The Dangerous liasons

7/23/2019 The Dangerous liasons

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Dangerous Liaisons: Dyadic PowerTransitions and the Risk of Militarized

Disputes and Wars

DAVID SOBEK Louisiana State University

JEREMY WELLS Louisiana State University

According to power transition theory, hegemons occasionally face a major

power challenger who feels that the benefits accrued from the status

quo do not match their rising position in the power hierarchy. This gap

can generate, or exacerbate, grievances that encourage the challenger to

seek changes to the status quo just as their growing power gives them

the capacity to modify the status quo. As this dynamic continues and

the challenger approaches the power of the hegemon, the risk of heg-

emonic war becomes acute. While power transition theory was origi-

nally developed to describe this major power dynamic, Lemke ~2002!expands the logic to regional hierarchies and found similar effects.

The underlying logic of power transition, however, does not necessarily

apply only to hierarchies. The logic that details the dangers of power

transitions within a hierarchy can equally apply to power transitions within

a dyad. In other words, when a power transition occurs between a

pair of states, the risk of conf lict should increase. In fact, whether

the theory had been previously applied to global or regional hierar-

chies, the theory itself was couched in the dyadic interactions between

the hegemon and challenger. As such, we would argue that power tran-sition theory is, at its core, a dyadic phenomenon, and the previous

research that looked at power transitions within global or regional hier-

archies are actually just special cases of the more general dyadic power

transition phenomenon.

Acknowledgments: We would like to thank Joe Clare and Douglas Lemke for look-ing at an earlier version of the manuscript.

David Sobek and Jeremy Wells, Department of Political Science, 240 Stubbs Hall,Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA 70803-5433, [email protected] [email protected]

Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique

46:1 (March/mars 2013) 6992 doi:10.10170S0008423913000218

2013 Canadian Political Science Association ~lAssociation canadienne de science politique!

and0et la Socit qubcoise de science politique


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While the stakes involved in a dyadic power transition may be lower

than those that involve global or regional hegemons, the basic logic of

power transition theory should still apply. If one assumes that most pairs

of states have some equilibrium distribution of benefits from their shared

interactions that is correlated with the distribution of power within the

dyad, then changes in that power distribution should either lead to changes

in the distribution of benefits or increase the level of dissatisfaction of

the rising state. Of course, there does not need to be a relationship between

a change in the distribution of power and the generation of a grievance

because there may already be a set of preexisting grievances that become

more salient. Regardless, a dissatisfied rising state has both the willing-

ness~grievance!and opportunity~rising power!to change the status quo,so the risk of conflict should increase under these conditions. In fact,

DiCicco and Levy have already noted that the nature of a distribution

of benefits at the level of the international system is hardly equivalent to

the nature of the benefits at stake between two states in a dyad, and, in

fact, it is likely that some states will be satisfied with the systemic status

quo but dissatisfied with the status quo of a particular bilateral relation-

ship~1999: 690!. As such, it may be more fruitful to examine bilateralpower transitions.

To test the effects of dyadic power transitions we examine all non-

directed dyads from 1816 to 2001. In general, the results confirm that

dyadic power transitions increase the risk of militarized conflicts. In addi-

tion, this effect seems strongest in the years preceding the actual power

transition. We also find that the effect is not conditional on the dyad

containing powerful states or those with dissimilar preferences. As such,

we conclude that dyadic power transitions represent a critical explana-

tion for the onset of conflict. In addition, our results indicate that a theory

of dyadic power transition can subsume both global and regional hierar-

chy power transition theories in that they are both special cases of the

dyadic effect.

Understanding the Logic of Power Transitions

In the original presentation of power transition theory Organski ~1968!and Organski and Kugler ~1980! argue that international politics ishierarchical with a global hegemon atop a power pyramid, great powers

below the hegemon, and minor and small powers below them. Major

wars occur when a dissatisfied major power reaches parity with the

hegemon and seeks to either reap the benefits of the current inter-

national structure or redesign the system in its favour. This limits the

applicability of the theory to major wars fought between only the stron-

gest few states in the system, that is, power transitions occur at the top

70 DAVID SOBEK AND JEREMYWELLS


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of the power pyramid with the control of the international system the

prize.

This narrow scope became one of the most substantial criticisms

of power transition theory, that is, it only explains major wars fought

among the half-dozen or so major and hegemonic powers of the system~Geller, 1992; Gochman, 1990though he also separately analyzesLatin American rivalries; Lemke, 1996; Lemke and Werner, 1996; Siver-

son and Miller, 1996; Vasquez, 1996!. In particular, Vasquez notes thatit is

curious that the power transition effect would turn out to be so limited, given

the great theoretical emphasis placed in realist analysis on the role of power

and changes in power for shaping behavior ... As a result, while Organski and

Kuglers findings lend some support to their proposition, the findings also make

it evident that the power transition is an inadequate explanation for most ofthe interstate wars that have been fought in human history. In this sense, the

empirical findings can be seen as indicating a deficiency in the explanatory

power of the proposition. ~1996: 39!

Siverson and Miller expand this critique by challenging studies that are

limited by the inclusion of only dyads that comprise at least one major

power for major powers are introduced on an ex post facto basis. That

is, the major powers are selected on the basis of what we now know

~1996, 6364!.This is not to say that scholars completely ignored the implications

of power transition for minor powers, although this was often done by

looking at parity within a dyad. Garnham ~1976! finds that violent con-flict is more likely between contiguous states of approximately equal

Abstract. Power transition theory has been both theoretically and empirically developed in

the context of a hierarchy ~both global and regional!. Yet the logic of the theory describes the

interactions of a hegemon in relation to a rising challenger, which is essentially a dyadic inter-

action. As a result, we argue that power transition theory is a dyadic theory that can be exam-

ined across all dyads. We test power transition in a data set of all non-directed dyads from 1816

to 2001. Our results find robust evidence that dyadic power transitions increase the risk of

militarized disputes. In addition, this result is not actually contingent on the dyad containing

either powerful states or those with dissimilar preferences.

