The defeat of the Blue Ridge pump-storage project as microcosm of environmental policy change

Policy Sciences 20:235-258 (1987) �9 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht - Printed in the Netherlands 235

The defeat of the Blue Ridge pump-storage project as microcosm of environmental policy change*

DAVID LEWIS F E L D M A N

Department o f Political Science, Moorhead State University, Moorhead, M N 56560, USA

Introduction

A decade-long struggle to protect one of the few remaining white-water tracts in the Eastern United States from development reached its culmination on 11 September, 1976. President Ford signed S. 158 designating a 26.5-mile segment of the New River in North Carolina as a National Scenic River. 1 The act remanded American Electric Power Company 's license (AEP) to construct a

pumped-storage hydro-electric project along a segment of the New River in North Carolina and Virginia. This signified the t r iumph of a diverse coalition of environmentalists, white-water enthusiasts, and local residents.

Most significantly, preservational goals won n o t because of widespread agree- ment over their pre-eminence, but as a consequence of a unique collaboration of political forces. The diverse groups opposed to 'Blue Ridge '2 concurred upon

one vital point: a relatively undeveloped water resource which adequately serves local residents was believed to be preferable to a project whose benefits would serve, and be controlled by, groups residing outside the affected region. In es-

sence, this case study exemplifies two recent and interconnected trends affecting some public works projects in the United States - (1) an increasing resistance toward government-endorsed projects seen as economically unviable without heavy governmental subsidy; and (2) a growing vulnerability of such projects

to legislative or juridical defeat if policy options are seen as too complex or esoteric to marshal significant popular support.

Other examples of recent policies illustrate these dynamics. T h e Clinch River Breeder Reactor project, initially cancelled by President Carter in 1979 and re-

vived by President Reagan in 1981, was finally cancelled by the 98th Congress in 1983 largely due to the concerted efforts of the National Taxpayers Union and the Heritage Foundation and several antinuclear organizations. 3 A second example is the 'Storm King' d a m proposed by the Consolidated Edison Company

* An earlier version of this manuscript was presented at the First New River Symposium, US Na- tional Park Service and the West Virginia Department of Culture and History, Beckley, WV, 1982, May 7.

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of New York in 1983 as a pump-storage project in the Hudson River basin. After initially satisfying the economic and technical requirements of the Federal Power Commission and the Army Corps of Engineers, this project was untracked by litigation initiated by environmental groups concerned with the project's impact on fisheries, instream flow, and regional aesthetics. A coalition made up of the Sierra Club, Audubon Society, and the Natural Resources Defense Council joined forces with the City of New York, concerned with the adverse conse- quences of the project on water quality and the economic impact of the project upon Con Ed ratepayers. 4

As we shall see, what makes the Blue Ridge project an especially apt case study to examine the dynamics exemplified by Clinch River and Storm King is that while the former case study is less well known, it is a partial precedent for the resolution of the other cases. This is so precisely because the Blue Ridge case raises the need to reform the process by which environmental, energy, and natural resource decisions are formulated.

The focus of Blue Ridge opponents was the dominance of the so-called iron triangle of interest groups, Congressional public works and resource subcom-

mittees, and water and resource management agencies such as the Corps of En- gineers, Bureau of Reclamation, Federal Power Commission and Department of Energy. 5 While the Blue Ridge conflict was neither the first nor the most contentious dispute, its lessons point to challenges confronting environmental policy-makers in light of recent demands for local control of natural resources, preservation of scenic wonders, termination of interest group subsidies, and more rigorous clarification of the objectives and benefits of specific resource policies.

Our purpose in analyzing the Blue Ridge project is to: (1) point out why the project failed to muster political support; (2) describe how disparate groups found in the project a catalyst for their own dissatisfaction with federal policies; and (3) explore what the project's defeat may tell us about similar public works that have engendered protracted policy debates endangering their implementation. As we shall see, project opponents labelled their foes exploiters even though proponents thought the project promised balanced, socially optimal development. Thus, regardless of who was correct, one lesson of Blue Ridge is that technically respectable arguments failed politically because of the project's complexity, its perceived inequity, and changes in public perceptions of such projects.

Conception and evolution of Blue Ridge: proponents, opponents and the problem of a 'Conservationist' ethic

When the Appalachian Power Company, a subsidiary of the American Electric Power Company of New York, applied for a license to build a pumped-storage

237

project in the New River valley in February, 1965, few residents of Grayson County, Virginia, or Ashe and Alleghany Counties in North Carolina expressed much opposition to the company's plans. What made the absence of criticism especially conspicuous was that APCO's proposal was the culmination of years of effort, 6 and thus, not unexpected.

Under the Federal Power Act of 1920, all proposals for hydro-electric projects must receive prior approval from the Federal Power Commission (FPC). 7 FPC's mandate is to ensure that 'multi-purpose' planning objectives such as flood control, recreation, regional economic growth, water quality, and the potential for power markets are adequately assessed in plans by public or private bodies to impound navigable streams, s Its limited powers were a concession to the federal government's own water resource agencies: the Army Corps of En- gineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, and, to a lesser extent, the Soil Conservation Service. These agencies are concerned that the efforts of private power compa- nies enhance, or at least not detract from, their own watershed programs. 9

In reconciling itself to this 'balance of power' among agencies, the FPC has been accused of serving as patron for the nation's investor owned electric utilities. Independent commissions such as the FPC commonly become closely tied to the interests they regulate, due to lack of independent expertise, reliance upon the regulated industry for political support before Congress, and a wish to promote the regulated industry's goals. 1~ Yet, it is not accurate to say that such agencies lack room to maneuver or the capacity for independent judgment.

As an advocate of hydro-electric power, the FPC frequently chooses to promote the spill-over effects from power projects. In one sense, this actually discourages projects lacking broad economic justification.

In addition, although critics have often alleged that the FPC rarely authorizes higher rates during peak usage periods - an incentive to conserve electricity - for fear such a policy might lessen the need for power projects used for peak power, 11 such a criticism is not entirely warranted. In recent years, efforts have been made to bring the charges for electrical power more in line with the margin- al cost of its production. Subsequent to passage of the Public Utilities Policy Act (PURPA) of 1978, state public utility commissions, as well as the FPC, have adjusted their rate structures to reflect peak usage by authorizing time-of-use, seasonal rates and demand charges. 12 Because of these policy changes, a more

accurate view of the FPC is that its bureaucratic outlook is shaped not only by 'territorial' imperatives but also by economic realities. 13 When it appeared that nationwide electrical demands would inexorably increase - as they did during the decade of the 1960s - FPC's licensing policies were designed to encourage rapid electrical production growth. When that high demand climate shifted to one of conservation, as reflected by shifts in federal policy in response to the 1973 OPEC oil embargo, so did the FPC.

It is against this setting that the evolution of Blue Ridge must be analyzed.

