THE DEVIL’S TRADE GunsandviolenceinElSalvador

October 2014

Report by: JacobParakilasandIainOverton

With thanks to:JennaCorderoy,AlexanderRenderos,StevenSmith

Cover Illustration: GanglandgunsinElSalvadorbyAdamHinton

Clarificationsorcorrectionsfrominterestedpartiesarewelcome

DesignMattBellamy

TheDevil’sTrade:GunsandviolenceinElSalvador|1

CONTENTSExEcutivE summary 2

introduction 3

a briEf history 4

crimE and Law EnforcEmEnt in EL saLvador 7

firEarms in EL saLvador 8

sourcEs of wEapons 9

thE civiLian firEarms markEt in EL saLvador 10

wEapons divErtEd from miLitary stockpiLEs 12

wEapons from civiL war-Era stockpiLEs 14

wEapons importEd from rEgionaL sourcEs 15

pattErns of ownErship and usE 16

concLusion 18

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYEl Salvador is a country with a troubled past and a troubled present. It is home to two of the most powerful and violent criminal gangs in the world - the Calle 18 and the Mara Salvatrucha-13 (MS-13). And it is haunted by the constant presence of violence. Ravaged by a civil war in the 1980s and 90s, this Central American nation has the highest concentration of gang members of all of the ‘Northern Triangle’ countries1 - and its homicide and gun violence rates are shockingly high - well above global averages.

In2011,ElSalvador,thiscountryofjustoversixmillion2,sawnearly70murdersper100,000inhabitants.Thatyearithadover4,000homicides,justunderhalfthenumberofmurdersseenintheUS,acountryoverfiftytimesitssize.3

ElSalvadorisnotjustacountryhauntedbyviolentdeath.Itisalsoacountrywherethegunisubiquitous.In2011,70percentofhomicidestherewereattheendofagun.4Andthousandsmoreareseriouslywoundedbygunfireeveryyear.Despiteagangtrucein2012betweentheCalle18andtheMS-13,violenceinElSalvadorremainsanuglypartofeverydaylifethere.

Understandinghowgunsendupinthehandsofcriminalsisvitalifwearetobegintounderstandsomethingaboutthedailyhorrorsofshootingsandmurders.YetverylittleresearchhasbeendoneonarmstraffickinganywheresouthoftheUS-Mexicoborder.

Inthisreport,THE DEVIL’S TRADE,ActiononArmedViolence(AOAV)travelledtoElSalvadorandfoundthatthenumberofillegalgunsinElSalvadormatches,andprob-ablyvastlyexceeds,theestimated250,000legitimatelyownedgunsinthecountry.Italsofoundthatobstaclesandresistancefromthosewithfinancialinterestsintheguntradehavecrushedanyattemptsatfirearmslawreform.Andthatcorruptioninthesectorsofthegovernmentresponsibleforgunlawenforcementisrampant.

THE DEVIL’S TRADEalsofoundthatveryfewgunsarebeingsuccessfullyremovedfromcirculationinElSalvador-orinCentralAmericagenerally.Evenconfiscatedweaponsoftenmaketheirwaybackintoillicitcirculation.Withsuchaccesstoweap-ons,Salvadorancriminalgroups’abilitytocommitwidespreadviolencewithimpunityremainsuncontested,andwillcontinuetogrowfortheforeseeablefuturedespiteattemptstobrokeratruceamongthegangs.

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TheDevil’sTrade:GunsandviolenceinElSalvador|3

INTRODUCTIONIn 2011, the police in El Salvador recorded 4,371 homicides – a rate of 69.9 per 100,000 inhabitants – the second highest murder rate in the world following Honduras. 5 This obscene level of violence is driven not by any ideological insurgency or religious conflict. It is, rather, driven by exceptionally powerful criminal groups that use casual and lethal violence to run their illicit trades - in drug running, kidnapping, protection rackets, prostitution and smuggling.

Comparedtomoretraditionalconflicts,theimpre-ciseboundariesandshiftingallegiancesofthesegangsmakesithardtounderstandandaddresstheviolenceinElSalvador.Unlikethepolitically-driveninsurgencieswhichprecededthem,thesecriminalgroupsarehardtonegotiatewith:theyaresmaller,morediffuse,profit-drivenandnumerous.

Inordertosuccessfullytransitionfromcivilwartocivilpeace,anationmusttaketwofundamentalactions.Itmusthealthedivisionscreatedduringthewar,anditmustaddresstheremainingmeansofviolence.Thisreportexaminesthelatterprocess,though–aswithmanyissuesinthestudyofarmedconflict–thatcannotbeseparatedfromtheformer.

ButwhyElSalvador?Itisasmallcountry,evenbyCentralAmericanstandards,withadensepopulationofjustoversixmillion.6Itscivilwar,from1980until1992,wasexceptionallybrutal,whereithasbeenestimatedthat75,000peoplewerekilledandmanymoresubjectedtosevereviolationsofhumanrights.7

Today,ElSalvadorattractsinternationalmediaattentionforitsstreetgangs,whosereachandunrestrainedviolencearenotorious.In2012,awidely-publicisedtrucebetweenthetwodominantgroups–theMS-13andtheCalle18gangs–wascreditedforasubstantialdropinthecountry’shomicideratewherein2012,2,594mur-derswererecordedbythepolicecomparedtothepreviousyearwherethereweremorethan4,000.8

Eventhoughitnolongerleadstheworldinhomi-cidespercapita,ElSalvadorisstilloneofthe

mostviolentcountriesonearthoutsideofactive,recognisedarmedconflicts.Andwhilethetruceremainsinplace,themurderratehasbeencreep-ingbackup,withfiguresindicatingthathomicideratesarebacktothesamelevelasbeforethegangtrucewasdeclared.9

MajortensionsstillremaininthisCentralAmericanstate,especiallyinthewakeoftheextremelycloseanddisputed2014presidentialelection.Addtothismix,theweakandcorruptibleinstitutions10;porous,remotelandborders;andalengthy,easilynavigablePacificcoastline,itsvaluetosmugglersbecomesclear.

Ourreportdoesnotseektofullyexplainthecomplexsocial,cultural,economicandpoliticalmechanismsthatliebehindElSalvador’sappall-inglevelofviolence.Rather,itseekstocastlightuponthewaysinwhichviolentgroupsarmandequipthemselvesoutsideofrecognisedconflicts,andunderlinestheimportanceofunderstandingthelong-termharmsthatcomefromuncontrolledarsenalsofeventhesmallestofsmallarms.

©IainOverton

Advertisingentreatspeopletovoteagainstthegangs.

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A BRIEf HISTORYThe Salvadoran Civil War is generally considered to have lasted from 1980 until 1992. Before 1980, military-influenced governments ruled El Salvador for half a century. Under the regime, poverty, income inequality and land disputes grew, and with them, organised opposition. Matters came to a head when Archbishop Oscar Romero – “The People’s Bishop,” who had called for greater transparency and an end to American military assistance to the government – was assassinated. The situation escalated when government forces fired upon mourners.

Inthe1980s,severalleft-wingrevolutionaryguer-rillamovementsbegantocoalesceundertheumbrellaoftheFarabundoMartiNationalLibera-tionFront,orFMLN.TheFMLN,namedafteraleftistleaderofthe1930swhosemovementwasbrutallyrepressedbythegovernmentofthetime,becamealargeandsophisticatedoperation,launchingitsfirstmajoroffensiveinJanuary1981.