Rsum. La thorie de la transition du pouvoir a t la fois thorique et empirique dve-

loppe dans le cadre dune hirarchie ~ la fois mondial et rgional!. Pourtant, la logique de la

thorie dcrit les interactions dune puissance hgmonique par rapport un challenger en hausse,

qui est essentiellement une interaction dyadique. En consquence, nous soutenons que la tho-

rie de la transition du pouvoir est une thorie dyadique qui peut tre examin travers toutes

les dyades. Nous testons transition de puissance dans un ensemble de toutes les dyades non-

directifs 18162001 donnes. Nos rsultats trouvent des preuves solides que les transitions de

pouvoir dyadique augmentent le risque de conf lits militariss. En outre, ce rsultat nest pas

rellement subordonne la dyade contenant soit des Etats puissants ou ceux qui ont desprfrences diffrentes.


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power and less likely between contiguous states of asymmetric power.

Likewise, Weede ~1976! finds that war is less likely in dyads where onestate had at least a ten-to-one advantage in military power, although his

sample was limited to East Asia. Despite these early efforts, power tran-

sition theory maintained its early focus on major powers. One possible

exception is Bremer, who offers the closest approach to an analysis of

power transition theory involving all dyads: he contrasts seven theories

of war and peace and finds that although it is not as strong as others

considered here, and certainly weaker than hard-core realists would have

us believe, the existence of overwhelming preponderance is, ceteris pari-

bus, a pacifying condition ~1992: 337!. His analysis, however, onlycovers from 1816 to 1965.

More recently scholars have made efforts to increase the generaliz-

ability of the theory by adding more contenders or looking at inter-

national subsystems. Houweling and Siccama ~1988! reject Organskiand Kuglers ~1980! f inding that power transitions only among thetop three or four powers in the system matter; they find them to be

significant predictors of wars among an entire subset of major powers.

Lemke ~1996, 2002! and Lemke and Werner ~1996! focus on regionalhegemons within the global system. The multiple hierarchy perspec-

tive posits that the international system comprises several hierarchic

subsystems, each with its own hegemon and set of potential challeng-

ers. Within their sample of South American states, Lemke ~1996! andLemke and Werner ~1996! show that minor-power wars can beexplained in terms of regional power transitions, all occurring within a

subsystem of the global order. In addition, Lemke ~2002! expands hismultiple hierarchy perspective to include a more global sample of regional

hierarchies.

Researchers have also tried to broaden power transition theory by

extending the conception of power. Kim ~1989! extends the measureof a major powers capabilities to include those of its allies and finds

that this measure was significant and Organski and Kuglers measure

of capabilities ~1980! loses statistical significance. Alliances are also ofimportance for Bussman and Oneal ~2007!, who test power transitiontheory at the dyadic level by focusing on the single global hegemon

Great Britain until 1945 and the US after 1946and its ability to

distribute private goods to major power allies. While their findings at

the systemic level present challenges for power transition theory in

general, they conclude that power preponderance at the dyadic level

maintains peace. This conclusion supports the assertion that dyadic

power parity may be destabilizing, regardless of power status. Gellers

work ~1993, 1998, 2000! similarly finds that unstable, equal powerdistributions increase the probability of war within major power rival

dyads.



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Generalizing Power Transition

The previous literature leaves two questions unanswered. First, how far

can one generalize power transition theory? Second, is it a useful exer-

cise to even attempt to further generalize power transition theory? In

answer to the second question Lemke reasonably argues that when one

considers that roughly twenty-two million people have been killed in wars

since World War II and that all of these were minor-power wars, an exclu-

sive focus on the conflict behaviour of the major powers must be ques-

tioned~1996: 77!. So how far can one expand power transition and notlose its central argument? We argue that power transition can be used all

the way down to dyadic interactions because, at its core, it is a dyadic

theory. In particular, power transition theory describes a lack of agree-

ment about the relative balance of power between two states ~similar inmany ways to Blainey, 1988, and Reed, 2003, among others!. This dis-agreement arises from a change in the distribution of power combined

with dissatisfaction. As such, a dyad that has a power transition is more

likely to contain states with both the willingness and opportunity to engage

in conflict. Note that this can occur in any interacting pair of states; major

power status is not a prerequisite.1

The source of the disagreement about relative power is the subject

of a large literature on the relationship between information and war.

Blaineys thesis that war is usually the outcome of a diplomatic crisis

which cannot be solved because both sides have conflicting estimates of

their bargaining power ~1988: 114! is the foundation upon which thesestudies are established. Fearon ~1995! expands upon Blaineys thesis byarguing that private information and incentives to misrepresent that infor-

mation, which would produce a rational miscalculation of relative capa-

bilities and resolve to fight, is a rational mechanism that can lead to war.

Because war is costly and risky, states should consider themselves better

off by striking a deal without fighting; thus, Fearon argues that states

cannot always use quiet diplomatic conversations to discover mutually

preferable settlements ~1995: 400! to their bargaining problems due toprivate information about capabilities and resolve. States can use misin-

formation or withhold information to influence the likelihood of war.

This is easier to accomplish as the observable ratio of capabilities reaches

parity, for even the slightest advantage unknown to a states potential

adversary could tip the balance in its favour.

Wagner additionally argues that war is not the end or failure of bar-

gaining; war is part of the bargaining process, or a competitive struggle

to determine the disagreement outcome in a bargaining game in which

states use force and the threat of force to influence other states ~2000:481!. Thus, whereas Fearon argues that war is the result of the failure toreach an ex ante bargain, Wagner considers war to be a means of refin-

Dangerous Liaisons 73


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ing the relative positions of each state in setting the terms of the bargain.

Slantchev ~2003! adds that, even under conditional assumptions stackedin favour of peace, war remains a viable, rational outcome as a means to

exercise the power to hurt, or to inflict costs on the opponent and reduce

its ability to inflict costs, thus affecting the relative balance of bargain-

ing positions. By extending the bargainingwar argument, these works

have greatly added to understanding the relationship between informa-

tion and war.

