The Dead Sea Scrolls and Roman Warfare

The War Scroll and Roman Weaponry ReconsideredAuthor(s): Russell GmirkinSource: Dead Sea Discoveries, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Jul., 1996), pp. 89-129Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4201555Accessed: 27/08/2010 06:01

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THE WAR SCROLL AND ROMAN WEAPONRY RECONSIDERED

RUSSELL GMIRKIN

This article takes a new look at the dating of the War Scroll (IQM) and War Rule (4QM) of the Dead Sea Scrolls sectarians.' By carefully comparing the weaponry, tactics, and military formations found in the War Scroll with those of the Roman legions before and after the reforms of Marius in 104-103 BCE, this paper will demonstrate that these documents reflect Roman military practices of the second century BCE, not the first century BCE as commonly assumed based on Yadin's incomplete analysis.

The proposition that the War Scroll might reflect military tactics and weaponry of the second century has never been properly investigated before. In his masterful work, The Scroll of the War of the Sons of Light Against the Sons of Darkness, Yigael Yadin conclusively demonstrated that the War Scroll weaponry, formations, and tactics closely resembled those of the Romans, not the Hellenistic armies of the Seleucids or Ptolemies. Dead Sea Scrolls scholars have generally adopted Yadin's conclusions that the arrny of the War Scroll was patterned after the Roman legions, more specifically those of Julius Caesar and Augustus in the second half of the first century BCE.2

I Initial publication of the War Scroll was by E.L. Sukenik, The Dead Sea Scrolls of the Hebrew University (Magnes Press: Jerusalem, 1955) pls. 16-34, 47; transcription, 1-19. For the full critical edition see Y. Yadin, The Scroll of the War of the Sons of Light Against the Sons of Darkness (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1962). For the critical edition of the War Rule see M. Baillet, Qumran Grotte 4 III (4Q482-4Q520) (DJD VII; Clarendon: Oxford, 1982) 12-72; pls. 5-8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 24, 26. For a convenient translation of War Scroll, War Rule and other related texts in a Loeb edition format, see J. Charlesworth (ed.), The Dead Sea Scrolls, Vol. 2: Damascus Document, War Scroll, and Related Documents (Princeton Theological Seminary Dead Sea Scrolls Project 2; John Knox Press: Louisville, 1995).

2 A dating in the time of Herod the Great is accepted by J.T. Milik, Ten Years of Discovery in the Wilderness of Judaea (SCM Press: London, 1959) 39, 122-23; E. Schurer, revised with eds. G. Vermes, F. Millar, and M. Goodman, The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ (175 BC-AD 135): A New English Edition

? E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1996 Dead Sea Discoveries 3, 2

90 RUSSELL GMIRKIN

However, Yadin's dating of the War Scroll to the first centuiy BCE was not demonstrated with the same rigor as his general demonstration of Roman weapons and tactics in the War Scroll. An implicit assumption permeating Yadin's book is that Jewish soldiers of the second and early first centuries BCE must have used the Hellenistic weaponry and tactics of the Seleucids.3 Conversely, for Yadin the evidence for Ro- man weaponry and tactics in the War Scroll implied that the scroll should be dated to the Roman period, i.e. after the conquest of Jerusa- lem in 63 BCE by the Roman general Pompey, Caesar's contemporary. This led Yadin to look for special correlations between the War Scroll and the Roman legions starting with Caesar's time, and to neglect possible correlations with the Roman military of earlier times. In a key chart summarizing the results of his investigation, Yadin compared the weaponry, formations, and tactics in the War Scroll army against those of the "Pre-Roman Hellenistic-Hasmonean" army prior to 63 BCE and the Roman army after 63 BCE.4 Yadin's chart omitted any information on the Roman army prior to 63 BCE, which is symptomatic of Yadin's limited analysis of the Roman evidence. The phrases "Roman period" and "pre-Roman period" recur throughout Yadin's book, framing the debate in such a way as to exclude the discussion of Roman evidence prior to 63 BCE.5

The possibility that armies from Maccabean or Hasmonean times might have been organized along Roman lines is completely ignored in Yadin's 1955 Hebrew edition. This possibility was first raised by M.H. Segal in 1958, who noted the diplomatic contacts between the Jews and Romans as early as the time of Judas Maccabeus. However, Segal conceded that he lacked the competence to argue his thesis of a second century date for the War Scroll based on a knowledge of

(T. and T. Clark Ltd.: Edinburgh, 1986) 3:403; G. Vermes, The Dead Sea Scrolls in English (JSOT Press: Sheffield, England, 1995) 123. Yadin's military evidence found approval in T. Gaster, The Dead Sea Scriptures (Anchor Press: Garden City, New York, 1976) 386-87, but the question of date was considered unresolved. A. Dupont-Sommer, The Essene Writings from Qumran (Peter Smith: Gloucester, Mass., 1973) 167, inde- pendently dated the War Scroll to the Roman Period based on tactics and weaponry. A survey of alternative opinions, for the most part dating elements of the War Scroll to Maccabean times, can be found in P.R. Davies, IQM, the War Scroll from Qumran: Its Structure and History (BibOr 32; Biblical Institute Press: Rome, 1977) 11-20.

Yadin, 1 16, 245. Yadin, 245. Sub-headings for the Roman period are "Whole Period," "63 BC- I AD,"

and "1-70 AD." I Yadin, 110-11, 117, 136, 178-79, 245.

THE WAR SCROLL AND ROMAN WEAPONRY RECONSIDERED 91

Roman weaponry or tactics, and was therefore prepared to defer to Yadin's expertise in this area.6 Segal's suggestion was dismissed in a single footnote of less than fifty words in Yadin's 1962 English edition, on the grounds that some of the evidence developed in Yadin's book pointed to Caesar's time or shortly thereafter.' Yadin's arguments comparing the Sons of Light to Caesar's legions have apparently proved convincing to the majority of Dead Sea Scrolls scholars in the decades since.

Some of the positive evaluation of Yadin's thesis regarding the War Scroll's date might have been based on Yadin's reputation as an expert on ancient warfare rather than a discussion of the relevant Roman evidence. This willingness to defer to an authoritative secondary source such as Yadin rather than delve into the primary Roman sources is perhaps understandable, since Roman weaponry and warfare lie outside the field of specialty of most scholars engaged in Scrolls research. For whatever reason, during the thirty years since Yadin's book was published, no one within the Dead Sea Scrolls field has undertaken to review the Roman evidence bearing on the War Scroll's date.

This paper will bring fresh evidence to bear on the subject of the War Scroll's date by systematically comparing the formations, weaponry, and tactics of the army described in the War Scroll with those of the Roman armies in the second and -first centuries BCE. The Roman evidence will be shown to demonstrate clearly that the army of the War Scroll is patterned after the legions of the second century BCE, before the reformns of Marius in 104, not later in the time of Caesar as Yadin held.

6 "I am not competent to venture an opinion on such a technical military subject. I am ready to bow to the superior authority of the forrner Chief-of-Staff of the Israeli Defense Forces. But it may be asked whether such Roman influence could not have been operative before the Roman subjugation of Judea. Roman armies were active in the Middle East long before Pompey, and a knowledge of their equipment and tactics could have penetrated into Judea much earlier than the second half of the last century B.C.E." M.H. Segal, "The Qumran War Scroll and the Date of its Composition," Scripta Hierosolymitana 4, Aspects of the Dead Sea Scrolls (eds. C. Rabin and Y. Yadin; Magnes Press: Jerusalem, 1958) 143.

7 "In fact our evidence partly points to the period of Caesar and the early Augustan age. Hence I cannot follow M.H. Segal (in Aspects 138ff.) who-though accepting my view that DSW shows Roman military influence-maintains that this reflects conditions of the Hasmonean period." Yadin, 246 n. 1.

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An Abbreviated History of the Legions

A natural starting point in this discussion is to outline the major developments in the organization and weaponry of the legions. A major reform took place around 350 BCE by Camillus, the "second founder" of Rome, who was credited with replacing the old method of fighting in a single mass (the phalanx) with division of the legion into smaller fighting units. The army as a whole was arranged into 3 ranks. Each of these ranks was divided into smaller units called maniples and centuries, perhaps initially composed of 200 and 100 soldiers respectively, but by the third century reduced to 120 and 60.

During the Second Punic War (218-201) against the Carthaginian general Hannibal, maniple warfare was fully developed under Scipio Africanus after he took command of the Roman armies in 209 at New Carthage.8 A key innovation in Roman warfare under Scipio was the introduction of the gladius or Spanish short sword. Since Yadin demonstrated that the sword described in the War Scroll corresponds in form and dimensions to the gladius,9 then the War Scroll must post- date the Second Punic War. Another development that took place at this time was the introduction of the velites or skirmisher class war- riors.'0 These also appear in the War Scroll (see below).

The next major reform took place under the hero of the Jugurthine War, Marius, in 104-103 BCE." Marius, the "third founder" of Rome, made major changes in the organization of the legion. The previous 3 divisions of the legion into hastati, principes, and triarii were con- solidated into an army of uniform age and weaponry.'2 The velites were abolished, as well as the Roman cavalry. Cavalry and skirmishing units were now composed exclusively of foreign auxiliaries. The cohort, which varied in strength from 400-600, became the basic tac-

' N.P. Milner, Vegetius: Epitome of Military Science (Translated Texts for Histo- rians 16; Liverpool University Press: Liverpool, 1993) 13 n. 1, citing Suidas s.v. maxaira. New Carthage (modem Cartagena) was located in Spain near the river Ebro.

I Yadin, 124-29. '? This took place in 211 at Capua in Italy. Livy 26.4.10; Vegetius 1.15; cf. Mil-

ner, 15 n. 1; H. Delbruck, History of the Art of War Within the Framework of Political History (3 vols.; Contributions in Military History 9; Greenwood Press: Westport, Connecticut, 1975) 1:278.

11 L. Keppie, The Making of the Roman Army (Barnes and Noble: Totowa, New Jersey, 1984) 60.

12 H.M.D. Parker, The Roman Legions (Barnes and Noble: New York, 1971) 43-44; Delbruck, 1:414-15; Keppie, 60, 64.


tical unit."3 The army retained this organizational structure down to the time of Julius Caesar and Augustus,'4 when Yadin would date the War Scroll.

Yadin showed there were important inconsistencies between the weaponry of the post-Augustan army and that of the War Scroll.'5 The Roman legions of the first century CE may therefore safely be ruled out as the model for the War Scroll armies. Two alternatives remain for our consideration. The War Scroll is either patterned after the pre- Marius army of roughly 209-104 BCE or the post-Marius army of roughly 104-1 BCE.'6

The most authoritative source on the pre-Marius army is Polybius, whose Histories, written around 160-150 BCE, gives an extensive and authoritative description of the Roman anny of his day.'7 Livy, writing at approximately 10 BCE, is also a useful source of information. Sallust, Plutarch, and Julius Caesar are the most informative sources on the post-Marius army.

What follows is a discussion of the military formations, tactics, and weaponry in the War Scroll as compared to the pre-Marius and post- Marius arrnies. In each section, one paragraph will be devoted to the pre-Marius army, one to the post-Marius army, and one to the War Scroll army, followed by analysis and conclusions.

It should be noted that virtually all the material descriptive of the War Scroll army is found in columns 3-9 (the "Battle Serekh Series"), and the evidence relating to weaponry and formations is therefore

13 Parker, 29; Keppie, 63-64. The last mention of maniple warfare was duing the Jugurthine War. Sallust, The Jugurthine War 49.6.

14 "Caesar marks the highest development of the Roman art of war, and yet we shall find in his campaigns little that is new in organization, tactics or military organization. His fighting machine was the Marian legion, and the Marian legion it remained at his death." O.L. Spaulding, H. Nickerson and J.W. Wright, Warfare: A Study of Military Methods From the Earliest Times (Arno Press: New York, 1925) 158. (All citations in this article are from Spaulding, Part I, Ancient Warfare: To the Death of Julius Caesar.) Cf. Parker, 4748.

15 Yadin, 121, on the round cavalry shield, which went out of use after the time of Caesar, 129, on the suspension of the sword from the belt and shoulder strap, which "is typical from the first half of the first century AD onward."

16 J. Kromayer and G. Veith, Heerwesen und Kriegfiihrung der Griechen und Romer (C.H. Beck: MUnchen, 1928) refers to these periods in Roman military history as the Polybian Era and the Caesarean Era.

" Polybius 6.19.1-6.42.6 contains a detailed account of the Roman and Italian legions. Polybius, the author of a Tactica or military manual, was especially qualified to write on military matters.