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At the outset, APCO's request was for a twin-reservoir project costing around $140 million, and consisting of an 'upper' reservoir of 16,600 acres at full pool, and a lower impoundment of 2850 acres from which water would be 're-pumped' into the upper lake during slack-demand periods. 14 This project would have a total installed capacity of 980 mw. At the time of this proposal, APCO also applied for a license to construct a 60,000 KW plant at the Corps of Engineers Bluestone Dam, 140 miles down stream in West Virginia. 15

A critical juncture in the evolution of the project was reached in June, 1966. Prior to FPC licensing, the Department of the Interior asked the Commission to delay approval, pending modification of the project for purposes of downstream pollution mitigation. Interior, at that time responsible for enforcing federal clean water laws, wanted enough storage capacity included in the reservoirs to dilute pollution from the large chemical complexes centered around Charles- ton, West Virginia, during periods of low-flow.

The FPC, responding to this broad mandate, subsequently ordered APCO to modify its plans and in June of 1968, the company re-submitted a design for a project roughly twice the size of the original. 16 This 'Modified' Blue Ridge project proposed an upper lake of 26,000 acres and a lower impoundment of 12,000 acres. This project would almost double the installed generating capacity of the original design, raising it to 1800 mw. It was at this point that several objections to the plan arose from residents of the valley.

First, the increase in the project's size multiplied the contemplated number of family relocations (see Table 1). In addition, there were strong objections voiced about the destruction of prime farmland to provide 'peaking' power for the convenience of persons hundreds of miles away. This was deemed a callous policy toward the traditional values and folkways of the valley's residents. 17

Their concerns focused on specific costs: (1) the loss of ancestral homes and farms owned by some families over 200

years; (2) the erosion of the property tax base of three counties; (3) the busing of school children many additional miles due to the inundation

of several roads; TM

(4) the destruction of productive farmland with an annual yield conservatively estimated at $13.5 million 19 - a cost AEP conceded was not outweighed by the anticipated tax and other economic benefits of the project;

(5) the establishment of a recreational industry of dubious value, since draw- downs from the upper reservoir would have created large mudflats; 2~

(6) harmful downstream impacts upon fisheries and riparian habitat due to excessive fluctuations of the river 21 and cold-water releases into an historically warm-water stream; 22 and

(7) skepticism over the efficacy of using stored water for 'flushing out' downstream pollution. 23

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Table 1. Comparison of original and 'modified' Blue Ridge project.*

Original project Modified project % change of affected variable

Upper reservoir area Lower reservoir area Intalled generating capacity Estimated project cost

Physical structures

Number of anticipated relocations

16,600 acres 26,000 acres 61% 2,850 acres 12,390 acres 435%

980 mw. 1,800 row. 54% $140 million $430 to 325 to 607%

850 million a Upper Dam Upper Dam N.A. 300 ft. high/ N.A.

1500 ft. long Lower Dam Lower Dam N.A. 236 ft. high/ N.A.

2000 ft. long 500 people 3000-5000 people 600 to 1000%

(200 - 900 families)

athis range reflects the period 1965- 1976. *Sources: Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The New River Controversy (Winston-Salem, NC: John F. Blair, 1979), p. 49; George Laycock, 'New River, Old Problem', Audubon 77 (November, 1975): 62; 'Saving the New', Time, September 27, 1976, p. 68; E. W. Kenworthy, 'Pollution - Dilution Issue in Blue Ridge Power Plan', New York Times, November 11, 1971, p. 58; and 'Project to Build Two Dams on Carolina River Protected', New York Times, February 10, 1974, p. 50.

These ob jec t ions became credible only a f t e r In te r ior ' s in tervent ion in enlarg-

ing the pro jec t ' s design. There is a long and venerable t r ad i t ion a m o n g A m e r i c a n

conserva t ion is t s t ha t cons t i tu te the f o u n d a t i o n for water, energy, and environ-

menta l policies. This t rad i t ion , wi th roots in 19th Ce n tu ry u t i l i ta r ianism, posi ts

tha t na tu ra l resources are ut i l ized mos t democra t i ca l ly and eff ic ient ly when they

p roduce sus ta ined yields o f growth for present and future genera t ions t h rough

the a p p l i c a t i o n o f technology. This a p p r o a c h may be label led a benef i t -cos t op-

t imiz ing view of deve lopmen t tha t t r ies to ba lance use and preservat ion.

Benefit-cost optimization

As espoused by such env i ronmenta l luminar ies as Gi f fo rd P inchot , fa ther o f the

US Fores t Service, ' conserva t ion ' m e a n t the use o f science to guide ' . . . an in-

tensely felt hope for social bet terment . '24 It was an opt imist ic , l iberal , and de-

ve lopmen ta l ly o r ien ted doc t r ine which exhibi ted p r o f o u n d fai th in the abi l i ty

o f m a n k i n d to overcome v i r tua l ly any na tu ra l obstacle. This doc t r ine has t ended

to be favored by planners , engineers, and economis ts , while na tu ra l scientists

have usua l ly subscr ibed to more 'p reserva t iona l ' app roaches tha t see nar rower

240

limits to growth, development, and technological modification of the environment. 25

Although it has come under attack in recent years for its allegedly materialistic bias and naive confidence in the reversibility of negative environmental impacts, this benefi t -cost approach to conservation, sometimes relying on empirical benefi t -cost studies of proposed projects, is still highly regarded as a legitimate and ideologically acceptable doctrine - in contrast to a purely exploitive view in which the short-run economic returns of resources is the only policy guide. Prior to the advent of the benef i t - cost approach, it was rarely emphasized that resources are finite, require careful management to be sustained, and can be over- utilized and irreparably harmed. 26 Moreover, although Pinchot's Forest Service has been accused of simplistic exploitation of forest resources, (e.g., for its recent clear-cutting approach to tree harvesting), Pinchot himself would have criticized such an approach. Pinchot opposed practices that would have liquidated forest resources under appropriate price conditions, reasoning that the multi-purpose nature of national forests as wildlife preserves and watersheds made them unsub- stitutible as resources and dictated a prudent, balanced approach toward their management.

Thereare three characteristics of this doctrine which pose potential barriers to government water policies. First, this benefi t -cost optimizing approach favors policies which promote efficient utilization of resources through public expenditure. Thus, a water project in a distinct region could be justified from the standpoint of 'compensation' for losses in another policy affecting that region. 27 This implies further that local control of resources is appropriate, and it is the job of government to promote prosperity in particular regions at the expense of nature.

Second, proponents of this approach are optimistic toward the future. If'wise- ly' used, they argue, water resources can last indefinitely. In all cases, however, wise use means development and augmentation of resource yields, not locking resources up by preserving them in a pristine state, as would be advocated by non-development oriented preservationists.

