ‘troublesome’ interference in trying to stop a Court hearing. The Mokau people held rights in Mokau, they would substantiate these rights at the Court and have the land granted to them. Tawhiao was welcome to attend the hearing or not, but he had no customary claim to the land. The hearing must proceed.139

With a hearing apparently inevitable, more local chiefs, as had been predicted, began to consider going to the Court. It suddenly seemed likely that title would be sought for a far greater area than just the disputed Poutama area. In mid-April, the Court registrar announced that the hearing would take place in Waitara on 25 May and that five separate applications had been received. 140

These applications, and their extensive if hard to understand borders, suggest the danger that a Court hearing could spiral out of Wetere and Rewi’s desire for controlled and limited interaction with the Court. These claims were to a significant degree encouraged and facilitated by European speculators and land agents who, with the

137 Ibid 138 Poverty Bay Herald, 17 April 1882, p2 139 ‘Native Land Court at Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 22 April 1882, p2 140 New Zealand Gazette, 27 May 1882, No 43, pp651-652


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promised coming of the Court, had stepped up their activities in the area. Joshua Jones and William Grace had prepared the application for the two claims that would eventually be heard by the Court.141 The application for what would eventually become the Mokau Mohakatino block was made by Epiha, Takirau Watihi, Te Oro Watihi, Hone Pumipi and others. The application stated that the boundaries commenced at the mouth of the Mokau River, carried on ‘by the centre of the river up to a mineral spring near Totoro’, then due south to the Mohakatino River, following that river to the sea coast and then back to the Mokau River-mouth.142

What would become the Mohakatino Parininihi block was applied for by Te Rangi, Wetere Te Rerenga, Takirau, Epiha, Takirau Watihi and others. It commenced at the mouth of the Mohakatino River, running to its source, then by a direct line to the eastern corner of the confiscated boundary, running by the confiscation line to the coast, and then up the coast to the mouth of the Mohakatino River boundary.143

The three other applications were all made by the upper Mokau chief Heremia, backed by Te Huia and others including Epiha, Takirau Watihi, Hone Pumipi and others. It would seem that the land speculator George Stockman, backed again by Grace had a hand in all or some of these, including in the boundary definition.144 One – the Mokau Awakino block – incorporated a large area of land north of the Mokau River, running eastward to Totoro. The other two, described as the Mokau and the Upper Mokau and Ohura areas, incorporated an apparently large area south of the Mokau River running eastward to Ohura and apparently encompassing much of or all of the land mentioned in the Mokau Mohakatino and Mohakatino Parininihi boundaries.145 In short, it seemed possible that the Court hearing could see disputes between Ngati Maniapoto chiefs, perhaps encouraged by rival speculators.

Shortly afterwards, two further applications were submitted that further widened the potential scope and complexity of the hearing. Now included was an area that stretched at least as far north as the Awakino River, inland to Totoro and Ohura and possibly beyond, and moved well into Taranaki, to the Waitara River in the south.146 Moreover, it was now apparent that the Court would be the scene of inter-tribal rivalry and cross-claims. Poutama and Mokau Ngati Maniapoto chiefs applied for land well to the south of Poutama. Takirau, Te Oro Watihi and ‘Weteni Peeneta’ applied for a block named Waitara, that was situated near Waitara River. Just as significantly, Ngati Tama and Taranaki chiefs were making a cross claim for the ‘Poutama’ block which went from the confiscation point at Parininihi northwards and eastwards to an unclear degree.147 European hopes that one application would set off a series of additional

141 Grace to J Jones, 28 March 1882, William Henry Grace Letterbook 1880-1892, MSY-4506, ATL, p220 142 New Zealand Gazette, 27 May 1882, No 43, pp651-652 143 New Zealand Gazette, 27 May 1882 144 Grace to Stockman, 31 March 1882, WH Grace Letterbook, p228 145 New Zealand Gazette, 27 May 1882 146 New Zealand Gazette, 27 May 1882 147 Kahiti O Niu Tireni, 23 May 1882, No 18, p99 (translation by Ariaan Gage-Dingle)


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claims and counter-claims, and entrench the Court in the Rohe Potae seemed to be coming true.

A last Kingitanga effort to delay a hearing: May 1882

Despite these developments, Tawhiao, Wahanui and others had still not given up the hope that a Court hearing could be avoided altogether. In May 1882, Tawhiao’s long-delayed hui at Whatiwhatihoe finally took place. As we have seen, Tawhiao intended this hui to lay the basis for a major breakthrough with the Crown that would see a formal recognition of some sort of Kingitanga control over the Rohe Potae. It would seem that the King had also intended that this hui would mediate an agreement between the disputing parties regarding Poutama that would stave off any need to use the Court.

Despite Pakeha predictions that he would refuse to attend, Wetere did take part and there was no evidence of any ultimate split between him and the King Movement.148 Indeed, there was a clear desire for cooperation. In the lead-up to the hui, Wahanui, who was emerging as one of Ngati Maniapoto and the Kingitanga’s major leaders, and who had close links to the Mokau, had a series of constructive discussions with Wetere. A ‘good understanding’ was reached including an agreement that Wetere would attend the hui and listen to the ideas on how a Court hearing could be avoided. During these discussions, Wetere emphasised how reluctant he had been to apply to the Court, but had seen no alternative given the Crown’s dealings with the Ngati Tama chiefs. Wahanui showed an understanding of this key point, and agreed that Ngati Tama had no rights to enter into such negotiations as they had only been ‘permitted by Tawhiao to return [to the Poutama area] on sufferance’. Wahanui was considered by some Europeans to be a ‘large claimant’ to the Mokau lands, and there were even reports that while he would not attend the hearing himself, he was sure Wetere would act for him and demolish the claims of Ngati Tama to the land.149

Around 3,000 attended the Whatiwhatihoe hui, including a heavy proportion of the Waikato and Ngati Maniapoto tribes.150 The general message of the hui was a willingness for a negotiated agreement that would allow greater European involvement in the Rohe Potae while preserving Maori authority.151 The hapu and chiefs from throughout the region also exhibited considerable unease about the activities of land speculators and of the Native Land Court which were threatening that authority.152

Tawhiao’s central message was that, until this agreement had been reached, that there should be no Court hearings, no surveys and no land sales. According to Resident Magistrate RS Bush’s translation, Tawhiao called specifically on Wetere to delay going to the Court:

148 ‘The King Meeting at Whatiwhatihoe’, Hawke’s Bay Herald, 1 May 1882, p3 149 ‘Tawhiao’s Meeting’, Star, 8 May 1882, p3 150 Tawhiao’s Meeting at Whatiwhatihoe in May, 1882, AJHR, 1882, G-4A, p1 151 Cathy Marr, ‘The Waimarino Purchase Report’, p104 152 Ibid


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With reference to Mokau. Mokau to Tongariro. That is mine. I appointed a man to manage affairs there, telling him to remain there quietly, and manage properly. Te Rerenga is the man in charge there ... Let things remain quietly until the whole have been put through the sieve, and the husk and decayed matter separated from the good.153

Bush also reported that Tawhiao issued a coded warning to Ngati Tama not to interfere with Mokau, for instance by bringing gold prospectors into the area. Wahanui, quoted by Bush, also protested over Ngati Tama’s land dealing. They had, he said, been permitted to return to the area and occupy some of the land ‘on condition that they would simply live there and cultivate, without attempting to exercise any right of ownership.’154

Wetere was then pressed for an answer. Would he delay going to the Court until Tawhiao’s emissary, Major Te Wheoro, sought negotiations with the Crown? Wetere’s reply was lengthy, ambivalent and subject to different interpretations. Bush, and many Maori at the hui, including Tawhiao, believed that he agreed to postpone the Court for a short period while the King made his diplomatic efforts.155 A newspaper journalist thought it impossible to know Wetere’s position. Another journalist provided the most accurate prediction. Wetere, he believed, would go ahead.156

Wetere’s ambivalence was understandable. He neither wanted to break the collective resistance to the Court but nor would he stand by and watch the land being sold or lost. The Court, he told the hui, was a compulsion more than a choice:

he had been compelled to take the step he had in consequence of the action of Ngatitama, who were taking money upon lands in that locality in which they had no right, and that he had interviewed the Hon. Mr. Rolleston with respect to a payment of £300 which Ngatitama were endeavouring to obtain, and which he had prevented. That the Hon. Mr. Rolleston had pointed out the advisability of settling the question in the Native Land Court, to which he was agreed.157

If anything, the Whatiwhatihoe hui must have strengthened Wetere’s sense that there was little alternative to the Court. Tawhiao’s hopes of reaching a far-reaching accord with the Crown and Europeans at the hui had utterly failed. Bryce and other senior Government officials had refused even to attend, and would continue to ignore Tawhiao’s subsequent calls for negotiation.158 Understandably, the King had fallen into

153 AJHR, 1882, G-4A, pp6-7 154 Ibid, p2 155 Ibid, pp2, 8. Also, Wi Te Wheoro to Fenton, 19 May 1882, Letter in Maori with English translation, NLC 82/2560, pp173-174, in BBOP 4309, box 11a, ANZ Akl 156 ‘The King Meeting’, Hawke’s Bay Herald, 16 May 1862, p3; ‘Raglan’, Waikato Times, 25 May 1882, p2 157 AJHR, 1882, G-4A, p2. See also p8 158 Parsonson, ‘Te Mana o Te Kingitanga’, pp113-116


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a despondent drunkenness by the end of the hui.159

Nor had the gathering seen any specific solution or mediation regarding Poutama. Of all the relevant parties, only Wetere’s group was there. The Government, the land speculators and gold prospectors, and Ngati Tama were absent and were showing ever-decreasing respect to the pronouncements of the Kingitanga. Tawhiao could call on them not to interfere with Mokau land, but who was listening?

Rewi also felt compelled to go to the Court regarding Mokau. He discussed with the hui his determination to create a district or reserve upon ‘which we may remain undisturbed’. The district needed to be surveyed to be protected. Four times, he told the hui, he had tried to facilitate the survey of the district, not to facilitate land sales but to prevent them. He would now not turn back nor would he turn back from a Court for Mokau as this was part of his ‘policy’ or ‘programme’.160

The exact nature of Rewi’s policy is not clear from the evidence. Rewi at this stage was apparently focused on protecting the aukati by surveying it, but many questions are hard to answer. For instance, the role the Court would play in this survey is not clear, nor is it apparent how he saw a Mokau hearing facilitating this survey. Was he, for instance, expecting that a Court hearing over Mokau would include a survey that would establish the legal boundary for the aukati that Pakeha and other Maori would have to respect? Did he want the Court for title determination or only boundary definition? There is much that is uncertain.

However, it would seem that Rewi considered the legal ownership and surveying of the under-threat Mokau lands to be a crucial element in protecting the aukati as a whole. Shortly after the end of the meeting, he was quoted as saying that ‘nothing took place at Whatiwhatihoe to change his mind’.161 Still, the desire for consensus and to avoid internal conflict remained strong. According to Grace, Rewi would delay the planned survey of the aukati to try to avoid any direct insult to the King. However, there must be no delays in the Mokau Court hearings. The land needed to be protected, and it would be a crucial boundary point of the aukati. Rewi wrote to Mokau instructing them to go to the Court and ‘fight Ngati Tama to the end’.162 By late May, a large gathering of Mokau Maori were on their way to the Waitara and to the Court.

The long-discussed Mokau Court hearings were about to begin, albeit with radically different expectations. For Rewi and the Mokau participants, they were an attempt to protect their land and their communal authority. For the Government and its supporters, they were intended as a crucial step towards undermining that communal control and strength, leading to the alienation rather than preservation of Maori land. Time would prove that the Government’s bleak vision would triumph.

159 Ibid, p116 160 AJHR, 1882, G-4A, p2 161 Grace, Kihikihi to Tole, 25 May 1882, WH Grace Letterbook, pp264-265 162 Grace diary entry, 25 May 1882, WH Grace Diary 1882


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7.2 The Native Land Court Hearings, June 1882

Introduction

The Native Land Court hearings over Mokau lands opened in Waitara on 2 June 1882 with a sense of excitement and importance, but also of confrontation. Rewi had urged Mokau Maori to go to the Court and ‘fight Ngati Tama to the end’ and gain legal control over the land.163 A high proportion of local hapu and leaders took up his call and in the week or so before the hearings began, considerable numbers of Mokau Maori, and Pakeha lawyers, land agents and speculators converged on Waitara. The steamer Moturoa transported over 50 Mokau Maori, including the chiefs Wetere, Te Rangituataka, Taniora Pararoa Wharau and Te Oro Watihi to the hearings. More than 100 others were reported to be on their way overland to Waitara.164

The heavy involvement of Ngati Maniapoto-aligned hapu from Mokau was understandable, given that the Court was allocating legal title over their lands, and those not present risked exclusion. Nevertheless, attendance by Maori with interests in Mokau was far from universal and many remained opposed to use of the Court or chose to remain aloof from it. The upper Mokau chief Heremia Te Aria, for instance, having first applied to have lands put through the Court, did not pursue the application and did not travel to Waitara.165 Even those who attended the Court remained suspicious of it. Wetere stated that many of his people were ‘hauhaus’, ‘afraid of the Government’ and ‘strangers’ to the Court. He warned the chief judge not to make decisions that would frighten them away from further involvement with the Court and confirm their fears that it was a threat to their land and a method of imposing the ‘pakeha tikanga’ over it.166

Moreover, Pakeha hopes that large numbers of Kingitanga and Ngati Maniapoto leaders from the wider Rohe Potae would take part, signalling the categorical collapse on the boycott of the Court, were not borne out. The only major Kingitanga participant was Rewi. Even he had not intended to appear personally, only changing his mind after being told that his presence was needed to prevent Ngati Maniapoto’s case from failing. Others stayed away. Wetere’s belief that a significant number of ‘Tawhiao’s people’ were on their way to Waitara to support his case was apparently incorrect.167

Settler newspapers wrongly predicted that the fear of being excluded from legal title to the land could force Tawhiao and Wahanui, who they considered one of the main claimants, to attend.168 Instead, the King and his key adviser appealed to the Government and to the Court to halt the hearings. Kingitanga envoy Major Wiremu

163 Ibid 164 ‘Trip of the S.S. Moturoa To Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 29 May 1882, p2 165 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, pp14-15 166 Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, p87 167 Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, p1 states he asked for an adjournment pending their arrival. However, there is no evidence that they did attend. 168 Taranaki Herald, 5 Jun 1882, p2; New Zealand Herald, 28 Mar 1882, as cited in Loveridge, p27


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Te Wheoro wrote to Fenton that the resolution of the Whatiwhatihoe hearing was that no hearing should take place until Tawhiao’s demands were heard by Parliament. Tawhiao had stated that ‘the Land Court must not sit in the district over which he stands as a protector: Mokau is included in this word’.169

Opposition to the Court did not lead to disruption of it, and despite European fears the hearings were not unruly. After unsuccessfully calling on the hearing to be abandoned, Tawhiao and Wahanui tried to limit its potential impact, demanding that all Mokau land that passed through the Court be declared inalienable.170 After the hearings, they still did not recognise Court jurisdiction over Mokau. Wahanui warned all Europeans that the sale, lease or survey of Mokau land would not be permitted. Furthermore, he instructed ‘all the Europeans including the Chief Judge’ that they were not permitted in the area.171 He described himself as the ‘komakohua’ of Mokau, apparently a reference to a bird which guarded areas and prevented tapu from being broken.172 If the Court, the Government and Europeans did not leave Mokau alone, ‘I shall know you are pursuing my soul to destruction’.173

Apart from Ngati Maniapoto-affiliated hapu of Mokau, the only other group to attend the Court hearings were the Ngati Tama claimants to Poutama. But there is evidence that Ngati Tama’s attitude to use of the Court was, like their rivals in these hearings, complex. While some of their prominent chiefs took part, it would appear that others did not or had to be pressed to attend. Many Ngati Tama were based at Parihaka and may well have shared the hostility of Te Whiti and Tohu to the Court process. The Ngati Tama leader Tupoki Te Herewini Ngapiko had to be subpoenaed by the Court to give evidence.174 He asserted his people’s connection to Poutama while exhibiting hostility towards the Court, at one point telling the judges that ‘I will have nothing more to do with you’.175 Ngati Tama’s 1997 claim to the Waitangi Tribunal suggested that they were not fully represented at the Court, and that many of their people remained at Parihaka or elsewhere.176

While some Maori stayed deliberately away from the hearings, it would seem likely that others did not have the opportunity to attend. Two weeks before the scheduled opening, Epiaka on behalf of the Tuhua people wrote requesting that the hearings be delayed for a month. He believed that his people had interests in some of the land scheduled to be adjudicated on, including Heremia’s case involving the Ohura district.

169 Wi Te Wheoro to Fenton, 19 May 1882, Letter in Maori with English translation, NLC 82/2560, pp173-174, in BBOP 4309, box 11a, ANZ Akl 170 Telegrams, Waikato Times, 17 June1882, p3 171 Wahanui to Dickey, 29 July 1882, Letter in Maori with English translation, NLC 82/3754, pp143-144, in BBOP 4309, box 11a, ANZ, Akl 172 Alisa Loraine Smith, ‘Taranaki Waiata Tangi and Feelings for Place’, PhD Thesis, Lincoln University, 2001, p139 173 Wahanui to Dickey, 29 July 1882, Letter in Maori with English translation, NLC 82/3754, pp143-144, in BBOP 4309, box 11a, ANZ, Akl 174 Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no1, p73 175 Evidence of Tupoki Te Herewini Ngapoko, 9 Jun 1882, Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no1, p35 176 Byrnes, ‘The Mohakatino Parininihi Block and the Mokau Mohakatino No.1 Block’, pp2-3, 18


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However, most of his people had not yet heard of the hearing or would not have time to get themselves to Waitara, which was around 200 miles from their homes. He wanted a delay so that all could be informed of the hearing and a response decided upon.177 The request was denied.

Whanganui Maori were deeply angry that the Court had defined ownership of the lands without taking into account their claims. After the hearings, Meiha Keepa wrote to Fenton protesting that the Court had sat regarding ‘lands belonging to the people of Whanganui’. A hui of 1000 people had taken place to voice their protest and to map out and define the boundaries of their lands, which they stated included Pukearuhe and the Mohakatino River. They called for the Court to come to Whanganui to hear their claims. They also threatened to disrupt any attempts to survey or place ‘strange people’ within their boundaries. Fenton was unmoved, His reply revealed the central threat that the Court system posed to Maori, that non-participation for any reason could lead to losing all legal connections to the land. As Fenton put it, the dates of the hearings had been published in the Government gazette, and the petitioners ‘should have appeared at the Court’. They failed to do so, there was no use in ‘writing letters afterwards’.178

Those Maori who did appear before the Court were attempting to use it selectively. Mokau Maori had initially applied for title to a number of large areas both north and south of the Mokau River. During the Court hearings, several of these applications were withdrawn so that legal title was sought over only the most immediately endangered lands – the Poutama area – that would be divided into the Mokau Mohakatino and Mohakatino Parininihi blocks.179

The Court was therefore not being used to define all the interests and rights claimed by Mokau Maori. Despite earlier inferences to the contrary, there was no attempt to petition the Court to return the confiscated area south of Parininihi. Chiefs would continue to assert their rights to this land in other forums, and during the Court hearings frequently discussed their connections to the confiscated area. Nevertheless, the realistic conclusion seemed to have been reached that this Court had neither the authority nor the intention to grant to Maori land in the legal ownership of the Crown. This impression was confirmed when a quixotic attempt by one Ngati Maniapoto chief at the hearing to gain title to (apparently) Crown land in Waitara, including the Waitara township, was summarily dismissed by the Court as falling outside of its jurisdiction.180

This hearing therefore did not signal the end of the resistance to the Native Land Court in the aukati or represent an embracing of Pakeha transformation of tribal

177 Epiaka per James Booth to AJ Dickey, 17 May 1882, Letter in Maori with English translation, NLC 82/2516, pp181-184, in BBOP 4309, box 11a 178 Meiha Keepa & others to Fenton, 25 Sep 1882, letter in Maori with English translation, & minute apparently by Fenton, 19 October 1882, NLC 82/5438, pp129-142, in BBOP 4309, box 11a 179 Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, pp16, 82 for withdrawal of applications 180 Ibid, p35. As this area is outside the scope of my report, I have not attempted to further research Takirau [Watihi?]’s application and the Court response.


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tenure. Rather, it was a more discrete attempt by the Ngati Maniapoto hapu of Mokau to gain legal control over specific and under-threat areas, and once they had gained that control, to administer the land in the way that they saw fit.

Nevertheless, the fact that a Court hearing was taking place over land in the aukati, with the participation of some Kingitanga and Parihaka-affiliated groups, created considerable Pakeha interest. The hearings were the ‘main talk’ among European settlers in the Urenui district. The Taranaki Herald considered that the importance of the case was not which tribal group ‘won’, but that the Pakeha system of tenure was being introduced to the aukati which, it believed, would lead to a railway line through Mokau and be ‘the first step towards opening up the country north’.181

The Court members were highly conscious that this was one of the first hearings over the aukati, with considerable political ramifications and potential for disruption. Chief Judge Francis Dart Fenton, who took the dominant role in the proceedings, was accompanied by Judge HAH Monro and assessor Retireti Tapihana of Te Arawa. A clerk and interpreter were also present.182 The hearing opened with a warning to the gathered Maori that all activities must take place under the tikanga and control of the Court, and any interference, poor behaviour or wasting of the Court’s time would be punished by inflicting costs on the offenders.183 The hearings were then adjourned until the following week so that the gathered groups could be acquainted ‘with the mode of procedure’ that would be followed.184

This, then, was decidedly not a Maori–controlled hui, but a formal Court hearing played out in an European environment. The hearings took place not in Mokau as local chiefs such as Wetere and Takirau had called for, but at Black’s Store in Waitara. The disruption and costs of having to travel to Waitara combined with fears that the Court hearing, like many throughout the country, would lead to drunkenness and disorder. Wetere described Waitara as a place of ‘ardent spirits’, and warned that many local Maori had no aptitude for alcohol, ‘so that when they have a single glass they become drunken and their speech confused’.185 That the Court was an alien and in some senses dangerous forum was further indicated by the fact that the tribal cases would be presented, and to some degree, dictated by their European representatives. William Henry Grace for the Ngati Maniapoto claimants, and the lawyer HR Richmond with the land agent Major Charles Brown for Ngati Tama, played a major role in the hearings, providing the knowledge of the Court’s proceedings and demands that the claimants lacked. Grace was involved in virtually every facet in the courtroom and out; from preparing the case with Wetere, to presenting it and examining the witnesses, to explaining the boundaries of the blocks. After the Court’s decision was

181 ‘Urenui’, Taranaki Herald, 15 Jun 1882, p2 182 Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, p1 183 Ibid 184 Ibid, p3 185 Wetere to Dickey, 6 Apr 1882, Letter in Maori with English translation, NLC 82/1924, pp196-197 and Takirau and others to Native Land Court, Letter in Maori, NLC 82/3008, p154, both in BBOP 4309, box 11a


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reached, he, again with Wetere, controlled the negotiations on which individuals would be included on the list of owners, even having himself declared the legal trustee for some of them.186

As we shall see, local Maori were charged a heavy fee for such services. They also ran the risk of becoming embroiled in the land and business ambitions of these Europeans. Grace was not only representing Mokau Maori, he was also trying to acquire land for himself and acting as a private agent for Joshua Jones. He was, in effect, seeking to secure the legal control of the land for Mokau Maori so that it could be passed over to himself and his Pakeha clients. Richmond was a major figure in rival attempts to gain land and coal in the area. Brown too, was a private land agent, and would be involved in numerous, difficult to unravel attempts to secure Mokau land. It could be said that in these hearings they represented competing business interests as much as competing claimants.187

These ‘outside’ influences had at least some, and arguably a crucial effect on the evidence offered to the Court by the Maori witnesses. Those seeking information today regarding the traditional history of the area, the inter-tribal battles of the 1820s and 1830s, places of significance for local people, and the relationships, conflicts and negotiations among local people will find much of interest in the Court minute books, which are the major written sources of the hearings.

But these records confuse as well as enlighten. Recorded only in English, they are a very imperfect record of the evidence offered by witnesses usually in te reo. They are also very far from a full record. They do not, for instance, make clear what the questions were that the witnesses were responding to. It is impossible to understand the context or full meaning of many of the statements. There are also many contradictions, chronological difficulties and inconsistencies in the accounts, which are certainly not unusual in oral histories, but also seem to have stemmed from the errors and confusion of the clerk and interpreter.

What does come through very clearly from the minute books is the adversarial, winner-take-all nature of the Court proceedings. The often irreconcilable accounts presented by opposing Ngati Maniapoto and Ngati Tama witnesses reflects that land rights were a highly debated issue among local Maori but also stemmed from the nature and needs of the Court. This may have been the first time in the Court for most of the witnesses, but they had clearly been well-schooled in the need to emphasise that the land ‘belonged’ only to their tribe or people, and to explicitly denigrate the interests and connections of opposing claimants. The confrontation, the battle of words and history made the hearings a riveting spectacle. Wanganui Resident Magistrate Booth

186 Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, pp79-80; Grace diary entry, 21 June 1882, WH Grace Diary 1882 187 The Grace letterbooks and diaries provide a good indication of Grace’s career. See AJHR, 1888, G-4C, pp32-33 for Brown’s involvement in attempts to lease Mokau land. Richmond’s involvement in the Mokau Coal Company is touched on in the following chapter


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considered that ‘he has never watched a more exciting contest’.188 But it also meant that that the more peaceful and productive links between Ngati Maniapoto and Ngati Tama, the intermarriages and shared commercial relationships, the multiple and changing tribal affiliations, were given little emphasis or ignored altogether.

This slant may well have been guided by the Pakeha representatives who, in their examinations, encouraged witnesses to take extreme stances. But the witnesses, even without this ‘coaching’, had every incentive for exaggeration and simplification, and for emphasising exclusive rather than shared control. The two Pakeha judges had ‘unprecedented power’ over Poutama.189 Their decision would define its legal ownership. The history and evidence offered to the Court therefore had a very clear and immediate purpose.

Any nuance or concessions could prove disastrous in such an environment. A Ngati Maniapoto chief of Mokau, Hone Pumipi, agreed with some of the specifics although not the overall gist of historical claims made by a Ngati Tama witness. Grace was horrified, believing that Pumipi had ‘nearly cooked our case’.190 Newspapers predicted that Ngati Tama would be awarded ‘most of the land south of Mokau’ as Judge Fenton declared that Pumipi’s evidence had helped ‘put the case of N.maniapoto into a bad position’.191 To repair the damage, Grace rushed the ill Rewi to Waitara and recalled Wetere to give more uncompromising evidence.

The evidence regarding the Mohakatino Parininihi block

The Court first heard evidence relating to the Mohakatino Parininihi block. The Court only very approximately described the parameters of this block as stretching from the Mohakatino River in the north, then a ‘line from Matapeka – a waterfall near the source of that [Mohakatino] river – to the corner on the confiscation boundary on the East, the confiscation boundary on the South, and towards the West by the Sea’.192 There is no reference to any surveys or maps being presented – although hearing usually required at least sketch maps – and it does not seem that the Court investigated the precise boundaries with any thoroughness.193 The Court estimated the block to be around 100,000 acres of ‘rough country’. A rehearing in 1884 considered it to be 250,000 acres.194 Confusion and disputes over the size and boundaries of the block would long continue and the more precise survey required by the Court to issue a certificate of title was to be long delayed.

188 Byrnes, ‘The Mohakatino Parininihi Block and the Mokau Mohakatino No.1 Block’, p21 189 Ann Parsonson, ‘Stories for Land: Oral narratives in the Maori Land Court’, in Bain Attwood and Fiona Magowan (eds), Telling Stories: Indigenous History and Memory in Australia and New Zealand (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2001), pp22-23. Thanks to Paul Husbands for providing this reference. 190 Grace diary entry, 9 June 1882, WH Grace Diary 1882 191 Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, pp46-47. The judge was referring to Tupoki’s evidence, which Pumipi had to some extent agreed with. See also ‘Urenui’, Taranaki Herald, 15 Jun 1882, p2 192 Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, p48 193 Ibid, p3, pp6-7 194 Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, pp3, 48, 96


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During this hearing, Maori witnesses offered relatively little precise discussion on the boundaries of the Mohakatino-Parininihi block, although it is evident that Ngati Tama witnesses were seeking a somewhat larger area that stretched further inland.195 Rather, the predominant theme of the evidence was a dispute between Ngati Maniapoto and Ngati Tama over customary and contemporary rights to the Poutama area.

Although matters would become more complex and varied as the hearings proceeded, the Ngati Maniapoto claimants tended to emphasise that they had conquered and utterly defeated Ngati Tama by the 1830s, and had occupied and controlled Poutama since. There had been, they generally argued, no subsequent agreement allowing Ngati Tama to return to Poutama. The few who did reside in Poutama had less than full rights, and had come without permission from the local Ngati Maniapoto people who quickly forced them out. The Ngati Tama claimants, in turn, emphasised that they were the undoubted ‘original’ owners of the land, denied the claimed extent of their military defeat and its consequences, and emphasised that they returned in some numbers and with their full rights restored and acknowledged.

These basic arguments were introduced in the opening statements. Taniora Pararoa Wharau of the Waikorara hapu of Ngati Maniapoto stated that Waikato and Ngati Maniapoto hapu had conquered the area and Ngati Maniapoto hapu had then occupied it. Ngati Tama, he said, had never been permitted and had never resumed full control over the land. He was translated as stating:

The land formerly belonged to Ngatitama; we conquered them six generations ago. N.tama fled to Kapiti. Poneke, Arapawa & the Chatham Islands. They have some of them returned to the land, - about 4 years ago; we said come & live under the mana of Ngatimaniapoto. They had no right to come: they came to join the King movement.196

Richmond then summarised Ngati Tama’s case as centring on their ancestral right. Ngati Maniapoto had not occupied the area and had therefore not confirmed their conquest. Ngati Tama had returned to Poutama in 1848 upon ‘invitation by Ngatimaniapoto, it being understood that they were resuming possession of their ancestral lands’. Only around that time did some Ngati Maniapoto also come to live in the area.197

The evidence given to the Court was largely based around these two differing and not-easily- reconcilable versions. There was considerable material and detail regarding the tribal battles of the 1820s and 1830s. Some of this was from men who had taken part in the fighting themselves. Taikauri More of Ngati Maniapoto explained that he was taken prisoner and was a ’slave’ to Wiremu Kingi’s Taranaki people in Waitara. He was ordered to help defend the Pukerangiora pa when it was besieged by Waikato and

195 Ibid, pp6-7 196 Ibid, pp3-4. It should be noted here that the years and chronology of events as recounted by Maori to the Court often did not match exactly with other evidence. 197 Ibid, p4


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Ngati Maniapoto forces, but instead assisted them, taking prisoners and bringing them to Mokau. He finished his account of the fighting by stating:

N.tama & their allies went to attack Motutawa an island in the Mokau river, but were defeated by N.maniapoto with great slaughter. Then N.tama & N.awa fled to Kapiti and down South, even across Cook’s Straits. They never came back to live. I occupied the land.198

According to Taniora, after their conquest Ngati Maniapoto occupied settlements between Waitara and Mohakatino:

Waitara was then occupied by Te Watihi Takirau. I resided at Te Mimi. Tangahoe lived at Onairo, Poihipi [?] at Pukearuhe, Te Kaharoa & Tikaokao at Tongaporutu, Tikipoti at Omahu, Te Wetini at Te Kawau, Hone Pumipi at Mohakatino.199

On the other hand, Paiura Te Rangikatatu of ‘Ngati Tama of Ngati Awa’ stated that Ngati Tama were only lightly represented at the Pukerangiora defeat and had remained strong afterwards. Ngati Tama were subsequently attacked by Ngati Maniapoto at Te Kawau but repulsed and pursued them, and were not attacked again. Like several other Ngati Tama witnesses, he stated that Ngati Tama were never fully conquered and did not flee into exile, rather they went south ‘with their women and children’ to collect guns to strengthen themselves for their return. ‘N.maniapoto had not the mana over our land while we were away South’.200

There were similarly conflicting accounts of the area to which some Ngati Tama returned from the 1840s. Taniora, like other Ngati Maniapoto witnesses, emphasised that Ngati Tama had never been permitted to return to Poutama. Taranaki and Ngati Tama chiefs had requested that Potatau and others restored them to Poutama and ‘[g]ive me back my land’. Potatau had replied:

‘Eat that part of my pipe which is outside my mouth. Leave me what is between my teeth. Let that be a red sea for me’. 201

According to Taniora, Potatau meant by this that the area from around Parininihi north would remain between his teeth or part of his rohe, and that Ngati Tama could not return there. Further south, near Waitara was the part of the pipe that Ngati Tama could return to, providing local Ngati Maniapoto chiefs agreed. A subsequent hui was held between Takerei and Wiremu Kingi of Taranaki which established that Waikaramuramu, (just south of Parininihi) would henceforth be the boundary between the two peoples:

198 Evidence of Taikauri More, 8 Jun 1882, Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, pp30-31 199 Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, p17 200 Evidence of Paiura te Rangikatatu, 5 [6] June 1882, Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, p6 201 The NLC Minute Books provide different spellings of this location. It would seem to be near or synonymous with Waipingau Stream, located between Parininihi and Pukearuhe, and cited elsewhere by Mokau Maori as a boundary mark. See Interlocutory Judgement, June 15 1882, Waitara-Mokau NLC Minute Book no 1, p50 and ‘Native Meeting at White Cliffs’, Taranaki Herald, 25 Jun 1881, p2


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At the meeting Wiremu Kingi sang a waiata meaning that he was afraid of N.maniapoto. Takerei father of Te Rerenga replied, Stay on your own land. Then a boundary was given at Waikaramuramu. South was to be for Wiremu Kingi, North of that for us. We have always occupied this land since. Those of us who were South of the boundary removed to the North of it.202

This boundary held, he stated, and Ngati Tama did not live in any numbers north of Waikaramuramu.

Ngati Tama accounts did not mention the establishment of a border at Waikaramuramu but stressed instead that they were permitted to return to Poutama. According to Paiura, a series of negotiations took place with Potatau and others, after which Paiura’s father and about ten others were among the Ngati Tama that returned to Poutama:

Waikato fetched my father ... my brothers also came. They came to live at Poutama. He did not come as a slave, but as a chief. He lived where he liked on Poutama & died at Waitara & was buried at Poutama.203

There was also no agreement on more recent events regarding how many Ngati Tama had come back to the area in the 1870s, and the extent they were able to cultivate, live where they chose and bury their dead in the area. These arguments illustrated that claims to land were not based solely on more ancient take, but were also tied to more recent events and agreements.

In particular, the nature and effect of the discussions of the late 1860s and early 1870s between Kingitanga leaders and Ngati Tama chiefs produced what Judge Fenton described as a ‘remarkable conflict of evidence’ that rendered impossible a clear definition of what happened.204 Tupoki Te Herewini Ngapiko gave the most detailed Ngati Tama account. He said that from around 1868 he had been based in Te Kuiti as part of his links to Kingitanga leaders including Tawhiao, Rewi and Wahanui. These rangatira agreed that he and Ngati Tama more generally could return to Poutama, as they were considered by Tawhiao to be ‘strong in fight’ and would help the Kingitanga protect the area, apparently from the Government.205

Most Ngati Maniapoto accounts argued that no final permission for a return to Poutama had ever been granted either by the Kingitanga or by more local leaders. Rewi, who had participated in the negotiations, stated that only a conditional arrangement had been reached. Ngati Tama leaders were to be aligned with the Kingitanga, and their leaders were invited to live in Te Kuiti and elsewhere. They were

202 Evidence of Taniora Pararoa Wharau, 6 Jun 1882, Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no1, pp17-18 203 Ibid, p4 204 Ibid, pp48-49 205 Evidence of Tupoki Te Herewini Ngapiko, 9 June 1882, Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no1, pp37


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required to obey the King’s authority and ‘land was not to be leased or sold. Roads were not to be made; we had not come to an agreement with the Govt’.206 Only after they had demonstrated this commitment for a number of years would there be broader discussions about a possible return to Poutama, in consultation with local Ngati Maniapoto hapu:

I had no authority to give back Poutama unless the tribe, N.maniapoto agreed. But if N.tama had obeyed our wishes, it would have been time to consider the recompense, & to consult the tribe about it.207

Rewi argued that Ngati Tama had not fulfilled those conditions, for instance by prematurely pressing for a full return to Poutama, by entering into land deals with the Crown in the Chatham Islands and elsewhere, and by withdrawing their ‘allegiance to the King’.208 Therefore, when Tupoki and some Ngati Tama had returned to Poutama in the early 1870s, they did so ‘of their own accord’ and were ‘not right in doing so. If they had behaved properly, something would have been found for them’.209 Wetere agreed on these general points, emphasising that his consent, which was essential for any return, had never been given.210

One witness broke this pattern of each group giving contradictory accounts of the same events. Pumipi of Ngati Maniapoto believed that from around 1870 there had indeed been a significant return to Poutama of Ngati Tama, acting with the permission of Kingitanga leaders including Tawhiao, Rewi and Wahanui. This had been done without the consent of local Maori, who nevertheless did not prevent it as they recognised the authority of these Kingitanga leaders to make such a decision. He recalled that in 1870 Wahanui had brought Tupoki to the Mokau area for negotiations:

They said nothing to me. They talked about Poutama, but not to me. I sang a song about Poutama; it was an ancient song, not to be understood by Europeans, It meant that my heart was sore about Poutama; that it was flowing away from me. I thought they were giving away the land, & did not consent. I was objecting. None of us approved of the land being given away.211

Asked why he did not subsequently expel Tupoki and his people, Pumipi explained that they were under the protection of Tawhiao and the other Kingitanga leaders and ‘[w]e respected Tawhiao’s word, because he was the King’.212 Pumipi was not arguing that Ngati Tama chiefs such as Tupoki had been granted permanent, unconditional rights over Poutama. Tupoki was only ‘to be restored to his land on condition of living

206 Evidence of Rewi Maniapoto, 19 June 1882, Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no1, pp59 207 Ibid, p61 208 Ibid, p62 209 Ibid, p63 210 Evidence of Wetere Te Rerenga, 19 June 1882, Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no1, pp63-68 211 Evidence of Hone Pumipi, 9 June 1882, Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no1, pp38-39 212 Ibid, p38


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there peaceably’.213 This condition had been breached through the recent actions of Paiura and other Ngati Tama, an apparent reference to their negotiations to sell the land or place gold prospectors on it. Tupoki’s right ‘has ceased in consequence of the trouble made by Paiura’.214 Therefore, Pumipi argued that Tupoki, and apparently Ngati Tama in general, should not be included amongst the legal owners of Poutama lands.

The discussion did show one element of consensus, if such a term is fitting for what remained a highly fractious and often confusing debate. At the time of the Court hearing, few Ngati Tama were permanently residing on Poutama. However, there was no agreement on what this absence signified in terms of customary rights, and whether they had recently left of their own accord to Parihaka and elsewhere, or alternatively had long since been driven from the area by hostile Ngati Maniapoto hapu.

Evidence relating to the role of the Kingitanga

Interwoven into these debates was the complex question of the degree of authority the Kingitanga and its leaders had over land issues in the area. This discussion was primarily driven by the Court. It would seem to have repeatedly questioned witnesses over whether they accepted that the alleged agreements by Tawhiao and others in the late 1860s and early 1870s allowing Ngati Tama to return to Poutama held customary weight, and whether they were, and needed to be approved by more local leaders. The issue did not only involve the Kingitanga, for there were also questions regarding the rights of non-local Waikato and Ngati Maniapoto chiefs to mediate and decide on land rights in Mokau.215

Once again, it is likely that the context of the hearings influenced some of the responses. Tupoki, for instance, had good reason to emphasise the Kingitanga’s authority over Mokau lands given that he was arguing Ngati Tama’s interests in Poutama had been acknowledged and to a degree granted by Tawhiao and others in the 1870s. Tupoki stated:

I got Poutama back because the time had come for it to be returned to me. I considered that the mana of Te Rerenga over the land would have ceased, because of the King’s word ... What does it matter whether Te Rerenga thinks so or not. The King has said. That is enough.216

Wetere Te Rerenga on the other hand, was the witness who most downplayed the historical role of the King and Kingitanga leaders in Mokau. Wetere’s driving concern, and central belief, was that he and local Ngati Maniapoto, not Ngati Tama, and not

213 Ibid, p39 214 Ibid, p39 215 As mentioned, the questions asked by the Court and the legal representatives during cross-examination were usually not explicitly recorded, but only implied through the subjects addressed by the witnesses. 216 Evidence of Tupoki Te Herewini Ngapiko, 9 Jun 1882, Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no1, pp37


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Tawhiao, should be recognised as having authority over the area.

Wetere denied that the Kingitanga had allowed Ngati Tama to return in the late 1860s and early 1870s. Nevertheless, apparently asked by the Court to state what would have been the result if Tawhiao had unilaterally allowed their return, he replied:

If Tawhiao invited N.tama to return, they would go on the land he would give; they would have no right to come on to my land, Poutama.217

Wetere’s approach clearly reflected his current dispute with Tawhiao over whether the King had the authority to prevent Wetere seeking title to Poutama in the Court. He explicitly referred to that dispute when asked once again about Tupoki’s claim that Ngati Tama had been permitted to return to Poutama in the 1870s with the permission of the King:

The King has no mana over that land. He has made assertions of mana & I have made my reply in the newspapers. He said at the late meeting at Whatiwhatihoe that the mana was with me.218

However, Ngati Maniapoto witnesses generally suggested that the relationship between local and wider leaders was close and that issues of land rights were resolved through multiple levels of discussion, debate and agreement. For instance, Taniora was asked whether the great Waikato chief Potatau had the authority in the 1840s to allow Ngati Tama and Taranaki to return south of Waikaramuramu. Taniora’s response suggested a non-rigid situation, in which Potatau had considerable influence that stemmed from the consent of local chiefs, and that he in turn recognised their need to be involved in the decision-making process. Taniora explained that:

Potatau was chief of N.Mahuta. He was the chief of Waikato. He had authority to give back land to N. tama because the fathers of Te Rerenga & Wetine [Wetini?] assented. He admitted that Takerei had the mana over the prisoners and the land. Potatau suggested it [the border] to Takerei & Takerei agreed.219

Taniora also discussed the more recent relationship with King Tawhiao. He made no mention of any split, and did not denigrate Tawhiao’s role in the area. He acknowledged that Tawhiao had the authority to place individual Ngati Tama leaders such as Tupoki on the land and that this would have been accepted by the local people:

The King has authority over the N.maniapoto & could give

217 Ibid, p68 218 Ibid, p23 219 Ibid, p19


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permission to any stranger to live on their land.220

However, he suggested that local Ngati Maniapoto chiefs would need to participate in any overarching agreement over Poutama. The Court apparently asked him a hypothetical question - if Tawhiao had actually granted all the Poutama lands to Ngati Tama, what would be the response of local Ngati Maniapoto hapu? Taniora’s response suggests that he saw the relationship with the Kingitanga as close and based around discussion not dictate:

If the King were to give all this land back to N. tama, N.maniapoto would object. When I said that the King could give permission to a stranger to occupy our land, I meant that we should agree to what the King wished, but there would be no right unless we did agree.221

Rewi, in discussing the role he and other leaders played in the negotiations with Ngati Tama in the late 1860s and early 1870s, took a similar position. Kingitanga and broader leaders did have considerable influence in the area but that final and far-reaching decisions over land required consultation and consent from local Ngati Maniapoto hapu:

I had no authority to give back Poutama unless the tribe, N.maniapoto agreed. But if N.tama had obeyed our wishes, it would have been time to consider the recompense, & to consult the tribe about it.222

Hone Pumipi was the local Ngati Maniapoto leader who most explicitly recognised the role of the wider Kingitanga and Ngati Maniapoto leadership in deciding on land rights in Poutama. Pumipi stated that Tawhiao, Rewi and Wahanui neither sought nor needed his permission, or that of other locally based Ngati Maniapoto, to return Ngati Tama to the area. The Court apparently asked on what grounds these chiefs had this authority. Pumipi replied that they held considerable rights in the area, both as individual chiefs and as leaders of the Kingitanga. Upon further questioning, he stated that Tawhiao’s authority stemmed solely from his role as King: ‘I admit the right of Tawhiao in this land on account of his mana over us as King. He has no right as a man Tawhiao’.223 Rewi, he stated, had interests in the land ‘because they have mana over us’.224 Ngati Maniapoto hapu therefore made no effort to eject Ngati Tama and Tupoki from the land, ‘[b]ecause Tawhiao had taken him [Tupoki] under his wing. But for his protection, Tupoki would have been driven away. We respected Tawhiao’s word, because he was the King’.225 Rewi and Wahanui also held personal mana and were agents of the King, therefore local tribes would not act against their decision that Tupoki’s people could return.

220 Ibid, p20 221 Ibid, p21 222 Ibid, p61 223 Ibid, p39 (underline in original) 224 Ibid, pp38-39 225 Ibid, p39


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These variations indicate that despite the incentive to exaggerate and simplify matters, the Court was informed that customary tenure in Poutama was anything but simple. The evidence provided glimpses into an extremely complex and fluid situation, with multiple levels of authority and rights, and where interests in land were not static but varied over time and reflected relationships and political issues. At very least, the Court had been left in no doubt that land rights in Poutama were contested, complicated and subject to multiple interpretations.

Furthermore, it was far from clear what Maori wished regarding the eventual legal ownership of the Mohakatino Parininihi block. The overall thrust of the evidence could lead one to assume that Ngati Maniapoto were seeking complete control of the Poutama area with no recognition whatsoever of any role for Ngati Tama, and vice versa. However, such assumptions are somewhat dangerous, as the Court does not seem to have explicitly posed this question to the witnesses. Ngati Tama’s representative Richmond, for instance, despite the absoluteness of the case he presented, did not expect that his clients would gain the whole of the land. Rather he privately hoped for a partial share, ‘possibly a fourth’.226 Given that the tribes had a history of connection and overlap in Poutama as well as of dispute and conflict, it is not impossible they may have been open to some form of agreement or compromise.227

Things become more blurred still when considering if the Mokau-based Ngati Maniapoto witnesses were interested in including wider Ngati Maniapoto and Kingitanga leaders in the title for Mohakatino Parininihi and Poutama in general. On this issue, Wetere’s hostility to acknowledging Tawhiao in the title can be safely assumed.

Wetere was also clearly seeking to gain the primary control over Poutama for himself and local Ngati Maniapoto. Nevertheless, he envisioned that wider Ngati Maniapoto leaders and Ngati Maniapoto as a whole would play a part in the future of the land, alongside the primary role of himself and the local people. The Chief Judge portrayed Wetere as the representative of ‘resident’ or ‘southern; Ngati Maniapoto’ which seemed to be his description for the more Mokau based groups. He apparently explicitly questioned Wetere whether he believed ‘northern Ngati Maniapoto’ should also be included in the title. Wetere responded:

The land being a recent conquest, I consider it belongs to the people who conquered it, not to the whole of N.maniapoto. The northern part of the tribe would have an interest but it would be for me to assign them their share. The land would be

226 Byrnes, ‘The Mohakatino Parininihi and the Mokau Mohakatino No 1 Block’, p21 227 O’Malley, ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement, 1840-1863’, p114 suggests that the wider Waikato/Ngati Maniapoto claim over Taranaki was not usually advanced as an exclusive right and that ‘customary rights were rarely as straightforward as a binary either/or choice between two different groups. Maori custom was instead capable of accommodating multiple overlapping layers of interest or claim’. However, in the context of the Mokau Court hearings in 1882, there was certainly a strong tendency by the claimants not to acknowledge the rights of their ‘competitors’.


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under my authority – my management. 228

Rewi, as a major Kingitanga and Ngati Maniapoto leader, did not seem to want the block to be exclusively under the control of only ‘resident’ hapu and chiefs. During his evidence, Rewi was careful not to explicitly state that Tawhiao or the Kingitanga as a whole had no role in Poutama, or to in any sense belittle the movement of which he remained a powerful leader. Moreover, Rewi saw himself as having influence over the future of Poutama, with Wetere playing a more direct role. Rewi had permitted the hearing and testified at it, despite being unwell and reluctant to travel to Waitara. He would later in the hearing instruct the judge over what the legal status of the Mokau Mohakatino block should be.229

Hone Pumipi was one local Ngati Maniapoto witness who took the chance to tell the Court that he believed the legal ownership of the Poutama land should include wider Ngati Maniapoto and Kingitanga leaders such as Tawhiao, Rewi and Wahanui. One indication of his position is his statement that:

Manga has a right to be in the Certificate, if we get the land, because they have mana over us. Tawhiao has a right.230

The judgement on the Mohakatino Parininihi block

On 26 June, the Native Land Court ruled that the Mohakatino Parininihi block would be granted to the ‘resident’ portions of Ngati Maniapoto only. Shortly afterwards, it approved a list of 141 individuals as the registered owners of the block, and who would be granted a certificate of title over the block once a Court-approved survey had been completed. As no alienation restrictions were imposed, the owners would then have the legal ability to sell off their individual shares in the land. A couple of days later, the Mokau Mohakatino blocks was also granted to 100 individuals associated with Wetere and the Ngati Maniapoto hapu of Mokau.

The intention of this report is decidedly not to make pronouncements as to which group or groups should have been granted legal rights to the land. It could instead be asked whether the Native Land Court was the right body to make the decision at all. The Court was faced with an extremely complex situation of overlapping and disputed rights. No simple formula could cope with the impact on customary tenure of conquest and conciliation, exile and return, the establishment of a King and so much more. A Maori forum would have been better positioned to decide on such issues and, as the whole history of the Rohe Potae compact suggests, this was what the area’s leaders demanded.

Instead, the Court had control. It adopted an overly rigid understanding of customary land use and tenure in Poutama, and may also have been influenced by political and diplomatic considerations. The evidence suggests, for instance, that the Court used the

228 Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, p67 229 Evidence of Rewi, 23 June 1882, Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, pp83-84 230 Ibid, p39


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Mokau hearings as an opportunity to deal a legal and rhetorical blow to the Kingitanga, perhaps seeing this as a precedent for the greater battles to come.

The fundamental issue is not that the Court acted incompetently or exceeded its jurisdiction. Rather, the problem is that it achieved what it set out to do. The Court’s primary objective was not to understand customary tenure but to revolutionise it, and in doing so, weaken communal authority and lay the groundwork for the alienation of Maori land.231 These goals were achieved. With the Court hearing, the long, complex and ever-changing nature of customary tenure in Poutama had been, legally at least, swept away. Poutama was not the legal property of resident Ngati Maniapoto hapu and chiefs. Rather, it was the possession of large numbers of individuals. These individuals may have been the owners of the land, but more deeply, the land had been placed under the authority of a chaotic but powerful legal system. The Court’s judgement was, in immediate terms, a marked success for Wetere and Ngati Maniapoto from Mokau. But ultimately, no tribe or group were the victors of these Court hearings, as the Crown’s native land system would have disastrous consequences for all Maori groups with connections to Mokau.

The Court issued its judgement over Mohakatino Parininihi in two stages. By June 10, Grace feared that his case had been severely derailed by evidence that Kingitanga leaders had agreed in around 1868 that Ngati Tama could return to Poutama. He asked for an adjournment so that Rewi could be brought from Kihikihi to rebut these statements. The chief judge first required Wetere’s assurance that Ngati Maniapoto would not blame the Court should the infirm Rewi fall more seriously ill during the hearing. Fenton then agreed to the adjournment, considering this recompense for the fact that Grace’s clients had been placed in ‘a bad position’ through testimony solicited by the Court after the claimants and counter claimants had rested their cases. Fenton then proposed that the Court’s findings on the status of the land at 1868 be issued immediately, while its final judgement would be delayed until after Rewi had given evidence. Grace and Brown had no objections to the proposal.232

The first part of the judgement was delivered on June 15. It was reported that the ‘two tribes’ ‘listened in silence’ and with great attention as Fenton explained that his findings were based on ‘very simple, very intelligible’ principles.233 Conquest of an area that resulted in the complete expulsion of the defeated, or the abandonment of the area, conferred a ‘perfect title’ on the conquerors provided it was backed by permanent occupation. Any tribe who held such a perfect title in 1840 continued to hold it unless it of its own free consent implicitly or explicitly admitted the right of the expelled people to return. A violent or non-permitted return had no validity given that from 1840 and the assumption of Crown sovereignty when ‘a new state of things came with

231 See for instance, Marr, ‘The Waimarino Purchase Report’, p42; D V Williams, ‘Te Kooti Tango Whenua’: The Native Land Court 1864-1909 (Wellington: Huia, 1999), pp63-64; Boast, p93 232 Marr, p48. Although it was indicated that Judge Monro and the Native Assessor also issued judgements, only Fenton’s was recorded. 233 ‘Native Lands Court, Waitara, Taranaki Herald, 19 Jun 1882, p2; Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, pp48-52


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it, and private warfare being illegal, no rights could be acknowledged by force’.234 It has been argued that such principals were altogether too simple, too artificial when applied to the complex nature of Maori customary title.235

Fenton ruled that until 1868 Ngati Maniapoto held such a perfect title. He essentially accepted the historical arguments made by Ngati Maniapoto witnesses and rejected those of Ngati Tama. But he also exhibited a strong belief that tribal life and rights in Poutama was marked only by a senseless and uncivilised violence. According to Fenton, Ngati Tama were originally the ‘undisputed possessors of the land in question’. They were locked in ‘a state of feud more or less violent’ with their northern neighbours Ngati Maniapoto:

[T]he questions which gave rise to the perpetual bloodshed and frightful destruction of life in the old days were generally insults to individuals which to the civilized mind appear trifling, and quite inadequate to the results.236

According to Judge Fenton, these feuds were terminated by the advance of a ‘great army’ of Waikato and Ngati Maniapoto tribes that forced the mass of Taranaki Maori that remained in the area to gather at Pukerangiora, where they were defeated ‘with great slaughter’. Although Ngati Tama witnesses claimed not to be in that pa, Fenton believed that, if they were not, they must have been fugitives elsewhere. Potatau and the Waikato invaders retreated home, and Ngati Maniapoto resumed hostilities, which forced the remaining Ngati Tama to flee south. Although Ngati Tama witnesses claimed to have gone only to gain guns, for Fenton the crucial point was that they had abandoned their lands and had not returned by 1840. Ngati Maniapoto took possession of the deserted lands ‘in a sparse manner ... but sufficiently to show a domiciliary intention, and were in undisturbed occupation’ from 1840 until 1848.237

Fenton concurred with the Ngati Maniapoto account that the negotiations he dated to 1848 resulted only in Ngati Tama being permitted to return south of Waikaramuramu. From then to 1868, Ngati Tama had made various ‘desultory attempts’ to return that did not constitute permanent occupation and did not take place with the consent of Ngati Maniapoto. Therefore, according to the chief judge, Ngati Maniapoto had conquered Poutama and permanently occupied it. Until 1868, there had not been any agreement by the Ngati Maniapoto ‘owners’ which permitted Ngati Tama to return to Poutama to threaten their ‘perfect title’.

Although both groups remained in Waitara to await the Court’s final ruling, European newspapers now confidently predicted that the outcome would favour Ngati

234 Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, pp48-49 235 See for instance, Marr, ‘The Waimarino Purchase Report’, p42; Bryan Gilling, ‘Engine of Destruction? An Introduction to the History of the Maori Land Court’, Victoria University of Wellington Law Review, 25 (1994), p127 236 Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, p49 237 Ibid, pp48-49


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Maniapoto.238 They were only partially correct, for the Mohakatino Parininihi judgement would recognise the rights of only the ‘resident’ part of Ngati Maniapoto. The basic effect, and intent of this ruling was to split and divide. The chief judge broke Ngati Tama’s overall tribal claim into three separate claims by three separate groups or individuals. Ngati Maniapoto were rendered into two distinct entities, a southern or resident section who were granted all legal rights to Mohakatino Parininihi and the rest, who were granted nothing. The Court showed a particular determination to remove the Kingitanga from Poutama, stating repeatedly that it and its leaders had no legally recognisable role in the area historically, now or in the future. Furthermore, the ruling legally split the Ngati Maniapoto hapu of Mokau and their leaders into a collection of individuals.