94 RUSSELL GMIRKIN

directly useful in dating only this section of the scroll. In most discussions of the redactional history of the War Scroll, columns 3-9 are considered a distinct sub-document,'8 and it is this portion of the War Scroll that most closely resembles surviving Greco-Roman military manuals.'9 Additionally, fragments of a different recension of the War Scroll found in Cave 4 illuminate several important points and will be considered in the course of this article as appropriate.20

(1) Conscription

Pre-Marius. The pre-Marius army was essentially a citizen army.? All troops, whether heavy infantry, skirmishers or cavalry, were drawn exclusively from the Romans and their Italian allies.22 Citizens were liable for military service starting at age 17.? The cavalry served 10 years total, while the infantry served 16 years total before the age of 46,24 or 20 years in times of national emergency. All soldiers provided their own weaponry and equipment, the cavalry (equites) being drawn from the wealthier class.26 Among the infantry, the "youngest and poorest" were assigned to the light-armed infantry or skirmishers (the velites). The 3 battalions of heavy-armed infantry (the hastati, principes, and triarii) were composed of progressively older troops,

'" On the composite nature of the War Scroll, see especially arguments of J. van der Ploeg, Le Rouleau de la Guerre (E.J. Bill: Leiden, 1959) 11-22; Dupont-Sommer, 166; Vermes, 124; cf. the critique of Yadin's theory of unitary authorship in P. Davies, 12; and Davies' monograph generally.

1' J. Duhaime, "The War Scroll From Qumran and the Graeco-Roman Tactical Trea- tises," RevQ 13:1 (1988) 133-51, demonstrates the general correspondence in content and structure between the War Scroll and other tactical treatises, namely Asclepiodotus, Aelian and Arrian. (His object was restricted to establishing the literary genre of the War Scroll, not to determine whether the tactics and weaponry reflected the specific Greek or Roman military of some particular period.) Significantly, the clear points of similarity between the War Scroll and Greco-Roman military treatises are restricted to IQM 3-9, the Battle Serekh series. Hence Duhaime's investigation best supports the view that the War Scroll is a composite document, of which columns 3-9 were adapted from a contemporary military manual.

I Of the six manuscripts of the War Rule from Cave 4, 4QM' and 4QMc have been argued to reflect a significantly different recension from the War Scroll of Cave 1. Baillet, 12, 50; cf. Schmrer (ed. Vermes), 3:398.

21 Keppie, 51-56; Delbruck, 1:412; Parker, 20. 22 Keppie, 21-23, 55; K.R. Dixon and P. Southern, The Roman Cavalry: From the

First to the Third Century AD (B.T. Batsford Ltd.: London, 1992) 20. 23 Livy 22.57.9. 24 Polybius 6.19.2. 25 Polybius 6.19.4. 26 Polybius 6.20.9.


the senior veterans in the rear (the triarii).27 The tribunes or generals were also theoretically seasoned veterans, though in practice younger officers frequently attained command.28

Post-Marius. In the post-Marius army, service in the army became more of a professional career than a civic duty.29 The cohort replaced the battalion as the main tactical unit within the legion. The old classification into hastati, principes, and triarii was abolished, and age classifications became irrelevant.30 The Roman legions no longer included velites (light-armed skirmishers) or cavalry in their. ranks. Rather, auxiliary cavalry and skirmishing forces were hired as mercenaries or raised by levy in conquered territories beyond the borders of Italy.3' The post-Marius auxiliaries were largely barbarian forces32 under tribal command33 with little or no Roman discipline34 and only loosely connected to the Roman command structure.35 They were not attached to the legions, nor did they exist in numbers of a fixed proportion to the infantry forces of the Roman legion.36 The number of available auxiliary skirmishers and cavalry was extremely variable until at least the time of Augustus3" and depended largely on local recruitment efforts among conquered peoples in regions where the legions were deployed.38

War Scroll. In the War Scroll, no provisions were made for foreign auxiliaries.39 The 6000 cavalry were cbnscripted 500 from each of the

27 Polybius 6.21.7-9. 2' Polybius 6.19.1; Parker, 17-18; P. Connolly, Greece and Rome at War (Prentiss

Hall: Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1981) 113. 29 Parker, 24-26; Delbruck, 1:412-13, 422-23. 30 Parker, 43-44; Delbruck, 1:414-15. 31 Parker, 43; Connolly, 215; Delbruck, 1:418, 546; Keppie, 79, 105-106, 150-52;

Dixon and Southern, 22. 32 Caesar, The Gallic War 1.18; 2.7, 10, 24; 3.4; 4.6; 5.5; 8.11; G.L. Cheesman, The

Auxilia of the Roman Imperial Army (Ares Publishers: Chicago, 1975) 24, 116; Keppie, pp. 79, 105-106, 150-52; Delbruck, 1: 546.

33 Caesar, The Gallic War 1.18; 5.5; 8.12; Cheesman, 16, 58, 91; Dixon and South- em, 22, 24.

34 Cheesman, 16, 24 n. 1; 116; Vegetius 2.2 elaborates on the diversity of training and weaponry and the general lack of discipline that precluded the barbarian auxiliary forces from being integrated into the legions.

35 Caesar, The Gallic War 8.5, 10; Cheesman, 23, 24, 49, and especially 58; Keppie, 152.

3 Keppie, 182. 3 Keppie, 182. 3 Caesar, The Gallic War 1.15, 18; 4.6; 5.5, 46, 58; Delbruck, 1:548; Keppie, 78-

79; Dixon and Southern, 22. 39 IQM 1:2 limits the Sons of Light to those of Levi, Judah, and Benjamin; 3:12-15;

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12 tribes,'0 and as such were purely native forces. The Sons of Light were to be volunteers (or, in times of emergency, conscripts) from the twelve tribes.4' They were assigned to different parts of the army based on age, the non-combatants the youngest (25-30), the light-armed cav- ahry (3040) and skirmishers (3045) a little older, the heavy-armed infantry older yet (40-50). The provosts or field officers were aged 40- 50, and the non-combatant camp prefects were aged 50-60.42

Analysis. Both in regard to age categorization and in the exclusion of foreign mercenaries, the War Scroll most closely resembles the pre- Marius army. In both cases the skirmishers were the youngest and most agile combat troops, though the War Scroll also has an even younger non-combatant class that performed guard duty, prepared meals, buried the dead, and so forth. It should be noted that the velites or skirmishers, the youngest legionaries of the pre-Marius army, also performed similar non-combatant duties as part of their apprenticeship to the legions.43

The durations of service for troops in the pre-Marius and War Scroll legions also show remarkable agreement. The light-armed cavalry of the War Scroll served 10 years from age 30 to 40, the same length of service as the cavalry of the pre-Marius army. The 15 years of service of the light-armed infantry of the War Scroll from age 30 to 45 should be compared to the 16 years of service of the pre-Marius infantry "before reaching the age of 46."" In the War Scroll, the soldiers of

4:16; 5:1-2 have battle standards assigned to each of the twelve tribes; 2:10-14; 11:13; 15:1-2, etc., the war is conducted against the nations. Compare II QT 57:1-11 legislat- ing an army of 12,000 Israelite soldiers. (All Dead Sea Scrolls references other than the War Scroll are from F. Garcia Martinez, The Dead Sea Scrolls Translated: The Qumran Texts in English [E.J. Brill: New York, 1994].)

IQM 6:10. "1 See Yadin, 79-82, for a discussion of how the armies were raised and organized

into units. 42 IQM 6:13-7:3; cf. Yadin, 75-78. 43 Delbruck, 1:276, 415. " Polybius 6.19.2. The War Scroll envisions 15 consecutive years of service from

ages 30 to 45. This may have been based on a misreading of a Roman military manual which cited the requirement that Roman infantry serve "16 years before reaching the age of 46." Unless the reader understood that Roman conscription began at age 17 (Polybius does not mention this fact), it would be easy to conclude that Roman infantry served on 16 consecutive campaigns starting at age 30. Might this misunderstanding explain the advanced age of the War Scroll legionaries? On the other hand, the diver- gent tradition at 4QM' 4 i 2 ("[... froim twenty years and upwards [.1") suggests that service in some categories may have begun at age 20.


the heavy infantry and heavy cavalhy, apparently drawn from the light forces, continue to serve in the army until age 50, i.e. for a total military duty of 20 years. This invites comparison to the 20 years service expected from the infantry troops in the pre-Marius army "in times of pressing danger."'45 The ages and length of service thus approximately match in all categories. Avi-Yonah rejected the War Scroll's segregation of the legions into divisions based on age criterion as imprac- tical,' and therefore questioned whether the War Scroll was actually intended as a war manual, but the concrete example of the pre-Marius legions shows this argument is unfounded.

By contrast, the cohorts of the post-Marius army were homogeneous in regard to both age and weaponry. Age was not a factor in enlisting in the auxiliary forces either. No age restriction is mentioned for auxiliary skirmishers of the first century BCE, while in the case of the cavalry, we have one example of a Gallic cavalry commander who was so old he could barely remain astride his horse.47 Hence the classification of troops by age and arms in the War Scroll contrasts sharply with the post-Marius army. Nor is Yadin's interpretation of the War Scroll cavalry and skirmishers as auxiliary forces consistent with their recruitment exclusively from the tribes of Israel, their existence in fixed numerical proportion to the heavy infantry, or the integration of these forces into the rigid, centralized command structure of the War Scroll. In summary, the composition and conscription of the War Scroll armies strikingly resemble the citizen army prior to Marius, not the professional army of the post-Marius period."

(2) Heavy Infantry

Pre-Marius. In the pre-Marius army, each legion had 3000 heavy infantry arranged in 3 battalions, each with its own distinctive weaponry. These 3 battalions were called the hastati, the principes, and the

4 Polybius 6.19.4. 4 M. Avi-Yonah, "The 'War of the Sons of Light and the Sons of Darkness' and

Maccabean Warfare," IEJ 2 (1952) 2. Caesar, The Gallic War 8.12.

4' Note that Roman generals of the second century BCE and earlier were elected officials with important civil and political responsibilities. "In essence, the Roman army of the early and middle Republic was its citizenry under arms led into battle by its elected magistrates." Keppie, 55; cf. 39 40. In this respect they strongly resembled the commanders of the War Scroll army, who also had important additional civil and judi- cial responsibilities.

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triarii. In battle formation, these were arranged in 3 lines facing the enemy.

The first 2 lines (the hastati and principes) consisted of 1200 troops divided into 10 maniples of 120 troops each.49 Each maniple was in turn divided into 2 centuries of 60 troops, in 6 rows of 10 troops each. The 20 centuries in each line thus presented a rectangular formation 6 soldiers deep and 200 across.

The third line (the triarii) contained only 600 troops. It possessed the same number of maniples and centuries,"0 but these each contained only half as many as those of the front lines. There is some debate whether the triarii lined up in 6 rows of 100 men, or 3 rows of 200 men, but the latter seems the more likely arrangement."

The legion as a whole, taking into account all 3 battalions, thus stood in a rectangular formation 200 soldiers across and 15 soldiers deep when lined up for battle.

hastati 1200 troops 10 maniples 20 centuries 6 x 200 principes 1200 troops 10 maniples 20 centuries 6 x 200 triarii 600 troops 10 maniples 20 centuries 3 x 200 combined 3000 troops 30 maniples 60 centuries 15 x 200

Post-Marius. Under Marius, the century was increased to 100 troops, the maniple to 200, and the legion to 6000 troops. The weaponry of

Polybius 6.21.7-10; Livy 37.39.8; Parker, 14. 5 Polybius 6.24.1-9 shows that all three divisions contained 20 centurions, 2 per

maniple. 1' While the hastati and principes had 1200 infantry, in 6 ranks and 200 files, the

triarii consisted of only half as many, or 600 infantry. Disagreement exists as to whether the triarii were assembled for battle in 6 ranks and 100 files (Delbruck, 1:278), or 3 ranks and 200 files (Connolly, 130; and Keppie, 34 fig. 8, 65 fig. 20). In the former case, gaps would appear between maniples, while in the latter no gaps would exist and the hastati would present the same frontal width of 200 soldiers as the other divisions. As a last line of defense, the hastati and principes would withdraw behind the triarii, who crouched with shields up and spears planted at an angle like a palisade (Livy 8.8.10-11). It seems to me that this formation would have blocked an enemy onslaught only if the triarii presented the same frontal width as the hastati and principes, with only 3 ranks of shields and spears; a palisade twice as deep, but with gaps in between, would have been wholly ineffective. In the special defensive formation described in Livy, at least, it would thus appear that the triarii were arrayed 3 ranks deep and 200 files across.