Finally, these 'optimizers' are guided by a human-centered, practical outlook toward nature: resources are viewed as commodities possessing an economic value. In weighing the economic value of water, a conservationist will ask two types of questions. First, what are persons willing to pay to keep a white water stream unmodified? There may be economic benefits in such activity as proven by tour- ism. Second will preservation from human transgression benefit later human use?

Applying benefit-cost optimization to 'Blue Ridge'

In the incipient stages of Blue Ridge, APCO spokesmen argued that the project's

241

various benefits would be widely distributed throughout the region. Consistent with this optimizing paradigm, project advocates tried to convince community leaders that construction of a hydro-electric project and the creation of recreational benefits symbolized 'progress' by any reasonable standard and that one would have to be provincial in the extreme to oppose such an endeavor. 28

Moreover, although Interior's intervention to force modification of the

project eventually became a political liability that delayed licensing of the project, proponents initially viewed these changes as additional evidence of the project's adaptability to 'multi-purpose' objectives. Thus, APCO and FPC argued not only that the project would spur economic growth in a long-depressed region, and provide a substantial increase 29 in the ability to respond to peak demand - an issue which would take on special importance after the 1973 Arab oil embargo - they also argued that the dams would actually improve the environment by enhancing overall water quality.

As the political scientist Henry Caulfield has noted, each of these justifications fall squarely within the traditional benef i t - cos t 'conservation' paradigm by stressing the manner in which water projects enhance social welfare. To Gifford Pinchot, for example:

. . . conservation.. . [meant] the development and wise use of resources [and it] aligned itself with the developmental thrust in American poli t ics. . , with the constraint that renewable resources should be used only on the basis of 'sustained yield' . . . .3o

The FPC frequently and explicitly embraced such arguments in the licensing proceedings. 31 Moreover, FPC staff argued that the project would not injure renewable resources since releases from the proposed lower reservoir would be limited to 3000 cubic feet/second - an amount biologists deemed safe for downstream aquatic life. 32

There were three characteristics of these arguments Blue Ridge opponents later exploited in an effort to disparage the project. First, neither APCO nor FPC demonstrated that the project would fill an existing gap in AEP's extensive power generation network; nor that the power would directly benefit the region within which it was to be produced - one of the implicit parameters of the 'old' bene f i t - cost optimizing tradition. In reality, the project would not produce new

power at all, but rather augment the 'firm' generating capacity of the utility. Blue Ridge would actually use power from other AEP plants during slack de-

mand periods to pump water back into the upper reservoir. Like most pump- storage projects, Blue Ridge would consume more energy than it would produce - 3 Kw for every 2 Kw generated. 33 Since the off-peak power used to refill the upper reservoir would be far cheaper per kilowatt-hour than would the substitute peak power AEP would otherwise have to purchase, the decision to build the

242

project was based on quite economical grounds. Long-run utility savings would more than repay the cost of the project. In other words, it could be economically justified within the framework of a reasoned benefi t -cost approach.

The political problem with this strategy, however, was two-fold. It was so complex and esoteric as to be extremely difficult to sell to project opponents, who generally focused only on overall net increases in power, not on the internal eco- nomics of operating a large public utility. This should have been anticipated and defused before the project was unveiled. In addition, it did not square logically with AEP and FPC's second justification - that Blue Ridge would lessen US dependence on fossil-fuels from overseas. While the project could conceivably produce fuel savings since the stored energy would be produced with less power, little imported oil was used for peak power in this region. In essence, this argument was also esoteric and made it difficult for AEP and FPC to defend the project on grounds that it constituted a technological panacea from energy shortages. It also made it difficult to argue that dependence on foreign energy supplies would be reduced by the project, or that it represented a viable base for 'sustained growth'.

A second argument opponents could mobilize was bolstered after the EPA publicly indicated the project would indirectly contribute to an increase in air pollution. The coal-fired boilers from which Blue Ridge's pump-storage power would be derived were in older plants in the Ohio valley - designed prior to the stringent air quality regulations of the late 1960s and early 1970s. 34 This public claim only served to deride the project and to make it appear as if its advo-

cates had failed to consider other alternatives. In fact, over time many of these older plants would have been retired and replaced with less polluting ones. Nevertheless, Blue Ridge proponents now found it more difficult to defend the project on ecological grounds. In the past, one of the most persuasive arguments favoring hydro-electric plants was the claim that 'falling water produces no pollution'; 35 a criterion pumped-storage projects like Blue Ridge cannot totally meet.

A third boost for project opponents occurred when the FPC adopted Interi- or's modified plan for mitigating water pollution, thus shattering any opportunity for proponents to defend the project upon traditional 'conservationist' grounds. Interior's commitment to pollut ion-dilut ion raised two ancillary issues: (1) whether outside interests should become beneficiaries of the river's resources at the expense of the valley's residents since none of the Blue Ridge power would be sold in North Carolina or Virginia36; and (2) whether this method of abatement was, in fact, a public subsidy of the chemical industry of West Virginia's Kanawha Valley.

The acceptance of Interior's modifications resulted in APCO and FPC tacitly divorcing themselves from a 'conservationist' strategy justifiable on grounds of environmental enhancement. This is exemplified by the testimony of Lorne R.

243

Campbell, general counsel for Grayson County, Virginia, and critic of the project:

Any industrial complex, by similar strategy, might continue to . . . inundate land under guise of emergency power needs or pollution control. 37

Interior's adamant insistence upon sticking with the legal precedent of using stored water for pollution abatement became increasingly indefensible over time. This is especially ironic since, in the past, it had been a workable and acceptable strategy. When applied to Blue Ridge, however, the strategy alienated local residents and quieted what little acquiescence they had toward the project. It also isolated proponents from the newly formed EPA, and thus further compromised the project's credibility.

The players in the Blue-Ridge game

Blue Ridge epitomizes a long tradition in federal water policy of 'distributive politics' - providing public works projects to local constituencies at a cost diffused throughout society. 38 This approach is characterized by active political advocacy of projects by government agencies.

Table 2 illustrates the degree of conflict between national and state/local policy actors. It also highlights the extent of disagreement among affected states. The most significant factor dividing policy actors was proximity to, and thus perceived benefits from, the project. The Army Corps of Engineers supported the project because it conformed to its own developmental approach to river basin planning. The Corps noted that the project would provide 160,000 acre/feet storage for the New River valley - long a Corps planning priority both generally and for this particular region. 39 In addition, the Corps had a long-standing commitment to the principle of 'low-flow augmentation'.