Thegovernment,inturn,wasarmedandsup-portedheavilybytheUnitedStatesastheReaganadministration–whichprioritisedaidtoforeignanti-communistgovernmentsoverhumanrightsconsiderations–steppedupmilitaryandeconomicaidtotherightwinggovernment.TheUSsuppliedthegovernmentwithvirtuallyallthematerielneces-sarytoconductwar:smallarms,armouredvehicles,combataircraft,ammunition,logisticalequip-ment,andtrainingandintelligencesupport.AsfortheFMLN,itisthoughtthatalargeproportionoftheirweaponswerecapturedfromtheSalvadoranArmedForces11,althoughtherehasbeensomesuggestionthatarmsshipmentshadbeenarrangedbyFMLNleaderSchafikHandalwithofficialsoftheSovietUnion,Vietnam,Ethiopia,andanumberofEasternEuropeancountriesintheearly1980s.12TheFMLNcouldalsocountonsupportfromtherebelmovementsinneighbouringcountries.

Asthewarwenton,bothitsscopeanditsbrutal-itywidened.InDecember1981,soldiersfromtheAtlacatlbattalionshotdeadresidentsofElMozote

whoweresuspectedofsympathisingwithrebels.Soldierskilledsome1,000people,andnearlyhalfofthevictimswerechildren.13From1979-81,army-backedright-wingdeathsquadshadkilledaround30,000people.14Thegovernmentalsousedmilitaryforcewithlittlediscriminationinthecountryside,employingairandartillerystrikesandlarge-scalesweepoperationsinanattempttobreakthewilloftherebelmovementorcaptureorkillitsleadership.Butitsattempts–whileresultinginsignificantlossofhumanlifeintheFMLN’srankandfile–didnotsucceedinbreakingtheinsurgency’sback.

Theearly1990sfoundElSalvadorinruinanddeadlock.WhiletheFMLNcouldstilllaunchspo-radicraidsandattacksinurbanareas,therewasnorealprospectthatitcoulddoanythingmorethanharass,ratherthansupplant,thegovernment.Thegovernment,foritspart,wasmorethancapableofholdingontoitsstrongholdsandlaunchingdevas-tatingattacksintothecountryside,butwasunabletoconsolidateitsgains.WiththedissolutionoftheSovietUnionandtheconsequentdisengagementoftheUnitedStatesfromideologicalconflicts,bothsideswerealsosuddenlyfacingtheprospectofcontinuingacripplingwarwithlessandlessmate-rialandfinancialsupport.Withneithersidecapableofwinningthewarandwithcasualtiescontinuingtomount,apeacetreatybecamethelogicalstrate-gicchoiceforbothsides,ifavictoryforneither.

InJanuary1992,thetwosidessignedasetofpeaceaccordsnegotiatedbytheUnitedNations.Therebelswouldlaydowntheirarms;thegovern-mentwoulddemobilisethemilitarymachinethatithadbuilttofightthewar;electionswouldbecalled.TheaccordsalsoestablishedtheTruthCommis-siontoinvestigatepasthumanrightsabuses.

Butthepeaceaccordsleftagreatdealunsaidandundone.Therewasnoorganisedprocessforrein-tegratingex-combatantsbackintosociety.Thosewhohadfoughtasguerrillas,asparamilitariesorassoldiers,werelefttofindtheirownway.Andthereweretensofthousandsofthem:duringthewar,themilitaryhadswelledtoasmanyas63,000

TheDevil’sTrade:GunsandviolenceinElSalvador|5

personnel.15Atitspeak,theFMLNnumberedsome12,000,andthousandsmoreweremembersofotherself-defenceandparamilitarygroupsassoci-atedwithboththegovernmentandtherebels.

Anotherrealitywasalsounfolding:theconse-quencesofmassemigration.Duringthewar,thousandsofSalvadoranshadfledthecountry.WithneighbouringGuatemalaandNicaraguaalsoembroiledincivilwars,manyoftheseémigrésflednorth,totheUS.ItwassoprofoundthattheSalvadoranpopulationintheUSincreasedfrom94,000in1980to465,000in1990-amassiveoutflowfromacountryofitssize.16

ManySalvadoranimmigrantswhofledtotheUS,particularlythosewhohadenteredthecountryillegally,foundthemselvesontheedgesofsociety,occupyingeitherundocumentedpositionsinthegreyeconomyorengagedinoutrightcriminality.

Withrivalgangslargelyorganisedalongnationalandethniclines,SalvadoransintheUSbegantoformtheirowngroups.Atfirst,thesegroupsweredesignedtoshieldSalvadoransfromviolentnon-Salvadorangangs,buttheyquicklymovedintoothercriminalactivities.TheMaraSalvatrucha,orMS-13,createdbySalvadoranimmigrantsinLosAngelesinthe1980s,becamethelargestofsuchgroups.Itsrival,theCalle18group,originallyformedbyMexi-canimmigrantsin1959inthePicoUniondistrictofLosAngeles,alsosawrapidgrowthwhenitincorpo-ratedCentralAmericanrefugees.17

AstheUnitedStatesgovernmentdeportedincreasingnumbersofSalvadorans,eitherforcriminalactivitiesorsimplyforviolatingimmigra-tionlaw,theinformalnetworksdevelopedintheUnitedStatesweresentbacktotheoldcountry.TheElSalvadoriangovernmentwasstrugglingtorebuildthelivesandhealthewoundsofcivilwar,andprovidingservicesforreturningémigréswasnotahighpriority.SotheSalvadoranswhohadbeendeportedbytheUnitedStatesfortheircrimi-nalactivitiesfoundthemselvesbackinacountrywithnocapacitytodealwiththemproductively.

YounggangmembersreturningtoElSalvadorimportedUSstylesofgangmembership.Accord-ingtoJoséMiguelCruzthesestylesnotonlycomprisedofthenamesofgangorganisations,

butalsotheuseoftattoosandhandsignstocommunicate.18Themarginalisedandexcludedyoungpeopleofpost-warElSalvadorlookedtothesegangsforasenseofidentityandbelonging.In1996,84percentofgangswereaffiliatedwitheitherMS-13ortheCalle18inthemetropolitanareaofSanSalvador.19

Thegovernmentwasalsoabjectlyfailingtodoanythingaboutthestockpileofsmallarmsthathadbuiltupduringthewar.ThepeaceaccordscalledforthedestructionofsurplusweaponsheldbyboththearmyandtheFMLN.TheFMLNwasunabletoaccountforitsstockpile,largelybecauseitdidnotkeepaccuraterecordsofalltheweaponsitsaffiliateshadimportedandused.Thegovernment,ontheotherhand,simplydraggeditsfeetincata-loguinganddestroyingbothitsownweaponsandthoseithadconfiscatedfromguerrillas.

Ascrimeratesrosethroughoutthe1990sandearly2000s,theright-wingARENAgovernmentbegantorespondwithso-calledManoDura(“stronghand”)policies.AdoptedinJuly2003,ManoDuracalledupontheimmediateimprisonmentofgangmembersforhavinggang-relatedtattoosorflash-inggangsignsinpublic,whichbecamepunishablewithtwotofiveyearsinjailandapplicabletogang

ThefuneralofReyneldoAdonaiCampos,killedby18thgangsmembersbecausehelivedinanMScontrolledarea.