Compare also Polybius 6.10-14, which describes the marching formation of hastati, principes, and triarii, in "three parallel columns," maniple by maniple, for easy trans- formation into fighting formation. This arrangement also suggests that the triarii contained the same number of files as the hastati and principes.


the infantry was made uniform and the old arrangement of the legion into 3 fixed battalions was abolished. A new tactical unit was introduced, the cohort, which consisted of 600 troops, or 6 centuries, typically arrayed with 3 centuries in front and 3 behind.52 The legion of 6000 thus consisted of 10 cohorts,53 which could be arranged into 1, 2, 3, or 4 lines, depending on tactical requirements.' After Marius, legion strength declined to a level of 30004000 in the time of Julius Caesar.55

1-4 lines 30004000 troops 10 cohorts 60 centuries

War Scroll. In the War Scroll, the legion was fixed at 3000 heavy infantry arrayed in 3 battalions of 1000 troops each.56 Each battalion consisted of 10 maniples of 100, each maniple in turn divided into 2 centuries of 50, arrayed in 5 ranks of 10. The legion as a whole thus consisted of 15 ranks of 200 soldiers each.57

line 1 1000 troops 10 maniples 20 centuries 5 x 200 line 2 1000 troops 10 maniples 20 centuries 5 x 200 line 3 1000 troops 10 maniples 20 centuries 5 x 200 combined 3000 troops 30 maniples 60 centuries 15 x 200

Analysis. The infantry forces of the legions described in the War Scroll closely resemble those of the legions before the time of Marius. Each legion was arrayed in 3 lines, tie overall infantry troop strength of each was 3000, with 15 ranks of 200 troops facing the enemy. The major difference is that instead of 60, 120, and 1200, the War Scroll has centuries of 50, maniples of 100, and uniform battalion strength of 1000, under influence of the traditional Biblical organization of Jewish militias into 1000's, 100's, 50's and 10's. By reducing the century strength from 60 to 50, and the maniple from 120 to 100, this

52 Parker, 30-31; Delbruck, 1:415. 5 Vegetius 2.6.

' Delbruck, 1:415; Keppie, 173; Parker, 21. 5 Yadin, 175-76, emphasized that the overall legionary strength of 3000 infantry in

the War Scroll compares favorably to the reduced legion strength of 30004000 in the time of Caesar, but fails to take note of variable legion size in the post-Marius anny. Yadin, 176 n. 1, calculated a legion size of about 3000 in Herod the Great's army, based on the reference to 30,000 troops in 11 legions in Josephus, Ant. 14:468-69, but failed to note that the figure of 30,000 included the 6000 cavalry plus auxiliaries referred to in the same passage, leaving a legion size closer to 2000.

56 Mention of three lines of infantry, flanked by cavalry, occurs at 4QM' 1-3 i 3, 11-12, 15-17.

" IQM 3:164:4; 4:15-17; 5:34; 7:14-15; 9:4-5; cf. Yadin, 175-76.

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automatically reduced the troop strength of the first 2 battalions from 1200 to the ideal figure of 1000. Also, the third line of the War Scroll legion was given the same troop strength as the front 2 lines, bringing the total legion strength up to the Roman 3000. Thus in the War Scroll, all 3 battalions consist of 1000 infantry, instead of the Roman arrangement of 1200, 1200, and 600. Otherwise, the troop organization is virtually identical. By this means, the Biblical system of 50's, 100's, and 1000's was fully implemented while ingeniously preserving the Roman triple acies formation and overall infantry strength.

By contrast, there are significant differences between the heavy infantry of the legions in the War Scroll and the post-Marius army. The War Scroll envisions a fixed battle array of exactly 3 lines, like that of the pre-Marius anny, instead of the varied arrangement in 1, 2, 3, or 4 lines in the post-Marius army.58 The flexibility in tactical deployment in 1-4 lines, an essential, defining characteristic of the post- Marius arrny, does not resemble anything described in the War Scroll.

Nor does the army of the War Scroll contain a tactical division corresponding to the cohort, the basic fighting unit of the post-Marius army. Yadin proposed identifying the 'm- or battalion of the War Scroll with the Roman cohort,59 but his arguments are unconvincing. Yadin acknowledged that the War Scroll legion consisted of only 3 battalions, while Roman legions always consisted of 10 cohorts, rendering the identification of battalion and cohort problematic.60 Also, the battalions in the War Scroll were all composed of exactly 1000 troops, as Yadin demonstrated.6' But the post-Marius cohort consisted of 600 troops at theoretical maximum, and in the time of Caesar only 300 to 400. Yadin pointed out the cohortes miliariae, a Roman cohort of 1000 troops, as a possible parallel to the War Scroll '1-T,62 but was appar-

5' The triple acies was preferred by Caesar, but not to the exclusion of other formations. On the single acies, see The African War 13. On the use of the double acies by Crassus in 56 BCE against the Parthians, see Caesar, The Gallic War 3.24. On the quadruple acies, see Caesar, The Civil War 3.89; compare The African War 41, which mentions Scipio's "usual practice" of deploying his forces in a quadruple acies.

'9 Yadin, 161-62, 175. 1 Yadin, 175, conceded that his interpretation of the War Scroll battalion as a

Roman cohort "does not cover all structural details," but argued that "the difference is. .. only apparent," citing the parallel in number of maniples and centuries per legion. However, this evidence is better suited to demonstrating the identity in basic structure of the War Scroll legions with the pre-Marius "maniple legions" than the post-Marius "cohort legions."

61 Yadin, 49, 156, 160, 269. 62 Yadin, 162.


ently unaware that the cohortes miliariae become common only to- wards the end of the first century CE,O and are considered to be an innovation of Vespasian.64 Finally, the Roman legionary cohort always consisted of 3 maniples, or 6 centuries, whereas the War Scroll battalion consists of 10 maniples or 20 centuries. Yadin's reading the post- Marius cohort into the War Scroll 'rn or battalion is not supported by the evidence. Clearly, the 3 heavy infantry and 1 light infantry battalions of the War Scroll correspond to the 3 heavy infantry and 1 light infantry battalions of the pre-Marius army, which also consisted of exactly 10 maniples or 20 centuries.

(3) Skirmishers

Pre-Marius. Attached to each legion of the pre-Marius army was a force of 1200 skirmishers or light-armed infantry called velites. These were the youngest, most agile, and also the most poorly armned of the Roman conscripts.65 The velites also performed additional duties such as transporting baggage, preparing meals, and guarding the outer peri- meter of the camp.' The skirmishers entered the battle zone between the armies by passing through intervals opened up in the front lines, which closed up again behind them.6' (This maneuver was accomplished by having one century back up and move to one side behind the other century of that maniple. After the skirmishers passed through the gap thus created, the century then moved back into its original position, closing the gap.)

Post-Marius. Under the reforms of Marius in 104-103, the light- armed Roman and Italian velites were abolished." (The last recorded use of velites was in 109-108 during the Jugurthine War.69) Baggage

63 Keppie, 182; Cheesman, 25-26. P.A. Holder, Studies in the Auxilia of the Roman Army from Augustus to Trajan (BAR International Series 7: Oxford, England, 1980) 5, points out that cohortes miliariae are first referred to in epigraphs and inscriptions in the early 80's CE.

I Holder, 5-6, points out that Josephus, War 3:67 is the first literary reference to cohortes miliariae, where they are listed as part of Vespasian's army, while the earliest inscriptions mentioning cohortes miliariae refer to units that either were founded under the Flavians or were arguably cohortes quingenariae (units with 500 troops) prior to Vespasian.

5 Polybius 6.21.7, 9. 6 Polybius 6.34.5; 6.35.5. 67 Delbruck, 1:275; Keppie, 38; Connolly, 140-41. '8 Parker, 43; Connolly, 214-15. 69 Sallust, Jugurthine War 46; cf. Parker, 39.

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and camp duties were now performed by non-combatants.7' The legionary soldier became more self-sufficient, carrying his own rations and preparing his own meals.7' The extra supplies the Roman soldiers were now required to carry gave them the nickname, "Marius' mules."72 Skirmishers still played an important role in battles, but these were now provided by auxiliary forces recruited among non-Italians. Typi- cally, auxiliaries were deployed on either flank of the Roman legions and entered the battle zone from the sides. At other times the auxiliary forces were initially deployed in the center as a first line, instead of at the flanks, and after the skirmishing phase ended passed through intervals to the rear like the former velites or to the sides to join the cavalry at the wings.73

War Scroll. A force of 1000 skirmishers was attached to each of the 7 legions of the War Scroll. The 7 battalions of skirmishers were classified according to weaponry: 2 battalions armed with slings, 3 with javelins, I with lance and shield, 1 with sword and shield.74 The War Scroll pays special attention to the activities of the skirmishers. In the first lot, the 2 battalions of long-range slingers were deployed between the opposing armies and assaulted the enemy forces from a distance. In the second lot, as the armies closed and the slingers began to incur casualties, they withdrew through the intervals. In the third lot, the 3 battalions of mid-range skirmishers armed with javelins hurled their missiles, and in the fourth lot withdrew. In the fifth lot, the battalion of close-range skirmishers threw their lances, protected by the battalion of sword-bearing skirmishers, and in the sixth lot the last of the skirmishers withdrew. The seventh and decisive lot was the full engagement of the heavy infantry forces, which occupied the rest of the day.75

Analysis. There is a close resemblance between the skirmishers of the War Scroll and the velites of the pre-Marius army. Both the War

70 Delbruck, 1:415; cf. Caesar, The Gallic War 6.40. 71 Plutarch, Caius Marius 13.1; Sallust, The Jugurthine War 45; Ammianus Mar-

cellinus 17.9.2. n Plutarch, Caius Marius 13.1; Frontinus, Strategies 4.1.7. 13 Cheesman, 50. 74 IQM 5:11-6:5; 8:1-20; cf. Yadin, 156-62. 75 1QM 5:15-6:6; 7:14-8:20; cf. Yadin, 160. 1QM 1:13-15; 17:10-18:5 also refer to

7 lots of battle, but without mentioning the weaponry of the skirmishers or their pro- tection by cavalry forces. This material belongs to an older, more primitive version of the War Scroll than columns 3-9.


Scroll skirmishers and the velites were directly attached to the legions as a fourth battalion, in addition to the 3 battalions of heavy-armed infantry. In both cases the skirmishers composed the youngest age group in the legionary forces. The numbers were approximately the same: the War Scroll legions had a full battalion of 1000 skirmishers, bringing the total infantry strength (light and heavy anned) to 4000, while the pre-Marius army also had a full battalion of 1200 skirmishers, bringing total infantry strength to 4200. The War Scroll's classification of the skirmishers according to weaponry, and deployment in three phases, is roughly consistent with the division of skirmishers into three thin lines based on weaponry in the pre-Marius army, attested to by Vegetius,76 though the correspondence of weaponry in each of the three divisions is not exact.

The deployment of skirmishers between the lines prior to the shock encounter of the main infantry forces in the center was common to most periods, but was especially important in countering the massive Macedonian phalanx formation that was common in the eastern Medi- terranean in the second century. To properly wield the gladius, a Ro- man swordsman required considerably more space than a Macedonian spear carrier. A single Roman soldier occupied the same frontal space as 2 Macedonian soldiers, and thus had to face down a total of 10 long spears (sarissa) extending from the first 5 ranks of the enemy phalanx.' It was therefore essential that skirmishers first inflict casualties and break up the enemy formation, so that the Roman soldiers could exploit gaps, however small, in the enemy line. The War Scroll's emphasis on the activity of the skirmishers, occupying the first 6 of the 7 lots of battle, shows a similar preoccupation with breaking up the enemy formation, which may indicate their enemies utilized the fearsome Macedonian phalanx. The series of defeats the Roman legions inflicted on Greek and Seleucid phalanxes in the second century

16 Vegetius 3.14, probably drawing on Cato's military manual of the mid-second century BCE, lists 6 lines of infantry altogether in typical battle formation. The light infantry were divided into 3 thin lines, presumably deployed separately.

Line 1: heavy infantry principes Line 2: heavy infantry hastati Line 3: light infantry bows and javelins Line 4: light infantry shields, bows and javelins Line 5: light infantry slings Line 6: heavy infantry triarii I Polybius 18.29.1-18.30.1; Delbruck, 1:395.

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demonstrated the superiority of the former over the latter,78 so that by the first century the phalanx was largely superseded by Roman military tactics.79

The skirmishers of the War Scroll do not correspond well to the skirmishers of the post-Marius Roman legions. During the first century BCE, skimishers were no longer directly attached to the legions, but belonged to independent units composed of foreign auxiliaries under the command of barbarian chiefs; nor was there a fixed ratio of auxiliary skirmishers to legionaries as seen in the War Scroll.

In summary, the attachment of the skirmishing unit to each legion in numbers comparable to those of the pre-Marius velites, and the abo- lition of the velites from the legion by Marius, seem decisive in exclud- ing the post-Marius anny as a model for the War Scroll.