On the state level, North Carolina officials almost wholly opposed Blue Ridge. Senator Sam Ervin, although sensitive to the traditional values of the valley's residents, was most strongly motivated by a 'strict Constructionist' view of Con- gressional power. He accused the FPC of usurping Congressional prerogatives by licensing the project without waiting for the results of a Department of the Interior study on the feasibility of making the New a scenic river. This accusation emerged from an incident in which the Senate recommended a study of whether to include a segment of the New into the Scenic River system. Before the House of Representatives completed hearings on the bill, however, the FPC formally granted APCO a license to build the modified Blue Ridge project. To add insult to injury, the effective date of the license was moved from July 1975 (as the Sen- ate had requested to give Interior time to consider the Scenic River proposal)

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246

to January 1975, thus limiting Interior's time frame for action. In Ervin's opinion, 'this arrogant act ultimately won many more votes in Congress for preservation of New River than might otherwise have been the case.'4~ However, since the FPC regarded the project as merely a modification of one which had received prior approval, its attempt to expedite matters was hardly surprising, nor un- justifiable in historical perspective.

Representative Wilmer Mizell, representing North Carolina's 5th Congressional District, introduced legislation in 1972 and 1973 to the House Public Works Committee to authorize the Corps of Engineers to investigate t h e ' . . , recreational, conservation, and preservation uses. . . ' of the New River. 41 Mizell's action was precipitated by: (1) the legal precedent of accepting the viability of pollution- dilution; (2) the EPA's reluctance to speak out against Interior's advocacy of po l lu t ion- dilution - even though the technique appeared to be contrary to recent Congressional legislation; and (3) the absence of any direct economic or social benefits accruing to residents of this district - an implicit 'rule of the game' in distributive politics. 42 Stephen Neal, Mizelrs successor elected in 1974, continued to oppose the project and voted for the Scenic River Bill in 1976.

Pivotal in the defeat of the Blue Ridge project was North Carolina's Governor, James Holshouser. Historically, gubernatorial opposition to federal water projects has usually been fatal to their construction. 43 In July, 1973, Holshous- er found Interior's Bureau of Outdoor Recreation and Fish and Wildlife Service favorably disposed towards scenic river status for the New. He was able to convince his personal friend Rogers Morton, Secretary of the Interior, to adopt his position. Morton opposed the project on grounds that it was a short term energy solution. Their mutual interest in the project was also related to the 1976 presidential campaign. Holshouser became the Southern states' coordinator for Gerald Ford's election campaign, while Morton became its national chairman. Ironically, Ford's loss to Ronald Reagan in the 1976 North Carolina Presidential Primary was largely due to Reagan's strong, and early, stance against Blue Ridge

- a position urged upon him by Jesse Helms. 44 When Ford was finally ap- prised of the intensity of the issue in North Carolina, acting Secretary Kleppe approved Holshouser's request for scenic river status. Although final disposition of the matter would rest with Congress, the significance of the decision - com- ing less than a week before the North Carolina primary - was not lost on the state's voters. 45

In West Virginia, divided opinion worked to the advantage of Blue Ridge opponents by underscoring the project's controversial features. Kanawha Valley's chemical industry stood to benefit from the modified project's 'po l lu t ion- dilution' plan. But the risks entailed in that plan aroused opposition to the project. While Governor Arch Moore supported Blue Ridge as an example of effective 'pollution-dilution' ,46 other state officials opposed it. West Vir- ginia DNR biologists joined those in North Carolina in opposing the project

247

on grounds that excessive fluctuation, turbidity, and temperature changes could adversely affect riparian habitat, fishing, and canoeing. 47

Differences of opinion toward the project among federal agencies also worked to the advantage of Blue Ridge opponents. When Interior endorsed pollution-dilution, it ignored the controversy surrounding the technique. Although long practiced by the Army engineers in a variety of watershed projects, it was rarely promoted as a principle project benefit. 48 The newly formed EPA - groping for test cases to assess its authority within the federal regulatory maze - saw the planned use of the technique at Blue Ridge as an opportunity to disprove its efficacy. Thus, Blue Ridge fortuitously became a tar- get for attacking an antipollution strategy long practiced by the federal government. In the process, EPA's influence grew considerably as a consequence of growing preservationist sentiments.

The 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act required EPA consent for pollution- dilution. The technique is implicitly discouraged by the law's requirements that polluters 'pre-treat' effluents and that the federal government promote the 'best practical' and eventually, 'best available' technology to eliminate discharges. Although EPA prohibited water storage for pollution-dilution in April, 1973, the decision was not viewed as a defeat by project proponents. As if anticipating EPNs decision, A. Joseph Dowd, AEP's general counsel, an- nounced in November 1972, that his company now embraced the idea of larger reservoirs for more power generation.49 Moreover, EPA's authority in this matter was open to question.

Before passage of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the EPA had been reluctant to challenge Interior's commitment to pollution- dilution for fear of engendering inter-agency conflict. This reticence was exemplified by the fact that in May 1971, when the FPC requested an advisory (non-binding assessment) of pollution-dilution from EPA, agency staff designated a more knowledgeable Interior spokesperson to represent EPA at public hearings. 5~ Without a legal mandate and support from other agencies, EPA could exert no authority. Such support did not materialize until environmental groups were able to stall FPC's licensing efforts in the courts - a lengthy, tedious, and confusing effort that bought time for scenic river advocates to persuade Congress to remand the FPC license.

Ammunition for environmental groups was indirectly provided by the Nation- al Environmental Policy Act of 1969 which required an 'environmental impact analysis' to be filed for all federally sponsored public work projects. When applied retroactively to Blue Ridge, project opponents in 1974 found that weak- nesses in FPC's impact statement for the project could be turned to advantage. Environmentalists discredited the project by demonstrating that its planners in- adequately assessed the value of archeological sites destined for inundation - as required by the 1969 NEPA and by a 1974 amendment to the Historic Preserva-

248

tion Act of 1960. They also argued that planners gave no serious consideration to alternate sites for the project that would not have threatened a rare white-water area, and provided inadequate plans for relocation as well as insufficient compensation to families. 5~

These inadequacies helped isolate proponents from other federal agencies - which saw the project as too vulnerable - and from influential groups close to the project. The opposition by organized labor is typical. AEP counted upon organized labor to back the project, but the AFL-CIO was divided. While the National Federation supported the project, the North Carolina Labor Federa- tion opposed it on grounds that little locallabor would be utilized. Other unions, most notably the United Mine Workers, broke with national leadership and spoke against the project, arguing that hydropower would hurt a depressed coal industry) 2

Environmentalists and the scenic river controversy: from the defensive to the offensive

The environmental groups that joined with local residents to oppose Blue Ridge were composed largely of non-development advocates. They held a pristine preservationist view, committed to limiting economic growth and skeptical of technological change. Most of these advocates felt that restricting the impact of the project, by limiting its size and narrowing the scope of permissible activities in the region, constituted politically feasible goals. Unlike the benefit- cost optimization approach which advocates exploiting natural resources in an efficient manner, non-development conservationists adopted a non-exploitive view of natural resources predicated on the assumption that human beings are in- tellectually finite creatures. Such a view, held by many scenic river advocates who were not residents of the New River valley, is similar to that espoused by classical environmental philosophers such as Aldo Leopold and John Muir, who ascribe psychologically rejuvenating qualities to rivers and speak of natural objects as having 'rights') 3

Initially, these environmentalists were perceived by residents as alien, contemptuous of the traditional apprehensions of Appalachia, narrowly committed to aesthetic preservation, and opposed to one of the most popularly held sets of political values in the United States - local control of natural resources. 54 The latter value is often at odds with environmentalist-oriented federal mandates for preservation, as typically favored by ecologists.