©Adam

Hinton

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membersfromtheageof12.20TheManoDuralawwassubsequentlydeclaredunconstitutional,butwasfollowedbyapackageofanti-gangreformsknownasSuperManoDurainJuly2004.21

Thereformsenhancedpolicepowersandstiff-enedpenaltiesfortheinvolvementwithorganisedcrime.TacticsassociatedwiththeManoDuraapproachincludedarrestingsuspectedgangmembersforlesserchargesandthencharg-ingthemforadditionalcrimesoncetheywerebeingdetainedaswellasengaginginaggressive,large-scaletacticaloperationsingang-controlledterritory.Ordinarygangmembersfaceduptofiveyearsinprison,andnineyearsforgangleaders.22

OneoftheimmediateeffectsoftheManoDurapolicieswastofillElSalvador’sprisonsto,andthenfarbeyond,theircapacities.AccordingtotheInternationalCentreforPrisonStudies,therewere9,471inmatesin2001.Theprisonpopula-tionincreasedto12,073in2004,risingto24,283in2010.23AsofDecember2012,some27,038inmates,including10,212currentorformergangmembers,werebeingheldinprisonsdesignedtoholdamaximumof8,328people.24

Atfirst,thegovernment’spolicyofthrowingarrestedgangmembersinwhateverjailwasmostconvenientledtovirtuallyunrestrictedbloodshedasmembersfromrivalgroupsfoundthemselvesincloseproximitytoeachother(andundertheextremelylimitedsupervisionoftheoverworked,underpaidandcorruption-proneprisonguards).Facedwithmassacresinsidewhatweresup-posedtobehighlysecurefacilities,thegovernmentswitchedtosegregatingentireprisonsbygangaffiliation.Thisprovedtobearecipefordisaster.Placinggangmembersandleadersinclose,butnotcloselymonitored,confinementmeanttheywererelativelysafefromattackfromrivalsandcouldalsocoordinatewithcolleaguesoutsideprisonwalls.ManyofthetopleadershipforboththeCalle18andMS-13wereinprisontogether.Theyturnedthisintoatacticaladvantage:insideafacilityguardedbygovernmentforcesandsurroundedbyhundredsoftheiradvisorsandallies,theyarearguablysaferfromattackthantheywouldbeoutside.Thegangs’powerrose,andwithittheviolence.Inthelastfewyears,thegovernment(which,since2009,hasbeenheadedbytheleft-wingFMLN),seeingtheimpact

ofpreviouspolicies,hasdecidedtopursueanewpublicsafetystrategy.

TheninMarch2012,theCatholicChurchandlocalNGOsbrokeredatrucebetweenthemajorgangs,theMS-13andCalle18.Thegovernmentatfirstdeniedinvolvementinthetruce,butPresidentFunesthenadmittedthatthegovernmenthad“facilitated”theagreementbyprovidingtrucks,guardsandhelicopterstooverseethetransferofgangleadersfrommaximum-securityprisonstoencouragethetruce.2526

Whetherthegangtrucehassucceededornotisatopicofconsiderabledebate.Certainlymurdersdeclinedintheimmediateaftermathofthetruce’scommencement.Foratleast15monthsaftertheannouncementofthetruce,thedailynumberofkillingsaveraged5.5adaycomparedwith14beforehand.27Inrecenttimeshowever,thehomicideratehasrisen,with89murdersrecordedinthefirsttendaysofJanuary2014.28Therehasalsobeenariseinthenumberofdisappearanceswherein2013,thosemissingdoubledcomparedto2012.29Therecentdiscoveriesofsecretmassgravessuggestthatthekillingsarecontinuingclandestinely.30

Mostobserversweinterviewedwerehighlyscepticalofthetruce.Theycitedthecontinua-tionofgangrecruitmentandarmamentactivitiesandthefailureofthegovernmenttooffernotableeconomicorsocialalternativestoganglifeasevidencethatnothinghadreallychangedbeneaththesurface.Sincethetruce,onesourceworkingintheintelligenceservicesremarkedhowgangsinElSalvadorhavebecomemorepowerful:“Gangshavebecomemorepoliticised,morestrident;andthischangesthetypeofpeopleinthegangs.Thegangsthemselvesaretransforming–thegovern-mentstrugglestocontaintheircommunicationnetwork,theirstructures,theirarmaments.Herethegangshaveevolvedintosomethingelse.Per-hapseventhefifthestate–thecriminalestate.”

Despiteappealsfromgangmemberstorevivethegangtruce,inJune2014,ElSalvador’snewPresi-dentSalvadorSánchezCeréndeclaredthathewillnot“makeatrucewithorganizedcrime”.JusticeandSecurityMinisterBenitoLaraconfirmedthatthetrucewouldnotbepartofthegovernment’ssecuritypolicy.31

TheDevil’sTrade:GunsandviolenceinElSalvador|7

CRIME AND LAw ENfORCEMENT IN EL SALVADORViolent organised crime in El Salvador is distinct from violent organised crime in Guatemala or Mexico. Where high-level criminality in those countries is dominated by major drug trafficking syndicates with diverse criminal portfolios, Salvadoran gangs are much more engaged in local crimes. Extortion, protection rackets, prostitution, murder for hire and other localised crimes – these are the mainstays of the gangs there, although there are suggestions the gangs might be increasingly involved in more organised criminal activity.

HomicideinElSalvadorisoverwhelminglycar-riedoutwithfirearms:accordingtodatafromtheUNOfficeonDrugsandCrime,thepercentageofmurdersinthecountrycommittedwithgunsdidnotdropbelow62%from2005to2012andreachedashighas80%in2007.32Thisisdoubletheglobalaverageofroughly40%.33

ThetwodominantforcesinSalvadoranarmedviolencearetheMS-13andCalle18gangs.Theydonotrepresentaduopolyovercriminalviolenceinthecountry,buttheyexertanoutsizeinfluence.Inourresearch,othergroupswereonlymentionedinpassingandwereneverdescribedashavingmorethanaminorimpactonoveralltrendsincriminalviolence.

SalvadorancriminologistCarlosPoncetoldAOAVthatthemajordifferencebetweenMS-13andCalle18wasorganisational.Botharecellularratherthanstrictlyhierarchical,buttheMS-13issomewhatmorehierarchical.AccordingtoPonce,MS-13hasalsomademoreinroadsintocomplexbutpoten-tiallylucrativeformsofcrime–largescaledrugs,armsandhumantrafficking,forexample.MS-13isgenerallyagreedtobethemorepowerfulofthetwogroups,andwasthefirstAmerican-basedstreetgangtobelabelleda“transnationalcriminalorgani-sation”bytheUSDepartmentoftheTreasury.34BothgangscontinuetohaveoperationalunitsintheUnitedStatesandelsewhereinNorthandCentral

America.Butthereisahighdegreeofautonomy–whiletheseparateunitsmaintaincommunica-tionswitheachother,thereisverylittleoperationalcoordinationacrossnationalboundaries.

Lawenforcementformostofthecountryfallstotheroughly20,000personneloftheNationalCivilianPolice(PNC).ThePNCwasfoundedattheendofthecivilwarinordertomakeacleanbreakfromthecivil-wareramilitarypoliceforces.Althoughtherearesomemunicipalpoliceforces,theyaregenerallyconcernedwithlow-levelcrime.SeriousandorganisedcrimecasesfalltothePNCnationwide.WhilethePNCmaintainsspecialistunitstohandlegangsandtraffickers,eventheseunitsoftenfindthemselvesoperatingatadisad-vantagerelativetothebiggercriminalenterprises.

Sometimesthegangsarebetterequippedthanthepolice.AOAVvisitedonespecialistanti-traffickingunitoutsideSanSalvador,whereofficersshowedusanencryptedradioseizedfromaMaraslogis-ticsco-ordinatortheunithadarrested.WeweretoldonlytheAmericanmilitaryhadthenecessaryequipmentnecessarytobreakitsencryption.

©IainOverton

GanglandsignsindowntownSanSalvador.

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fIREARMS IN EL SALVADORFirearms are a very visible presence in El Salvador. Virtually every gas station, shopping mall or other commercial establishment is guarded by at least one private security guard, generally armed with revolvers and 12-gauge shotguns. The Civilian National Police and Army are frequently seen around San Salvador on foot patrol or guarding government buildings, often armed with assault rifles and submachine guns. Civilian firearms ownership is slightly more circumspect, but armed civilians are so common that many commercial establishments are demarcated with signs declaring them gun-free zones (a prohibition which appears to be widely flouted).

Andthentherearethegunsownedandusedbycriminals.These,thoughlessvisibleundernormalcircumstances,arevastlymoreinfluentialuponElSalvador’scurrentpoliticalandsocialconditions.Theseweaponsaretheprimaryfocusofthisreport.