(4) Cavalry

Pre-Marius. Before the reforms under Marius, each Roman legion of 4200 infantry had 300 horsemen assigned to it.80 These horsemen were divided into 10 squadrons (or turmae) of 30 cavalry each.8' Heavy- armed cavalry protected the legionary flanks, while mobile light cavalry were used offensively.82 The light cavalry also sometimes operated between the lines in conjunction with the velites during the first phase of battle.83 Additional forces composed of troops from the socii, the Italian allies of the Latin League, were posted on either side of the Roman legions. These Italian allied forces were called alae or wings, due to their position at the Roman flanks. The Italian alae were organized along the same pattern as the Roman legions,"' except that there were 3 times as many cavalry, 900 cavalry attached to each Italian legion compared to 300 in the Roman legions.85 The Italian alae were used primarily for flank operations, in which cavalry played a crucial role.

Post-Marius. Under Marius, the legionary cavalry were eliminated, along with the velites class skirmishing forces. We last hear of Roman

1' Polybius 18.28.4. 7 Connolly, 75. so Polybius 6.20.8-9. 81 Polybius 6.25.1. 82 Vegetius 3.16. 83 Livy 37.41.1 1. " Keppie, 22; Delbruck, 1:418; Dixon and Southern, 20. 85 Polybius 6.26.7.


or allied Latin cavahy forces during the Jugurthine War, just prior to the reforms of Marius.- Italians were granted full citizenship rights in 90, after the Social War. The former distinction between Roman and Latin therefore became meaningless, and all Latins were thereafter allowed to join the legions.87 As a direct result, the Latin allied legions were phased out, and cavalry were instead now composed of foreign auxiliaries, as discussed previously.

War Scroll. The number of War Scroll cavalry totaled 6000 altogether in three distinct classes: 1400 heavy cavalry protecting the legions, 1400 light cavalry protecting the skirmishers, and 3200 light cavalry active at the flanks.88

The 1400 heavy-armed cavalry armed with shield and spear were assigned 200 per legion of 4000, or 50 per battalion of 1000. These units of 50 cavalry were probably divided up into 2 squadrons of 25, one posted at either flank of their battalion in normal defensive posture.89 When all 7 legions of the Sons of Light were arrayed side by side on the battlefield,90 the battalions pooled their heavy cavalry forces into 2 groups of 700, posted on the left and right flanks of the legions.

Keppie, 79; Sallust, Jugurthine War 95. '7 Keppie, 69; Parker, 46.

1 lQM 6:7-11; 9:5; cf. Yadin, 176-82. 9 All groups of cavalry mentioned in the War Scroll are multiples of 50 (i.e. 50,

200, 700, 1400, 4600, and 6000) suggesting 50 as a fundamental unit in the cavalry. However, it is reasonable to suggest the 50 cavalry were divided into two squadrons of 25 (much as the century was divided into 2 maniples), protecting the right and left flanks of each battalion. It is further reasonable to suggest that the 25 cavalry squadrons were arranged in 5 rows of 5. All four 1000-troop battalions of infantry were arranged in 5 rows of 200 each in battle formation. Thus 5 heavy cavalry were arguably posted at either end of every row of each battalion of infantry. The heavy cavalry protected the vulnerable flanks from attack, allowing the infantry to focus their entire energies on the battle in front of them.

90 IQM 5:3-4. "Regulations regarding arraying the battle battalions of the entire army to form a front line: arrays of 1000 shall be organized into a line, seven arrays forming a single front line, the other arrays organized by standing one man behind another." (Author's translation: inserted italics are intended to clarify the meaning of the text.) In this arrangement, seven battalions of 1000 (the first battalion in each legion) are arranged side by side to form the front line. Since only 7 of the 28 battalions of the War Scroll army made up the front line, it follows that the remaining 21 battalions were deployed behind them, "standing one man behind another." In each legion of 4 battalions, the first was part of the front line that engaged the enemy; the second and third battalions were held in reserve; and the fourth battalion consisted of skirmishers. The deployment of the total forces of the Sons of Light thus took the forn of a long rectangle, 7 battalions across by 4 battalions deep, the front line consisting of the seven battalions in closest proximity to the enemy. The front line faced the enemy, "line against line" (IQM 7:8), with the skirmishers active between the lines (IQM 6:1, 4; 8:4).

106 RUSSELL GMIRKIN

These played a purely defensive role protecting the legion's flanks, as indicated by their shields, greaves, defensive weaponry, and less agile steeds.9'

The 1400 mobile light-armed cavalry were assigned to the light- armed skirmishers, 200 cavalry attached to each battalion of 1000 skirmishers, 100 on either flank, to protect the skirmishers as they did battle in the space between the opposing armies.92

The remaining 3200 light-arrned cavalry appear to have been divided into 4 units of 800 each to protect the 4 sides of the army, as Yadin suggests.93 In battle, 2 units (1600 cavalry) were probably placed on either flank for offensive purposes.' While these mobile cavalry units attempted to envelop and attack the enemy flanks,95 the heavy-armed cavalry discussed above remained behind to defend against flank attacks by the enemy cavalry.

duties position distribution 3200 light cavalry offensive flanks (initially) 1600 per flank 1400 light cavalry offensive with skirmishers 200 per 1000

skirmishers 1400 heavy cavalry defensive flanks 200 per legion

The TID-=' D'1 or front line thus corresponds exactly with the Roman frons. The War Scroll's deployment of the legions side by side prior to battle appears to be identical with the 'rectangular" fonnation referred to at IQM 9:10, and was the normal initial deployment of the Roman army in all eras.

Yadin, 163-68, had a different interpretation of the front line, which has not received widespread acceptance due to his idiosyncratic interpretation of Hebrew military terms such as ii5Dnst, C'S and -10t. See for instance the critiques found in A.M. Gazov- Ginzberg, "The Structure of the Army of the Sons of Light," RevQ 5 (1965) 166-67; 171 n. 14; P. Davies, 48-49. The suggestions of neither of these latter two authors are an improvement over Yadin, however, as all three failed to take the "aDo D'S in its obvious meaning as a front line.

91 IQM 6:10-15. Vegetius 2.1, probably drawing on the mid-second century BCE de Re Militari by Cato, equates the legionary cavalry with the "greaved" cavalry. Vegetius 3.16, also probably drawing on Cato, makes the point that the armored heavy cavalry and those carrying spears should be posted "next to the infantry, with the mounted archers and those not issued with cuirasses ranging farther afield, for the heavy cavalry should be used to protect the infantry's flanks, while the swift light cavalry are for overwhel- ming and throwing into disorder the enemy's wings." This exactly corresponds to the War Scroll, where the heavy cavalry with greaves, shields and spears protect the legionary flanks, while the mobile light cavalry armed with bows aggress against the enemy.

I2 1QM 6:8-9. 9 Yadin, 179. 94 Yadin, 178-79. 9 IQM 9:6-7 shows cavalry in an attack on the flanks of the enemy line; 9:10-11

describes an enveloping maneuver.


Analysis. The cavalry of the War Scroll more closely resembles that of the pre-Marius arny. Most importantly, the War Scroll cavalry were directly attached to the legions, unlike the cavalry composed of semi- independent auxiliary forces in the post-Marius army. The War Scroll squadron of 25 cavalry, in 5 rows of 5, corresponds reasonably well with the pre-Marius Roman turmae of 30 cavalry, in 6 rows of 5.

The ratio of cavalry to infantry compared to that of the pre-Marius army is revealing.

cavalry infantry ratio War Scroll army (combined) 6000 28000 3:14 Pre-Marius Roman legions 300 4200 1:14 Pre-Marius Italian alae 900 4200 3:14

The relative strength of cavalry to infantry found in the War Scroll is exactly that of the cavalry-heavy legions of the Italian alae posted on either side of the Roman legions. These alae or wing formations provided the majority of the cavalry used in flank operations, and dif- fered from the regular Roman legions primarily in their extra cavalry. The evident modeling of the War Scroll's legions after the Italian alae in regard to cavalry strength may signify the importance placed on cavalry tactics to the author of the War Scroll. This generally fits the time of the pre-Marius army; Hannibal's early victories over the Ro- mans in the Second Punic War were widely attributed to his superior cavalry strength,96 a conclusion which greatly affected military strategies throughout the Mediterranean thereafter.9'

The cavalry forces described in the War Scroll do not agree well with the cavalry of the post-Marius army. Since the reforms under Marius eliminated the legionary cavalry forces, Yadin therefore ex- plained most of the War Scroll cavalry as auxiliaries,98 according to the following scheme:

duties distribution composition 3200 light cavalry offensive 1600 per flank auxiliaries 1400 light cavalry offensive 200 per 1000 auxiliaries

skirmishers

96 Polybius 3.117.5. 97 Yadin, 196, compared the ratio of cavalry to infantry in the War Scroll (1:4.6)

with that of Hannibal's army at Cannae (1:4). 9 Yadin, 161-62.

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duties distribution composition 1400 heavy cavalry 200 per legion

(as below) - 50 cohortes equitatae officers 50 per 1000 auxiliaries per legion skirmishers - 150 legionary cavalry officers 50 per 1000 legionary per legion infantry

Yadin's interpretation of all the light cavalry and part of the heavy cavalry as auxiliaries cannot be supported. The skirmishers of the War Scroll, along with their 1400 defending light-armed cavalry, were clearly not auxiliary forces, but rather were forces attached to the legions themselves. The 3200 light-armed offensive cavalry of the War Scroll, while more autonomous than the skirmishing cavalry, still exist in fixed proportion to the legions, which is inconsistent with the auxiliaries of Caesar's period.

Yadin's interpretation of the heavy cavalry is even more problematic. Yadin failed to grasp the important combat role of the heavy cavalry in defending the flanks of the legions during battle.99 Indeed, Yadin did not assign any real tactical function to the heavy cavalry. Instead, Yadin understood the heavy cavalry as a mounted officer corps whose primary function was administrative: "transmitting orders, adju- tancy, guard duties, etc."'?? However, this analysis appears to be in error, since the War Scroll does not assign the cavalry any administrative or command duties, and clearly distinguishes the heavy cavalry from the legionary field officers (the provosts or D In any case, it is difficult to picture nearly a quarter of the total cavalry forces, and the most heavily armed at that, being wasted on guard duties and transmitting orders, especially since the War Scroll assigns guard duties to the non-combatants,'0' and dwells at length on the transmission of orders during battle by trumpet signals.'02

Yadin's division of the heavy cavalry into two distinct subgroups is also highly questionable. The 1400 heavy-armed cavalry were assigned 50 per battalion of 1000, or 200 per legion. Yadin interpreted the 50 heavy-armed cavalry attached to each battalion of skirmishers as auxiliaries, along with the skirmishers themselves. The 50 heavy-armed

I 1QM 6:7-8. '' Yadin, 181-82. 101 1QM 7:2 on the guarding of weaponry. '1 1QM 2:15-3:11; 7:11-9:5.


cavalry attached to each battalion of heavy infantry forces, Yadin interpreted as legionary cavalry. By drawing a sharp line between the heavy cavalry assigned to the skirmishers and the heavy infantry, Yadin's construction already conflicts with the War Scroll, which contains no such description of distinct sub-groups within the heavy cavalry. Quite the contrary, in the War Scroll the heavy cavalry pos- sess uniform weapons and armor, and they were all deployed together at the legionary flanks. Nevertheless, since Yadin's dating of the War Scroll to Caesar's time was based in large part on his theories regarding the heavy cavalry, we shall discuss these in some detail.

Yadin's "cohortes equitatae." First we shall consider the 50 heavy- armed cavalry attached to the light-armed skirmishing battalion, an arrangement which Yadin interpreted as an example of the cohortes equitatae, a type of auxiliary unit made up of combined infantry and cavalry forces, which Yadin claimed to have existed "up to and during the time of Augustus."'03 Ignoring the problematic characterization of the skirmishing battalions as auxiliaries, which we have earlier discussed, there are additionally serious chronological difficulties in this identification. The earliest inscriptional reference to the cohortes equitatae is an inscription that mentions a cohortis equitum from the territory of the Ubii which served in the time of "Augustus and Tiberias."'04 This pushes the evidence for the cohortes equitatae back only to the Augustan period. Units of cohortes equitatae were more common in later times. Yadin thus seriously misstated the evidence in claiming the cohortes equitatae as dating to "up to and during" the time of Augustus: "the time of Augustus and thereafter" would be more accu- rate.'05 In any case, the usual ratio of cavaliy to infantry in the cohortes equitatae was approximately 1:4,'06 which does not correspond well to the 1:20 ratio of 50 heavy cavalry to 1000 skirnishers in the War Scroll.