These environmental groups, much like APCO, were initially regarded as 'outside' interference. The original scenic river idea angered many valley residents. Indirectly, fears of federal intrusion and even 'socialism' initially aided dam proponents. Residents really had no idea what a 'scenic river' would be. And,

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as one might expect, environmentalists were not always able to define, in practical terms, what it would look like and what activities would be allowed along its shores. 55

The victory of the scenic river advocates can only be explained as a convergence between their interests and those of valley residents. The former wanted to halt a project they saw as benefitting outside corporate interests and imposing irreparable harm to the environment, while the latter merely wanted to be left alone to manage their local resources.

Project proponents were hurt by residents' perception that the valley would be inundated for generating power, and that valley residents would not receive benefits to the region offsetting their loss of jobs, farms, and homes. Enlarge- ment of the proposed project for pollution mitigation only cemented opposition by worsening this perception and converging it with the fears of environmentalists.

This convergence of interest is attested to by (1) the sudden growth in opposition to the project only after its enlargement, and (2) the substantive criticisms of valley residents following the decision by FPC to allow project enlargement. The degree to which residents believed the project threatened their traditional values was frequently noted by environmental spokespersons throughout the region. 56

Repeatedly, valley residents and officials expressed dismay, anger, and frustra- tion over what they perceived to be the incongruous justifications for the project. By the mid-1970s, when it became apparent that such 'grass roots' criticisms would almost certainly pressure Congress into remanding APCO's license for Blue Ridge, AEP modified its strategy. The utility conceded that, to a large extent, disruptions caused by the project could create irreversible hardships. A new strategy was pursued: to persuade residents that the 'scenic river' alternative would pose even greater economic hardships than the dams; and to convince them that environmentalists were upper-class 'snobs' trying to cajole residents out of their benefits and land.

Because AEP was convinced that local residents were in greater fear of federal intrusion and intervention from 'radical' outsiders, the company gambled that public opinion could be cooled against the scenic river idea. In a full-page advertisement appearing in several newspapers, including The New York Times, AEP reiterated its claims of project benefits and argued that environmental opponents of Blue Ridge were an 'affluent elite', contemptuous towards the economic underdevelopment of the region and capriciously attached to narrow aesthetic values.

AEP further offered to pay residents more than market value for their homes, to provide a free relocation service, and to cover all moving costs and personal property losses. 57 Environmental groups countered on several fronts. They ad- dressed fears of a 'national' takeover of New River by moving their position

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closer to the traditional 'conservation' approach in both Congressional hearings and grass roots discussions at anti-dam rallies in the New River valley. Recogniz- ing that preservational values 'alone are too elitist to appeal to a broad segment of society',Ss they accepted Congressional establishment of a 'scenic river' with few restrictions upon traditional riparian rights and with little, if any, real changes in land use. This included public assurances of conventional floodplain zoning policy, rather than unique scenic river zoning policy. Public access to the river would remain basically unrestricted. 59

Conclusions: policy implications

The ambiguous status of environmental values - although working to the disad- vantage of preservationism - can work to the benefit of those whose environmental outlooks can be linked with traditionally powerful values of local control; what we have termed the model of 'distributive' politics. Such an ambiguity points to the difficulty of articulating natural resource policies based upon the philosophy that mankind should work with, rather than against nature. 6~ Yet it also points to the possibility of policy change resulting from dissatisfaction with unpopular, environmentally unacceptable projects. What does this tell us about some of the current conflicts in federal water and natural resources policy? Does it portend a long-term trend?

Blue Ridge shows us that traditional water policy, by resting upon an 'iron triangle' of special interests, agency largesse and Congressional promotion, reflects the fragmented, decentralized character of representation and group access in American political culture. As a consequence, policy implementation tends to be placed in the hands of engineers and technocrats interested in struc- tural solutions that will maximize economic growth. The values pursued by these technocrats in implementation are perceived as elitist and prohibitive of democratic participation. A similar set of apprehensions is seen in the decline of public confidence in nuclear power and in the concerted opposition to the Clinch River Breeder Reactor.

The combination of shielded policy making and elitist-seeming policy implementation produces an environment that minimizes public trust toward natural resource agencies. It assures an adversarial relationship between policy actors and produces value disagreement over long-term goals for natural resources policy. Con Ed's cancellation of 'Storm King' is perhaps the best additional example in recent water policy to exemplify this phenomenon. 61

If Blue Ridge points the way to a solution to this problem, it would seem to suggest that policymakers should learn more about how to achieve value consen- sus in environmental matters. In the US there is a long-standing tradition of 'anti-statism' stemming from our individualistic heritage, frontier character,

251

regional and ethnic diversity, and enthusiasm for private enterprise. 62 This 'anti-statism' affects attitudes toward environmental disruptions by government in two ambivalent ways.

First, while Americans generally favor environmental disruptions in pursuit of economic progress, they generally oppose disruptions perceived as denying local access to, or control over, natural resources vital to well-being. In hazardous waste policy, this is exemplified by the so-called 'not in my backyard' phenomenon, which is, in its own way, as direct an assault on federal land-use policies as is resistance to unwanted dams and nuclear power plants. This means that the standard approach to weighing benefits and costs in environmental policies may arouse opposition, on equity or even non-economic grounds, that is very difficult to defuse or address.

Second, civil servants invested with the authority to regulate economic and environmental activity are generally held in low esteem because they are not viewed as 'generators of wealth'. In certain regions where government-sponsored environmental disruptions occur, this issue is compounded by an 'outsider' complex. 63 Efforts to promote a pump-storage hydro-electric project on the New River stirred powerful resentment not only because the potential benefits of such

a disruption were perceived as incongruous to residents, but also because the entire plan was viewed as a surreptitious assault upon a region which had sur- vived quite well through local initiative. While the attempt to construct the project was, as we have seen, by no means underhanded or surreptitious, potential sources of hostility stemming from the failure to integrate project objectives with residents' values proved to be an insurmountable obstacle.

AEP and FPC failed to convince residents that the promise of construction jobs, flat-water recreation, and new industry filled an economic void. In terms of the economic values residents themselves define as important - small farms, shoreline access, and the preservation of ancestral homes - construction of the dams would have imposed changes outside of local control. In essence, residents did not want the dam 'in their backyard' unless its perceived benefits accrued to the local community. Local benefits to compensate for losses were not persuasive. Project proponents failed to define their objectives in ways salient to this community. In short, New River residents did not perceive themselves as living in 'scarcity'. Economically, they had an 'abundance' of those things they - not outsiders - defined as valuable. It is not that the economic arguments used by AEP or FPC were wrong. In other regions they might have worked quite well. It is merely that, in this case, they were unsellable. Thus, for a technically valid argument to have made political sense, AEP should have understood, and stressed concerns with regional development and the need for local input in the project.