In2000,researchersattheInstitutoUniversitariodeOpinionPublica(IUDOP)inSanSalvadorestimatedthattherewerebetween250,000and400,000firearmsincirculationinElSalvador,includingweaponsheldlegallyandillegally.TheIUDOPresearcherscitedanumberofdif-ferentestimatesbasedonvaryingfiguresandsurveys,concludingthatoverhalfthegunsinthecountrywereunregistered.35

Sadly,intheinterveningdecadeandahalf,mat-tershavenotimprovedeitherintermsoftheapparentnumbersoffirearmsinthecountryorinthereliabilityandaccessibilityofdataonthesub-ject.A2007estimatebytheSmallArmsSurveyfoundaroughlysimilarsetofnumbers–175,400registeredgunsascomparedto225,000unregis-teredones,foratotalof400,000guns.36

TheOrganisationofAmericanStateshasasomewhatdifferentestimate–156,325registeredgunsin2000,climbingto215,000by2009.37Thefactthatwidelyrespectedinstitutionsareworkingwithdifferentsetsofnumbersindicates

thattheSalvadoranMinistryofDefence,whichisresponsiblefortheregistryoffirearms,isnotentirelyconsistentwithitsrecord-keepingoritsdata-sharing.

Thenumberofunregisteredfirearmsisingreaterdispute.Expertsinterviewedforthisreportgavearangeofestimatesfromroughly200,000illegalgunsallthewayuptonearly500,000.Obviouslygivinganexactfigureonthenumbersofillegalgunsisfarmoredifficult,butmoresystematicdatacollectioncouldatleastprovidemoreaccurateandfine-grainedestimates.

Thoseillegalgunsareenteringthecountryalongavarietyofdifferentpathways–onland,bysea,mixedwithlegitimatecargoshipmentsandsmug-gledthroughporousborderzones.ElSalvadorhasnodomesticarmsmanufacturers,sothegunsinthecountryhaveallcomeinfromoutside.Butgunshavealonghalf-life:withamodicumofmaintenance,theycanremaineffectivefordecades.Accordingly,dealingwiththeretentionofarmsisanissueofoverridingimportanceinaddressingtheburdenofviolenceinElSalvador.

©IainOverton

Despitetheviolencelifecontinues.

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SOURCES Of wEApONSThere is not a single predominant source of weapons being used in violence in El Salvador. Some weapons make their way from the civilian market into the black market, some are sourced from the stockpiles held by the militaries, others are recovered from civil war-era guerrilla arms caches, and some are imported from outside the country by or on behalf of criminal syndicates.

Instead,itishelpfultothinkaboutdifferentcate-goriesofweaponsinuse.ThevastmajorityofgunviolenceinElSalvadoriscommittedwithrelativelysimple,inexpensiveweapons–cheaprevolversandsemi-automatichandguns.Suchweaponsaredesignedforshort-rangeself-defenceandforsecurityandpolicepersonnel;asaresult,theyaregenerallynotamajorpartofmilitaryaidprogrammes.However,theytendtobewidelyandcheaplyavailableoncivilianmarketsworldwide.

Morepowerfulweapons–assaultrifles,sniperrifles,machineguns,grenadesandantitankweap-ons–areexpensiveandrare;consequently,theyareonlyseeninthehandsofmoreorganisedandpowerfulgroups,andeventhen,generallyonly

forattacksonhigh-valuetargets.Thoughthereisconsiderabledisinformationanddisagreementabouttheprevalenceofsuchweapons,manyoftheseweaponslikelyoriginatefromthecountry’scivilwar-erastockpiles.

TradethroughoutCentralAmericaalsoappearstobeamajorfactor.MultiplesourcesconfirmedthatbothElSalvador’sNorth-easternborderwithHon-duraswaslargelyuncontrolled,bothbecauseofitsremotenessandbecauseofcollusionbetweenthesecurityforcesresponsibleforthatzoneandarmstraffickers.Similarly,thecountry’sPacificcoastprovidesampleopportunitiesforsmug-glersoperatingbyboat.Longstretchesofopen,lightlypopulatedbeachesprovideeasyaccessforsmugglers,andtheauthoritiesarenotwellequippedforinterdiction.

Butthefactthatweaponsareenteringthecountryfromnumeroussourcesisnottheonlyprob-lem.Thereisalsoremarkablylittlebeingdonetoaddresstheweaponsalreadythere.Giventhat,simplystaunchingtheflowfromabroadwillnotbeenoughtoaddresstheproliferationofillegalgunsusedincriminalactivity.

©IainOverton

Childrenremainheavilyaffectedbythecity’sviolence.

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THE CIVILIAN fIREARMS MARkET IN EL SALVADORThe civilian firearms market in El Salvador represents a potentially productive source of weaponry for criminal organisations, but as with the total number of weapons, inadequate and inconsistently available data make it difficult to come to reliable conclusions on this issue.

Certainly,thereisnotonepredominantsourceofweaponsenteringElSalvadorlegally,thoughtheUnitedStatesappearstobethesinglelargestsource.AccordingtodatafromtheNorwegianIni-tiativeonSmallArmsTransfers(NISAT),in2011(themostrecentyearforwhichdisaggregateddatawereavailable)theUSexported684pistolsorrevolvers,493sportingorhuntingshotgunsand72sportingorhuntingriflestoElSalvador.Thiscomparestorecordedtransfersof704pistolsfromArgentinain2010,616pistolsfromItalythesameyearand375pistolsfromBrazilin2011.TheOASestimateoflegalfirearmsownershipfrom2000-2009indicates

thatroughly6,500newweaponsarebeingreg-isteredperyear,meaningthattheUnitedStatesexportedroughly1/6ofnewlyregisteredweaponswithothermajorexportersresponsibleforbetween1/10and1/20ofthetotaldemand.

However,theNISATdatais,aspreviouslyindi-cated,incomplete.Thesenumbersshouldbeviewedasindicativeratherthanconclusive–andthegovernmentofElSalvadorshouldmakeitaprioritytopubliciseitsowndataonarmstransfersmorewidelysothatthedimensionsoftheissuecanbemorefullyunderstood.

Intheory,existingfirearmslawinElSalvadorisreasonablycomprehensive,ifnotparticularlystrict.Civiliansarepermittedtoownawidevarietyofweapons,thougheachweaponisrequiredtobelicensedindividually.Certaincategoriesofweap-ons,suchasautomaticrifles,arebannedoutright.

©Adam

Hinton

MSgangmembers.

TheDevil’sTrade:GunsandviolenceinElSalvador|11

Beforepurchasingaweapon,buyersmustpassabackgroundcheckadministeredbythepolice.Withthebackgroundcheckcompleted,thepotentialbuyermustattendandpassafirearmssafetyandproficiencycoursebeforereturningtothestoretopickuptheirlegalfirearm.Carryingweaponsinpublicisgenerallylegal,thoughmanybusinessesprohibitweaponsontheirpremises.

Inpractice,mattersareconsiderablylessstrict.Theprocessreliesoncooperationbetweenthegunstores,thepoliceandthemilitary,thoughtherelationshipsbetweentheseparties(particularlybetweenthepoliceandarmy)arestrained.Therecordscheckprocessisunreliableatbest,oftenmissinglegitimateandtechnicallydisqualifyingcriminalconvictions.Evenardentgunrightssup-portersinterviewedforthisresearchdisparagedtheeffectivenessofthesafetycourse.

Mostimportantly,however,theprocessiseffec-tivelyimmunisedagainstreform.AlthoughtheFMLNgovernmentistheoreticallyinfavourofmorestringentguncontrollaws,ithasnotattemptedcomprehensivereform,viewingthegunlobbyastoopowerfulandentrenchedtobeworthtakingon.