The relationship between war and information is especially critical

for the logic behind power transition theory. While power transition theo-

rists have explained how parity makes war likely, they have generally

failed to explainwhy this is the case. Tammen and colleagues come clos-

est to making a case: Power transition anticipates that war is likely to

be waged when differences in perceptions about the status quo exist

that is, war will likely occur when the challenger is dissatisfied ~2000,22!. The dissatisfaction is the product of a failure to reach a resolutionof the challengers grievances; in other words, they fight because they

fail to reach an ex ante bargain. We argue that this is a plausible expla-

nation for all wars, not simply those between dominant powers and

challengers.

In fact, Huth and colleagues ~1992! show that the dyadic approachwe advocate here stands up in tests that focus on systemic variables. Focus-

ing on systemic factors, they find the likelihood of war increases when

the ratio of military capabilities between challenger and rival is between

3:4 and 4:3, and either the challengers or rivals military expenditures are

growing 10 per cent faster than its opponents. Bennett and Stam~2004!measure the rate of change in the distribution of capabilitiesa critical

power transition variablein a dyad , assuming that as the rate of change

increases the risk of conflict increases as well. Although Bennett and Stam

~2004:113! offer little support for our thesis,2 they do not actually codedyadic power transitions; rather, they measure the rate of change in the

balance of power in a dyad and assume that high rates of change are cor-

related with power transitions. As such, the validity of their test is con-

tingent on this assumption.

These studies are indicative of a recurring pattern of methodologi-

cal problems that power transition theorists have faced in terms of mea-

suring its two critical variables: power and satisfaction. Organski and

Kugler~1980!employ gross national product as a proxy for national capa-bilities and find that transitions mattered only for the top three or four

powers. Houweling and Siccama ~1988! use the Correlates of War Com-posite Index of National Capabilities ~at the time referred to as the Com-posite Potential Index! and find that transitions matter for all majorpowers, not just the top dogs. This issue is summarized and dealt with

by de Soysa and colleagues. They compare the designs of these two stud-



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ies, including the operationalization of power and the cases included and

conclude that support for the power transition theory depends on both

the measure of power and the set of cases chosen for analysis~1997: 526!.A major difficulty within studies of power transition theory is mea-

suring status quo satisfaction. Powell ~1996: 263! insists that the prob-ability of war depends on both the distribution of power and the status

quo distribution. Thus, any attempt to assess the relation between the

probability of war and the distribution of power should control for the

status quo. Failing to do so will generally lead to biased estimates if, as

might be expected, the distribution of power and the status quo distribu-

tion are correlated. Powell ~1996, fn. 50! suggests Bueno de Mesquitaand Lalmans ~1992! measure of a states utility for the status quo is astart in this direction, but inadequate because it reduces to assuming

that the status quo distribution is constant in all cases. Regional inter-

ests, including measures of alliances, trade, colonies and diplomatic

exchanges, serve as Danilovic and Clares ~2007! operationalization ofstatus quo satisfaction among great powers.

Separating power and satisfaction is the subject of an extended debate

between scholars beginning with de Soysa and colleagues~1997!. Lemkeand Reed ~1998! rebut their claim that power transition theory suffersfrom two contradictory logical inconsistencies: all rising powers are at

least somewhat dissatisfied because they do not enjoy the benefits of

hegemony and all rising powers are satisfied because their absolute eco-

nomic positions are increasing. Lemke and Reed~1998!use Granger cau-sality tests to show that national capabilities do not determine status quo

satisfaction, supporting Organskis position~1968!that states can be pow-erful and satisfied or powerful and dissatisfied. Oneal and colleagues

~1998! counter with two points: first, power transition theorists are notclear on what the benefits afforded by the hegemon are, and if they are

not wealth and power, as measured by GNP, then what are they? And

second, they assume that hegemons grant to themselves and their major

allies disproportionate benefits.

Since our own extension of power transition theory toward a general

dyadic theory, it is critical to resolve the issue between distributions of

power and benefits. In the original formulation, the distribution of ben-

efits is determined by the hegemon; therefore, a states satisfaction is a

function of its access to those benefits. In a dyadic formulation, the rela-

tionship between systemic benefits and satisfaction becomes less clear.

A state may be content with the level of benefits it receives yet simulta-

neously be dissatisfied within one or more of its dyadic relationships.

An example of this occurred in the Seven Weeks War between Prussia

and Austria in 1866 where neither state disagreed as to the construct of

the system yet disagreed over the dyadic distribution of benefits ~Buenode Mesquita, 1990: 40!. Power transition theorists note that territorial



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disputes, like the Seven Weeks War, remain important generators of

conflict. They have the potential to create long-lasting polarization often

characterized by intractable positions colored by ideological or national-

ist rhetoric. This is the breeding ground of national dissatisfaction ~Tam-men et al., 2000: 3637!. Vasquez adds that, while not deterministic,states satisfaction depends primarily on whether they have resolved all

border questions and territorial claims that they have with their neigh-

bours ~1996: 51!.Dissatisfaction is not only important for providing casus belli but

also for determining how states behave within the international system.

Satisfied states are constrained by the status quo, but dissatisfied states

are unconstrained and act as though anarchy prevails. Among satisfied

states absolute gains may be pursued, but between dissatisfied states or

within mixed dyads of satisfied and dissatisfied states, relative gain con-

cerns pre-dominate ~Lemke and Reed, 1998: 512!. Bargaining basedupon concerns for relative gains in a world of asymmetric information is

complicated ~Blainey, 1988; Powell, 1999; Waltz, 1979!. The effects ofasymmetric information would be exacerbated in a dyad characterized

by the kind of polarized rhetoric of which Tammen and colleagues ~2000!write. It is thus not difficult to theoretically link the balance of power

and satisfaction within a dyad where a transition in power favouring a

dissatisfied state would propel it towards adjusting the balance of ben-

efits within the dyad. This drive to renegotiate the balance of benefits

within the dyad would increase the risk of armed violence between those

states.