The upshot is that the usual pattern of 'sub-system' decision making back- fired. Two quite disparate groups came together for different reasons in order

252

to express profound dissatisfaction with a federally sponsored and, as they saw it, federally subsidized project. While neither coalition alone might have been able to defeat Blue Ridge, together they were practically invincible. While environmentalists could focus on 'pollution- dilution' and preservationist issues, local residents could seize the economic high ground by criticizing the energy and 'cost-benefit' aspects of the project.

A similar coalition overcame the Clinch River Breeder project - another tech- nologically complex and esoteric venture. Environmentalists focused on the dangers of proliferation from the plant's production of plutonium, while the Na- tional Taxpayer's Union asserted that the reactor would not pay back its own costs for a very long time, if ever. Finally, in the case of the Storm King pump- storage project in New York state, a project similar to Blue Ridge, a coalition of environmentalists and New York City officials delayed the project. While New Yorkers were concerned with rate hikes to pay for the project, environmentalists were able to concentrate upon fisheries, recreational, and aesthetic issues. In both of these instances, as in Blue Ridge, 'sub-system' policy making worked to fragment the decision making so that each coalition was able to attack the project from different points. Economically oriented groups could use public utility commissions, for example, while environmentalists could lobby Congress, EPA, and the Interior Department. In each case, the projects were delayed long enough to make policy proponents look impetuous and project opponents methodical and patient - even though, in fact, each of these projects had been contemplated for a long time before being actively pursued.

Perhaps President Ford, upon signing S. 158 - the New River Scenic River Bill - pondered this irony when he noted that: 'When a decision has to be made between energy production and environmental protection, it should never be made in haste.'64 What remains to be resolved is whether or not this defeat, and similar ones like Storm King, and even the Stanislaus River basin in Califor- nia, 65 will lead to a new and qualitatively different policy climate.

Such coalitions function most effectively when a proposal is handicapped by its own complexity that makes it vulnerable to multiple criticisms by groups nor- mally opposed to each other on ideological grounds. The challenge for policy makers, then, is to find ways to develop environmental policies that are both rele- vant and comprehensible to the average person concerned with the economic, environmental, and socio-political effects of natural resource development and who, in addition, is unwilling to accept a project whose benefits are most likely to accrue to others. Ironically, Blue Ridge proponents chose the almost politically indefensible high ground of benefit- cost optimization. Had the project been purely exploitive in intent, it would have been bad public policy but, perhaps, easier to sell. Moreover, since preservationist foes of the project also rejected a benefit-cost approach, they virtually equated proponents' real views with those of pure exploiters, thus placing project advocates in an especially difficult position to defend the project.

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If there is a dilemma here for environmental policymakers, it is that, too often, the 'do nothing' option, while attractive and politically palatable, only serves to delay decisions that might solve pressing water and energy crises. While we can take heart when 'bad' projects, purely exploitive in character, are defeated by public resistance, are we willing to endure the cost of losing potentially 'good' solutions to problems merely because their social benefits are difficult to define? Even good breeder reactors, pump-storage dams, and hazardous-waste storage facilities are but three examples of such hard-to-sell projects. Because their logic is often difficult to demonstrate, they generate several levels of opposition that confound long-term solutions to energy and other natural resource problems.

Notes

1. Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The New River Controversy (Winston-Salem, NC: John E Blair, 1979), p. 160ft. Also, US Senate, Subcommittee on Environment and Land Resources, Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, Hearings on S. 158, Designation o f New as Segment o f the Na- tional Wild and Scenic Rivers System, May 20-21, 1976.

2. This was the most commonly acknowledged title for the project in APCO and FPC documents. 3. See, Energy and environment: the Unfinished Business. Washington, D.C.: Congressional

Quarterly, Inc. 1985: 76-81. 4. See, Ervin Sheinbaum, 'Storm King: Bureaucratic Pluralism in Regulatory Administration',

Southeastern Political Review XI (Spring, 1983): 111-126. 5. See, for example, Dean Mann, 'Democratic Politics and Environmental Policy', in: Sheldon

Kaminiecki (ed.) Controversies in Environmental Policy (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1985), pp. 3 - 36; and T. R. Miller, 'Recent Trends in Federal Water Resource Management: Are the "Iron Triangles" in Retreat?', Policy Studies Review 5 (November, 1982): 395-412.

6. Schoenbaum, New River Controversy, p. 47, also 'Appalachian Power Files Plans for Two Plants', New York Times, March 2, 1965, p. 48.

7. Since 1977, it has been called the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and has been a part of the Department of Energy.

8. A good discussion of the FPC's politics relative to the Federal Water Resources Establishment is contained in Harold Seidman, Politics, Position, and Power: The Dynamics o f Federal Or- ganization (New York: Oxford press, 1970), p. 44. On the concept of 'Multi-Purpose' Planning see Gilbert White, Strategies o f American WaterManagement (Ann Arbor: University of Michi- gan Press, 1969), p. 34ff.

9. Seidman . . . . Power, p. 44. Also, see Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change: The White House Years, 1953-1956 (New York: New American Library, 1963), p. 453ff. An official analysis of this 'competition' between agencies is offered in 'Water Resources Policy', (no author) A report of the president's Advisory Commission on Water Resources Policy, Washington, D.C.: December 22, 1955.

10. For a discussion of these problems relative to 'Independent' Regulatory Commissions, see Marv- er H. Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent Commissions (Princeton, N J: Princeton University Press, 1965). Also, a good analysis of the relationship between the FPC and investor- owned utilities is contained in, Marshall Beil, 'Power for the People: Electricity and the Regula- tory Agencies': pp. 193 - 226, The Monopoly Makers: Ralph Nader's Study Group Report on Regulation and Competition, edited by Mark J. Green (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1973).

254

11. Schoenbaum . . . . Controversy, p. 84, and Bayard Webster, 'Two Dams Planned to Ease Pollu- tion', New York Times, October 26, 1969, p. 48; also, 'Power to Ruin', TheNation 223 (August 14-21, 1976): 100-101.

12. See, for example, Peter V. David, 'Selling Saved Energy: a New Role for the Utilities', pp. 182-198, in Dorothy S. Zinberg, editor, Uncertain Power: The Struggle for a National Energy Policy. New York: Pergamon Press, 1983.

13. See, for example, Eisenhower, Mandate . . . . p.453ff.,also, GroverStarling, The Politics and Eco- nomics o f Public Policy: An Introductory Analysis with Cases (Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press,; 1979), p. 136ff.