The judgement was delivered on 19 June.239 In Fenton’s words, as the Court had already ‘disposed of the ancestral title of N.tama to this estate’, it needed only to consider whether, from 1868 Ngati Tama had established a ‘new title ... grounded on an alleged cession of the land in consideration of their becoming supporters of the Maori King’.240 The Court described the evidence revolving around the negotiations between Ngati Tama and the Kingitanga leaders in the later 1860s as so conflicting that ‘it is impossible to determine with absolute certainty the amount of truth in all the statements made on one side and denied on the other’.241

Nevertheless, the Court had come to some firm and final conclusions. The chief judge had decided to divide Ngati Tama’s claim into three. The first, involving Paiura and ‘his section’, was quickly dismissed as they had argued essentially on the ‘ancestral title’, of Ngati Tama which the Court had earlier ruled had been extinguished through conquest. The Court did not believe they had provided sufficient evidence to show that title had been restored to them following conquest, while their claims of recent occupation were described as ‘so trivial as not to call for further notice’.242

The rights of Tupoki ‘and his friends’ were considered to require ‘more consideration’. According to Fenton’s understanding, they had argued that Rewi and Wahanui had promised to restore them to Poutama if they ‘embraced the political side called the King party’, and they had taken possession of the land until they voluntarily abandoned it to join Te Whiti in Parihaka.243 However, the chief judge rejected their claim because he did not accept that Rewi had the right to reinstall Ngati Tama as the ‘land was not Rewi’s to give’.244 Ngati Maniapoto and Waikato may have conquered it but they had not occupied it. It was instead the land of ‘Takerei and his people’ as only they had taken possession of it and ‘the land became theirs’. Takerei’s control was passed to Wetere Te Rerenga, who had not assented to any return of Ngati Tama and

238 ‘Native Lands Court, Waitara’, Taranaki Herald, 19 Jun 1882, p2 239 Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, pp71-74 240 Ibid, p71 241 Ibid 242 Ibid 243 Ibid, p72 244 Ibid


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therefore Tupoki and his people held ‘no title’. They may have lived on the land during the 1870s, albeit ‘in an irregular, intermittent, and uncertain manner’ but ‘they omitted the one great step necessary to secure a peaceful occupation and permanent title’, they had not secured Wetere’s support. ‘That neglect is now too late to remedy’.245 Fenton also thought their case was weakened by the fact that Tupoki had not wanted to attend the Court, and gave evidence only after being subpoenaed.

The Court decided that one Ngati Tama individual, Te Kaeaea, should be granted a piece of the Mohakatino Parininihi block. This was based around the belief that the local Ngati Maniapoto ‘owners’ of the land had welcomed him to the area, and he had lived with two of their ‘principal men’ until recently and had consequently ‘acquired a right to land there’.246 The judge instructed Ngati Maniapoto to mark off an area that Te Kaeaea would be granted ownership of. If the Court was not satisfied with this allocation, the Court would itself decide which area Te Kaeaea would receive.

Apart from this piece, the Court ruled that the entire block be granted to the ‘resident section of Ngatimaniapoto’ only. Ngati Maniapoto as a whole and ‘the northern portion’ of the tribe were excluded from the award. They had assisted in the conquest of the area but had not occupied it. This, according to Judge Fenton meant that they customarily had ‘some interest’ in the land but only of a ‘subsidiary character’ which ‘cannot be dealt with’ or recognised by the Court.247

The Court’s understanding of customary rights in Poutama has been described as deeply flawed. The Taranaki Tribunal damned it as a precise and clear interpretation ‘that none the less suffered the impediment of having nothing at all to do with Maori custom, despite its pretensions to the contrary’.248 Particularly problematic was its rigid views on what constituted rights to land, and its belief that these rights represented the absolute ‘ownership’ of the land. Presented with a contested and complex history of Poutama, it was inflexible where delicacy was required. Historians have complained that the Native Land Court often downplayed ‘customary mechanisms and principles for co-existence, overlapping interest, inclusiveness, flexibility and compromise’.249 The Court’s handling of the Mohakatino Parininihi hearing could be cited as a prime example of this tendency.

A political decision?

There are grounds for considering that the Court’s ruling reflected political considerations. The Taranaki Tribunal thought so, arguing that the Court was ‘very political at this time’ and suggesting its rulings regarding Poutama could be considered an element of the Government’s efforts to open up the Rohe Potae. It suggested that the Court ruling reflected the Government’s desire to attach itself to Ngati Maniapoto

245 Ibid, pp73-74 246 Ibid, p74 247 Ibid 248 Waitangi Tribunal, The Taranaki Report, p281 249 Marr, ‘The Waimarino Purchase Report’, p42


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at this time. In particular, a favourable judgement in this case would encourage Ngati Maniapoto chiefs to place more lands before the Court. According to the Taranaki Tribunal, for these and other reasons, it was a ‘foregone conclusion’ that the Court would find against Ngati Tama.250

While I have seen no evidence that directly supports this, it is clear that the Court did use the Mokau hearings to deliver a politically charged rejection of the Kingitanga. In both its rulings and its rationale for those rulings, the Court denigrated the Kingitanga as a political force and argued it had no recognisable customary or contemporary role in the lands of Mokau. The Court did not explicitly discuss the range of opinions from witnesses over the historical role of Kingitanga in the Poutama lands. Rather, it argued that it had no interests within Poutama, and its efforts to mediate and decide on land rights and political relationships were meaningless. Judge Fenton, echoing the comments of many a Government official, described Tawhiao as merely a tribal chief, the ‘chief of Ngatimahuta, who is sometimes called the Maori King’. Any decisions involving the Kingitanga regarding Ngati Tama’s return to Poutama were irrelevant, because Tawhiao’s ‘authority would be on no avail in this Court, for we do not recognise in Tawhiao or any other man to dispose of another person’s property’.251

The immediate context of this interpretation was to reject any Ngati Tama connections to the land on the basis of agreements with the Kingitanga. But the ruling that the Kingitanga had no status in Poutama either in legal title or as an decision-making body had far wider potential ramifications for future Land Court rulings in the aukati. Moreover, the Court explicitly rejected any claims Tawhiao or Waikato tribes might have to Poutama on the basis of customary rights, such as their role in the conquest of the area. Tawhiao, both as king and chief, was ruled to have no recognisable standing in Poutama.

Judge Fenton would later proudly claim that one of the ‘great reasons of the break-up of the [Kingitanga] coalition’ was that the Court presided over aukati lands despite the opposition of ‘Tawhiao and his mob’.252 The Mokau hearing can therefore be seen as an early example of how the Court considered itself to be in opposition and a grievous threat to the Kingitanga. The Court was, in the Taranaki Tribunal’s words, seeking to elevate itself above the King and to establish that it, and not the Kingitanga, held authority in Poutama and beyond. 253

The Court was scathing of another Maori political challenge to Crown domination. Ngati Tama’s involvement in the Parihaka movement was ridiculed. Tupoki was described as being ‘seduced by the fanatical influence of Te Whiti’ and having gone to

250 Waitangi Tribunal, The Taranaki Report, p281 251 Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, pp50-51 252 David Williams, ‘The Use of Law in the Process of Colonization: An Historical and Comparative Study, With particular Reference to Tanzania (Mainland) and to New Zealand’, PhD thesis, University of Dar es Salaam, 1983, pp314-315; Marr, The Alienation of Maori Land ...Part one, p16 253 Waitangi Tribunal, The Taranaki Report, p281


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Parihaka in a fit of ‘temporary insanity’.254

Given such indications of judicial partiality, it is perhaps easy to overlook that the Court decision also represented a crucial, if more subtle, blow to the efforts of Ngati Maniapoto as a whole, including leaders such as Rewi and Wahanui, to keep control of their tribal lands. The Court was explicit – Poutama was to be the legal possession of only the ‘resident section’ of Ngati Maniapoto, not of Ngati Maniapoto as whole. The non-residents, or ‘northern’ Ngati Maniapoto as they were termed, had played a role in the conquest of the region but had ‘returned home’ afterwards. Without permanent occupation, the interest in the land was only of a ‘subsidiary’ character’ that could not be recognised by the Court.255 The whole wider Ngati Maniapoto tribal connection to Poutama – and the cohesion of its constituent hapu – was denied. The only connection was that ‘northern’ Ngati Maniapoto had once lent some ‘military services or assistance’ which the Court could not equate into an interest in land.256

Rewi’s role was similarly belittled and the Court would not recognise that he had any connection to Poutama on the basis of his leadership. Great rangatira, political leaders, had, in the Court’s understanding, no recognisable authority or power. The Court would acknowledge:

no right in Rewi any more than in Tawhiao to give away another man’s land.257

According to the Court, the only rights Rewi could claim in Poutama were based on his role in the earlier conquests. But this was only an ‘inferior interest ... altogether of a secondary nature’ and ‘by no means’ gave him authority to decide on land rights in Poutama.258

In this light, Rewi’s apparently contradictory response to the Court statements makes perfect sense. His great fear that the Poutama lands would be granted to non-Ngati Maniapoto tribes, and possibly then sold to the Government, had been successfully prevented. But neither he as a chief or Ngati Maniapoto as a cohesive whole, had been granted the land. Their connection to the tribal estate in Poutama had been legally severed and verbally rejected. Newspapers reported Rewi after the Court hearings to be both satisfied and angry. As a New Zealand Herald correspondent commented, he had the ‘satisfaction’ that the ‘lands of his people’ had been protected. But, as the Taranaki Herald stated:

He is very puri anent the recent judgment of the Native Lands Court, and he considers the judges have underrated his authority when they stated he had no power to give away the

254 Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, pp71-72 255 Ibid, p74 256 Ibid 257 Ibid, p73 258 Ibid, pp72-73


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block of land at Mokau.259

The Court’s tendency to create division was seen in every element of its ruling. It divided the Mohakatino Parininihi block into three. The main part was titled Mohakatino Parininihi no 1. It would belong to the ‘resident section of Ngatimaniapoto’, but not as a community. Nor would it be under the legal control of chiefs such as Wetere. Rather, after a day’s negotiations, Wetere and Grace produced a list of 141 individuals who the Court approved as the owners.260 Local Ngati Maniapoto chiefs Wetere, Te Rangituataka, Hone Pumipi, Taniora, Takirau and Epiha were among the individual owners. Wider Ngati Maniapoto and Kingitanga leaders such as Rewi, Wahanui and Tawhiao were not.261 A smaller area on the Tongaporutu River, Mohakatino Parininihi no 2, was granted to Wetere as an individual, so that he could pass the land on to Grace. Mohakatino Parininihi no 3, a 500 acre area on the very south-west tip of the block, abutting the confiscation line, was granted to Te Kaeaea alone.262 Crown grants would be issued upon the completion of an approved survey.

Maori had entered into the Mohakatino Parininihi case as part of a communal and chiefly battle for control over land. However, the ultimate effects of the Court’s interference would be the undermining of collective authority, and the eventual fragmentation and alienation, rather than the collective management and development of the land. In the case of Mohakatino Parininihi block, this process would take a decade or more to fully manifest itself. But the Native Land Court could pose a more immediate threat to Maori control of land. This was exhibited during the Mokau Mohakatino case, when the adjudication of title ran parallel to attempts to alienate the block. The hearings also revealed how Wetere and other Mokau Maori were determined to overcome these threats, and to control the Court process rather than be controlled by it.

The Mokau Mohakatino case

The Native Land Court was, of course, inextricably linked to the alienation of Maori land and for that reason it inspired considerable resistance and suspicion among local Maori. The Court not only transformed customary title in land into a saleable interest, but Court hearings were themselves a convenient location for Government and private land agents to seek to divest Maori of their newly granted legal rights to land.

The Native Land Court hearings over Poutama were also a type of land market, as both the Government and private speculators turned their attentions to the most commercially attractive part of Poutama - the Mokau Mohakatino block with its coal

259 Taranaki Herald, 22 Jun 1882, p2 260 Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, pp79-80; Grace diary entry, 21 Jun 1882, WH Grace Diary 1882 261 It is worth pointing out that their non-inclusion stemmed from the decisions of the grantees (and Grace). Nonetheless, the crucial point is that the Court system did not encourage a list of grantees that reflected the multiple levels of authority and rights to land. 262 Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, p78


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and its strategic location. The negotiations going on outside the Court were as important as what was happening inside. In fact, there was no clear distinction between the legal process of determining title and the commercial desire to alienate it. This overlap was embodied by Grace, who was working to ensure that Wetere and his people would be made the legal owners of the Mokau Mohakatino block so that they could sell or lease the land to his other client and partner, Joshua Jones.

The first part of Grace’s ambition – to have the Maori he was already in negotiation with declared the legal owners of the land – proved to be straightforward. The Court’s ‘inquiry’ into the customary ownership of the Mokau Mohakatino block was over as soon as it began. When the hearing opened on June 22, no counter-claimants appeared. Potential counter-claimants had either boycotted, not heard of the Court hearing, or in the case of Ngati Tama leaders, abandoned it. The Court’s ruling and rationale regarding the Mohakatino Parininihi block had shattered their plans to gain legal title to the neighbouring land. They left the Court as soon as the Mohakatino Parininihi ruling was announced, to consider their next moves and protests. Given the lack of challenge to their claim, Grace and Wetere were immediately asked to prepare the list of owners for the Court’s approval. No evidence was required, no investigation into the contested history of the area took place.263

The out-of-Court discussions over who would be included on the register of owners were somewhat more fraught but on June 26, the Court approved a list of 100 names.264 These were mainly, it would seem, Mokau-based Ngati Maniapoto individuals including some of the chiefs most active in the parallel negotiations with Jones, including Wetere, Takirau Watihi, Te Oro Watihi, Taniora, and Epiha Karoro. Importantly for future events, the upper Mokau chief Heremia Te Aria, who would emerge as one of the key opponents of any land deal with Jones, was also named.265 Once again, no wider Kingitanga or Ngati Maniapoto leaders were included, although Rewi, Wahanui, and Tawhiao would all in different ways exhibit a determination to play a major role in the future of the land. As with the other Poutama block, the Crown grant to the land would be issued only after a Court-approved survey had been carried out. In the meantime, the Court gave no indication of the expected size or boundaries of Mokau Mohakatino. However, three of its boundaries were reasonably apparent. The Mokau River was to be it northern boundary, the sea its western boundary and the Mohakatino River its southern boundary. Its eastern extent would subsequently be the subject of prolonged dispute.

Neither private speculators nor the Government were willing to wait until the legal formalities were complete before beginning their efforts to gain the land. Jones and Grace had, it would seem, throughout the Court hearing been seeking an agreement to buy the block as part of a promised coal extraction partnership with local Maori. However, their efforts would be frustrated and complicated by Maori opposition, and

263 Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, p82 264 Grace diary entry, 24 June 1882, WH Grace Diary 1882 265 Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, pp85-86


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more immediately, by the determination of Wetere and Rewi. Wetere may have legally been just one owner among many, and Rewi not even that, but they were determined to play the central role in the Court hearings and to ensure that the Court process would be a mechanism for protecting and developing the land, not for selling it or losing control over it.

Both saw real potential in a coal partnership with Jones, but were far more cautious over any land deal. Sale was unacceptable while lease was possible but would require further negotiation and consultation with local people, and careful control. Interestingly, both Rewi and Wetere wanted the Court to help ensure that they were able to maintain that control. Rather than being a mechanism for land alienation, they wanted the Court to help to protect and develop it, for instance through overseeing and mediating any land arrangements with Pakeha.

Indeed, the negotiations over the Mokau Mohakatino block took place in the courtroom with Judge Fenton to some degree playing the role of mediator and protector of Maori interests.

These negotiations began with Rewi instructing the Court that:

This land should not be sold. But if the owners wish to lease it, they should apply to the C[hief] Judge for permission, and such an application should be made through Wetere te Rerenga.266

Grace, now wearing his alternative hat as Jones’ representative, instructed Fenton that they would agree to the land being made inalienable if the Court made legally acceptable a long-term lease. Jones and Grace had already been in negotiations with Wetere about that very lease. The proposal was that while the annual rent would be low, local Maori would be equal participants in the mining enterprise and share in its profits.

Grace asked the Court whether such an arrangement would be acceptable. The Court was concerned that this could potentially disadvantage Maori, for ‘if the mine was a failure, the natives would get nothing’.267 Wetere assured the Court that he understood the risk, but ‘on the other hand’ local Maori ‘would perhaps receive a handsome income’ and be full partners in a successful commercial operation.268

The Court, now convinced that the ‘natives knew what they were doing’ then ruled that the land would be inalienable for sale, but could be leased for a maximum of 56 years. Any lease must include an annual payment of rent.269 Following this ruling, Jones and Grace, out of the Court, tried to have Wetere and the other gathered owners immediately sign a lease. Although at least two of the owners were willing, Wetere refused, insisting that further negotiations and any agreement could take place only in

266 Ibid, pp83-84 267 Ibid, p84 268 Ibid 269 Ibid, p85


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Mokau, in front of the gathered community and all the owners.270 These negotiations will be discussed in the next chapter.

At the same time, another attempt by Europeans to gain land in Mokau Mohakatino was defeated by the determination of Wetere and Rewi to strictly control and benefit from any land deals, and by their influence over the Native Land Court. A Government official, the Wanganui Resident Magistrate Booth, was present throughout the Court hearings. Although he described his responsibility as ‘simply to watch the case’, the Government had clearly decided that the Court was opening up possibilities for the future colonisation of Mokau and the wider Rohe Potae.271 It wanted to use the Court to secure a small but strategically important stake in the area. Booth, apparently without any consultation with local Maori, applied for a piece of the Mokau Mohakatino block to be made inalienable and set aside for a Government township. ‘[U]nable to state how much land would be required’ or exactly where the township would be laid out, the hearing was adjourned so he could get seek more information from his superiors.272 On June 24, he reported that the Government wanted a piece of land on the south banks of the Mokau River, bordered on the west by the sea, on the south east by a straight line from ’Tapututu [?] creek to the mouth of the Waihi River.273 This land was one of the rare places in Poutama potentially suitable for settlement and was crucial for access to the coal deposits further up the river. It was therefore important not just to local Maori and the Government, but also to Jones and Grace.

Grace complained bitterly to the Court that the Government was reneging on Sheehan’s earlier promises not to interfere in Jones attempts to acquire land. Jones tried to persuade the Court not to grant the application by stating that the land was ill-suited for a township and arguing that a more appropriate location would be on the north bank of the Mokau where the Government already claimed land (but was unable to take possession).274

But it was Wetere and Rewi who stopped the proposal in its tracks. The minute book records, although barely legible, still reveal their determination to control the land, and their desire to use the Court to help them maintain that control. They were angry that the Government was seeking to usurp that control, primarily through its efforts to create a township on part of their land and instituting other restrictions over the area. Rewi wanted to keep the Government from any influence over the land: only the Court in cooperation with Maori should have the ability to restrict or define use of the land.275 The Court should be, in Wetere’s words, ‘our Court’. Any approval of the township proposal would drive local people away from a nascent trust that the Court was there to protect them, and would instead confirm suspicions that it was a

270 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, p21 271 Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, p1 272 Ibid, p83 273 Ibid, p88 274 Ibid, pp82-83 275 Ibid, p83


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mechanism by which the Government seized control and land:

I won’t have the mana of the Government upon our Court. The hauhaus are afraid of the Government, I wish to be careful about burying them under the pakeha tikanga. If the hauhaus learn that the Govt. are wanting to impose restrictions upon the land it will frighten them away. These people are strangers, they just came into the Court, and the Government will immediately step forward to make difficulties.276

Wetere was not necessarily opposed to a town of Pakeha settlers; indeed he stated he looked forward to one and the financial benefits it could bring. But if a township was to be created on his land, it would be under his mana and his control, not the Government’s: I know the plan of the Government. I won’t agree, We know how to manage things ourselves’.277

Given the opposition of Wetere and Rewi, the Government withdrew its application. Wetere, however, was still worried that the Government might use the Court to seize the land. He therefore had the area that the Government desired excluded from the Mokau Mohakatino no 1 block. They would have no legal title over it, but it would be under his people’s customary rule, in preparation for possibly establishing a town for Pakeha under their mana.278

I therefore say, I will set out my town for myself as the government does for itself.279

The costs of the Court

Despite these successful efforts to manage and influence the Court, Rewi and Wetere were unable to prevent land being lost due to the massive and multiple costs of the Court process. Maori throughout the North Island had long protested over the costs of going to the Court.280 Rewi and Wetere tried to limit these costs as much as possible but were unable to avoid incurring debt that could only be met through land loss.

The largest potential cost of the Court process was the requirement for a survey. This threatened in the case of the Mokau Mohakatino and Mohakatino Parininihi blocks to be very high. As we have seen, the owners were required to have these blocks surveyed after the hearings in order to receive Crown grants to the land. Immediately after the hearings, Wetere and some local chiefs entered into an arrangement, involving Jones and Grace, with a surveyor to survey both blocks at the cost of four pence per acre. No reliable estimate of the final total cost could be offered given the uncertainty over

276 Ibid, p87. It is possible that Wetere here was talking about his opposition to any Government restrictions on the block, not just the proposed township. 277 Ibid, p87 278 The main part of the block was designated Mokau Mohakatino no 1. Mokau Mohakatino no 2 was the appellation designated for the Government’s township site which was abandoned upon the Court’s refusal of this application in 1882. 279 Ibid, p87 280 Williams, ‘Te Kooti Tango Whenua’, p157


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the size of the blocks. However, the Court’s rough estimate for the Mohakatino Parininihi block was 100,000 acres which would have equated to a cost to local Maori of £1666, or just under $260,000 in 2010 terms, for the survey of the one block alone.281 The arrangement was that the total costs had to be paid off after three years before a lien would be placed on their lands. How much, and how, local Maori would eventually pay for the surveys of these two blocks is an extremely murky question, that later chapters will touch on. What is clear is that in 1882 they were anticipating a potentially massive debt to gains legal title to the lands. The need to meet these expected survey fees were a critical factor in Mokau Maori entering into the coal mining and land arrangement with Jones. It would seem that the understanding was that Jones would pay for the survey of the Mokau Mohakatino no 1 block which he would be entitled to mine. The proceeds that local Maori received from the mining would then be used to pay off the Mohakatino Parininihi survey.282 It would therefore seem that local Maori did not enter into the Court and survey process to bring about a deal with Jones. Rather, they entered into a deal with Jones to pay for the Court and survey process.

Other Court-related costs would have to be paid and did directly result in the loss of land. Court fees, while not massive in themselves, could be damaging, especially given the limited financial resources of local hapu. Dotted through the minute books are various amounts incurred through Court fees including £10 18s, £10 10s, £2, £3.283 It is not stated what the specific reasons for these fees were, nor is it clear whether local Maori were charged additional Court costs.

The Court process also involved substantial subsidiary costs, including travel. Although the original expectation had been that the Court would be held in the Mokau area itself, in eventuality a large number of local Maori travelled to and from Waitara, many of them by the steamer Moturoa. Some of the costs for use of the steamer were apparently borne by local Maori, but much of it resulted in debt to Joshua Jones.284

The costs of Rewi’s emergency trip to the Waitara hearings were particularly substantial. The infirm Rewi wanted to give his evidence at Kihikihi but given the Court refusal, Grace deputised an assistant to escort the chief first to Auckland and then on a steamer to Waitara.285

The Court hearing, with its frequent adjournments, was also long. Many Maori arrived

281 Grace diary entry, 20 Jun 1882, WH Grace Diary 1882; New Zealand Inflation Calculator, www.rbnz.govt.nz/statistics/0135595.html, downloaded 14 Oct 2010 282 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, pp18-19, 20, 20-22 which show that Heremia had earmarked the proceeds for the survey of the Poutama or Mohakatino Parininihi block and p36 in which Jones states he was to arrange and pay for surveying, presumably meaning the Mokau Mohakatino block. Note however that Grace diary entry, 20 June 1882 seems to infer that local Maori would pay for the surveying of both blocks. 283 Ibid, pp78, 79, 80, 85 284 ‘Trip of the S.S. Moturoa To Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 29 May 1882, p2; ‘New Plymouth Hospital’, Taranaki Herald, 14 Jun 1882, p2; ‘Harbour Board’, Taranaki Herald, 28 Jun 1882, p2 285 Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, p46; Grace diary entry, 1 July 1882, WH Grace Diary 1882


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in late May to prepare for it opening on June 2. It closed on June 24, and it was not until early July that most Maori returned to Mokau, either by foot or by sea.286 It would therefore seem that over 150 Mokau-based Maori lived in Waitara for a month. Accommodation, food and other expenses must have been considerable even accounting for the organised attempts by chiefs to limit costs. After Rewi’s warning that the hearing could be long and that plenty of food needed to be brought with them, the Moturoa was loaded with ten tons of provisions.287 Despite this, they still ran out of food and went into debt with Grace to secure more supplies.288

There were also the costs of legal representation at the hearings. One of Ngati Tama’s two representatives, the New Plymouth lawyer Richmond, expected that his impoverished clients would be able to pay him only through land granted to them, or by a share of the proceeds for the sale of that land. However, Richmond, who only attended the Court for seven days, was relatively relaxed about the possibility that he might not be paid.289

Grace, on the other hand, was involved in every aspect of Ngati Maniapoto’s case for more than a month and was decidedly not working pro bono. In all, he expected a payment of £120, which in today terms equates to over $18,000, for services rendered plus advances.290 Grace later claimed:

When Wetere and all his people went to Waitara to attend NLC they had no money whatever to pay Court fees hearing fees etc. and nothing to buy food with. Then towards the end of the case it was found absolutely necessary that Rewi should be a witness ... That money was found ... by me as well as the Court fees and cash to buy food. Also cash paid Wetere over and above the above advances mentioned above.291

Local Maori had no way of paying such sums, except through land. Grace claimed that it was their idea, not his, that he be allocated a block of land on the southern banks of the Tongaporutu River in lieu of payment. This is not impossible, for Wetere and others had at this stage no other immediate source of revenue, and they may well have wanted to be rid of the debt, and their financial obligations to Grace as soon as possible. Be that as it may, they were forced to provide Grace with a substantial and valuable amount of land to Grace. The Court cut out an area on the southern banks of the Tongaporutu River, the Mohakatino Parininihi no 2 block, and registered it in the

286 ‘Urenui’, Taranaki Herald, 6 Jul 1882, p2; Grace diary entry, 9-16 Jun 1882, WH Grace Diary 1882 287 Trip of the S.S. Moturoa To Mokau, Taranaki Herald, 29 May 1882, p2; Grace diary entry, 25 May 1882, WH Grace Diary 1882 288 Grace to Jack, Kihikihi, 24 Aug 1884, WH Grace Letterbook 1880-1892 289 Byrnes, ‘The Mohakatino Parininihi Block and the Mokau Mohakatino No.1 Block’, p100 290 New Zealand Inflation Calculator 291 Grace to Jack, Kihikihi, 24 Aug 1884, WH Grace Letterbook 1880-1892. Grace claimed that he told local Maori ‘I wanted nothing for my services but certainly I expected any cash expended on their behalf to be repaid’. However, the first part of this statement is difficult to accept, especially when his general policy regarding charging clients is considered. See for instance, Grace diary entry, 20 July 1882, WH Grace Diary 1882


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name of Wetere. Wetere then immediately transferred it to Grace.292 Grace estimated it initially at well over 1000 acres but later described it as 682 acres of ‘splendid’ flat land with a particularly valuable frontage to the sea.293 The loss was compounded by the fact that Grace did not meet Wetere’s expectation to develop this land in partnership with Mokau Maori, for instance by entering into a joint sheep farming enterprise. Rather, Grace attempted to on-sell the land for a considerable price. Despite delays due to survey and title problems, in 1889 Mokau Mohakatino no 2 was sold by Grace to a European.294

A year after the Court hearing over Poutama, a petition signed by Rewi and 414 others of Te Rohe Potae expressed anger at the practices common in the Native Land Court in Cambridge and ‘other places’. Waitara could well have been one of those places that the petition referred to when it condemned the costs of the Court. These included that lawyers and land speculators conspired to increase:

the expenses to so great an extent that the Natives were unable to defray them, so that they (the speculators) might seize the land, the result being that we secure the shadow and the speculators (land swallowers) the substance.295

Conclusion

By July 1882, the Native Land Court had been introduced to Mokau. The consequences were far-reaching and generally disastrous. As we have seen, the Court process divided local Maori, distorted and destroyed customary tenure, and paved the way for the eventual alienation of the great majority of Poutama. The hearing in Waitara did not, despite Pakeha hopes, immediately result in the Court spreading throughout the aukati given the continuing hostility to it among the leaders and hapu of the Rohe Potae in general. Nevertheless, the hearing has to be considered a huge step towards European control and Maori disenfranchisement in Mokau. From this point onwards, Maori land and Maori life in the area would be increasingly dragged into a disastrous and unequal relationship with European law, from which it still has not been able to fully emerge.

It is crucial to realise that the full ramifications of the Court would take years to manifest themselves. Indeed, by July 1882, one group had good reason to feel that they had made the right decision to bring the Court into Mokau. Wetere and those associated with him, backed by Rewi, had seemingly succeeded in their pressing goals. They had gained the legal ownership over the great majority of Poutama, preventing

292 Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, p79; Grace diary entry, 19-20 July 1882, WH Grace Diary 1882 293 Grace to Jack, Kihikihi, 24 Aug 1884, pp718-719, Grace to Bailey, 17 July 1886, p45, both in WH Grace Letterbook 1886-1887, MSY-5787 294 Grace to Jack, 27 November 1884, p783, WH Grace Letterbook 1880-1892, MSY-4506; Grace to Bailey, 17 July 1886, p45, WH Grace Letterbook 1886-1887, ATL MSY-5787; Grace to Houston, 23 April 1889, p982, WH Grace Letterbook 1880-1892, MSY-4506 295 AJHR, 1883, J-1, p1


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the immediate threat that it would be sold or otherwise ripped from their control. Despite the substantial financial costs, their interaction with the Court had been so successful that they had grounds for believing it would be more a partner and a protector than a threat. They were now in the position to consider business and land arrangements with Pakeha that they believed would bring them considerable benefits and few drawbacks. The rest of this report is, in essence, the story of the destruction of these hopes.

Figure 11: Native Land Court blocks and Crown purchases in the Mokau region

TRANSITION AND TROUBLE, 1882 TO 1888

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Chapter Eight

Transition and Trouble

1882-1888

Introduction

The years from 1882 to 1888 were arguably the most pivotal in the history of Crown-Maori relations in Mokau. At the beginning of this period, the Mokau region was essentially under Maori control. In the search to maintain that control, and to create new economic and socio-political opportunities, local hapu and leaders made a series of attempts to create a partnership both with individual Pakeha and with the Crown.

Despite some initially positive signs, by the end of the period these efforts had gone disastrously wrong and their hopes of a genuine alliance with the Government lay in tatters. The most crucial single blow was that the Government ignored sustained Maori protest and opposition and gave legal tenure over much of the Mokau Mohakatino no 1 block to a European coal speculator. This was not just the beginning of major land loss for local hapu, but it also heralded a crucial change in the dynamics of the region. The Government, after 40 years of relative impotence in the region, and a brief period in which equality and mutual respect seemed possible, was increasingly determined and able to assert dominance over Mokau, its people and its land.

8.1 The Jones Lease

In 1882, some Mokau chiefs facilitated an arrangement with Joshua Jones regarding Mokau Mohakatino no 1. This agreement appeared to be a blueprint for the future development of the region and interaction between local Maori and Europeans. Local hapu were to be full partners in a coal-mining enterprise while retaining authority over the region, its land and its resources. Jones and his Pakeha investors would bring the capital needed for such a venture while Mokau Maori would provide the raw materials. Together, they would create a business partnership which local Maori could dissolve, if they so wished, at any time. As Wetere, one of the prime architects of the deal, saw it, the arrangement offered great benefits and few drawbacks. Local hapu would continue to live on and use the land, while overseeing and benefitting from the development of its coal areas and the creation of infrastructure and new opportunities.1 The essential basis of the arrangement seemed so favourable that Wetere was to remain committed to it long after many others had lost all faith in Jones and his promises.

The contrast between this vision and the reality would prove to be virtually total. The land would lie undeveloped and unused, in the legal control of a man who would reveal himself to be a unusually persistent and ruthless adversary. Instead of control and partnership, local hapu would be dragged into the mire of a 30 year legal and political saga which, by the end of it, would see virtually the entire block alienated. The

1 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, p21


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deal with Jones would prove to be the most tragic example of a wider pattern in which the efforts of Mokau leaders to create controlled and beneficial interaction with Pakeha would lead to unwanted land loss and disempowerment.

Figure 12: Joshua Jones (Picture provided by the Mokau Museum, Mokau)

The initial proposal at Waitara

The general nature of the proposed partnership – although not all its critical details – were outlined at Waitara during and immediately after the Native Land Court hearing in June 1882. As we have seen, during the hearings Jones and his land agent WH Grace had attempted to buy the Mokau Mohakatino no 1 block. Rewi and Wetere had refused to consider a sale, but had indicated their openness to some form of lease or business arrangement. After negotiations between Wetere and the speculators, the Court ruled that the owners, if they so wished, could enter into a lease of the land not


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exceeding 56 years.2

Immediately after the Court hearing, Wetere and some other Mokau leaders, although not Rewi, entered into further discussions with Jones and Grace. Jones then had a Waitara solicitor draw up a deed in English which Grace translated shortly afterwards.3 Unfortunately, these deeds have not been sighted and there would be many later murky inferences of what they contained, along with suggestions of multiple and mysteriously altered versions. It should be emphasised that Joshua Jones’ involvement with Mokau produced an enormous amount of evidence but little clarity, given that Jones’ portrayal of events and of himself were in radical conflict with the impressions left by local Maori and more detached observers. Nevertheless, from what can be deduced regarding the deeds, and from other sources, we can establish some of the key elements of the proposed arrangement, to which Heremia and others would later add some vital alterations and conditions.

Jones was seeking a 56-year lease over the entire block up to its still unsurveyed boundary near Totoro. He would live on the block, among local Maori, and would mine the coal and other minerals on the land. While the lessors would receive just £25 annual rental, there was the opportunity for far greater benefits, including 10 percent of all proceeds from the coal-mining business. WJ Butler, a Native Land Court official with the reputation as a ‘most expert translator and interpreter’, later examined English and Maori language versions of the deed and found one major inconsistency. In the English version, the Maori lessors would receive 10 percent less deductions for expenses. In te reo Maori, the deed apparently stated that they would receive a flat 10 per cent, with no deductions for expenses.4

This was a potentially significant problem but nevertheless there were realistic expectations that the proceeds from coal mining could be extensive. A covenant was attached to the deed which committed Jones to forming a company ‘as soon as possible’ with at least £30,000 capital, to work the coal and minerals in the area. Jones would provide and pay for competent and experienced personnel to explore for and mine coal and for ‘developing the resources of the area’.5 Each year, he was required to invest an extensive amount of money to ensure the commercial success of the venture. Wetere later testified that the agreement was for the company to ‘spend £2,000 or £4,000 yearly in opening up the mine’.6 The covenant stated the figure was £3,000 per annum which would be spent on ‘raising winning and making marketable’ the enterprise, including providing the necessary roads and buildings, and shipping and transporting the coal.7 There were expectations that this enterprise would bring

2 To understand later events, it should be noted that any lease did not necessarily have any legal standing, in part because the lessees had not yet been issued a Crown grant. 3 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, pp13-14 4 Native Lands and Native-Land Tenure: Interim Report of Native Land Commission, on Native Lands in Mokau-Mohakatino Block, (Henceforth ‘Stout-Palmer Commission’) AJHR, 1909, Session I, G-1i, p4 5 Ibid, p4 6 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, p21 7 AJHR, 1909, Session I, G-1i, p4


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considerable numbers of Pakeha miners and other settlers into the area, long one of Wetere’s ambitions, and one of Jones’ responsibilities was to, if necessary, lay out a ‘township’.8

Jones also committed himself to paying for the survey of the Mokau Mohakatino no 1 block, ridding local Maori of a major expense and allowing them to complete their legal ownership of the block. The covenant stated that the lessee will ‘provide a competent and sufficient staff of surveyors for surveying and measuring’ the block.9 Jones himself acknowledged that ‘I was to get it done [the survey] for them and pay for it’.10 The lessee was also required to keep the cleared land on the block in good condition, sown in good pasture and well fenced.11

Crucially, local hapu were to be provided with a formal mechanism to enable them to control and participate in the development of their land. According to the covenant, two representatives of the owners would be appointed directors of the company that would control the mining and related activities. They would be elected in a majority vote by the owners and a number of other conditions were added to ensure that the owners were able to monitor and be informed of the company’s actions and economic position.12

These were just some of the formal obligations that Jones was committing himself to. There were also, no less importantly, a range of informal understandings and expectations not included in the deeds. We can get a glimpse of these, for example, in reports that Jones was at this time arranging to buy a steamer, which Wetere would be the pilot of, to transport the coal.13 In the coming months, Jones would also frequently be expected to pay the expenses of Wetere and others when they travelled together and to buy clothes for local Maori.14 Jones described the offering of gifts and ongoing payments in patronising terms but acknowledged that they were essential to the overall agreement: They were vital:

in keeping the natives alive to their obligations, for they are like children and required to be occasionally sweetened. Although there are many intelligent men among them yet as a whole they have no [illegible word] of the fulfilment of obligations. There is sometimes a necessity of carrying out a policy of sugar and blankets so as to keep them in [a] proper order of mind.15

Local Maori, as Wetere told the 1888 royal commission into the lease, were willing to reciprocate fully in an ongoing relationship based around mutual responsibilities and

8 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, p16 9 AJHR, 1909, Session I, G-1i, p4 10 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, p36. Note however that Grace diary entry, 20 June 1882, WH Grace Diary 1882 11 AJHR, 1909, Session I, G-1i, p5 12 Ibid, p4 13 Taranaki Herald, 2 Aug 1882, p2 14 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, p15 15 Papers attached to Public Petitions Committee into Joshua Jones Petition 17/1885, p20 LE 1, Box 235* 1885/9, ANZ Wgt


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benefits.16 At the heart of the arrangement was that local Maori would make available their resources and land, and in return they expected economic benefit and real partnership. For Wetere, this prospective deal was crucial for the development of the area under Maori control and he would work hard to get his people to accept it. Nevertheless, he rebuffed Jones’ wishes to have the deeds signed at Waitara. Instead, further negotiations and any final agreement must take place in Mokau, to allow for wider consultation and the participation of those who had not been at the Land Court, especially Heremia Te Aria. It would be Heremia who would demand that the deal with Jones be still more strictly controlled, limited and defined.

The demands of Heremia

By 1 July 1882, Jones had arrived in Mokau to seek finalisation of the plan outlined with Wetere and others. He faced enormous challenges, including from rival speculators. Jones’ erstwhile partner and current rival George Stockman was already at Mokau, trying to secure his own deal to the minerals and land in the region, and warning locals against dealing with Jones. Among Stockman’s potential investors was Nevil Walker, a land agent and would-be coal magnate who was keeping a close interest in developments regarding Mokau Mohakatino. He and his wife, Annie Walker, who was of dual descent and was one of the owners of the block, were trying to facilitate a rival coal and land deal on the north bank of the Mokau River. They also sought to disrupt Jones’ Mokau Mohakatino negotiations. Their tactics included sending letters and communications to the owners telling them to reject Jones because a wealthy, although apparently fictitious, Pakeha named Abbott, was on his way ‘with lots of money, who would make good terms with them’.17

However, Jones had not come unprepared for what was a struggle for signatures. He brought with him his deeds and his guarantees of development and partnership. He had also hired the Moturoa steamer, which, along with bringing the owners back from Waitara, contained large amounts of food and provisions that Jones would distribute liberally in the coming days. It also contained the casks of beer that some would argue played a crucial factor in what would unfold.18

Jones also had a team of Pakeha to assist him, including Thomas Poole, who, as he was about to open up a store in the area, served as a useful example of the kind of development and settlement Jones was promising. More valuable still were the interpreters Grace and Dalton, for Jones spoke little te reo, and relatively few of the Maori owners understood English or could read the deeds in either language. It was these interpreters who would explain to local Maori the nature and details of the proposal.

The negotiations took place at Wetere’s settlement of Te Rainga. At their height, about

16 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, p22 17 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, pp15, 33 18 Ibid, passim


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120 to 130 Maori were present.19 Not all of these were registered owners of Mokau Mohakatino no 1 block, and some of the owners did not attend due to their opposition to any lease.20 Nevertheless, it was a significant gathering. Among all the Pakeha and Maori present, the one closest to being a neutral observer was Major WB Messenger, head of the armed constabulary at Pukearuhe, who had been asked by Jones and Grace to witness the negotiations and deed signing. He also played a significant role in the negotiations, explaining to local Maori some of the key features of the agreement. His corroboration of some of the key points made by the Maori participants is therefore particularly valuable for understanding these events.

While some at the hui were enthusiastic at the prospect of an arrangement, many were sceptical. Opposition to any land arrangement with Pakeha remained strong, including among those closely affiliated with the Parihaka movement.21 There was also concern, based on past experience, as to whether Jones could be trusted to honour his obligations and respect the limitations placed on him. Tawhana told the 1888 royal commission that:

I and others suspected that the pakeha, Jones, had other intentions; that was because in former arrangements he had made with us there had been a great deal of shifting of the boundaries, and we were suspicious of him.22

The negotiations carried on inconclusively until the arrival of Heremia and some of his Upper Mokau people on 9 July. Initially, Heremia ‘would have nothing to do with Jones’ although he showed some interest in a coal deal with Stockman.23 After intense discussions, Jones and Grace believed that the deed would be signed on 12 July. However, at the last moment, ‘there was a general row’, which Grace blamed on the machinations of Stockman but more importantly stemmed from the continuing concerns of Heremia and others.24

After another night of korero among themselves, Heremia announced to local Maori that he would support an arrangement but only if it featured three key requirements. These included that the lease not be for 56 years but rather that the owners would have the power to stop the deal anytime they saw fit. According to a large number of Maori witnesses, Heremia essentially saw the main attraction of the arrangement was gaining money from the coal business in order to pay off the survey and Court costs revolving around the recent Native Land Court hearings. Once local Maori had completely secured the legal control over their lands and removed any debts, he

19 Ibid, p15 20 Ibid, p22. Note that all the evidence given by Maori to the 1888 Royal Commission was through translators, and was recorded in English only. 21 Ibid, pp18, 21 22 Ibid, p18 23 Ibid, p22 24 Grace diary entry, 12 July 1882, WH Grace Diary 1882, and AJHR, 1888, G-4C, pp19, 37


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envisaged a possible finish to the arrangement.25

Moreover, Heremia insisted that it be a mineral and coal lease only, and not the absolute lease of the entire block. Local Maori would continue to live on, use and cultivate much of the land while Jones could mine the coal, plus take what timber was needed for mining purposes. Takirau Watihi’s account was typical of how those Maori present at the negotiations understood Heremia’s terms: ‘the coal was to go to Jones, and the timber for working the coal’.26 Heremia also insisted that Jones would have these rights not for the entire block up to Totoro but only to Mangapohue, around 30 miles if travelling upriver and shortly before the river makes a sharp bend northwards. This boundary, while limiting the area Jones had access to, still allowed him access to major and navigable coal seams so that he could make a success of the venture.27

Beyond these central conditions, were a range of more fluid expectations, demands and rights that were less precisely spelt out. Jones had the right and requirement to dwell on the land, and at least according to Wetere, could run cattle and horses, and maintain a house and cultivations provided that he met his obligations to the local people, who he would live amongst.28 Crucially, given Jones’ later demand that he be granted the exclusive legal possession of the land, there is no evidence that local Maori believed that after they signed the deed they would simply leave Mokau Mohakatino and cease all connection with it, except for collecting the rent. Even Jones during the negotiations did not apparently seek or mention this. Such a demand would have been counter-productive because local Maori would neither have agreed to it nor could it have been enforced.

Much remained to be worked out in the course of the relationship with Jones. However, Heremia’s announcement of these conditions convinced many to enter into a deal with Jones. The previously staunch resister Te Ohu was among those who ‘gave up his opposition’.29 The increased enthusiasm was quite understandable, for local Maori stood on the brink of a far more favourable arrangement. The opportunity for partnership and prosperity that drew Wetere was still in place, but the new conditions ensured that local Maori kept overall control and minimised potential disruption. Critically, it was an arrangement that was backed and designed by their leaders. Te Oro explained:

Heremia was a leading man amongst the Natives; he was a man we respected. The matter was placed in his hands to manage it for us. What he said we trusted.30

Wetere too accepted the changes. As he put it: ‘As a chief I have mana over the whole

25 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, pp16-22 26 Ibid, p18 27 Ibid, p22 28 While context and Wetere’s evidence on AJHR, 1888, G-4C pp21-22 support this interpretation, there is only limited and ambivalent evidence on what rights local Maori expected Jones to have, outside of the specific coal and mineral business. 29 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, p22 30 Ibid, p17


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of the land, but Heremia had more right over it’.31

These, then, were the core conditions and principles that local Maori insisted must be at the centre of any arrangement with Jones. The question then emerges, did Jones and his representatives agree to them? Put another way, did local Maori have good grounds to believe that the arrangement would be based around these conditions? Despite the subsequent denials of Jones and Grace, the answer would seem to be yes.

‘Agreement’ reached

This acquiescence was reluctantly and perhaps cynically given. Famously volatile at the best of times, Jones became increasingly enraged as the negotiations dragged on and the Maori demands emerged. When informed that the boundary had to be changed to Mangapohue, Jones stormed out of the negotiations before being successfully advised by Grace that: ‘You had better take the line at Mangapohue – take what you can get’.32 Jones himself acknowledged to the 1888 royal commission that he did agree to the Mangapohue boundary. This would not prevent him from making various, ultimately successful attempts to assert a legal interest over the entire block up to Totoro. Some of these attempts stemmed from his unlikely claim that Heremia responded to the speculator’s concessions over the Mangapohue boundary by suddenly becoming ‘very friendly’ and promising that the rest of the block would be ‘held’ for Jones.33 However, even his land agent Grace did not recall such a conversation.

After agreeing to the boundary change, Jones took little direct role in the remaining negotiations. While there were suggestions that this was because he had become almost ill with anger given the Maori intransigence, the speculator was as canny as he was cantankerous. Jones was pushing for the deed to be signed as quickly as possible, keeping to a minimum any explanation about what was actually in the deed. Shortly before the signing on 13 July, as Messenger and others began carefully discussing and articulating the conditions, Jones again stormed out:

I got annoyed, because, as they had been discussing the matter for two days and two nights already, I thought that to agitate the Natives might upset the business, and I went away and lay down in my tent.34

But without some assurance that their conditions had been met, the deed would not be signed. The negotiations seemed to be developing into a take it or leave it situation for Jones and his representatives. As Wetere put it: ‘If it was a bad bargain [for the Pakeha] that was their look out; we did not want them there at all’.35

It therefore fell to Grace, Messenger and the other interpreters present to repeatedly

31 Ibid, p22 32 Ibid, p37 33 Ibid, p37 34 Ibid, p37 35 Ibid, p21


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assure local Maori that, under the agreement, they would maintain control and possession over the block as a whole while Jones would only be able to use what was necessary for the coal and mineral extraction business. Jones and Grace would subsequently deny that this assurance was ever made. However, the independent witness, Messenger, under oath, unambivalently and repeatedly told the 1888 royal commission that local Maori were informed that ‘it was a mineral and timber lease’ only and that they could continue to reside on and use the land. This, according to Messenger, was a central tenet in the negotiations with Grace leading up to the signing of the deed:

I do not believe they [local Maori] understood that it was a lease to give exclusive possession of the whole of the lands. I certainly did not understand it. I should think Mr. Grace was two hours explaining the deed to them, but there had been talk between the Natives and Mr. Grace about it for two or three days previously.36

Messenger did not mention in his evidence whether he heard the Jones’ party agree that this coal lease would be for a flexible period rather than for a fixed 56-year term. However, the Maori witnesses to the royal commission stated that they made their demands emphatically, and that they understood that them to have been agreed to. Otherwise, they would not have signed the deed. Te Oro stated that Heremia and the gathered leaders:

discussed the terms that we would make with Jones, and it was decided that we would only allow coal to be worked to pay for the survey of Poutama, and when that was done the work was to cease. This took place in Te Rerenga’s whare. Grace was present during the talk, and must have heard what was agreed to ... the pakehas made no objections to the terms.37

Wetere testified that both Grace, acting as Jones’ agent, and Messenger, as witness, go-between and the honest broker, explicitly agreed to the Maori terms:

I do not know whether Jones agreed to the new terms, because he got vexed and was running about, and it was left to Grace and Messenger to settle. They had the management of it.38

The deed signing

Credible eyewitness evidence therefore existed to throw into doubt Jones’ claims. Jones, on the other hand, did possess a deed or deeds, apparently stating that the land was exclusively leased to him for 56 years and allegedly signed by 81 of the block’s 100 owners. We need to use modifying terms such as ‘apparently’ and ‘allegedly’ for there is considerable confusion regarding these documents. The original English language



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deed and its translation in te reo Maori appear to be no longer extant and no full reproduction of their wording has been sighted. The 1888 royal commission did have access to documents which led WJ Butler to testify that both the English and Maori language versions clearly stated that it was ‘an absolute lease of the land’ for 56 years.39 However, it is not apparent whether Butler and this commission examined the originals or, more likely, only the purported copies of these deeds.40

This point is important for there were a number of copies of the deeds in circulation and claims that not all were identical. One historian has gone so far as to suggest that Jones and Grace, during the signing, probably switched leases. According to this theory, first a document which matched the demands and expectations of Maori was read and explained to the gathered owners, and then a different lease was secretly inserted, which the owners signed.41

A perhaps more likely argument is that many local Maori believed and were told that the deeds reflected their demands, but were unaware that the contents were actually quite different. There seems to be reasonably strong evidence to suggest that the deeds signed on July 13 were for a 56-year, absolute land lease. Jones had the English language deed ‘hurriedly’ prepared in Waitara, after his discussions with Wetere but before Heremia’s demands had been expressed. The content of this deed, judging by the comments made by the Stout-Palmer commission in 1909, therefore reflected Jones’ promises to Wetere of investment and partnership but did not reflect several of Heremia’s key requirements.42

Messenger and Wetere were present during the deed signing, and despite their many allegations against Grace and Jones, did not allege any lease-swapping. If I understand their accounts correctly, local Maori signed the document Jones had brought from Waitara. Wetere explicitly stated that the signed deed, which he had examined, represented ‘Jones’s terms’.43 Only one significant alteration was made to reflect Heremia’s demands. Apparently on the day before the document was signed, Messenger and Grace altered the boundary to Mangapohue. However, there is no evidence to suggest that they altered the document to incorporate the chief’s subsequent requirement that the arrangement be only for a coal and mineral lease running for a flexible period.

It would therefore seem that a large number of owners signed an agreement that, in two elements, was diametrically opposed to what they wanted. Why they did so is a

39 Ibid, p44 40 The lists of exhibits (ibid, p5) used by the 1888 Royal Commission refers to two different leases, both of which are described only as copies. These are the ‘Copy of plan and lease, Mokau-Mohakatino No. 1 Block’ and ‘Copy of lease, Heremia to Jones’. The witnesses themselves do not make clear whether the lease they examined during the Commission was an original or a copy. One of Jones’ creditors, William Bayly, did produce to the Commission what Jones had told him was the original lease, although it is referred to in the list of exhibits as only a ‘Copy’. 41 Barr, pp17-18 42 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, p13 43 Ibid, p21


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complicated but important question. Perhaps the single most important issue is that many, including Heremia, did not have full knowledge of what was in the deed, but believed, based on what they had been told by Grace and Messenger, that it faithfully represented their demands.

A large number of Maori witnesses told the 1888 royal commission that Jones and Grace made it difficult for them to closely examine the deed. Jones was said to have deliberately withheld the document from Heremia before the signing:

Heremia asked at the meeting to have the lease given to him to see if it was right ... Jones would not give it to Heremia for him to look at.44

Even those who did see the deed, may not have fully understood it. Many of the lessors were neither literate in English nor Maori, including Heremia, and the document was sufficiently intricate that even the witness Messenger failed to fully comprehend its meaning. It was therefore crucial that the deed was accurately translated and explained before signing. There certainly was translation and discussion but what was lacking was accuracy. Just before the signing, Grace spent two hours explaining the lease. He, Wetere and Messenger then added further information and answered specific questions. The result was, according to Messenger, that most Maori were certain, as was he, that they were signing a limited mineral deal only, and not an exclusive land lease to Jones:

Several of the Natives, while the lease was being explained, said they understood that they were to use all the land that was not in actual use by the company; they were told yes, I believe by Mr. Grace, but I will not be certain. In two or three cases I answered them myself. I do not think they would have been signed if they had not been told so. I myself understood, and believe the Natives understood, that they were to have the use of the land except such as was in actual use, or should be required for mining or timber-cutting. I understood it to be a lease for timber-cutting and mining.45

Messenger’s account of the agreement differs from some of the Maori witnesses only with regard to some of the specifics, such as whether Jones had secured the right to cut and sell timber, as Messenger understood, or only to use what timber was needed for the coal business, as many local Maori maintained. However, they were in accord on the fact that Jones was not being granted absolute control of the land. Indeed, Messenger considered it his duty to make sure there was no confusion over this key principle:

It was distinctly explained by me to the Natives, at the time of the signing, that the lease was for working mines and minerals and for sawing and selling timber, and not of the land; that is to

44 Ibid 45 Ibid, pp15-16


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say, the Natives were to run their cattle and other stock, and enclose growing crops, and live on the land, the company to have the power of making roads necessary for working mines and timber and laying out the township.46

Messenger made the same crucial point repeatedly to the 1888 commission. The limited nature of the lease was ‘distinctly explained by me to the Natives, at the time of the signing’. He had a ‘distinct recollection’ that Maori were informed of this. Although he had a decent facility with te reo Maori, he also used an interpreter, Sergeant Gilbert, so that there could be no ambiguity or confusion.47

It was for this reason that many of the owners, and Messenger himself, reacted with a sense of betrayal when they later became aware that Jones was claiming a 56-year absolute land lease. According to some accounts, Jones removed the deed speedily after the signing and rejected repeated demands from local Maori to examine it. Only in mid 1883 did Heremia and others gain access to a copy, and have it translated and explained by the interpreter RS Thompson. Their response, as will be discussed in more detail later, was to disavow any connection with Jones or the lease, to make repeated public protests both to Pakeha and the Government, and to eject Jones’ coal-miners from the land. Heremia had a letter written on his behalf to Taranaki newspapers:

Listen! I have seen the lease ... it does not agree with what I arranged. O friends, this lease will not be right.48

The major Ngati Maniapoto chief Wahanui was part of these protests. He quoted Heremia as saying:

‘These arrangements are not mine, they are Jones’ and his companions; mine they have cast aside. For this reason, destroy that letter said to be a lease, for this reason also, companions, I have ceased to be a party to that letter’.49

Many other local Maori shared this reaction. Te Oro, himself a significant leader of Poutama, stated:

It [the deed] was brought out and read to us at Mokau, and interpreted by Mr. Thompson. It was then that we first knew that Heremia’s words were not in the lease. Heremia said, when he heard the lease read over, ‘These are not my words; there is a fixed term in the lease, and it must be broken from to-day’.50

Messenger saw a copy of the deed around the same time and was outraged at the

46 Ibid, p16 47 Ibid, pp15-16 48 ‘The Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 16 Oct 1883, p2. Heremia and Wahanui’s letters were published both in te reo and translated into English. 49 The Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 16 Oct 1883, p2 50 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, p17


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dissonance between what the deed stated and what local Maori had agreed to. He informed the Native Minister that ‘the terms were not sufficiently clear according to what had been explained to the Natives, and that trouble might arise in consequence’.51

However, at the time of the signing, at least one important chief was aware that there was significant discord between the deed being signed and the nature of the agreement that local Maori believed that they were entering into. Despite this, Wetere was certain, as he told the 1888 commission, that the future relationship with Jones would be based around Heremia’s conditions. It was only on that basis that ‘I and all the people signed’.52 Wetere was sure that these conditions would be enforced even after reading the deed in Maori:

I signed it knowing that Jones’s terms were in it; but I had it in my thoughts that it would be carried out according to our own intention, notwithstanding the terms of the deed.53

Wetere was not totally unconcerned about the literal terms of the lease. According to evidence given to the 1888 commission, he delegated Te Ianui to go to Waitara shortly after the signing to meet with Jones and ‘see that the necessary alterations were made, and bring back a copy of the lease’.54 However, the failure of this mission did not dissuade Wetere from his belief that Jones would keep, and be kept, to his obligations.