While satisfaction makes theoretical sense, scholars have had more

difficulty generating a separate, objective measure of satisfaction. Despite

Organski and Kuglers note that their model does not require that the

dissatisfaction felt by the challenger be judged valid by an objective

observer~1980: 23!, the lack of a strong operationalization of satisfac-tion, as Vasquez laments, is unfortunate because focusing on what makes

states satisfied or dissatisfied is probably the key to explaining why some

power transitions end in war and others do not ~1996: 50!. Power tran-sition theorists have employed several measures of satisfaction indepen-

dent of power of national capabilities. Anderson and McKeown ~1987!,using national capabilities data, offer that when a state is dissatisfied

that is, when its projected level of its share of global capabilities exceeds

its aspired levelits government is activated and seeks to attend to

the external environment. Kim ~1989, 1992, 1996! and Kim and Mor-row ~1992! draw on the logic of Bueno de Mesquitas use of alliance

portfolio similarity to measure satisfaction. Parity~Geller, 1993!and tran-sitions ~Wayman, 1996! among rivals are particularly likely to lead towar.3 Although not yet used in a test of power transition theory, probably

due to its limited temporal reach of about fifty years, Gartzkes ~1998,



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2000!affinity score measures similarity of United Nations General Assem-bly votes. Powell~1999!formally defines a state as dissatisfied when itsexpected utility of fighting exceeds that of the status quo; thus, satisfac-

tion is a function of the distribution of power, status quo benefits, and

the cost of fighting. These measures share two qualities with respect to

our contribution to power transition theory: each is a questionable mea-

sure of satisfaction and each is a dyadic measure.

In summary, our dyadic version of the power transition theory can

be distilled into a fairly simple hypothesis and is essentially the dyadic

logic of the power transition theory. In particular, when a power transi-

tion occurs within a dyad, it creates an ambiguity in terms of the out-

come of a potential conflict. This disagreement over the outcome of a

possible conf lict decreases the likelihood of a negotiate settlement over

the issues of contention, which essentially increases the likelihood that

the two sides would rationally enter into a conflict. In many ways, hypoth-

eses 1 and 2 can be differentiated by who one expects to initiate the con-

flict on which power transition theory is ambiguous. If one believes that

the rising state will initiate, then it is rational for the challenger to wait

until after the transition to fight. The declining state ~that is, the onebeing passed!, however, has an incentive to fight before the transition.Since we are not necessarily interested in differentiating these explana-

tions at this time, we concentrate simply on the increased risk of conflict.

Hypothesis 1: Dyads that have experienced a power transition are more

likely to have a militarized conflict.

Since power transition theory is dynamic in the sense that it talks

about changes across time, we can refine the hypothesis. In particular,

the states in the dyad are not necessarily myopic and have the capacity to

anticipate future changes in the balance of power. As such, the militarized

conflict may actually occur before the power transition.

Hypothesis 2: Dyads that are about to experience a power transition are

more likely to have a militarized conflict.

Since power transition has generally been applied to major powers,

it is appropriate to test the conditionality of the relationship. In other

words, are power transitions between powerful states more dangerous than

those between weaker states? If so, then the concentration on the global

and regional hegemons might be vindicated. This leads to the third hypoth-

esis that we test.

Hypothesis 3: A power transition in a dyad with powerful states has a

higher risk of militarized conflict than a power transition in a dyad with

weaker states.



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Finally, power transition has emphasized the role that preferences

play in the process. In particular, it is the dissatisfied challenger that wants

to fight. As such, we would expect the relationship between power tran-

sition and conflict to be conditioned by the similarity0dissimilarity of

preferences between the states, and this generates our final hypothesis.

Hypothesis 4: A power transition in a dyad in which the states have dis-

similar preferences has a higher risk of militarized conflict than a power

transition in a dyad where the states have similar preferences.

Research Design

To examine the effects of dyadic power transitions, we use a dataset ofall non-directed dyads from 1816 to 2001.4 While it may be the case that

politically relevant dyads would be more likely to show a power transi-

tion effect, we believe that is better viewed as a testable hypothesis as

opposed to a sampling technique. As such, we prefer to use all non-

directed dyads as opposed to only political relevant dyads. The depen-

dent variable for the analysis is the onset of a new militarized interstate

dispute with the dyad-years containing an ongoing dispute dropped from

the analysis~Ghosn et al., 2004!. In addition, we have a series of tests of

robustness that use the onset of a new interstate war as the dependentvariable with the dyadyears having an ongoing war dropped from the

analysis. Since both dependent variables that we use are dichotomous,

we estimate our models with a logit. In addition, to account for the tem-

poral dependence all of our models include peace years and three cubic

splines ~Beck et al., 1998!, but we do not report the coefficients of thesplines in Table 1 for ease of presentation. Finally, in all models we use

robust standard errors and cluster on the dyad.

Coding Dyadic Power Transitions

Coding dyadic power transitions poses two main difficulties. First, the

measure needs to be sensitive enough to capture power transition but not

so sensitive that minor year-over-year noise creates false power transi-

tions. Second, the measure needs to account for the possibility that the

states will not act contemporaneous with a measured transition, so there

needs to be a window of time in which a power transition occurs. While

there is no ideal solution to these issues, the measure of dyadic power tran-

sition used in our analysis seems have both face validity and provides con-

sistent results that do not change with minor changes in the measurement.

To derive the power of a state we rely on the composite index of

national capabilities ~CINC! ~Singer et al., 1972! coded by the Corre-



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lates of War~COW!project.5 This measures six components of state power~energy use per capita, iron0steel production, military personnel, mili-tary spending, total population, and urban population!. For each year, astates share of each of these power components are calculated ~statesvalue for component X divided by the sum of all states values for com-

ponent X!. Each of these shares are then summed for each state anddivided by six. From this, the CINC score represents the states share of

global power resources in a given year.