14. George Laycock, 'New River, Old Problems', Audubon 77 (November, 1975): 62. 15. N Y Times, March 2, 1965, p. 48. 16. N Y Times, October 26, 1969, p. 48. 17. Honorable Wilmer Mizell of North Carolina, 'The Blue Ridge Power Project', House of

Representatives, extension of remarks, Congressional Record, vol. 118 (September 12, 1972): 30393 -4 .

18. N Y Times, November 7, 1971, p. 58.

19. See Schoenbaum . . . . Controversy, p. 50. Grayson County, VA stood to lose $3 million/year alone in agricultural production, while APCO's total estimated recreational benefits for the project for the three counties whose land area it would inundate was $3.4 million/year. (See E. W. Kenworthy, 'Battle for Future of a River', New York Times, December 8, 1974, IV, p. 3. Also, Laycock, 'New River... ' , Audubon, p. 63.

20. Schoenbaum, p. 52, N Y Times, October 26, 1969, p. 48. 21. Audubon, p. 62, and Congressional Record, vol. 118 (September 12, 1972): 30393-4. 22. 'Pollution Curb Stirs a Dispute', New York Times, August 8, 1971, p. 50. 23. N Y Times, November 7, 1971, p. 58; N Y Times, November 12, 1971, p. 18; N Y Times, August

8, 1971, p. 50. Samuel P. Hays, 'The Mythology of Conservation', in Perspectives on Conservation, edited by Hen- ry Jarrett (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1958; 1961), p. 41. 25. Daniel B. Luten, 'Ecological Optimism in the Social Sciences', American BehavioralScientist

24 (September/October, 1980: 129, 196). 26. See• Henry Pinkett• Giff•rd Pinch•t: Pub•ic and Private F•rester. Urbana: University •f •••in•is

Press, 1978. 27. Helen Ingrain, 'Politics of Water Allocation', pp. 61-75, in Peterson and Crawford, editors,

Values and Choices in the Development o f the Colorado River. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1978.

28. Schoenbaum . . . . Controversy, p. 49. 29. 'Saving the New', Time, September 27, 1976, p. 68. 30. Henry P. Caulfield, Jr., 'Policy Goals and Values in Historical Perspective', in: Values and

Choices in the Development o f the Colorado River, edited by Dean F. Peterson and A. Berry Crawford (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1978), p. 115.

31. E. W. Kenworthy, 'Project to Dam Carolina River to Flush out Pollution is Fading', New York Times, November 22, 1973, p. 38.

32. New York Times, August 8, 1971, p. 50. 33. E. W. Kenworthy, 'EPA Staff Study is Critical of Blue Ridge Power Project', New York Times,

November 5, 1973, p. 42. 34. Ibid. 35. Seef•rexamp•e•Summersvi••eLakeM•dificati•nStudy•Feasibi•ityRep•rt•DraftMainRep•rt

and Environmental Impact Statement, Vol. 1, US Army Corps of Engineers, Huntington Dis- trict, September, 1981, pp. 8-12, and EIS-12.

36. New York Times, October 26, 1969, p. 48.

255

37. New York Times, November 7, 1971, p. 58. 38. See Theodore E Lowi, 'American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory',

World Politics 16 (1974): 677-715. Also, see Henry Hart, 'Towards a Political Science of Water Resource Decisions', Man and Water: The Social Sciences in the Management o f Water Resources, edited by L. Douglas James (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1974), p. 127; and William B. Lord, 'Water Resources Planning: Conflict Management', Water Spec- trum (July, 1980): 2.

39. See especially, Arthur E. Morgan, Darns and Other Disasters: A Century o f the Army Corps o f Engineers in Civil Works (Boston: Porter Sargent Publishers, 1971), pp. 299ff. Morgan claims that the Corps has followed this general doctrine since the Mississippi River floods of 1927. Also, New York Times, January 9, 1976, p. 18. (Full page advertisement defending Blue Ridge.) On Flood Control as a Corps Planning Priority, see Daniel A. Mazmanian and Jeanne Nienbaer, Can Organizations Change? Environmental Protection, Citizen Participation, and the Corps o f Engineers (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1979), p. 10.

40. Recounted in Ervin's forward to Schoenbaum . . . . Controversy, p. VIII. Also, E. W. Kenworthy, 'FPC Approves Power Project; Opponents in Congress Angered', New York Times, June 15, 1974, p. 7.

41. E. W. Kenworthy, 'Mizell, N. C. Representative, Acts to Block Huge Power Project', New York Times, October 22, 1973, p. 8. Also, see CongressionalRecord, Vol. 118 (September 12, 1972): 30393 -4 .

42. Congressional Record, Vol. 118 (September 12, 1972): 30393-4. 43. See, US Army Corps of Engineers, Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors, Manual for

Water Resource Planners (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, May, 1979), p. 4-29 . 44. Schoenbaum, .. . Controversy, p. 67; also E. W. Kenworthy, 'Morton in Shift on Power Plant',

New York Times, April 6, 1974, p. 12; E. W. Kenworthy, 'Reagan Wants Carolina Dam Included in US Scenic System', New York Times, February 15, 1976, p. 55; and E. W. Kenworthy, 'Ford Expected to Back Scenic River Plan on North Carolina Trip', New York Times, March 8, 1976, p. 14.

45. New York Times, March 8, 1976, p. 14. 46. Carl W. Frasure and Leonard M. Davis, editors, Eight Years, Official Statements and Papers,

The Honorable Arch A. Moore, Jr., Governor o f West Virginia, 1969-1977, Vol. III (Charles- ton, WV: State of West Virginia, 1977), pp. 355, 357.

47. See Laycock, 'New River . . . ' , p. 52; also, New York Times, October 26, 1969, p. 48. 48. 'Blue Ridge' may have been the very first challenge to the 'low-flow augmentation'

(pollution- dilution) principle in a non-governmentally constructed water project in the United States. See, New York Times, August 8, 1971, p. 50. Since the mid-1970s, the Corps of Engineers have been moving away from the technique - see National Park and Conservation Magazine 51 (December, 1977): 31.

49. New York Times, November 22, 1973, p. 38; Federal Water Pollution ControlAct Amendments o f 1972, EL. 92-500. Also, see Schoenbaum . . . . Controversy, p. 65ff; and New York Times, November 22, 1973, p. 38.

50. CongressionalRecord, vol. 118 (September 12, 1972): 30394. Also, see E. W. Kenworthy, 'FPC Curb Asked in Waste Control', New York Times, February 6, 1972, p. 28.

51. Specifically, FPC was criticized for accepting APCO's 'EIS' with no suggestions for modification, while APCO was cited for failing to find housing for more than 10% of all the families who had to be relocated, while also offering to pay only 1/2 of the cost of each family requiring suitable housing. See E. W. Kenworthy, 'FPC Criticized Over Blue Ridge', New York Times, April 16, 1973, p. 74.