Wetere apparently saw relative little threat from the written document, which, it must be remembered, had no obvious legal significance at that time. Rather the chief believed that the verbal agreements – and his own authority – held more weight than words on a piece of paper. He would manage things so that local Maori would retain control over Jones and the land, and that the arrangement as a whole would bring great advantages to the local people. According to Wetere, Heremia had, before the signing, given him the responsibility to oversee the arrangement with Jones and ensure that it was beneficial, flexible and reflected the Maori demands: ‘Heremia then left the whole thing in my hands for me to see that the thing was to end when the money was enough to pay for the survey’.55

Even after Heremia and others turned angrily against Jones, Wetere would continue to see the coal deal as an opportunity rather than a threat. As we shall see, it would only be in 1887, after five years of waiting for the promised development and partnership to come, that he would decide to have ‘nothing more to do’ with the speculator and come out unambivalently against Jones’ claims of land rights.56

51 Ibid, p16. Messenger may not have fulfilled his initial responsibilities as witness very thoroughly. The implication seems to be that he signed as a witness to the deed without being completely sure of what was in the document, assuming but not checking that it matched the verbal promises and understandings made during the negotiation. Only later did he become aware of the disparity and begin his protests. 52 Ibid, p21 53 Ibid 54 Ibid, p19 55 Ibid, p21 56 Ibid, p22


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Wetere’s approach is consistent with the fact that he was the Mokau leader of what could be termed the more optimistic faction – those who believed that selective contact and deals with Pakeha brought enormous potential benefits that far outweighed the risks. Heremia, and many others, were more sceptical, acknowledging that some contact was economically necessary, but calling for care and distance. Both factions entered into an arrangement with Jones based on their belief that it would be a limited and flexible coal and mineral deal, which would bring them profits while not threatening their essential control over the land. Where they differed was on whether Jones, and his claims, represented a real threat to the land.

Neither approach would be able to overcome the ambition of the speculator, or more importantly, his backing from the Government. It would seem that some local Maori, with the advantage of hindsight, later considered that their leaders could have handled the 1882 negotiations with Jones differently. Wetere, for instance, could have more explicitly informed local Maori of the contents of the deeds. Tawhana Te Kaharoa, in 1888, found it hard to explain Wetere’s actions, and thought that Heremia and others had ‘made a mistake’ in not seizing the deeds during the negotiations and more forcefully ensuring that they met the Maori demands before signatures were attached.57 But the real anger would be directed to where it belonged, towards Jones and, increasingly, towards the political and legal authorities that placed greater weight on facilitating the alienation of Maori land in Te Rohe Potae than care in ensuring that the alienation had taken place with the full and genuine consent of the local owners.

This discussion should not distract from another important point – not all local Maori agreed in 1882 to enter into any sort of arrangement with Jones. Opposition to land deals with Jones in particular, and with Pakeha in general, remained deep, even among those who had used the Native Land Court. After several weeks of negotiations, many promises and dubious tactics, a signing session that took all day, and then follow-on efforts that scanned years, Jones was not able to claim the signatures of almost one fifth of the owners of the Mokau Mohakatino no 1 block.

Moreover, many who were recorded as having signed the deed, or having made a mark next to their name, denied having done so. The 1888 royal commission heard allegations of fraudulent behaviour and of personation (individuals signing on behalf of or pretending to be someone else). Wetere was present for the main part of the signing and, with Messenger, was in charge of identifying the owners who came forward to sign. He expressed surprise at the list of alleged signatories, noting that it included people he did not believe were at Mokau at that time, or were known opponents of the transaction who he did not recall seeing give their assent:

Some of the Natives whose name appear to the lease were not at Terainga on that day. I did not see Te Pukekipa there that day, Ngahiraka was not there, she was at Parihaka at that time. Taiaroa was at Mokau, but I did not see him sign, I do not

57 Ibid, p19


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believe he would have done so, as he belonged to Parihaka, and opposed the lease. Ngawhakeke was at Mokau, but I do not think she signed ... Te Ianui was there, but I do not think he signed, as he was a disciple of Te Whiti.58

Wetere, did however, acknowledge that it was possible some of these owners may have signed later. Predictably, Jones and Grace denied any wrongdoing, while Messenger stated that he stopped ‘several instances’ when ‘one Native wanted to sign for another’ which he would not allow. He testified that he tried to ensure that all that took place was above board.59

Whether he was successful is debatable. Certainly, some owners testified that they were pressured by the Pakeha to sign, and when they refused to do so, were offered individual inducements of money.60 There were also allegations that drunkenness played a major part in the proceedings. A number of the alleged signatories told the 1888 commission that they had been too intoxicated to sign, and that someone else must have done so for them. Ngawhakaheke said:

I did not make the mark on the deed now shown me ... I suppose they signed my name in the house, as both Grace and Jones knew me. Owing to my being busy and the beer I had drunk, I did not go to the house where the signing was going on, or touch the pen.61

Pare Huakirua stated:

I was lying helpless. My legs would not carry me through drinking the beer, Some one else must have made the mark. I am sure I did not. Did not go near to touch the pen.62

Others acknowledged signing the document but stated that they had done so after being encouraged by Jones into drunkenness. Te Oro said:

I saw other Maoris drinking beer on the day the lease was signed. Some of them were drinking beer when they were called in to sign the deed. I saw Jones draw beer himself and give it to the people ... Jones gave me some too, before I signed, I had several drinks before I signed. I commenced to drink in the morning, and was drinking all day. The casks were very large, I think the beer had something to do with my signing.63

Pukatea Pupurutu likewise stated that, ‘My thoughts were not clear when I went to sign the deed. I was getting very bad through drinking the beer’.64 Indeed, claimant

58 Ibid, p22 59 Ibid, p16 60 Ibid, pp16-17 61 Ibid, p20 62 Ibid 63 Ibid, p17 64 Ibid, p19


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evidence states that ‘our people mostly signed in a drunken stupor’.65

Despite the drinking that did take place at some stages during the negotiations and its aftermath, a number of other participants believed that intoxication did not play a major part in the signing of the deed. Jones and Grace claimed that it was a sober and rational affair, while the ship captain responsible for bringing the beer in believed that local Maori were positively abstemious in comparison to the Pakeha present.66 Messenger stated that: ‘The proceedings were very orderly, and I saw no drinking going on’.67 Wetere also did not present alcohol as a crucial factor in the signing of the deed, although he believed it credible that some individuals had been drinking before signing.68

Many of the allegations of drunkenness and fraud were made in 1888, and may have reflected the overwhelming disillusionment of local Maori regarding Jones’ post-deed actions and their determination to stop him from being granted legal control over the land. Not all the individual statements to the royal commission of non-assent to the lease are convincing.69 Nevertheless, the sheer volume of the allegations, and the litany of complaints and accusations that attached themselves to Jones throughout his long connection with Mokau, raise suspicions. Chicanery and shenanigans were hardly unknown in land dealings in New Zealand during the period. Despite that inglorious tradition, historians have nominated Jones’ lease as constituting ‘one of the most dubious of any transactions involving Maori land in the nineteenth century’.70 Claimant evidence puts it even more bluntly: ‘The taking of our land is a complete fraud from the beginning to the end’.71

The July 1882 negotiations were only the beginning of the pain and protest. Immediately after the negotiations, many local Maori believed that they had entered in a valuable agreement. Jones in the coming years would prove himself neither the partner that Wetere was looking for, nor the honest man that all local Maori demanded, but a schemer and indefatigable opponent. But the real threat would come not from his claims to an absolute, 56-year land lease. It would come from the Government’s support of these claims. The failure of the Government – and the Native Land Court – to listen to the protests and demands of local Maori would epitomise the coming years. It would badly damage the understanding apparently reached between Te Rohe Potae Maori and the Government based around good faith and partnership. Before looking at the Government’s failure to honour that understanding, it is necessary to outline what local Maori hoped and expected from the Crown.

65Evidence of Haumoana White, Te Rohe Potae - Nga Korero Tuku Iho o Te Rohe Potae: 5th Oral Traditions Hui, Maniaroa Marae, Mokau, p183 66 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, p23 67 Ibid, p16 68 Ibid, p22 69 Ibid, p19 70 Stokes, p148 71 Evidence of Haumoana White, 5th Oral Traditions Hui, Maniaroa Marae, p183


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8.2 Negotiations and the Forming of the Compact, 1882 to 1885

The legacy of the wars

By 1882, the hapu of Mokau had a positive reputation among many Government officials and European observers. Their reputed break from the Kingitanga, and the recent Native Land Court hearings, had strengthened the belief that Mokau Maori wanted increased interaction with Europeans and could serve as valuable allies and intermediaries as the Government searched for a broader agreement in the wider district.

Wetere sought to turn this reputation into a meaningful relationship with the Crown that would strengthen the hold of local Maori over their land while bringing them new opportunities and infrastructure. But he also looked towards the Crown to repair the wrongs of the past.

Immediately after securing the Poutama lands through the Court, and entering into a business partnership with Jones, Wetere set out for Wellington for discussions with Government leaders. He had two major goals: the return of the confiscated lands south of Parininihi and to start building a relationship of respect and equality with Government leaders. The trip was a brutal reminder of how much remained to be achieved. Colonial Treasurer Harry Atkinson told him that the Government could not, at least at the moment, ‘entertain the proposal’ of returning the confiscated Waipingau area.72 Talks with Government leaders about railway and land issues were inconclusive.

Paradoxically, another deeply upsetting event suggested that the Government was willing to put to one side the role of Mokau Maori in the wars and especially in the attack on the Pukearuhe redoubt. In the years following that attack, the Government had made no efforts to arrest or harass Wetere and the others who were believed to have taken part. Kingitanga leaders and followers were increasingly able to travel to European towns without fear.

However, triumphalism after the invasion of Parihaka may have been a factor in renewed Pakeha calls in the early 1880s to punish Maori for ‘crimes’ committed inside the aukati and during the wars.73 While Wetere was in Wellington for the 1882 discussions with the Government, a relative of the missionary John Whiteley, killed at Pukearuhe in 1869, attempted to have the chief arrested for murder.74 Wetere hurriedly left Wellington for Mokau, where large numbers of local Maori were furious at rumours that he had been arrested. The ‘intense excitement’ reached the Upper Mokau and the interior, as did bogus telegrams claiming that Wetere had confessed to the ‘crime’.75 Worried that the Mokau settlers could be in danger, Captain Messenger at the Pukearuhe redoubt quickly despatched two of his force to assure local hapu that

72 Taranaki Herald, 2 Aug 1882, p2 73 See Cathy Marr’s upcoming report for more analysis of this. 74 ‘Weteri Te Rerenga’, NZPD, 1882, vol 43, pp385-387 75 Taranaki Herald, 15 Aug 1882, p2; ‘The Mokau Scare’, Taranaki Herald, 17 Aug 1882, p2


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Wetere was free and on his way home. This fear of violence against the settlers was misplaced, John Shore noting that during all the tumult they received nothing ‘but civility and kindness’ from their hosts.76

Figure 13: ‘Great Chiefs’, photographed at whare komiti at Haerehuka, King Country, 4 June 1885. Back row, from left: Rewi Maniapoto, Tawhana Tikaokao, Taonui Hikaka, Hone Wetere Te Rerenga. Front row, from left: Te Rangituataka, Te Naunau Hikaka (ATL, PA7-36-30)

In Wellington, Government leaders were unhappy with the harassment of Wetere. The Government had not been involved in the attempts to arrest Wetere, rather Native Minister John Bryce had tipped off the chief that he was under threat and had, according to some reports, detached an official to accompany him out of harm’s way. The Government had no desire to cause ructions with Ngati Maniapoto or with Wetere, increasingly seen as a potentially important ally, over what it considered ancient events. Premier Whitaker was praised in Parliament for stating that it was ‘utterly out of the question’ that the Government would act against Wetere.77 The Taranaki Herald also supported this stance, arguing that those who were crying for ‘vengeance’ against Wetere could bring about ‘another war of [the] races’ and damage the chance of a railway going through Mokau.78

76 ‘The Mokau Scare’, Taranaki Herald, 17 Aug 1882, p2 77 ‘’Weteri Te Rerenga’, NZPD, 1882, vol 43, pp385-387 78 ‘The Massacre at the White Cliffs’, Taranaki Herald, 10 Aug 1882, p2; ‘Massacre at the White Cliffs’, Taranaki Herald, 21 Aug 1882, p2


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Nevertheless, the incident left Wetere in a bind. He now faced the possibility of arrest when he carried out one of his frequent visits to European areas for business and political reasons. He initially seems to have considered returning to Wellington to have the courts clear him of any responsibility.79 More attractive was the possibility of an amnesty. In September, legislation was passed enabling the Governor, if he saw fit, to proclaim a general amnesty, with or without exceptions, for offences ‘more or less of a political character’ committed during the wars.80 This legislation was, according to Bryce, not specifically motivated by Wetere’s situation and seems to have been part of a wider attempt to ease tensions with Maori leaders.81

It did, however, give the Government a potential bargaining chip over Wetere. The Act did not give an amnesty to Wetere, it only made possible that he and others may be absolved if the Government so chose. Some historians have suggested that in the following months Wetere, in a desperate attempt to pay the ‘price of the Amnesty’, essentially became a tool of the Native Minister.82 This seems to exaggerate the situation. Wetere would not, as we shall see, do anything contradictory to his own political philosophy or act outside of the framework and support of the wider leadership in the Rohe Potae. Nor is there direct evidence that Bryce held the lure of an amnesty over Wetere in order to get him to betray the interests of his people. If Bryce did try this, he was singularly unsuccessful.

The amnesty issue is therefore better seen as an attempt by the Government to ease tensions with the leaders of the wider region, on the eve of another attempt to gain agreement allowing the North Island main trunk railway to run through Te Rohe Potae. Bryce did make a general request that all who may benefit from an amnesty first offer some form of ‘submission’, guarantee their future conduct and ‘repent’ of their ‘sins’.83 Rewi on behalf of Ngati Maniapoto leaders angrily refused, calling for a general amnesty but declining to make any submission or apologies.84 Nevertheless, in February 1883, a general amnesty was proclaimed. Wetere was not excluded from this amnesty, a decision praised by many Pakeha who believed, as the Taranaki Herald put it, that the time had come ‘to be done with the war’.85

Preparing the way for negotiations with the Government

The refusal to return the confiscated areas did not dissuade Wetere and other Mokau chiefs from continuing to seek better relations with the Crown. If anything, it seems to have reconfirmed their view that a true accord with the Government was crucial to the protection and development of the area. Many leaders in the wider area shared this belief that an agreement with the Crown was needed if Maori were to be able to

79 See chapter four of this report and Stokes, pp125-126 80 Loveridge, pp39-41 81 Ibid, p40, fn 92 82 Parsonson, ‘Te Mana o te Kingitanga Maori’, pp131-133 83 Loveridge, p40 84 Grace to Joshua Jones, 26 Jan 1883, pp371-372; Rewi Maniapoto to Bryce, 27 January 1883, te reo with translation, pp373-375, WH Grace Letterbook, 1880-1892, ATL MSY-4506 85 Taranaki Herald, 28 Feb 1883, p2 quoting the Auckland Herald.


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manage, control and befit from interaction with Pakeha.

By the end of 1882, the Government’s negotiations with King Tawhiao over the future of the aukati seem to have finally failed. Native Minister John Bryce and major iwi of Te Rohe Potae including Ngati Maniapoto, Ngati Raukawa, Ngati Tuwharetoa, Ngati Hikairo and Northern Whanganui were considering separate negotiations.86 For Bryce and other officials, these discussions centred on trying to ‘open up’ the area to more Government and European influence, and in particular to securing agreement that a railway line could run through the area. The leaders of what Cathy Marr terms the interior alliance were willing to discuss the possibility of a railway and other developments, but in return demanded a series of concessions, reforms and guarantees that would allow them to maintain collective control over the area.87 The Government’s apparent acceptance of many of these terms created a belief among Te Rohe Potae hapu and iwi that a ‘sacred compact’ with the Crown had been forged.

Mokau hapu and leaders played a significant part in the search for this compact. Wetere, in particular, was a powerful advocate that the interior alliance should seek a far-reaching agreement with the Government. This involvement in the greater issues of the region reflects the fact that Mokau Maori, while having unique local issues to consider, remained closely linked to the wider iwi and hapu of the region. Indeed, local and wider needs could not be considered or dealt with in isolation. For instance, many local Maori were highly interested in improving the infrastructure of Mokau and gaining the economic benefits that better roads, transport, and a main trunk railway running through or near Mokau could bring. This was not unrealistic, as the the proposed western rail route from Wellington to New Plymouth, and then through Mokau to Auckland, was a favoured option among Government officials at this stage.88 Bryce was therefore anxious to secure Maori agreement that Government surveyors could explore the possible railway route between Mokau and Te Awamutu.

However, any Mokau Maori decisions revolving around a railway required the support of the wider leadership and the protection that only a general, collective agreement with the Government could provide. Wetere therefore led calls for negotiations with the Crown over these issues, while insisting to Europeans that major decisions must not be rushed, and could only be achieved through consensus and agreement among the wider leadership.

In early 1883, Mokau leaders were among the more than 500 Maori from as far away as Katikati, Tauranga, Opotiki and Taupo who met at Te Kuiti to debate what stance should be taken towards the Government, Pakeha settlement and the railway. Not surprisingly given the complexity of the decisions facing Te Rohe Potae Maori, considerable ‘diversity of opinion’ existed. A letter written on Wetere’s behalf to

86 Ibid, pp106-107 87 Marr. ‘The Waimarino Purchase Report’, pp99-101 88 Philip Cleaver and Jonathan Sarich, ‘Turongo: The North Island Main Trunk Railway and the Rohe Potae, 1870-2008’, a report commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal for the Te Rohe Potae district inquiry, November 2009, pp30-32, 36, 55-57. See also NZPD, vol 17, 20 Jul to 27 Aug 1875, pp314-315


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Taranaki newspapers stated that:

although the general feeling was in favour of facilitating the construction of roads and settlement of the lands, no definite conclusion was arrived at.89

Wetere therefore advocated that more talks, both among Maori and with the Government, take place. He found support for this from Rewi, Wahanui, Taonui and others and it was resolved that a great hui take place on 26 February, under Wetere’s auspices, at Totara on the Mokau River.90 The initial intention was that Bryce would attend, and an invitation was sent to him.91 Wetere saw the hui as having the potential for a major breakthrough. He informed local Europeans that he was ‘working with Wahanui to have the roads and the railways go through the country, and that my work will soon be complete’.92

However, consensus and caution were needed. In the lead-up to the hui, Wetere grew worried that Europeans, before any firm resolutions or agreements were made, would start coming to the Mokau area in anticipation of the railway and the resulting economic opportunities. While he was interested in increased Pakeha settlement, this must take place in a controlled manner. It was particularly crucial to avoid causing alarm among Maori that the area could be flooded by speculators and settlers. He therefore publicly instructed all Europeans planning to come to Mokau:

not to come as they will be disappointed; but let them wait quietly till I have finished my great work for peace; then let them come.93

Despite this, as extensive preparations for the meeting took place, European expectations grew that it would indeed result in an immediate decision to allow a railway.94 Wetere, perhaps acting on instructions from the wider leadership, sought to dampen these hopes. It was now considered that discussions with the Government would be premature without a clearer agreement amongst Te Rohe Potae Maori of their demands and policy. On 12 February, Bryce asked Wetere to escort him through the Rohe Potae, stopping at Mokau for the meeting. Wetere instructed the Native Minister not to make the trip at this time and not to attend the Totara hui. Reports at this time suggested that, ‘Wetere is anxious to open the country, but he fears complications from hasty or ill-advised actions’.95

Attempts to survey a western railway route – March 1883

Due to flooding, the Totara hui had to be cancelled, thwarting Bryce’s hopes for a

89 ‘Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 18 Jan 1883, p2 90 Loveridge, p67 91 Ibid 92 ‘Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 18 Jan 1883, p2 93 ‘Te Wetere and Mr Bryce’, Taranaki Herald, 19 Jan 1883, p2 94 ‘Hawera’, Taranaki Herald, 22 Feb 1883, p2 95 ‘Late Perjury Case at Wanganui’, Taranaki Herald, 17 Feb 1883, p2


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breakthrough.96 Nevertheless, the Native Minister still felt confident enough of Maori reaction that he authorised the exploration of a potential railway route from Te Awamutu to Waitara via Mokau and triangulation surveys of the King Country.97 His confidence was misplaced for without sufficient and explicit consent from rangatira and local people, such surveys risked obstruction and disruption. The railway survey party in early March 1883, led by Charles Hursthouse, was quickly forced to turn back. Bryce then travelled to Whatiwhatihoe for what would be a crucial meeting with Wahanui, Rewi and other Ngati Maniapoto chiefs.

This hui was a major step towards establishing a compact based around good will and Maori concessions over the railway in return for Government recognition that the region would remain under Maori protection and management.98 The most notable immediate agreement was that Hursthouse was permitted to explore a possible western route for the railway between Alexandra and Mokau. It was a decision welcomed by Wetere. Reflecting his enthusiasm for the possible benefits for his area of a railway line, and his determination to control what happened in Mokau, Wetere with 25 of his people, escorted Hursthouse and his assistant as they set out on 20 March.99

However, not all Maori within Te Rohe Potae had heard of, or agreed with, the permission given to the Government surveyors. At Te Uira, about 32 miles from Alexandra, the surveyors were set upon by the prophet and Parihaka supporter Te Mahuki (sometimes spelled Te Mahuiki) and about 100 of his followers from the Tekau-ma-rua movement.100 Wetere and his outnumbered supporters sought to shelter the Europeans but fearing that any further resistance could endanger the Europeans, Wetere ordered his men to step aside so that he and Te Mahuki could ‘talk over this affair’. 101 One Mokau man, Te Haere, was injured in the melee.102 The two surveyors and Te Haere, who proclaimed himself ‘happy’ to be able to continue to do what he could to protect the Europeans, were taken prisoner in a whare.103

Wetere unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Te Mahuki to release the prisoners, who were kept under harsh conditions and at times feared execution. Judging an attempt to forcibly release them too risky, Wetere sent messengers to Mokau to call for reinforcements while he made his way to Wahanui’s settlement to gather men and counsel. There, in consultation with the Government officer in Alexandra, George Wilkinson, Wetere concocted a rescue attempt that he insisted take place under his

96 Parsonson, p134 97 Cleaver & Sarich, p53 98 Marr, ‘The Waimarino Purchase report’, p109 99 Loveridge, pp63-64 100 Wilkinson to Native Minister, 21 March 1883, NO 83/1121 in MA 23/5 *5 Special File 128, Te Mahuki-Mokau, ANZ Wgt 101 Ibid and ‘Obstruction to Mr Hursthouse’. 22 March 1883, New Zealand Times, included in MA 23/5 *5 Special File 128, Te Mahuki-Mokau 102 Ibid and ‘Obstruction to Mr Hursthouse’. 22 March 1883, New Zealand Times, included in MA 23/5 *5 Special File 128, Te Mahuki-Mokau 103 ‘Proceedings against Mahuki’ 29 Mar 1883, New Zealand Times, included in MA 23/5 *5 Special File 128, Te Mahuki-Mokau


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control. He would arrange for a meeting with Te Mahuki. When opportunity came, Wetere and his men would take over the whare, rescue the prisoners and hand Te Mahuki and some of his leaders over to Wilkinson for arrest. Wahanui would only become directly involved if Wetere’s plan was unsuccessful.104 Such a plan reflected Wetere’s determination to fulfil his responsibilities to protect the Europeans placed under his charge.

However, events overtook him. The reinforcements from Mokau and elsewhere, who included the prominent Upper Mokau chief Te Wharo (or Te Whaaro), Te Kooti, Wahanui’s brother Kahu, and Wetere’s daughter arrived first in Te Uira. After fruitless negotiations with Te Mahuki, Kahu led a group who on 23 March overcame the guards and released the prisoners.105

Shortly afterwards, Wetere and a large party, accompanied by Wilkinson arrived. Bryce was angered at the capture of the Government men and was determined that the culprits would face European justice. Using Wilkinson as his representative, he praised and thanked Wetere, Wahanui, Te Kooti and the other rescuers for their conduct but warned them that the Government could not ‘overlook the gross and frank outrage which has been committed’. They were instructed to arrest Te Mahuki and his key supporters and hand them over to the Government. If not, Bryce warned, he would ‘at once make preparations for myself’.106

The Ngati Maniapoto chiefs quickly rejected any suggestion that Government troops would be allowed into the aukati to seize Te Mahuki and his men. Bryce was informed that they would ‘settle the matter themselves’.107 The question of how to settle the issue was the subject of a long debate which took place at Te Kooti’s settlement. Wetere’s sense that Te Mahuki’s actions were a personal affront to his mana, and a dangerous blow to the possibilities of an accord with the Government, led him to taking the hardest line. He forcibly argued that the chiefs should hand Te Mahuki and the others over to the Government.

However, there remained a strong reluctance to grant European law authority over Te Rohe Potae resisters. The general decision was that the survey party could carry on their work, with their safety guaranteed. However, Te Mahuki and his people would not be harassed or handed over to the Government, providing that they did not act on their threats to march on Alexandra and attack Wilkinson and other Government officials in retaliation for the invasion of Parihaka.108

To forestall that possibility, Wetere and some of his men moved to near Alexandra so

104 Wilkinson to Native Minister, 21 Mar 1883, NO 83/1121 in MA 23/5 *5 Special File 128, Te Mahuki-Mokau 105 ‘Proceedings against Mahuki’ 29 Mar 1883, New Zealand Times; ‘The Te Uira Affair’, Daily Southern Cross, 29 Mar 1883 both included in MA 23/5 *5 Special File 128, Te Mahuki-Mokau 106 Bryce to Wilkinson, 23 Mar 1883 in MA 23/5 *5 Special File 128, Te Mahuki-Mokau 107 Wilkinson to Bryce, 23 Mar 1883 in MA 23/5 *5 Special File 128, Te Mahuki-Mokau 108 Wilkinson to Bryce, 23 Mar 1883, NO 83/1126 in MA 23/5 *5 Special File 128, Te Mahuki-Mokau,; ‘Law and Police’, 7 Apr 1883, New Zealand Herald, in MA 23/5 *5 Special File 128, Te Mahuki-Mokau


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that they could send warning if any attack was launched. Te Mahuki and a group of around 20 immediately set out for Alexandra. It is possible that they never intended to attack but were rather attempting a non-violent protest in a European area. Nevertheless, the venture was doomed from the start. Wetere warned Europeans that they were coming, and Te Mahuki and his men were captured by Wilkinson and a large body of Governments forces without incident.109 Wahanui made no protests over the arrests.110

Wetere’s efforts to prevent conflict with the Crown had not finished there. He, and Wahanui’s brother Kahu, gave evidence in the trial of Te Mahuki and 22 of his followers in Auckland held at the end of March 1883. The prophet and his followers were found guilty of imprisoning and assaulting the surveyors and Te Haere but not guilty of creating a riot and tumult in Alexandra. They were sentenced to prison with hard labour for a period ranging from one year downwards.111 During the trial, Te Mahuki assailed Wetere as ‘a “dog” of the Government’.112 However, Wetere was certainly no craven collaborator. Rather, he had delivered a powerful message that he was willing to cooperate with European legal institutions to help create and enforce a peaceful relationship with the Crown.

Escorting Bryce

The incident with Te Mahuki received considerable coverage in European newspapers and enhanced Wetere’s already positive reputation among Government officials. It also reinforced Government awareness that any involvement in the area required consent from local leaders and people, or at very least a lack of active opposition. By late March 1883, Bryce sought to make his previously planned trip through the Rohe Potae to Taranaki, via Mokau. The Native Minister was informed that there were no objections to him travelling through the area, but told that this permission did not signify a willingness for more radical concessions.113

Nevertheless, the trip reaffirmed that there was widespread interest among Te Rohe Potae Maori in good relations and negotiations. Bryce, accompanied by a party of eight Europeans including the surveyor Hursthouse, was greeted at Te Kooti’s settlement at Te Kuiti and entered into several long discussions with Wahanui, Taonui, Te Whaaro, Wetere and others. Wahanui reminded the Native Minister that the trip settled nothing and must not be ‘regarded as throwing open the country to Europeans’.114 Bryce reassured Wahanui he understood, giving as an example that the Government would not give permission to gold prospectors to come into the aukati ‘as it was not

109 See various newspaper extracts included in MA 23/5 *5 Special File 128, Te Mahuki-Mokau 110 ‘Mr Bryce’s Preparations’, undated and untitled newspaper extract included in MA 23/5 *5 Special File 128, Te Mahuki-Mokau 111 ‘Law and Police’, 7 Apr 1883, New Zealand Herald, in MA 23/5 *5 Special File 128, Te Mahuki-Mokau 112 ‘Law and Police’, 6 Apr 1883, New Zealand Herald, in MA 23/5 *5 Special File 128, Te Mahuki-Mokau 113 Loveridge, p72; ‘Opening the King Country’, Taranaki Herald, 19 Apr 1883, p2 114 Mr Bryce’s Tour in the King Country’, New Zealand Times, 21 Apr 1883, both in MA 23/5 *5 Special File 128, Te Mahuki-Mokau


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Government land’.115

Wetere took the opportunity to again make clear both to Bryce and to his fellow chiefs his belief that an accord with the Government was critical to the success of the region. According to a European eyewitness, he argued that without a managed and negotiated agreement with the Government, Pakeha would continue to encroach on the area in harmful ways.116 Isolation was impossible, therefore he would embrace partnership. He was quoted as saying that Te Rohe Potae Maori had two alternative strategies:

[O]ne was adhering to the Government and the other adhering to isolation. If they adopted the latter course it could only be for a time, as the European would keep encroaching on them, so he decided to adhere to the Government.117

Wetere also addressed any who may have been tempted to follow Te Mahuki. The choice was stark, he said, they could embrace the hopeless policy of confrontation or the beneficial one of negotiation and agreement. There were two possibilities: ‘to go to Mahuki or to go to the Government’. Any who believed that Te Mahuki had more power than the Government, and that Te Mahuki’s ‘god could save them’ should embrace the prophet. But Wetere was sure which direction was the more profitable, the more powerful.118

Given these views, Wetere was happy to take the opportunity to again identify himself as a friend to the Government. He and his people volunteered to escort Bryce and his party through the Rohe Potae and to New Plymouth. This was not a dangerous assignment as the general consensus was that the Native Minister would not be obstructed. Nevertheless, it was a useful way for Wetere to reiterate to the Government his commitment to a shared and mutually beneficial future.

As expected, Bryce was able to travel unimpeded. At Totara, Mokau Maori invited the Native Minister to stay longer for talks and feasting but Bryce did not want his journey delayed. He and his party were also warmly received near the mouth of the Mokau River, where they entered into conversations with local Maori and Europeans about possible railway routes.119 The only unease came from the ‘aged chief’ Takirau, who was concerned that Bryce’s visit was breaking ‘the rule of the exclusion’ of the Government from Mokau and from the aukati. He was reassured when Wetere explained that ‘all the Ngatimaniapotos’ had given their permission for the visit and

115 Ibid 116 Note that it is not clear whether these comments were delivered at this hui or at another meeting at Te Kuiti around this time. 117 ‘Banquet to the Hon. Mr Bryce’, (contd) Taranaki Herald, 26 Apr 1883, p2 118 Ibid 119 ‘Mr Bryce’s Tour in the King Country’, New Zealand Times, 21 Apr 1883, both in MA 23/5 *5 Special File 128, Te Mahuiki-Mokau


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produced a letter from Wahanui announcing his approval.120

By 20 April, Bryce and party, and his escorts had arrived in New Plymouth. Europeans welcomed the Native Minister as the heroic conqueror of the King Country. As on numerous similar occasions, there were joyous claims that the trip through the Rohe Potae signalled the end of ‘the last stronghold of native isolation’.121 Except for it signalling the start of the railway explorations, Bryce’s journey had limited practical consequences. But what was significant for Mokau Maori was that, in New Plymouth, senior Government officials and settler leaders exhibited an apparent commitment to a relationship based around reciprocity and personal ties. In widely attended banquets in their honour, the Native Minister described Wetere as a ‘noble chief’ who, through his actions regarding Te Mahuki, had shown himself loyal to the law and to peace. Hursthouse said he owed Wetere ‘a debt of gratitude which he felt he could never repay’.122 The large crowds of settlers and their leaders responded with cheers and calls for Wetere’s good health.123

This improvement in relations helped ensure that shortly afterwards Government road and rail surveys were carried out in Mokau without obstruction, and apparently with considerable support and involvement from local hapu. By September 1883, two road survey parties were exploring a possible horse track between Parininihi and Tongaporutu and a road route between Tongaporutu to Mokau. It was reported that local Maori ‘have shown a great desire that the road should be opened up, and a number of them have been engaged on the work by the Government’.124 Wetere was taking the lead in negotiating further contracts and better terms.125

With the permission of the leaders of the interior alliance, the exploration of a possible western or coastal route for the railway also resumed. Given Hursthouse’s previous travails, the two railway survey parties were undoubtedly glad to be working in Mokau, where many local leaders were enthusiastic about the possibility of a railway. Wetere and other Mokau Maori assisted the surveyors, providing transport, guidance and protection.126 Wahanui apparently travelled to Mokau to explain the railway exploration to local people.127 The surveyors themselves tried to deepen the support of local people, for instance by providing gifts of flour and tea to Te Whaaro and other

120 ‘Hon. Native Minister Passing through the King Country’, Taranaki Herald, 21 Apr 1883; ‘Mr Bryce’s Tour in the King Country’, New Zealand Times, 21 Apr 1883, both in MA 23/5 *5 Special File 128, Te Mahuki-Mokau 121 Taranaki Herald, 27 Apr 1883, p2 122 ‘Banquet to the Hon. Mr Bryce’, (contd) Taranaki Herald, 26 Apr 1883, p2 123 ‘Arrival of the Hon. Mr Bryce’, Taranaki Herald, 21 Apr 1883, p2 124 ‘Surveying Road to Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 1 Sep 1883, p2 125 Wetere te Rerenga to Humphries, 8 May 1884, English translation only, in MA 13/93, ANZ Wgt, p49 126 Taranaki Herald, 10 May 1883, p2; ‘The Northern Trunk Railway’, Taranaki Herald, 19 Jul 1883, p2; ‘Urenui’, Taranaki Herald, 19 Jul 1883, p2 127 Marr, ‘the Waimarino Purchase Report’, p144, which mentions that in late 1883 Wahanui promised Bryce that he would make this visit.


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chiefs.128 Crown officials used such gifts to provide a small example of the far greater economic benefits that the railway would bring.

Despite Wetere’s attempts at mediation, the railway surveyors faced some opposition in the upper Whanganui district.129 But nearer Mokau, the main problem was from the rough terrain. As their work progressed, the calls of Taranaki settlers grew louder that the western route should be chosen. It was a hope shared by Wetere. Apparently acting with the permission of Wetere and his people, a European civil engineer and surveyor by the name of Donkin had for some time been involved in unofficial attempts to identify a suitable route for the railway.130 In October 1883, Wetere travelled to Auckland to help the Taranaki Chamber of Commerce lobby the Premier, Harry Atkinson, to speed up the railway surveying process and to choose the western route. Wetere was quoted to the effect that both he and Wahanui favoured a line that went through or near Mokau.131 However, these surveys and talks about possible routes could not disguise the fact that the leaders and hapu of the Rohe Potae had still not given their approval for a railway to be built. Wetere told the Premier that he believed this agreement could be shortly reached.132 Indeed, the Rohe Potae petition of 1883 had provided the crucial foundations, or perhaps more accurately, had articulated the essential preconditions, for a possible accord with the Government.

The Rohe Potae petition of 1883

In June 1883, a petition signed by Wahanui, Taonui, Rewi Maniapoto and 412 others was presented to Parliament. This petition, which other reports will look at in more detail, was based around the demand of the leaders and supporters of the interior alliance for legal recognition of the lands that remained in their customary authority.133 The petition called for a legally recognised boundary around the Rohe Potae. All the land within this boundary was to be recognised as Maori land, under their authority and inalienable. The petition also called for reform of the currently damaging system of land sales and the Native Land Court.

These moves were presented as the necessary preconditions for a possible agreement with the Government. The leaders of the interior alliance signalled their determination, once these demands had been carried out, to seek an arrangement that would allow for a managed and beneficial opening of the area. This could include leases, and the setting

128 Minute by GT Wilkinson, government agent, 14 Jun 1884, NO 84/2060 in MA 13/43, ANZ Wgt, p162 129 E Mitchelson forwarding statement of Wetere, 12 May 1884, plus Wetere’s statement in Maori and English translation, CS Native Office 84/153 in MA 13/43, pp77-79 130 ‘Mr Bryce’s Tour in the King Country’, New Zealand Times, 21 Apr 1883, in MA 23/5 *5 Special File 128, Te Mahuki-Mokau 131 ‘Trunk Line of Railway to Auckland’, Taranaki Herald, 31 Oct 1883, p2 132 Ibid 133 Shortly afterwards, a large number of Maori signed a counter-petition reasserting the King’s claims over the lands in question. See AJHR, 1883, J-1A. No evidence has been found regarding the attitude or involvement of local Maori to this counter-petition


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aside of land for roads and railways to bring about mutual prosperity.134

Such decisions were for the future. The immediate requirement was that the Government recognise and legally protect Maori rights over Te Rohe Potae, including Mokau. The insistence that Mokau be included in the area indicates that the chiefs of the Rohe Potae recognised both the unity and diversity of the area. Mokau, it could be said, was unusual in comparison with the wider region, given the history of interaction with Europeans, the Pakeha claims to rights over much of its lands, and the controversial actions of some of its chiefs. Nevertheless, it was seen, by both local and wider leaders, as an integral part of the Rohe Potae. Its future would be part of the wider future.

The petition was the result of intense debate among Te Rohe Potae Maori. Wetere and other Mokau chiefs were involved in that debate and were closely aligned with the interior alliance. In January 1883, Wetere took part in a hui at Puniu which reached the unanimous decision that Taonui and other selected ‘reliable men’ would be sent out to define the boundaries of the area which remained under Maori control and ‘upon which Europeans had no claim’.135 According to Wahanui, after three months of consultation in Mokau and elsewhere, the representatives ‘erected posts, with the full consent’ of the local peoples and marked out the boundaries.136

The result of this consultation was the Rohe Potae petition and the decision that Mokau must be included in the protected area. According to the petition, hapu representatives had ‘defined the boundaries of our land, and erected posts’. The southern boundary would be at Waipingau (or Waipingao), and following Waipingau ‘out to the coast, thence twenty miles out to sea’.137

The petition therefore suggests that Mokau Maori, as part of a wider pan-tribal alliance, demanded ongoing control over the Mokau. The unmistakable corollary of this was that Te Rohe Potae Maori evidently did not acknowledge that Pakeha currently held rights over Mokau land. The boundaries in the petition were not meant to represent the traditional rohe of the various iwi and hapu of the interior alliance. Rather, they were the contemporary areas that were still in Maori control. These were, the petition stated, the ‘lands still remaining to us ... upon which the European, to the best of our knowledge, has no legal claim’.138

The statement, which would be repeated in other forums, that Europeans had no known ‘legal claims’ to Mokau lands, is at first glance an extraordinary one. In fact, Europeans claimed, in various ways, rights over much of the area, including through the four highly disputed Crown purchases of the 1850s of land north of the Mokau

134 Rohe Potae petition, 1883, Maori and English versions, AJHR, 1883, J-1, pp1-4; Marr, ‘The Waimarino Purchase Report’, pp111-116; Loveridge, pp84-91 135 Loveridge, p65; Extract from ‘Important meeting of Ngatimaniapotos’, Waikato Times, 2 Jan 1883, in WH Grace diary 1882 136 Loveridge, p66 137 AJHR, 1883, J-1, p2 138 AJHR, 1883, J-1, p2


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River. The Crown had confiscated the land between Parininihi and Waipingau despite continuing Maori protests. And, of course, the Mokau Mohakatino and Mohakatino Parininihi blocks were at this point already under the tenure of the Native Land Court system and were legally the possession of over 240 individual owners. Joshua Jones claimed the exclusive and absolute control of a large part of these blocks.

It can only be presumed that many of the petitioners, and certainly the great chiefs such as Rewi, Wahanui and Taonui, who had played significant roles in the history of the area, were aware of at least some of these European ‘legal’ claims. As will be discussed below, it would seem that many Mokau Maori supported the petition, including Wetere and Heremia, and they certainly knew of these claims. It would therefore seem that these claims were known but they were not accepted. As far as the supporters of the petition were concerned, and this made good sense given the practical situation on these lands, the Mokau-Poutama area had not been lost from Maori control. These lands were still, in their eyes, part of the rohe, and they demanded that the Government recognise and safeguard that fact.

The list of signatories to the petition has been lost. Nevertheless, there is evidence that it enjoyed strong backing from Mokau hapu. After it was presented, Wahanui carried out a series of hui to consult with supporters of the petition and to gain more backing for it. In September 1883, he and two canoes filled with his followers arrived in Mokau, to discuss the petition and to get local Maori to sign (or re-sign) what appears to have been another version of the June petition. Large hui took place in Mokau in which it was reported that there was considerable support for Wahanui and his initiative and that ‘most of the natives’ had signed the petition.139 Shortly afterwards, Wahanui returned to the area for further hui, and evidently received backing for the petition from Heremia Te Aria and the upriver people based around Totoro.140

Mokau Maori had good reason to back the petition. It was consistent with their long-standing demand that protection of their lands and respect of their authority be the foundation points for positive interaction with the Government and Pakeha. As the petition put it:

[W]e are not oblivious of the advantages to be derived from roads, railways, and other desirable works of the Europeans. We are fully alive to these advantages, but our lands are preferable to them all.

Parliament was called upon to pass a law to ‘secure our lands to us and our descendants for ever, making them absolutely inalienable for sale’.141 This opposition to land sales was shared by Mokau chiefs. Land sales were decidedly off the agenda in Mokau, even among those chiefs most determined to increase contact with the Crown

139 Taranaki Herald, 22 Sep 1883, p2; Taranaki Herald 27 Sep 1883, p2; ‘Wahanui at Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 29 Sep, p2; ‘Native Meeting at Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 29 Sep 1883, p2; ‘The Mokau, Taranaki Herald, 16 Oct 1883, p2 140 Taranaki Herald, 29 Sep 1883, p2; ‘The Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 16 Oct 1883, p2 141 AJHR, 1883, J-1, pp1-2


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and Europeans. Jones and Grace made various attempts to purchase land in the Mokau region during this time without any success.142

The petition stated that only after the district had been legally protected from sale, and Maori had the opportunity to decide among themselves over land rights to particular areas, could land lease be considered. This too was a policy that local chiefs were happy to uphold. Shortly after the petition was presented to Parliament, Wetere wrote a letter to the Taranaki Herald instructing Pakeha not to attempt to lease land at Mokau until, in the words of the newspaper, ‘the tribe had completed their division’.143 Despite this warning, Europeans including Jones and other coal speculators would make a range of attempts to lease lands in Mokau during this period. All these attempts failed.144

The petition’s general complaints about the tactics and dishonesty of land speculators may have found particular resonance in Mokau, given the growing uneasiness about the situation with Joshua Jones. In words that could have been written about Jones, the petition complained that some Te Rohe Potae Maori went to the Native Land Court to have their lands ‘secured to us’. They then found themselves under siege by ‘the speculators (land swallowers)’ and their agents who, by subterfuge and the costs of the Court process, sought to secure the lands for themselves. ‘We are’, said the petition, ‘beset on every side by outrageous practices and ... temptations’.145

This overlap between the aims of the interior alliance and local chiefs was further exhibited during Wahanui’s aforementioned visits to Mokau in September and October 1883. After discussions over the petition and broader issues, the korero switched to more specific Mokau grievances. Heremia and others expressed outrage that Jones was claiming exclusive control over the Mokau Mohakatino block. Wahanui lent his support and mana to the protest, writing to the Government and to European newspapers that Jones’ claims for a lease were considered false and deceitful, and warning that they should not be pursued by Jones or backed by the Government. Wahanui described Jones and his ‘work of land swallowing’ as a prime example of what the recent petition had complained of and was seeking to prevent. In a reference to the petition’s complaint that some Te Rohe Potae Maori and their lands were being lured by trickery and false promises into the ‘nets of companies’, he wrote:

Look at the words of the petition. What is said there about the company? Oh! People, deceiving is the letter of Jones, which says it (the lease) has been agreed to; it has not, indeed not.146

Wahanui’s letter finished by summarising the widespread belief that existed among Te

142 Grace to Jones, 11 Sep 1882, p285; Grace to Jones, 3 Oct 1874, p748 and Grace to Jones, 16 Nov 1884, p763, WH Grace Letterbook 1880-1892, MSY-4506 143 ‘Wholesale Dismissal of School Teachers’, Taranaki Herald, 12 Oct 1883, p2 144 See for example, Grace to Jones, 5 Jun 1884, WH Grace Letterbook 1880-1892, p653 and AJHR, 1888, G-4C, p15 145 AJHR, 1883, J-1, pp1-2 146 ‘The Mokau’, letter by Wahanui in Maori with English translation, Taranaki Herald, 16 Oct 1883, p2


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Rohe Potae Maori, and the hapu of Mokau, that positive relations with Pakeha were possible but only if they were based around good faith and partnership. Wahanui asked Jones, the Government and Pakeha in general:

Will you not do that which is just? Do that which is right to-day, that trouble may not come upon the two peoples, that they may be relived and rejoice together for ever.147

During this period, Te Rohe Potae Maori would try to ensure that the Crown would do ‘that which is right’ through a series of agreements, or what they termed a ‘sacred compact’. The crucial question was whether the Government understood and was committed to this compact. This question would be increasingly asked in the following years, including regarding Mokau.

Government surveys and the threat to Mokau

The gap between Crown and Te Rohe Potae Maori understandings of their agreements was revealed in the conflict over the survey of the external boundary. As we have seen, the interior alliance had petitioned for protection of the Rohe Potae district, including Mokau, through the legal fixing and recognition of its outer boundary. In hui with John Bryce at Kihikihi in December 1883, they appeared to have secured an agreement that the Government would survey this external boundary.

The importance to Te Rohe Potae Maori of a legally acknowledged boundary meant that the agreement for the external survey was seen as another vital step towards a compact. It was believed that the exterior survey would help secure the legal protection of the land, and would see both Maori and Crown acknowledge that the Te Rohe Potae district was a unified whole, under the collective authority of the interior alliance and its constituent iwi and hapu. It would also help protect the area from unwanted and damaging European interference until a broader accord with the Crown could be reached on how the region would be managed and developed.148

It was therefore essential to the leaders of Te Rohe Potae that the survey accurately marked out the lands, including Mokau, which would be part of this protected area. The Government was instructed, and appeared to agree, to survey the boundaries as defined by Maori. Before signing the official application, Wahanui was explicit that at this stage there must be one survey only, of the external boundary, and no splitting or sub-dividing of Te Rohe Potae.149 This meant, as he later explained, that the external survey would include blocks such as Mokau Mohakatino and Mohakatino Parininihi that the Native Land Court had already adjudicated upon but which Maori considered an integral part of their rohe.150 It would also include the Mokau-Awakino blocks the Crown claimed to have purchased in the 1850s and the confiscated land between

147 Ibid 148 Marr, ‘The Waimarino Purchase Report’, pp129-139 149 Loveridge, p108 150 Wahanui to Ballance, 25 Sep 1885, in Maori with English translation, in MA 13/03, ANZ Wgt, pp33-35


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Parininihi and Waipingau.

Te Rohe Potae Maori had, after considerable consultation, defined the general parameters of the district in the June 1883 petition, which included all of the Mokau region down to Waipingau. It would seem likely that these boundaries were reiterated in the Kihikihi meetings with Bryce. According to newspaper accounts, after the agreement that an official survey would be carried out, WH Grace, on behalf of the interior alliance, ‘read out the boundaries which the natives propose to have’. These boundaries were then entered into the formal application for survey that the chiefs signed. While this formal application has not been found, newspaper reports described the agreed area as incorporating the ‘whole of what is known as the King Country’, including the Mokau area.151

The importance to Te Rohe Potae Maori of the external survey was indicated by the fact that the official application was signed by 30 major leaders of the interior alliance. Mokau chiefs, including Wetere, were not present at the Kihikihi agreement but it seems probable that there was considerable support among them for the initiative. European newspapers singled out Wetere as someone who would certainly have signed given the opportunity, describing him as a leader of the ‘party of progress’ that had helped create the framework for the external survey and other agreements with the Crown.152

If Te Rohe Potae Maori saw the external survey primarily as a step towards the definition and protection of their land, Crown officials saw it as paving the way for the eventual alienation of land. Permission to survey provided the Government with a good opportunity to mark out and examine previously little-known land, and also to introduce triangulation surveys which provided important information for Native Land Court purposes.153 More importantly still, the Government considered the survey agreement as progress in its efforts to remove customary title for the entire district. As other reports will look at in more detail, to secure an official survey of the area, Te Rohe Potae leaders had officially applied for a survey of a Native Land Court block.

The Crown therefore understood the purpose of the survey in a very different way from the interior alliance. It saw the survey not as marking out the outer boundaries as defined by Maori, but rather as defining those vast parts of Te Rohe Potae that, Government officials hoped, the Native Land Court would shortly adjudicate over. Furthermore, the Crown understood the application for a survey as technically an application for a Native Land Court hearing even though Te Rohe Potae Maori had made no final decision to go to the Court.154 The Crown therefore wanted to use the survey to produce the necessary information for a future hearing over what would become known as the Aotea Te Rohe Potae block, but was usually called by

151 Loveridge, pp110-111. 152 Loveridge, p112 153 Marr, ‘The Waimarino Purchase Report’, p143 154 Ibid, pp130-137


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Government officials during this period the ‘King Country’ or the ‘Great’ block.

For our purposes, the crucial point is that Government officials did not want to include Mokau within the ‘external’ boundary that the survey would mark. They wanted to survey only those areas still under Maori customary ownership, so as to pave the way for a future Court hearing. The Crown believed it had already successfully removed communal control over Mokau, by having previously purchased, confiscated or placed the Native Land Court over Mokau lands. The Government and Te Rohe Potae Maori therefore had two quite opposite views of the status of Mokau and the purpose of the external survey. The interior alliance, and local Maori, wanted the survey to protect and define Mokau as part of a wider communal area that would remain under Maori control. The Crown expected the survey to separate Mokau from the wider area, and to make explicit that Mokau lands were no longer under customary Maori control.

While the external boundary survey was getting under way, the Government was carrying out other surveys as part of the attempt to further its control over the Mokau. These included triangulation surveys, while surveyors were also defining the lands north of the Mokau River that they claimed were Government possessions.155 As discussed earlier, in the 1850s the Crown had met enormous opposition to its claims to have purchased the Mokau-Awakino blocks, and had until the 1880s been unable to assert any practical control or closely map them. With surveyors operating throughout the region on a bewildering variety of projects, and during a period of improving relations with Te Rohe Potae Maori, the Crown evidently judged the time right to return to the Mokau-Awakino ‘purchases’.

Between September 1883 and June 1884, Government surveyors mapped the boundaries of the four ‘purchased’ blocks using the old purchase deeds and earlier sketch maps as guides, while also marking out smaller individual lots in preparation for on-sale to settlers.156 It is not clear whether this took place with the agreement, consultation or even knowledge of many local Maori.157 These surveys did not have any immediate effect, as it would take a few more years before it was judged practical and safe to assert direct ownership or on-sell to Europeans. Nevertheless, the surveys would be a major step in the process by which the Crown would transform, virtually by stealth, disputed and apparently incomplete negotiations a generation earlier into full and final land alienations.

At the same time, the Government was attempting to solidify its control over the confiscated lands south of Parininihi. Chiefs, both locally and from the wider district had consistently protested against and refused to recognise this confiscation. Judging by the 1883 petition and later comments by Wahanui, they expected that the exterior

155 Taranaki Herald, 24 Sep 1883, p2 156 Ibid, 24 Nov 1884, p2; Skinner, Reminiscences of a Taranaki Surveyor, pp56-60 157 Skinner, Reminiscences of a Taranaki Surveyor, pp56-60 does mention some social contact with Wetere and others but not any discussions over land matters.


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surveyed boundary would extend down to Waipingau.158 This was not done. Rather, Crown surveyors in 1884 took the opportunity to formally mark, perhaps for the first time, the confiscation line at Parininihi.159 It can therefore be said that this was the first real assertion of Crown control over the confiscated lands north of the Pukearuhe redoubt.

It is again unclear whether local Maori, or the leaders of the interior iwi, were aware of the purpose and import of the Government’s actions. However, the Crown’s attempt to exclude the rest of the Poutama area from the exterior survey was brought to their intention and vigorously resisted. As mentioned, the Government saw the exterior survey as preparing the way for Native Land Court title to be placed over land still under customary tenure. The Court had already adjudicated on Mokau Mohakatino and Mohakatino Parininihi, therefore it served no Government purpose to have these lands mixed up with the survey and Court adjudication over the ‘King Country’ block. Moreover, to provide the Court with an acceptable map of the ‘King Country’ block, its border with Mokau Mohakatino and the Mohakatino Parininihi blocks needed to be defined. In April 1884, the Government ordered that the currently unsurveyed Mokau Mohakatino and Mohakatino Parininihi blocks be defined so as to exclude these blocks ‘from the King Country Block’.160

However, in this case, local Maori had to be told about the Government’s survey intentions, in part because they were expected to pay for the unrequested and unwanted survey of these two Poutama blocks.161 The reaction to this information was far from positive. The opposition in part stemmed from accurate fears that a survey of the Mokau Mohakatino block would be used by Jones to forward his efforts to be legally granted a 56-year absolute lease over the land.162 This merged with concerns that such a survey would exclude the Poutama lands from the protected area, and was a contradiction of the apparent promise for an accurate external survey of the lands that Te Rohe Potae Maori considered still under their possession.

Local Maori wrote letters of protest to the Taranaki Surveyor General Thomas Humphries against the survey of the Mokau Mohakatino and Mohakatino Parininihi blocks. Takirau, Kauparera and Te Oro Watihi stated that ‘[w]e do not want that land surveyed’. The Government must ‘[b]e satisfied’ with the road and railway surveys

158 See Otorohanga NLC Minute Book no 1, pp46-47 for Wahanui’s reiteration that Waipingau was the south western boundary of the rohe. In contrast, European newspaper accounts of the 1883 Kihikihi agreement seem to have assumed that local Maori would not seek to survey south of the confiscation line. See Loveridge, p111. Note also, that Wahanui himself at one point referred to Parininihi as the edge of the area to be surveyed, although this appears to be a casual reference. (Wahanui to Ballance, 25 Sep 1885, in Maori with English translation, in MA 13/93, pp33-35) Nevertheless, the 1883 petition, which uses Waipingau as the boundary, would seem to be the most authoritative indication of the area that was expected to be surveyed and protected. 159 Report by S Percy Smith, AJHR, 1884, sess II, C-1, appendix 2, p29; Assistant Surveyor General to Surveyor General, 3 Jul 1885, AJHR, 1885, G-9, p1 160 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, p27 161 Humphries to Wetere Rerenga, Takirau and others principally interested, 30 April 1883, in MA 13/03, ANZ Wgt, p47 162 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, pp29-30


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currently taking place in the region and not attempt any other surveys.163 Wetere wanted the Poutama blocks eventually surveyed so that legal title could be granted.164 However, he was concerned that the proposed method would contradict the policy and wishes of the interior alliance. Wetere therefore wrote to Humphries that he ‘cannot agree’ to any survey of the blocks without prior agreement between Wahanui and the Government.165

Wetere and other local chiefs then travelled to New Plymouth to express their concerns directly. This brought the matter to the attention of Wahanui, as Government officials believed that his permission was necessary if the survey was to be successfully carried out.166

However, Wahanui’s opposition was implacable. He was adamant that what had been requested and agreed on was a survey of the entire external boundaries, including Mokau. Wahanui’s resistance to the attempted transformation of the survey was strengthened by the fact that he had long shown, and would continue to demonstrate, a particular determination to avoid any splitting of the Mokau from the wider area. He had been an opponent of having the Court sit in 1882 over the Mokau Mohakatino and Mohakatino Parininihi blocks. In 1883, he had considered applying for a rehearing of the blocks, apparently out of an unease that the land had been granted to the resident section of Ngati Maniapoto only. He had abandoned this idea due to his hostility to use of the Court but would continue to seek ways to establish that Mokau remained part of the wider region, and to force the Government to recognise that it remained under the collective authority of the leaders and hapu of that region.167 The external survey was part of that effort.