For each dyad in each year, we subtract state As CINC score from

state Bs CINC score to get a measure of the difference in power between

the two states. We additionally assume that states that are within one

standard deviation ~calculated using the complete set of cases! of com-plete parity ~power difference equals zero! are in rough parity.6 Withthese data we create a tri-chotomous variable that is 1 if state A has a

power advantage ~power difference is greater than one standard devia-tion from the mean difference seen in dyads and side A has the advan-

tage!, 0 if the power is in rough parity, and 1 if state B has a poweradvantage ~power difference is greater than one standard deviation fromthe mean difference seen in dyads and side B has the advantage !. Fromthat variable we calculate a variable that measures if there was a change

in the tri-chotomous variable between the current year and five years

earlier. So the dyadic power transition in the past five years ~testinghypothesis 1! variable is coded as 1 in the cases where the past fiveyears saw a shift from A advantage to parity, A advantage to B advan-

tage, parity to B advantage, parity to A advantage, B advantage to par-

ity, or B advantage to A advantage, and 0 otherwise. In addition, the

power transition in the next five years variable is simply coded 1 if a

dyadic power transition occurs in the following 5 years ~testing hypoth-esis 2!, and 0 otherwise.

This measure has a number of potential problems, but we believe

that is still represents an adequate measure of dyadic power transitions.

The first problem is that we may not be capturing power transition, that

is, a movement from A advantage to B advantage or from B advantage to

A advantage. The problem is that using that stricter definition of power

transition leads to so few cases of dyadic power transitions that analysis

is virtually impossible ~21 cases out of roughly 580,000 dyadyears!. Asecond issue is that you may have a situation where state A has an advan-

tage just slightly less than one standard deviation and then it switches to

state Bs advantage just slightly less than one standard deviation and this

case would be coded as no transition. While this seems like a large move

and a power transition, it is not clear how precisely states measure power.

In other words, can states really discern that sort of change? Our dataset

can, after the fact, but states may not be able to do the same at the time

of the change. As such, we wanted to make sure that the dyadic power



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transitions captured by our dataset will be visible to the states because if

the states cannot sense the change, then there is little reason for them to

act. In addition, what seems most important to the power transition liter-

ature is the movement from one states obvious advantage to rough par-

ity between the states, and this is what our measure captures.

We believe that this variable passes our criteria in that it is sensitive

enough to capture power transition, not so sensitive to pick up numerous

false signals, and captures a wide enough time span to allow states to act.7

The power transition in the past five-years variable codes 4,643 dyadic

power transitions over 578,017 dyad years, or about 0.8 per cent of the

cases. As such, power transitions are a relative rare phenomenon, which

is to be expected. By looking at changes over a five-year time span, we

additionally avoided smaller year over year transitions. For instance, if

we looked at year-over-year changes, then dyadic power transitions jump

to 5.89 per cent of the cases. In general, we do not believe that transi-

tions are nearly that frequent and do not use such a short time period. To

test the robustness of our results, however, we also used a ten-year period

to create the dyadic power transition variables and found no changes in

the results ~this is discussed in more detail in the results section!.Our coding of dyadic power transitions is different from Bennett and

Stam~2004!, who measure power transitions with the rate of change~aver-aged over five years! of the balance of power within a dyad.8 So if stateAs power was growing at 6 per cent and state Bs power was growing at

2 per cent, then Bennett and Stam would code that as four-point gap.

The assumption behind their measure is that a higher rate of change cor-

relates with transitions, so they expect a positive coefficient. What their

measure fails to capture, however, are the actual dyadic power transi-

tions. As such, we believe that our measure is better at seeing whether

dyadic power transitions are periods of increased risk.

Control Variables

All of our models include a series of control variables to account for any

confounding relationships. Given that we are interested in the effects of

power transitions, we need to control for other effects of power. Balance

of capabilities is simply the higher CINC score of the two states in a

dyad divided by the lower CINC score. In addition, it has been argued

that powerful states have more to gain ~lose! in the international system,so they tend to be more conflict prone~Hegre, 2008!. To account for thiseffect, the power of dyad variable is the sum of the two states individ-

ual CINC scores.

Power transition theory~Organski, 1968; Organski and Kugler, 1980!also implies that preferences matter and play a critical role in the onset



13/24

of conflicts. To measure preferences we rely on the S-score ~Signorinoand Ritter, 1999!, which uses alliance patterns of the two states in thedyad to determine preference similarity. Theoretically, the S-score can

range from 1 ~completely dissimilar preferences! to 1 ~completelysimilar preferences!. While there are alternative measures of preferencesimilarity, the advantage of the S-score is that it allows us to go further

back in time and have a larger sample. The models also include a mea-

sure of alliance ties, which is simply a dichotomous variable ~allies!codedas 1 if the two states in the dyad have a formal alliance ~alliance datacomes from Gibler and Sarkees, 2004!, and 0 otherwise.

Finally, our models control for the well documented effect of regime

type~see Russett and Oneal, 2001, for an overview of this theory and lit-erature!. We use Polity IV to measure democracy.9 The Polity measure ofdemocracy is based on six separate institutional characteristics. Each state

has a regime type score~democracy characteristics minus autocracy char-acteristics! that can range from 10~complete autocracy!to 10~com-

plete democracy!. To capture the level of democracy of a dyad we use twomeasures that are common in the literature ~Russett and Oneal, 2001!.First, low democracy is the lower of the two regime-type scores of the

states in the dyad. As the value of low democracy increases, it is indica-

tive of a dyad with more democratic states. Second, high democracy is

the higher of the two regime-type scores of the states in the dyad. As high

democracy decreases, it is showing a dyad with more autocratic states.

Results

Table 1 provides the results of our analysis of the effects of dyadic power

transitions on the risk of dispute onset. In general, the results confirm our

expectation that dyadic power transitions represent periods of risk. In par-

ticular, the years preceding a power transition have a higher probability

of militarized dispute onset. In addition, the effect is not contingent on

the dyad containing powerful states or that the states have dissimilar pref-

erences. In fact, it appears that dyads with weaker states have power tran-

sitions that are more dangerous than dyads with powerful states.