Inthiscontext,thegrowthinlegalgunownershipcontributestothewideavailabilityofhandguns.Slippagefromlegaltoillegalgunownershipcanhappeninavarietyofways.Strawpurchasing–theuseofabuyerwithacleanrecordtopurchaseweaponswhicharethenillegallytransferredtocriminalactors–ispartofit,thoughtheexactextenttowhichitisafactorisdisputed.Certainlytheguidingfirearmslegislationmakeslarge-scalestrawpurchasesimpractical,giventhatapurchasermustsendintheirfirearmslicenceeachtimetheypurchaseaweapon.38

Abiggerproblemappearstobethelackofoversightoverfirearmssellersandthecosyrela-tionshipbetweenretailersandtheArmy,whichislargelyresponsiblefortheenforcementoffirearmslaw.ArecurringthemeinourinterviewswasthatmostgunstoresinElSalvadorareownedbycur-rentorformermilitarypersonnel,orbyindividualswithstronglinkstothemilitary.Beingprotectedbyamilitarypatronagenetworkwouldallowgunshopstoselectivelyenforcefirearmslawinrelativesafety.AndgiventhatthePNCassignsarelatively

lowprioritytoenforcingfirearmslaw(oneknowl-edgeableobserverestimatedthatonly80officershadbeenassignedtocounter-firearmsdutiesfortheentirecountry)theoddsofbeingcaughtviolat-ingtheregulationsseemfairlylow.

Anotherimportantaspecttothelegalfirearmsmarketistheprevalenceofprivatesecuritycontractors.Theseprivateguardsareacon-stantpresenceonthestreetsofSanSalvador,standingguardovercoffeeshops,gasstations,shoppingmalls,hotelsandwealthyneighbour-hoods.Suchguardsaregenerallyarmedwithpump-actionshotguns,theimposingappear-anceofwhichisheldtoserveasadeterrentallonitsown.AccordingtoestimatesbytheSmallArmsSurvey,thereisalmostonefirearmtoeveryprivatesecuritypersonnel39,butsometimestheseweaponsendupontheblackmarket.In2011,thegovernmentannouncedmorethan1,700firearmsusedbyprivatesecuritycompaniessince2009hadbeensoldontheblackmarketafterbeingreportedmissing.40

Guardsarenotprotectedbyspecialprovisionsinlaw;theyhavenomorepowertoaffectanarrestoruselethalforcethandoordinarycitizens.Butwithanestimated21,146nationwide,privatesecurityguardsoutnumberpolice(16,737).41Accurateestimatesareforobviousreasonsmoredifficulttocomebyforcriminalgroups,butmostsourcesagreethatthetotalnumberofgangmembersisroughly60,000–andofcoursethatincludesgroupsviolentlyopposedtoeachotherandinwhichnoteverymemberisarmed.Recent-ly,therehavebeenreportsofgangmembersworkingassecurityguards,usingtheirpositiontocarryoutextortion.In2013,severalguardsweredismissedwhenapoliceinvestigationfoundthattheyweremembersoftheMS-13,andthatcom-munityleaderswerethreatenedintoemployingthembytelephonecallsmadefromprison.42

Securityguardsareusuallydeployedsingly,topro-tectparticularpatchesofcommercialrealestate,meaningthattheyarebothphysicallyandlegallyexposed,andtheirpayisgenerallyclosetothenationalminimumwageof$250amonth.Thesefactorsmakethemtargetsbothforcorruptionandoutrighttheft,andgivethemlittleincentivetofightbackifconfrontedbyarmedattackers.

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wEApONS DIVERTED fROM MILITARY STOCkpILESAnother commonly cited source of weapons used in criminal activity are the stockpiles held by the Salvadoran military. It is important to draw a distinction between the military’s arsenals and the stockpiles they hold. The arsenals comprise the weapons currently used by their active-duty troops. These are not a particularly major proliferation concern. In some cases, soldiers seeking a quick cash infusion may rent, lend or sell weapons from the arsenals to criminals, but such behaviour carries significant risk and is accordingly fairly rare.

Thestockpilesofarmsheldbythemilitaryareofmuchgreaterconcern.Thesecomprisearangeofweapons:thoseturnedoverbytheFMLNattheendofthecivilwar;thoseformerlyinthemilitaryarsenalbutdeclaredsurplustorequirementsattheendofthewar;andthoseconfiscatedfromillegalstockpilesinthepost-warera.

ThesestockpilesrepresentoneofthegreatestproliferationrisksinElSalvador.Theycontainthousandsofweaponsofalldescriptionsandsizes,fromhandgunstoanti-tankweapons.Thereisverylittletransparencyregardingsuchholdings;wemadeenquiriestovariousofficesof

theSalvadorangovernmenttogainaccesstoalockupbutwereunabletoaccesseitherthephysi-callocationoranycomprehensivedataabouttheircontents.

Itisunclearhowcomprehensiveoruniformphysicalsecuritymeasuresare,butagreaterriskiscorruption.Numeroussourcesingovernmentandwithinthegangsthemselvesdescribedeasyaccesstotheweaponseitherdirectlyviacorruptmilitarypersonnelorindirectlythroughmiddlemen.OnesourceintheMS-13describedbeingofferedanentirecrateof100ammunitionmagazinessuit-ablefortheM-16assaultriflefor$1000,or$10permagazine.Thiscomparesfavourablywiththeroughly$30anAmericancivilianbuyerwouldpayfora30-roundmagazineforanM-16patternrifle.

Here,theissueonceagainisthedivisionofresponsibilitybetweenthepolice,theAttorneyGeneral’sofficeandthemilitary.Allstockpilesofconfiscatedweaponsareultimatelytherespon-sibilityofthemilitary,regardlessofwhethertheweaponswereconfiscatedbymilitarypersonnelorcivilianagencies.Onceaweaponisconfis-cated,itisturnedovertothearmyforindefinitestorage,thoughtheAttorneyGeneral’sofficemaytemporarilytakepossessiontoperformballisticstestsorothertracingmeasures.

Withregardstoweaponsholdings,themilitaryiseffectivelya“blackbox”:exemptinpractice,ifnotinlaw,frominvestigationoroversight.MultiplesourcestoldAOAVthatarmyofficers,evenuptotherankofgenerals,aredirectlyinvolvedinarmstrafficking,butthatinvestigationsorarrestsbythecivilianauthoritiessimplywerenotpossible.

Giventhelackofoversight,corruptofficerseffectivelysignifycorruptsoldiersaswell.Whilealow-paidsoldiermightnotbeoperationallyresponsibleorcutintotheprofitsfromcorruption,theyhavefewopportunitiestoreportcorruptionhigherupintheranks.Andshouldtheymake

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SuspectedmassgravesinSanSalvador.

TheDevil’sTrade:GunsandviolenceinElSalvador|13

suchareport,thereislittleguaranteethatanycor-rectivemeasureswillbetaken–orthattheywillbesafeguardedagainstretribution.Accordingly,andintheself-reinforcinglogicofinstitutionalcor-ruption,itoftenseemsaperfectlystraightforwardchoicetoremainsilent.

Onalargerscale,themilitaryhassimplyfailedtodestroyitsowngunstockpiles.43Asthemilitarygrewoverthecourseofthecivilwar,itsarsenalincreased,aidedespeciallybymilitaryaidfromtheUnitedStates.TheSmallArmsSurveyreport-edthattheUnitedStateshadsupplied1,900handguns,32,474M-16assaultrifles,3,117M203andM79grenadelaunchers,andnearly270,000grenadestotheSalvadoranmilitaryfrom1980to

1993–anarsenalwhichbyitselfwouldcomfort-ablyequiptheentiremodernSalvadoranmilitarytwoandahalftimesatleast.44

TheSalvadorangovernmentreportshavingdestroyedsome28,036weaponsfrom2006to2008.45However,thatreportednumberisnotdis-aggregatedbetweenfirearmsandgrenades,thelatterbeingmassivelymorenumerousingovern-mentstockpiles.Furthermore,wewereinformedbymultipleindependentsourcesthatthemilitarygenerallydestroyedonlyweaponsthatwerealreadyinoperableandexaggeratedthenumbersofexplosivesdestroyedincontrolleddemolitions.Inshort,themilitary’stransparencyaboutitshold-ingsofweaponsissharplylacking.