In June 1884, Bryce was therefore forced to order that the planned survey of the Poutama blocks be temporarily abandoned as ‘nothing could be done to remove the opposition’.168 In July 1885, the Government reported it had successfully completed all the surveying ‘necessary to make a map for the Native Land Court’ of the ‘King Country’ block except for the ‘unforeseen difficulty’ of the Maori refusal to allow it to define the shared boundary with the Poutama blocks.169

Given that this inability to survey the Poutama blocks was complicating the Crown’s broader aims for the entire region, Bryce’s successor as Native Minister, John Ballance,

163 Takirau, Kauparera, Te Oro Watihi to Humphries, English translation of letter only, 10 May 1884 , MA 13/93, p48 164 For Wetere’s overall desire for a survey of the two blocks, see Wetere Te Rerenga to Te Paranihi (John Ballance), 27 Jun 1885, Letter in Te Reo Maori only (translation by Aaron Randall), MA 13/93, p50 165 Wetere Te Rerenga to Humphries, English translation of letter only, 8 May 1884, MA 13/93, p49 [check reference] 166 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, p27 167 Grace to Jones, 14 Apr 1883, pp405-406; Grace to Wetere in te reo with English translation, 10 Jul 1883, pp432-433; Grace to Jones, 16 Dec 1883, p591, all in WH Grace Letterbook 1880-1892, MSY-4506 168 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, p27 169 Assistant Surveyor General to Surveyor General, 3 Jul 1885, AJHR, 1885, G-9, p1


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renewed attempts to obtain Wahanui’s permission. In September 1885, Wahanui again refused, instead instructing the Government to keep to its agreement to make one external boundary survey of the district as defined by Maori. The Government, he wrote, was trying to place Mokau ‘outside the external boundary which is not correct’. He told Ballance that there ‘is but one boundary line’, that which Maori had specified, and which included the Poutama lands. Wahanui stated that the fact that the Poutama lands had been through the Court was irrelevant. Te Rohe Potae Maori had deliberately included within the boundaries of their protected area a number of blocks that had already been before the Court. He warned Ballance that any attempt to exclude Poutama or to alter the external boundaries defined by the alliance would damage relations:

Friend, cease from this sort of interference lest there be trouble, let what you do be done satisfactorily.170

Ballance replied that Wahanui misunderstood the issue and that the Crown was simply acting to survey the Poutama blocks as the Native Land Court had ordered in 1882.171 This was disingenuous. The broader ramifications and purpose of the Government’s plans were apparent, both to Wahanui and to Crown officials. Assistant Surveyor General Percy Smith in November 1885 put it succinctly. The ‘whole gist of the matter’ was that Wahanui and Te Rohe Potae Maori insisted that the external survey reflected their demands that Poutama be included in the ‘big block’, as he termed the district-wide protected area, while the Government wanted to ‘exclude’ these lands as it would complicate its aspirations for the Native Land Court to sit over the ‘King Country’ block.172

Possibilities for a partnership

The Mokau lands would eventually be excluded from the wider ‘King Country’ block. But by 1885, the Government was unwilling to provoke a major break with Wahanui and other chiefs over the issue, and abandoned its plans to survey the Poutama blocks. Overall, the period between 1882 and 1885 could be seen as the highpoint of attempts by Mokau chiefs, acting independently and as part of wider tribal and pan-tribal initiatives, to forge a relationship based around partnership and mutual benefit with the Crown and with Europeans.

This commitment was exhibited in a wide variety of ways. Local Maori tried to encourage the infrastructure and commercial possibilities of the region. Alongside supporting Crown road and railway initiatives, Wetere also met with Government

170 Wahanui to Ballance, 25 Sep 1885, in Maori with English translation, MA 13/93, pp33-35 171 Ballance to Wahanui, 3 Oct 1885, MA 13/93, p37 172 S Percy Smith to Lewis, 3 Nov 1885, NO 85/3715 in MA 13/93, pp16, 19. In 1885 Smith suggested that Wahanui and the interior alliance intended to have the Native Land Court award them title over Poutama as part of a Court hearing over the whole of the surveyed area. This seems unlikely as it is generally accepted that until 1886, the leaders of the interior had not decided on seeking a Court hearing at all.


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ministers in 1884 to request investment in a ferry for Tongaporutu.173 Although the Government showed little interest in such enterprises, Wetere welcomed the limited attempts to help make the Mokau River more navigable and suitable for the coal trade. In April 1884, Wetere and two of his men rescued some Government marine surveyors who had capsized while trying to de-snag the river. For their bravery, they were honoured with medals and certificates by the Royal Humane Society of Australasia in a ceremony attended by many of the Pakeha elite of Taranaki.174

The increase in interaction with European political and legal institutions was one of the more notable features of this period. In this, and in many other issues, we know most about Wetere’s activities. As discussed, Wetere attempted, and to some degree succeeded, in developing strong ties with senior Government leaders. His determination to exercise authority in partnership with Europeans was further suggested by his unsuccessful 1884 attempt to be elected to Parliament as the member for Western Maori.175 He was also a native assessor, receiving £100 per annum.176 Furthermore, the chief had ties, distant but growing, with European settler organisations in New Plymouth who were seeking to promote economic developments in Mokau.177

These attempts to build links with the Government did not preclude close involvement with pan-tribal political movements. We have detailed the apparently strong, although doubtlessly complex, ties between local leaders and the broader alliance of interior iwi. Little evidence has been seen regarding the relationship with the Kingitanga at this point, although the breach with Wetere evidently remained.178

Ngati Maniapoto and Taranaki affiliated hapu certainly had ties to the resurgent Parihaka movement. In 1884, large numbers of Waikato and Ngati Maniapoto Maori were reported to be attempting to visit Te Whiti, while those hapu based around Pukearuhe had well-established links to Parihaka.179 The following year, Wetere’s visit to Parihaka led to claims by Government officers that he was closely associated with Te Whiti and was endeavouring to bring Rewi into the fold.180 A short time later, Wetere and 30 Mokau Maori were at Parihaka for meetings.181

Europeans still viewed the Parihaka movement with considerable suspicion, and were uneasy about the ties of local hapu to Te Whiti. Despite this, European security fears regarding Mokau had largely dissipated and the armed redoubt was increasingly

173 Grace to Wetere, English translation, 25 Dec 1884, p803, WH Grace Letterbook 1880-1892, MSY-4506 174 ‘Royal Humane Society of Australasia’, Taranaki Herald, 14 Dec 1885, p2 175 ‘The Southern Maori Election’, Waikato Times, 29 Jul 1884, p2 176 Lewis to Native Minister, 16 Aug 1886, NO 86/2846 in MA 23/5 *5, Special File 128, Te Mahuki-Mokau 177 ‘Trunk Line of Railway to Auckland’, Taranaki Herald, 31 Oct 1883, p2 178 Otorohanga NLC Minute Book no 2, pp18-19 179 Taranaki Herald, 13 Mar 1884, p2; ‘Urenui’, Taranaki Herald, 14 Mar 1884, p2;’Urenui’, Taranaki Herald, 9 May 1884, p2 180 Annual report of GT Wilkinson, AJHR, 1886, G-1, p3 181 ‘Parihaka Meetings’, Taranaki Herald, 25 Sep 1885, p2


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considered by Pakeha to be unnecessary. While there were still 40 or 50 armed constabulary stationed there or nearby in 1884, they were mainly involved in road work, an activity apparently supported by many local Maori.182 Care was taken to avoid tension between the soldiers and local Maori. The forces, for instance, were ordered not to make any signs of distrust or force when a major hui took place in the area in March 1885.183 Shortly afterwards, the Government decided to withdraw all but a handful of the troops from Pukearuhe.184

This did not mean that Maori protest against Government actions, including the confiscation had finished. But any willingness of local hapu to consider using force had long passed. The feeling of some Pakeha observers that a transition was taking place in Mokau was heightened by the growing, although far from total, influence of European law in the area. The most prominent examples were the Native Land Court hearing in 1882, and Wetere’s willingness to use Government troops and the law courts to have Te Mahuki punished. Moreover, as time went on, Mokau Maori sometimes looked to the Taranaki court system and the armed constabulary to help deal with problematic settlers and coal companies.185

Europeans keenly emphasised signs that respect for the Crown’s sovereignty was growing. In 1885, the Taranaki Herald claimed Wetere had successfully halted some brawling by asserting his standing as a Native Assessor and by calling on ‘the Queen’s name to restore order’. The newspaper felt this was a hopeful sign that local Maori recognised the authority of the Queen as ‘not a mere chimera’.186 This interaction was not always a matter of choice, as local Maori were occasionally forced to appear in the District Court to answer claims made against them by Europeans.187

Overall, European law still had only a limited influence in Mokau and local hapu retained the right, and at least some ability, to deal in their own way with troublesome settlers. In 1886, a local European allegedly received £60 worth of pigs for which he neglected to pay. After a long wait, local Maori entered his unoccupied house and auctioned off some of his possessions. As they recouped little from this, they were reportedly planning to take more of his possessions including a boat, to Waitara to sell to Europeans.188 Furthermore, while local Maori were increasingly willing to use European courts in matters of inter-cultural conflict, purely Maori disputes do not seem to have been referred to Pakeha officials for adjudication. On first glance, Wetere’s participation in the capture and trial of Te Mahuki trial seem to disprove this point. However, the Mokau chief may have been guided by the fact that Te Mahuki’s

182 ‘The Armed Constabulary’, Taranaki Herald, 25 Apr 1884, p2 183 ‘Latest Intelligence’, Taranaki Herald, 23 Mar 1885, p2 184 ‘Urenui’, Taranaki Herald, 9 Apr 1885, p2 185 ‘Resident Magistrate’s Court’, Taranaki Herald, 20 Jul 1887, p2; ‘Editorial’, Taranaki Herald, 9 Feb 1888, p2; ‘Police Court’, 21 Feb 1888, p2 186 Taranaki Herald, 11 Mar 1885, p2 187 ‘District Court’, Taranaki Herald, 20 Mar 1884, p2; ‘Police Court’, Taranaki Herald, 1 Oct 1884, p2 188 Taranaki Herald, 11 Feb 1886, p2


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actions had been directed against the Government.189

The key feature of this period was not that Europeans extended control over the region but rather that the possibilities of a genuine partnership had grown. It is likely that many local chiefs were disappointed when it became clear, in late 1884, that the central route had been chosen and Mokau would not derive any clear benefit from the possible main trunk line.190 Nevertheless, this loss was offset by the general strengthening of relations between the Government and the interior alliance. By 1885, permission had been granted to begin building the railway. This permission was based on the belief that a strong and solemn understanding had been achieved with the Government.

As Cathy Marr details, this understanding included that the Government would recognise and protect the entire Te Rohe Potae district, including Mokau. There would be, it was believed, far-reaching reforms in land legislation and the Native Land Court, and increased Maori rights to manage their land and its title. More broadly, and just as importantly, a new model had been established for the relationship between local communities and the Government. By early 1885:

it seemed that the Government had embraced a system of direct good faith negotiations, consultation and proposed legislative reform that promised significant cooperation between settler and Maori communities over economic developments for mutual benefit.191

Mokau chiefs such as Wetere had long been attempting to create this co-operation and understanding, both through their local efforts and in alliance with their brethren from the wider region. By 1885, they had reason to believe that the Government would work with local hapu and Europeans to develop the region, while respecting the Maori demand for authority and good faith. What remained to be seen was whether the Government understood and was committed to that role, and to the agreement it had reached with Maori. In Mokau, the key test was how the Government handled the developing crisis over the Joshua Jones ‘land lease’. The Government would profoundly fail that test, with local Maori bearing the consequences of that failure.

8.3 The Collapse of a Coal Deal and the Threat of a Land Lease, 1882 to 1885

Between 1882 and 1885, the attempts by local Maori to enter a relationship of equality and opportunity with European businessmen began to go disastrously wrong. The most significant of these enterprises – the coal deal with Joshua Jones – would turn into a dangerous threat to local Maori land and society. As discussed, Mokau chiefs had entered into the arrangement with Jones believing they could secure considerable benefits from a joint coal enterprise while maintaining control over the land and the partnership. Instead, they received virtually no financial benefits while Jones would

189 Vincent O’Malley suggested this point. 190 Cleaver & Sarich, pp59-62 191 Marr, ‘The Waimarino Purchase Report’, p196


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launch a long and ruthless campaign to have the Crown grant him a 56-year, exclusive land lease over the Mokau Mohakatino block.

The leaders and hapu of Mokau – and of the wider region – expressed their rejection of Jones’ claims to a land lease in a variety of ways. Some rejected any commercial relationship with Jones, disrupting his attempts to mine coal or assert rights in the area. The survey of the Mokau Mohakatino block, and the issuing of final title over the land, was prevented in part because of fears that this might be used by Jones to seize legal control. But most importantly, Government officials and the wider European population were repeatedly told that Jones’ claims were false and must not be given any legal standing.

Until around 1885, the Government remained largely uninvolved in the dispute with Jones. Its main focus was on gaining agreement and advantage in the wider Rohe Potae. Government officers, especially Native Minister Bryce, did not involve themselves in Mokau unless it was seen as contributing to their greater ambitions. This meant that the opportunity to mediate and assist local Maori in their conflict was ignored, but it also meant that the Government did not lend direct assistance to Jones’ land claims. This was crucial, for it was becoming increasingly clear to all concerned that only extraordinary intervention by the Government could secure Jones legal recognition of a land lease that local Maori overwhelmingly rejected.

Jones’ claims of a land lease revealed

It would take some time before it was clear that Jones was claiming to have secured an exclusive land lease for 56 years. As explained earlier, most local Maori believed that the written deed that they signed in July 1882 reflected their demands. Jones could mine the area up to around Mangapohue, and live among the local people, who would be able to cease (or alter) the arrangement as they saw fit. He would not possess exclusive control over the land. Heremia was the driving force behind these conditions, and primarily saw the arrangement as a method of raising funds so that local Maori could survey and complete their legal control over both the Mokau Mohakatino and Mohakatino Parininihi blocks.

In the period after the ‘agreement’ was reached in July 1882, there were some limited but encouraging signs that a successful coal partnership between Jones and local Maori would soon be launched. Jones was, by contract and expectation, required to form a coal company that would invest significant resources in the enterprise. There were frequent claims that such a company would soon be created, which would enjoy great success given that the whole region was ‘one vast coal-bed’ with an abundance of other minerals.192 In July 1882, newspapers prematurely reported that Jones had formed a coal company and that its prospects were ‘unquestionably good’.193 In October 1882, 10 or 12 ‘Australian and Auckland capitalists’ were visiting Mokau and

192 Taranaki Herald, 11 Jan 1884, p2 193 ‘The Mokau Country’, Taranaki Herald, 14 Jul 1882, p2


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considering forming a mining company.194 Jones and local Maori shipped samples of Mokau coal and limestone to New Plymouth and elsewhere, and received a promising reception.195 In July 1883, the Taranaki Chamber of Commerce sent an expert to Mokau to examine a proposal for a joint enterprise, while it was expected that a Sydney firm would soon start working the coal fields.196 By September it was said that a ‘Company will be formed without delay to open up the mine and prove its capabilities’.197

While waiting for more solid developments, local Maori had to make do with a few small payments, and promises of far greater eventual wealth. According to the agreement, the annual payment for the lease was just £25. Jones, after signing the agreement, made the payment for the first year, with local Maori deciding it would go to Heremia.198 The lessors were not to know that this would be the only time Jones ever met this obligation.199 He and Grace also made a number of informal payments or gifts, especially to Wetere, Heremia, and their families.200 More important still, was the vision they created of a prosperous partnership. Grace wrote letters as a ‘faithful friend’ to Wetere, telling him that there was no ‘point in living in poverty’, for ‘with money and correct behaviour ... everything in the world is achievable’. The money was to come from joint business enterprises, while the correct behaviour was support for those enterprises and to abandon ‘all thoughts of [the] Hauhau side’.201

Having had, during and since the signing, little chance to examine the deed in depth, local Maori began to grow increasingly anxious about Jones’ reluctance to make available a copy.202 By May 1883, rumours were circulating that Jones was claiming to have in his possession a signed, absolute land lease of 56 years. Revealingly, the immediate response of Wahanui, Heremia and other local Maori was to call on the Government for assistance, investigation and protection. Heremia wrote to Native Minister Bryce and asked him to inspect the lease and to provide local Maori with a copy. Wahanui made clear that local people denied agreeing to any exclusive, fixed-term land lease. The Native Minister promised to do what he could to investigate the matter.203

194 ‘New Zealand Telegrams’, Taranaki Herald, 16 Oct 1882, p2. Note that in this and other reports, it is not always clear whether the reference is to Jones’ initiatives, or to other mining enterprises operating on the north bank of the Mokau River. 195 ‘Advertisements Column’, Taranaki Herald, 24 Mar 1883, p2 196 Taranaki Herald, 4 Jul 1883, p2; ‘Parliamentary News’, Taranaki Herald, 3 Jul 1883, p2 197 ‘Surveying Road to Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 1 Sep 1883, p2 198 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, pp14-15, 21 199 Ibid, p21 200 ‘Grace to Jones, 19 Sep 1882, WH Grace Letterbook 1880-1892, MSY-4506, p303; AJHR, 1888, G-4C, pp14-15, 22 201 Grace to Wetere Te Rerenga, 23 Sep 1882, English translation, WH Grace Letterbook 1880-1892, p310 202 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, p17 203 Summaries of correspondence from 14 May 1883, NO 83/1665, 12 May 1883 NO83/1444 in LE 1, Box 235* 1885/9, Papers Attached to Public Petitions Committee into Joshua Jones Petition 17/1885, ANZ Wgt. This source provides a brief summary, in English only, of the correspondence apparently


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As a consequence, Government officer Robert Parris was asked to report to the Government on what he knew of the situation. Parris confirmed that there had been ‘unsatisfactory rumours about the lease’. Jones was requested to provide the Government with a copy of the lease.204 Bryce seems to have considered that this would be the full extent of his and the Government’s involvement in the case.

However, by this point Wetere had possession of a copy of the deed. As mentioned, the document would seem to have been an unambivalent 56-year exclusive lease of the block up to Mangapohue. The chief initially showed it to Major Messenger, the witness to the original agreement. After careful examination, Messenger decided that the document was not an accurate recollection of the arrangement that local Maori had agreed to. He was particularly alarmed that it failed to make clear that it was a coal and mineral deal, with Jones having rights only to that land needed for mining. He immediately wrote to Bryce warning that ‘trouble might arise’.205

Wetere then brought the deed, along with an interpreter, RS Thompson, to Mokau, where it was explained and translated to local chiefs including Heremia. Te Oro Watihi would later testify that he and many others were shocked that the deed contradicted ‘Heremia’s words’ – the stipulation that it was a coal arrangement which Maori could cease when they saw fit:

It was then that we first knew that Heremia’s words were not in the lease, Heremia said, when he heard the lease read over, ‘These are not my words; there is a fixed term in the lease and it must be broken from to-day’.206

A large hui then took place, attended by Wahanui, Heremia, Wetere and many local people. It was decided to write letters both to the speculator and to the Government making clear that Jones’ claims would not be accepted. Wahanui wrote to Bryce that ‘Heremia declines to have anything more to do’ with Jones and his claims to a lease.207 Jones was presented with a written notice, that apparently included a warning that he must not ‘trespass’ on the land.208 The wider European public were also made aware of the Maori protests. The Taranaki Herald reported that, at the hui, Heremia and his people had ‘repudiated the lease’ after realising that it was ‘entirely different from’ their intentions. The paper gave a reasonable summary of what would continue to be the main protests of local Maori. Some apparently denied any connection or agreement with Jones at all, while others such as Heremia insisted that the agreement was only that Jones could work the coal ‘until sufficient money had been accumulated to pay for

examined by the 1885 Committee. Many of the details are missing and the originals have not been located. 204 Summaries of correspondence from 23 May 1883 and 25 May 1883, NO 83/1452 in LE 1, Box 235* 1885/9, Papers Attached to Public Petitions Committee into Joshua Jones Petition 17/1885 205 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, p16 206 Ibid, p17 207 Summaries of correspondence from 28 Sep 1883, NO 83/3123 in LE 1, Box 235* 1885/9, Papers Attached to Public Petitions Committee into Joshua Jones Petition 17/1885 208 Summaries of correspondence from 29 Sep 1883, NO 83/3119 in LE 1, Box 235* 1885/9, Papers Attached to Public Petitions Committee into Joshua Jones Petition 17/1885


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the survey of Poutama’. The whole affair, said the newspaper, seems to have been a ‘great misunderstanding’.209

Jones then swung into counter-attack. He demanded that the Government protect him against Heremia and published newspaper accounts portraying a totally different, and as was his wont, highly misleading version of the situation.210 Jones repeatedly claimed that local Maori overwhelmingly backed his assertion of a land lease, and that any reports to the contrary were the result of the malicious machinations of rival speculators who, he frequently implied, were in cahoots with corrupt Crown officials. In this case, he argued ‘certain Europeans’ were trying to turn local Maori away from him. However, Wahanui, Wetere and local chiefs refused to listen to their slander, and, alongside warning these Pakeha away from Mokau, had complained to the Government about the actions of these Europeans.211

Wahanui and Heremia were outraged by Jones’ version of events and moved to make sure there could be no doubt that they refuted Jones’ and his claims to the land. Wahanui requested that European newspapers publish letters written by him and Heremia and addressed to all Pakeha and Maori. The letters, written in Maori and translated into English, repeatedly described Jones and his claims as false and deceitful. Wahanui recalled that Heremia, after examining the deed, had stated:

Those arrangements are not mine, they are Jones and his companions; mine they have cast aside. For this reason destroy that letter said to be a lease, for this reason also, companions, I have ceased to be a party to that letter.212

Wahanui decried Jones’ attempts at ‘land swallowing’ and stated that there was widespread local resistance to it. He used Jones as an example of a wider pattern of dishonest speculators seeking to deceive and entrap Maori. This was the reason, he explained, why the great Rohe Potae petition had recently been sent to the Government demanding that Maori control over all land in the region, including Mokau, be legally recognised and that the Government put in far-reaching protections against the ‘land swallowers’. More specifically, he called on Jones to ‘desist from your deceits, and cease to trouble these people’. Jones must ‘do that which is just’, and bring relief and rejoicing to all, so that ‘trouble may not come upon the two peoples’.213

Heremia’s letter was to the point. He called on all who were conscious of justice to:

Listen! I have seen the lease ... it does not agree with what I arranged. O, friends, this lease will not be right. This is all.214

209 ‘Native Meeting at Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 29 Sep 1993, p2 210 Summaries of correspondence from 28 Sep 1883, NO 83/3122 in LE 1, Box 235* 1885/9, Papers Attached to Public Petitions Committee into Joshua Jones Petition 17/1885 211 ‘Melbourne Cup’, Taranaki Herald, 3 Oct 1883, p2 212 ‘The Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 16 Oct 1883, p2 213 Ibid 214 Ibid


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The Government, however, refused to investigate. Bryce later explained that as a rule he ‘studiously avoided inquiring’ into private transactions of this sort.215 He read Messenger’s report and examined the Jones’ deed in a perfunctory way to determine ‘if Government interference was necessary or desirable’. Judging by his later comments, he failed to grasp the key issues in dispute. Nevertheless, Bryce’s half-hearted examination convinced him that everything ‘appeared in order and I took no further action’.216 He batted away the frequent correspondence by local Maori (and by Jones) by stating that the Government would make no special intervention, and that the law must run its course. Wetere was curtly informed that the Native Minister was ‘not acquainted’ with Jones’ business transactions and ‘has nothing to do’ with his lease.217 Wahanui was told that ‘Bryce can only work under the law, and that if Mr. Jones’s lease is legal it must remain so’.218

Maori responses to Jones’ claims

The failure of the Government during this period to consider and protect the interests of Mokau Maori was, at least, preferable to its later active support for Jones’ claims. Nevertheless, Bryce’s refusal to intervene forced some hard decisions on local hapu regarding how they should respond to Jones. There would not seem to have been any local Maori chiefs who openly and emphatically backed Jones claims for a 56-year exclusive lease. Rather, two general approaches were evident, reflecting the perceived risks and opportunities of contact with Jones.

Heremia represented perhaps the dominant, and certainly a growing, perspective that Jones’ false land claims meant it was impossible to trust him regarding a coal deal. As we have seen, he had always been somewhat sceptical about Jones and the potential benefits of a coal deal. But once Jones started claiming an exclusive land lease, Heremia appears to have abandoned any positive connections with the speculator or support for a coal partnership. According to the chief and many others, Jones had broken his side of the bargain, and therefore Maori were no longer obliged to give him access to the coal. Heremia and his supporters considered a number of tactics to frustrate Jones’ ambitions and prevent him from using the coal. These included briefly contemplating using the Native Land Court to subdivide the land so that Jones would not be able to mine or assert claims over their interests.219 This was not pursued. Rather, their most immediate action was to try to prevent Jones from mining coal or

215 Evidence of John Bryce, 15 Jul 1885, pp1-2, in LE 1, Box 235* 1885/9, Papers Attached to Public Petitions Committee into Joshua Jones Petition 17/1885 216 Evidence of Bryce, pp3-4 in ibid 217 Summaries of correspondence from 18 Jul 1883 and reply 26 Jul, NO 83/2230 and 3 Sep 1883, NO 83/2526 in LE 1, Box 235* 1885/9, Papers Attached to Public Petitions Committee into Joshua Jones Petition 17/1885 218 Summaries of correspondence from 28 Sep 1883, NO 83/3123 in LE 1, Box 235* 1885/9, Papers Attached to Public Petitions Committee into Joshua Jones Petition 17/1885 219 Note that there are some hints that Heremia at this time considered using the Native Land Court to split the legal control of the Mokau Mohakatino no 1 block between those who supported a coal arrangement with Jones and those, including himself who did not. AJHR, 1888, G-4C p23 which mentions a failed application by Heremia and others for a partition of the block.


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actively asserting rights over the land. No attempt was made to physically force the speculator from the area, in order to avoid conflict with Pakeha, with the Crown, or, just as importantly, with Jones’ remaining supporters among local Maori, who were associated in particular with Wetere.

Wetere was himself very far from being a whole-hearted backer of Jones and his claims. His attitude, although highly complex, revolved from 1882 until around 1887 around two consistent stances. The first was an unambivalent support for a coal partnership. The second was a deliberately opaque position regarding Jones’ land lease claims, which he neither clearly supported nor publicly condemned. While some wanted to stop any coal deal because of Jones’ land claims, Wetere did not clearly contradict the land claims because of the possibility of a coal deal.

As discussed above, Wetere was one of the few local Maori who realised from July 1882 that Jones had in his possession a document asserting to be a 56-year exclusive land lease. According to Wetere’s later account, he believed that he would be able to prevent and control Jones’ still theoretical claims. This was not a fanciful position, as Jones’ deed was not yet legally recognised, while Wetere and local Maori still clearly retained more political power than the speculator, and had apparently secured a powerful ally in the Government.

Wetere’s preference was therefore to try to control a highly complicated situation, seeking to avoid open conflict either with Jones or with the many Maori who opposed the speculator. Wetere’s confidence that this could be achieved was sometimes shaken. He apparently almost broke with Jones around July 1883, at the time when the speculator’s land aspirations began to cause enormous Maori resentment, including from Wahanui. Nevertheless, by September 1883, Wetere had decided not to abandon Jones, or more precisely, the nascent coal partnership.220 This determination was no doubt buttressed by Jones and Grace stepping up their assurances that their coal enterprise would soon bring real benefits to local hapu.221 Hone Pumipi Kauparera was another local chief who refused to abandon the coal deal with Jones.

This uneasy status quo could be maintained while Jones made no obvious moves to assert control over the land, or to bring Europeans in to mine the coal. However, in December 1883, Jones and Wetere were in Auckland seeking investors and there were reports that ‘[g]reat inquiry is being made for shares in the proposed Company’.222

By February 1884, Jones had received enough commercial backing to begin small-scale mining with a handful of European miners on the south bank of the Mokau River and believed he may soon secure larger investment. Work had been going on for a few weeks and a few tons of coal had been extracted before news reached Heremia in

220 Grace to Te Wetere, 26 Sep 1883, letter in Maori with English translation, WH Grace Letterbook 1880-1892, MSY-4506, pp500-501 221 Ibid 222 ‘Mokau Coal’, Taranaki Herald, 18 Dec 1883, p2


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Totoro in early March.223 Heremia announced he ‘objected to that altogether, as the deed had not been drawn up as he intended it to be drawn’.224 With five others, including his nephew Te Huia Te Rira, Heremia canoed down to the mine and threw the extracted coal in the river. They then escorted the European miners, plus ‘bag and baggage’ as newspaper reports put it, to the Mokau River mouth where they were put on the first steamer back to Auckland.225

Within a week, the miners had returned to Mokau and to work. However, newspaper claims that Wetere had mediated an amicable settlement of the dispute were soon disproved.226 It would seem that the mining relied on the protection of coastal Mokau supporters of the coal enterprise. In late March, when they were not present, upper Mokau hapu from Totoro and Makauiti, led by Heremia, again deposited the coal into the river and instructed the miners to leave.227 In an effort to protect the initiative, Wetere and others decided that some Mokau Maori would live full-time at the mine to prevent further obstruction while Jones and Wetere requested Government assistance.228

The Government continued to stay aloof from these events, and in April six of Jones’ backers arrived in Mokau to find an unsettled situation. They were reportedly ‘very much disappointed’ to hear that almost all of the coal extracted lay at the bottom of the river. Although they were able to sneak out a few tons of coal ‘before [Heremia] Te Aria should get to know of it’, such a situation was unlikely to attract further investment.229 By mid-1884, Jones’ mining efforts were at a standstill. They could not be revived, even after the death in October 1884 of Heremia, one of Jones’ most powerful opponents.230 The key reason for Jones’ complete failure to develop the coal trade – even before considering the difficulties of transport – was Jones’ attempt to go beyond his agreement with local Maori, and claim a land lease. Maori resistance made his efforts to mine the land impossible, and scared off the investment that coal initiatives relied upon.

Maori opposition to land transactions in general, and to Jones in particular, also made it impossible for Jones to complete his unfinished ‘land lease’. Only around 80 of the 100 registered owners of Mokau Mohakatino had signed the hotly disputed ‘land lease’ in 1882. For several years, Jones tried and completely failed to convince any of the resisters to change their minds, despite hiring Grace to seek out signatures. Many of those who had not signed the original document were considered followers of Te

223 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, p9 224 Ibid, p19 225 Ibid, pp9, 19, 22; Barr, p19; ‘Urenui’, Taranaki Herald, 6 Mar 1884, p2 226 ‘Urenui’, Taranaki Herald, 14 Mar 1884, p2 227 ‘Terrible Railway Accident’, Taranaki Herald, 3 Apr 1884, p2 228 Ibid; Summaries of correspondence from 3 Mar 1884, NO 84/805, 4 Mar 1884, NO 84/805 and 29 Mar 1884, NO 84/1042 in LE 1, Box 235* 1885/9, Papers Attached to Public Petitions Committee into Joshua Jones Petition 17/1885 229 ‘Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 14 Apr 1884, p2 230 ‘Sudden Death of a Mokau Chief’, Taranaki Herald, 30 Oct 1884, p2


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Whiti and hostile to any deals with Pakeha.231 Having refused to agree to what most Maori believed was a limited coal arrangement, they were even less likely to sign what had been revealed to be a cynical attempt to gain land. Grace’s assistant, Alex Campbell, found this out in November 1882. He was prevented from going inland to seek support for the lease due to warnings of armed men angry about recent European incursions. By November 1882, this threat had receded and Campbell was able to travel inland but he was unable to secure any signatures.232

Attempts by Jones and Grace to buy or lease the Mohakatino Parininihi block and land north of the Mokau River also proved complete failures.233 Jones and Grace hoped to exploit internal tensions to break the boycott on land sales. In September 1882, Grace advised Jones that they should keep hidden their desire to buy land but be ready to strike when the opportunity arose. Grace believed that with tension over the recent Native Land Court hearing, and with Tawhiao and the King Movement asserting their rights over Mokau, it was likely that Rewi and Wetere would sell ‘to spite the Waikato.’ Jones and Grace could then buy the land at cheap prices and avoid allegations that they had tricked local Maori into sales. If:

jealousies increase it will suit us all as the Natives will then sell for a low price and at [the] same time will not prejudice ourselves in eyes of Mokau Natives. That is they cannot turn on us and say we were the cause of their selling and say we are land sharks.234

This hope was frustrated. Wetere and other local Maori leaders refused to consider any new land deals with Jones, or to sell land in general. With his designs on the wider Mokau area thwarted, Jones focused on seeking the elusive signatures for his original ‘land lease’ of Mokau Mohakatino. However, by June 1884, these efforts also had to be abandoned, given the attitude of local Maori towards Jones.235 Jones would subsequently argue that later Government restrictions on private land transactions, namely the Native Lands Alienation Restriction Act 1884 and the Native Land Administration Act 1886 prevented him from completing the transactions, and demanded that the Crown grant him land, legislative assistance and money in compensation.236 Despite the sympathetic response by Government officials, this was a

231 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, pp13-14 232 Grace to Jones, 5 Nov 1882, p323 and Grace to Jones, 10 Dec 1882, p343, WH Grace Letterbook 1880-1892, MSY-4506 233 The efforts to buy or lease land north of Mokau are a little unclear, but see i.e. Grace to Jones, 3 Oct 1884, p748 and Grace to Jones, 16 Nov 1884, p763, WH Grace Letterbook 1880-1892, MSY-4506, which indicate that Grace was approached by Taranaki coal interests to assist in their land buying attempts but wanted to offer his services first to Jones. 234 Grace to Jones, 11 Sep 1882, p285, WH Grace Letterbook 1880-1892, MSY-4506 235 Grace to Jones, 5 Jun 1884, p653, WH Grace Letterbook 1880-1892, MSY-4506, and AJHR, 1888, G-4C, p15 236 I.e. AJHR, 1888, G-4C, p3. The Native Lands Alienation Restriction Act 1884 effectively introduced pre-emption into the Rohe Potae and made illegal any future private transactions, although the status of earlier private transactions under the Act was unclear. The Native Lands Administration Act 1886 made illegal any direct private transactions, all such transactions needing to be carried out through Government set-up boards.


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spurious assertion. It was local Maori who stopped Jones from gaining control over land in Mokau. It was to be the Government that would override the wishes of local Maori, and secure land for Jones.

Tension with other Europeans over land rights

Before examining in detail how this came about, it is instructive to quickly discuss the interaction of Mokau Maori with other settlers. This interaction suggests that a wider pattern was emerging during this period. Europeans invited into the area for business arrangements were asserting control over land, leading to disputes with local Maori. The Pakeha often based their land claims on written documents or leases, of questionable legal standing, the power and meaning of which Maori understood in different ways. All this tension and uncertainty elevated the importance of the Crown both in mediating these disputes and, as time went on, ruling on these land claims.

One example involves Thomas Poole, who came to Mokau in 1882. Apparently with the permission of Hone Pumipi Kauparera, he lived near the south bank of the Mokau River, opening a store and involving himself with trade. Problems arose when he claimed to have leased the land and built a wharf near the river mouth for the use of visiting trading boats. Epiha, Te Oro (or Te Ora) Watihi, Takirau and Wetini protested against this, arguing that Poole had no right to build a wharf without their consent and demanding that he pay for the use of it. The dispute continued even after long discussions and negotiations, which apparently included Wahanui. In August 1884, the wharf was damaged, in an effort, according to Epiha, ‘to make Poole leave the Mokau’. Poole indeed left the area, although not before bringing a case against Maori for damages. Local Maori told the district court in New Plymouth that they caused the damage, but argued that they had the right to do so because Poole had no legitimate claim over the land. Despite what newspapers described as Epiha’s long statement over ‘extraneous matters about rights of land and other Maori intricacies’, the Court stated that Epiha, Te Oro and Wetini should not have acted unilaterally but rather should have allowed the Crown to rule over land matters in the area. Judgment and costs of almost £50 were levelled against them, leading to apparently unsuccessful petitions by local Maori for a Government inquiry into the matter.237 Around the same time, there was conflict surrounding John Shore’s claim to have leased land on the south side of the Mokau River resulting in Te Oro Watihi and others running his cattle off the land. Shore took the hint, moving north of the Mokau River, although he also brought the matter before the district court.238

Particularly complex and contested was the issue of what rights rested with coal companies. Apart from Jones’ efforts on the south bank of the Mokau River, there were negotiations involving the north bank. Given the potential financial benefit of these coal deals, there was a particular incentive and pressure for local Maori to sign

237 Jamie Mitchell, ‘King Country Petitions Document Bank’, commissioned by Crown Forestry Rental Trust, January 2008, (Wai 898, A9), pp58-121 and ‘Police Court’, Taranaki Herald, 1 Oct 1884, p2 238 ‘District Court’, Taranaki Herald, 20 Mar 1884, p2 and AJHR, 1888, G-4C, p10


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documents. George Stockman, the dual-descent interpreter and land agent, was the catalyst for these negotiations, acting on his own behalf and for a number of European businessmen.239 In late 1881, Stockman claimed to have received permission from Heremia to mine for coal on ‘all the north part of the Mokau District’.240 Around the same time, Stockman signed an agreement with Mare Kura and seven others, including Wetere, Takirau, Te Oro, Epiha and Wetini. This gave him the rights for 99 years to enter their lands north of the Mokau River and prospect and mine for coal and use timber. In return, Stockman and his associates would pay them one-fifth of the proceeds. This was a preliminary arrangement only, which would apparently only take effect when the lands had passed before the Native Land Court.241

In the next two years, Stockman involved himself in some tangled dealings with creditors, prospective partners and associates involving his claimed ‘rights’ to Mokau land and coal. By 1884, some local Maori leaders were ready to push forward with mining efforts in partnership with Pakeha. They entered into arrangements which would lead to the founding of two separate coal mining operations. In December 1884, a number of ‘influential’ Mokau Maori travelled to New Plymouth for talks with local businessmen, who had shown interest in forming what would become the Mokau Coal Company.242 In February 1885, Te Huia, Wetere and 19 others signed an agreement with the businessmen. At the same time, Te Huia and seven others signed a separate arrangement with George Stockman, in a deal witnessed by Wetere.243

Presumably because of their problems with Jones, Maori made sure that these documents were explicitly and unmistakably not land leases. Rather, the documents suggested a joint enterprise that would provide local Maori with considerable ongoing income and control. They were described in European newspapers as ‘a deed of partnership ... to develop the Mokau coal mines’.244 Stockman’s group on the one hand, and the Mokau Coal Company on the other, would be allowed, for 20 years in one case and 25 in the other, to mine separate areas north of the Mokau River. They would extract and then buy the coal from the Maori owners for four shillings per ton. Each mining group was required to purchase at least 2000 tons of coal per annum. This meant that local Maori would receive yearly income of at least £800 from the two operations. If the coal companies were unable to extract and buy the required amount, they were contractually obliged to pay substantial compensation to local Maori.

239 See chapter on mining and quarrying in Philip Cleaver, ‘Maori and the Forestry, Mining, Fishing and Tourism Industries of the Rohe Potae Inquiry District, 1880-2000’, report commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal, February 2011 (Wai 898, #A25). For more on these lands see also Barr, Stokes, ‘Report of Natives Affairs Committee on the Petition of Arthur Owen’, AJHR, 1888, I-3A and ‘Report of the Native Affairs Committee on the Petition of the Mokau Coal Company and Another’, AJHR, 1888, I-3B 240 AJHR, 1888, I-3B, p1 241 Ibid, p16 242 Taranaki Herald, 23 Dec 1884, p2 243 See Cleaver on mining and quarrying, and ‘Report on Coal Mines, Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 5 September 1885, p2 244 Taranaki Herald, 23 Dec 1884, p2


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The deeds also stipulated various methods by which local Maori could monitor the situation. The mining groups were able to use timber which was needed for mining purposes, provided that they then re-laid any cleared areas with grass. They were also required to provide infrastructure to facilitate the coal trade, such as a jetty. Furthermore, the Maori owners could at any time instruct the miners to extract, for a set price, coal that Maori would be able to use for their own purposes.245

There were doubtless other expectations not included in the written contracts, including employment opportunities for local Maori. Mokau chiefs saw it as the start of an ongoing relationship, as indicated by the fact that they regularly requested and received small informal payments of money, clothes, flour and other goods from the mining interests.246 Wetere became a shareholder in the Mokau Coal Company.247

The agreements therefore had a considerable amount in common with the type of arrangement local Maori believed they were entering into with Jones. However, as with Jones, the coal deals north of the Mokau River did not prove to be the avenue for the hoped-for development and prosperity. There were considerable impediments to coal mining in the area, most notably the difficulties of transportation. There was something of a pattern in Mokau of European businessmen who claimed to possess access to considerable funds but who were found on closer inquiry to be bankrupts and, in the broader sense of the word, speculators.

Stockman’s mine, as it was known, was about 29 miles up the Mokau River on what would become the Mangapapa block. It proved to be a short-lived initiative. Rather than buying from Maori the expected 2000 tons of coal a year, less than 100 tons were extracted before the mine closed due to financial difficulties.248 The Maryville Mine, a couple of miles downriver from Stockman’s mine, began more successfully. The Mokau Coal Company’s shareholders included some men with powerful political links, including HR Richmond and the Taranaki politician and fervent promoter of the economic potential of Mokau, EM Smith.249 They hired steamers and employed mine managers and miners. By August 1885, they were reportedly extracting 50 tons of coal per week without difficulty. The directors claimed that ‘more has been achieved with a small outlay than is known in the annals of coal mining’.250

Local Maori were increasingly pressured to offer the company and various other mining and timber interests in the area legally recognisable rights in the area. The pressure to use the Native Land Court and to enter into land leases increased. It is beyond the scope of this report to investigate closely the land negotiations and complex legal dealings involving what would be the Mangapapa, Mangoira and Mangaawakino blocks.

245 AJHR, 1888, I-3B, pp14-16 246 AJHR, I888, I-3A, p11 247 AJHR, 1888, I-3B, p6 248 See Cleaver chapter on mining and quarrying 249 Parliamentary, Taranaki Herald, 7 Sep 1885, p2 250 Taranaki Herald, 7 Aug 1885, p2


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However, it would seem that the relationship with the Mokau Coal Company was not as harmonious or profitable as local Maori had hoped and expected. Newspaper reports of the economic potential of coal in Mokau were increasingly punctuated by discussion on the desperate need for far greater government and private investment. By 1888, the Mokau Coal Company was extracting 500 tons per annum, a ‘respectable figure’ for a small and ‘grossly undercapitalised’ company, but far short of what had been expected and contractually required.251 The company had, by 1888, invested a total of around £1000 in the enterprise, far short of what was required for significant development.252 Consequently local Maori reaped few economic benefits from the mine. According to the company, it had by 1888 paid a total of only £100 to Maori.253 Moreover, there is evidence of some other problems, including suggestions that the apparently few Maori who worked in the mine did not receive the required payment for their labours.254

It should also be noted that, by July 1887, a number of competing Pakeha were attempting to secure land rights over the Mangapapa block. Te Huia and some others protested that they were the victims of fraud and misleading practice after signing a lease with Nevil Walker for the Mangapapa block.255 The Mokau Coal Company also claimed to have leased Mangapapa, although no local Maori agreed to support their claims during a 1888 Native Affairs Committee hearing into the land. One of the company’s shareholders explained this lack of Maori support as stemming from a change in attitude by Wetere:

The Natives are very much influenced by their chief, and the chief Wetere, who was our friend for a time, and to whom we paid money in the hope of getting us a lease, has used his influence against us latterly.256

8.4 Ignoring the Compact - Government Backing of Joshua Jones, 1885 to 1888

By well before 1885, it was clear that there were major barriers to any legal recognition of Jones’ claims to a land lease. Apart from the overwhelming Maori opposition, there were numerous legal, political and, it could be said, ethical difficulties to be overcome if Jones was to be granted a lease. Yet by 1888, Jones had secured recognition of an exclusive 56-year lease to much of Mokau Mohakatino no 1.

This came about because of a quite extraordinary level of government support for the speculator, combined with an equally apparent rejection of the wishes and protests of local hapu and leaders. Government policy towards Mokau and towards Jones changed noticeably. Driven by a need to secure permission for the main trunk railway, Government officials sought to avoid provoking Maori resentment over Mokau. John

251 Barr, p34 252 AJHR, 1888, I-3B, p12 253 Ibid 254 ‘Resident Magistrate’s Court’, Taranaki Herald, 20 Jul 1887, p2 255 AJHR, 1888, I-3B, p20 256 AJHR, 1888, I-3B, p6


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Bryce in particular was sceptical about the political benefits of supporting Jones, and showed no interest in backing his land claims.

However, as the Government became increasingly confident that it would indeed succeed in opening up the aukati, concern over the interests and attitudes of Mokau Maori diminished. From 1885, John Ballance, Bryce’s successor as Native Minister, and other Government officials, actively endorsed and assisted Jones’ land ambitions. They sought to reward a pioneer who had helped create the chance for the colonisation of the region. But more importantly still, a land lease in Mokau was seen as a step towards wider European dominance in a region where, despite the Crown’s diplomatic gains, nearly all land remained under the practical and legal control of Te Rohe Potae Maori.

Some politicians and officials were uneasy about the validity of Jones’ claims. More still wondered whether it would not be more advantageous to have the Crown, and not a private speculator, in control of coal-rich land. However, these concerns, and the protests of local Maori, were increasingly overshadowed by the wider desire of placing Europeans on Maori land in Te Rohe Potae. They were also overcome by the ferocious lobbying efforts of Jones himself. One European speculator, with a highly questionable reputation, was able to wield more power and influence among the Government than the chiefs and hapu of Mokau.

Overall, this period must be seen as delivering a major, perhaps even fatal blow to the hopes of local Maori for a genuine partnership with the Crown. Mokau Maori, through their own actions, and as part of the hapu and iwi of Te Rohe Potae in general, believed they had created a strong relationship with the Government based around equality, fairness and recognition of their authority. Increasingly, they looked towards the Government, and towards the law, to hear their protest over Jones and to protect their land. The Government’s refusal to listen to these calls was an early and telling indication that it did not see itself bound in Mokau by what many Maori thought was a sacred compact.

The 1885 Public Petitions Committee hearing

The Native Land Alienation Restriction Act 1884 effectively introduced pre-emption over the entire region, including Mokau. All private purchasing or leasing was from this point deemed illegal. The impetus behind the Act seems to have been the Government’s desire to dominate land purchasing in the wider region, given the increasing likelihood of the main trunk railway line being built.257

As we have seen, with or without such legislation, Jones’ attempts to gain land in Mokau had reached an impasse due to Maori opposition. Nevertheless, with the passing of this Act, the already murky legal status of Jones’ earlier negotiations was

257 Leanne Boulton, ‘Land Alienation in the Rohe Potae Inquiry District, 1889-1908: An Overview’ (henceforth referred to as ‘Land Alienation in the Rohe Potae’), report commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal for the Rohe Potae Inquiry (Wai 898), November 2010 draft, pp52-57


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rendered more unclear still, while any attempts by Jones to gain new signatures for his land lease was seemingly rendered illegal. The new Native Minister John Ballance, who was the architect of the Act, stated it was passed without awareness or consideration of how it may affect Jones’ individual situation.258 However, the Act provided Jones with an opportunity to argue that it was the Government, not local Maori, that was standing in the way of his land lease. His argument that the Government had acted prejudicially against him would be dubious in the extreme. But more important was Jones’ strategic appreciation that given Maori and legal impediments, his only hope of securing legal control of Mokau Mohakatino no 1 was to enlist Government support.

In 1885, Jones petitioned Parliament calling for an inquiry. He argued that his land acquisition efforts in Mokau were a crucial contribution to the colony and to the opening up of the aukati. According to his petition, he had come to Mokau in 1876 at great risk to his life but had succeeded in securing peace between the Government and Mokau Maori. In 1879, then Native Minister Sheehan had promised that the Government would aid his land negotiations ‘in consideration of his opening up this hostile country to trade and commerce’.259

According to Jones, this promise had ‘since been broken and violated in a most unrighteous manner’.260 Jones made various, at times bizarre allegations against the Government. The most serious was his claim that Bryce had deliberately undermined his efforts to gain a land lease, in particular through preventing the survey of the Poutama blocks in 1882. He also claimed that the recent Native Land Alienation Restriction Act 1884 had in effect ‘completely confiscated the interests acquired by him’ and wasted the large amounts of money he had spent pursuing this lease.261 Jones, besides seeking considerable financial compensation, put forward a number of demands, including that laws be enacted allowing him to complete his negotiations, and that the legal maximum of 21 years for lease of Maori land be lifted in his case to 56 years.262

In July 1885, Parliament’s Public Petitions Committee inquired into Jones’ claim. Their investigations and recommendations were a major indication that Jones’ almost manic persistence in pressing his land claims was finding fertile ground among Pakeha politicians. In the period leading up to the hearing, Jones based himself in Wellington and frequented Parliament, gaining a reputation as perhaps the most ‘indefatigable lobbyist’ in the colony.263 Although some observers regarded him as a ‘bore’ and crank, he struck a deep chord with politicians in his arguments that his land efforts should be

258 Evidence of John Ballance, no date given, pp1-3 in LE 1, Box 235* 1885/9, Papers Attached to Public Petitions Committee into Joshua Jones Petition 17/1885 259 Petition of Joshua Jones, no date given, pp1-2, in LE 1, Box 235* 1885/9, Papers Attached to Public Petitions Committee into Joshua Jones Petition 17/1885 260 Ibid, p3 261 Report of Public Petitions Committee, AJHR, 1885, I-1, p4, petition no 17 262 See for instance evidence of John Bryce, 15 Jul 1885, pp1-2, in LE 1, Box 235* 1885/9, Papers Attached to Public Petitions Committee into Joshua Jones Petition 17/1885 [check reference] 263 ‘Parliamentary’, Taranaki Herald, 30 Jul 1885, p2


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supported as a part of an opening up the aukati.264

The evidence given by the former and current Native Ministers was a powerful testimony to the change in Government policy towards Mokau. Bryce told the committee that he had a long history of contact with Jones, who he regarded as dangerously intemperate and prone to wild allegation.265 However, he emphasised that he had never deliberately interfered with Jones’ attempts at a lease. While Native Minister, he had prevented the survey of the Poutama blocks out of wider strategic concerns and through fear that provoking Maori opposition would disrupt the Government’s wider diplomatic efforts. Jones’ land negotiations had not, he told the committee, been a factor in his deliberations and, overall, he had sought to neither actively support nor impede Jones’ lease claims.266

While Bryce portrayed himself as neutral about Jones, he was also uninterested in allegations by local Maori of fraud and sharp practice. Bryce acknowledged that as Native Minister he had received considerable complaints from Maori and from Major Messenger refuting Jones’ claims to a land lease. However, Bryce stated that he had largely ignored these complaints. His claim of indifference is believable, given that his evidence to the committee revealed a lack of understanding over the nature of Maori complaints. At the core of Bryce’s testimony was his repeated position that it was not the Native Minister’s job to intervene in private transactions between Maori and European. These were a matter for the law to decide.267

However, Ballance advocated a decidedly different tack. His evidence to the committee showed a clear preference for Government assistance and acceptance of Jones’ claims to a land lease. Particularly important was Ballance’s belief that the Government had a general obligation to assist Jones’ land efforts due to his contribution towards ‘opening up the aukati’. The committee focused considerable attention on Sheehan’s letter to Jones in 1879 which stated that the Government would not obstruct his land efforts. As we have discussed, this letter was rather vague. However, the committee and the witnesses interpreted it as a guarantee of active assistance. As the committee chairman Richard Turnbull understood it, Sheehan had promised that the Government ‘would facilitate’ Jones obtaining land.268

It was Ballance’s opinion that the Government must, as much as was legally possible, seek to fulfil Sheehan’s promise. In contrast, Bryce justified to the committee his lack of active support for Jones on the basis that Sheehan’s informal letter was ‘[n]ot at all’ binding on later administrations.269 However, the current Native Minister told the committee that the letter had considerable ‘importance’ and that his Government had

264 ‘Political Gossip in Wellington’, Taranaki Herald, 26 Jun 1885, p2 265 Evidence of John Bryce, 15 Jul 1885, pp7, 14 in LE 1, Box 235* 1885/9, Papers Attached to Public Petitions Committee into Joshua Jones Petition 17/1885 266 Ibid, evidence of Bryce 267 Ibid, evidence of Bryce, i.e., pp1- 4, 15 268 Ibid, evidence of Bryce, 15 Jul 1885, pp1-2, 269 Ibid


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an obligation to assist Jones’ land claims ‘providing there is nothing done contrary to law’.270 According to Ballance, Sheehan’s letter:

contains a promise, the promise was not an improper one in itself, and that it is to a certain extent binding on any succeeding government.271

Ballance’s evidence left the clear impression that he believed active assistance for Jones would not be contrary to the law, or unethical. He told the committee that he would be happy if legislation was passed to remove Jones from the problems caused by the Native Land Alienation Restriction Act. Ballance explained that he had not been aware, when drafting this legislation that it may hinder Jones’ efforts to obtain land. Indeed, Ballance explained that the intention of the Act was not to impede the claims of individual Pakeha who had operated in the Rohe Potae before the legislation as long as they asserted ‘any rights whatever – either legal rights or other rights well founded’.272

Ballance informed the committee that Jones had a stronger case to be granted legal rights to land than many successful applicants under the previous Government. When Jones began his land dealings, these were not illegal at the time. His only problem, in the view of the Native Minister, had been his inability to gain the signatures of all the owners. Currently, the Native Land Court had no power to cut out the shares of those Maori who had sold or leased and grant them to the individual purchaser. Ballance was planning to introduce legislation to provide a remedy for Jones and other private buyers in a similar position. In the meantime, he told the Committee, he had no objection to Jones being granted the right to complete the transaction.273 Ballance emphasised that the Government would follow the law in its dealings with Jones. Nonetheless, he suggested a degree of flexibility was in order to assist Jones with his land claims. He told the committee that any:

merely technical error of fault should not be allowed to stand in his way. So long as he has virtually complied with the law, his claim should be received.274

Ballance’s testimony exhibited little understanding or acceptance of complaints by local Maori against Jones’ claims to a lease. He failed to deal with the crucial evidence showing that many Maori, and the independent Pakeha witness, did not believe the original agreement to be a land lease at all. Instead, he linked the case in Mokau to what he believed was a general pattern of unacceptable Maori attempts to repudiate land transactions that they had initially fully accepted. Ballance accepted that there could be a case for not granting a lease if it had not received support, and indeed had been carried out despite the opposition of some of the principal owners and chiefs.