Model 1 simply contains the control variables as a check of the data-

set. In general, the control variables have the expected effects, in that

dyads with powerful states and those that are at parity have higher risks

of dispute onset.10 In addition, jointly democratic dyads, jointly auto-

cratic dyads and dyads that contain states with similar preferences are

all more peaceful.11 Strangely, dyads that contain states with a formal

alliance are more likely to have disputes, although this is consistent with

Bueno de Mesquita~1981!. This could relate to the inclusion of the S-scorewhich is based on alliance patterns, although the correlation between the



14/24

TABLE1

DyadicPow

erTransitionsandtheR

iskofMilitarizedConflicts

Model1

~MID!

Mo

del2

~M

ID!

Model3

~MID!

Model4

~MID!

Model5

~MID!

Model6

~MID!

Powertransition

inthepast5years

0.45

0.09

~

2.79!***

~0.5

2!

Powertransition

inthenext5years

1.27

1.02

1.18

1.50

~8.0

7!***

~6.6

6!***

~9.0

3!***

~5.4

8!***

Powertransition

inthenext5years

powerofdyad

4.32

~2.62!***

Powertransition

inthenext5years

preferencesimiliarity

0.54

~1.22!

Powerofdyad

7.20

6.20

7.08

6.0

5

7.33

7.11

~9.8

8!***

~1

0.46!***

~9.5

7!***

~9.9

9!***

~9.5

4!***

~9.6

1!***

Balanceofcapabilities

0.0003

0.0001

0.0002

0.0

0005

0.0002

0.0002

~2.01!**

~

1.38!

~1.76!*

~1.1

1!

~1.75!*

~1.76!*

Preferencesimilarity

0.37

0.31

0.27

0.23

0.25

0.24

~2.61!***

~

2.30!**

~1.85!*

~1.6

6!*

~1.74!*

~1.76!*

Lowdemocracy

0.05

0.03

0.05

0.04

0.05

0.05

~7.06!***

~

5.72!***

~7.53!***

~5.9

1!***

~7.55!***

~7.54!***



15/24

Highdemocracy

0.05

0.03

0.05

0.04

0.05

0.05

~7.7

0!***

~

5.79!***

~7.6

4!***

~5.7

9!***

~7.6

2!***

~7.6

6!***

Allies

0.2

7

0.22

0.21

0.18

0.21

0.21

~2.2

1!**

~

2.25!**

~1.7

0!*

~1.7

5!*

~1.6

9!*

~1.7

1!*

Contiguity

3.0

4

2.38

3.02

2.36

3.01

3.02

~28.9

5!***

~2

4.96!***

~27.37!***

~24.12!***

~27.20!***

~27.38!***

Peaceyears

0.28

0.42

0.28

0.420

0.28

0.28

~17.71!***

~2

1.49!***

~16.1

7!***

~

20.23!***

~16.3

8!***

~16.19!***

Constant

5.15

3.67

5.31

3.77

5.33

5.34

~37.3

0!***

~2

3.24!***

~37.0

1!***

~

22.96!***

~36.7

9!***

~36.68!***

Numberofobservations

648944

55557

6

572611

481

685

572611

572611

Loglikelihood

11387.5

9

976

1.51

10369.06

8

821.58

10360.95

10367.13

Chi-squared

2500.4

7

349

1.43

2231.4

9

3

019.23

2493.0

0

2284.9

8

P-valueforchisquared

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Note:*p,

0.10

;**p,

0.05;***p,

0.01~two-taile

dtestswithrobuststandarderrorsclusteredonthestate!.

Thecoefficients

areinthetopcellwiththestandarderrorsbelow.

Allmodelscontainthreecubicsplines.



16/24

measures is only 0.23. When model 1 excludes the measure of prefer-

ence similarity, the coefficient on allies remains positive but is no longer

statistically significant. Despite this result, the results from model 1 appear

fairly consistent with previous research.

Models 2 and 3 separately test the effects of power transitions, where

model 2 looks at the risk of conflict after a transition and model 3 exam-

ines the risk before the transition. In both models, the coefficient is pos-

itive and statistically significant indicating that the years before and after

a dyadic power transition have increased risks of militarized interstate

disputes, which provides preliminary support to hypotheses 1 and 2. When

both variables ~model 4! are including in the same model, however, thepost-transition years are no more likely to have a dispute, although the

years before the transition still have a higher risk of dispute onset. So, of

the two main hypotheses, it appears that hypothesis 2 is more robust.12

Models 5 and 6 test to see if the risk of dyadic power transitions are

contingent on either the dyad containing powerful states ~model 5!or thestates in the dyad having dissimilar preferences~model 6!. While it seemsintuitive that dyads with powerful states would have more dangerous tran-

sitions, this is simply not the case and so is not supportive of hypothesis

3. In fact, the opposite is true in that the negative and statistically signif-

icant coefficient on the interaction term in model 5 shows that a power

transition in a strong dyad actually leads to reduced likelihood of

militarized conflict compared to an equally powerful dyad with no tran-

sition. Not only is this counter to previous research on power transition

theory, it highlights why it is so important to move beyond hierarchies

and major powers when looking at the effects of power transitions.13

Model 6 also shows counterintuitive results in that dyadic power tran-

sitions are just as dangerous when the states have dissimilar as similar

preferences. Of course, this result is contingent on the ability of the

S-score to measure preferences, but, with that being said, the results are

fairly clear. The similarity of preferences in a dyad has no statistically

significant effect on the risk inherent in a power transition, which is

counter to hypothesis 4. In fact, this result is counter to a lot of theory of

power transition, that is, power transitions are only dangerous with a dis-

similarity of preferences. There are three possible explanations for the

results. First, as noted above, the measure of preferences is not accurate.

Second, power transitions and preference similarity are not as connected

as previously thought. Third, MIDs are not the appropriate measure of

conflict given the importance that the literature places on wars. The first

two possibilities are not completely addressable in the context of these

analyses but the third can easily be examined.