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DeathGraffiti,SanSalvador.

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wEApONS fROM CIVIL wAR-ERA STOCkpILESEven less controlled are the arms caches held by the FMLN during the civil war era. One of the conditions of the peace treaty was that the rebel group turn its weapons over to the government for destruction. The United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador supervised the recovery of over 10,000 weapons from FMLN stockpiles, but that did not represent the totality of the guerrillas’ arsenal. A retired high-ranking military officer told us that the FMLN had not turned over all its weapons – in part because it did not trust the government and in part because the FMLN did not know how many weapons it actually had or where they were. As a result, the country continues to host an indeterminate number of caches of weapons from the rebels – and finding, repairing and selling those weapons is one of the ways that illicit arms sellers and middlemen do business.

TheFMLNusedwhateverweaponsitcouldfind,butitwassupported–likemanyLAinsurgencies–bytheSovietUnionandregionalSovietclientstatessuchasCuba.Sovietsmallarms,especiallythemanyvariantsoftheAK-47assaultrifle,arenotoriouslydurable;abletofunctionfollowinglongperiodsofstorageinharshenvironments.Therefore,despitetheiradvancedageandpoorstorageconditions,manyoftheseweaponsare

stillfunctional,ormightbemadefunctionalwiththeattentionofanarmourer.

Morethanonesourcetoldusthatowingtothatdurability,criminalspreferredSoviet-patternweaponstoAmericanorWesternEuropeanguns.Butthoseweaponsalsorequireaseparatesupplychain.Western-patternweapons,suchastheM16,Galil,FALandG3rifles,fireasetofNATO-standardisedammunition.Soviet-typeweaponssuchastheAK-47andType56assaultriflesortheDragunovsniperriflefireadifferentandcompletelyincompatiblesetofcartridges.ProvidingsparepartsforSovietweaponsandcompatibleammuni-tionisabusinessforsmugglersoperatingonaregionalandtrans-nationalbasis.WhensuchpartsandammunitionaredifficulttolegitimatelysourceinElSalvador,GuatemalaorHonduras,wheregovernmentforcesuseexclusivelyWesternweap-ons,thereisnosuchdifficultyinNicaragua,whosemilitaryandpoliceuseSoviet-designedarms.ThecostofviolenceinSanSalvador-poverty.

ThecostoffemicideinSanSalvador.

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TheDevil’sTrade:GunsandviolenceinElSalvador|15

wEApONS IMpORTED fROM REgIONAL SOURCESThere is a thriving cross-border trade between El Salvador and its neighbours: Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. Like El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala both had extensive civil wars, and like El Salvador neither adequately dealt with their arms stockpiles when the wars ended. Col. Carlos Rivas, the former head of Army Intelligence, told AOAV that the Honduran border is particularly difficult to control for historical reasons: El Salvador and Honduras fought a border war in 1969 and the area remained disputed until the formal declaration of peace in 1981, at which point the Salvadoran Civil War had already begun.

ElSalvador’sbordersarenotespeciallysecure.Thecountryhasa343kmborderwithHondurasanda203kmborderwithGuatemala,andfacesNicaraguaacrossthenarrowGulfofFonseca.Thegeographyoftheseregionsdoesnotmakethejobofpolicingthemagainstillicitflowseasy:thelandbordersaregenerallyveryruralandmountainous,whichwouldbedifficultterraintopatrolforevenawealthy,well-equippedgovern-menttoeffectivelypatrol.

Mattersareevenworseatsea.ElSalvador’snavynumberslessthanathousandpersonnelandoperatesjustahandfulofsmall,agedpatrolcraft–aforceentirelyinadequatetothetaskofpreventingorevenmateriallylimitingnauticalsmuggling.GiventheshortdistanceandcalmwatersbetweenNicaraguaandElSalvador,smugglerscansimplyusesmallfishingboatstomovesmallcargoesonanightlybasis.

AOAVresearchersweretakentoabeachusedbysuchsmugglersandshownboatsusedintheseoperations.UnlikethespecialisedcraftusedtosmuggledrugsfromtheAndestotheNorthernTriangle,MexicoortheUnitedStates,theseboatsareidenticaltocraftusedforfishingandrecreationalpurposes.Indeed,weweretoldthat

someoftheoperatorswerelegitimatecommercialfishermenandtourguidesbydaywhosupple-mentedtheirincomebymakingnight-timerunstoandfromNicaragua,returningtoElSalvadorwithupto25AK-47satatime.

MovementofweaponsbetweenCentralAmericanstatesservesseveralpurposes.Itprovidesaccesstoabroaderrangeofweaponsandammunition,buildsandstrengthenslinksbetweencriminalgroupsandallowsfortheexchangeordisposalofweaponswhichhavealreadybeenusedincrimesandmightpotentiallybetracedback.Italsoper-mitsweaponstocrossbackandforthbetweenlegitimateandillegitimateusersinseparatecoun-triesthroughintermediarieswhotakeadvantageofimperfectinformationsharingbetweennationallawenforcementbodies.

PublicmemorialtoSanSalvador’spre-Columbianpast.

©IainOverton

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pATTERNS Of OwNERSHIp AND USELike many non-state violent groups, both the MS-13 and Calle 18 are organised along cellular lines. While both groups have overall hierarchies with top leadership maintaining ultimate responsibility, significant operational responsibilities lie with lower-level “clique” commanders. Those lower-level commanders are responsible for a specific neighbourhood, their personnel and properties and the execution of all violent and non-violent criminal activities in their area of responsibility. Accordingly, the arsenals are also held and maintained at the clique level.

Asaresult,thelevelofarmamentthatthegangscancalluponvariesconsiderablybyarea.Inareaswhereaganghasbeensuccessful,itmighthaveweaponsfornearlyallofitsactivemembership,withamixofhandgunsandpistolsforstraightfor-wardextortionandattacksonsofttargetsalongwithassaultrifles,submachinegunsandotherheavyweaponsforattacksonwell-armedrivalgroupsorconfrontationswiththePNCorArmy.Alesswealthyorlessestablishedgroupmighthavetomakedowithasmallnumberofhand-gunstoshare.Yetnomatterhowbigorsmallagangis,thegunisseenasanecessarytoolfordefence.AsonememberoftheCalle18toldus,“Wehavethecontrolofthelandhere,butthefactthateveryonehasagunmeanswewillalwaysbeprotectingourselvesfromotherscomingin.”

Oftheweaponsthatareconfiscatedbypolice,handgunsareanoverwhelmingmajority.BetweenJanuaryandNovember2011,policeseized3,915weapons,including1,817pistolsand1,037revolv-ers.Shotguns(405)andrifles(224)weremuchlesscommon.Militaryweaponssuchasmachinegunswereconfiscatedinsmallnumbers,whichpresum-ablyreflectstheirrelativerarityalongwiththeirgreatermaterialandfinancialvalue.46

Operationally,storageanddistributionalsotakediverseforms,thoughonecommonalityseemsto

bethatgunsareregardedaspropertyofthegangratherthantheindividual.Somecliquesprefertomaintaincentralcommandofanarsenalhiddeninahomeinacontrolledneighbourhood;otherskeepweaponsdistributedacrossanumberoftrustedconfidantes.Moreestablishedgroupsmighthaveadesignatedarmourerorweaponsspecialist,responsibleforweaponsacquisitionandmaintenancealongwithtraining;othersusemoread-hocsystems.

Weweretoldthatgangmembersneveraban-donedweaponsafterusingtheminviolentcrimes,astherewaslittlefearthatthepolicewoulduseforensicstobuildcasesaroundspecificweapons.Ontheotherhand,weweretoldbybothpoliceandgangsourcesthatgangmemberscarryingweaponsoutsidefriendlyterritorywasstronglydiscouraged,exceptaspartofattacksonrivaltar-gets.Thesewaspartlyascribedbygangmembersasareflectiononthefactthatthepolicewillarrestsuspectedgangmembersforweaponsposses-sionandthenbuildacaseagainstthemwhiletheyawaittrialinjail.