270 Ibid, evidence of Ballance, p5 271 Ibid 272 Ibid, evidence of Ballance, pp1-2 273 Ibid, evidence of Ballance, pp1-11 274 Ibid, evidence of Ballance, p6-7


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This case struck him as somewhat different:

my opinion is that if the Natives had the right to give a lease – that is the legal right – I do not think they had the right to undo what they had done. That would be repudiation.275

The committee informed the Native Minister that local Maori had held meetings to ‘cancel the lease’. Ballance replied:

I would not regard that as undoing what they had done if what they had done was legal. Some chief of influence might say you should not have done this thing without my consent and he would be quite ready to repudiate. This sort of thing is done every day.276

Ballance’s evidence may well have been highly influential in the committee’s eventual recommendations for Government assistance to Jones. Another, crucial factor was that the committee did not seek testimony from Mokau Maori. Despite this lack of direct Maori input, it cannot be said that the committee was unaware of the long history of complaint and protest over Jones’ claims. It examined a large amount of correspondence to the Government from local Maori and from independent witnesses voicing such protests.

However, it would seem that the committee did not inquire into these Maori protests deeply, or take them particularly seriously. Jones, in his evidence, blithely claimed that there was no opposition to his land lease.277 The committee responded by asking him to comment on various pieces of evidence that clearly suggested protest and resistance. Jones quickly denied these accusations, often in implausible or simplistic ways. However, judging by the written record, the committee was happy not to pursue matters further.

This pattern was shown when the committee asked Jones about claims by local Maori that the arrangement was for coal and minerals only, and not a land lease. Jones quickly dismissed this key issue without offering any real evidence or explanation. The matter was allowed to rest. Similarly, Messenger’s report to the Government that he believed the agreement was for coal was briefly raised and quickly dealt with. Jones’ lawyer simply denied it, arguing that Messenger understood that the arrangement was for a land lease.278 The committee also asked about letters of protest written by Wahanui and Heremia. Jones suggested that these were caused by meddling by a Pakeha, RS Thompson, and should not be taken seriously.279 The member for Cheviot, JD Lance, stated that the ‘Natives appear to have resisted your residence among them: they threw your coals away’. Asked why, Jones suggested this must have been the work

275 Ibid, evidence of Ballance, pp8-9 276 Ibid 277 Evidence of Joshua Jones, p10 in LE 1, Box 235* 1885/9, Papers Attached to Public Petitions Committee into Joshua Jones Petition 17/1885 278 Ibid, p18 279 Ibid, p10


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of his competitor, George Stockman.280

The committee’s failure to inquire more deeply into these issues, or to hear evidence from local Maori, would later be criticised by Maori Members of Parliament.281 This criticism angered the committee chairman, R Turnbull. It was, he explained, so clearly an issue of a fair land lease that Maori evidence was superfluous:

It was a case which could be understood by anyone who understood title and fair dealing.282

Guided by this belief, the Public Petitions Committee on 17 July 1885 recommended that the Government take legislative action to remove ‘any prejudicial effect’ which the Native Land Alienation Restriction Act had on Jones’ rights to the Mokau Mohakatino block. This rather limited statement was intended, and was indeed understood to imply a more general support for Jones and his land lease claims. As Ballance told Parliament:

Mr. Jones did not illegally attempt to acquire the land. The lease he had from the Natives was a perfectly legal lease – it was signed after the land had gone through the Court. This matter has been carefully inquired into by the Public Petitions Committee ... and I am told that the[y] ... unanimously came to the conclusion that Mr. Jones had an equitable claim to the lease of this land.283

The Taranaki Herald likewise saw the recommendation as signalling the acceptance of Jones’ land lease claims. The committee had carried out an ‘exhaustive’ inquiry and were unanimous that Jones ‘dealings had been straightforward and honourable, and alike conducive to the interests of the natives and the colony’.284

However, the practical result of the committee was somewhat more limited. To Jones’ frustration, he was not offered financial compensation for any Government impediment to his land dealings. Instead, Ballance and the Government had legislation passed to aid Jones to complete his lease. As Jones requested, the land he was interested in was exempted from the restrictions on private land transactions within the Rohe Potae, so that he could complete what the legislation described as a ‘lease of land’. Judging by the somewhat unclear wording of the legislation, only Jones had the right to lease this land. Moreover, he was exempted from the maximum period for a land lease from Maori, and could seek a 56-year lease.285

The Special Powers and Contracts Act 1885 gave Jones these rights over a far larger area than incorporated in the 1882 arrangement between him and local Maori. As we

280 Ibid, p18 281 NZPD, vol 60, May 10 to Jun 12 1888, pp327-328 282 Ibid, p330 283 NZPD, vol 53, 12 Aug to 22 Sep 1885, p840 284 ‘Political Gossip in Wellington’, Taranaki Herald, 6 Aug 1885, p2 285 Special Powers and Contracts Act, 1885


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have discussed, Jones had sought an area of land that stretched from the opening of the Mokau River to a mineral spring on the Totoro, and from there running in a straight line down to the source of the Mohakatino River, before running along that river to the sea. The original application to the Court in 1882 had specified these as the boundaries of the Mokau Mohakatino block. However, during the 1882 negotiations local Maori had categorically refused to grant Jones rights of any sort further inland than Mangapohue. Jones, as he himself admitted, had been forced to agree to this and the document had been altered to reflect these demands. The Government’s legislation, through ignorance of this basic and crucial fact, or perhaps through a desire to assist the speculator, had created the possibility of Jones securing the whole of the area.

Moreover, the Act gave Jones the right to pursue a lease over land that was still under Maori customary title. In 1882, the Court had, acting on the demands of Rewi and Wetere, exempted from the Mokau Mohakatino no 1 block a 500-acre area of particularly valuable land near the river opening. This was land that the Government wanted for a township and Jones coveted for himself, but which local Maori had insisted must remain under their customary control. Jones demanded to the Public Petitions Committee that it be included in the area over which he would have a right to lease.286 The legislation reflected that demand.287

This legislation was passed without apparent consultation with local Maori. Indeed, it is doubtful whether local Maori knew of this legal support for a lease that they had consistently opposed. They certainly did not have an opportunity to shape the legislation or comment on it before it became law. The legislation was introduced, at the very end of 1885 session of Parliament, as part of the Special Powers and Contracts Act 1885. This blanket Act was used by the Government to quickly and quietly make law relating to a large amount of separate issues.

The Government’s tactics did not please John Bryce. He complained to Parliament that the Government had slipped into this Act a number of different and important pieces of law that required more open and detailed consideration, singling out the Jones’ legislation as a potent example of this. Bryce’s concern was not over whether this legislation breached the rights of the Maori land owners. Rather, Bryce was concerned that the Government was, without due consideration, offering support to private land transactions of questionable legality.288

Despite these complaints, the Act was passed without sustained discussion of the rights and attitudes of local Maori. The legislation therefore stands as a good example of how, despite the expectations of good faith and a lasting compact, local Maori were highly vulnerable to political and legal actions taken without consideration, and in

286 Evidence of John Bryce, 15 Jul 1885, pp16-19 in LE 1, Box 235* 1885/9, Papers Attached to Public Petitions Committee into Joshua Jones Petition 17/1885 287 Special Powers and Contracts Act, 1885 288 NZPD, vol 53, 12 Aug to 22 Sep 1885, p835


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direct defiance, of their wishes. The threat that the political and legal system posed to their land and to their society would increase further in the coming years.

Maori demands to control surveying

Nevertheless, the Special Powers and Contracts Act did not solve Jones’ essential problem – the overwhelming and growing hostility of local Maori towards his claims of a land lease. Nor did it conquer his related inability to have a survey made of Mokau Mohakatino no 1. An officially accepted survey was a prerequisite for Jones being granted legal title over the block. For Jones, that was the sole point of a survey. He wanted Crown title over the land to be officially granted to the Maori owners so that the lease could then be legally granted, he hoped, to himself. Jones was therefore determined that the surveyed block be as large as possible, and in particular reflect his ambitions to acquire all the land between the Mokau and Mohakatino Rivers, with Totoro marking the eastern boundary.

The attitude of Maori towards a survey in the Mokau area was somewhat different and decidedly more complex. As we have seen, both local and wider chiefs had long been interested in surveys as a way of asserting and defining their legal rights over the land. However, they insisted that any survey be under their control and for purposes they supported. For this reason, any surveys that were believed to be connected with Jones’ land ambitions, or used Totoro as an eastern border, were liable to obstruction and opposition.

In the 1880s, a third party was central to the situation in Mokau. The Government had its own changing reasons for wanting a survey of the Mokau Mohakatino block. By 1885, it saw the survey of the block as one element in the far larger ambition of placing the Native Land Court system over the entire Te Rohe Potae area. As we have discussed, the Government wanted to define the boundary between the Poutama blocks that had gone before the Court in 1882, and the rest of the district which the Crown hoped would soon go before the Court. Previous surveying efforts in Mokau had run into resistance and complications for a number of reasons, including hostility to Jones’ lease.289 In November 1885, Government surveyor HM Skeet launched another attempt. He was instructed to survey the eastern boundary of the Mokau Mohakatino block, using the original 1882 Native Land Court description that its starting point would be a mineral spring near Totoro on the Mokau River. However, this definition corresponded with Jones’ own agenda, which added to Maori suspicion that the survey may be an attempt to wrestle Maori control over the land and place it with Jones.290

Skeet was frequently confronted by local Maori, some of whom he reported were ‘very excited’ in their hostility towards Jones, who stated that ‘if the survey was for the

289 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, p27 290 Note that the Government planned not to cut the line due south from Totoro to the source of the Mohakatino river as Jones wanted. Rather, for practical reasons, it sought to take a winding route from Totoro, finishing some miles east of the source of Mohakatino River. AJHR, 1888, G-4C, pp27, 29-30


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purpose of the lease they would have nothing to do with it’.291 He tried to overcome these suspicions by repeatedly promising and explaining that that the survey ‘had nothing to do with Jones’s lease’.292 He also hoped to overcome suspicion through the assistance and support of Wetere. The chief had, since 1882, shown interest in having the survey of the Poutama blocks completed so that title could be granted to local Maori. But he was also aware that surveys, and boundary issues, were a highly delicate issue among the leaders and hapu of the region.293 Wetere and a number of other Mokau chiefs therefore told Skeet that any survey would require the permission of Te Whaaro, one of the principal upper Mokau chiefs.

Skeet arrived at Miroahuiao (or Mirohuiao), where Te Whaaro was based, to find that Wahanui was visiting. Although Skeet emphasised that the survey had nothing to do with Jones, both Wahanui and Te Whaaro were uneasy about its impact and wanted to know more about its purpose. Wahanui explained to the surveyor that local Maori had made a number of complaints to Ballance and the Government about what they called Jones’ fraudulent land claims. The surveyor would need to wait until they had heard whether the Government would act on these complaints.294 Nevertheless, Skeet made some preparation to start the survey at Totoro, before being told by Te Huia that he ‘had better not, as it would cause trouble between themselves’.295

There was no move to address the Maori grievances over Jones and by December 1885, complaints from local Maori about the planned survey were being sent to the Government.296 The chief surveyor of the Taranaki district, Thomas Humphries, agreed that a survey was impossible in the current atmosphere. Humphries therefore accompanied Skeet in a new effort to secure Maori permission for a survey starting at Totoro. It would seem that they were able to convince at least some chiefs that the planned survey was not in support of Jones’ claims. Nevertheless, Maori attitudes to the survey, and to boundary issues remained complicated, especially as there was growing talk about a possible Native Land Court hearing over the wider region.

The Government surveyors were emphatically told at hui at Mokau Heads, Totoro, Ruangarahu and Mirohuiao, where Wahanui was again present, that no survey would be permitted from Totoro. However, permission was granted for a line to be cut from Kokahurangi, which was well downriver from Totoro, to, it would seem, the source of the Mohakatino River. By February 1886, this survey had been completed by Government surveyors without obstruction. In effect, this shrunk the Mokau Mohakatino block from an estimated 56,500 acres, when encompassing its 1882 Court definition, to around 34,000 acres.297

291 Ibid, p30 292 Ibid 293 Ibid, p27 294 Ibid, p30 295 Ibid 296 Ibid, p27 297 Ibid


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Figure 14: Suggested extent of Mokau Mohakatino no 1 - approximate area of February 1886 survey

It is not clear how Maori understood the purpose of this survey was or what shaped the decision to set the boundary at Kokahurangi. It is possible that local Maori were preparing for a possible Native Land Court hearing over the wider area, and were using the Government surveys to help define what boundaries they would seek. It is also possible that the agreement for a survey, but only over a smaller area, reflected a compromise between the desire of local Maori to have their legal title over the Poutama blocks confirmed, and the determination of regional leaders such as Wahanui to prevent any splitting of Mokau from the wider Te Rohe Potae.

All this is speculation. What is clear is that this survey was successfully carried out only because it received widespread Maori agreement, and reflected their boundary demands rather than the wishes of Jones. Wahanui’s involvement in these events was also further evidence that the resistance to Jones claims’ of a land lease was a joint enterprise, coming from both wider and more local leaders and hapu.

The Native Land Court hearing over the ‘Great Block’

That local Maori considered Mokau an integral part of the wider region was reiterated during the Native Land Court hearings from July 1886 over the great Aotea Te Rohe Potae block. The Court had, of course, already come to Mokau in 1882. Nevertheless, as we have discussed, through the 1883 petition the interior alliance and local Maori insisted that Mokau was part of Te Rohe Potae and would remain under collective Maori control and protection.

There continued to be attempts to maintain this collective control while recognising local independence. By 1886, as other reports will look at in detail, the interior alliance finally agreed to a great Court hearing over the lands of Te Rohe Potae. In July 1886, the Court hearing opened where a massive block was ‘claimed jointly’ by ‘five tribes or


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sections of tribes’, including Ngati Maniapoto, Ngati Hikairo, Ngati Raukawa, Ngati Tuwharetoa and Ngati Rangatahi.298

However, just a month before the hearings opened, Mokau chiefs facilitated a separate Court investigation in Waitara regarding the Mangapapa and Mangoira blocks north of the Mokau River. Wetere, Te Huia, and a number of other Mokau Maori were named the individual owners of these blocks.299 These separate hearings seem to have been viewed by local Maori not as splitting Mokau from the wider claim, but rather as reflecting local needs, including assisting the coal and timber arrangements that Maori had arranged with Europeans on these lands.300

This continuing involvement in the wider region was shown by the fact that Wetere and Te Aria, after securing legal control over this piece of Mokau, went immediately to Otorohanga to support Wahanui and others in the Court case over the larger Aotea Te Rohe Potae block. Wahanui, Wetere and the other claimants in this hearing made no clear distinction between Mokau and the wider Rohe Potae, despite their very different positions in terms of legal title. Rather, it would seem that the great block and the Mokau were seen as overlapping parts of a shared rohe. Wahanui, in explaining to the Court the total area under claim, effectively repeated the definition provided in the 1883 petition. All of the Mokau, with Waipingau as the south western boundary, was included in the great area that he was claiming. He explicitly acknowledged that it included areas that had already ‘been adjudicated upon by the Land Court, and that it is still subject to the action of the Court’.301

These ongoing links were further suggested during the main part of the Otorohanga Court hearings, where the evidence offered by Wetere, Wahanui and others never made a clear separation between Mokau and the great block. These leaders apparently believed that they had already secured Mokau. Therefore, while they mentioned Mokau in passing as part of the wider area, their focus was on explicitly arguing for their rights over disputed areas elsewhere, such as Kawhia.302 Wetere took a leading and partisan role in this discussion.303

On 20 October 1886, the Court ruled that the great majority of the Aotea Rohe Potae block would be granted to the claimants led by Wahanui and the five tribes. Only then did the Court and Maori leaders sit down to discuss where the boundary was between the Mokau Mohakatino and Aotea Rohe Potae blocks. Two of the great leaders of the wider claim, Wahanui and Taonui, and some of the major chiefs of Mokau including Wetere and Te Huia were amongst those that took part in this discussion. It would seem that the Court suggested that the boundary be drawn at Kokahurangi, in

298 Otorohanga NLC Minute Book no 2, pp55-57. Paul Husbands’ upcoming report for the Waitangi Tribunal on the Native Land Court will look at this case in more detail. 299 Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 2, pp1-18 300 Ibid, pp6, 9. 13 301 Otorohanga NLC Minute Book no 1, pp46-47 302 Otorohanga NLC Minute Book no 1, pp400-404 303 Ibid; Otorohanga NLC Minute Book no 2, pp1-23


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accordance with the survey carried out in February 1886.304 However, this was objected to by the chiefs and after discussion among themselves, it was agreed that the boundary would be drawn a further three miles down the Mokau River. The boundary would start at Mangaruahine on the Mokau River. It would go south to a place named Waipapa, then west to Matapeka on the Mohakatino River, before following that river to the sea. No objections were heard.305

Figure 15: Suggested extent of Mokau Mohakatino no 1 – October 1886 NLC agreement This did not officially establish the boundary of Mokau Mohakatino no 1, as an approved survey still needed to be carried out. Nevertheless, this decision apparently signalled an agreement between the Court and local Maori leaders that a smaller Mokau Mohakatino block, now estimated to be only 23,000 acres, would be established.306 At the same time, there was no intention that Mokau Maori would be rendered short of land or split from the wider block. Shortly afterwards, the complex process of preparing ownership lists for the great block began. Wetere was highly involved in this, producing a list of around 250 names from 17 hapu that he suggested be included on the list. At least some of the names, and hapu mentioned, including Ngati Tu, Ngati Tumae, Ngati ‘Hineuru’ and Ngati Rakei, had close links to Mokau.307

Overall, in negotiations amongst themselves and with the Court, the chiefs had agreed on a boundary between the Aotea Rohe Potae and Mokau Mohakatino blocks. Maori did not intend this boundary as a firm border which split the areas and people into distinct, unconnected entities. Rather, they sought to gain legal recognition of their rights while working together to protect and develop their lands.

What remained to be seen was whether these efforts to use and control the Native

304 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, pp27, 30 305 Otorohanga NLC Minute Book no 2, p71 306 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, p27 307 Otorohanga NLC Minute Book no 2, pp140-144


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Land Court would be successful. The entire region, including Mokau, was now legally under the Native Land system and individual tenure. The Crown and Europeans increasingly considered that the collective power of Te Rohe Potae Maori over the area had been broken. Having achieved its overall ambitions of having the railway and the Court accepted into the wider district, the Government would show an increasing confidence that they could ignore the will of Maori leaders. In Mokau, this manifested itself in increasing attempts to secure for Joshua Jones the legal control of much of the Mokau Mohakatino no 1 block.

Government attempt to ignore Maori wishes and circumvent survey requirements

Given the depth of Maori resistance, only extraordinary Government intervention would secure Jones’ legal rights to the land. The Government would offer this assistance, as shown during Jones’ efforts to provide the Native Land Court with a certificated survey of the block with Totoro as the eastern boundary. It would seem that, with its wider ambition of a Native Land Court hearing over the great block achieved, the Government turned more of its focus towards bringing about a survey that would assist and reflect Jones’ land aspirations. In seeking to help Jones, Government officials would show a startling willingness to deliberately ignore the wishes and boundaries of local Maori, and to be less than diligent in fulfilling the legal requirements and expectations of the Native Land Court system.

As we have seen, local Maori had, for their own purposes, allowed a survey with Kokahurangi as the eastern border, and had then entered into an agreement with the Native Land Court in 1886 to further diminish the size of Mokau Mohakatino by making Mangaruahine the eastern extent of the block. However, it was clear that local Maori were overwhelmingly opposed to any survey of the block according to Jones’ parameters and needs.

Native Minister Ballance and the Surveyor General James McKerrow resolved to help Jones solve this dilemma through a highly questionable method.308 As a rule, and generally accepted as a matter of law, the Native Land Court required for the final issuing of title a survey marked on the actual ground. This was done through surveyors literally cutting lines and hammering pegs.309 Considered the most accurate method, a side-effect was that such surveys allowed a degree of Maori participation. Local Maori were more likely to know that the survey was taking place, to understand where the proposed boundaries were and to respond. For this reason, surveys were particularly vulnerable to obstruction and resistance.

The Government understood that there was little or no chance of successfully carrying out such a survey in connection with Jones’ land claims. To assist Jones, the New Plymouth survey office was instead ordered to carry out a topographical map of the

308 Ibid, p43 309 Ibid, p28


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Mokau Mohakatino no 1 block. A topographical map was not a physical survey, but merely a sketch map that could be created from existing information, and drawn up in the isolation and safety of an office.

However, as Thomas Humphries, who was ordered to carry out this work, pointed out, a topographical map had some rather clear limitations. Apart from its less accurate information, it completely cut local Maori out of the process, rendering them unaware that the survey was taking place or where the boundaries were drawn. This was particularly problematic given that the Government had ordered that the map define the block according to Jones’ wishes, namely that the eastern boundary be drawn at a mineral spring just east of Totoro and then headed due south to the Mohakatino River. This, as Humphries himself was well aware, was in direct contradiction to the wishes and demands expressed by local and district chiefs and hapu. In these circumstances, Humphries considered a topographical map highly inappropriate as it was ‘essential that the boundary should have been marked on the ground itself, because the primary object was to settle objections to the boundaries’.310

Furthermore, the Government was aware that a map with Totoro as the eastern boundary violated the agreement reached and sanctioned at the Otorohanga Court in October 1886 that the eastern boundary would be set at Mangaruahine. As Humphries said, it was:

likely that the up-river Natives would be misled by what had taken place at the Land Court at Otorohanga, as a boundary was agreed to before Judge Mair, which was some miles seaward of the boundary shown on the topographical map.311

A topographical map had another drawback. In the opinion of Humphries, and Native Land Court Judge JA Wilson, it did not meet the legal standards required to issue Crown grants and complete the title process.312 Despite this, Surveyor General McKerrow ordered Humphries to certificate the survey as adequate for the purposes of the Court. McKerrow would later defend his action, saying he believed a topographic map matched the definition of a legally required survey.313

With the ‘survey’ achieved, Jones then set out to have a Court hearing convened. He hoped it would grant final title to the Mokau Mohakatino no 1 block and partition the land, granting him 56-year exclusive control over the areas belonging to those who had signed the disputed ‘land lease’.314 However, such a process was not legally straightforward as only Maori owners, not individual Pakeha, could apply for a Court hearing or for partitions. Usually, a settler could secure at least one Maori to carry out the application on his behalf. In this case, Jones could not.

310 Ibid, p28 311 Ibid 312 Ibid, pp24, 27 313 Ibid, pp26-27 314 Ibid, p25


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What Jones did have was considerable support for his land ambitions among both Government and Native Land Court officials. This backing continued even after the Stout administration, with Jones’ key backer John Ballance as Native Minister, was replaced in early October 1887. Jones and his parliamentary allies lobbied the new Premier Harry Atkinson and Native Minister Edwin Mitchelson to grant a Court hearing. They agreed, after consultation with Ballance, even though Atkinson believed that this intervention was ‘rather stretching the law’.315

Atkinson was guided by the belief that European control of the Mokau was of considerable political importance. The Premier was fully aware of the overwhelming opposition to Jones by local Maori owners, and of the accusations of fraud against Jones. He himself had grave doubts about the speculator’s character and probity. Nevertheless, as he later told Parliament:

He had been willing to help Mr. Jones in any way that he could, because he recognised that if the Mokau could be opened up it would be a good thing for the colony; and he had gone to a further extent in helping Mr. Jones that he had felt quite justified in going.316

The Court sat in Waitara in October 1887. Judge Wilson was immediately confronted with the difficulty that no Maori owner had requested a partition hearing for the Mokau Mohakatino block. To allow the hearing to go ahead, some manoeuvring was required. It was suggested, apparently by Jones, that an 1883 partition application by Heremia should be the basis of the hearing. This was ironic as well as dubious, given that Heremia was one of the firmest opponents of Jones’ claims. Judge Wilson had another problem when it was pointed out that the official ‘applicant’ for a partition was dead. After some hasty discussions with the Chief Judge of the Native Land Court, John MacDonald, a solution was found. A successor to Heremia was appointed and the application was allowed to proceed.317 As Wilson would tell the royal commission in 1888, he had adopted this rather flexible approach ‘to assist Jones’.318

But there were limits to Judge Wilson’s willingness to cut corners. In particular, the Government’s attempt to pass off a topographical map as an acceptable survey was a step too far for the judge. Wilson was angry to be presented with what he considered a patently unsatisfactory survey officially certificated by the Survey Department as fulfilling the required standards. He considered that ‘the Survey Department, in certifying that plan, had placed the Court in a false position’.319 Wilson therefore refused to proceed with the application for partition, inspiring Jones to accuse him of being part of a conspiracy of Native Land Court judges and political leaders scheming to hand the coal fields of Mokau to rival speculators.320 In fact, it was the Government

315 NZPD, vol 61, 13 Jun to 12 Jul 1888, p127 316 Ibid, p127 317 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, p25. See also ‘Sporting’. Taranaki Herald, 18 Oct 1887, p2 318 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, p25 319 Ibid, p25 320 Ibid


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and the Court that were Jones’ greatest allies, and local Maori his real opponents.

Maori look to the legal system in their dispute with Jones

By this point, Jones faced virtually unanimous opposition from local Maori and any attempts by him to assert control or use of the land struck resistance. In July 1886, reports reached local Maori that Jones was considering starting up coal mining again. Te Oro Watihi and Tumitaiana inserted into New Plymouth newspapers a public notice on behalf of ‘us all of Mokau’. It warned all Europeans that they should not give up the land to the untrustworthy Jones or allow him to work it:

We have heard that Joshua Jones has gone to form a Company to work the land at Mokau. Take notice that we will not consent to give our land up to him; and take notice all you Europeans, do not listen to what the pakeha, Joshua Jones, says.321

Following this, other local Maori tried to place similar notices in European newspapers.322 Mokau Maori also frequently travelled to New Plymouth and elsewhere to make sure that the Government understood their hostility towards Jones and to any recognition of his claims. Oliver Samuel, the member for New Plymouth, said that:

he had Natives coming to him from the Mokau – often at night – coming to him in a hurried and excited manner, and saying, ‘We must shoot Mr. Jones. We cannot use our land. He is driving us off it.’ They were determined that they would not be driven off this land.323

However, the preferred policy was to make complaints to the Government and to the legal system, rather than taking direct action against Jones. There was no violence even after Jones killed pigs and ran off horses belonging to local Maori, which he claimed were running on his land.324

Crucially by 1887, Jones’ last Maori supporters had lost all faith in him. For quite some time, a small handful of local chiefs, including Wetere and Hone Pumipi Kauparera had remained hopeful that a profitable coal deal with Jones could still be achieved. While this possibility remained, Wetere had, in his own words, ‘ignored’ and not participated in the complaints of local people over Jones’ claims to a land lease or in their disputes with the speculator.325. In a highly opaque way, and apparently for their own reasons, Wetere and Hone Pumipi, had also been involved in some of Jones’ unsuccessful applications to the Native Land Court.326

321 ‘Page 3 Advertisements Column 1’, Taranaki Herald, 19 Jul 1886, p3 322 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, p32 323 NZPD, vol 61, 13 Jun to 12 Jul 1888, p377 324 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, pp22, 39-40 325 Ibid, p22 326 AJHR, 1888, G-4C pp23-26 mention Wetere’s involvements in some applications to the Native Land Court until 1887. See Wetere’s own evidence, ibid, pp20-22 in which he denies that he had ever


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However, they had grown highly frustrated with Jones’ inability to establish the promised coal partnership and his failure to even pay the required £25 annual fee. The details of the final incident that caused the break are somewhat unclear. According to Wetere, it would seem that he, Hone Pumipi and others thought that Jones was finally willing to pay the overdue rent. Jones was instead seeking to renegotiate the terms of the deal, so that rather than paying local Maori £25 per year plus 10 percent of proceeds from any coal business, they would get only an annual payment of £100. Perhaps sceptical by this point over the short-term likelihood of coal royalties, the chiefs would seem to have agreed. However, Jones did not actually pay even ‘a penny’ of this sum. Tired of the speculator’s promises and duplicity, and the turmoil he had brought to the area, Wetere decided that Jones was ‘doing wrong. Then I put him away. I told him I had nothing more to do with him’.327

Jones also faced determined opposition from Te Oro and his hapu. As claimants recall, they:

never conceded their rangatira[tanga] or ahikaroa over their ancestral land. Realising what had happened was not right or legal, [they] waged a campaign against Jones. They were led to believe that the lease was only until the Poutama survey debts were paid and then they would get the land back ... Jones was not even going through the pretence of meeting the obligations of the lease.328

In January 1888, Te Oro, Takirau, Heta, Hone Pumipi Kauparera and Porua met with Jones and, as Jones put, it ‘told me I had no land there’. Jones stated that he had a lease, which they had signed, to which they replied that ‘they did not want’ or recognise the document.329

Shortly afterwards, they demonstrated their refusal to accept Jones’ lease or his attempts to control the land. News reached their Mokau River settlement that Jones had recently put up a fence near the Mohakatino River. On February 6, the fence was pulled down by a number of local people, including women and children. Jones was in no doubt that the issue was opposition to his lease. As he said:

It is the Maori custom when they dispute the title to land to put their women and children or some insignificant man to commit some act. The Maoris do not hesitate to say that it was to test my title to occupy that land.330

Shortly after the fence was pulled down, Jones and his son confronted Te Oro and a

attempted to facilitate a land lease for Jones. Hone Pumipi Kauparera was another Mokau chief who, despite connections with Jones, would later deny any support for Jones’ lease. 327 Ibid, p22 for the somewhat confusing account of this incident, and p39 for Jones’ different version 328 Evidence of Haumoana White, Te Rohe Potae - Nga Korero Tuku Iho o Te Rohe Potae: 5th Oral Traditions Hui, Maniaroa Marae, Mokau, pp181-182 329 ‘Police Court’, Taranaki Herald, 28 Feb 1888, p2 330 ‘Police Court’, Taranaki Herald, 21 Feb 1888, p3


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number of other chiefs who they believed had ordered the protest. The chiefs explained that while they had not participated, they fully supported the action. Jones, gnashing his teeth and emitting strange sounds, then grabbed Te Oro by the throat and threatened him with an axe. Te Oro took hold of the axe and refused to let it go, despite warnings from Jones that he would ‘smash him’.331 The fracas then ceased.

Revealingly, the response by Te Oro was not retaliation but to seek assistance from the law. A police constable from Pukearuhe was summoned, and was informed that the pulling down of the fence ‘was a mild protest’ that had been met with assault.332 Te Oro and others then travelled to New Plymouth to consult with a police inspector on how they could ‘see justice done them in the matter’.333

On February 20, Jones was charged in New Plymouth with the assault of Te Oro. Jones admitted the assault but described it as justified. He asked that the case be dismissed ‘as it was a bona fide quarrel between the parties over the title, from which the Court has no jurisdiction’. The judge disagreed, describing the assault as ‘perfectly unjustifiable’ as Te Oro had not himself pulled down the fence, and calling it an attack that could well have led to more serious violence. Jones was fined.334

A week later, the court examined the incident from a different angle. Following Jones’ complaints, Porua, Ngapaki, Whakaheke and Rapona, were charged with malicious damage of property for pulling down the fence and Heta, Hone Pumipi Kauperere, Te Oro and Takirau were charged with inciting them to do so. The hearing developed into a discussion over the validity of Jones’ lease. Jones argued that he had a valid lease to the land which had been agreed to by the great majority of local Maori, including most of the defendants. He stated that both he and most of the owners had remained committed to the arrangement and called the defendants members of a rogue hapu acting against the ‘wishes of the majority’ of local people.335

The defendants based their case around the fact that they still claimed title to the land. They denied having agreed to lease the land, claiming they were unaware of the conditions of the written deed and/or drunk during the negotiations.336 Resident magistrate Rawson believed that the case revolved around the issue of whether Jones did indeed have the right to occupy and fence the land. While he thought the Supreme Court would be a more appropriate institution to rule over the matter, he nevertheless examined the lease Jones had presented to the Court, plus various legislation and precedents surrounding the issue.

His opinion was that Jones did not, at this point, have a valid lease as he had neither completed negotiations, nor had the lease been validated by the trust commissioner as

331 Ibid 332 Ibid 333 Taranaki Herald, 9 Feb 1888, p2 334 ‘Police Court’, Taranaki Herald, 21 Feb 1888, p3 335 Ibid and ‘Police Court’, Taranaki Herald, 28 Feb 1888, p2 336 ‘Police Court’, Taranaki Herald, 28 Feb 1888, p2; ‘Police Court, This Day’, Taranaki Herald, 28 Feb 1888, p2; ‘Police Court’, Taranaki Herald, 29 Feb 1888, p2


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required by law. Jones had no legal right to occupy the land or to establish fences upon it. The defendants had therefore not maliciously damaged his property but rather had carried out a justifiable action. The case was dismissed with Jones charged costs.337

Surveying the Mokau Mohakatino block without Maori consent

With this ruling, the willingness of Mokau Maori to use Crown institutions and the Courts in their dispute with Jones had seemingly received powerful affirmation. Jones was certainly taken aback, responding with a series of attacks on the honesty of Judge Rawson. A commission of inquiry would later dismiss all the allegations against the judge.338 However, in early 1888, the Government would deal a major, if hidden blow to the hope that it would act as a fair dealer in the issue with Jones, and to the expectation that consultation and consent would be the basis of the relationship between Crown and Maori in the region.

By this point, even the most obtuse of observers could not help but realise that there was considerable opposition to Jones’ ‘land lease’. Moreover, the Crown had been repeatedly informed not to carry out any survey that might assist his claim. The key Maori demand was that any survey needed to reflect the consent and wishes of local hapu and leaders regarding its purpose and its boundaries.

As we have seen, the Crown had tried in late 1887 to ignore this demand. To assist Jones, a topographical map of Mokau Mohakatino with the eastern boundary running due south from Totoro had been submitted to the Native Land Court. The Court had rejected this map as legally inadequate. A proper, physical survey of the land was required.

The Government was therefore faced with a number of possibilities. It could submit the survey carried out with Maori agreement that drew the boundary at Kokahurangi. Alternatively, it could meet the apparent understanding reached by local leaders and the Native Land Court in 1886, that the eastern boundary of the block would be defined further downriver, from Mangaruahine. Most obviously, it could seek further discussion with local Maori on whether any survey of the block was acceptable. None of these options, however, met Jones’ demands or advanced his land aspirations.

In February 1888, the New Plymouth Chief Surveyor Thomas Humphries was ordered to arrange a survey of the block, with Totoro as the eastern boundary. Doubtlessly, it was an order Humphries received with some trepidation, as he could draw on his own previous experiences to know the likely reaction of local Maori. Luckily for Peter Dalziel, the man despatched to do the work, most local chiefs and hapu did not find out about the survey, or at least not until it was too late. At this time, more than 600 Maori had gathered near Mokau for a hui, entertainment and a race meeting. Europeans were also in attendance, as was a Te Kuiti police constable ‘invited to

337 ‘Police Court’, Taranaki Herald, 29 Feb 1888, p2 338 ‘Rawson Inquiry’, Taranaki Herald, 17 Apr 1889, p2


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inspect, so that he might report the reverence the natives have for the law’.339

Figure 16: The Mokau Mohakatino no 1 block – 1888 final survey Only a few Maori were therefore present when Dalziel arrived near the head of the Mokau River. They still made their opposition clear to the survey and refused to provide canoes for the surveyor. Undeterred, he continued his journey to Totoro, without meeting or consulting with Maori along the way.340

Te Oro, and many of the ‘principal Mokau Natives’ had to forego the running of the Mokau Cup to be in New Plymouth for the aforementioned assault charge against Jones. There, they heard of the planned survey. Takirau and around 10 others rushed to Humphries to ‘protest against any survey being made’ but were told that preparations were complete and the survey would go ahead.341

By this time, Dalziel had reached Totoro. There too, he found the settlement only lightly populated with around 20 to 30 mainly women and children present and a few young men. Dalziel believed he was only able to proceed because many of the ‘principal Natives’ and those most interested in the survey were absent at a Native Land Court hearing in Otorohanga. Nonetheless, a number of women tried to stop the surveyor, pulling down his markers as he began the survey at the Motukaramu mineral spring, just east of Totoro. Dalziel was able to proceed only a small distance when he was also confronted by the only Totoro chief present, Topuni. Told that only Humphries could hear his complaints, the chief raced to New Plymouth.342 There, Humphries tried to pacify the ‘very angry’ Topuni by promising that this ‘was not a final settlement of the boundaries, and that the Natives would have an opportunity of

339 Taranaki Herald, 27 Feb 1888, p2 340 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, pp30-31 341 Ibid, p28 342 Ibid, pp30-31


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objecting’.343

Dalziel was able to complete the survey in about two months. He faced no further obstruction, indeed, he neither met nor consulted with any other Maori. Dalziel was unsure whether the principal chiefs of the area had returned to Totoro by the time he finished the survey or knew of his work, as he left the area as directly and quickly as possible after its completion. However, he was clear that it was only his good luck, or the misfortune of local Maori, that had allowed the completion of the survey. It was, he said:

a particularly favourable opportunity for running a line through, on account of the absence of the natives. Had they been all present I should have expected opposition.344

The survey was not in the interests of the owners and was carried out without their approval. Nevertheless, the Government still expected them to pay for it. The full survey costs of £408 were added to the lien placed on the block, which now totalled £535 6s 5d.345 The survey was then submitted and accepted by the Native Land Court despite, as we will see, substantial Maori protest. The boundaries of the Mokau Mohakatino block had finally been defined. But it was not the owners, or local Maori who had set these boundaries, rather it was the Government acting in the interests of a private speculator. This was not the last service that Jones would receive.

Calls for an inquiry into Jones’ claims

The Government, through its covert survey, had achieved an essential pre-condition towards Jones gaining control over much of the Mokau Mohakatino block. Nevertheless, Jones still needed his claims to a lease to be legally validated, and his interests partitioned out. This was no easy task given the well-publicised allegations of fraud and that he could count on no Maori owners to back his claims. From the end of 1887, Jones pressured the Government to pass legislation that would declare him the legal lessee of the land without prior investigation of the validity of his claims. Newspapers reported that he haunted ‘the precincts of Parliament Buildings for the whole session in the hope of getting redress’.346 He and his supporters repeatedly called upon the Premier to demand ‘that nothing but a parliamentary title would do’.347 Atkinson by this point believed Jones’ determination ‘to get a title in spite of everything’ was becoming unbalanced, especially given the speculator’s predilection for allegations of corruption in the highest offices. Atkinson refused to recommend that Parliament grant title to Jones without investigation. Such an action would be ‘a gross

343 Ibid, p28 344 Ibid, p31 345 Ibid, p28. Note that there is considerable confusion over the actual payment of survey costs in the Mokau area. 346 Taranaki Herald, 27 Dec 1887, p2 347 NZPD, vol 61, 13 Jun to 12 Jul 1888, p127


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piece of injustice to the Natives’.348

Nevertheless, Turnbull, the former chair of the Public Petitions Committee, and others among Jones’ parliamentary supporters attempted to introduce legislation that would essentially do just that. According to their proposal, Jones would be guaranteed the right to complete negotiations without impediment. A Native Land Court judge would certify that the signatures Jones had obtained belonged to the owners of the block and would declare that Jones’ lease ‘shall be in all respects valid and effectual’. Jones would then be entitled to apply to the Native Land Court to partition off his interests.349 However, the House rose at the end of the 1887 session before this motion could be introduced. In doing so, it ignored the cries of Thomas Duncan, the member for Waitaki, that he was prepared ‘to stay here until after Christmas’ to see justice done for Jones.350

The speculator and his supporters were nothing if not persistent. As the Government refused to provide Jones with title without investigation, they worked to ensure that a favourable ‘inquiry’ took place. Almost immediately after Parliament reopened in May 1888, E Hamlin, the member for Franklin South, proposed that a special parliamentary committee be formed to inquire into the Jones case. He nominated its ten members, a suspicious number of whom were declared supporters of Jones and his claim to a land lease, including Hamlin himself, Duncan and Turnbull.351

This proposal was rejected. In part, this was because not all of Jones’ political backers believed a parliamentary committee was the most effective way of putting his lease into legal effect. Ballance told Parliament that the Public Petitions Committee of 1885 had already enquired into Jones’ land lease ‘very carefully, and had reported in Mr. Jones’s favour’. It was ‘the duty of the Government’ to pass legislation that ‘would put Mr. Jones in a proper position’. There was, said Ballance, no need for further investigation. Rather, an expert commissioner should be appointed to decide on the ‘purely technical question’ of what legislation should be passed to assist Jones. This, compared to a committee, would be a far quicker and more effective way of solving the issue.352

There was considerable opposition from those who believed that, given the attitudes of local Maori, a hand-picked committee to forward Jones’ case would bring Parliament into disrepute and impede the opening of the aukati. Oliver Samuel, the member for New Plymouth, alleged that the great majority of the nominated committee were known supporters of Jones or ‘knew nothing of the Maoris and their feelings, and could sympathize with none of their wrongs’.353 Samuel doubted that such

348 Ibid 349 Ibid, p128 350 NZPD, vol 59, 25 Nov to 22 Dec 1887, pp958-962. Duncan’s comments are on p960 351 NZPD, vol 60, 10 May to 12 Jun, 1888, pp324-325 352 Ibid, pp327-328 353 Ibid, p326. The remarkable level of support for Jones’ claim amongst politicians, despite the overwhelming evidence of its dubious nature, raises the possibility that the speculator used questionable means to enlist that support. However, I have seen no direct evidence that corruption was at the root of


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a committee would fully inquire into the views of Mokau Maori and warned that resistance to Jones was reaching breaking point. He feared that any attempt to institute a sham inquiry and place Jones on the land could lead to violence:

Although the Native difficulty was fast disappearing, it was a very serious thing to rouse these Natives, by what appeared to be an injustice, to take measures to revenge what they deemed to be injuries inflicted upon them.354

Samuel was particularly worried that inciting Maori hostility would impede efforts to open up Mokau to more sustained European settlement and commercial activity. He had long believed that only the Government could ensure that the mineral wealth of Mokau was fully exploited. He did not want to see the land ‘blocked up for fifty-six years’ in the hands of a speculator.355

Samuel therefore called for a royal commission that would fully and independently investigate whether Jones had obtained a land lease fairly. This call was taken up by the Maori members of the House and, it would seem, Mokau Maori. Hoani Taipua, the member for Western Maori, and T Parata of Southern Maori called for a commission made up of men with ability and knowledge of te reo Maori, at least one of whom should be Maori. The commission, they emphasised, should be charged with considering the grievances of local hapu and not just Jones.356

By June 1888, with the support of Premier Atkinson, a three-man royal commission consisting of GB Davy, Registrar-General of Lands and Deeds, Lieutenant-Colonel JM Roberts, and Hamuera Tamahau Mahupuku, an assessor of the Native Land Court, was appointed. There was apparently widespread approval from Mokau Maori at the prospect of an independent inquiry. A considerable number of letters from Mokau Maori stating that they ‘would not give up the land’ and signalling their support and willingness to cooperate with the Commission were sent to the Premier and to parliamentarians, including to Richard Monk, the member for Waitemata, and Hoani Taipua of Western Maori.357 In these, the commission was urged to thoroughly examine the many complaints sent to the Government over the years regarding Jones claims to a land lease, before coming to Mokau to talk to local people.358 Local Maori would willingly testify before the committee.

There remained some concern among Maori members of the House of Representatives whether the commission had been created to serve Jones’ interests. Both H Taiwhanga of Northern Maori and James Carroll of Eastern Maori

the political backing for Jones. Rather, the key factors seem to have been the desire to place Pakeha on the land, and Jones’ persistence as a lobbyist 354 NZPD, vol 61, 13 Jun to 12 Jul, 1888, p377 355 NZPD, vol 59, 25 Nov to 22 Dec 1887, pp959. 356 NZPD, vol 60, May 10 to June 12, 1888, pp329; NZPD, vol 61, June 13 to July 12, 1888, p118 and ‘”Mokau” Jones Case’, New Zealand Herald, 13 Jun 1888, p5 357 NZPD, vol 61, 13 Jun to 12 Jul 12, 1888, p378 and ‘”Mokau” Jones Case’, New Zealand Herald, 13 June 1888, p5 358 ‘The Mokau Jones Commission’, New Zealand Herald, 21 June 1888, p5


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commented archly that the Government, in appointing the commission, had displayed more interest in Jones’ private affairs that it had shown for Maori with far greater grievances.359 Nevertheless, they were hopeful that the commission would ensure ‘fair play’ for all involved in the case.360

That the royal commission was instructed to seek evidence from Mokau Maori as to the validity of the land lease alarmed Jones and his supporters. They attacked the commission as an unnecessary and expensive waste of time. Samuel Hodgkinson, the member for Wallace, was among those who argued that there was no question that Jones had a conclusive right to the land. This, said Hodgkinson, had been affirmed by previous Native Ministers including Ballance and John Sheehan who had recognised that Jones ‘had rendered very great services to the colony’.361 Many of Jones’ backers questioned the independence of Davy and Roberts, as they had links to the Civil Services, and Jones had made claims against the Government. There were particular fears that they would be vulnerable to control by a ring of Auckland land-dealers desirous of Mokau lands and who had influenced the Government and the Courts to persecute Jones.362 Richard Seddon, the member for Kumara, opposed any Maori member of the commission and believed Tamahau would inevitably act as the representative of Mokau Maori. When told that Tamahau, who had Ngati Kahungunu affiliations, was not the representative of Mokau Maori but rather an independent commissioner, Seddon replied that this made ‘little difference. A Native was a Native’.363

Jones, although he initially threatened to boycott the commission, eventually testified in considerable length. So did a considerable number of Mokau Maori and other relevant parties. The commission must have struck local Maori as a chance to rectify their long-term problems with Jones. In fact, things were about to get much worse.

The 1888 royal commission

The commission opened on 22 June 1888 with the instructions to inquire whether Government actions and legislation were the cause of Jones’ failure to complete his land lease, or whether other factors, such as ‘the unwillingness of the Native owners’ were the key to his situation.364 In its favour, it can at least be said that the commission was fairly thorough in its almost two months of investigations. It examined

359NZPD, vol 61, 13 Jun to 12 Jul 12, 1888, p378 360 Ibid, p383 361 Ibid, p377 362 AJHR, 1888, G-4, pp1-2; NZPD, vol 61, 13 Jun to 12 Jul, 1888, pp115-116, 120-121, 126-127, 376, 384-385 363 Ibid, p381. No evidence has been found reagrding the role that Tamahau played in the commission. However, given the commission’s findings, Seddon’s fears that Tamahau would favour Mokau Maori were evidently groundless. Tamahau’s appointment to the commission may have been connected with the fact that the Government considered him a non-threatening figure. According to Angela Ballara, he had a reputation for ‘enthusiastic acceptance of all things Pakeha’ and for ‘support of various governments’ paternalistic plans for the Maori people’. Angela Ballara, ‘Mahupuku, Hamuera Tamahau’, Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, vol 2, pp304-306 364 AJHR, 1888, G-4, p2


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documentation and witnesses in Wellington before travelling to Auckland, New Plymouth, Otorohanga and Waitara to seek evidence. While it did not go to Mokau, it interviewed, with the aid of interpreters, 13 Mokau Maori directly related to the issue.

We have already looked in detail at the evidence presented to the commission in an earlier part of this chapter. It will suffice here to reiterate that the commission was told, in unmistakable terms, of the opposition of Mokau Maori to any legal recognition of Jones’ land claims. None of the Maori witnesses testified that they had agreed in 1882 to a full and exclusive lease of the land for 56 years. The overwhelming explanation was that they had believed it to be a flexible term arrangement, giving Jones the right only to extract coal no further inland than Mangapohue. It was consistently argued that Jones had not kept to the arrangement, and there were repeated allegations that linked him to fraud and sharp practice, and suggestions that some Maori signed the deed only under the influence of alcohol. Not a single Maori witness backed Jones’ claims of a land lease, vouched for his probity, or professed a desire to see him granted any legal rights over the land.

The commission also heard from Major Messenger, arguably the most non-partisan observer of the 1882 negotiations. He confirmed the key issue that local Maori, and he himself, understood that it was a coal deal and not an exclusive land lease. The commission also talked to five former business partners of Jones in his Mokau land dealings. None painted a flattering picture of his honesty.365 The Chief Judge of the Native Land Court, John MacDonald, was also called to explain the many legal complexities and his history of dealings with Jones. He and Judge Wilson apparently treated as beyond contempt the accusations levelled against them that they were in the thrall of rival speculators and had acted in an inappropriate and discriminatory way towards Jones.366 The commission interviewed a number of these rival speculators, and others who Jones had accused of various wrong-doings, without hearing anything that backed his allegations.367 A number of survey officials also gave evidence. They strengthened the impression of enormous Maori opposition to Jones and his claims to a land lease, and explained that the Government, through carrying out a survey of the block had gone against that opposition in order to assist Jones.368

Lined up against this was the evidence of Jones and his land agent, William Henry Grace. Jones testified for almost a week at the end of the inquiry, during which he contradicted virtually all the evidence that had gone before. We have already discussed the significant flaws in many of his claims, including, most importantly, that local Maori willingly and knowingly agreed to an exclusive land lease for 56 years.

Despite this, the commission emphatically reported to the Government that ‘the lease was understood by the Natives according to its actual purport and effect – viz., as an

365 AJHR, 1888, G-4C, pp8-13 366 Ibid, pp14-17 367 Ibid, pp31-34 368 Ibid, pp25-31


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absolute lease for fifty-six years’.369 It reached this conclusion after categorically rejecting as ‘unreliable’ the evidence of local Maori.370 The Commission’s report saw no need to go into ‘a minute analysis’ of the ‘inherent improbability’ and unreliable character’ of the evidence of Maori.

Rather, its final report provided a couple of examples of what it considered a general pattern. It argued that the evidence of Wetere and Hone Pumipi Kauparera was contradicted by what they had earlier told Judge Wilson.371 The exact nature of the contradiction is hard to gather from the commission’s terse comments but the following would seem to be the situation. In February 1887, Jones made an application for a partition of the block and requested that Judge Wilson, as trust commissioner, validate his land lease. Wilson initially refused to consider the application for a number of reasons but eventually agreed, after pleading by Jones and his lawyer to take the testimony of Wetere and Pumipi. He did so only under the ‘express stipulation’ that the evidence they offered was not binding or relevant to any subsequent decision.372 Wilson took notes of their evidence, which he provided to the royal commission in 1888. We do not know what these notes state but it would seem that the commission understood that Wetere and Pumipi had backed Jones’ claims in 1887 and had therefore contradicted themselves in their rejection of them in 1888.

However, as Wetere himself tried to explain to the commission, the situation was somewhat more complicated. He acknowledged that Wilson’s notes were an accurate reflection of what he had said but denied they proved he had supported an exclusive land lease to Jones. Judging from the commission’s limited written translation, Wetere explained that he had simply told the judge that he had willingly entered into an arrangement with Jones which he stood by but without specifying exactly what the arrangement was. Wilson had not asked whether it was an exclusive land lease or, alternatively, a flexible coal deal as Heremia had insisted upon:

The Judge did not ask me anything about Heremia’s arrangements. If I had been asked I would have told him that the lease was good according to that arrangement.373

Wetere’s explanation is certainly conceivable. As we have seen, until their break later in 1887, Wetere had shown a deep commitment to a coal partnership while maintaining a studied ambivalence on the exact nature of the rights Jones possessed. It may well have been that Wetere believed that Jones’ rights were flexible and dependent on whether he fulfilled the essence of the arrangement – a coal partnership. As he told the commission, he had no problem with Jones maintaining a significant, although not necessarily exclusive, presence on the lands as long as he ‘paid the rent and worked the

369 Ibid, p2 370 Ibid 371 Ibid, p4 372 Ibid, p25 373 Ibid, p21


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coal’.374 But Jones did not fulfil those conditions and did not prove himself to be a partner. Only when Wetere had reached this sad conclusion, did he drop his support for Jones and his presence on the land.

There is a simpler reason why whatever Wetere and Pumipi said to Wilson in 1887 should not have had the radical effect it evidently did on the commission. They were only two of 100 owners, and two of the 81 signatories to the document. Many of these owners and signatories had clearly and consistently protested against Jones’ claims of an exclusive land lease from a very early stage. They had shown their opposition through direct action, through obstruction, through letters to the Crown, and appeals to Government officials. Maori were reiterating to the commission what they had, to an overwhelming extent, said many times before.

Indeed, Judge Wilson himself told the royal commission that he did not regard the 1887 evidence of Wetere and Pumipi as conclusive proof that it was valid land lease. Wilson stated that as a trust commissioner he believed ‘special precautions’ and wider investigations were needed regarding this case, given the presence of an independent report that had called Jones’ claims into grave question.

This independent report was, of course, from Major Messenger. To support Jones, the royal commission had to dismiss Messenger’s testimony that he made in 1883 and repeated to the commission in 1888. The royal commission did so in a somewhat bizarre and difficult-to-comprehend manner. It stated that Messenger did not, before the deed was signed, have any duty to explain to local Maori the nature of the arrangement they were entering into.375 Therefore, the commission’s reasoning seems to have been that it was of no consequence that he repeatedly told local Maori they were signing only a coal mineral deal, and not an exclusive land lease. This is strange on any number of reasons. Most crucially, it does not explain why Messenger’s eyewitness account of what took place before local Maori signed the deed was not credible.

The royal commission also singled out as ‘unsatisfactory’ the evidence of Te Huia. His claim that he was not at the 1882 negotiations, and therefore could not have signed the deed, was indeed contradicted by others. His claim may well have stemmed from an overwhelming desire to disavow any connection or offer any support to Jones and his assertions of a land lease.376

It is conceivable that for similar reasons some witnesses rather exaggerated in their evidence to the commission the effects of drunkenness in their signing of the lease. A number of those based at the whare where the signing took place stated they saw no clear signs of mass drunkenness. However, it is impossible to dismiss the long-standing claims of some local Maori that alcohol influenced these events. There was drinking during the negotiations, well away from the whare. It therefore cannot have

374 Ibid, p22 375 Ibid, p2 376 Ibid, p2, 18, 19, 22


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been easy for men like Messenger to judge the sobriety of 80 or so people when they signed the lease over the course of the day. Nevertheless, the Commission considered authoritative Messenger’s subjective opinion that alcohol was not a major factor, while ignoring what he had personally heard and said about the nature of the lease.377

These were the stated reasons why the commission essentially accepted the evidence of Jones as having more weight, and his word as more credible, than the great mass of contrary opinions. To say the least, this faith in Jones’ probity was not universal. Jones was, as we have seen, frequently accused of embellishing matters, making unsubstantiated allegations and of questionable behaviour.

The commission itself saw fit to simply ignore Jones’ claims that his difficulties stemmed from the fact that rich capitalists, and corrupt judges and politicians, wanted to stop him gaining Mokau land. Indeed, the commission stated he had not been hindered by any ‘improper action, mistake or neglect’ by a Government or court official. Overall, the commission absolved the Government of any direct responsibility for Jones plight. The effect of this was that Mokau Maori, through their land, and not the Government, would be required to compensate Jones.

Overall, it is difficult to avoid the impression that the commission’s findings were more swayed by political factors than the evidence. Jones was a persistent and well-connected lobbyist desperate for land. He was also a Pakeha trying to gain a legal foothold in an area hitherto dominated by Maori. There was a strong belief that Jones should be granted land both as a reward for his efforts to open up the aukati, and as a step towards more extensive colonisation. The commission, in its judgment, stated that:

It should be taken into consideration that Mr. Jones originally entered into these negotiations with the sanction and encouragement of the Government of the day, as expressed in the letter of Mr. Sheehan of the 29th April, 1876 [sic 1879] ... and that his services at that time in assisting to open up the Mokau District were regarded as worthy of special acknowledgement.378

If the commission’s rulings were a blow to Mokau hapu, its recommendations to the Government were even worse. The commission considered it too difficult to recommend specific assistance or compensation that the Government should provide to Jones for his difficulties in having his valid land lease legally recognised. Rather, the ‘exceptional nature and circumstances of the case’ entitled Jones ‘to any assistance which the Legislature can accord’. It would, stated the commission, be most suitable if Jones and his advisers tell the Government what they wanted.379

The Commission felt it almost too obvious to say that any assistance to Jones should



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take into consideration the ‘just rights and interests’ of Mokau Maori. However, the commission had effectively stated that they had ‘no just rights and interests’ to control much of Mokau Mohakatino no 1. The Government therefore quickly moved towards granting Jones legal tenure over the land. In doing so, it signalled the end of an era in which Mokau Maori believed that they had established a partnership or compact not just with individual Pakeha, but more importantly with the Government. In the next few years, Mokau Maori would suffer from major land loss. This would come not through communal consent, or through negotiation and agreement. Rather, in a myriad of ways, the hapu of Mokau would see their legal rights over their land slip, or more to the point, be snatched from their hands.