All of the models in Table 1 use militarized interstate disputes as

the dependent variable, where the power transition literature tends to look

at the onset of wars. To ensure the reliability of our results, we also exam-



17/24

ined the effect of dyadic power transitions on the risk of war onset in

Table 2. Switching to wars had virtually no effect on the dyadic power

transition results except in two cases. First, in model 2 of Table 2, the

coefficient on power transition in the past five years is no longer signif-

icant, although the p-value was 0.105 so the change was not that great

from model 2 of Table 1. The second change was the effect of the pref-

erence similarity in model 6 of Table 2. When looking at wars the simi-

larity of preferences is an important contextual variable. In particular,

dyadic power transitions are more dangerous when the states have dis-

similar preferences~a confirmation of hypothesis 4!. While not decisive,this also helps explain the preference similarity results in Table 1 as not

being completely anomalous with regard to the previous literature. It may

just be the case that at lower levels of conf lict, preference dissimilarity

does not play as important a role. Despite these two differences, the results

appear fairly consistent between militarized dispute or interstate wars.

As a final check of the robustness of our results, we changed the

time frame of the power transition and looked at the 10 years before a

power transition and the 10 years after a power transition. In addition,

we used this new measure with both the onset of militarized disputes

and the onset of war as the dependent variable. For the models that did

not contain the interaction terms the results are virtually identical with

one exception. With the onset of war as the dependent variable the effect

of a power transition in the past 10 years is positive but statistically insig-

nificant. The four models that contained the interaction terms the results

were exactly the same as reported with the five-year window.

The effects of dyadic power transitions are not only statistically sig-

nificant but they also have large substantive effects as well. For instance,

holding all variables in model 3 to their mean the risk of a militarized

dispute onset when there is not an approaching power transition is 0.14

per cent. If that same dyad had an approaching power transition, how-

ever, the risk of a militarized dispute jumps to 0.38 per cent, which is a

171 per cent increase. The substantive effects are equally large when

looking at the risk of war. In the average dyad when no power transi-

tion is imminent the risk of war is only 0.03 per cent, but rises to 0.13

per cent ~a 333 per cent increase! in the years preceding a power tran-sition. So, not only are the effects of dyadic power transitions statisti-

cally robust, but they have quite large effects on the real world risk of

armed conflict.

Conclusions

Power transition theory has traditionally been applied to the interaction

between the hegemon ~global and0or regional! and a rising challenger.



18/24

TABLE2

DyadicPow

erTransitionsandtheR

iskofInterstateWars

Model1

~War!

Mo

del2

~W

ar!

Model3

~War!

Model4

~War!

Model5

~War!

Model6

~War!

Powertransition

inthepast5years

0.31

0.23

~1.62!

~1.1

2!

Powertransition

inthenext5years

1.99

1.5

6

2.57

1.10

~9.9

4!***

~7.4

3!***

~9.0

5!***

~4.1

2!***

Powertransition

inthenext5years

powerofdyad

4.49

~2.21!**

Powertransition

inthenext5years

preferencesimilarity

2.06

~4.5

4!***

Powerofdyad

10.2

3

6.90

9.69

6.1

1

10.0

9

9.57

~14.29!***

~12.01!***

~14.16!***

~11.2

8!***

~14.63!***

~14.10!***

Balanceofcapabilities

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

~5.9

4!***

~5.01!***

~5.73!***

~4.94!***

~5.79!***

~5.79!***

Preferencesimilarity

0.79

0.29

0.71

0.30

0.68

0.8

9

~4.88!***

~1.94!*

~4.26!***

~1.91!*

~4.05!***

~5.16!***

Lowdemocracy

0.06

0.04

0.06

0.04

0.06

0.0

7

~5.18!***

~3.75!***

~5.30!***

~3.62!***

~5.48!***

~5.48!***



19/24

Highdemocracy

0.04

0.00

0.05

0.01

0.05

0.05

~3.9

5!***

~

0.25!

~4.4

6!***

~1.4

4!

~4.5

6!***

~4.5

0!***

Allies

0.00

0.18

0.06

0.19

0.09

0.11

~0.0

2!

~1.04!

~0.28!

~1.09!

~0.41!

~0.51!

Contiguity

1.89

0.90

1.81

0.88

1.80

1.81

~12.81!***

~

8.43!***

~11.34!***

~7.8

7!***

~11.37!***

~11.40!***

Peaceyears

0.90

1.18

0.87

1.15

0.87

0.87

~27.12!***

~40.35!***

~26.3

2!***

~38.0

7!***

~26.4

1!***

~26.36!***

Constant

3.69

0.72

3.94

0.83

3.98

3.83

~22.3

4!***

~4.45!***

~22.5

7!***

~4.66!***

~22.6

8!***

~21.74!***

Numberofobservations

648944

555576

572611

481685

572611

572611

Loglikelihood

5884.0

5

4064.63

5250.7

7

3608.0

9

5243.5

5

5227.94

Chi-squared

3307.6

0

5197.24

2940.6

1

4668.7

8

3126.27

3218.5

2

P-valueforchisquared

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Note:*p,

0.10

;**p,

0.05;***p,

0.01~two-taile

dtestswithrobuststandarderrorsclusteredonthestate!.

Thecoefficients

areinthetopcellwiththestandarderrorsbelow.

Allmodelscontainthreecubicsplines.



20/24

Despite this focus, the basic logic of the argument is described in the

context of a dyad, that is, the interaction between the hegemon and ris-

ing challenger. As such, there is little theoretical reason to believe that

the theory should only apply to top two states in the international sys-

tem. Why would minor powers not pay attention to a rival state rising up

and passing their level of power? Why would a minor power that is grow-

ing in power not want to seek changes to the status quo to reflect their

new position? We argue that there is no reason to expect a difference and

in fact the empirical results confirm our expectations.

In general, dyads where a power transition is about to occur are more

likely to experience militarized disputes and international wars, which is

more supportive of the preventive war logic. Our results support the for-

malized arguments that preventive wars are the product of the inability

of rational states to commit to a stable peace agreement ~ Fearon, 1995:404408; Powell, 2006!. By taking power shifts within the next five yearsinto account, we capture the preventive motivation that compels states

to take preventive action that is a response to a threat that will generally

take several years to develop~Levy, 1987: 91!. This relationship is robustacross models and is, unexpectedly, not conditional on the dyad contain-

ing powerful states, contiguous states or states with dissimilar prefer-

ences. As such, it seems clear that dyadic power transitions represent a

general effect that alters the risk of militarized disputes. Of course, this

study is only a first cut at understanding how power transition works at

the dyadic level of analysis and so there are a number of additional ques-

tions that are left unanswered.