Thecultureofguncustomisation,asseenamongstMexicandrugcartels,doesnotseemtobepar-ticularlyprevalentinElSalvador.Gangmembersinterviewedtookwhatmightbedescribedasafunctionaltonedescribingweapons:nonethatwetalkedtohadaparticularfavouriteweaponandwesawnoindicationininterviewsorfromphotograph-icevidencethatcustomisedordecoratedweaponswereeithercommonorparticularlydesirable.Effectiveness,ratherthansymbolism,seemstobethewatchwordforSalvadorangangs.

Onerecurringtheme,perhapsunsurprisingly,wastheroleofpersonalrelationshipsinthelocalarmstrade.SourceswithintheMS-13andCalle18bothindicatedthattheypreferentiallydealtwitharmstradermiddlemenwhowererelatedtothem,orattheveryleastwerewellknownandtrustwor-thy.Familyconnectionsarealsoseenasawayto

TheDevil’sTrade:GunsandviolenceinElSalvador|17

limitexpenditures–gangsourcesindicatedthatthiswasnotonlyamatteroftrustworthinessbutalsoofeconomics,asthepricestheypaidfrommiddlementheyhadbloodtiestoweresubstan-tiallylessthanpricespaidtounrelatedbrokers.

Relationshipsbetweenthelocalgangsandtrans-nationalcriminalsyndicatesarealsoimportant.Fromourresearch,itdoesnotappearthatthemajortransnationalcriminalorganisationssuchastheSinaloaFederationortheZetashaveaparticu-larlystrongonthegroundpresenceinElSalvador(incontrasttoGuatemala,wheretheydo).

Wherenecessary,transnationalcriminalgroupsoperateinElSalvadorona“lightfootprint”basis,usingallianceswithlocalgangstoachievetheirobjectives.Thisrelationshipcarriesthroughto

firearmsownership,wherethetransnationalgroups,withtheirfargreaterfinancialresourcesandinternationalsupplynetworks,willlendtheiralliedgangspowerfulweaponsifnecessaryforaparticularoperation,suchasanassassinationattemptonawell-protectedrivalleaderoranoffensiveagainstanenemystronghold.

Thatsaid,thetrucehascreatedanincentiveforgangstoavoidtheappearanceofmajorescala-tions,whichlimitstheiremploymentofthemostpowerfulsmallarms.Whilegangsourcesindi-catedthattheywerecapableofacquiringhandgrenadesandlightanti-tankweaponswithoutparticulardifficulty,theyexpressedareluctancetousethemforfearofprovokingadisproportion-atepoliceresponse.Indeed,therehaveonlybeenafewrecordedattackswithexplosiveweapons.

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Hinton

MSgangmemberswithoneoftheirweapons,LasVictirias,SanSalvador.

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CONCLUSIONAt no point during our research was it suggested that gangs had any major difficulty obtaining weapons. As in any complex criminal enterprise, there are setbacks, hurdles and difficulties, but nothing to prevent these exceptionally large and sophisticated organisations from obtaining weapons as they see fit. It is well-established that there is a link between the proliferation of guns – especially illicit guns – and gun deaths outside of declared conflicts.47 The largely uncontrolled arms bazaar operating in El Salvador underscores this correlation.

However,itisdifficulttounderstandtheprecisescaleoftheproblem.Estimatingthenumberofillicitgunsinacountrywithextraordinarylevelsofviolentcrimeisneithereasynorprecise,butthedifficultyiscompoundedbytheabsenceofcentralised,reliabledataandthedifficultiesinaccessingthatdata.Informationheldbythemilitaryisofparticularconcernhere–weweretoldthatthePNC,theMinistryofJusticeandtheAttorneyGeneral’sofficehadallimprovedthequalityofthedatatheykept.Butdataaroundthesizeandcompositionofthestockpilesandarsenalsheldbythemilitaryappearstobeeitherclassifiedornon-existent.

Forabriefperiodoftime,thegangtrucemayhavereducedthemurderrateinElSalvador,butithasdonelittletolimitthemeansbywhichviolencemightbecarriedout.Thereareanumberofinter-relatedissueswhichneedtobeaddressedtomoveElSalvadorawayfromthebrink:judicialandpenalsectorreform,addressingcorruptioninthepoliceandpoliticalstructures,buildingstrongerrelationshipsbetweenthemilitaryandothersec-torsofsociety,creatingjobopportunitiesaswellastacklingpovertyandsocialexclusion.ButthelargenumbersofgunsinElSalvadorthreatenallofthosepossibilities.

Moreimportantly,theyreinforcethepotentialforanewupsurgeofviolence.Thegangsmaynotbepoliticalinthetraditionalsense,buttheyrespondtopoliticaldevelopments.AsoneCalle18membertoldus,“Ifthegovernmentpushesus,we’llfightback.Andiftheypushustoohard,we’llbringinreinforcementsfromHondurasandGua-temalaandfightthemtothedeath.”ElSalvador’sapparentpeaceisdeeplyprecarious–andwillremainsountilitsissueswithgunsareforthrightlyandcomprehensivelyaddressed.

Businesssignsmakeitclearabouttheirpolicyonguns.

PubliccemeteryinSanSalvador

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TheDevil’sTrade:GunsandviolenceinElSalvador|19

ENDNOTES1 UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime,“Transnational

OrganizedCrimeinCentralAmericaandtheCaribbean:AThreatAssessment”,September2012,p.29http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/TOC_Central_America_and_the_Caribbean_english.pdf(accessedon29July2014)

2 https://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Demographics_of_El_Salvador.html

3 UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime,“Intentionalhomicidecountandrateper100,000population,bycountry/territory(2000-2012)”http://www.unodc.org/gsh/en/data.html(accessedon29July2014)

4 UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime,“Percentageofhomicidesbymechanism,timeseries2000-2012”http://www.unodc.org/gsh/en/data.html(accessedon29July2014)

5 UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime,“Intentionalhomicidecountandrateper100,000population,bycountry/territory(2000-2012)”http://www.unodc.org/gsh/en/data.html(accessedon29July2014)

6 http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/el-salvador-population/

7 UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime,“CrimeandDevelopmentinCentralAmerica:CaughtintheCrossfire”,May2007https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Central-america-study-en.pdf(accessedon30July2014)

8 UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime,“Intentionalhomicidecountandrateper100,000population,bycountry/territory(2000-2012)”http://www.unodc.org/gsh/en/data.html(accessedon29July2014)

9 KyraGurney,“HomicidesinElSalvadorReachPre-GangTruceLevels,”InSight Crime,8July2014http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/homicides-in-el-salvador-reach-pre-truce-levels(accessedon30July2014)

10 ElSalvadorscored38/100(0ishighlycorrupt,100is‘veryclean’)asratedbytheTransparencyInternationalCorruptionPerceptionsIndexhttp://www.transparency.org/country#SLV_DataResearch(accessedon25August2014)

11 FionaTerry,“CondemnedtoRepeat?TheParadoxofHumanitarianAction”,CornellUniversityPress(2002)p.92

12 MichaelKlareandDavidAndersen,“ASourceofGuns:TheDiffusionofSmallArmsandLightWeaponsinLatinAmerica,”FederationofAmericanScientists(1996)p.83http://fas.org/asmp/library/scourge/scourge-ch6.pdf(accessedon26August2014)

13 “ElSalvadortoldtoinvestigate1981ElMozotemassacre”,BBC,11December2012http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-20675619(accessed31July2014)

14 “ElSalvadorprofile”,BBC,18March2014http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-19402222(accessedon31July2014)