367 DISEMPOWERMENT AND LAND LOSS, 1888 TO 1911

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Chapter Nine

Disempowerment and Land Loss

1888 to 1911

9.1 Mokau Mohakatino Lost to Joshua Jones

Following the royal commission’s report, the Government’s efforts to give Joshua Jones legal control over much of the Mokau Mohakatino block became unstoppable. Justification was now at hand to ignore the protests and opposition of the owners and the unease of other observers. On 20 August 1888, the Governor received the commission’s findings that a valid land lease had been signed and its recommendation that Jones was entitled to ‘receive any assistance’ that the Government could offer.1 Within 10 days, and without consultation with local Maori, legislation was passed effectively ensuring that Jones would be granted much of Mokau Mohakatino no 1 and would be in a prime position to acquire the rest of the block.

The Mokau-Mohakatino Act 1888 ordered the Native Land Court to immediately issue the certificate of title for the block. The Court was instructed to define and partition out the interests of all those who had signed the ‘land lease’ into one contiguous area which corresponded, as much as was possible, to the western part of the block Jones had claimed from 1882. Jones’ ‘good, valid, and effectual’ land lease for 56 years over this area would then be registered, following the generally formulaic receipt of a certificate from the trust commissioner.2

The Act also granted Jones, albeit in a somewhat confusing manner, the pre-emptive right to lease the balance of the block. Within a short period, Jones had exercised that right and was in control of virtually the entire Mokau Mohakatino block, except for a few isolated and uneconomic subdivisions.

Jones’ efforts to acquire the balance of the block were helped immeasurably by another consequence of the legislation. The Act brought the Native Land Court, and its destructive impact, fully into the Mokau region. By ordering the Native Land Court to allocate an area to those who had signed Jones’ 1882 document, the Act set off a process of subdivision, fragmentation and ‘pseudo-individualisation’ in the entire block. Because of the need to help Jones acquire land, the Court distorted customary rights over the entire block by creating a large number of subdivisions, with lists of individual owners holding undefined and uneconomic shares. In such a situation, it would prove reasonably easy for Jones to acquire the interests of individual owners.

The Mokau-Mohakatino Act proved highly effective in ensuring that the block was lost to Maori control. In doing so, it showed contempt for the protests and collective resistance of local Maori, and delivered a major blow to their ability to communally

1 AJHR, G-4C, p4 2 Mokau-Mohakatino Act 1888, section 4


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control and protect the entire area.

The creation of the Mokau-Mohakatino Bill

The Mokau Mohakatino Act was therefore a huge step toward reducing, even shattering, local Maori control over their own lands. Just as damaging was the manner in which it came into law. The Government had this Act passed despite the views of Mokau Maori, and the protests of their leaders and the Maori Members of Parliament. The Mokau-Mohakatino Act 1888 was to reveal and deepen the marginalisation of Mokau Maori from the political and legal sources of power in the colonial state.

The Act was passed without any consultation with the people it most affected, the owners of the block. Almost immediately after the royal commission’s report was released, Jones’ supporters in Parliament called for legislation to be introduced that would see the Mokau Mohakatino block partitioned and land granted to Jones.3 Premier Atkinson requested from Jones and his solicitors that they draft a bill to ‘give him the relief he considers himself entitled to in connection with the Mokau affair’.4 The suggestions of the Jones’ party formed the core of the Mokau Mohakatino Bill introduced into Parliament a few days later.

The Government’s priorities were suggested by two demands of Jones that were not incorporated into the Bill. The Government was willing to grant Jones rights over Maori land, but was highly concerned about limiting the financial and other costs to the Crown of assisting the speculator. Jones’ demand that he be provided with an ‘advance’ of £2000 was rejected as ‘quite out of the question’ by the two main sponsors of the legislation, Attorney General Sir Frederick Whitaker and Colonial Secretary TW Hislop.5

Along with saving itself money, the Government sought to maintain at least the pretence of some protection for local Maori. It refused Jones’ request for an exemption from the standard requirement that the trust commissioner certify that it was a fraud-free transaction before the land lease was finally registered.6 In theory, the trust commissioner, also known as the frauds commissioner, had the potential to offer genuine protection for Maori in a case like this. However, by this period, the commissioners had earned a reputation among both the Crown and Maori for almost invariably approving transactions. A commission of inquiry in 1886 went so far as to describe some legislation governing the trust commissioners a ‘positive cloak for fraud’.7 Even John Ballance, who did not exhibit much concern in Mokau over allegations of fraud, stated in 1886 that:

3 NZPD, vol 63, 8 Aug to 30 Aug 1888, pp363-364 4 ‘‘The Mokau Jones’ Case’, New Zealand Herald, 28 Aug 1888, p5 5 NZPD, vol 63, pp492, 528 and ‘‘The Mokau Jones’ Case’, p5. They argued that it would not be fair to the Colony to set a precedent for direct compensation in this case and that the Government was in various ways already providing Jones’ land aspirations with considerable financial assistance. 6 NZPD, vol 63, p493 7 Vincent O’Malley, ‘The Aftermath of the Tauranga Raupatu, 1864-1981’, an overview report commissioned by the Crown Forestry Rental Trust, June 1995, (Wai215 ROI, doc A22), p81


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it is notorious that the Frauds Commissioners in the past have performed their duties in the most perfunctory manner, and passed transactions when the consideration was a mere bagalette.8

The Government therefore was quite clear what the purpose and effect of the bill would be if passed into law. The Native Land Court would cut out land that would be granted to Jones as an exclusive 56-year lease while opening the way for him to lease the rest of the block. Despite protests emanating predominantly from the Maori members of the House of Representatives, Parliament quickly passed the Mokau-Mohakatino Act.

Parliament speedily passes the Mokau Mohakatino Act 1888

It took just three days for both Houses of Parliament to consider, debate and enact the Mokau-Mohakatino Act. The speed of the process, and the lack of sustained discussion, reflected the determination of senior Government leaders to drive through the legislation, and Parliament’s acquiescence in passing it. After Colonial Secretary Hislop, with the assistance of Jones’ advisors, hastily drafted the Mokau-Mohakatino Bill, it was introduced late in the evening of 28 August. With some minor changes, it passed its three readings and was approved by the House of Representatives the following day. That evening, it was brought before the Legislative Council for ratification. The Council declined to pass it before Jones had the opportunity to examine and sanction the bill. As Whitaker stated, the purpose of the Bill was ‘to serve Mr. Jones’. Without Jones approval, the Government would consider withdrawing the legislation.9 No thought was given to consultation with Mokau Maori.

Not surprisingly, Jones indicated he wanted the Bill passed.10 Therefore, on 30 August 1888, after Whitaker had briefly explained the history of the case to the Legislative Council, and without opposition or further discussion, the Mokau-Mohakatino Act became law.11 The speed of the process reflects that fact that the Government, following the royal commission’s findings, was determined to put Jones in legal control of the land as soon as possible.

In doing so, the Government revealed that the views of the commission – and the demands of Jones – held greater precedence than the protests and interests of local Maori. The Government explicitly promoted the legislation to Parliament as the greatest possible assistance that could be offered to Jones. According to Whitaker, it was ‘the most that could properly be done’ to aid the speculator.12

The royal commission’s findings provided the justification for the Government to

8 Waitangi Tribunal, He Maunga Rongo: Report on Central North Island Clams (Wellington: Legislation Direct, 2008), vol 2, p628 9 NZPD, vol 63, 8 Aug to 30 Aug 1888, p518 10 ‘The Mokau Mohakatino Bill’, New Zealand Herald, 31 Aug 1888, p5 11 NZPD, vol 63, and ‘The Mokau Mohakatino Bill’, New Zealand Herald, 31 Aug 1888, p5 12 NZPD, vol 63, 8 Aug to 30 Aug 1888, pp527-530


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dismiss the sustained and ongoing opposition of local hapu to Jones’ claims. The commission, Whitaker told Parliament, had found that Jones was ‘entitled to a lease’ and the Government was determined to act on its findings. He described the opposition that Jones had faced as typical of the difficulties that Pakeha dealing with a large number of Maori land-owners encountered.13

The Attorney General explained to Parliament that the Government felt it was therefore appropriate to offer through this Act an extraordinary degree of assistance to Jones. Whitaker singled out two parts of the Act as unique. The first was providing Jones with pre-emptive rights over the whole block. The other was the remarkable and ‘peculiar power’ of instructing the Court to partition out the interests of the owners who had signed the deed, so that they would be granted to Jones.14

Government officials, like the royal commission and many other politicians, generally added the qualification that Jones should be offered great assistance as long as this did not encroach upon the valid rights of local Maori. However, Whitaker was a little more forthcoming. He told Parliament that the Act, ‘probably, to a certain extent’ breached the rights and interests of the owners. However, the Attorney General presented these breaches as limited and worthwhile considering the greater requirement of assisting Jones. He explained that Jones’ main problem was that the owners refused to consider partitioning their land so that the land lease could be recognised. The Act, by forcing a partition of their land against their will ‘took away the Native right’. Nevertheless, Whitaker did not ‘take any exception to this’. Indeed, he thought ‘it a very good thing’ that would not do any harm.15

With this legislation, the Government exhibited a hardening of its attitude towards local Maori, and arguably showed a new confidence that the protests of the hapu of Te Rohe Potae could be safely dismissed. By 1888, the region as a whole had been exposed to the Native Land Court and to the railway and was about to experience sustained pressure from Crown purchasing officers. As the balance of power began to shift in Te Rohe Potae, the Government exhibited less interest in considering the interests and wishes of local hapu and chiefs.

This wider context and the considerable political pressure to put Pakeha in legal control of land are crucial background to the legislation. The New Zealand Herald reported that the passing of the Act had led to renewed optimism that Mokau and its coal would ‘shortly be opened up’.16

Senior Government officials were also desperate to pacify Jones so as to be rid of him. Premier Atkinson, Attorney General Whitaker and Colonial Secretary Hislop were all less than enthused about the speculator’s personality and unconvinced that he had any legitimate case, at least against the Government. However, they were tired of Jones’

13 Ibid, p529 14 Ibid 15 NZPD, vol 63, p529 16 ‘The Mokau Mohakatino Bill’, New Zealand Herald, 31 Aug 1888, p5


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lobbying, and his quickness to litigation and accusation. The Government showed a greater desire to stop Jones’ complaints than to consult with or consider the interests of local Maori. Whitaker appealed to the Legislative Council to quickly pass the Act for:

it was desirable that they should now finally dispose of this matter, and put Mr. Jones in a position in which he could no longer have any complaint ... Having given him this, he hoped that the Assembly would have heard the last of Mr. Jones of Mokau.17

Atkinson was so anxious that Jones’ complaints be finally dealt with ‘in one form or another’ during the current parliamentary session, that he tried to put a quick end to debate over significant financial matters so that the House would have time to consider the Mokau legislation.18 Other Pakeha politicians were also desperate to put an end to unpleasant dealings with Jones. George Beetham, the member for Masterton, called on the Premier to do all he could to settle this ‘vexed question’ as it ‘is very unpleasant to see him [Jones] ... year after year’.19 The parliamentary correspondent for the New Zealand Herald felt the same, expressing fear that the Bill may not pass and that the Jones case ‘will appear with the same monotonous regularity next session as for the past eight years’.20

While some politicians supported the Act out of a desire to pacify a troublesome lobbyist, other parliamentarians had long advocated the need for the Government to put Jones in control of the land. The only slight note of discontent raised by Jones’ long-term supporters was that the legislation did not go quite far enough. Ballance saw no reason why the fraud commission should still be required to examine the lease before it was finally registered. The royal commission:

had made out the transaction was fair, that the deed was properly translated to the Natives, and that there was no misrepresentation in the case. That seemed to be arrived at beyond all doubt.21

Ballance also thought the Government, at some other point, should consider more closely the refusal to grant financial compensation to Jones. Overall, when considering the Bill, he urged the House to remember that Jones ‘had suffered loss; there was no doubt he had suffered great loss’. Parliament should therefore, ‘as far as it was fair to the Natives ... deal leniently and liberally with the case’.22

There was, however, resistance to the Act, led by the Maori Members of the House of Representatives. They did what they could to force debate on the legislation and to

17 NZPD, vol 63, 8 Aug to 30 Aug 1888, p530 18 Ibid, p492 19 Ibid, p496 20 ‘Mokau Jones’ Bill’, New Zealand Herald, 30 Aug 1888, p5 21 NZPD, vol 63, p493 22 Ibid


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limit its impact on the owners of the land. Hoani Taipua, the Western Maori representative, condemned the Bill as a ‘very unjust one so far as the owners of the land’ were concerned. It clauses ‘were very stringent’. He demanded that the House delay discussion in order for the Bill to be translated into Maori, so that he, as the parliamentary representative of the owners, could examine more closely this ‘very important and ‘very large’ question.23

With the Act translated, and the Government pushing for quick ratification, Taipua urged the members of the House not to ‘be in a hurry to go away’ but instead to deal with this ‘business properly, because this was an important matter’.24 H Taiwhanga of Northern Maori described the Bill as ‘a very important measure against the Maoris’ lands’ and joined the call for it to be referred to the Native Affairs Committee. 25

The Maori members were joined in their concerns by WD Stewart of Dunedin West. After reading the commission’s evidence, he had reached the conclusion that the speculator had ‘trapped’ Mokau Maori into signing a lease that they did not fully understand or desire. From its ‘very foundation’, this was a land claim that ‘no Court of law, and ... no Court of equity, would recognise’. The ‘Natives had been seriously wronged, and the House was endeavouring to inflict a further injustice upon them’, especially through granting Jones pre-emptive rights over the entire block. Overall, he believed the ‘transaction from beginning to end was a disgrace to the colony’.26

James Carroll, unusually among the Maori members of the House, accepted the commission’s findings that a land lease had been created. (Local Maori, when informed of this, replied that while they respected the member, ‘he doesn’t know all the ins and outs as we do’).27 Carroll’s stance reflected his belief that the lease, if honoured, would create great opportunities for local Maori. He emphasised that the ‘stringent conditions’ of the contract obligated Jones and his partners to ‘spend considerable sums of money on the land in mining’ and to bring development and opportunities to the region.28

Nevertheless, Carroll agreed that the legislation ‘went too far’ in ‘interfering with the rights of the Natives’. He argued that it sought to compensate Jones for whatever wrong he had suffered at the hands of the Government through endangering the interests of the Maori owners. In particular, he was worried that the owners who had not signed the lease were having their rights interfered with. Carroll opposed Jones being granted pre-emptive rights over the whole block, which interfered with the owners’ ability to lease or enter into business arrangements with whomever they saw fit. He was also highly concerned that the legislation was instructing the Native Land Court to distort and ignore the customary interests of local Maori so as to grant Jones

23 Ibid, p494 24 NZPD, vol 63, 8 Aug to 30 Aug 1888, p519 25 Ibid 26 Ibid, p521 27 Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, p113 28 NZPD, vol 63, p520


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the land that he wanted, the western area of the block. This contradicted, he pointed out, the requirement of the Court to allocate interest to Maori based on ‘Maori laws and customs’.29

The Maori members were able to have the Bill referred to the Native Affairs Committee for further discussion, despite complaints that they were ‘stonewalling’ important legislation and that the ‘whole question’ had already been discussed and settled by the royal commission.30 However, it would seem that the discussion in the committee was restricted to debate over some specific clauses, and there is no evidence of any in-depth debate over the overall intent and appropriateness of the legislation.

Within the committee process, the Maori members were able to institute a couple of specific changes to the legislation. They managed to have removed a clause that would have given Jones the ‘exceptional privilege’ of being in the position of the Maori owners and being able to call for partitions or Court hearings over the entire block at any time he saw fit.31 This right would have posed real dangers for Maori owners, deepening Jones’ ability to destabilise their control of the remaining land. It may well have been insisted upon by Jones as a method to have the Native Land Court grant title over the valuable 500-acre area near the opening of the Mokau River. This, as we will recall, had been kept in customary title by Rewi and Wetere in 1882 because they were aware that Jones and the Government were seeking it.

Also removed, after considerable discussion, and a close vote in the committee, was a clause which granted Jones the sole right to carry out lease land negotiations in the block for the next two years. Carroll led this fight, which he saw as infringing on the owners’ rights. However, the effect of his victory seems to have been reasonably minor. Section 4 of the Act still contained a provision that restricted any dealing over the entire block for three months, except with the consent of Jones. As Whitaker explained to Parliament, this gave Jones ‘pre-emptive right to deal with this land’.32 Furthermore, section 6 reaffirmed that the Special Powers and Contracts Act 1885 remained in full force and effect. As we recall, section 17 of this 1885 Act had already exempted Jones from alienation restrictions that were in force over the entire region. Although there was some confusion over its effect, it also appeared to grant him, for an unstated period, the pre-emptive right to lease the entire block. While the legal situation was therefore somewhat complicated, in practical terms Jones would in coming years act as if he had pre-emptive rights to the entire block.33

These small victories could not disguise that the Mokau Mohakatino Act represented a

29 Ibid 30 ‘Taiwhanga and Mr Marchant’, Taranaki Herald, 29 Aug 1888, p2 31 NZPD, vol 63, 8 Aug to 30 Aug 1888, p493 32 Ibid, pp529-530 33 Ibid, p530. There was considerable confusion over Jones’ pre-emptive rights and it is not clear if the members debating the issue were fully aware of all the complexities surrounding this question. See also AJHR, 1909, Session 1, G-1i


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major defeat for local Maori. Without any consultation with the owners or their leaders, Parliament had paved the way for Maori to lose legal control over much of the area, while their legal ownership of the entire block was irrevocably transformed and distorted. The focus now shifted onto the Native Land Court to allocate land to Jones. In doing so, it destroyed any chance that Mokau Maori could retain communal control over the entire Mokau Mohakatino block.

The Native Land Court approves the Mokau Mohakatino survey

In 1882, some local Maori had, after enormous debate and delay, co-operated with the Native Land Court. Many Mokau chiefs had left the 1882 hearing in Waitara confident that the Native Land Court would be their partner and help them gain legal title over their lands so it could be protected and developed. It would be, said Wetere, ‘our Court’. This faith was dealt a mortal blow by the Court’s subsequent role of working alongside the Government, and placing much of the Mokau Mohakatino block in the legal possession of Jones.

By 1888, local Maori certainly did not see the Court as under their control, or even reflecting and fully considering their interests and desires. Rather, the Court was increasingly alien, dangerous and unavoidable. In the following few years, it would preside over the alienation of land, and to create not partnership or protection but rather division.

One of its most damaging acts was to officially define the boundaries of the block according to the wishes of the Government and Jones, and in doing so, to ignore both the protests of local Maori and the Court’s own apparent agreements. To understand how this came about, a brief review of the long and complex history of the eastern boundary of the Mokau Mohakatino block is needed. In a nutshell, Jones’ priorities were to have his lease of all the land from the sea to Mangapohue legally recognised and to be in position to obtain more land still, stretching to Totoro. He therefore wanted the Mokau Mohakatino block surveyed with the eastern boundary at Totoro. When local Maori came to realise this, they opposed any survey that may assist Jones’s claims and in particular any survey setting the boundary at Totoro. For other reasons, they did support a survey which would make the Mokau Mohakatino block considerably smaller than what Jones wanted.

In April 1882, Te Oro Watihi, Takirau Watihi, Epiha, Hone Pumipi Kauperere and other Mokau chiefs made an application that was published in the New Zealand Gazette for a survey and Court hearing over the Mokau Mohakatino block. Apparently on Jones’ urgings, the named boundaries commenced at the mouth of the Mokau River and ran eastwards to a mineral stream near Totoro, before heading due south to a point near the source of the Mohakatino River and then running to the sea.34

However, as borne out from the official records, the 1882 Court hearings did not deal

34 New Zealand Gazette, 27 May 1882, No 43, pp651-652


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in any depth with the boundaries of the block and no firm agreement was made over using Totoro as the eastern boundary. Rather, the expectation following these hearings was evidently that a survey would be carried out with the involvement and agreement of key local leaders, and following this, title would be issued. In the following years, there was considerable discussion and dispute amongst local Maori over exactly where the boundaries of the block should be. The constant factor in these discussions was the insistence that the definition and surveying of the block must reflect Maori consent. More specifically, overwhelming opposition emerged to setting the eastern boundary at Totoro, as it became associated with Jones’ attempts to gain control over the block. Even chiefs such as Te Oro and Pumipi, who had originally suggested the Totoro boundary, would later tell the Court that they had became completely opposed to it.35

In 1886, some new suggestions were made by Maori as to where the eastern boundary should be. Permission was given for a survey that drew the eastern boundary from Kokahurangi then running southwards (see figure 14). In that year, major regional and local chiefs then reached an agreement with the Native Land Court at Otorohanga that the eastern boundary should be drawn further downriver still, from Mangaruahine southwards (see figure 15). Jones was completely opposed to any recognition of this boundary, as it would shrink the block and therefore the area he could claim from approximately 56,500 acres down to around 23,000 acres.

What happened next damaged both the interests of local Maori, and the concept of a relationship of trust and goodwill with the Crown and the Court. The Government, out of a desire to assist Jones, conducted a survey in early 1888 using Totoro as the eastern boundary (figure 16). This survey was carried out without the knowledge or approval of local hapu, and only avoided major obstruction because many Mokau leaders and people were absent from the area at the time.

This survey was then submitted to the Court, which sought to register it as the official boundaries of the block. This would enable a certificate of title to be issued so that the Court could proceed with defining and making legal Jones’ rights to the land. In late June 1888, the Court issued a public notice stating that Maori had 14 days to object to the boundaries. The plan was not sent to the Maori owners for examination, rather it was displayed in New Plymouth with a copy at Otorohanga.36 Not surprisingly, given the limited notice and the long distances, it seems that few local Maori were able to see the plan.37 Nevertheless, news that the Court was seeking to recognise a survey of ‘Jones’ boundaries’ filtered out with a predictably strong reaction. Four separate letters of protest were sent to the Court.38

35 Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 2, pp21,23 36 New Zealand Gazette, 5 Jul 1888, No 38, p750. The Native Land Act 1880, section 39, required that the ‘map shall be deposited for public inspection, for a long as possible before the sitting of the Court, at some place to be indicated’. 37 Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 2, p26 38 Ibid, p20


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On 7 November 1888, the Court considered these objections at a hearing in New Plymouth. Many of those with interests in the issue were unable to attend. For example, flooding meant that many Upper Mokau Maori and Wetere were trapped in Totoro and unable to travel.39 However, some of the owners were able to be present. They made palpably clear their hostility to any official recognition of the survey. All the Maori witnesses told the Court clearly of their opposition to any setting of the boundaries at Totoro and their protests over a survey that they considered had been carried out against their will and interests. They argued that drawing the boundaries at Totoro would disrupt hapu life and connections, and damage internal agreements over the relationship between Mokau and the wider region.

Te Oro Watihi, for instance, stated that, ‘[t]his survey is not ours i.e. the one from Totoro. I protested against the survey from the first’.40 Te Huia Te Rira told the Court that he was one of the few Maori who had been aware that the survey was taking place and had protested unsuccessfully to the surveyors at the time. Subsequently, ‘I have been along the survey lines, it does not match the [M]aori boundaries, it cuts across cultivations and [M]aori lands’.41 Hone Pumipi Kauparera said, ‘I object to this line, because it has taken over our lands without our consent ... what we objected to was the survey was against our wish.42

During this hearing, there were suggestions of a strong general hostility to the Court and surveying process, alongside a growing awareness of its power. Some of the witnesses stated that they opposed any contact with the Court. They had not attended the original hearing in Waitara in 1882 and still did not recognise the Court’s authority to define and survey Maori land. Nevertheless, they felt they had to make their objections to the survey known, for it was becoming increasingly clear that the Court could simply ignore the rights and views of those who did not participate in it. Te Aorere said:

I object to the line altogether – there ought to be no line at all. I did not come to the Court [in 1882] as I thought it a bad thing, and do so still.43

Likewise, Te Haupohe described himself as ‘hard’ against the survey and against the Court process:

I object to the line because our cultivations are there. I was not at the Court at Waitara [in 1882]. I knew the Court was going to hear this land, I was hard and would not go – am hard still.44

Others, who had supported co-operation with the Court in 1882, appeared to be growing disillusioned about the role the Court was playing. Several witnesses expressed

39 Ibid, p22 40 Ibid, p21 41 Ibid, 20 42 Ibid, p23 43 Ibid, p24 44 Ibid


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this by protesting that the survey and the block as now defined ‘had not been through the Court’. Evidently, this meant that the survey and the setting of the block’s boundaries were not being based around Maori agreement and partnership with the Court.45 The Court was also told repeatedly that there had been a failure to consult with them about the future of their land. They had not been consulted over the survey and had not had the opportunity to examine the survey plans that were placed at Otorohanga and New Plymouth. Many wanting to make their protests known to the Court were not able to, for instance because ‘[o]ur old people have been detained by floods and so have not been able to attend’.46

Underlining this anger was the belief of Mokau Maori that the survey and the Court’s actions were designed to place Jones on their land. The Court was certainly aware of the wider implications of the survey, even if Judge EW Puckey maintained the veneer that the hearings were a simple and discrete matter of the boundaries of a Native Land Court block. This stance was unconvincing, given that Jones was given permission to cross-examine the Maori witnesses and address the Court. Indeed, the hearing turned into another battle between local Maori and Jones. Jones told the Court that the Maori witnesses had willingly signed the original ‘land lease’ and that there was widespread support for the survey from Totoro. He accused a number of them of giving false evidence both here and at the recent royal commission because they had been bribed or influenced by his rival land dealers.47 Even the normally terse Court clerk felt moved to note in the official record that Jones acted in an ‘excited and rather disorderly manner’.48

Although Jones did not always leave a good impression on officials, the Court understood the clear implications of the Mokau-Mohakatino Act. Jones was to get his lease and the block defined by a survey carried out according to his wishes.49 Judge Puckey dismissed all Maori objections and ordered the survey with Totoro as the eastern boundary to be officially registered.

While the decision was a major blow to local Maori, the rationale given also had some worrying implications. Judge Puckey showed that the Court was capable, when it so chose, of adopting an inflexible, blinkered formalism incompatible with the complex, fluid situation it was dealing with. The judge placed enormous weight on the fact that the Gazette notice of the 1882 application to the Court stated that Totoro was the eastern boundary. The 1882 Court hearing that followed had not clearly dismissed these boundaries, nor had local Maori at that time explicitly protested over them. Therefore, according to the judge, a 1888 survey that was ‘as nearly as possible

45 Ibid, pp22, 23 46 Ibid, p20 47 Ibid, pp20-21 48 Ibid, p24 49 While the Mokau-Mohakatino Act 1888 did not mention boundaries, it reaffirmed the Special Powers and Contracts Act which explicitly stated that the eastern boundary was at Totoro.


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identical with the boundaries’ mentioned in the 1882 Gazette notice must be accepted.50

Such a narrow approach was both inadequate and inaccurate. Indeed, the Court revealed an almost astonishing arrogance and ignorance regarding the long history of Mokau Maori demands for genuine consultation over the surveying process. Judge Puckey suggested that the Court had shown a remarkable attention to the wishes of the owners. It had received letters of protest to the survey that gave no ‘tangible ground of objection’. Nevertheless, he said, the Court, through this hearing had generously given the protesters ‘the fullest scope to state their reasons at length’ and carefully reviewed all the evidence.51

According to the Court, Mokau Maori had failed to demonstrate any genuine grievance or even commitment to their protests. Judge Puckey ruled that those who complained through written letter but had not attended the Court had ‘forfeited their right to appear and their objections are therefore dismissed’.52 The credibility of those who did appear was lessened by the fact that they had failed to take ‘the trouble’ to travel to Otorohanga or New Plymouth to inspect the survey plan beforehand. They were only complaining about the survey, the judge stated, because the land was being dealt with, that is to say, that Jones was going to be granted it. None of their ‘objections had been substantiated’.53

Local Maori protests had been summarily dismissed and their commitment towards trying to control their land belittled. The Court would then move to exercise genuine dominance over the land.

Mokau Mohakatino subdivision 1F created for Joshua Jones

The Native Land Court hearings of May 1889, literally and figuratively, shaped the future of the Mokau Mohakatino block. Before it began, the block was only partially under the Native Land Court system. A week later, after the hearings and the related trust commissioner inquiry had concluded, the cohesion of both the land and those who owned it had been shattered. While all the block remained technically in Maori ownership, much of it was now legally under the exclusive legal control of Jones, who was seeking to acquire the rest. Moreover, the block had been fragmented into a large number of partitions, each owned by different sets of individual owners. The fragmented and highly confused title situation created by the Court – and the loss to Jones of much of the land, including its most economically important area – would make it difficult for Maori to effectively utilise and develop what remained to them. By the end of this week-long hearing, the Native Land Court system had triumphed in Mokau. In law and on the ground, the Mokau Mohakatino block was no longer under communal Maori control.

50 Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 2, p25 51 Ibid, p26 52 Ibid 53 Ibid


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Judge L O’Brien’s primary task during this hearing was not to allocate legal title to Mokau Mohakatino on the basis of customary rights. Rather, the Court’s central responsibility was to make possible the alienation of that land through the lease to Jones.54 The Court sought to create a subdivision that would be granted to the approximately 80 owners who had signed the ‘land lease’.55 Jones exclusive 56-year lease over this land, after a trust commissioner’s hearing, would then be formally registered.

This goal was achieved in spite of the efforts of local Maori. The owners of Mokau Mohakatino entered into the hearing with the aim of preventing, and if that was not possible, re-negotiating the Jones’ land lease, and maintaining as much communal control as possible over both the land and the Court process.

The need for a united front during this hearing was made more apparent by the presence of Jones, and other speculators and land agents. Before the Court began in Mokau on 17 May, the well-known land agents WH Grace and Major Charles Brown had contacted different sets of owners, seeking to represent them in the hearings. However, there seems to have been particular wariness about allowing Grace, who was of course closely associated with Jones and had entered the application for the partitions hearings, to have any control over proceedings. Instead, committees of owners decided that a local chief, Tawhana Te Kaharoa should represent them in the Court.56 Hone Wetere Te Rerenga had recently died, so his son Kingi also took a leading role during the hearing, as did Te Huia Te Rira, the nephew of the late Heremia Te Aria.

Tawhana told the Court that most local Maori denied Jones claims. He explained that ‘[w]e object to the lease altogether’ and argued that there had been never been an agreement over a land lease. He and the other signatories had granted Jones ‘only a mining right to look for coal’.57 The Court was uninterested in these protests, stating repeatedly that its business was only to partition the land, and that the trust commissioner, who would be present after the hearings had finished, ‘would inquire into the validity of the lease’.58

Despite the promise of an inquiry from the trust commissioner, it seems likely that most local Maori had realised by this point that Jones would almost certainly be legally granted some land in the block. Jones was seeking the immediate recognition of his rights to the western half of the block up to Mangapohue, as a prelude to trying to obtain the eastern half of the block as well. Parliament, the royal commission and the

54 Note that while the Mokau Mohakatino Act had legislated that this partition could be created even without the application from Maori owners, it would seem that Jones’ land agent, WH Grace, did make an application for a hearing on behalf of Tawhana Kaharoa and Hone Wetere Te Rerenga. 55 Note different numbers were given for how many owners had actually signed the deed, 80 or 81 being most commonly mentioned. 56 Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, pp102-104 57 Ibid, p107 58 Ibid, pp105-106


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Native Land Court had all shown a clear determination to see this happen. Tawhana had therefore come to the Court with a proposal which aimed to make the best out of a bad situation. He explained that meetings of the owners had called for the old, disputed lease to be destroyed. However, local Maori offered to enter into new negotiations with Jones, and to try to gain a genuine agreement over, as Tawhana put it, a ‘fresh lease’.59 Tawhana explained that the owners had ‘come to an agreement’ amongst themselves that the Court should subdivide an area in preparation for these new negotiations with Jones. This area would not be the western region up to Mangapohue which Jones claimed. Rather, they would allow a portion in the centre of the block to be partitioned out.60

Judge O’Brien refused to consider Tawhana’s proposal. The Court, he told Tawhana once again, would have ‘nothing to do with the lease’ which ‘speaks for itself’. ‘[W]e are here to cut off a piece of Land for Owners that leased to Mr. Jones’.61 The Court’s unbending attitude to the wishes of local Maori was bolstered by the fact that Jones made clear that he wanted neither a renegotiation of the lease nor to be placed in the central portion. He wanted the western portion up to Mangapohue and the Court was willing to help. After Jones explained his position to the Court, Judge O’Brien issued an ultimatum to local Maori. There had, the judge stated, been enough delay and protest over Jones’ claims. Either local Maori would specify the exact area to be cut out and granted to the 80 owners who had signed the lease, or the Court would do it:

After hearing Mr Jones it [the Court] thought it very desirable this matter should be settled after so many years trouble – and if Natives could not agree among themselves the Court would proceed to take evidence on [the] matter & settle it that way.62

This warning had the desired effect. On 18 May, after some hasty discussion among the chiefs attending the Court, Tawhana requested an adjournment so that the owners could decide which areas would be granted to those who had signed the lease to Jones.63 Tawhana continued to protest against recognition of the land lease, calling it ‘a mistake’ and clashing with Jones in the courtroom.64 Nevertheless, his focus shifted to trying to control what, and how much, land would be granted to Jones, and keeping what remained in some sort of collective Maori control. His efforts were to be largely unsuccessful, for it was the Court not local Maori who held ultimate power over the land title process, and this fact made it increasingly difficult for the owners of the land to maintain a unified stance.

On 20 May, Tawhana returned with the suggestion that the block be divided into three parts. Twelve of the owners who had not signed the Jones lease would be granted a western area, while the other eight non-signatories would be granted land in the north

59 Ibid, p106 60 Ibid, p105 61 Ibid, p106 62 Ibid 63 Ibid, p107 64 Ibid, p113


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of the block in the Upper Mokau. The rest would go to the 80 who had signed the deed with Jones. There is limited information about this proposal and the exact areas that were suggested are not clear. However, it seems to have been an attempt to maintain as much quality land as possible out of the ‘Jones area’. This proposal would have seen much of the valuable frontage and flat land around the mouth of the Mokau River granted not to Jones but to non-signatories. Despite Jones’ complaints that this was crucial land and that he already had a house in this area, Tawhana was insistent, telling Jones that ‘I have cut off a very small portion, you have plenty of land’.65

For it to work however, this suggestion relied both on the consent of the Court and the collective acceptance of the owners. Tawhana implicitly acknowledged that the non-signatories who would be granted these areas did not have sole or specific rights to these lands. Others, who would not be included in the legal ownership of these partitions, also had customary interests, while the non-lessors themselves had connections to places right across the block.66 This proposal therefore needed all the owners to accept that the land they claimed an interest in would be legally granted to other individuals who, it seems, would be expected to act as legal guardians over areas that would remain open to the wider community.

It was highly difficult to achieve such a degree of unity and flexibility in a forum as divisive and inflexible as the Native Land Court. The Court, after all, was about to allocate legal title to specific areas and to specific individuals. Not surprisingly, groups, individuals and chiefs began arguing to the Court that they, and not the non-lessors, had rights to these areas. For example, Kingi Wetere did not agree that the western area should be allocated to some of the non-signatories as he doubted that, as individuals and through hapu connections, they had prime interest in the areas. He claimed this principal right for himself and Ngati Wai.67

Efforts to maintain a collective stance were further undermined by the behind-the-scenes machinations of land agents and speculators. During the Court hearing, Major Brown, the land dealer, contacted two of the non-signatories based in Waitara and received authorisation that he would represent their interests in Court, further weakening Tawhana’s efforts to control matters.68 Jones himself was playing a major role in the hearings, opposing Tawhana’s proposals and suggesting that the non-signatories be granted rights elsewhere in the block.69 It seems that during the hearings he approached individual owners and proposed new arrangement over the balance of the block, and tried to create individual alliances with certain chiefs, most noticeably, with Kingi Wetere.

Jones, in his cross-examination, succeeded in having Kingi tell the Court that he was not opposed to Jones’ land lease, or to the partitioning of the block according to

65 Ibid 66 Ibid, p114 67 Ibid, p114, 124 68 Ibid, p108 69 Ibid, pp116-117


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Jones’ desires. Kingi stated that his father, Hone Wetere Te Rerenga had said, shortly before his death, ‘we should uphold your lease and carry out agreements with you’.70 Tawhana responded by pointing out to the Court examples of the continuing opposition to Jones. Kingi did not deny this, acknowledging that ‘there was trouble about the lease’, and ‘a constant state of quarrel about it’, as illustrated by groups cultivating on land claimed by Jones as part of an attempt ‘to turn the European off’.71

However, the protests of local Maori over the lease and their attempts to maintain control over the entire block were in vain. The Court duly partitioned out virtually the entire western area up to Mangapohue that Jones sought, and allocated it to the 80 owners and their successors who had signed the 1882 ‘land lease’.72 The Court designated this area Mokau Mohakatino 1F. Upon survey, it would be revealed to be 26,480 acres out of the approximately 56, 500 acres of the total block.73 Jones’ 56-year, exclusive lease of this land was almost immediately registered. This area never returned to Maori control.

Given this loss, the rest of the Court hearing turned into something of a scramble among local Maori for legal title over the remaining land. Tawhana’s efforts for a collective approach with as few partitions as possible were overwhelmed. When the hearings closed on 24 May, Mokau Mohakatino no 1 had been split into nine subdivisions named 1A to 1J. The piece earmarked for Jones was the largest, the smallest was just 4 acres. There were also a significant number of urupa and other areas which the Court ordered set aside. Even the prime area near the Mokau River mouth that chiefs in 1882 had wanted to be kept in customary title had been swept up in this process, and was now Mokau Mohakatino no 2. It was in the process of being subdivided further, amidst drawn-out disputes over who held individual rights to which parts of it.74 The Taranaki Herald praised the Court’s rapid progress in ‘individualising’ the block but noted that there had been a ‘little squabbling’ among Maori over the extent of their rights.75

The process had been divisive in more than one way. It had entrenched a system of tenure that would require constant Court intervention as more partitions were created, and as the list of owners for each partition grew larger with the Court’s rules regarding succession. Local Maori had lost customary control and did not even have the consolation of an efficient and rational system in its place. They were trapped in a strange netherworld of land tenure, where they held undefined shares to land which they owned but could not effectively use, and indeed, in the areas placed under Jones

70 Ibid, p127 71 Ibid, p130 72 Excluded from the 1F partition designed for Jones was the small area near the mouth of the Mokau River which Maori had in 1882 asked to be kept out of the land court process and the Jones arrangement because it was considered to have considerable potential for settlement and other uses. 73 Brian Herlihy, ‘Mokau-Mohakatino and Mohakatino-Parininihi Blocks’, report commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal, November 1999, (Wai 143, doc I24), no pagination 74 Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, pp165-177 75 Taranaki Herald, 25 May 1889, p2


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control, could not legally use at all.

Mokau was now fully part of a destructive tenurial system that baffled all those who came into contact with it. The Native Land Laws Commission in 1891 provided a general summary of the effects of the Native Land Court:

So complete has the confusion both in law and practice become that lawyers of high standing and extensive practice have testified on oath that if the Legislature had desired to create a state of confusion and anarchy in Native-land titles it could not have hoped to be more successful than it has been. Were it not that the facts are vouched upon the testimony of men whose character is above suspicion and whose knowledge is undoubted, it would be well nigh impossible to believe that a state of such disorder could exist.76

The Court’s handling of the Mokau Mohakatino block in 1889 raises any number of specific questions. However, few confident answers can be provided given that the Court failed to clearly record what guided its decisions. For example, the essence of the Court’s task, as outlined in the Mokau-Mohakatino Act, was to define the area that would be leased to Jones. As figure 17 shows, Jones’ area was the western half of the block, what would become Mokau Mohakatino 1F. The Court was then required to cut out, from within Jones’ western area, land that was to be granted to those who did not sign Jones’ lease. The rest of the block, which was the eastern half and would come to include the subdivisions 1D, 1E, 1G, 1H and 1J, should then have been granted to all the owners, signatory and non-signatory alike. However, the Court apparently misunderstood this. One of the areas (1E) granted to eight of the non-signatories and that should have been cut out of Jones’ western portion, was actually placed in the eastern half of the block.77

Given the shortcomings of the evidence, it is different to be categorical on this matter. However, it appears that this group of eight non-signatories did not receive the land due to them within the western half of the block. An additional consequence was that there were 1523 acres less land available in the eastern part of the block to be granted to the owners as a whole. The Court’s error would seem to have resulted in Jones being granted more Maori land than he was entitled to.

The picture left by the admittedly incomplete evidence is that the Court hastily cut out the area to be allocated to Jones, and simply relied on a few local chiefs (and Jones) to provide the details of where the other partitions should be and who should be included in the various lists of owners. In doing so, it may well have failed to handle a

76 Quoted in Waitangi Tribunal, Turanga Tangata Turanga Whenua, p468 77 Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, pp159-161. It is possible I have misunderstood this issue. However, it would seem that Tawhana suggested that what became 1E in the eastern part of the block be granted to the non-signatories, who had strong ties to that specific area, and neither the Court nor local Maori realised it meant that Jones was, in effect, being allocated more land within the western half than he was entitled to.


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complex task with the appropriate rigour and transparency.

Jones’ lease over most of the block recognised

The Court left all the owners of the Mokau Mohakatino subdivisions with a legacy of division, fragmentation and confusion. However, the Court could be satisfied that it had achieved its primary task – cutting out the area that would immediately be granted to Jones. Before Jones’ 56 year land lease over Mokau Mohakatino 1F could be registered, there was one remaining hurdle for him to confront, the investigation of the trust commission. In reality, this seems to have been more of a stroll for the speculator than a major obstacle.

As we have seen, the royal commission, the Government and the Native Land Court had repeatedly deflected the protests of Mokau Maori and their leaders by stating that the lease would be subject to investigation by the trust commissioner. Trust commissioners were part of the Crown’s mechanism to protect Maori against fraud and landlessness. They were charged with ensuring, amongst other tasks, that transactions ‘were not contrary to equity and good conscience’, that Maori consent had been properly obtained and based on a full understanding of the effect and nature of the agreement, and that liquor had not played a part.78

Figure 17: Mokau Mohakatino c.1890 The trust commissioner therefore potentially represented hope for local Maori that their allegations would be fully considered and acted upon. Presumably some form of

78 Waitangi Tribunal, He Maunga Rongo, vol 2, pp627-628


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investigation did take place, as Judge O’Brien mentioned during the May 1889 Court hearings that the trust commissioner would shortly be in Mokau. However, no records have been found of the sitting.

Judging by the actions of trust commissioners around the country, it may well be that whatever investigations that did take place in Mokau were essentially perfunctory. It has been suggested that trust commissioners rarely probed deeply and almost invariably passed even highly questionable transactions.79 Certainly, the Jones transaction, that had become notorious among many, was by 1889 legally recognised.

Jones was now the legal lessee of the 26,450 acre Mokau Mohakatino 1F block. He had achieved, through the Crown and its institutions, his long-standing ambition of gaining sole legal control over virtually all the western half of the Mokau Mohakatino block. Jones had also been placed in a prime position to secure the lease of the rest of the land and had been granted the pre-emptive right to further leasing in the block, (although land- buying was illegal). The parts of Mokau Mohakatino which remained in Maori control had been split into separate partitions. Each partition had a group of individual owners, who possessed undefined shares which they could not easily convert into clear title over specific land, but which they were legally permitted to lease to Jones, and to Jones only.

As soon as the Court had completed its partitioning and naming of the owners of the subdivisions, Jones began seeking the signatures of individual owners for 56-year land leases involving the sub-divisions on the eastern half of the block. Within a year, he had succeeded. He now held secured control over virtually the whole block. Out of the 56,500-acre Mokau Mohakatino no 1, Jones had leased 53,285 acres.80

We have very little specific information about these later negotiations, what was promised and what shaped the responses of local Maori. In many ways, they seem to resemble the purchasing and leasing of shares from individual owners that was a common feature of land transactions under the Native Land Court system, and would, a few years later, be used by the Government to acquire much of the Mohakatino-Parininihi block. Jones evidently took skilful advantage of the weakening ability of local Maori and their leaders to institute effective collective resistance to land transactions. He apparently approached individual owners and small groups, encountering many refusals but gradually creating a momentum for signings. Shortly after the Court hearing concluded, Jones secured a few signatures from among the 18 newly declared owners of the Mokau Mohakatino 1G bock for a 56-year land lease. This put pressure on the other owners of 1G to sign. A month later, a second document was signed regarding the same 2969-acre subdivision. In total, 11 of the 18 owners signed one of these two documents.81

79 Ibid, pp628-629 80 AJHR, 1909, Session I, G-Ii, pp5-7. Different sources provide slight variations on these figures. 81 AJHR, 1909, Session I, G-Ii, pp5-7 and Herlihy, no pagination. The fact that Jones did not acquire all the owners’ signatures created confusion over what areas or rights he had actually obtained. The unclear


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By a similar process Jones was able to secure the signatures of some, but not all, of the owners of the 4260-acre 1J partition. Between June and July 1889, 20 owners apparently agreed to a 56-year land lease. 16 did not.82 This process of securing a few initial signatures and then approaching the other owners had its greatest success with the 1H subdivision, of 19,576 acres. Between July 1889 and 29 January 1890, three separate documents were signed with three separate groups of owners, until Jones had secured all 31 signatures.83

We can only speculate about why the individual owners signed. It may be that some of the owners saw little option but to sign, given that much of the area was already under Jones’ control and that their interests were insufficient to control and develop land. Kingi Wetere, for instance, seems to have felt some residual loyalty to a man who Kingi’s father had identified as a crucial partner. Kingi and others may well have believed that involvement with Jones could still bring some wider benefits to them and the region, especially as Jones was again promising that economic developments involving coal and cement were imminent.84

There were few other prospects for economic advancement on the horizon for local Maori, and the immediate prospects of rental payments, albeit small ones, were obviously a factor, especially for the impoverished. The lease agreements for the 1J block stated that the total fee was just £62 per annum for the first 28 years and £142 for the next 28 years. Total rentals for 1H were £105 per annum for the first 28 years and £210 per annum for the balance of the term. 1G owners stood to receive £50 yearly for the first half, and £100 per annum for the second half, of the lease.85 This equated to only a pound or two a year for each owner for the long-term loss of their interests in substantial areas. The rentals for all the Jones’ leases were later described by a Government commission as ‘entirely inadequate’.86

Overall, the key factors in Jones’ success were surely the fragmentation and disruptions of tenure created by the Native Land Court, combined with the general lack of protection offered to local Maori by the Government. Between 1882 and 1889 Mokau Maori had, in a great variety of levels and forums, voiced their protests regarding Jones’ attempts to acquire their lands. These protests had gone unheeded. The Government had shown more interest in placing a European on the land than in the concerns of local Maori. It had failed, despite many opportunities, to remove the doubt and dismay that surrounded Jones interaction’ with this land.

After years of powerful communal resistance, and political and public wrangling, Mokau Mohakatino passed almost quietly out of Maori control. Maori Members of

legal control of all his 1888-1890 leases is suggested by the fact that they were included on the ‘provisional register’ of leases only. Regardless of this confusion, it would seem that effective Maori control over these lands was effectively curtailed. 82 Ibid, p6 and Herlihy, no pagination 83 AJHR, 1909, Session I, G-Ii, pp5-7 and Herlihy, no pagination 84 Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, p141 85 AJHR, 1909, Session 1, G-1i, pp6-7 86 Ibid, p7


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Parliament occasionally brought up this case as a blatant example of how, in the words of Hoani Taipua, the ‘House lays very little stress on the injustice which the Maori people suffer’ but was eager to address ‘any fancied wrong’ that Pakeha complained about.87 For Maori owners, there was little prospect of redress or reconsideration. Most of Mokau Mohakatino would, in the following decades, lie outside of their reach, legally controlled by Pakeha and mostly unused and undeveloped.

This was not the only example of how covert and gradual land loss took place in Mokau during the late 1880s and early 1890s. In the 1850s, the Crown had conducted some disputed and apparently unfinished purchase negotiations in the area. A generation later, it claimed those lands, without further consultation or agreement with Mokau Maori.

9.2 The Return of the ‘Mokau-Awakino Purchases’

From the late 1880s, the Government was exercising increasing control over Mokau lands. This change was accompanied by a growing indifference to the concerns, protests and interests of Mokau Maori. This appears to have been shaped by the Crown’s growing sense of power in the wider region. Fears that Te Rohe Potae hapu and iwi were a significant military threat had long since dissipated. Moreover, the Government had secured some of its major political and diplomatic aims, including beginning the building of the main trunk railway and the introduction of the Native Land Court throughout the region. With these successes, the Government evidently felt less need to show concern for the demands of Te Rohe Potae Maori. For the Government, the concept of a ‘sacred compact’ was withering.

In the wider region, these political changes had not yet been turned by the Government into tangible land acquisitions. However, in Mokau, officials saw the prospect of acquiring land without the burden of further expense or negotiation. The Government had in its possession four seemingly forsaken and forgotten purchase deeds from the 1850s. As chapter three has detailed, there are major questions about whether the Government at that time sought and obtained genuine, communal Maori consent to these ‘purchases’. However, later Crown officials seemed to view such issues as ancient and irrelevant history. Without consultation with local Maori, the Government gradually took control of the Mokau-Awakino blocks.

The Crown’s claim to have purchased the Mokau-Awakino blocks and the lack of Maori acceptance of that claim

In the 1850s, the Crown had attempted to acquire large areas of land in and around Mokau but had met sustained opposition and resistance. By early 1857, it had managed to secure only four deeds of purchase for comparatively limited and difficult pieces of land, the so-called ‘Mokau-Awakino purchases’. All of these negotiations were carried out under the shadow of protest and unease. It has been argued that Crown officials

87 NZPD, vol 66, 22 Aug to 16 Sep 1889, p129


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failed to identify all the rights-holders to these blocks, but even some of those who were clearly connected to the lands refused to participate in the transactions. The Government was therefore able to secure the signatures of only a limited number of local Maori, particularly associated with Takerei, while facing claims and protests from many others.

Government purchasing officials operating in Te Rohe Potae and elsewhere at this time were frequently confronted with similar situations. They often responded by attempting to enter into follow-up negotiations with the protesting parties in the hope that this would allow the Crown to claim to have ‘completed’ the purchase.88 This was usually followed by the Government asserting some practical control over the land, for instance by on-selling it to settlers.

On other occasions, the Crown’s response to protest was to abandon its claims to the land.89 For more than a generation, local Maori had good grounds to believe that the Mokau-Awakino transactions had been abandoned. By 1857, the threat of Maori opposition, and the confused and incomplete nature of its key ‘purchase’ of the Mokau block, persuaded the Crown to leave the region without asserting control over the lands.

For around 25 years, due to the wars and the establishment of the aukati, it showed no signs of returning. In 1857, ‘Native’ title over three of the four Mokau-Awakino blocks was declared officially extinguished. Even Government officials evidently considered the purchase of the Mokau block incomplete and declined to proclaim it property of the Crown.90 However, such Government proclamations, as we have seen, were evidently neither known nor meaningful to local Maori.91 The more relevant marker of the status of the lands was that local hapu continued to use and occupy the land as before, without any protest from the Crown.

Indeed, there were no practical indications that the Crown maintained any link or claim to these lands. During all of this period, the Crown did not survey, sell or settle it. Nor did it follow up on some of the main elements of the ‘agreements’. For instance, it made no attempt to bring the collateral benefits, such as towns of Europeans, which it had told local Maori would be an almost inevitable corollary of a transaction. Revealingly, Crown officials do not seem to have even mentioned the transactions during the long course of post-war negotiations with local and regional chiefs. The Mokau-Awakino transactions appeared to have been stillborn.

Matters changed somewhat in late 1882. The recent Native Land Court hearings, and the activities of Jones and others, had awakened Pakeha hopes that Mokau would soon

88 See, for instance, Boulton, ‘Hapu and Iwi Land Transactions’, esp. pp248-249 and Waitangi Tribunal, Te Tau Ihu O Te Waka A Maui, chapter 6 89 Boulton, ‘Hapu and Iwi Land Transactions’, p249 90 See section 3.10 91 AJHR, 1883, J-1, p2 is perhaps the most explicit evidence that many local and regional Maori leaders did not consider the land the property of the Crown. For other examples, see section 8.2


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be ‘open’ and prosperous for Europeans. Perhaps more important to Native Minister John Bryce was the desire for some leverage in the stalled negotiations with Te Rohe Potae leaders over the future of the wider region. In late 1882, he suggested that Wahanui should grant permission for the railway, in part to allow the Government access to ‘its lands’ in Mokau. Bryce wrote that the Government owned ‘large blocks near Mokau, and it is unreasonable to suppose that they will consent to be denied access to their own lands’.92 Shortly afterwards, the Government let it be known that it was intending to open up for sale to settlers the land it owned at Mokau, the title to which was not in dispute.93

The Government did not, in fact, make any attempt to place settlers on the land or make any other assertion of control. Nevertheless, a pattern had been established that would continue. Officials would be guided by the assumption that the Crown was the legitimate owner of all four of the Mokau-Awakino blocks. They would fail to investigate the validity of these claims, or to talk to local Maori in any sustained manner about whether they accepted that this was the case. Even the extraordinary fact that these deeds were now more than 25 years old, and the Crown still had no hold on the land, would not be enough to inspire Government introspection or negotiation. Instead, the Government was seemingly concerned with determining when it was safe enough, and profitable enough, to take possession of ‘its’ lands.

Te Rohe Potae Maori, on the other hand, continued to practically and politically assert that the lands remained unquestionably part of their rohe. In June 1883, the Rohe Potae petition outlined the area which was considered under Maori control. The whole Mokau area to Waipingau, including the Mokau-Awakino blocks, were included amongst the ‘lands still remaining to us ... upon which the European, to the best of our knowledge, has no legal claim’.94 As discussed earlier, it would seem that this petition, signed by Wahanui, Taonui, Rewi Maniapoto and 412 others, had considerable support among Mokau hapu.

Given the lack of explicit discussion between the Crown and Maori over the Mokau-Awakino blocks, the exact meaning of the statement that Europeans had no ‘legal claim’ over them is somewhat unclear. It is possible that many local Maori simply did not remember the existence of these apparently failed negotiations of a generation earlier. Indeed, many of the leading proponents and opponents of the transactions were now dead. This arguably made it incumbent upon the Government to ensure that the new generation accepted and understood that ‘their’ lands were in fact Crown property. Nevertheless, there were clearly some powerful leaders who were aware of the Crown’s claims to these lands but who refused to accept them. The Government’s failure to follow up the transactions, or to secure genuine consent for them, had evidently convinced Wahanui and others that the Crown had no legitimate or existing stake in the lands.

92 Loveridge, pp58-59 93 Ibid, p60 94 AJHR, 1883, J-1, p2


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This view continued even after the Government surveyed the Mokau-Awakino blocks. From late 1883, while a wide range of surveys were being carried out in Te Rohe Potae, the Government marked the boundaries of the four ‘purchased’ blocks and also carried out preparatory mapping for a possible road and a bridge over the Mokau River. However, the impact of this surveying on the attitudes of local Maori seems to have been slight. In part, this was because the surveys were apparently not accompanied by any significant discussions and negotiations over the nature and validity of the ‘land purchases’ themselves. This was decidedly not the role of surveyors, who apparently focused on drawing the boundaries of the four blocks as closely as possible in accordance with the deeds.95 (They also marked on official maps the exact resting place in the Mokau River of the anchor of the Tainui waka, a crucial tribal taonga.96 Whether this was done with or without the consent of local Maori is not clear.)