52. E. W. Kenworthy, New York Times, June 22, 1976, p. 18; E. W. Kenworthy, New York Times, August 21, 1974, p. 13, and E. W. Kenworthy, 'Labor Federation Joins Utility in Lobbying for Dam on New River', New York Times, August 20, 1974, p. 71.

256

53. See, Ald0 Leopold, A Sand Country Almanac. New York: Oxford University Press, 1966, pp. 176ff. Also, John Muir, Our National Parks. New York: AMS Publications, 1901; 1970.

54. Foradiscussionofthisconcept, see:Albert Lepawsky, 'Water Resources and American Federal- ism', American Political Science Review (September, 1950): 631- 649.

55. Schoenbaum, .. . Controversy, pp. 102- 3. 56. Laycock, 'New River . . . ' , pp. 62 - 63; 'Saving the New', Time, September 27, 1976, p. 71; Bayard

Webster, 'Two Dams Planned to Ease Pollution', New York Times, October 26, 1969, p. 48; NY Times, January 7, 1971, p. 58.

57. New York Times, January 9, 1976, p. 18. 58. Schoenbaum, ...Controversy, p. 183. 59. Ibid., p. 160. 60. See Lynton K. Caldwell, 'Survivalist Policies: Ecological-Environmental Factors', (unpublished

paper), 1981 American Political Science Association Meeting, New York City, NY, p. 43. 61. See, E. Sheinbaum, ' "Storm King": Bureaucratic Pluralism in Regulatory Administration',

Southeastern Political Review XI (Spring, 1983), pp. 11-126. 62. GrantMcConnell, PrivatePowerandAmericanDemocracy,(NewYork:VintageBooks): 1966. 63. See, D. N. Rothblatt, RegionalPlanning: The Appalachian Experience (Lexington, MA: D. C.

Heath, 1971); also, T. Skocpol and J. Finegold, 'State Capacity and Economic Intervention in the Early New Deal', Political Science Quarterly, 97 (Summer, 1982): 255-278.

64. New York Times, September 12, 1976, p. 20. 65. Tim Palmer, Stanislaus: The Struggle for a River. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982.

Appendix I. Chronology o f major events in the evolution o f the "Blue Ridge" project .

3/63 2/65 6/66

6/68

6 - 7 / 6 9 10/69

2/70 4/70 7 - 11/70 12/70

1/71 4/71 6/71

1/72

10/72

FPC grants permit to APCO for 2 year feasibility study on damming New River. APCO files with FPC for building pump-storage project. Department of Interior asks to be heard before FPC on water quality issue; hearing held. FPC approves modified plans of APCO to enlarge project in response to Interior concerns. FPC holds new hearings on enlarged project. Judge Levy of FPC approves license for project pending filings of objection by interested parties. NC, VA, WV file exceptions on 'pollution-dilution' issue. FPC overrules Levy and orders further hearings. Variety of conservation groups testify for reduction of projects' size. FPC orders APCO to file and environmental impact statement for the project in conformance with NEPA and in response to conservation group testimony. APCO completes EIS in one month; files it with FPC staff. FPC staff submit own EIS based on expansion of that of APCO to Judge Levy. Levy issues 'Supplemental Initial Decision' recommending licensing of modified 'Blue Ridge' project. US Court of Appeals in New York hands down a decision in a case involving the Power Authority of New York declaring that PFC acted illegally in preparing an EIS after public hearings were completed. Has effect of overturning Levy's decision on 'Blue Ridge'. US Supreme Court refuses to review Appeals Court decision; ruling stands.

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11/72 1/73 4/73

6/73 7/73

10/73

1/74

2/74 3/74

4/74

5/74 6/74

8/74 12/74

1/75

1/75

4/75

5/75

9/75

11/75

3/76

4/76

4/76

5/76

FPC refuses approval of project without new EIS. Revised draft EIS completed by FPC staff. EPA determines that 'pollution-dilution' is unjustified; disallows inclusion of water quality storage at 'Blue Ridge'. New EIS submitted to Judge Levy for review. New hearings held by Levy on project. North Carolina Governor Holshouser inter- venes against project. Wilmer Mizell and Sam Ervin submit separate bills for inclusion of New in national scenic river system. Levy recommends modified 'Blue Ridge' project for flood control and recreation; North Carolina General Assembly introduces resolution for New as a state scenic river. US Senate being hearings on 'scenic river'. Holshouser tries to persuade Interior Secretary Morton to accept North Carolina position on scenic river. Morton sides with North Carolina; Senate public lands subcommittee recommends New as scenic river. Senate approves scenic river bill. House hearings on scenic river bill begin; FPC formally issues license for modified 'Blue Ridge' project. House Interior committee approves scenic river bill. House Rules Committee refuses to let bill to floor; Speaker Albert overrules committee. Full house falls to pass scenic river bill by required 2/3 vote; Holshouser formally asks Morton for scenic river status for New; Meanwhile, APCO voluntari- ly agrees to forego assertion of rights on license until 1/31/75. James Watt, director of Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, agrees to review application for scenic river if courts delay FPC license for 'Blue Ridge'. Washington, D.C. Court of Appeals orders 'stay' of license. Mizell and Jesse Helms introduce bills in Congress for scenic river again; does not advance before end of session. North Carolina General Assembly considers bills to 'lengthen segment' of New Riv- er. US District Court Judge Gordon refuses to decide legality of Govern Holshouser's application for scenic river status. Acting DOI Secretary D. Ken Frizzell notifies Holshouser that DOI will support scenic river application. North Carolina files 'Application for Leave to Adduce Ad- ditional Evidence' to Court of Appeals (charging APCO withheld information on archeological sites) in violation of 1974 amendment to Historic Preservation Act of

1960. Secretary of DOI Kleppe announces that North Carolina's application for scenic river will circulate for 90-day review period. Kleppe announces he will sign order to create scenic river. US Court of Appeals up- holds FPC's grant of license. FPC draws up order to modify license; requires APCO to salvage archeological remains. Helms and Congressman Neal introduce scenic river bill again. Senator Robert Morgan of North Carolina, Erwin's successor, announces support of scenic river bill. North Carolina files motion for hearing on technicality - FPC did not wait 21 days as required to issue permit. Court of Appeals rules in favor of North Carolina. House of Representatives sub-

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6/76 8/76

9/76

committee on National Parks and Recreation holds hearings to 'statuatorily recog- nize Kleppe's designation' of New as scenic river. Full Interior Committee approves. Senate Interior Committee hearings on scenic river begins. Committee approves scenic river bill. House Rules Committee approves scenic river bill; full House approves; full Senate approves. Ford signs bill, scenic river adopted, 'Blue Ridge' license remanded.

Documents

The defeat of the Blue Ridge pump-storage project as microcosm of environmental policy change