15 DouglasFarah,“OrganizedCrimeinElSalvador:TheHomegrownandTransnationalDimensions”,WoodrowWilsonInternationalCenterforScholars,February2011http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Farah.FIN1.pdf(accessed22August2014)

16 AaronTerrazas,“SalvadoranImmigrantsintheUnitedStates,”MigrationPolicyInstitute,5January2010http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/salvadoran-immigrants-united-states(accessed22August2014)

17 UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime,“TransnationalOrganizedCrimeinCentralAmericaandtheCaribbean:AThreatAssessment”,September2012,p.27-28http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/TOC_Central_America_and_the_Caribbean_english.pdf(accessed22August2014)

18 JoséMiguelCruz,“GlobalGangsinElSalvador:MarasandthePoliticsofViolence”,paperpresentedattheGlobalGangsWorkshop,CentreonConflict,Development,andPeacebuilding,Geneva,May14-15,2009http://www.academia.edu/1451010/Global_Gangs_in_El_Salvador_Maras_and_the_Politics_of_Violence(accessedon26August2014)

19 JoséMiguelCruz,“GlobalGangsinElSalvador:MarasandthePoliticsofViolence”,paperpresentedattheGlobalGangsWorkshop,CentreonConflict,Development,andPeacebuilding,Geneva,May14-15,2009http://www.academia.edu/1451010/Global_Gangs_in_El_Salvador_Maras_and_the_Politics_of_Violence(accessedon26August2014)

20 DennisRodgers,RobertMuggah,andChrisStevenson,“GangsofCentralAmerica:Causes,Costs,andInterventions”,SmallArmsSurvey(May2009)p.12http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/B-Occasional-papers/SAS-OP23-Gangs-Central-America.pdf(accessedon22August2014)

21 ClareRibandoSeelke,“GangsinCentralAmerica”,CongressionalResearchService(February2014)p.9http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34112.pdf(accessedon22August2014)

22 DennisRodgers,RobertMuggah,andChrisStevenson,“GangsofCentralAmerica:Causes,Costs,andInterventions”,SmallArmsSurvey(May2009)p.12http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/B-Occasional-papers/SAS-OP23-Gangs-Central-America.pdf(accessedon22August2014)

23 “Overview:ElSalvador”,InternationalCentreforPrisonStudieshttp://www.prisonstudies.org/country/el-salvador(accessedon22August2014)

24 ClareRibandoSeelke,“GangsinCentralAmerica”,CongressionalResearchService(February2014)p.6http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34112.pdf(accessedon22August2014)

25 RandalC.Archibold,“Gangs’TruceBuysElSalvadoraTenuousPlace”,TheNew York Times,27August2012http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/28/world/americas/in-el-salvador-gang-truce-brings-tenuous-peace.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0(accessedon22August2014)

26 ElyssaPachicoandStevenDudley,“Govt-‘Facilitated’GangTruceinSalvadorSetsDangerousRegionalPrecedent”,InSight Crime,29March2012http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/el-salvador-president-denies-negotiating-with-gangs(accessedon22August2014)

20|ActiononArmedViolence

27 “WhyElSalvadorhasapactwithitsgangsters”,The Economist,2February2014http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/02/economist-explains(accessedon22August2014)

28 MichaelLohmuller,“ElSalvadorMurdersFallSlightlyfor2013,butRisingAgain”,InSight Crime,14January2014http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/el-salvador-murders-fall-slightly-in-2013-but-rising-again(accessedon22August2014)

29 “Seduplicacifradepersonasdesaparecidasen2013”,La Prensa Grafica,19December2013http://www.laprensagrafica.com/2013/12/19/se-duplica-cifra-de-personas-desaparecidas-en-2013(accessedon25August2014)

30 SethRobbins,“ThissecretmassgravedoesnotbodewellforElSalvador’sgang‘truce’”,Global Post,29January2014http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/americas/140128/el-salvador-mass-grave-maras-gangs-election(accessedon26August2014)

31 MimiYagoub,“IsElSalvador’sNewPresidentBuryingtheGangTruce”, InSight Crime,11June2014http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/is-el-salvadors-new-president-burying-the-gang-truce(accessedon22August2014)

32 UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime,“Percentagedistributionofintentionalhomicides,bymechanismandbycountry/territory(2005-2012)”http://www.unodc.org/gsh/en/data.html(accessedon25August2014)

33 UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime,“GlobalStudyonHomicide”(2013)p.66http://www.unodc.org/documents/gsh/pdfs/2014_GLOBAL_HOMICIDE_BOOK_web.pdf(accessedon25August2014)

34 “MS13”,InSight Crime,21November2013http://www.insightcrime.org/groups-honduras/mara-salvatrucha-ms-13(accessedon25August2014)

35 JoseMiguelCruzandMariaAntonietaBeltran,“LasarmasdefuegoenElSalvador:Situacioneimpactosobrelaviolencia”,InstitutoUniversitariodeOpinionPublica(2000)http://www.uca.edu.sv/publica/iudop/libros/armas.pdf(accessed25August2014)

36 AaronKarp,“CompletingtheCount:Civilianfirearms,”SmallArmsSurvey(2007)Appendix1.79countrieswithcomprehensivecivilianownershipdatahttp://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2007/en/Small-Arms-Survey-2007-Chapter-02-annexe-1-EN.pdf(accessedon25August2014)

37 OrganizationofAmericanStates,“Civilianfirearmslegallyregistered”http://www.oas.org/dsp/observatorio/database/indicatorsdetails.aspx?lang=en&indicator=29(accessedon25August2014)

38 “Leydecontrolyregulaciondearmas,municiones,explosivosyarticulossimilares”,CorteSupremadeJusticadeElSalvadorcentrodedocumentacionjudicialhttp://www.faes.gob.sv:90/images/stories/Ley%20de%20Armas%2016abril2013.pdf(accessedon25August2014)

39 NicolasFlorquin,“ABoomingBusiness:PrivateSecurityandSmallArms”,SmallArmsSurvey(2011)Table4.4ReportednumberoffirearmsheldbyPSCsinselectedsettingshttp://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2011/en/Small-Arms-Survey-2011-Chapter-04-EN.pdf(accessedon26August2014)

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41 NicolasFlorquin,“ABoomingBusiness:PrivateSecurityandSmallArms”,SmallArmsSurvey(2011)Table4.1Privatesecuritypersonnelin70countrieshttp://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2011/en/Small-Arms-Survey-2011-Chapter-04-EN.pdf(accessedon26August2014)

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ACTION ON ARMED VIOLENCEActiononArmedViolence(AOAV)isaLondon,basedcharitythathasacentralmission:toreduceharmandtorebuildlivesaffectedbyarmedviolence.

Wedothisbycarryingoutfieldwork,researchandadvocacytoreducetheincidenceandimpactofglobalarmedviolence.

Thenumberoffatalitiesfromarmedviolenceisestimatedtobeoverhalfamillionpeoplekilledeveryyear.Aroundtwothirdsoftheseviolentdeathsareestimatedtooccuroutsideconflictsituations.Poorercountriesareparticularlybadlyaffected.

Weseektoremovethethreatofweapons,monitortheimpactofexplosiveweaponsaroundtheworldandinvestigatewhatcausesarmedviolence–fromgunstosuicidebombings.Weaimtoclearlandofexplosiveweaponsandworkwithgovernmentstoregulateguns.

Weworkwithvictimsofarmedviolence,offeringpsychosocialassistance,providingopportunitiestohelpthemearnalivingandtotrytoreduceconflictatlocallevels.

Weworktobuildcommunitiesaffectedbyarmedviolence,workingwithgovernmentsandmeasuringandmonitoringtheincidencesandimpactsofarmedviolencearoundtheworld.

TocontactAOAVpleasegotoourwebsite:www.aoav.org.uk

CONTACT

Action on Armed Violence5thFloor,EpworthHouse25CityRoadLondonEC1Y1AAT +44(0)2072569500F +44(0)2072569311E info@aoav.org.uk

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