Wahanui certainly did not view this surveying as changing the fundamental issue that Te Rohe Potae Maori did not consider that the Government had any claim over the area, including the Mokau-Awakino blocks. In October 1884, he repeated to the House of Representatives the demand of the interior alliance for legal recognition of their authority over the entire Rohe Potae.97 These, he said:

are ancestral lands, and the hands of the Europeans have never touched them. No white man’s foot has trodden over those lands, nor has any Europeans obtained authority over them, either by lease or otherwise. This is the reason I say that we should have the administration of those lands98

Given this attitude, and the delicate state of the wider negotiations, the Government made no efforts to change the status quo regarding the Mokau-Mohakatino block. In 1884, there were reports that ‘Crown land’ north of the Mokau River was soon to be put on the market alongside promises from Ballance to Taranaki settlers that the Government would ‘use every means for the immediate opening up of the Mokau.99 However, in practice local Maori remained in complete, and apparently undisputed, command of these lands.

The Government’s hesitancy seems to have been shaped not by concern over the validity of the transactions but rather out of its own political and economic priorities. The surveyors had reiterated that most of the ‘Crown lands’ in the area were rough and

95 WH Skinner, Reminiscences of a Taranaki Surveyor, pp56-59. As will be discussed later, they also laid out reserves in discussion with some local Maori. 96 Ibid, pp116-119 97 On this occasion, Wahanaui did not explicitly reiterate the boundaries of the district. However, as chapter 8.2 discusses, the entire Mokau area down to Waipingau would, during this period, be consistently included within the area that Wahanui and the leaders of the interior alliance stated was, and must remain, under their control. 98 As quoted in Loveridge, pp155-156 99 Taranaki Herald, 29 Nov 1884, p2 and ‘Hon. Mr. Ballance’, Taranaki Herald, 4 Dec 1884, p2; ‘Urenui’, Taranaki Herald, 11 Dec 1884, p2


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mountainous.100 Mokau had been rejected as a possible route for the railway, while the coal industry was slow to start and in the hands of private speculators. Government officials therefore saw no immediate need to put to the test their claims to have purchased the Mokau-Awakino blocks.

The Crown takes control

It was the change in power dynamics and the decline in the ‘compact’ which led to the Crown taking practical control over the Mokau-Awakino blocks. This meant that from the mid to late 1880s, Government officials rarely consulted with Mokau leaders or showed significant interest in their attitudes and interests. Instead, the Crown responded to political pressure from Europeans and granted Jones legal control of lands south of the Mokau River while selling or leasing to Pakeha ‘Crown lands’ north of the river.

This apparently took place without any further investigations over the complicated questions surrounding the transactions, including the Mokau block. As discussed, the Crown in 1854 had been confronted by powerful and multi-levelled opposition to completing this transaction. A deed in May 1854 had been signed with some local Maori, purporting to alienate the Mokau block while excluding a number of areas within it which the Crown signalled it would shortly purchase. However, as hostility and disputes persisted, Government officials were forced to abandon efforts to either complete the purchase or to clearly mark out which areas it claimed to have acquired and those which it did not.101 Even disregarding the question of whether the transaction had been agreed to by all the rights-owners, the legal status of the arrangement remained murky. The deed itself was somewhat ambiguous about the status of the transaction and the Crown did not, at least at this stage, officially proclaim any of the Mokau block the property of the Crown.102

However, these complexities did not bother Government officials, who were becoming interested in establishing a township on the Mokau block. As mentioned, the block was surveyed in 1884, with areas excluded from the ‘purchase’ apparently marked out. In June 1886, accompanied by reports that the land ‘was in the hands of the Government’, further preparations were carried out for establishing a township.103

The problem concerning the Government was where it would find settlers willing to pay for land in the township and in the Mokau-Awakino blocks in general. Although European politicians and newspapers continued to extravagantly promote the economic potential of the area, few settlers were convinced. In 1886, there were reports that a private company was planning to ‘introduce and settle foreigners upon

100 ‘Urenui’, Taranaki Herald, 11 Dec 1884, p2 101 See chapter 3.7 102 See chapter 3.10 103 ‘Township Being Laid out at Mokau’, Taranaki Herald, 14 Jun 1886, p2


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the land’. Ballance, as Minister of Lands, was said to be interested in the project.104

Nothing came of this idea and there remained little immediate European interest in or need for the land. However, the desire for colonisation and more land acquisition, and its imagined economic advantages, remained potent. The 1887 election for the New Plymouth member of the House of Representatives saw both candidates agree on the pressing need to open up the Mokau. Their point of difference was whether the Government or private enterprise should lead the way. EM Smith advocated the need for the Government to support entrepreneurs and coal companies, especially by establishing better roads. He proudly pointed out his long connection with Mokau coal mining and argued that in the area ‘lay sufficient natural wealth to pay the whole national debt of New Zealand’ if only a decent road was built.105

His opponent, the incumbent Oliver Samuel, denied accusations that Mokau had been neglected during his tenure. He emphasised that the Government should acquire and control land settlement in the area, and that efforts should be made to ensure the land was not bound ‘up in the hand of a few’ speculators, including Jones.106

Both approaches were adopted by the Government in the following year. It lent great assistance to private entrepreneurs, most notably Joshua Jones. It also, from early 1888, tried to facilitate settlement by selling or leasing the four Mokau-Awakino blocks. By early 1890, it was reported that perhaps 25,000 acres of this land had been acquired by Pakeha.107 Much of it was apparently in the ownership of absentee speculators, who left it unimproved and unoccupied.108 Indeed, despite a scattering of settlers involved in flax milling, farming and coal mining, Europeans had by the 1880s acquired far more land throughout the Mokau district than they could utilise.109 It could therefore be argued that the Government had, for little real need or purpose, on-sold land that it had questionable title over.

The attitudes of local Maori to the seizing and selling of the Mokau-Awakino blocks is not recorded. This in itself is an indication of the lack of consultation which characterised the entire process. More than thirty years after some highly disputed and then seemingly abandoned negotiations, the Government did not tell local Maori that it was taking control of the lands. Nonetheless, the response of local Maori can easily be imagined, given the long history of resistance and non-recognition to these Crown ‘purchases’. It can only be presumed that many of them saw the entire process as another blow not just to their lands, but to their faith in the Government.

Reserves

104 ‘New Zealand Telegrams’, Taranaki Herald, 19 Jul 1883, p2 105 ‘Elections for General Assembly’, Taranaki Herald, 17 Sep 1887, p2 106 ‘Election Addresses’, Taranaki Herald, 20 Sep 1887, p2 107 ‘Chamber of Commerce’, Taranaki Herald, 21 Jun 1890, p2 108 ‘British Politics’, Taranaki Herald, 19 Apr 1893, p2; 109 ‘Land for Settlement’ Taranaki Herald, 23 Jan 1893, p2; ‘Outside the Taranaki Provincial District’, Taranaki Herald, 23 Jan 1893, p2


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One issue that requires further research is the situation relating to the reserves promised from the Mokau-Awakino purchases of the 1850s. Preliminary research suggests that the Crown’s handling of this matter was marked by confusion, carelessness and a failure to consult with Maori. However, it should be emphasised that more work is required on this subject.110

The Government officially recorded 11 reserves or pieces of land that would be excluded from the transactions of the 1850s.111 Later Government investigations suggested that these promised reserves ranged in size from 884 acres to 6 acres.112 Furthermore, local Maori claimed that they had been promised additional reserves which the Crown had neglected to officially record.113

As we have seen, both the Crown and local Maori saw the provision of reserves as a central element in the land ‘agreements’ of the 1850s. It would seem that many of the promised reserves were places of specific importance for local Maori. For instance, Te Piripiri, stipulated as a reserve from the Taumatamaire block, was evidently an important area for canoe transport. The Taumatamaire deed of purchase specified that: ‘One portion has been reserved for ourselves as a landing place for the canoes of the people of the interior at te Piripiri’.114 Local Maori also demanded that kainga, such as the Te Kauri settlement on the banks of the Mokau River, be excluded from transactions.115

The Crown essentially ignored the issue of reserves during the 30 or so years that it was unable to assert control over any of the land within these blocks. However, when the Government began to claim practical control over the blocks from the mid 1880s, local Maori renewed their demands that the reserves promised in the 1850s be marked out and protected. Judging by the official correspondence, the Crown failed to investigate this issue with any rigour. Instead, it on-sold land to settlers that were meant to be Maori reserves and generally failed to follow up on Maori protests.116 By 1896, only one of the 11 officially promised reserves had been granted.117

Even this reserve was not in the correct area. According to Crown purchasing officer John Rogan, during the Awakino negiotiations in 1854 the ‘only thing he [Takerei]

110 The file at National Archives, Wellington, ‘Awakino and Mokau Native Reserves, 1885-1904’, AADS accession W3562 box 331 record no 22/3009 is one avenue for this further research. 111 Turton’s Deeds, vol 1, pp623-629, Deed Nos. 452, 453, 454 and 455, as cited in Stokes, p 227; ‘Return of Native Reserves’, AJHR, 1862, E-10, pp4-5 112 ‘Native Reserves at Mokau & c.’ [no date, but produced in 1896] 28142 in ‘Awakino and Mokau Native Reserves, 1885-1904’, AADS accession W3562 box 331 record no 22/3009, ANZ, Wgt 113 Rangi Henare to Lewis, 11 Jul 1885, NO 85/2339 in ‘Awakino and Mokau Native Reserves, 1885-1904’, AADS accession W3562 box 331 record no 22/3009, letter in Maori with English translation 114 Turton’s Deeds, vol 1, p628 115 Turton’s Deeds, vol 1, No 453, pp625-627 116 The area known as Otiau or Otio that was supposed to be Maori land excluded from the Rauroa transaction was also instead sold by the Crown. ‘Native Reserves at Mokau & c.’ [no date, but produced in 1896] 28142 in ‘Awakino and Mokau Native Reserves, 1885-1904’, AADS accession W3562 box 331 record no 22/3009 117 ‘Native Reserves at Mokau & c.’ [no date, but produced in 1896] 28142 in ‘Awakino and Mokau Native Reserves, 1885-1904’, AADS accession W3562 box 331 record no 22/3009, ANZ, Wgt


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asked for was two sections of 50 acres each for his two boys’, Hone Wetere Te Rerenga and Te Rangituataka.118 Takerei and his family continuously pressed the Crown to survey and acknowledge these areas. In 1857, Government surveyor WN Searancke, in Mokau on other business, and at ‘Ta Kerei’s constantly expressed wish ... mark out the 50 acre sections for his sons’ at the north of the Awakino block.119

However, in the mid to late 1880s nearly all the Awakino block was on-sold to settlers, including the areas specified for Te Rangituataka and Wetere. This led to a series of protests by the two chiefs.120 Native Department officials were instructed to look into the whole situation of Mokau reserves, not an easy task given the Crown’s poor records and officials’ apparent refusal to take the trouble to go and talk with local Maori about these issues. Instead, when Wetere died in March 1889, Crown officials seemed to view it as an opportunity to forget the issue. One reported that with ‘Wetere now being dead the matter [of the sold 50 acre reserves] may rest for the present’.121

However, the protests from local Maori, including from Te Rangituataka and from Wetere’s children and whanau, continued.122 Despite that, the Crown’s response remained painfully slow. In June 1892 it finally got around to setting aside a 50 acre area for Te Rangituataka, not in the Awakino block but rather in the Taumatamaire block. They neglected to even tell Te Rangituataka where the reserve was and eighteen months later, he was still writing to the Minister of Native Affairs asking whether his reserve had been granted and ‘if it has, where is that piece located?’123

Apart from this rather inadequate attempt at redress for Te Rangituataka, by 1896 no reserves had been officially set aside for local Maori. Further research is required to understand whether the Government was only extremely slow in honouring its promises regarding reserves, or whether it failed to honour them at all. But at the very least, it would seem that Government neglect and the failure to listen to Maori protests regarding reserves had contributed to the increasing landlessness and disillusionment of Mokau hapu during the 1880s and 1890s.

9.3 The Crown Acquisition of Most of Mohakatino Parininihi

118 Evidence of John Rogan, 19 March 1891, Rees-Carroll Native Lands Laws Commission, AJHR, 1891, G-1, p56. See chapter three for more on the issue of reserves during the 1850s negotiations. The promise in the Awakino deed of 50 acres for ‘Reihana[,] Takerei’s son’ refers to Te Rangituataka, also known as Reihana. 119 WN Searancke, Mokau Heads to McLean, 20 January 1857, McLean Papers, MS-Papers-0032-0561 120 The area known as Otiau or Otio that was supposed to be Maori land excluded from the Rauroa transaction was also sold by the Crown without Maori consent. ‘Native Reserves at Mokau & c.’ [no date, but produced in 1896] 28142 in ‘Awakino and Mokau Native Reserves, 1885-1904’, AADS accession W3562 box 331 record no 22/3009 121 Minute from Morpeth, 22 March 1889 in ‘Awakino and Mokau Native Reserves, 1885-1904’, AADS accession W3562 box 331 record no 22/3009, NA Wgtn. 122 Te Rangituataka and Kingi Wetere to Under Secretary Lewis, 20 May 1889, letter in Maori with English translation, NO 89/1332 in ‘Awakino and Mokau Native Reserves, 1885-1904’, AADS accession W3562 box 331 record no 22/3009 123 Raihana Takerei to Minister of Native Affairs, 23 December 1893, letter in Maori with English translation, NO 92/922 in ‘Awakino and Mokau Native Reserves, 1885-1904’, AADS accession W3562 box 331 record no 22/3009


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Among the Mokau lands that this report is directly concerned with, Mohakatino Parininihi was the only substantial block that remained under Maori control in 1890. By 1900, five-sixths of the block had been purchased. The reasons for its alienation were closely linked to some of the broader stresses afflicting Mokau Maori during this period. Communal strength and cohesion had been damaged after years of land loss, and by the divisions and fragmentation engendered by the Native Land Court system. Local hapu and leaders were increasingly marginalised, economically and politically. The small-scale growth in European settlement and farming had provided little scope for Maori control or benefit. Nor had the nascent coal industry brought its tribal sponsors the expected prosperity or partnership. Perhaps most damagingly, the attempts to constructively interact with the Crown and its political and legal institutions had resulted not in authority and alliance but in threat and disillusionment.

Mokau Maori were therefore highly vulnerable when the Liberal Government began a land acquisition drive throughout Te Rohe Potae. Certainly, there remained strong antipathy to land alienation among the owners of Mohakatino Parininihi and in the region more generally.124 However, Government purchase agents were experienced in exploiting economic need and lack of political power. Indeed, the acquisition of this block provides a typical example of the tactics and circumstances that led during this decade to the Government’s acquisition of more than 600,000 acres in the inquiry district, and two million acres throughout the North Island.125 By working in tandem with the Native Land Court, and undermining communal opposition through the gradual acquisition of individual interests, the Government was able to secure the great majority of the Mohakatino Parininihi block.

The block between 1882 and 1890

Mohakatino Parininihi had gone before the Native Land Court in 1882 as part of a struggle between Ngati Maniapoto and Ngati Tama hapu for legal control over the land. Mokau hapu affiliated with Ngati Maniapoto had emerged largely – although not totally – successful from this battle, gaining title over Mohakatino Parininihi no 1, which covered the vast majority of the block. A far smaller area, Mohakatino Parininihi 3, was granted to a Ngati Tama leader, Te Kaeaea, while Mohakatino Parininihi 2 was set aside as payment to WH Grace for debts incurred during the hearings.

Mokau hapu had received title of Mohakatino Parininihi not as a community but as individuals. It was the individualisation of land tenure, and especially the exploitation of it by Government purchasing officers, that would eventually result in the loss of most of the land. However, the full effects of the Native Land Court system were not apparent for much of the 1880s. Probably the clearest immediate effect of the disputatious 1882 hearing was continuing tribal tension and arguments among those

124 Marr, The Alienation of Maori Land... Part one, p56 125 Tutahanga Douglas, Craig Innes, James Mitchell, ‘Alienation of Maori Land Within Te Rohe Potae Inquiry District, 1840-2010: A Quantitative Study’, report commissioned by Waitangi Tribunal, June 2010 draft, p131 and Alan Ward, An Unsettled History: Treaty Claims in New Zealand Today (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 1999), pp148, 153


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who had favoured use of the Court versus those who had called for a continuing boycott. Ngati Tama and Taranaki Maori chiefs pressed unsuccessfully for a rehearing, while there were rumours that Kingitanga-aligned chiefs who had refused to attend the original hearings would do the same.126 However, the only rehearing that took place was in January 1884 and was inspired by apparently Ngati Maniapoto-connected individuals angry over not being included in the original list of owners. To stop this protest, Wetere Te Rerenga agreed that a further 33 names be added to the owner list.127 There were now 174 registered owners, although the Court had not issued final title to the block as a survey had not been completed.

Mokau hapu were therefore able to prevent attempts by the Government and private interests to purchase the block.128 This became easier as Pakeha interest in the block diminished when the hopes of finding gold were dashed. The owners also fended off Joshua Jones’ attempts to acquire the land. In general, it would seem that through the 1880s Mokau hapu were able to live on and use Mohakatino Parininihi much as before.

This use included the well-established practice of placing individual Pakeha on the land in order to gain new economic opportunities. In 1889, Wetere Te Rerenga and others agreed that James Rattenbury could live on part of the block, build a house and carry out flax milling and farming.129 This relationship resembled earlier attempts to establish mutually beneficial ties with Pakeha, and was, initially at least, markedly less problematic than the association with Jones. Rattenbury, while not prosperous, was a well-established and solvent settler, who brought his adult family and a number of other Pakeha to the area. In return for informal land rights, he provided payment, goods and gifts to local people, as well as employment in his flax mill.130 He and his family evidently enjoyed close ties with the Wetere whanau in particular. After Te Rerenga’s death, Kingi Wetere would take the lead in supporting the settlers and managing the arrangement. The two families would be further bound together when one of Rattenbury’s sons married a niece of Kingi’s.131

During this period Rattenbury did not seek to gain a Government-recognised land sale or lease, which contributed to the apparently harmonious relations. Crown pre-emption made this legally difficult, although not practically impossible. However,

126 Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, p96; Grace to Jones, 14 Apr 1883 and Grace to Jones, 16 Dec 1883, WH Grace Letterbook 1880-1892, MSY-4506, pp405-406, 591 127 Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, pp89-96 128 As far as I can tell, the 1894 comment from the Under Secretary of the Native Department that Maori had repeatedly attempted to sell the land between 1882 and 1892 was incorrect. Minute of P Sheridan, 8 August 1894, NLP 94/189, MA-MLP 1 1901/69, in Paula Berghan, ‘Supporting Papers to CFRT 1508 Te Rohe Potae Inquiry District Research Assistance Projects: Block Narratives’, July 2009, vol 23, p768 129 James Rattenbury to Native Minister, 18 July 1894, MA-MLP 1 1901/69 in Berghan, ‘Supporting Papers’, vol. 23, pp772-774 130 Berghan, ‘Supporting Papers’, vol. 23, including James Rattenbury to Native Minister, 18 July 1894, pp772-774; Cecil Seymour to E O’Hara Smith, 9 August 1893, NLP 99/2-0 in MA-MLP 1 1901/69, pp788-791; E Ohara Smith to Minister of Lands 23 April 1894 in MA-MPL 1 1901/69, pp779-782 131 ‘Personal’, Taranaki Herald, 29 Dec 1908, p7


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Rattenbury apparently saw little need for legal title in an area where the Crown had little practical influence, and was therefore not in a position to interfere with legally questionable informal land arrangements. For local hapu, the deal with Rattenbury and his party provided useful if limited economic benefits while not challenging their ultimate control over the land. Crown purchasing agents would prove a far more formidable threat.

Considerations of purchase

The Government was not initially interested in buying Mohakatino Parininihi. When its purchasing programme began in Te Rohe Potae in 1889, the focus was on areas more attractive to European settlement and nearer the main trunk railway line. It was the inability to secure this more valuable land that led some Crown officials to consider Mohakatino Parininihi. Not for the first time, Mokau was portrayed by Government officials as a step towards greater intrusion in the wider region. In early 1890, WH Grace, Jones’ former agent and now a Crown purchasing officer, called for the Government to purchase any land whatsoever in Te Rohe Potae. This, he hoped, would weaken the prohibition against land selling, and create the internal rivalries and yearning for cash that would lead to the purchase of higher-quality land. Grace thought Mokau the easiest place to start. He had helped arrange the ownership lists for Mohakatino Parininihi and was aware that some prominent northern chiefs had been granted interests in the block. While these chiefs resisted any land transactions in the north of the district, the land purchase officer thought a need for money meant they would sell their interests in a distant, southern area. He wrote to his superiors from Kihikihi:

The old man [Te Rangianini] is very much against selling any of the land in this district, but is willing to sell the block called Mohakatino Parininihi No 1 ... I am confident it would be a good thing to buy that block.132

Having ‘broken the ice’ in Mohakatino Parininihi, Grace was confident land sales in more attractive areas would soon follow:

It will be a commencement and the N. Maniapoto of this part of the district selected to own in this block being only the leading men, should they sell, will be the very thing that will cause the people to become dissatisfied and make them sell other blocks. For they will say ‘why should the principal men sell land and we sit still’? We could commence to buy as nearly all those interested and resident in this part of the Rohepotae – I mean from Te Kuiti northwards – will sell, so also will the majority of those residing at Mokau. It will break the ice and I am sure lead to the selling of those blocks which the Govt are

132 Copy of memo from WH Grace to Wilkinson (no date), MA 13/78, ANZ Wgt, pp42, 44


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more desirous of acquiring.133

The Government initially rejected Grace’s proposal, although not because it was felt that more open and communal negotiation was needed. Rather, officials doubted whether acquiring Mohakatino Parininihi, which they judged ‘practically useless’ for settlement, would serve the Government’s cause.134 Senior purchase officer GT Wilkinson wanted, through buying individual interests, to create a Maori belief that chiefs were breaking the prohibition against selling land inside the great Aotea Rohe Potae block. He believed that negotiations over Mokau land outside of the great block would not create the necessary weakening of communal unity. It was considered more effective to allow economic need to fester so that Maori would sell more attractive lands:

The reason why some of the owners are anxious to sell is because they want money to buy sheep, and for other purposes, and they would like to get it without breaking into, or selling land within Rohepotae if possible ... it seems to me that it would be a mistake to supply their wants by purchasing their interests in a valueless block outside Rohepotae, when by not doing so, but by waiting patiently they will most likely, before long, be willing to dispose of their interests in the blocks we [are interested in] purchasing, more especially if they find they cannot get their desire for money satisfied by other means ...135

Mohakatino Parininihi therefore remained temporarily out of the Government’s sights. Nevertheless, notice had been served that the Crown thought it an easy block to eventually purchase. The tactics eventually used to acquire the block – including the exploitation of Maori impoverishment, the need for development capital, and acquiring individual shares as a means of breaking down collective resistance – had also been foreshadowed.

The Crown purchases neighbouring lands and seizes part of Mohakatino Parininihi

By mid-1890, Government purchase officers were operating just inland from Mohakatino Parininihi. The Umukaimata, Waiaraia and Taorua blocks, which have been the subject of a numbers of specific claims to the Waitangi Tribunal, are outside the parameters of this report. My discussion on these purchases is consequently based on limited research and focuses on issues that overlap with Mohakatino Parininihi.136

Cathy Marr writes that, by mid-1890, senior Te Rohe Potae chiefs, including Wahanui and Te Whaaro, had decided to sell some land in the inland Mokau area to the Crown. This was not intended as a major change in their policy against large-scale land sales.

133 Copy of memo from WH Grace to Wilkinson (no date), MA 13/78, pp42, 44 134 Geo T Wilkinson to Under Secretary, Native Department, 10 March 1890, NLP 90/51 in MA 13/78, p43 135 Geo T Wilkinson to Under Secretary, Native Department, 10 March 1890, pp41-45 136 The following discussion is largely based on Marr, The Alienation of Maori Land ...Part one, pp108-112


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Rather, they offered a few thousand acres of land from within what would soon be defined as the Taorua block, near Mohakatino Parininihi, to the Crown in order to pay Native Land Court-related costs. Crucially, the chiefs were determined to limit the extent of the sale but also to make sure that the arrangement was controlled and defined by Maori acting collectively. The Government’s corrosive purchasing techniques, focusing on the separation of the individual from the community, would be kept at a distance. According to Marr, the ‘decision about the sale and what land had been sold had been reached publicly and by consensus. The Government was now being asked to assist in the process’.137

The Government was not satisfied with such discrete areas or with such a collective method of controlling land negotiations. Wilkinson had, by late 1890, come around to the idea that acquiring land in the Mokau region could set off a chain reaction. He proposed the purchase of Taorua, presenting it as a breakthrough that could lead to large-scale alienation throughout the Rohe Potae. Native Minister Edwin Mitchelson was unconvinced, due to the fact that the Taorua lands, like Mohakatino Parininihi, had little agricultural potential and were outside of the railway area for which purchase money was more readily available. Wilkinson was instructed that ‘[n]o land should be purchased outside the railway area unless it is fit for immediate settlement’.138

By February 1891, the Liberals were in power. Permission to begin purchasing was given after advice that land near Mokau and its coal had potential for profit and settlement.139 However, rather than restrict itself to the specific part of Taorua that Maori had offered, the Government sought to purchase the whole block before turning to neighbouring lands. Crown officials suggested that when owners were unlikely to communally agree to a sale ‘we could go on buying shares in each as opportunity offers and perhaps eventually acquire the whole of each block’ and that ‘when these blocks are acquired the ice will be fairly broken.’140 As Marr writes:

It is clear that without consultation with the owners, and after only considering its own interests, the Government had unilaterally changed the whole basis of the purchase. The Government had only been offered some land within the blocks. It had decided, however, that its interests were best served by buying the whole block … Wilkinson was expected to buy the land offered, but also to continue with secret individual purchasing throughout the whole block, undermining the authority and wishes of the chiefs.141

Wahanui and Whaaro were astonished by the Government’s plans. Wilkinson was told, first by the chiefs and then by the wider community, that they would not agree to a

137 Ibid, p107 138 E Mitchelson to Lewis, 29 Dec 1890, MA 13/78, p301 139 S Percy Smith to Under Secretary of Native Land Purchase Department, 9 Feb 1891, NLP 91/30, MA 13/78, pp279-280 140 Marr, The Alienation of Maori Land ...Part one, p110 141 Ibid


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wider transaction, especially as it would render landless some of the owners.142 The Government did not respect these demands, and instead carried on aggressive, secret purchasing of individual interests in Taorua and nearby lands. In 1891, a Native Land Court judge had ‘received so much criticism about the activities of the Land Purchase Department in the blocks, that he felt obliged to report the matter to the Chief Judge of the Court and note the criticism in his minute book’.143 The Crown carried on regardless, and by the turn of the century, all of Waiaraia, 88 percent of Umukaimata and 69 percent of Taorua had been alienated.144

These purchases set the model for Crown activities in nearby Mohakatino Parininihi but they would have another, more direct impact. The issue is highly complex. It would seem that while acquiring Waiaraia, the Government wrongfully seized parts of Mohakatino Parininihi and Umukaimata. In 1882, it had been agreed in the Native Land Court that the eastern boundary of the Mohakatino Parininihi block would go from a ‘line from Matapeka’, a waterfall near the source of the Mohakatino River, to the eastern extent of the Taranaki confiscation line.145

However, it would seem that the Government did not follow the appropriate boundaries and instead took for itself a considerable area (estimates vary between 5000 and more than 11,000 acres) of Maori-owned land from the neighbouring Umukaimata and Mohakatino Parininihi blocks.146 These mistakes stemmed from a rush to survey out the purchased Waiaraia block and the failure to consult with local chiefs. Kingi Wetere took the complaints of the Mohakatino Parininihi owners to the Native Land Court. He argued that the Government surveyors had not checked with local Maori where the Matapeka waterfall was, and as a consequence had seized their land. Judge Gudgeon, after investigation, agreed that it is ‘almost certain that the Waiaraia Block contains probably 6000 acres of land which properly belongs to the Umukaimata and Mohakatino Parininihi No.1 Blocks’.147 The judge commented that the owners:

naturally blame the Land Purchase Dept for the indecent haste displayed in forcing forward the title ... [T]he Maori owners are naturally very wroth and ... do not hesitate to accuse the Government through the Native Land Purchase Dept. of having successfully swindled them out of so much land – this was the expression used in Court by more than one person.148

Judge Gudgeon reported his findings to the Chief Judge of the Native Land Court but there is no evidence that the Court or the Government took any action. The owners,

142 Ibid 143 Ibid, p111 144 Tutahanga Douglas and Craig Innes, ‘Te Rohe Potae Land Alienation, 1840-1908’, a report commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal, 19 February 2010 draft, pp52-53 145 Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, p48 146 Marr, The Alienation of Maori Land ...Part one, p110. See Paul Thomas, ‘Mokau, Including the Mokau-Mohakatino and Mohakatino-Parininihi Blocks’, scoping report commissioned by the Crown Forestry Rental Trust for the Te Rohe Potae Claim, September 2009, pp79-83 for more details 147 Otorohanga NLC Minute Book no 13, p49 148 Ibid, pp48-49


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confronted by official indifference, had few attractive alternatives. Umukaimata owners, led by Te Rewatu Hiriako, went on a decades-long, highly costly and ultimately unsatisfactory search for Parliamentary redress.149

It is not clear if the Mohakatino Parininihi owners took their fight over the survey and the apparent seizing of part of the block to Parliament.150 They may well have been preoccupied with an even greater threat than Government surveyors, namely, Crown purchase officers.

Figure 18: Mohakatino Parininihi c.1900 Crown purchasing and the role of Court

The purchase of the Mohakatino Parininihi block was inextricably linked to the activities of the Native Land Court. More than any individual decision, it was the Court’s creation of individual owners holding alienable shares which provided the framework for the Crown’s purchasing programme. The Court rendered Mohakatino Parininihi a commodity that could be sold, with the community of owners transformed into list of individuals holding paper shares to the block. Crown purchase officers consulted these lists and calculated what prices they were willing to pay for the block

149 Native Affairs Committee, Petition 748/1907 AJHR, 1908, I-3, p5; Under-Secretary, to Chairman of Native Affairs Committee, 8 September, 1925, LE1 1925/12. Native Affairs Committee Petition 129 in ‘King Country Petitions Document Bank’, p2371; LE1 1925/12. Native Affairs Committee Petition 129 in ‘King Country Petitions Document Bank’, pp2366-2374 150 It is worth pointing out that the official definition of the Mohakatino Parininihi block seems to have stemmed almost entirely from the land acquisition demands of Pakeha, rather than through consultation and the wishes of local Maori. The southern boundary of the block was the Taranaki confiscation line. The northern boundary stemmed from Jones’ disputed lease of Mokau Mohakatino. The eastern boundary came from the apparently bungled Government survey of Waiaraia. The long, straight lines that define both the Mokau Mohakatino and Mohakatino Parininihi block are, in themselves, a good indication that the surveying process did not stem from the involvement or the traditional boundaries of local Maori.


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per acre and per share. They then approached the individual share-owners and despite facing considerable opposition, gradually acquired the majority of shares. The Court transformed these paper acquisitions into a physical piece of land, the largest part of Mohakatino Parininihi, which was declared Crown property. The Court seems to have rubber-stamped the Government’s requests for what area it would be granted, without significant investigation or discussion with the non-sellers. Instead, the Court grouped the non-sellers interests into smaller subdivisions and a new round of purchasing individual shares and Court partitions began. By 1899, this process had resulted in the Crown and Pakeha owning the great majority of the Mohakatino Parininihi block. The rump of the block that remained nominally under Maori ownership was firmly in the grip of a damaging system of land tenure over which local communities had little control.

In the early 1890s the Native Land Court, under pressure from the Government and its purchase officers, sped up the process of defining individual shares for Te Rohe Potae lands.151 In July 1892, the Otorohanga Court stated that Mohakatino Parininihi no 1 block had 174 owners, who possessed between them 159.5 shares. Some of the more prominent owners and leaders were allocated 1.5 shares each. Other owners were granted one share, while it would seem that non-residents and others considered to have less of a connection to the land were granted a half or even a quarter of a share. Little is known about the role and attitudes of local Maori in this process. It is not clear, for instance, whether the Court, as it was entitled to do, ordered this definition of individual entities without a request to do so from local Maori.152 Kingi Wetere was the only owner who appeared in Court. He provided a list of suggested shares, prepared by himself and Tawhana Te Kaharoa which the Court, after significant modifications, largely accepted.153

Almost immediately, the Crown’s efforts to purchase Mohakatino Parininihi no 1 began in earnest. There are many gaps in our knowledge of what took place as the Land Purchase Department mislaid many of the relevant records.154 It is apparent that the purchase officers were not able to acquire land as quickly or easily as they had expected. They faced considerable opposition from individual owners and from local leaders, especially Kingi Wetere. Continuing his father’s stance, Kingi favoured some form of land lease or arrangements with individual settlers such as Rattenbury (and even Jones), in order to establish beneficial relations while maintaining control over the land. However, he and many others were highly reluctant to enter into land sales with the Crown. By September 1883, Crown officials were reporting that some of the ‘Natives have refused to sell their share to the Govt., i.e. King[i] & his hapu’.155

151 See Paul Husband’s upcoming report on the Native Land Court in Te Rohe Potae for more on this issue. 152 1888 Native Land Court 1886 Amendment Act, s21 153 Otorohanga NLC Minute Book no 14, pp1-9, 32-37 154 A Brown to Commissioner of Crown Lands, 31 Dec 1895, MA-MLP 1 1909/69, in Berghan, ‘Supporting Papers’, vol 23, p751 155 E O’Hara Smith to Under Secretary of Crown Lands, 19 Sep 1893, MA-MLP 1 1901/69, in Berghan, ‘Supporting Papers’, vol. 23, p784


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Despite this continuing opposition, by March 1894 the Crown had acquired a majority of the shares and applied to the Court for its interests to be partitioned out. Wilkinson informed the Court that the no 1 block was around 62,000 acres. On behalf of the Crown, he had acquired 89.9 out of a total of 159.5 shares which was calculated to equate to just over 34,945 acres. This left the non-sellers with just over 27,054 acres. The Crown asked to be granted the southern area of the block, which would give it ownership over a large contiguous area including the Taranaki confiscated land.156

The Court agreed, having carried out only a perfunctory investigation as to whether Maori owners approved of this submission. Evidence was taken only from Kingi, who appeared to be at the Court on other business. As we have seen, Kingi had generally taken up a leading role in arguing against sales and had also tried to exercise a degree of chiefly control over the entire process of Crown purchasing and Court hearings. He told the Court in 1892 that ‘I am the leading man by all the Ngatimaniapoto and I am the person to manage the affairs by this block’.157

As individual shares were purchased and the land became fragmented, Kingi also needed to be cognisant of his own personal and whanau interests. He became, by necessity, a regular and skilful user of the Court. The Court treated him as the sole spokesperson for all the owners and made little effort to hear other opinions or to enquire closely into their interests.

In this case, Kingi stated that he was the representative of the non-sellers and that he had no objections to the Crown being granted the southern part of the block. Kingi’s personal focus had switched to his desire to be granted the north-western part of the block and protect it from sale. He and his whanau had close links with this land and had installed Rattenbury on it. Kingi therefore had little personal reason to fight the Crown’s request. However, his brief remarks suggested that there were non-sellers with strong ties to the area that the Crown was seeking, and who were not present at the Court to give their views. The Court was not delayed by this and a few days later, without any more input from Maori, granted the Crown the area it wanted, which was named Mohakatino Parininihi no 1A.158

Shortly, afterwards, Kingi requested that the Court partition the non-sellers’ part of the block into three subdivisions. The Court approved this without objections and without hearing from any other witnesses. The numbers used to describe these holdings are testament to the fragmentation, individualisation and confusion that the Court was presiding over. Mohakatino Parininihi no 1B was granted to Kingi, Te Rangituataka and seven others, apparently from their whanau. They possessed 8 and 8/45 shares which, after calculation, was deemed to entitle them to 27,054 acres, 2 roods, and 7 and one quarter perches. (Given that this process of fragmentation continued to

156 Otorohanga NLC Minute Book no 21, pp241-242, 266. The small Mohakatino Parininihi no 2 and no 3 blocks were not part of the Crown purchase. 157 Otorohanga NLC Minute Book no 14, p1 158 Ibid, p266


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worsen, we will hereafter use more approximate figures.) Mohakatino Parininihi no 1C of just over 11,890 acres was granted to 26 owners, including Takirau Watihi, Te Oro Watihi and Te Wetini Paueta who possessed slightly more than 30.5 shares. Epiha Karoro and 41 others, possessing almost 31 shares, were granted 1D, representing the balance of the block.159

Despite the fragmentation and divisions taking place, it would seem that the aim of many owners was to prevent further sales. All three subdivisions were declared inalienable, apparently on Kingi’s request. However, alienation restrictions were little deterrence to the purchase officers, especially as legislation passed under the Liberals had made it easy to set aside or evade these protections.160

By March 1899, the Government had purchased most of the shares in the ‘inalienable’ 1C and 1D subdivisions. Almost 20 of the nearly 31 shares of 1D had been acquired. The Crown requested and was granted the 7560-acre 1D West block. The non-sellers were left with 1D East of 4425 acres.161 The Crown had also acquired roughly 14.33 out of a total of 30.5 shares for IC, and were granted 1C East of 5574 acres leaving the non-sellers with the 6316-acre 1C West block.162

Again, it would seem that the Court ratified the Crown’s requests on what areas it would be allocated. By securing 1D West and the neighbouring 1C East, the Government had acquired a contiguous area in the middle of the block. The only evidence of consultation with Maori over this was that Wilkinson claimed that Kingi Wetere, who did not even have interests in these areas, had agreed that the Crown could take 1D West.163

The process of Crown purchasing

The limited available evidence suggests that the Government adopted similar tactics to purchase Mohakatino Parininihi as it was using in the wider inquiry district and indeed throughout the North Island. Government purchasing in the 1890s was based around the acquisition of individual shares. The Waitangi Tribunal, in its report on the Central North Island claims, stated that this:

effectively undermined or destroyed community control and decision-making over lands, while leaving individuals open to pressure to sell their negotiable signatures outside the protection of their communities.164

There is no record that the Crown ever held hui to discuss with the Mohakatino Parininihi owners whether they, as a community, wanted to sell the land. However, senior leaders such as Kingi Wetere clearly informed Government purchase officers of

159 Otorohanga NLC Minute Book 21, pp307-310 160 Waitangi Tribunal, Te Urewera (Wellington: Waitangi Tribunal, 2010), Part II, vol. 2, p770 161 Otorohanga NLC Minute Book no 35, p137 162 Ibid, pp154-55 163 Ibid, p137 164 Waitangi Tribunal, He Maunga Rongo, p617


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their opposition to sales. Despite this, resistance gradually splintered, largely it would seem because of poverty and the obstacles placed in their way of having the leases invalidated.

Need was so great – and the prospect for successful use of land under the Native Land Court system so small – that the owners sold their shares for relatively small amounts. It would seem that the average rate received for selling one full share was around £48 9s. This meant that prominent owners who possessed and sold 1.5 shares received approximately £72 18s while an owner selling half a share received just over £19.165 Many owners possessed less than half a share. Such sums were not insignificant for an impoverished person but they hardly provided the basis for a secure economic future.

It was the Government that set and ruthlessly enforced the price that would be paid for the land. The Government set the standard rate that it was willing to pay for Mohakatino Parininihi at just two shillings six pence per acre.166 This rate did not change throughout the 1890s, nor vary depending on the particular partition the Government was buying. This was among the lowest rates the Government paid for land in Te Rohe Potae. It has been calculated that throughout the inquiry district, the maximum price the Crown paid during the 1890s varied between five and 10 shillings per acre. The minimum price varied during the decade between one shilling and sixpence to four shillings per acre.167 Leanne Boulton notes, by way of contrast, that the Government during the 1890s paid 84 shillings per acre to break up the large European-held estates in lands under settlement schemes, although it should be remembered that these lands were highly developed and considered of far higher quality than the rugged Mohakatino Parininihi block.168

Te Rohe Potae Maori could criticise, as they frequently did, the low prices offered for their lands but it would seem that purchase officers in Mohakatino Parininihi would not budge.169 In fact, the Government ended up paying in reality just under the two shillings and sixpence they set as the standard rate for the block. In total, the Government acquired over 49,079 acres of Mohakatino Parininihi at a total cost of £5964.170

Despite these low prices, some owners were in such difficult financial situations that they approached the Government desperate to sell their interests. In 1895, Alfred Yates tried repeatedly to sell his brother’s shares in Mohakatino Parininihi as his

165 This is a rough calculation only. It stems from the fact that £5964 was paid for roughly 123.2 shares, which suggests £48.4 was paid for each share. Figures calculated from AJHR, 1894, G-3, p3; AJHR, 1899, G-3, p5; Otorohanga NLC Minute Book no 14, p1 and Otorohanga NLC Minute Book no 35, pp137, 154-5 166 See AJHRs, 1893-1899, Lands Purchased and Leased from Natives in the North Island 167 Leanne Boulton, ‘Land Alienation in the Rohe Potae Inquiry District’ overview, December 2010 draft, pp329-330 168 Ibid, p330 169 Boulton, ‘Land Alienation in the Rohe Potae’ overview, p188, passim 170 AJHR, 1894, G-3, p3; ibid, 1899, G-3, p5


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brother was ‘in great need of the cash’.171

Government purchase officers Wilkinson and Grace had considerable knowledge of the local situation and were expertly placed to identify those most likely to sell.172 Purchase officers considered achieving even a few initial purchases of shares an important way of gaining a foothold in a block and weakening resistance to sale. Apart from purchasing from impoverished owners, Government purchase officers often targeted absentee owners and those with lesser connections to the land.173 There are some indications that this was done in Mohakatino Parininihi. Government agents travelled in search of signatures and owners based in Rotorua, Coromandel, Otaki, Wellington and Auckland sold their interests.174 In certain years, the Government was able to purchase very few shares in Mohakatino Parininihi but most opposition was eventually overcome.

Another common Government tactic during this period was to make extra or discretionary payments to influential owners in exchange for them encouraging others to sell.175 Teni Rangihapainga Paraone and her husband George Brown were involved in land dealing throughout the region, as were her sister Annie Walker and her husband Nevil Walker. Teni was not originally included on the list of owners for Mohakatino Parininihi but she and a number of others apparently connected with her, were added after placing pressure on Wetere Te Rerenga and demanding a rehearing of the block.176

Teni’s background in land dealing and connection to many non-resident owners meant that the Government was anxious to enlist her help in the purchase of this block. The Government advanced her money to secure shares. By April 1895, she had facilitated the sale of £184 14s 9d worth of shares, including her own and six others. What payment she received for this service is not clear. She was certainly under pressure to buy land, as she had to repay the Government the balance if she did not achieve £200 worth of sales.177

The Government also considered obstructing the relationship between local Maori and the Rattenbury group in order to further their land purchasing agenda. The resulting economic hardship would, it was believed, push Kingi and his people (who were considered bulwarks against land sales) into selling their shares. In August 1893, a local police constable wrote to the auditor of land revenue to complain that Rattenbury and his partner Purdie were occupying land on the block, running cattle and sheep, and

171 Yates to Alfred M Grace, 5 Jan 1895, MA-MLP 1 1909/69, in Berghan, ‘Supporting Papers’, vol 23, p764 172 Wilkinson was the main Crown officer in the purchase. 173 Waitangi Tribunal, He Maunga Rongo, p614-615 174 WH Grace to Gill, 10 Oct 1895 (and related minutes and material, MA-MLP 1 1909/69, in Berghan, ‘Supporting Papers’, vol. 23, pp761-764. Also Otorohanga NLC Minute Book no 35, pp137, 154 175 Waitangi Tribunal, He Maunga Rongo, p616 176 Mokau-Waitara NLC Minute Book no 1, pp91-92 177 Accounts recorded by GT Wilkinson, 4 April 1895, MA-MLP 1 1909/69, in Berghan, ‘Supporting Papers’, vol 23, p759


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providing payments and goods to local Maori. He blamed this for the slow progress in land purchasing:

It must be obvious to you that so long as Rattenbury remains on the land and keeps the Natives (who support him) in stores etc the purchase of the remaining shares will not be completed for some time. There are many persons in different parts of New Zealand who are only waiting for this land to be opened up. This I know from the number of persons who call at my house.178

The Government considered prosecuting Rattenbury, or having him ejected from the area, for not observing Government pre-emption in the area. It was said Rattenbury had been paying Kingi a few pounds for what the chief called a gift, but which was suspected to be a land arrangement.179 Rattenbury was seen as a rival and impediment to the Crown’s purchasing efforts, and there were fears he would soon attempt to turn his informal deal with Kingi’s people into purchase or lease.

The threat of prosecution – and the Government’s attempts to acquire the land he was using – convinced Rattenbury that he needed legally-recognised title. He began to lobby senior Government ministers to be granted the right to purchase or lease part of 1B, owned by Kingi and others. He enlisted some well-connected Taranaki politicians and businessmen to argue his case.180 Rattenbury was presented as a pioneer settler of the ‘North Taranaki wilds’ and compared to Joshua Jones.181 Rattenbury offered, if allowed to acquire part of 1B, to use his good reputation to convince the owners to sell the rest of the area to the Crown.182

Government officials began to consider whether it would not serve their interests better to align themselves with Rattenbury rather than persecute him. The Surveyor-General was sent in April 1897 to examine the area. He was ‘surprised at the fuss’ that had been made of acquiring such unpromising land and advised the Government to ‘have nothing to do with the [1B] Block at all’.183 He recommended that Rattenbury be permitted to purchase 1B while the Government focussed on purchasing ‘some very fair land ... capable of settlement’ on 1C.184

The Government agreed. In July 1897, 1B was exempted from the prohibition on

178 Cecil Seymour to O’Hara Smith, 9 Aug 1893, NLP 99/209, MA-MLP 1 1909/69, in Berghan, ‘Supporting Papers’, vol 23, p788 179 Ibid and E O’Hara Smith to Under Secretary of Crown Lands, 19 Sep 1883, MA-MLP 1 1909/69, in Berghan, ‘Supporting Papers’, vol 23, pp783-785 180 Lawry to Seddon, 4 Jul 1896, MA-MLP 1 1909/69, in Berghan, ‘Supporting Papers’, vol 23, p746 181 Minute of Sheridan, 8 Aug 1894, in NLP 94/189, MA-MLP 1 1909/69, in Berghan, ‘Supporting Papers’, vol 23, p768 182 Rattenbury to Native Minister, 25 Jul 1896, MA-MLP 1 1909/69, in Berghan, ‘Supporting Papers’, vol 23, p7741-743 183 Surveyor General to Minister of Lands, 6 Apr 1897, SG 21191, MA-MLP 1 1909/69, in Berghan, ‘Supporting Papers’, vol 23, p734 184 Ibid, in Berghan, ‘Supporting Papers’, vol 23, p734


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private dealings in Maori land.185 In the past, the owners had appeared to be consistently against any sale of the block, but open to some form of land lease with Rattenbury. But by this point, there seemed little protection against land sales. By 1898, Rattenbury had purchased the entire 1B block of over 3187 acres.186

In total, at least 51,266 acres of Mohakatino Parininihi no 1 were acquired in the 1890s, from a block estimated to be around 61,000 acres. The great majority of owners had lost all legal rights to the land. Of the two subdivisions that remained in Maori ownership, most of 1C West would later be sold after a series of partitions and alienations.187 It would seem that 1D East of 4,425 acres still remained in Maori hands.188 If so, it was a rare survivor. By the turn of the twentieth century, Mokau and its lands were no longer under Maori control.

9.4 The Purchase of Mokau Mohakatino No 1

By the early twentieth century many Mokau Maori were reported to be landless or virtually so.189 The great majority of land in Mokau was under Crown or private European control and many of their interests in the Aotea Rohe Potae block had been lost during the Government’s purchasing drive of the previous decade.

Adding to their problems, local hapu were largely unable to exercise communal control or derive significant economic benefit from those lands that remained technically in their ownership. Most significantly, the 56,500-acre Mokau Mohakatino no 1 block was locked in a series of disastrous and disputed 56-year leases to Joshua Jones and his successors.190 Many of the owners refused to recognise these leases and some continued to occupy the land.191 But with the block in the exclusive legal possession of absentee Pakeha speculators, local Maori were unable to develop the land or utilise it in any sustained manner. They received only paltry rents while being subject to heavy survey debts and other costs.

Despite this bleak situation, there remained hope among Mokau hapu that the Crown or the courts would strike out these hated leases to Jones and return the land. These hopes were first raised and then destroyed between 1907 and 1911. Government commissions condemned the leases as harmful, legally invalid and as having been systematically violated by Jones and other Pakeha. Despite receiving these reports, the Government showed no interest in returning the land, and did not assist or advise local Maori in their desperate and expensive attempts to seek justice through the

185 Berghan, ‘CFRT 1508 Te Rohe Potae Inquiry District Research Assistance Projects: Block Narratives’ (hereafter ‘Block Narratives’), p574 186 ‘Land on line’ website, Taranaki Certificates of Title, TN CT 33/297 and 34/222 187 Berghan, ‘Block Narratives’, p574 and Herlihy, section on Mohakatino Parininihi No. 1 188 Berghan, ‘Block Narratives’, p574 and Herlihy, section on Mohakatino Parininihi No. 1, p6 189 AJHR, 1909, Session 1, G-1i, p7. Note that AJHR, 1911, I-3A, including p38 suggests that many owners retained interests in some lands elsewhere, although it would seem that they had limited control over these lands and derived few economic benefits. 190 AJHR, 1911, I-3A, p218 191 Ibid, p213


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courts. Instead, the Government attempted to acquire the land for itself. When that effort was abandoned, it oversaw the sale of 53,285 acres, virtually the entire block, to a Pakeha coal and property company. This sale took place despite considerable protest from Maori owners. Owner resistance was ultimately undermined through poverty and by Government legislation and institutions that were directed more towards facilitating land alienation than protecting Maori interests.

The Stout-Ngata commission

In 1907, the Native Lands Commission, better known as the Stout-Ngata commission, recommended to the Government that there should be no resumption of land purchasing in Mokau and stated that the leases to Jones had brought neither benefit to local Maori nor development to the region. The commission noted that Jones’ tactics in securing these leases illustrated the dangers of the ‘old days of free trade’ when Maori rights and the integrity of transactions were not sufficiently protected.192 However, it saw no need to detail the tortured history of these dealings as Government legislation had removed ‘all doubtful matters in connection’ with the leases.193

Rather, the commission cited Mokau Mohakatino no 1 as a textbook example of land leases that were ‘not beneficial to the Maori owners nor to the people of the colony’.194 Maori were ‘compelled’ to lease the land for a meagre fee which was largely swallowed up in costs. The commission noted that the annual rental for the 26,480 acre 1F subdivision was just £25 per year. After land taxes were deducted, the owners received just £7 a year. The absentee lessees had failed to bring development and the ‘area was laying idle’ leading a representative of the owners, Pepene Eketone, to wryly note that if the block ‘were still in Maori hands there would be a loud demand to have it utilised’.195

The commission was under enormous public pressure to identify Maori land for purchase and settlement by Europeans.196 Nevertheless, after discussions with Eketone and other leaders, it did not recommend a resumption of land purchasing in Mokau. Rather, the Government was told that those parts of Mokau Mohakatino still controlled by Maori should not be purchased or leased but instead reserved for owner occupation.197 Likewise, it recommended no further purchasing in the neighbouring Mohakatino Parininihi block, with a thousand acres reserved for Maori occupation and the rest possibly made available for leasing under an improved system overseen by the Maori Land Boards.198 The commission presented the boards as agents of the owners who would stand between Maori and a Pakeha public anxious for settlement and

192 AJHR, 1907, G-1B, p11 193 Ibid 194 Ibid 195 Ibid 196 Waitangi Tribunal, He Maunga Rongo, vol 2, p684 197 AJHR, 1907, G-1B, p22 198 Ibid


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alienation.199

The commission reported that throughout the Rohe Potae the ‘general opinion was hostile to selling’.200 It divided Maori attitudes into two broad factions: a ‘progressive wing’ who were interested in leasing some of their land under the aforementioned Land Board system and reserving the rest for their permanent occupation; and others, linked to the Kingitanga, who exhibited a ‘distrust, based on past experience of pakeha law and justice’ and wanted to ‘manage their own affairs’ outside of Crown institutions and control.201

The commission agreed that widespread further purchasing was not appropriate and that the Crown had a responsibility to preserve a tribal land base.202 It described claims that Maori-owned land in Te Rohe Potae was retarding useful settlement as unfair and exaggerated. Under various forms of pre-emption, the Crown had already acquired vast areas of Te Rohe Potae at prices far below their value and with little long-term benefit to local Maori. According to the commission, the Crown had ‘rated too low the rights of the Maori owners and its responsibility in safeguarding their interests’.203

Perhaps most importantly, the commission’s general vision for Mokau and the wider region was greater partnership between local people and the Government, through the Maori Land Boards in particular. This, it suggested, would allow local Maori to successfully utilise and control their remaining land. Productive use of the land, rather than alienation of it, was presented as the key to the Maori future. The commission therefore called for more training assistance and access to development capital so that Maori farming in the area could be renewed.204 In sum, the commission’s recommendations suggested the possibility of a more positive future for Mokau.

The Stout-Palmer commission

Shortly after the Stout-Ngata commission’s criticism of the effects of the Mokau Mohakatino leases, the Government received expert opinion from Chief Justice Sir Robert Stout and the Chief Judge of the Native Land Court, Jackson Palmer, that the leases were invalid under the law and that the land, or as much of it as was possible, should be returned to the Maori owners.

The investigation was not sparked by the long-running Maori protests over Pakeha control of the land. Rather, the Government hoped that the Stout-Palmer commission would put to rest the equally intractable legal battles among rival speculators over who held these leases, and in doing so, pave the way for the alienation of the land. Soon after the Government validated his land rights in 1888, Jones went to England. Heavily indebted, he mortgaged and lost ownership of all his leases. Ironically, given that Jones

199 Waitangi Tribunal, He Maunga Rongo, vol 2, p684 200 AJHR, 1907, G-1B, p12 201 Ibid, pp5-6 202 Waitangi Tribunal, He Maunga Rongo, vol 2, p684 203 AJHR, 1907, G-1B, p4 204 Ibid, pp3-4


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had used the law rather than Maori agreement to gain control over the land, the leases ended up as the property of his lawyer before being on-sold. For the next two decades Jones attempted to convince politicians, the public, and the Supreme Courts of England and New Zealand that he had been defrauded and that fairness, natural justice and his services in opening up the Rohe Potae meant the land was rightfully his.205

By 1908, the leases had ended up the possession of Herrman Lewis, a speculator. However, the indefatigable Jones continued to disrupt both Lewis’ efforts to bring about the sale of the land and the Government’s efforts to buy it. Both Lewis and Jones successfully pressed for an official inquiry into the matter but, to their dismay, the Stout-Palmer commission found that neither held legitimate rights to the land. Instead, the commission argued that the leases were legally invalid and had been dishonoured, and the lessors were entitled to have their tenants ejected.

The commission found the 1882 lease of the 1F block invalid for two reasons. The first was highly technical. More expert analysis is required but the issue would seem to be that Jones was granted the legal right to complete a lease only if he was already in possession of that land in 1882. However, the terms of Jones’ arrangement meant he could only take possession in 1883. This, according to the commission, was sufficient to render the lease invalid.206 More fundamentally, the commission noted that there was a significant inconsistency between the English and Maori language versions of the lease. In the English version, the owners were entitled to 10 per cent of the proceeds from the planned coal enterprise after deducting expenses, while in the Maori version there was no mention of any deduction. The commission stated:

The mistake is no slight or trifling one: the difference between 10 per cent before or after expenses have been deducted is most important, and no business man requires the difference to be pointed out. The law necessary to the validity of the deed in this respect has not therefore been complied with.207

Even if the lease was not invalid, the commission found that its central condition had not been honoured. According to the covenant attached to the 1882 lease, Jones – and all those who took over the lease from him – were obligated to reside on and develop the land. As we have discussed, they were also legally required to form a coal company with capital of at least £30,000 and appoint a minimum of two of the Maori owners as directors of this company, as well as invest £3000 or more per annum in the enterprise. The commission ruled that this ‘covenant has never been fulfilled, and it is a continuing covenant’. It therefore stated that the ‘lessors can proceed, after the proper and necessary legal steps are taken for the ejection of the present tenant’.208

The remaining leases covering 1G, 1H, and 1J were also found to be invalid. They

205 AJHR, 1909, Session 1, G-1i, p3. See also AJHR, 1911, I-3A, pp6-14 206 AJHR, 1909, Session 1, G-1i, p4 207 Ibid, p4 208 Ibid, p4


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were signed between 1888 and 1890 but contravened, according to the commission, various statutory requirements in place at those times. These included violating sections 5 and 7 of the Native Lands Frauds Prevention Act 1888 (which prohibited individuals from leasing land from more than twenty Maori) and breaking an 1889 amendment to that act which banned private transactions involving more than 5000 acres of Maori land.209

Unfortunately for the Maori owners, the commission only had the jurisdiction to make recommendations and could not legally enforce its findings. After talking with the owners and their legal representatives and investigating the transactions, the commission stated that ‘one cannot help feeling sympathy with them [the owners] in the position in which they are placed’.210 The owners, through what the commission inferred were dubious tactics by Jones, had been manipulated into an arrangement that brought ‘great’ loss and ‘entirely inadequate’ payment.211 Pointedly, the commission did not think that ‘any sympathy is required’ for any Pakeha involved in the transactions.