Perhaps the most important question left unanswered with our analy-

sis deals with the actual initiation of the dispute. In other words, are

these disputes initiated by the rising challenger or the declining state?

In addition, if the challenger is attacking do they do so after the transi-

tion and if the declining state initiates is it done before the transition?

Since our models use a non-directed data set, there is no way to address

these questions but clearly the theory behind dyadic power transitions

can be extended generate directional hypotheses which can then be tested

on a directed dyadic data set. Of course, since our results find a stronger

relationship before the transition, it seems plausible to hypothesize that

the more powerful state is attacking before the transition to maintain

their superiority but this is only a supposition.

Power transition also makes predictions as to the outcome of the

conflicts between the hegemon and rising challenger that can be more

comprehensively examined at the dyadic level. In other words, who is

more likely to win conflicts that arise because of power transitions? Does

the outcome depend on when the conflict is initiated and who initiated

it? Again, these are questions that cannot be answer within this article,

but would be logical extensions.



21/24

In general, we have developed a logical extension of power transi-

tion down to the dyad. Even in its original formulation, the theory

described the actions of a dyad within the context of the major power

system. When Lemke ~2002! looked at regional hierarchies, he was stilldescribing the relationship of a dyad within the context of a regional

system. Since the theory itself has been consistently used to detail the

interaction of a dyad, it only makes sense to test the theory among all

dyads. Unsurprisingly, our results confirm our belief that power transi-

tion theory is best thought of as a dyadic theory and should be devel-

oped further at the dyadic level of analysis.

Notes

1 It is important to note that disagreements arise in the power transition theory because

dominating a hierarchy provides tremendous benefits, so it is a battle worth fighting

~so to speak!. By eliminating the hierarchy, we are implicitly arguing that disagree-ments come from another source. We do not specifically point to a new source because

we believe that it is dependent on the dyad. For instance, for some contiguous states

it may develop from border issues or water rights. For noncontiguous states it may

derive from differences over policy or regime change, so when we talk about the

development of grievances we are purposively vague because we do not think there

is a single source of grievances and we do not want to tie our theory into a single

source of grievances.2 Bennett and Stam f ind that transitions have little estimated effect on war, and tran-

sitions slightly reduce disputes of all levels when estimated along the all dyad set

~2004:113!.3 Geller ~2000! finds that status quo challengers in rival dyads are more likely to ini-

tiate wars, whether they are superior or inferior in power to status quo defenders;

moreover, defenders initiate wars almost solely under unstable power balances.

4 As a f irst look at the effects of dyadic power transitions, we felt more comfortable

looking at non-directed dyads as opposed to directed dyads. While power transition

theory can certainly make predictions as to which side in a dyad attacks, it seems

more appropriate to first establish a basic relationship. As such, we make no distinc-

tion as to which side is attacking. In addition, using the directed dyads would requirean operationalization of initiation, which is not always clear.

5 The Correlates of War data are available online at http:00www.correlatesofwar.org0.

6 We are assuming that states do not necessarily have the ability to make fine grain

analysis of the balance of power. As such, there is the large group of rough parity,

where states are not going to believe one side or the other has a distinct advantage.

7 By using standard deviations, it is possible that we may be coding pairs of states,

particularly ones with very low levels of capability, as at parity despite considerable

difference between them. Because we are testing power transition theory in terms of

all dyads, we must bear in mind that most states are small states, so the standard

deviation will be biased towards them. The fact of the matter is that because the

majority of CINC scores are so low, most dyads have very large differences but inreality the differences are not meaningful. This is why we are using standard devia-

tions, to get away from our biases as to what would be a meaningful difference and

let the data set show us the meaningful differences. For instance, if in one dyad one

state was over 12,000 times more powerful than the other, it would seem to be mean-



22/24

ingful. In reality, however, it often is not meaningful, for that is how much more

powerful Nepal was over Vanuatu in 2001.

8 Kim and Morrow~1992! find that the rate of change in the rising states capabilitiesdoes not have a significant effect on whether a power transition leads to war.

9 For more information on Polity 4e and to download the data see: http:00www.cidcm.umd.edu0inscr0polity0.

10 A measure of parity is often used as control variable in quantitative research, so it

should be included. Unfortunately, any measure of parity would also be related to a

measure of power transitions because these occur at parity. This correlation implies

that we should drop parity from our models, but we decided to include it. When we

run the models without our measure of parity the results do not change, so any cor-

relation between parity and power transition are not affecting the results.

11 Sweeney ~2003! also finds that preference similarity generates peace within dyads.He also uses the S score, except for the years since 1946, where he averages the S

score with Gartzkes alternative preference similarity measure based on United Nations

General Assembly voting.12 One possible problem with the years preceding a power transition is that there may

exist endogeniety, that is, states believe that a conflict is coming so they build out

their army. While this may be the case, we do not find the issue too problematic.

First, the years preceding a power transition have a similar effect. Second, and per-

haps more compelling, this process should not affect balance of power. If both sides

see the war coming then both should build up their power and the balance should not

change. Third, even if only one side built out, the CINC score is unlike to change

dramatically because two-thirds of the measure are demographic and economic vari-

ables which are quite difficult to drastically change in the short run. Finally, endog-

eniety assumes that any conflict will substantially change the amount of power. This

is highly unlikely with militarized interstate disputes, that is, how is a show of forcegoing to change the total population, for instance, of a state. Wars are certainly more

likely to do this but wars larger enough to radically change a states power are rela-

tively rare as such while we acknowledge the possibility of an endogeniety issue with

wars it seems unlikely that it would dramatically affect the results. In addition, it is

unlikely to have any effect on the militarized interstate disputes.

13 We also tested to see if dyads with contiguous states had more dangerous power tran-

sitions, but the results showed the opposite, the interaction of power transition and

contiguity was negative and statistically significant.

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The Dangerous liasons