103 Yadin, 182. '0 "Ubiorum peditum et equitum, donato hastis puris duabus et coronis auris ab divo

Aug. et Ti. Caesare Aug." See Holder, 247; cf. Keppie, 151 .Tacitus, Histories 4.28 mentions Ubii cohorts possibly originally fonned in the time of Augustus.

1' It is puzzling how Yadin made this mistake. Kromayer and Veith, whom Yadin cited, made it plain that the cohortes equitatae existed starting in the. Augustan Era until at least the time of Hadrian. Kromayer and Veith, 495, 549, 577. For a relatively recent, detailed account of the cohortes equitatae see R.W. Davies, Service in the Roman Army (Columbia University Press: New York, 1989), 141-5 1.

11" Cheesman, 29-30; Keppie, 183.

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Another problem arises in connection with the tactical role of the "cohortes equitatae." While Yadin nowhere discussed precisely how the 50 cavalry in his "cohortes equitatae" were deployed in battle, he appears to imply that they remained with the skirmishers throughout the battle.'07 Yet their lack of mobility would have been a severe liability between the lines. But the War Scroll clearly states that all 1400 heavy cavalry were deployed together at a separate location at the legions' flanks, while a second unit of 1400 mobile light-armed cavalry were deployed to defend the skirmishers' flanks when they sallied forth against the enemy.'08 This is clearly incompatible with Yadin's idea of a cohortes equitatae. It is important to note in this connection that only a single class of skirmishers was active between the lines at any given time, the other skirmishers remaining in position with the heavy cavalry, awaiting their appointed "lot." The inactive skirmishers thus formed a fourth line in the main formation, requiring their own protective cavalry to defend their flanks. Hence all 1400 heavy cavalry maintained their defensive posture at the flanks, while separate units of mobile light-armed cavalry accompanied the skirmishers into offensive action between the lines.

Yadin's "legionary cavalry." Second, we shall consider the remaining heavy cavalry attached to the heavy infantry battalions. Although in his system Yadin was able to account for most of the cavalry as auxiliaries, at least some heavy cavalry in the War Scroll were without doubt fully integrated into the legions. At 50 heavy cavalry per infantry battalion, and 3 heavy infantry battalions per legion, this amounted to 150 heavy cavalry per legion in Yadin's system."'9 Yadin equated these with the legionary cavalry, i.e. Roman and Italian cavalry forces fully integrated into the legions.

Yadin attempted to show that legionary cavalry in Caesar's time amounted to approximately 150 per legion, like the heavy cavalry of the War Scroll. Yadin's procedure for estimating the ratio of cavalry to infantry in the Roman legions was highly doubtful. Yadin collected

107 The 50 cavalry attached to each battalion of heavy infantry "fight" alongside their respective units, while each skirmishing battalion is somewhat ambiguously "accompanied by" 50 heavy cavalry. Yadin, 182. One must presume Yadin meant the 50 cavalry accompanied them into battle.

1' 1QM 6:8-9. '0 The War Scroll assigns 200 heavy cavalry per legion, but Yadin, 181, assigned

50 of these to his cohortes equitatae, leaving 150 cavalry directly attached to each legion in his construction.


examples from the time of Caesar to calculate an approximate ratio of 100-200 cavalry per legion,'10 which Yadin found consistent with his figure of 150 heavy infantry attached to each legion in the War Scroll. However, Yadin failed to produce any evidence that the passages he cited referred to Roman or Italian cavalry attached to the legions. Rather, these cavaly are in every case to be identified as foreign auxiliary forces, not legionary cavalry."'

Indeed, Yadin's whole construct of legionary cavalry at the time of Caesar presents serious problems, since modern authorities are virtually unanimous in agreeing that the legionary cavalry were abolished in the reforms of Marius."2 Latin or Roman cavalry are last mentioned

110 Yadin, 181 n. 5. Additionally, Yadin took note of the numbers of legionary cavalry in the pre-Marius period and after their revival in the late first century CE, but these data are of no relevance to the time of Caesar.

"I Yadin, 181 n. 5, singled out three specific examples from Caesar's Greek campaign leading up to his victory over Pompey at Pharsalus: the 600 cavalry Caesar brought with him from Italy to Greece in 49 (Caesar, Civil War 3.2), the 800 additional cavalry Mark Anthony joined him with at "Dyrrhachium" (actually, Lissus-ibid. 3.29), and the 1000 remaining cavalry Caesar had the next year at Pharsalus (ibid. 3.84). If these were all Roman legionary cavalry, as Yadin interpreted them, then one would have to conclude that Caesar had no auxiliary cavalry forces whatever at Pharsalus or indeed in Greece. But as M.P. Speidel, Riding For Caesar: The Roman Emperors' Horse Guards (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 1994), 13-14, pointed out, Caesar brought his 400 German cavalry bodyguard with him in all his travels from Gaul to Spain, Greece (Pharsalus), Egypt, Asia, and Africa. Appian, Civil Wars 2.64 specifically mentions Germans in Caesar's forces in Greece. These Germans were obviously in the cavalry, not the legions. See Delbruck, 1:550, on the barbarian character of Caesar's cavalry forces in Greece, and specifically at Pharsalus. Note that the 8th Legion, present at Pharsalus, is known to have had 300 cavalry provided by the king of Noricum (Caesar, The Civil War 1.18). Appian, Civil Wars 2.70 contrasted Caesar's Italian legions at Pharsalus with his foreign cavalry, and specifically described the composition of the cavalry as follows: "In the way of allied forces, Caesar had cavalry from both Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul." There is thus no question that the examples of cav- aIry from Caesar's time that Yadin cited refer to ordinary foreign auxiliaries.

Yadin's dependence on secondary sources was undoubtedly the source of his error on this point. Yadin relied heavily on Spaulding, 175-78, whom he cited here, for his raw data on Caesar's cavalry, but appears unaware that Spaulding is referring to foreign auxiliary cavalry throughout. Yadin's confusion may have been based on Spaulding's imprecise statement on 178 that in the accounts of the troops strengths at Pharsalus (i.e. Caesar, Civil War 3.89 and Appian, Civil Wars 2.64), "the number of auxiliary troops does not appear; it was probably small, and these troops had little influence on the batfle." Spaulding referred only to the absence of auxiliary infantry forces, not auxiliary cavalry, as is clear from Spaulding's sources (especially Appian), but Yadin may have improperly read Spaulding to mean that the 1000 cavalry at Pharsalus were non-auxiliary, i.e. Roman legionary forces, an inference Spaulding never intended.

112 Parker, 43, notes that Caesar's cavalry in the Gallic War were composed exclu-

112 RUSSELL GMIRKIN

in the Jugurthine War in 106 BCE,"3 and are completely absent in all accounts of the first century BCE legions, including those of Caesar. Most authorities believe that Roman cavalry units had been completely eliminated from the legions under the reforms of Marius, and were absent throughout the first century BCE."4 For instance, on one occa- sion when Caesar wanted an armed cavahy bodyguard in Gaul, and didn't trust his Gallic auxiliaries to provide it, he had to borrow their horses as mounts for his Roman soldiers of the Tenth Legion."' This incident is usually taken to demonstrate the complete absence of organized Roman cavalry units in Caesar's legions at this time,"6 although legionary officers still rode horseback."' The absence of legionary cavahy in the post-Marius period thus excludes Yadin's model from consideration.

In summary, Yadin's explanations for the War Scroll cavalry against the context of Caesar's legions are unconvincing. It is difficult to see the flanking or skirmishing light cavalry as auxiliaries, the 50 heavy cavalry with the skirmishers as cohortes equitatae (prior to the first known Roman units of this type), or the remaining 150 heavy cavalry as legionary (during a period when no legionary cavalry existed). The arrangement of cavalry in the War Scroll that Yadin finds "so strange at first sight" and believes "can only be understood in the light of the organization of the cavalry in the Roman army from the beginning of the first century BCE onwards""8 is simply the ordinary light and heavy cavalry of the pre-Marius legions.

(5) Reserve Forces

Pre-Marius. The concept of reserves had been an essential part of Roman military strategy ever since the reforms of Camillus in the 4th century. Keeping fresh troops in reserve was the strategy underlying

sively of auxiliaries from Spain, Gaul, and Germany. During the Civil Wars, Caesar mostly made use of these same cavalry.

113 Keppie, 79; Dixon and Southern, 22; Sallust, Jugurthine War 95. 114 See Delbruck, 1:418, 424; Parker, 43; Connolly, 214-15; Keppie, 79; Dixon and

Southern, 22. "5 Caesar, The Gallic War 1.42. Caesar subsequently acquired a force of 400

German cavalry, trained to fight in combination with infantry, to act as his bodyguard in all his travels.

116 Parker, 43; Keppie, 84. 117 Keppie, 100. 118 Yadin, 181.


the triple battalion formation of hastati, principes, and triarii: when the front line became wearied, it witldrew tirough intervals to the rear of the heavy infantry, allowing the troops of the next line to engage the enemy. The Romans called their reserve forces subsidia.

Livy contains perhaps the best and fullest description of reserve tactics in the pre-Marius army. This classic statement occurs in connection with the reforms of the Roman legions under Camillus in about 340 BCE.

When an army had been marshalled in this fashion, the hastati were the first of all to engage. If the hastati were unable to defeat the enemy, they retreated slowly and were received into the intervals between the companies of the principes . . . If the principes, too, were unsuccessful in their fight, they fell back slowly from the battle-line on the triarii ... Then, with no more reserves behind to count on, they would charge the enemy in one compact array. This was a thing exceedingly dis- heartening to the enemy, who, pursuing those whom they supposed they had conquered, all at once beheld a new line rising up, with augmented numbers.119

Polybius, writing around 160-150 BCE, describes this strategy as unique to the Romans.

When the phalanx has its one opportunity for charging, we keep out of action even a small portion of it at the moment of shock... For the Romans do not make their line equal in force to the enemy and expose all the legions to a frontal attack by the phalanx, but part of their forces remain in reserve and the rest engage the enemy.'2"

Post-Marius. The concept of reserves continued to play an important role in the post-Marius army. Caesar's writings, both his Gallic War and Civil War, frequently note the role of reserves in the course of battles, either bemoaning the inability to keep troops in reserve due to numerical superiority of the enemy, or commenting on the positive effect of engaging the enemy with fresh troops. The battle of Pharsalus provides the classic example. The third line of troops, held in reserve, were brought into action by Caesar at the exact time as Pompey's left flank was routed, precipitating the flight of Pompey's entire army.'2'

War Scroll. Yadin saw the concept of reserve troops as underlying the 7 lots or phases of battle described in the War Scroll. The skirmishers attack the enemy forces in three separate waves (lots 1, 3, and 5), retiring through intervals (in lots 2, 4, and 6) as soon as they start

119 Livy 8.8.9-13. 'IO Polybius 18.31.12; 18.32.2. All quotations from classical sources are from Loeb

editions. 121 Caesar, The Civil War 3.94.

114 RUSSELL GMIRKIN

suffering casualties, to be replaced by fresh troops in the next attack wave, ending in the final decisive clash of armies in the seventh lot."22 Yadin suggested a parallel to the Roman concept of reserve troops.'23

Analysis. Whether the concept of reserve forces can be seen at play in the 7 lots of battle is at best doubtful. If replacing worn out or wounded troops was the main consideration, one would expect skirmishers to have been replaced by other skirmishers of the same type. Instead, the 3 waves of skirmishers utilized slings, javelins, and lances, i.e. long,. medium, and short range missiles respectively.'24 Clearly the closing distance between the armies was the ovenriding consideration in the successive deployment of the 3 types of skirmishers. As the charging enemy forces drew close, the long range skirmishers were quickly withdrawn and replaced by those with shorter range weapons, with the third wave of skirmishers armed in part with sword and shield for direct contact with the enemy. This sequence had nothing to do with the idea of reserves.

Further, the concept of reserve forces in Roman military strategy applies primarily, perhaps even exclusively, to the main body of heavy- armed infantry, not skirmishers."2' That there are almost no examples of skirmishers held out as reserves is due to the relative brevity of the first, skirmishing phase of battle. The skirmishers generally went into action shortly before the main clash of armies, as the two main armies began their final approach: there was thus insufficient time for fatigue to be a factor in replacing skirmishing troops. The replacement of the fatigued and wounded with fresh troops was more of a factor in the protracted clash of the main infantry forces. Still, the replacement of worn out and wounded troops may possibly be seen as a minor, secondary consideration in the succession of the 7 lots of battle in the War Scroll, since casualties were mentioned in connection with the withdrawal of skirmishers in lots 2, 4, and 6.126

'1 IQM 1:13-15; 5:15-6:6; 7:14-8:20; 17:10-18:5; cf. 16:2-12. '23 Yadin, 174-75, citing IQM 16:10-11. '4 1QM 5:16-6:6; 7:14-8:20; cf Yadin, 158. 1- A better example of reserve tactics is found in 4QM' 1-3 i 15-17, which was

not available to Yadin. "The first line will [go out to battle,] and the second will rem[ain...] in its position. When the first have carried out their part, they will withdraw and the[y will rise up...] The sec(ond: ... I organizing itself for battle. The second line will carry out its part and will withdraw and will re[main in its position.] The th[ird...]" The successive action of three lines is in exact parallel to the tactics of the pre-Marius army as described in Livy 8.8.9-13, quoted earlier.