However, the commissioners admitted to being in a quandary over what the Maori owners could do to regain control over their land. The commission presented a series of unattractive options, including one that local Maori buy Lewis out of the leases, financing this through the sale of some of the block. Lewis and his party were demanding at least £14,000 and possibly much more. The commission suggested that if a lower sum was arranged, the owners could sell 10,000 acres of the block to acquire the necessary capital. They could lease half the remaining land through the Maori Land Boards in a more profitable and controlled arrangement, while the rest could be set aside for their own occupation.212

This was the method the commission favoured, perhaps reflecting that it saw the increase of European settlement and the productive use of Maori land as a key priority. However, the commission reported that there was little owner support for selling a considerable area of their land to buy out leases they had never accepted or wanted. The owners had ‘little or no land’, were reluctant to enter into sales and were ‘very strong’ in their refusal to pay to cancel leases they did not accept.213 The commission was not surprised ‘considering how they have been treated, and how little they have obtained during the past twenty-eight years from their land’.214

After talking with the owners and their lawyers, the commission was ‘sure’ that local Maori planned to either take the matter to court in a bid to have the leases cancelled, or to ‘wait till the end of the lease’.215 However, the problems of either of these approaches were apparent. Litigation was potentially expensive, especially for an

209 Ibid, pp5-6 210 Ibid, p7 211 Ibid, p7 212 Ibid, p7 213 Ibid, p7 214 Ibid, p8 215 Ibid, p8


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impoverished people, and the results unpredictable. Maintaining the status quo, on the other hand, meant being locked into the leases for at least another twenty eight years and, as the commission pointed out, receiving ‘entirely inadequate rentals’ with no realistic expectation that the lessors would ever honour their broader obligations.216

The commission did not propose arguably the most appropriate course of events: that the Government should assist local Maori owners to regain their land and provide adequate compensation. It was, after all, the Government which had recognised and facilitated the leases that were now being condemned. Judging from the Government’s subsequent actions, the commission was perhaps being realistic in not even suggesting such a policy.

After receiving the commission’s report, the Government exhibited no obvious interest in the fact that grave doubts had been raised about the validity of the leases. Nor is there much evidence of official concern over the reports that the owners were seriously short of land and in need of assistance and protection. Rather, the Government was most influenced by the identification of a large block of idle land and sought to acquire that land for itself. When it decided that such an acquisition would be unprofitable and troublesome, it facilitated the sale of the land to private Europeans. The Stout-Palmer commission would be proven correct in its pessimistic reading of the situation facing local Maori.

Crown efforts to buy

From 1900, the ‘taihoa’ policy saw a virtual halt in Crown purchasing activity in Te Rohe Potae.217 Despite the fact that the Crown already owned considerable areas of undeveloped land in the Mokau area, there was widespread Pakeha pressure for more acquisitions.218 In particular, settlers and politicians called for the Crown to purchase freehold the Mokau Mohakatino block. Its current un-utilised state was presented as an impediment to widespread European settlement of the region and there were claims that, in addition to its valuable coal and lime, it would ‘make good dairying country’.219 Alongside criticism of the Government for not acting with more determination, there were predictions that Maori would willingly sell, given that the land was locked up in non-profitable leases.220

Purchasing resumed in the wider district in 1906 in ‘consequence of the strong agitation all over the colony for the settlement of Native lands’.221 The following year, the Government began to direct its attention towards acquiring Mokau Mohakatino. In 1907, it turned down the possibility of acquiring the leasehold to the land for £20,000 after being advised that this would not further its ambitions to buy the land outright

216 Ibid, p7 217 AJHR, 1907, G-1B, p4 218 ‘New Lands for Settlement’, Taranaki Herald, 8 Mar 1904, p6 gives an example of the large areas of Crown-owned land that remained undeveloped. 219 ‘The Mokau-Mohakatino Block’, Taranaki Herald, 2 Jul 1904, p4 220 ‘The Mokau-Mohakatino Block’, Taranaki Herald, 8 Jul 1904, p4 221 AJHR, 1907, G-1B, p4


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and could also bring it into ‘conflict with the Natives’ who ‘have always remained in possession or occupation, and protest against the leases’.222

However, the prospects for purchase increased the following year when the leases came into the possession of Herrman Lewis. Lewis had no interest in occupying or developing the land himself but aimed to move it on for a profit. With both the Government and potential investors unwilling to buy such disputed and uncertain leases, Lewis acted as a middleman trying to arrange the outright sale of the block.223 Along with his legal representative FG Dalziell, Lewis attempted to secure the support of some of the Maori owners for sale and entered into discussions with the Government and private parties.

Officials remained primarily concerned that the battling speculators Lewis and Jones might complicate the smooth acquisition of the block. In 1908, the Minister of Lands received petitions from Awakino and Mokau settlers calling for the land to be acquired in the interests of closer settlement.224 The member for Egmont, WT Jennings, led the calls for purchase, arguing that its ‘present idle state renders it a bar to the progress of North Taranaki and South Auckland’.225 In April 1909, the Prime Minister, Sir Joseph Ward, was asked what steps were being taken to ‘open the Mokau-Mohakatino block of land for settlement’ as its acquisition was of ‘immediate importance to the colony, and especially to Taranaki’.226 A month later, Ward announced that plans to acquire the block would have to remain in ‘abeyance’ due to ‘the very confused state of titles’ in the block.227 This was in reference to Jones’ ongoing demands for a commission of inquiry into his rights to the land.

Government interest in the block, especially if the price was right, remained strong. In January 1910, Lewis arranged a meeting between some Maori owners interested in a sale and Government officials. The Government indicated it would purchase the block, pending inquiries into the value of the land. In March 1910, the Commissioner of Crown Lands valued the Mokau Mohakatino block at 18 shillings per acre but suggested, after making the usual Crown deductions of 8 shillings per acre for road and survey costs, that only 10 shillings per acre be paid. This would mean a total price of £25,247 for the entire block, measured at 50,495 acres after subtracting land earmarked for the Crown for survey debts. He acknowledged this was a low price but believed most of the block was of lower than average quality and that the commercial potential of its coal was uncertain.228 William Kensington, the Under Secretary of Lands, recommended the Crown pay up to £35,000 as a method of ending the

222 AJHR, 1911, I-3A, pp213, 216 223 Ibid, p95 224 Taranaki Herald, 29 Jul 1908, p4 225 ‘Mokau Jones Estate’, Taranaki Herald, 27 Mar 1908, p5 226 Ibid, p217. The request was made by the MP H Okey, on behalf of the Egmont representative, WT Jennings. 227 Ibid 228 Ibid, pp129-130, 218


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arguments between Lewis and Jones.229

During all these discussions, there was little indication of official concern about the interests of local Maori or the need to secure their genuine consent to any sale. The Government entered into some private negotiations in Wellington with a handful of owners and made an advance payment to one of these owners tso that he would agitate for a sale.230 Even such dubious efforts at securing Maori support were considered excessive and unnecessary by Cabinet who by March 1910 had resolved to acquire the land compulsorily.231 Warned by the Solicitor General that such an action was illegal, and bothered by Jones’ continuing demands, the Government abandoned efforts to acquire the block. Although some Members of Parliament continued to push for a purchase, Ward stated that:

in view of the extraordinary complications in this case, it is most inadvisable to enter into any negotiations for the purchase of the land in question. The more I investigate the matter the more complicated it appears.232

The Government was still determined that the land be transferred from Maori to European ownership. It would use the Maori Land Board system to facilitate its alienation despite protests and non-consent from some of the owners, to a coal syndicate connected with Hermann Lewis.

Maori attitudes towards sale

According to the Stout-Ngata and Stout-Palmer commissions, local Maori were generally opposed to further land selling and were determined to regain full control, or as much control as was possible, over Mokau Mohakatino no 1. This desire never disappeared. It was, however, undermined by impoverishment and debt, by pressure from purchasing agents and local advisers, and by a lack of Government support and protection. Particularly damaging to anti-sale resistance was the inability, despite determined Maori efforts, to have the disputed leases voided and the land returned to them.

Local leaders made a number of appeals to the Government regarding Mokau Mohakatino, including to various Native Lands Commissions, and were willing to consider compromise in order to gain some benefit from the land. In 1907, regional leaders suggested that the Government acquire the leasehold from Pakeha and honour the requirements of partnership and development included in the original arrangement. The Government declined.233

With the Stout-Palmer commission’s finding that the leases were invalid, the focus

229 Ibid, p222 230 Ibid, pp113, 228 231 Ibid, pp220-222 232 Ibid, 225 233 ‘Native Lands’, Taranaki Herald, 30 May 1907, p5


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shifted to having the courts return the land to unencumbered Maori control.234 However, without Government assistance, the costs and risks of litigation loomed as a major impediment. In December 1909, Pepene Eketone, on behalf of the owners, approached a prominent lawyer, CP Skerrett, to represent them in a court case. Skerrett’s advice was that they should instead ‘sell and so save themselves expensive litigation’.235 While he believed they had a strong case, Skerrett warned that the legal procedure to have the leases cancelled was a ‘very troublesome one’. On behalf of Eketone and the other owners, preliminary moves were made to seek £80,000 damages against the Crown for wrongfully registering Jones’ leases.236 However, Skerrett strongly advocated that ‘the best thing, in the interests of the Natives, is for the land to be sold at a fair price ... and so save themselves expensive litigation’.237

Skerrett and various other lawyers, advisers, land agents and middlemen would continue to press local Maori to sell the land. Survey debts and the other costs loaded onto the land by the Crown and the Native Land Court system were another push towards sale. As detailed in chapter eight, to assist Jones the Government had in 1888 ignored clear Maori opposition and surveyed the outer boundary of Mokau Mohakatino no 1. The Native Land Court then split the block into nine pieces, each of which were surveyed.

Local Maori were ordered to pay large sums for these surveys that were carried out without their consent. In 1898, the Government levied survey liens against the subdivisions totalling almost £1140.238 Such costs were out of the reach of the owners, many of whom received only around £2 per annum in rentals.239 The total lease payments were £217 per year, but after land taxes were removed, the more than 100 owners had to share far less than this.240

Survey costs may have contributed to the sale in the following year of the 250-acre 1A subdivision.241 Heavy interest charges demanded by the Government meant that survey debts for the owners of the other subdivisions grew exponentially.242 In 1906, to satisfy these debts, the Native Land Court awarded the Crown a total of 5152 acres, 3 roods and 25 perches of land from the various subdivisions.243

It would seem that such costs and problems, combined with the lack of benefit

234 AJHR, 1909, Session 1, G-1i, p7 235 Ibid, p167 236 Ibid, pii 237 Ibid, p167 238 Herlihy, no pagination 239 AJHR, 1911, I-3A, p97 240 AJHR, 1909, Session 1, G-1i, pp6-7 for total lease fees. AJHR, 1907, G-1B, p11 for the heavy cost of land taxes. It should be kept in mind that, at least in the early years of the ‘informal lease’, local Maori consistently failed to receive the required payment. See AJHR, 1888, G-4C, pp20-22 241 Herlihy, no pagination. 185 acres was sold to the Crown in 1899, with the rest sold to a Pakeha. 242 AJHR, 1911, I-3A, pp226-227 243 Ibid, pp218, 226-227 and Herlihy, no pagination. It would seem that the European purchasers of Mokau–Mohakatino agreed to pay these survey costs, with the result that the Crown cancelled its planned takings


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derived from the block, pushed Maori owners into considering selling the block. By 1910, Pepene Eketone, Anaru Eketone, and Takerei Kingi Wetere were being identified as leaders of a pro-sale faction of owners. Such a description is too simplistic, as they saw sale as a last resort. After talks with the Government, Anaru Eketone approached some of the owners and stated that efforts to cancel the land leases and utilise the land were hopeless. He feared that debts including the potential costs of fighting a court case would, in the long-term, lead to the land being lost. It was therefore better to sell now and gain some benefit. He was quoted as saying, ‘We have been fighting the Mokau case, and we find there is no means of getting out of trouble. The only thing to do is sell the land. It is better to have half a loaf than no bread at all’.244 The following year, Pepene Eketone also argued that given the lack of Government and other assistance, sale was the only option. He bemoaned ‘the great wall’ at Wellington he was fighting unsuccessfully against.245

Despite these pressures, many owners continued to resist efforts to purchase the block. Their opposition was attributed to a number of factors, including dissatisfaction at the ‘ridiculous’ prices offered by both the Government and by private purchasers.246 There was strong ideological resistance against land sales, often linked to support of the ideas of Te Whiti and Tohu which were still powerful among older owners in particular. These owners would reportedly not ‘sell at any price, even if the weight of the land were given them in gold. It is an old gospel of theirs’.247 Te Oro Watihi put it most simply, he believed ‘it was much better for us to hold our land than to sell it’.248

Anti-sale sentiment was also strong among those who had personally been involved in, or were descendants of those who had fought against Jones’ claims to a lease from the 1880s.249 Indeed, contemporary attempts to fight the lease and have the land returned were central to the anti-sale movement. It would seem that those local Maori who believed there was a realistic chance that the leases would be cancelled were more able to maintain a determined opposition to sales. An anti-sale committee was formed that doubled as a method to raise funds for the legal fight against the leases.250 Te Oro described the committee, and their lawyer FHD Bell, the future Prime Minister, as a double-barrelled gun that would ‘shoot the lease and the sale, and kill them both’.251

The Government facilitates the purchase of the block by private interests

The collapse of the legal battle against the leases, and in particular the inability to raise sufficient funds for that struggle, would badly weaken the anti-sale movement.

244 Ibid, p97. Anaru Eketone also had personal motive to push for sale. As mentioned, the Government gave him an advance payment, which he would have to refund if a transaction was not secured. AJHR, 1911, I-3A, p85 245 AJHR, 1911, I-3A, p85 246 Ibid, p16 247 Ibid, p27 248 Ibid, p89 249 Ibid, pp85-89 250 Ibid, p57 251 Ibid, p91


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Government actions and omissions would also play a major part in the purchase of the block by private interests. In 1910, Herrman Lewis proposed that he be allowed to purchase the entire 53,825 acres currently under lease and then sell, at a large profit as it would turn out, the land to investors who would form the Mokau Coal and Estates Company. This plan was reliant on Government support, in part because the Native Land Act 1909 limited the amount of land that could be purchased by private individuals to 3000 acres. Any larger acquisition required an order-in-council signed by the Governor.252

Lewis applied for that order-in-council and had Skerrett, on behalf of some pro-sale owners, make a similar application.253 The cabinet, on the recommendation of the Prime Minister and the Native Minister, quickly agreed. The Government had decided that the alienation of the block was necessary for closer European settlement.

As we have seen, the Stout-Ngata commission had envisioned the land boards as the ‘active agents of the owners’.254 In this case at least, the Waikato-Maniapoto Maori Land Board more resembled an active agent of alienation. Rather than partner or consult with the owners as a whole, it worked with Lewis to bring about a transaction. Indeed, board president Walter Harry Bowler was involved in some quite extraordinary and unorthodox ways in facilitating the purchase. By contrast, there is little evidence that the Land Board seriously inquired into whether the transaction was beneficial to the owners as a whole or consulted with them in depth. Despite the fact that there was unmistakable evidence of anti-sale feeling, the land board treated Skerrett, who pushed for a sale, as the spokesman for the owners as a whole.255

Bell, the lawyer for the non-sellers, was scathing of the land board’s role, claiming they had failed in their responsibility to ‘protect the Natives’. He accused them of ‘coercing’ a sale and insisting on ‘meeting after meeting, until a resolution was passed which put into their hands the power of conveying away the lands of people whom they knew perfectly well did not want to sell’.256 Bell accused the board of not giving local Maori proper advice and not ensuring that they had access to independent and expert assistance on the complex questions that confronted them.257

Government legislation was as or more important than the specific actions of the board in allowing the sale to take place despite considerable owner opposition, unease and non-consent. The laws governing the land boards have been described as ‘manipulative’ and designed to ease transfer rather than protect owners’ rights.258 In 1905, Maori-elected representatives to the land boards were replaced by Crown appointees while legislation made it possible for land to be alienated by a minority of

252 Ibid, pp47, 137, 167 253 Ibid, p131. Skerrett, in return, dropped the claim for £80,000 damages against the Government for the wrongful register of Jones’ leases. 254 Waitangi Tribunal, He Maunga Rongo, vol 2, p684 255 AJHR, 1911, I-3A, p37 256 Ibid, p17 257 Ibid 258 Waitangi Tribunal, He Maunga Rongo, vol 2, pp688, 692


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owners without the consent or even the knowledge of other owners. Under the 1909 Native Lands Act, only five owners ‘present or represented’ through a proxy constituted a quorum. A resolution for sale, to be confirmed by the board, required only that those voting for a sale held a greater aggregate of shares than those voting against.259 As Bell put it, ‘the effect of the Act of 1909 is to enable people to sell his land over a Native’s head without his consent’.260

On 22 December 1910, it was published that a meeting of assembled owners would vote on 6 January 1911 as to whether Mokau Mohakatino 1F, 1G, 1H, and 1J should be sold and the Waikato-Maniapoto Maori Land Board would be empowered to act as the owners’ agents in that sale.261 Unusually, given that it was not involved in the proposed transaction, the Government directed that this meeting be convened. This, in itself, may well have been perceived by the board as a sign that the Government supported the sale of the block.262

However, many local Maori were determined to prevent sale. Anti-sales owners asked Bell for his opinion on whether they should seek to have the Supreme Court declare the leases invalid. Bell believed that legal action would succeed in having the leases declared invalid but warned the owners that:

litigation in such matters cannot be otherwise than expensive, and they must subscribe a very substantial sum and deposit it so that the solicitors and counsel can be paid from time to time. The case would be vigorously defended, the attack will be upon titles to large areas of land, and the expense must be heavy.263

Proving his point, Bell demanded an immediate payment of £100 which the owners, who were ‘entirely without means’, went into debt to meet.264 A committee was formed of opponents to the sale with Te Oro, Te Ahiwaha, Paeroroku Rikihana, Wetini Paneta, Tauhia Tewiata and Tatana Te Awaroa among those involved.265 Efforts began to raise a preliminary legal fund of £800 while Tuiti Macdonald and EH Hardy, two middlemen and land agents who would pay a major role in subsequent events, were instructed by the anti-land sales owners to represent their cause.266

On 6 January 1911, 30 to 40 Maori attended the meeting of assembled owners at Te Kuiti to decide whether the lands should be sold to Lewis for £25,000.267 Of the estimated 108 to around 200 total owners of the block, only a minority attended or voted at any of the meetings.268 It is clear that many owners did not know of the

259 Ibid 260 AJHR, 1911, I-3A, p19 261 New Zealand Gazette, 22 Dec 1910, no 109, p4319 262 AJHR, 1911, I-3A, p36 263 Ibid, p157 264 Ibid, p56 265 Ibid, p23 266 Ibid, p57 267 Ibid, p159 268 Ibid, pp35, 198-204.


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meetings, while others were unable to attend given the limited notice and the need to travel from Mokau, Otaki and elsewhere to Te Kuiti.269

What the first meeting of assembled owners did establish was that local Maori were split on the issue and there was no consensus in favour of sale. Owners of each subdivision were asked to approve the sale. For 1F, 18 owners, representing 24 and some fraction of shares, voted in favour of sale while nine owners with 20 and some fraction of shares were opposed. All the assembled owners of 1G opposed a sale so no vote took place. In the 1H block, seven owners with 7 and a fraction of shares were in favour, and five owners with 11 shares were against. There were four owners with 5 shares in favour of sale in 1J, and four owners with 3 and some fraction against.270 Bowler, the President of the Waikato-Maniapoto Maori Land Board, believed that the sale could not be confirmed with only a bare majority of shares in favour of sale. He perceived no prospect for unanimity and suggested that another meeting was needed with fuller representation.271 Pepene Eketone, representing those supporting a sale, and Tuiti Macdonald, for the non-sellers, agreed.

By this stage, anti-sale sentiment was apparently dominant. Shortly after the vote, anti-sale leaders decided to push forward with litigation demanding the invalidation of the leases and the return of the land to Maori control. At one hui, 40 of the IF owners signed a writ for a court case to begin. In total, 75 per cent of the owners apparently signed the writ.272 ‘Every scheme conceivable’ was considered to raise funds to fight the court case and the land sale. Around £50 was raised from the owners, including £20 from one individual.273 As this was well short of the £800 identified as the minimal amount needed for the legal fund, local Maori attempted to secure mortgages against the owners’ interests in Mokau Mohakatino and other blocks.274 There would later be attempts to sell or lease land to raise money for this legal fund.275

At this point an estimated 77 per cent of all owners were opposed to sale, including nearly all those based around the Mokau coast.276 Te Oro arranged a hui at Mokau in which documents opposing the sale were signed and presented to the owners’ representatives. Documents were also signed resolving to sell 800 acres of Mokau Mohakatino to help finance the fight against the lease and to pay other expenses. The rest of the land would be preserved.277 Macdonald, Hardy and several of the owners were sent to Te Kuiti to oppose the sale and look after the group’s interests. 278

On 10 March 1911, the second meeting of assembled owners took place in Te Kuiti,

269 Ibid, p35 270 Ibid, pp36, 159-161 271 Ibid, p160 272 Ibid, pp27, 57 273 Ibid, p57 274 Ibid, pp27-28, p68 275 Ibid, p58 276 Ibid, pp18, 27, 85-89 277 Ibid, pp89-90 278 Ibid


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again with about 30 to 40 attending.279 According to Hardy, the mood was overwhelmingly against sale. Realising this, Lewis’ representative, Dalziell, warned that if the owners did not immediately agree to accept the £25,000, the offer would be withdrawn. This did not have the desired effect. Even Anaru Eketone, who was in favour of sale, reacted angrily to the ultimatum. The decision on whether to sell was, however, adjourned.280 Bell would later suggest that the adjournment was a deliberate ploy by the board to keep the chance of sale alive, while others suggested that local Maori wanted the chance for further korero over the issue.281

A vital development occurred before the final meeting of assembled owners took place on 22 March 1911. Macdonald and Hardy, hired to represent the non-sellers, changed tack and became advocates for sale. There were later suggestions that underhand factors led to this change.282 Macdonald and Hardy denied this, explaining that they had reached the honest opinion that local Maori had no option but sale. European institutions would not agree to mortgage Maori land with their complexities of title. Nor did the owners have enough sellable land outside of the block. They therefore believed that the legal fight against the lease was doomed and dangerous to proceed with.283 Deciding that ‘resistance is sometimes futile’, Hardy told a meeting of about twenty owners at Mahoenui, including some of the prominent members of the non-sale camp, that ‘a crisis has come, and desperate measures require desperate treatment’. He presented £25,000 as a good price for the land and told the owners that if they continued with the legal trial they could be liable for ruinous costs.284

Furthermore, Hardy had, without the knowledge of his clients, entered into negotiations with the Mokau Coal and Estates Company and created a new method of breaking down anti-sale feeling. In addition to the £25,000 purchase price, the owners would receive £2500 worth of shares in the company.285 Some owners may have seen this as giving them a degree of control and ongoing benefit from the arrangement, although this hope was mistaken. Hardy believed the deepest significance of the provision of shares was that it diminished the owners’ sense that they were severing all connections to the land. He presented the shares as a way in which the owners could retain ‘an interest in the land for their lives’.286 According to later claims, he also promised that the company would pay all expenses involved in the block, including survey debts and the costs incurred to Hardy, Macdonald and others.287

Paeroroku Rikihana would later emphasise that this advice convinced him and other leaders of the non-sellers’ faction to vote for sale. They would also, by proxy, vote for

279 Ibid, pp37 280 Ibid, p58 281 Ibid, pp19-20, 58 282 Ibid, p68 283 Ibid 284 Ibid, p59 285 Ibid 286 Ibid 287 Ibid, p97


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sale on behalf of those who had deputised them to oppose the transaction.288 Hardy and Macdonald denied that they sparked a dramatic change, arguing that the position of non-sellers was already collapsing through poverty and the inability to raise money for the legal fight.289 However, according to Rikihana, he and other owners were reliant on the representatives for understanding the complex legal and economic decisions facing them. Rikihana was ‘startled’ when told that the court case was doomed and would bring upon the owners ‘very serious and heavy expenses and troubles’ if continued with.290 Macdonald and Hardy were the non-sellers’ major advisors, as Bell, their lawyer, was not present at the pivotal meetings. Bell would later accuse Macdonald and Hardy of pushing Maori into voting for sale through offering incorrect, unwise and non-independent counsel, including presenting local Maori with a false choice between a ruinous court case or sale.291

However, Bell believed primary responsibility rested with the Waikato-Maniapoto Maori Land Board for ‘coercing’ the owners into a sale they did not want. He believed that by the second meeting it was clear to all concerned that most owners were opposed to sale. However, the land board adjourned the vote, knowing that local Maori were ‘without independent advice’ and were surrounded by interested parties trying to persuade them ‘to change their opinions’.292 Bell claimed that the land board, through various other actions, pressured the owners to sell. He stated:

I have never known of a case like this, of a Maori Land Board trying to persuade Maoris against their own will to sell their land for a sum.293

On 22 March 1911, the third and crucial meeting took place with around 30 to 40 owners in attendance. According to Bowler, the owners were notified of the first two meetings only through ‘circulars’, which would seem to mean that the date of the meeting was printed in the New Zealand Gazette and possibly in newspapers.294 Many owners would not have read these sources. However, no notification at all was published of the third meeting. Bowler was unconcerned when later questioned whether the board had done enough to ensure that the owners had the opportunity to decide on the future of their land. It was not, he stated, his duty to inform all of the Maori owners especially as ‘[y]ou cannot get in touch with Natives all over the country’. He was satisfied that news of meetings ‘get about pretty well’ and denied that the board had a ‘loose way’ of informing owners, or that it should take on the responsibility of individually informing each owner when ‘such important business was

288 Ibid 289 Ibid, pp28-29, 59 290 Ibid, p97 291 Bell claimed he was deliberately not informed of the meetings by Macdonald and Hardy. They, in turn, suggested that he demanded further payment to attend, something Bell under oath denied. Ibid, pp21, 28, 45 292 Ibid, pp19-20 293 Ibid, p19 294 Ibid, p38


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intended to be dealt with’.295

Those owners who did attend the third meeting unanimously voted to sell the block to Herrman Lewis for £25,000 and £2500 worth of shares in the company. The Land Board’s role was, however, far from over. It was required to check that the alienation would not render any of the owners landless. Legally, landlessness was defined at this stage as not possessing enough freehold land for ‘adequate maintenance’.296 Bowler would later state that he was ‘quite satisfied that each of these 108 owners had sufficient land left to maintain themselves and live upon’.297 It is not clear how he reached such a conclusion given that most of the owners were not even present to explain their position. Furthermore, there is no evidence that any in-depth investigations took place. Board minutes indicate considerable discussion about transaction issues but none at all about the issue of landlessness.298 Whatever investigations did occur must have been quick, for the Board confirmed the alienation just one day after the vote took place.299

Regardless of Bowler’s blithe assurances, there are suggestions that some of the owners were left without sufficient land. The Native Affairs Committee inquired into the rights retained by three of the owners after the transaction. Merangi Taramau retained ‘various interests’ in others lands.300 However, Te Oro, who described himself as the ‘largest owner’ on the block before the sale, was now left without significant property. He held legal rights in other blocks but these areas were not under clear Maori control. He told the Committee that he now lived on one of the small portions of Mokau Mohakatino that had not been alienated, although he was apparently not a legal owner of this land. Overall, he stated that local Maori were now scattered, gathering together only for occasional hui.301 Rikihana was not an owner in Mokau Mohakatino no 1 but his wife was. With the alienation, she had lost all legal interests in land in the area. As far as Rikihana was aware, she retained only one and a quarter acres of land in Otaki on which they lived and which they had privately purchased.302

The aftermath of the sale was rancour, dispute and accusation. Some of this centred around the fees demanded by Macdonald, Hardy, Pepene Eketone and some of the others who had been instrumental in arranging the sale. According to some Maori, they had been assured that if they agreed to sale they would not be liable for these expenses. However, in June 1911, Bowler went to Mokau to make the payments for the sale. He found that there was considerable anger as the agents were demanding payment from the (former) owners. After meeting with 40 to 50 local Maori, it was

295 Ibid, p38 296 Waitangi Tribunal, He Maunga Rongo, vol 2, p691 297AJHR, 1911, I-3A, p38 298 Ibid, p168. Note that this is based only on those records supplied to the Native Affairs Committee, and not on a full search through Board records. 299 Ibid, p169 300 Ibid, p88 301 Ibid, p91 302 Ibid, p97


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resolved that each owner would give 10 percent of their payment (£250 in all) to pay for these costs. This money was handed over to a committee headed by Macdonald and Pepene Eketone who would distribute the money to the appropriate claimants, including themselves. Bowler was non-committal when asked whether he thought that such an arrangement was appropriate, stating it was not the land board’s responsibility to concern itself with such matters.303

Bowler would later tell the Native Affairs Committee that the board was not determined to push a sale through and did not even show a particular interest in this case.304 However, Bowler’s own actions rather contradict this claim. This was, as Bowler himself acknowledged, the largest transaction the board had overseen as well as the most unusual.305 The Board was involved in many of the complex commercial deals surrounding it. For instance, after the Board was appointed the agent for the owners and for the alienation, WH Bowler, Board chairman, then transferred the land to himself, WH Bowler, private citizen. Bowler held the land in trust and oversaw various mortgages and its transfer to the Mokau Coal and Estates Company. Bowler would later deny that he acted as ‘a very willing agent’ of the company or had done anything for personal gain or without permission.306 Instead, he claimed that his focus was on ensuring that the very complex arrangements surrounding the block did not disrupt the sale and prevent the land being opened to European settlement.307

The Board showed less interest in whether all the owners were informed and supportive of the sale. Many who had not attended the meeting, including those who had appointed representatives to oppose the sale, were shocked at the news of the alienation.308 Frank Rattenbury testified to the Native Affairs Committee that the owners at Mokau were ‘angry’ and ‘dissatisfied’.309 Te Oro confirmed this, explaining that it took considerable time for the news to filter down to the people on the land and that ‘all the proper owners of the land’ believed that a hardship had been inflicted upon them.310

Many refused to accept that the land had been sold and some refused to accept their share of the purchase money.311 When Rikihana visited Mokau in June 1911, he found the old people had gathered there to lament the loss of the land. They told him that their ‘desire was that the land should come back to them – that they should regain possession of it right from the coast to the furthest limit inland’.312 A telegram of protest was sent to the Chairman of the Native Affairs Committee.313 Other owners,

303 Ibid, pp38-39 304 Ibid, p45 305 Ibid, p53 306 Ibid 307 Ibid, pp47-50 308 Ibid, p86 309 Ibid, p86 310 Ibid, p90 311 Ibid 312 Ibid, p96 313 Ibid


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claiming they had not agreed to a sale, attempted to have their interests partitioned out.314 However, the land was legally gone.

There was some Pakeha anger about the transaction, but for rather different reasons. William Massey, the leader of the opposition, was concerned that no reserves were made for Maori owners and that the decision to sell had not been representative. However, his primary complaint was that the land had not been acquired by the Government in the interests of European settlement. Rather, it was in the hands of a ‘gang of speculators’ who were seeking ‘a monopoly on the coal-bearing areas on the west coast of the Taranaki Provincial District’.315

Massey’s demands led to an inquiry by the Native Affairs Committee in 1911. The committee’s inquiry was reasonably thorough but its findings brief and largely unexplained. Overall, it found no improprieties or problems with the transaction which it suggested was both legal and in the best interests of the colony. Accusations and concerns about the role of Bowler and the Waikato-Maniapoto Maori Land Board had been ‘entirely disproved’. As summarised above, the Commission had heard considerable evidence of Maori opposition and anger regarding the transaction. Nonetheless, it was satisfied that accusations that the decision to sell was ‘not properly representative’ of the wishes of the owners had been disproved’.316

Thirty five years after Jones’ first attempts, the great majority of Mokau Mohakatino had been fully and finally alienated. This long and convoluted process was characterised by Government attempts to put Pakeha in control of the land and by a corresponding failure to act on the concerns, grievances and protests of local Maori. These protests had been sustained but they went unheeded.

With the alienation of this block, Mokau hapu had lost the great majority of their land. The compensation for this loss had proved minimal. Certainly, by 1911, there were some small-scale signs of development in the Mokau region. The roads and river access remained difficult and sometimes dangerous, while the long-anticipated wealth from coal mining had not arrived. In spite of this, European settlement, farming and local government had slowly grown.317

However, local Maori did not share equally in these limited opportunities and local hapu and their leaders had become marginalised from the area they once controlled. By 1911, consultation and contact with the Crown – outside of the Native Land Court and fruitless Maori complaints about land issues – had virtually stopped. An indication of the marginalisation of Mokau Maori from the colonial state was that they were

314 Ibid, p87 315 AJHR, 1911, G1, pp1-2 and AJHR, 1911, I-3A, ppii-iii 316 Ibid, piii 317 Stokes, pp176-182, 191-193


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seemingly not mentioned in Parliament between 1889 and 1911.318

Locally, there were other suggestions that Mokau Maori had not been able to achieve partnership, or maintain authority in their dealings with Europeans. The limited available evidence does not suggest hostility between Mokau settlers and Maori in the early twentieth century but nor does it indicate equality. Local Maori laboured on European farms.319 There was occasional social contact.320 But the two communities did not, it would seem, have an equal say in the development and government of the region. This is hinted at by the lack of references to Mokau Maori in settler newspapers from the late 1880s. At the same time as national politicians lost interest in Mokau and its hapu, it would seem that many Europeans stopped regarding local Maori as occupying a central position in the area and in its future.

Regardless of what some Europeans thought, Maori had not disappeared from Mokau. There are few precise figures on how many Maori were based there in the early twentieth century but it would seem that the Maori population in the inquiry district as a whole was gradually recovering after the significant decline experienced in the previous century.321 Moreover, local chiefs continued to try to exercise a degree of control and communal authority. This was seen, for instance, in the local committees formed to prevent the sale of the Mokau Mohakatino block in 1911 and have the land returned to Maori control. But the failure of these efforts to stop the sale were another sign that local Maori had lost considerable power in the region and were faced with increasingly diminishing options and opportunities.

318 This statement is based on a manual search of the indexes of the New Zealand Parliamentary Debates during this period. 319 Ibid, p181 320 ‘Awakino’, Taranaki Herald, 4 Jan 1908, p4; ‘Maori and Pakeha’, Taranaki Herald, 18 Jan 1908, p4 321 Helen Robinson, ‘Te Taha Tinana: Maori Health and the Crown in the Rohe Potae Inquiry District, 1840 to 1990’, a report for the Rohe Potae District inquiry, (Wai 898), December 2010 draft, chapter 2 suggests that the Maori population in the Rohe Potae was increasing even as they became a minority in a Pakeha-dominated area. The census figures, which focus on county boundaries during this period, provide little conclusive evidence on Mokau.

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Conclusion

This report has traced the gradual change in the power dynamic between Mokau Maori and the colonial state. More than any other factor, political power determined the land situation in the region and much else besides. During the first 40 or so years of the interaction, the Crown and Europeans posed sometimes violent, sometimes subtle challenges to local hapu. Local chiefs reacted flexibly to these new pressures and opportunities, attempting to benefit from the relationship while limiting and controlling the damages it could bring. Until the 1880s, they largely, although not completely, succeeded in this difficult juggling act and remained essentially in control of the area.

This was a considerably easier task in the early contact period when the relationship between Maori and Pakeha in Mokau took place on a small-scale, personal level. Up until 1850, the Crown played a marginal role and its officials rarely visited the area, let alone established a sovereign presence. While the Crown held no power, European goods, technology and ideas were rather more influential. Local chiefs welcomed European traders and visitors, while a handful of settlers and missionaries essentially lived under Maori protection and Maori control.

Mokau Maori were, like hapu throughout Te Rohe Potae, relatively comfortable about this level of contact with Europeans. Far more divisive was the possibility of larger-scale Pakeha settlement and closer interaction with the Crown. By 1850, the Government was seeking more land for the settlers of Taranaki and a foothold in Te Rohe Potae. Mokau, with its proximity to New Plymouth and its untapped coal fields, became a focus of Crown purchasing efforts. Government officials were confident that the twin promises of partnership with the Crown, and new economic and other opportunities through increased Pakeha settlement, would lead Mokau Maori to sell large areas of land for small sums.

However, land purchasing efforts in the region were largely unsuccessful and dominated by dispute and disruption. Support for land transactions came from Takerei and other local Maori who wanted a nearby town of Pakeha to trade with and exhibited little fear of being overpowered by the expected newcomers or by the Government. However, many other leaders and groups were uneasy or outright opposed to land transactions and to an influx of Pakeha. Moreover, there was enormous anger at the Crown’s failure to consult widely or to seek genuine communal approval for the land deals. During the mid 1850s, the Government secured deeds of purchase to a handful of blocks – the Mokau-Awakino purchases – but failed to secure the consent of many who claimed rights to these lands. The resulting resistance and protest meant that the Crown was unable to take control of the blocks. Instead, it abandoned the area and seemingly abandoned its unconvincing claims to the Mokau-Awakino ‘purchases’.

The Government’s next involvement in Mokau was not even based on the premise of consent and negotiation. The wars of the 1860s took a significant toll on local hapu.


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Along with the casualties and disruption, the confiscation of the area south of Parininihi outraged even those local Maori most committed to close ties with the Crown. Fearing further intrusion and confiscation, local Maori in 1869 attacked and temporarily destroyed the Crown’s military base in the area, the armed redoubt at Pukearuhe.

This was the last major act of the wars in the wider region, although the demands for the return of the confiscated lands would continue. A period of standoff and mutual suspicion ensued. The redoubt effectively served as the south-west boundary of the aukati, the area encircling and protecting the remaining territory of those tribes affiliated with the Kingitanga. Local Maori only occasionally went south of Pukearuhe, the Crown had no authority north of it.

Nevertheless, complete isolation from Pakeha was neither desirable nor possible. By the mid 1870s, the area was under growing pressure from Europeans searching for land and minerals, and from a central Government anxious for influence in the wider Rohe Potae. From 1877 to 1879, the administration of Premier George Grey and Native Minister John Sheehan poured considerable resources and energy into Mokau. Their ultimate aims were far-reaching and, if fulfilled, would have been disastrous for local Maori. The Government hoped to ‘open up’ Mokau as a first step towards the destruction of the aukati and the Crown’s dominance of the region.

No such radical transformation took place in this period. Instead, Mokau chiefs took the chance to cautiously rebuild relations with the Government and Europeans while refusing to respond to pressure for Native Land Court hearings and land sales. Many rangatira were convinced that interaction with Pakeha and the Crown would inevitably increase and thought it crucial that this process was carefully managed and controlled in negotiation with the Government. However, decision making within the aukati revolved around multi-levelled debate, consultation and consensus, which inhibited quick or unrepresentative action. No clear decisions were made about the level of Pakeha involvement that would be allowed into Mokau.

Nevertheless, the pressure on Mokau’s Ngati Maniapoto-affiliated hapu grew, both from private speculators and from fears that the Government would buy the disputed Poutama area from their tribal rivals. In 1882, after enormous debate and division, a group of local chiefs led by Hone Wetere Te Rerenga and backed by Rewi Maniapoto broke the boycott on the use of the Native Land Court. Initially, the decision seemed well-founded. Wetere and others secured legal control over the Mokau Mohakatino and Mohakatino Parininihi blocks, and were able to achieve their central ambition of protecting the land from sale. They also created a coal extraction deal with Joshua Jones that seemed to provide a blueprint for prosperity and partnership with Pakeha.

More widely, the creation of a ‘compact’ between the leaders of Te Rohe Potae and the Crown promised a relationship based around cooperation and mutual benefit. Mokau chiefs such as Wetere were heavily involved in the establishment of this accord. By 1885, they had reason to believe that the Government would work with local hapu

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to develop the region, while respecting their demand for continuing authority and mutual good faith.

The following years would see the collapse of this hope and the collapse of the compact. As the Government achieved its wider aims in the region – notably permission to build the main trunk railway and the authority of the Native Land Court over the entire Rohe Potae – it was increasingly willing to ignore the demands and interests of local hapu.

In Mokau, this manifested itself most crucially in the Government’s legal recognition of Joshua Jones’ highly suspect claims to an exclusive land lease over most of the Mokau Mohakatino block. In recognising this lease, it ignored sustained protest by local Maori and seemingly overwhelming evidence that the agreement had been for an informal coal arrangement only and not a land lease.

The change in power dynamics and the decline of the compact also resulted in the Crown taking practical control over the Mokau-Awakino blocks it claimed to have purchased a generation earlier. This was done without any further investigation into the complicated questions surrounding the original transactions, most notably, whether the Crown had secured genuine communal consent for these ‘sales’.

Tribal strength and cohesion was increasingly damaged by land loss and political and legal powerlessness, and by the divisions and fragmentation engendered by the Native Land Court system. Furthermore, the coal industry failed to bring its tribal sponsors the expected economic advantages or authority.

Mokau Maori were therefore highly vulnerable when the Liberal Government began a land acquisition drive throughout Te Rohe Potae in the 1890s. There remained strong antipathy to land alienation amongst hapu in Mokau and in the region more generally. However, government purchase agents were experienced in exploiting economic need and undermining collective resistance. By 1900, almost the entire Mohakatino Parininihi block had been purchased.

By this stage, the great majority of land in Mokau was under Crown or private European control and many of their interests in the wider region had also been lost through Crown purchase. Adding to their problems, local hapu were largely unable to exercise communal control or derive significant economic benefit from those lands that remained technically in their ownership. Most significantly, the 56,500 acre Mokau Mohakatino no 1 block was locked in a series of disastrous and disputed 56-year leases to Joshua Jones and his successors. Government commissions condemned these leases as harmful, legally invalid and systematically violated by the lessees. Despite receiving these reports, the Government showed no interest in returning the land and did not assist or advise local Maori in their desperate attempts to seek justice through the courts. Instead, the Government in 1911 facilitated the sale of virtually the entire block to a Pakeha coal and property company. This sale took place despite considerable protests from owners. Owner resistance was ultimately undermined through poverty and by Government legislation and institutions that were directed more towards


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facilitating land alienation than protecting Maori interests.

By 1911, Mokau and its lands were no longer under Maori control and local hapu were politically and economically marginalised. Mokau therefore provides a telling case study of how the Government’s failure to observe its wider and more specific agreements with Te Rohe Potae hapu led to a process of land loss and Maori disillusionment with the Crown that is still with us today.

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Tribunal, November 1995

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Cleaver, Philip, and Sarich, Jonathan, ‘Turongo: The North Island Main Trunk Railway and the Rohe Potae, 1870-2008’, report commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal, November 2009 (Wai 898, #A20)

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Francis, Andrew, ‘The Rohe Potae Commercial Economy in the Mid-Nineteenth Century, c.1830-1886’, report commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal, February 2011, (Wai 898, #A26)

Herlihy, Brian ‘Mokau-Mohakatino and Mohakatino-Parininihi Blocks’, report commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal, November 1999, (Wai 143, #I24)

Loveridge, Donald M, ‘The Crown and the Opening of the King Country: 1882-1885’, A report for the Crown Law Office, February 2006, (Wai 1130, #A72)

Marr, Cathy, ‘“The Mokau blocks” and the Ngati Maniapoto urgency claim Wai 788; Wai 800’, (Wai 788, #A1; Wai 800, #A1)

Marr, Cathy, ‘The Waimarino Purchase Report’, report commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal, 2004, 2 vols (Wai 903)

O’Malley, Vincent, ‘King Country (Wai 898): A Review of Casebook Research Requirements’, report prepared for the Waitangi Tribunal (Research Unit), December 2006, (Wai 898, ROI 6.2.1)

O’Malley, Vincent, ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement, 1840-1863’, report commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal, December 2010 (Wai 898, #A23)

O’Malley, Vincent, ‘Te Rohe Potae Political Engagement, 1840-1863: A Scoping Report’, November 2008 (Wai 898, #A15)

O’Malley, Vincent, ‘Te Rohe Potae War and Raupatu’, a report commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal, December 2010 (Wai 898, #A22)

O’Malley, Vincent, ‘The Aftermath of the Tauranga Raupatu, 1864-1981’, an overview report commissioned by the Crown Forestry Rental Trust, June 1995 (Wai 215, #A22)

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Parsonson, Ann, ‘Land and Conflict in Taranaki, 1853-1859’, November 1998 (Wai 143, #A1a)

Robinson, Helen, ‘Te Taha Tinana: Maori Health and the Crown in the Rohe Potae Inquiry District, 1840 to 1990’, a report commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal, February 2011 (Wai 898)

Stokes, Evelyn, ‘Mokau: Maori Cultural and Historical Perspectives’, report for the Ministry of Energy, 1988, (Wai 143, #F20L)

Thomas, Paul, ‘Mokau, Including the Mokau-Mohakatino and Mohakatino-Parininihi Blocks’, scoping report commissioned by the Crown Forestry Rental Trust, September 2009

6. Published books and articles

Abraham, CJ, Journal of a Walk with the Bishop of New Zealand from Auckland to Taranaki in August 1855 (London: Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, 1856)

Allen, Michael, ‘An Illusory Power? Metropole, Colony and Land Confiscation in New Zealand, 1863-1865’, in Richard Boast and Richard S Hill (eds), Raupatu: The Confiscation of Maori Land (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2009), pp115-120

Angas, George French, Savage Life and Scenes in Australia and New Zealand: Being an Artist’s Impressions of Countries and People at the Antipodes, 2 vols (London: Smith, Elder & Co, 1847)

Ballara, Angela, Iwi: The Dynamics of Maori Tribal Organisation from c.1769 to c.1945 (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 1998)

Ballara, Angela, Taua: ‘Musket Wars’, ‘Land Wars’ or ‘Tikanga’? Warfare in Maori Society in the Early Nineteenth Century (Auckland: Penguin Books, 2003)

Ballara, Angela, ‘Te Rangihaeata’, Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, vol 1, 1769-1869 (Wellington: Allen & Unwin & Department of Internal Affairs, 1990), pp488-491

Ballara, Angela, ‘Mahupuku, Hamuera Tamahau’, Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, vol 2, 1870-1900 (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books & Department of Internal Affairs, 1993), pp304-306

Ballara, Angela, ‘Waitaoro’, Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, vol 2, 1870-1900 (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books & Department of Internal Affairs, 1993), pp561-562

Belich, James, I Shall Not Die: Titokowaru’s War, New Zealand, 1868-9 (Wellington: Allen & Unwin and Port Nicholson Press, 1989)

Belich, James, Making Peoples: A History of the New Zealanders: From Polynesian Settlement to the End of the Nineteenth Century (Auckland: Penguin Books, 1996)


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Belich, James, The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict (Auckland: Auckland University Press and Oxford University Press, 1986), 1998 edition, Auckland, Penguin

Bentley, Trevor, Pakeha Maori: The Extraordinary Story of the Europeans who Lived as Maori in Early New Zealand (Auckland: Penguin, 1999)

Binney, Judith, Redemption Songs: A Life of Te Kooti Arikirangi Te Turuki (Auckland: Auckland University Press and Bridget Williams Books, 1995)

Boast, Richard, Buying the Land, Selling the Land: Government and Maori Land in the North Island 1865-1921 (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2008)

Brazendale, Graham, ‘John Whiteley’, Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, vol 2, 1870-1900 (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books & Department of Internal Affairs, 1993), pp590-591

Cowan, James, Sir Donald Maclean: The Story of a New Zealand Statesman (Wellington: Reed, 1940)

Cowan, James, The New Zealand Wars (Wellington: Government Printer, 1922-23), 1983 reprint, 2 vols

Craig, Dick, The Realms of King Tawhiao, (publisher, place and year of publication not stated)

Dieffenbach, Ernest, Travels in New Zealand: With Contributions to the Geography, Geology, Botany, and Natural History of that Country, 2 vols, (Christchurch: Capper Press, 1974 reprint)

Fenton, Francis Dart, Observations on the State of the Aboriginal Inhabitants of New Zealand, (Auckland: New Zealand Government, 1859)

Gibson, Tom, The Maori Wars: The British Army in New Zealand, 1840-1872 (Wellington: Reed: 1974)

Gilling, Bryan, ‘Engine of Destruction? An Introduction to the History of the Maori Land Court’, Victoria University of Wellington Law Review, 25 (1994)

Hammer, GEJ, Pioneer Missionary: Raglan to Mokau, 1844-1880: Cort Henry Schnackenberg, (Auckland: Wesleyan Historical Society, 1991)

Oettli, Peter, God’s Messenger: J.F. Riemenschneider and Racial Conflict in 19th Century New Zealand (Wellington: Huia, 2008)

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Oliver, Steven, ‘Te Wherowhero, Potatau’, Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, vol 1, 1769-1869 (Wellington: Allen & Unwin & Department of Internal Affairs, 1990),

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pp526-528

O’Malley, Vincent, Stirling, Bruce and Wally Penetito (eds), The Treaty of Waitangi Companion: Maori and Pakeha from Tasman to Today (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2010)

Orange, Claudia, An Illustrated History of the Treaty of Waitangi (Wellington: Allen & Unwin, 1990) 2nd edition, Wellington, Bridget Williams Books, 2004

Orange, Claudia, The Treaty of Waitangi (Wellington: Allen & Unwin, 1987)

Parsonson, Ann, ‘Stories for Land: Oral Narratives in the Maori Land Court’, in Bain Attwood and Fiona Magowan (eds), Telling Stories: Indigenous History and Memory in Australia and New Zealand (Crows Nest: NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2001)

Petrie, Hazel, Chiefs Of Industry: Maori Tribal Enterprise in Early Colonial New Zealand (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2006)

Reed, AW, The Reed Dictionary of New Zealand Place Names (Auckland: Reed Books, 2002)

Sinclair, Keith, The Origins of the Maori Wars (Wellington: New Zealand University Press, 1957)

Skinner, WH, Reminiscences of a Taranaki Surveyor (New Plymouth: T Avery & Sons, 1946)

Stone, RCJ, ‘The Maori Land Question and the Fall of the Grey Government, 1879’, New Zealand Journal of History, vol 1, no 1, April 1976, pp54-55

Taonui, Rawiri, ‘Canoe traditions – Canoes of the West Coast and Lower North Island’, Te Ara - the Encyclopedia of New Zealand, updated 4 March 2009. URL:http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/canoe-traditions/7

Ward, Alan, A Show of Justice: Racial ‘Amalgamation’ in Nineteenth Century New Zealand (Auckland: Auckland University Press and Oxford University Press, 1973; 1983 and 1995 reprints)

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Weaver, John C, The Great Land Rush and the Making of the Modern World, 1650-1900 (Quebec City: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003)

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Research Assistance Projects: Block Narratives’, July 2009

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/OFFICIAY . - Wai 898, # 2.3.41

WAITANGI TRIBUNAL

CONCERNING the Treaty ofWaitangi Act 1975

AND the Te Rohe POtae District Inquiry

DIRECTION COMMISSIONING RESEARCH

1. Pursuant to clause 5A of the secof'Kl schedule of the Treaty of Waitangl Act 1975, the Tr1bunal commissions Paul Thomas to prepare a resealCh report on the MokalrMohakailno and Mohakatlno-Paranlnlhi blocks for the Ta Rohe POlee district Inquiry. The report should address the following matteI'S:

a) Provide a background on the area and Its people, with a particular focus on how tribal alliances and rivalries innuanced the Interaction between local MAori and the Crown.

b) Give II. brief discussion of earty rontect between MAori and Europeans In the Mokau area, i'lcIudlng European missionaries and trader.>.

c) Describe any ealty land dealings between Europeans and Maon. d) DIscuss Crown-Maori rolatlons In the 1840s and 1850s Including the

Awaklno, Mokau, Teumatamalre and Rauroa transac1lons, to the extent that these have not been covered In Leanne Boulton's nineteenth century lands raport Part 1 (WaI898 #A19).

e) Consldar the role of Mokau and its people In relation to war and raupa tu. This should include conSideration of the attack on the Pukearuhe redoubt In 1869 and Its subsequent Influonce on Maor{ relations with Europeans and the Govemment.

f) How did the establishment of the aukatl affect Mokau In the 1870s1 g) DIscuss government policy toward Mokau In the 18705 and 1880s and

whether there was a COncerted effort to open the area to European control.

h) Describe any negotiations and disputes over the 'return of Taranaki Maori' to this region.

i) Discuss events surrounding the Introduction of the Native Land Court into the region, IllCIudlng their relationship to the weakening the aukati and In tensions within tho King Movemenl

J) Describe the nature of the relationships between local Maon, the CroYm and European speculators, Including Joshua Jones, durtng this period.

kJ What were the events surrounding Jones' '\eass' on Mokau-Mohakatlno and the special legislation Involved and the Royal Commission of 18881


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I) Consider the subsequent lend sales to the Crown and prtvate purchasers, Including the 1911 sale of much of Mokau-Mohakatlno, the role of the Walkato-Manlapoto Maori Land Board In these transactions, and the effects of the land loss on Maori of the reglon_

2. The researcher will consult with affected claimant groups to determine what Issues they consider to be of particular significance to their claims in respect of the ebove matters and to access such relevant oral and documentary Informallon as they wish to make available.

3. The commission commenced on 26 November 2009. A complete draft of the report is to be submitted by 5 January 2011 and WIll be circulated to claimants and the Crown for comment.

4. The commission ends on 25 February 2011 . at 'Nhlch time one copy of the final report must be submitted fOf filing in unbound form. An electronic copy of the report should also be provided In Word or Aool>t:l Acrobat formal. Indexed copies of any supporting documents or transcripts are also to be provided as soon as II Is practicable after the final report Is filed. The report and any subsequent eVidenlial meterlal based on It must bo filed through the Registrar.

5. At the discretion of the Presiding Offlcer the commission may be extended If ona or more of the following conditions apply: a) the terms of the commission are changed so as to Increase the scope of

work; . b) mom time Is required for completing one or more project components

owing to unforeseeable clrcumsten~s, such as Illness or denial of access 10 primary sources;

c) the Presiding Officer directs that the services of the oommissionee be temporarily reassigned to a higher prlortty task for the Inquiry;

d) the commlsslonee Is required to prepare for and/or give evidence In another Inquiry during the commission period.

6. The report may be received as evidence and the authof may be crossexemlned on it.

7. The Registrar Is to send copies of this direction to: Paul Thomas Claimant oounsel and unl'9pfBsented claimants In the Te Rohe POtae district InqullY Chief Historian, Waltangl Tribunal Manager - Researctv'Report Writi'lg Services. Wallangl Tribunal Inquiry Supervisor, Waitangl Tribunal InquIry Facilitators, Wa!tangl Tribunal Solicitor-General. Crown Law Off~

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Director, OffIce of Treaty Settlements Chief Executive, Crown Forestry Rentel Trust Chief Executtve, T e Punl K6klrl

this 29" day of September 2010.

e J Ambler Presiding Officer WAITANGI TRIBUNAL

Page 3