126 It should be noted that in columns 3-9 the description of the 7 lots contains no


However, even if the concept of reserves can here be dimly per- ceived, this is not useful in dating the War Scroll, since reserves were an integral part of Roman military strategy ever since the time of Camillus. One must strongly disagree with Yadin's characterization of reserve troops as "generally regarded as an innovation of the Roman army and more particularly of the time of Julius Caesar."'27 Yadin cited Kromayer-Veith as seeing "the completion of this process in Caesar's famous command at Pharsalus."'28 There is no question that Caesar was keenly aware of the necessity for keeping fresh troops in reserve to replace the wounded and battle-weary. However, there is a vast difference between an "innovation" and the "completion" of a process: Caesar may be argued to have perfected the use of reserve forces, but not to have invented it.

The concept of reserves thus unquestionably predates the first century. The testimony of Polybius in 160-150 BCE on the Roman use of reserves in his day was known to Yadin, who cited Polybius 18.32 (quoted above) to show that "one of the chief differences between phalanx and legion tactics is that the Romans leave part of their troops in reserve."'29 Yadin did not seem to be aware of the anachronism involved in citing a second century author regarding what Yadin viewed as a first century innovation by Julius Caesar.'3' On the contrary, Cae- sar's strategy of maintaining reserves, reflected in his preference for the traditional triple acies formation, was a direct adaptation of the old triple battalion of the pre-Marius army to the post-Marius cohort fighting environment. Caesar's use of reserve troops could better be char- acterized as an intelligent conservation of proven strategies from the past, rather than an innovation.

reference to casualties. The mention of casualties thus occurs only in the older, "primitive" version of the 7 lots of battle that omits classification of the skirmishers by weaponry and shows no traces of Roman influence. This renders Yadin's idea of the 7 lots of battle reflecting the Roman idea of reserve forces even more problematic.

'" Yadin, 174, citing Kromayer and Veith, 119, 433. But although p. 119 indicates reserve forces were not used by the Greeks, it says nothing about their use by Caesar, while p. 433 only mentions that Caesar used reserves, not that he innovated them. Quite the contrary, Kromayer and Veith, 296, properly note the use of reserve tactics by Scipio Africanus in the Second Punic War. Yadin's cited evidence thus fails to support his point.

128 Yadin, 174 n. 7, citing Kromayer and Veith, 433. '29 Yadin, 175 n. 1. 130 Yadin, 174.

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(6) Coordination of Infantry and Cavalry

Pre-Marius. As Cheesman notes, "Corps in which infantry and cavalhy fought together had of course always been common."'3' Special units composed of infantry fighting alongside cavalry during the time of the Second Punic War were described by Livy under the year 211 BCE. In this arrangement, the light cavalry gave light-armed skirmishers a lift on their horses. Approaching the enemy line, the skirmishers would dismount, hurl 7 javelins at close range at the enemy, and jump back on the horses to return to their own line.'32 The centurion who invented this novel method of combining infantry and cavalry was pro- moted to general.'33 The pre-Marius army thus provides examples of cavalry coordinated with the infantry.

Post-Marius. Combined corps of infantry and cavalry were also found in the post-Marius army. Examples may be seen among the troops of Marius in Africa,'3 Scipio's Numidian auxiliaries in Africa,'35 and Caesar's auxiliaries in Gaul and later at Pharsalus. Caesar had first observed how cavalry and infantry could work together in the Gallic War. One of his bands of auxiliaries consisted of 6000 horsemen, with an equal number of infantry, working together in pairs. Specially trained German infantry kept up with the cavalry riders by running alongside the horses and holding onto the manes.'36 Caesar brought these auxiliaries along with him at the conclusion of the Gallic Wars,'37 and used them as a model to train a special unit of combined cavalry and infantry that distinguished themselves at the battle of Pharsalus.'38

'.' Cheesman, 28-29. 132 Livy 26.4.7. 133 Livy 26.4.10. '3 Sallust, The Jugurthine War 46, 59. 135 The African War 69. '36 Caesar, The Gallic War 1.48. 13? Caesar, The Gallic War 7.13, 65; 8.13. '3J Caesar, The Civil War 3.84; Frontinus, Strategies 2.3.22; cf. Cheesman, 28-29.

Caesar's 1000 cavalry at Pharsalus in Greece included those he had brought from Germany (see discussion of Delbruck, 1:550; cf. Appian, Civil Wars 2.64; Florus 2.13.48), who were already accustomed to fighting combined with infantry. A unit of cavalry already trained to fight in combination with "400 infantry" just prior to Pharsalus (Caesar, The Civil War 3.75) was probably the 400 cavalry of Caesar's famous German horse guard which Caesar had brought with him from Italy (Caesar, The Civil War 3.2). By the battle of Pharsalus, all 1000 cavalry (including the rein- forcements brought from Greece by Mark Anthony) had been trained to fight combined with light infantry in the German manner. Caesar's later use of combined units in


War Scroll. Yadin believed he saw evidence of similar special units combining infantry and cavalry in the War Scroll, pointing to the 100 horsemen assigned to defend each flank of the skirmishing battalions.

This method of employing the light cavalry, customary also with Hellenistic armies, developed during the Roman period, especially in the first century B.C., when the light infantry and most of the cavalry belonged to the auxiliary units. The cooperation between light units and cavalry reached its climax at the time of Julius Caesar.'39

Analysis. Whether the cooperation of cavalry and infantry reached its peak of development in the time of Caesar is subject to debate, since similar examples can be found predating the time of Caesar.'40

More importantly, the combined units in either the pre-Marius army or in the time of Caesar do not in fact provide a convincing model for the cavalry assigned to protect the skirmishers' flanks in the War Scroll, as Yadin would have us believe. In Roman coordinated units during the time of Caesar, the number of cavalry and infantry were equal. In all cases known to us, one light-armed skirmisher was assigned to accompany each cavalry rider.'41 In the War Scroll, however, 1000 skirmishers were accompanied by only 100 cavalry on each flank.

The use of cavalry to defend skirmishing forces is simply routine Roman tactics. In the first phase of battle, both armies typically sent skirmishers forward to hurl missiles at the opposing infantry formations. Light-armed cavalry were sallied forth between the lines at this same time, to attack the other side's skirmishers, defend their own skirmishers against similar cavalry attacks, and quickly to exploit any gaps their skirmishers opened up in the enemy's infantry formations by riding into these gaps and attacking the adjacent heavy infantry from the sides, where they were most vulnerable. One obvious historical example is the battle of Magnesia, in 190 BCE, when Roman cavalry

Africa (African War 20, 81) in imitation of his Numidian foes also utilized his German cavalry (African War 6, 34).

39 Yadin, 177-78. '? According to Vegetius 3.16, "If the cavalry are outnumbered, the ancient custom

should be adopted of mixing in with them very swift infantry with light shields, specially trained for the purpose ... All ancient generals found this to be the only answer." Since Vegetius often drew on Cato, this passage seems to imply Cato also recom- mended this strategy in the mid-second century BCE.

141 The German units are expressly said to have numbered 6000 each. Caesar, The Gallic War 1.48. In Spain, combined forces consisted of "six cohorts and a corresponding number of cavalry," with each cavalry taking up one infantry with him on his horse. The Spanish War 34.

118 RUSSELL GMIRKIN

accompanied skirmishers between the lines.'42 Such cavalry deployed in the skirmishing phase were not usually coordinated with the infantry in the specialized manner which Yadin suggested. Yadin himself acknowledged that the arrangement seen in the War Scroll, with 1000 skirmishers protected on either side by 100 cavalry, "does not agree in details"'43 with Caesar's combined units. Yadin's case for "specialized coordination" between infantry and cavalry in the War Scroll is, in conclusion, unconvincing.

(7) Weapons

Yadin advanced a number of arguments that the weaponry in the War Scroll is Roman rather than Hellenistic: the rectangular shape of the shields of the heavy infantry,'" the round shape of the cavalry shields,'45 the shape and measurements of the sword,'6 and so forth. Yadin's analysis did not generally distinguish between the Roman weaponry of the first and second centuries. In cases where Yadin did see evidence for a first century BCE dating, his handling of sources merits close scrutiny.

The Rectangular Shield (30). Yadin pointed out the close correspondence of the shape and size of the rectangular shield of the heavy infantry with the rectangular scutum of the Roman army.'47 The evidence for the dimensions of the Roman scutum is twofold: a passage in Polybius (ca. 160-150 BCE) describing the measurements of the scutum at 4 by 2'/2 cubits,'"4 and a shield unearthed at Dura Europus (ca. 200 CE) measured at 102 x 83 cm. The War Scroll shield was said to be 2'/2 by 1 '/2 cubits. (The cubit of Polybius was approximately 30 cm, whereas that of the War Scroll was about 45.8 cm.'49) Yadin listed the dimensions of the three shields as follows:`O

Polybius: 120 x 75 cm Scroll: 115 x 69 cm Dura Europus: 102 x 83 cm

142 Livy 37.41.1 1. '43 Yadin, 178 n. 2. '" Yadin, 116-17. 4' Yadin, 120-2 1.

"1 Yadin, 128-29. '47 Yadin, 116. "' Polybius 6.23.1-2. "9 Yadin, 1 6 n. 2. '5I Yadin, 117.


Yadin asserted that "this comparison proves that the measurements of the shield in the scroll represent the average of the two others."''5 While it is true that the height of the shield in the War Scroll lies between the other two, it is significantly closer to the shield described in Polybius. Additionally, the width in the War Scroll is the least of the three, not the average, and again lies closer to that of Polybius. To call the measurements of the War Scroll shield the average of the other two is thus misleading, and obscures the close correspondence of the dimensions of the War Scroll rectangular shield with that of Polybius.

Indeed, the dimensions of the War Scroll shield are effectively identical to those of the legionary shield in Polybius, given that they are given in Hebrew units of measurement rather than Greek. The dimensions in Polybius, 4 by 2'/2 Greek cubits, translates to 120 x 75 cm, as in Yadin's chart. This in turn translates to 2.61 x 1.65 Hebrew cubits, which rounds to 2'/2 by 1 '/2 cubits, the exact figure in the War Scroll.'52 A date for the War Scroll rectangular shield at or near that of Polybius appears to be indicated.

Yadin also found significance in the fact that "the rectangular and convex scutum, i.e. the typical shield of the Roman legion, was not generally used by the legions before Caesar."'53 While it is true that the rectangular semi-cylindrical shield first appears shortly before Caesar's time,"' Yadin cited no evidence to show that the War Scroll shield was semi-cylindrical. The literary evidence of Polybius (which Yadin cites) demonstrates that a flat rectangular shield was used by the legions in the mid-second century. Yadin again appears not to have been aware of the anachronism involved in using a passage from Polybius in the second century as evidence for a rectangular shield he claims appears in the first century. In conclusion, Yadin's argument that the rectangular shield of the War Scroll points to a first century date must be rejected, given that Polybius, writing in the mid-second century, describes the shield of the Roman army as rectangular, and with virtually identical dimensions to that of the War Scroll.

"I Yadin, 117. I-2 By a similar calculation, the shield found at Dura Europus translates to 2.22 x

1.80 Hebrew cubits, which rounds to 2 x 2 cubits, a figure significantly different from that of the War Scroll shield.

"I Yadin, 117. 134 Parker, 15. P. Couissin, Les Armes Romaines (Librairie Ancienne Honord Cham-

pion: Paris, 1926) 319 suggests the rectangular semi-cylindrical shield evolved from the rectangular flat shield of Polybius' time.

120 RUSSELL GMIRKIN

The Spanish Sword (Q-r). As Yadin pointed out, the double-edged sword in the War Scroll corresponds in form and dimension to the gladius or Spanish sword used by the Roman legions.'55 This sword was adopted during the second Punic War, after Scipio observed its use while fighting the Carthaginians in Spain.'- Polybius refers to this sword in his description of legionary weaponry.

Besides the shield they also cany a sword, hanging on the right thigh and called a Spanish sword. This is excellent for thrusting, and both of its edges cut effectively, as the blade is very strong and firm.157

Yadin didn't consider the gladius itself as dating the War Scroll to the time of Caesar, but argued that the sword's mode of suspension points to this period. The War Scroll describes the sword as being suspended by straps, which corresponds to Roman practice prior to the time of Augustus. Yadin, citing Couissin, saw this as pointing to the first century BCE.'58 However, Couissin reported that the Roman sword was also suspended by straps in the second century BCE,'59 a fact which Yadin omitted to mention. Couissin maintained that the Romans adopted the method of suspending the sword from the Spanish at the same time as the Romans began to use the Spanish sword itself, and that the gladius was suspended by straps from the belt by the Roman legions throughout the second century. (Indeed, the passage in Polybius describing the Spanish sword as "hanging on the right thigh"'60 appears to imply this mode of suspension in the second century.) Yadin repro- duced a figure out of Couissin, captioned "Roman soldiers of the second and first centuries BCE," in which two typical Roman soldiers of the first century (nos. 10 and 11) are depicted with swords hanging by straps.'6' Ironically, Yadin omitted to mention that soldier no. 7, of the second century, had a sword attached in an identical fashion.

The Javelin (rnp-r). Yadin identified the dart or javelin of ihe War Scroll skirmishers as most closely resembling the Roman javelin (called the iaculum or the hasta velitaris).'62 He pointed out its use by the velites or light skirmishers of the second century BCE, and by the

"' Yadin, 128-29. IS Delbruck, 1:281 n. 7; Parker, 19; Milner, 13 n. 1. '" Polybius 6.23.6-7. In8 Yadin, 129, citing Couissin, 309-10. '5 Couissin, 232-34. 16 Polybius 6.23.6. 161 Yadin, 129, figure 5. 162 Yadin, 133.


skirmishers in auxiliary units in the first century BCE. Yadin cited a passage in Livy which first mentions the hasta velitaris in connection with the battle of Capua in 211 BCE, in which the velites carried 7 javelins, just like the skirmishers of the War Scroll.'63 The use of the javelin of the War Scroll thus appears to have its closest parallel in the javelin of the pre-Marius army. Note especially that the velites javelin- throwers in the pre-Marius army were directly attached to the legion, like the skirmishers of the War Scroll, and unlike the auxiliary skirmishing forces of the post-Marius army.

Greaves (D'pl 'nfl). In the War Scroll, the heavy-armed cavalry were said to have worn greaves or metallic shin-guards, while the infantry were not so equipped.'64 Citing Couissin, Yadin argued that this points to the first century BCE, when greaves were no longer used by the infantry, except for those of centurion rank.'65 In the second century, Polybius describes the infantry as wearing greaves, apparently supporting Yadin's argument.'66 However, no infantry wearing greaves appear on monuments of the second century (for instance, the Monu- ment of Paul-Emile). Couissin says that were it not for the passage in Polybius, one could easily conclude that greaves had passed out of use by the second century. He suggests that the greaves mentioned in Polybius were wom by only the wealthiest legionary soldiers.'67 Since apparently only a small fraction of Roman infantry wore greaves in the second century, the War Scroll's omission of this item from the armor of the heavy infantry seems to have negligible value for dating purposes.

Catapult (9lni) and Ballista (12M). In a Cave 4 fragment of the War Rule there is reference to "the catapult and the ballista" present near the battle line.'68 The War Scroll does not assign a fixed number of

16 Yadin, 133 n. 2, citing Livy 26.4.4. '64 IQM 5:4-14; 6:14; cf. Yadin, 122-23. 165 Yadin, 123. Vermes, 124, misinterpreted Yadin to mean cavalry greaves were

"introduced into the Roman army during the time of Julius Caesar." Yadin's point was rather that infantry greaves had by that time disappeared.

66 Polybius 6.23.8. 167 Couissin, 271. According to Polybius 6.23.15, chain mail was worn by the wealth-

iest infantry (those rated above 10,000 drachmas). It is this class which Couissin suggests also wore greaves. Vegetius 1.20, probably drawing on Cato's second century BCE military manual, associates infantry greaves with this same heavy armor, supporting Couissin's conclusions. This stratification of infantry according to wealth, with superior armor worn by the upper class, is a hold-over from earlier times (when greaves were worn only by the 2 richest of the 6 classes-Dionysius of Halicarnassus 4.16.2-4).

" 4QMC 5. See Baillet, 52, for justification of the translation of these two terms as

122 RUSSELL GMIRKIN

artillery per legion in any surviving text.'69 From the positioning of the priests near the artillery, but safely distant from the actual field of conflict, the catapults and ballista appear to have been located behind or at the flanks of the heavy infantry forces, perhaps in a specially for- tified position to prevent the artillery from falling into enemy hands.'70 The Greeks invented artillery in 399 BCE, and more fully exploited them in battle than the Romans, but their use by the Roman legions had become commonplace by the Second Punic War.'7' Hence their mention in the War Rule is not useful for dating purposes.

(8) Legionary Tactics

The War Scroll legions were normally arranged in rectangular formation with the seven legions arrayed side by side prior to engaging the enemy. In the final attack phase of the heavy infantry, the legionary forces went through a fixed series of battle formations designed to envelop the enemy legions and disrupt them by attacking both their flanks. Yadin listed the sequence as follows:

(1) "A rectangle with towers" (2) "Enveloping arms with towers" (3) "An arc with towers" (4) "A flat arc with protruding columns" (5) "Wings issuing from both sides"'72

Yadin suggested that the names of these formations were copied from a military manual,'"7 and uses the military writer Vegetius to shed

catapult and ballista. Catapults were war machines for throwing bolts or arrows, while ballista hurled stones. These were the two main classifications of Greco-Roman artillery. See E.W. Marsden, Greek and Roman Artillery: Historical Development (Clarendon: Oxford, 1969) 1-47 on the history of technical developments of artillery.

169 It was not until the time of Augustus that a fixed number of artillery were assigned to each Roman legion. Marsden, 184.

'1 Historically, catapults and ballista were mainly used in siege operations, due to the time involved in assembling them and also due to their susceptibility to being seized by enemy forces in open battle under a retreat Nevertheless, artillery were occasionally used in the field against enemy personnel in carefully planned ambushes where the could be set up and positioned in advance in easily defensible positions. See Marsden, 164- 68. This appears to have been the strategy underlying their mention in the War Rule.

1I On the invention of artillery at Syracuse in 399 by engineers working for Dio- nysius I, see Marsden. 48-56; cf. Diodorus Siculus 14.41.6. On the adoption of artillery by the Romans by the Second Punic War, see Marsden, 83-85.

'n Yadin, 184; from IQM 9:10-12. 113 Yadin, 183.


light on these various formations.'74 As Yadin noted, "Vegetius seems to have copied this passage literally from Cato's De re militari,"'75 written in the mid-second century BCE. Yadin also compared the sequence of formations enveloping the enemy with the classic battles between the Romans and Carthaginians at Cannae in 216 and at Zama in 202.176 Thus the basic legionary offensive tactics of the War Scroll were an outgrowth of the Second Punic War, and could have been copied out from any Roman military treatise from the second century BCE.

(9) Miscellanea

Two other minor points not covered above also appear to exclude the post-Marius army as a model for the War Scroll.

Rations. Under the reforms by Marius, legionaries began to carry their own rations and cook their own meals,m'7 whereas in the War Scroll meal preparation is one of the duties assigned the non-combatants.'78

Standards. Marius introduced an additional standard into the Roman army, the legionary standard, a special standard with an eagle, the sym- bol of Rome, as a rallying point for the legion as a whole.'79 Although the War Scroll contains standards for 10's, 50's, 100's, 1000's, and tribal units,'80 the legionary standard is notably missing.

Conclusions: Roman Weaponry

The possibility that the War Scroll might reflect second century BCE weaponry and tactics was never properly explored by Yadin in either his 1955 Hebrew or 1962 English edition. Yadin's entire argument against this proposition consisted of a single statement that some of the relevant evidence "partly points to the period of Caesar and the early Augustan age."'8' However, in our detailed comparison of the War Scroll with the pre-Marius and post-Marius armies, we have discussed

174 Yadin, 185-87, 190-92, drawing on Vegetius 3.20. '" Yadin, 185 n. 1. 176 Yadin, 193-96, especially relied on a detailed analysis of the battle of Cannae. '" Plutarch, Caius Marius 13.1; Sallust, The Jugurthine War 45; Ammianus Marcel-

linus 17.9.2 (which says Caesar's troops carried provisions for 17 days). 17" IQM 7:3; cf. Yadin, 155-56. 1"9 Parker, 36; Keppie, 67. Marius first introduced the legionary standard in 104,

according to Pliny, Natural History 10.16. 'I' 1QM 3:12-5:2; cf. Yadin, 38-64. 18 Yadin, 246 n. 1.

124 RUSSELL GMIRKIN

every point of evidence which Yadin argued as dating the War Scroll to the time of Julius Caesar. This alleged evidence has evaporated on close examination, and Yadin's assertion of specific ties to the time of Caesar or shortly thereafter must therefore be rejected.

In conclusion, a detailed comparison of the War Scroll with the Roman legions before and after the reforms of Marius shows close, systematic parallels with the former. The War Scroll legions, like the pre-Marius armny, consisted of 3 fixed battalions of heavy infantry, a fourth battalion of light-armed skirmishers (the velites), and attached cavalry forces. The numerical strengths of all corresponding divisions agree remarkably well. Recruits in both the War Scroll and pre-Marius armies were segregated by age. The weaponry in the War Scroll is also generally consistent with that of the pre-Marius legions.

By contrast, the War Scroll contains no hint of the post-Marius cohort, and the post-Marius transfer of cavahy and skirmishers from the legions to the foreign auxiliary forces is inconsistent with the structure of the army of the Sons of Light described in the War Scroll. All this evidence, taken cumulatively, demonstrates that the military data in the War Scroll are based on the second century pre-Marius army, not the first century legions of Caesar or Augustus. Since columns 3-9 are generally considered to be the latest strata of material in the War Scroll,'82 this points to a second century-date for the War Scroll as a whole. The military data in the War Rule of Cave 4 are also consistent with this date.'83

Preliminary Dating of the War Scroll

The foregoing analysis on weaponry and military tactics indicates that the War Scroll should be dated to the time of the pre-Marius army, i.e. sometime in the period 209 to 104 BCE.-'4 Other considerations allow us to date the War Scroll's composition with much greater pre- cision. The literary dependence of several sections of the War Scroll on Daniel 11-12I85 indicates that the War Scroll was composed after

152 Van der Ploeg, 11-22; cf. Vermes, 124. P. Davies, 75, appears isolated in view- ing columns 15-19 as later than columns 3-9.

153 Specifically, the arrangement of the heavy infantry in three lines, found at 4QM' 1-3 i 11-17 points to the pre-Marius legions.

11 "The dating of the War Rule essentially depends on the historical identification of military data." Schurer (ed. Vermes), 3:402-403.

183 For instance, IQM 1:2 "offenders against the covenant" cf. Dan. 11:32; 1QM 1:4 cf. Dan. 11:42-44; 1QM 1:6 "with none to help" cf. Dan. 11:45; IQM 1:11-12 "a time


165 BCE. The War Scroll's requirement that the army of the Sons of Light be composed exclusively of Jews argues for a date before the time of Hyrcanus (135-105), when mercenaries began to be used in the Jewish army.186 The War Scroll thus appears to have been written between 165 and 135 BCE, when the Jewish nation was under the leadership of Judas (165-161), Jonathan (153-142), and Simon (142- 135), the sons of Mattathias. However, a date for the composition of the War Scroll during the time of Jonathan or Simon seems to be excluded by the fact that all the Hasmonean rulers after Judas Macca- beus governed Judea in cooperation with the Seleucids, while the War Scroll expresses strong opposition to all foreigners, and to the Syrians specifically.'87 There also exists a strong presumption that the Jewish army under Jonathan and Simon retained the same basic organizational structure as in the time of Judas Maccabeus, when Jonathan and Simon gained their early military experience. These preliminary considerations suggest that the War Scroll was composed during the time of Judas Maccabeus.

Many authors have discussed the numerous parallels between the army organized by Judas Maccabeus and that described by the War Scroll.'88 Like the army in the War Scroll, the Maccabean army was organized in units of thousands, hundreds, fifties and tens.'89 The Mac- cabean legion appears to have numbered 3000 infantry, as this number recurs in several accounts of Maccabean battles.'90 The Maccabean army use of trumpets as battle signals has been compared to that in the War Scroll.'9' Although the use of banners is not documented for the Maccabean Wars, some of the mottoes on the War Scroll banners were

of might trouble ... in all their troubles there was none like it" cf. Dan. 12:1, I Macc. 9:27; 1QM 10:10 "holy covenant" cf. Dan. 11:28, 30. See G.K. Beale, The Use of Daniel in Jewish Apocalyptic Literature and in the Revelation of St. John (University Press of America: Lanham, 1984) 42-66 for a detailed discussion of the use of Daniel in the War Scroll.

186 Josephus, War 1:61. Also, as pointed out by M. Treves, "The Date of the War of the Sons of Light," VT 8 (1958) 421, "The mention of Edom points to a date before c. 127 BC, when the Edomites were converted to Judaism and ceased being enemies" (cf. 1QM 1:1).

87 IQM 1:2, 6; 2:12; 11:11; 18:2-3; 19:10. '' Avi-Yonah, 3-5; P. von der Osten-Sacken, Gott und Belial (Vandenhoeck und

Ruprecht: Gottingen, 1969) 62-66; P. Davies, 60-67. ,89 I Macc. 3:54-55; Josephus, Ant. 12:301; cf. IQM 2:16; 3:15-18; 4:2-5. 190 1 Macc. 4:6; 5:20; 7:40; 9:5. Compare the figure of 3000 in the Maccabean

arny with 3000 infantry per legion in the War Scroll (Yadin, 175). "'| On the Maccabean use of trumpets, see 1 Macc. 4:13; 5:31, 33; 7:45. The War

126 RUSSELL GMWCKIN

identical to Maccabean passwords, such as "God's Help" and "God's Victory."'92 The war conducted by Judas Maccabeus was a holy war, like that of the War Scroll, with priests officiating as commanders.'93 The Maccabean army, like that of the War Scroll, was assisted by heavenly hosts, according to the account in 2 Maccabees.'" The Mac- cabean speeches of exhortation and the prayers both before and after battle are reminiscent of both the War Scroll as well as the Mishnaic passage regarding the Priest Anointed for War.'95 Although by no means conclusive, all these points of comparison strongly suggest the Maccabean conflict as the historical background of the War Scroll.

The Roman weaponry, tactics and formations of the War Scroll, though generally compatible with a Maccabean background, also neces- sitate a reformulation of basic arguments on the Maccabean dating of the War Scroll. Early advocates of a link between the Maccabean armies and the War Scroll operated on the prevailing assumption that the Maccabean army was patterned after the Hellenistic forces of the Seleucids. It was therefore frequently argued that the War Scroll reflected the Hellenistic style of warfare."* Yadin's demonstration of

Scroll lists different trumpet calls for advance, attack, retreat, regrouping, chase, and ambush (1QM 3:1-11; 7:12-13; 8:1-19; 9:1-6; 16:3-13). As Avi-Yonah, 2-4, points out, the Maccabean conflict contains examples of all these operations.

192 2 Macc. 8:23; 13:15; cf. IQM 4:13. See discussions in H.H. Rowley, The Zadokite Fragments and the Dead Sea Scrolls (Basil Blackwell: Oxford, 1955) 71; P. Davies, 62-64; Avi-Yonah, 3.

19 1 Macc. 2:1-5; 3:49; 5:66-67; cf. IQM 7:8-18; 8:1-19; 9:1-9; 16:2-12; Yadin, 208- 209, 216-18; Osten-Sacken, 63-72.

'9' 1 Macc. 7:14; 2 Macc. 10:29; 11:6; cf. IQM 1:11-12; 4:1-2; 11:17; 12:4-5; 15:14; 17:6; Yadin 23740.

"5 M. Sot. 8 discusses the "priest anointed for battle"; cf. Yadin, 209, 214; IQM 7:8-18; 8:1-19; 9:1-9; 16:2-12. B. Bar-Kochva, Judas Maccabaeus: The Jewish Struggle Against the Seleucids (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1989), 494-99 denies that the Mishnaic "priest anointed for battle" has any connection with Maccabean times, pointing out the reference to Roman military equipment in M. Sot. 8, notably the Roman shield and the hob-nailed sandal (the caligula). But the Roman army was similarly dressed in Maccabean times, and Bar-Kochva's arguments should be reevalu- ated in light of this article's demonstration of second century BCE Roman weaponry in the War Scroll.

'9 J.G. F6rrier, "La Tactique Hell6nistique dans un Texte de 'Ayin Fashkha," Sem 3 (1950), 53-59; Avi-Yonah, 3-5; K.M.T. Atkinson, "The Historical Setting of the 'War of the Sons of Light and the Sons of Darkness,"' BJRL 40 (1958), 290-97. For a thor- ough, devastating critique of Atkinson's and others' attempts to find a background of Hellenistic warfare in the War Scroll, see G.R. Driver, The Judaean Scrolls: The Problem and a Solution (Schocken Books: New York, 1965), 187, 190; a simple brows- ing of the Tacrica by Asclepiodotus should convince even the casual reader that the War Scroll has nothing in common with Greek phalanx tactics.


Roman weaponry and tactics in the War Scroll had the effect of dis- crediting the dating of the War Scroll to the Maccabean period, as the theory was argued at that time.'97 Clearly, if the Maccabean army fought with Hellenistic weaponry and battle formations, this strongly argues against a Maccabean background for the War Scroll.

However, it is proper to question whether the Maccabean army was organized along Hellenistic lines throughout the whole period 166-161 BCE. During the first phase of the Maccabean uprising, in the years 166-164 BCE, the Jewish guerrilla forces were said to have used Helle- nistic weaponry taken from the bodies of their fallen enemies.)98 But this says little of the armaments or tactics employed during the second phase of the revolt, after the restoration of the temple in late 164, when Judas created a new, professionally trained army equipped with weapons of local manufacture.'99 I and 2 Maccabees are nearly silent on the arms and organization of the later Maccabean army,200 although it may be inferred that cavalry and heavy infantry were added at this time, and that new tactics allowed the Maccabean forces directly to con- front the Seleucid phalanx in open battle.20' For instance, Bar-Kochva's

Driver's own theory that dates the War Scroll just prior to the Jewish War (Driver, 168-97) uncritically accepted Yadin's arguments on Roman weaponry and formations, other than arguing that the War Scroll sword is the curved blade of the sicarii. This article's rebuttal of Yadin's analysis also applies to Driver's theory. Remark- ably, P. Davies, 12-13, gave equal credibility to the proposals of Hellenistic influence on arms and tactics in the War Scroll and those of Yadin and Driver on Roman influence. After noting that more than one opinion exists on the subject of the War Scroll's weaponry and formations, Davies concluded that "one should not seek to determine the date of the scroll from such controversial evidence."

197 Schiirer (ed. Vermes), 3:403. Osten-Sacken and P. Davies are notable exceptions in dating major portions of the War Scroll to the Maccabean period. P. Davies, 12-13, 58, discounted the relevance of the military evidence as inconclusive. Osten-Sacken, 29-30, displaying a better grasp of the issues, cited Segal and noted that Roman tactics became known in the east in the afternath of the battle of Magnesia in 190 BCE.

19I 1 Macc. 3:12; 2 Macc. 8:27, 31. 19 Bar-Kochva, 68-69, 141-43; cf. allusions to the manufacturing process for

shields and weapons in IQM 5:4-14; and the reference to metal-working in 4QMm 1-3 i 7.

200 Jewish interest in acquiring Roman weaponry may be indicated in the unusual clause on armaments (hopla) in the treaty of alliance negotiated in 161 BCE between Judea and Rome. I Macc. 8:26, 28; cf. Josephus, Ant. 12:414-19, which omits the clause on arms.

201 Bar-Kochva, 69-70 discusses the Jewish horseman named Dositheus from a unit of Tobiad cavalry from Transjordan mentioned in 2 Macc. 12:35; ibid., 70-71, discusses the battle of Elasa, in which Jewish pursuit of Seleucid cavalry implies the existence of Jewish cavalry forces; ibid., 72-77 discusses Jewish heavy infantry forces after 164.

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detailed analysis of Maccabean battles concludes that after the restoration of the temple the army of Judas Maccabeus consisted of at least 22,000 troops, arranged with heavy infantry in the center, flanking cavalry forces, and skirmishing forces (slingers and archers) used in the initial phases of battle,202 in very close approximation to the size and organization of the War Scroll army. Catapult and ballista were also used by the Maccabean army starting in 163.203 It is thus within the realm of historical possibility to suggest that the War Scroll reflects a Maccabean adoption of Roman weaponry and tactics in the second phase of the uprising starting in 163 BCE.

History provides more than adequate motivation for Judas Macca- beus to have organized the Jewish army along Roman lines after 164. The superiority of the Roman legions over the Hellenistic phalanx had been demonstrated several times over in the early second century, most recently in 168 with the Roman defeat of Perseus.204 Fear of facing the victorious Roman legions with the outmoded phalanx may have fac- tored into Antiochus IV's hasty decision to accede to Roman demands and withdraw his forces from Egypt in 168.205 Earlier, in 190, at the battle of Magnesia, Babylonian Jewish soldiers stationed in Lydia and Phrygia may have been present to witness the defeat of Antiochus IV's

m Bar-Kochva, 49-52 on the greatly increased size of the Maccabean army after the restoration of the temple; 69-81 on its organization.

203 That Seleucid war machines were seized by Judas Maccabeus during his Transjordanian campaign in 163 may be inferred from I Macc. 5:30; cf. Bar-Kochva, 81. Almost immediately thereafter, Judas Maccabeus is said to have achieved a river crossing against superior forces of Timotheus positioned on the opposite side, and routed the enemy army (I Macc. 5:37-43). This dramatic victory was probably accomplished using the catapults and ballista, which were used to secure river crossings according to several accounts of ancient battles (Marsden, 165-66). Later that year, Maccabean forces manufactured and used catapults and ballista in siege operations at Jerusalem and Beth-Zur (I Macc. 6:20, 51-52). Baillet, 52, cites the latter passages as parallels to the catapults and ballista in 4QMC 5. War machines were also used in later years by Jonathan and Simon (1 Macc. 11:20; 13:43). Note that prior to the time of Augustus, catapults and ballista were acquired for the Roman legions at the individual initiative of individual generals, often seized from the enemy or manufactured in the field, as in 1 Maccabees. See Marsden, 174-77.

1 Polybius 18.28.4; 18.32.13; Livy 44.41.6-8. 205 Rome's defeat of Perseus was the immediate cause of Antiochus' withdrawal from

Egypt (Polybius 29.27.12-13). This left Roman military forces free to intervene in Egypt if required, which was of course Antiochus' major concern. But that Antiochus also viewed the Roman victory as proving the superiority of Roman weaponry and tactics over that of the Greeks is indicated by the retraining of key units of the Seleucid army in Roman arms after 168 (Polybius 30.25.4).


army by Scipio's legions.206 Bar-Kochva has argued that some of these Babylonian troops subsequently migrated to Palestine and fought in the professional army of Judas Maccabeus after 164.207 If so, their advice to Judas Maccabeus would likely have been to adopt the military techniques which had already proved successful against the Seleu- cids. Rather than slavishly adopting the discredited tactics of his Seleucid foes, it seems reasonable that Judas may have chosen to organize his army along Roman lines. Indeed, Antiochus IV had retrained half of the elite Seleucid Royal Guard in Roman techniques after 168 and proudly displayed them in their Roman armor in the procession at Daphne in 165 BCE described by Polybius.208 That the Maccabean army encountered some of these Seleucid soldiers in Roman armor prior to 164 is possible, and after 164 is certain.209 If the Seleucids were already beginning to adopt superior Roman weaponry and techniques in their best units, we must question whether Judas Maccabeus used the outmoded Hellenistic style of phalanx warfare, as has commonly been assumed. Roman military manuals were common enough, used throughout the empire for training officers.210 Around 175 BCE, Cato wrote his de Re Militari, which received wide circula- tion, and a couple decades later Polybius wrote his Tactica. Some such manual should have been easy enough for the Jews to obtain, especially given the diplomatic contact between the Romans and Jews starting in 164. There are several instructive examples from the first century BCE of barbarian armies adopting Roman military techniques.2' In summary, the adoption of Roman military tactics by the Maccabean army after 164 would have made good sense from a strate- gic perspective and could have been accomplished with relatively little difficulty.

206 Livy 37.40.11 mentions the "2700 auxiliaries mixed from all races" along with Phrygian and Lydian cavalry in the army of Antiochus. Although the Jewish troops garrisoned in Phrygia and Lydia are not explicitly mentioned in Livy or Appian, it is hard to believe they were absent from the battle.

I Bar-Kochva, 85. 1 Polybius 30.25.4; Bar-Kochva, 120, 314-15, 416-17. 9 1 Macc. 6:35; Bar-Kochva, 120.

210 Keppie, 51. "I Keppie, 141, points out the two legions organized by Deiotarus of Galatia in

Caesar's time "on our [Roman] disciplinary system and using our types of weapons" (The Alexandrine War 68, cf. 34, 3940), and the "legions" organized in Mauritania (The Alexandrine War 62) and Numidia (The African War 48).