The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation

STEPHANE LEFEBVREStephane Lefebvre is a former Strategic Analyst at the Canadian Department of National Defence and a former Marcel Cadieux Policy Planning Fellow at the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. The views expressed here are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the views of any governmental or nongovernmental organizations with which he is or has been affiliated. An earlier version of this article was presented at the Colloque Renseignement et Securite internationale, Laval University, Quebec City, Canada, on 20 March 2003.

The terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 once againforcefully brought to the fore the necessity for cooperation among securitya n d i n t e l l i g e n c e a g e n c i e s , b o t h n at i o n a l l y a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y .1T h etransnational nature of several terrorist organizations, al-Qaeda (the Base)being the most notorious, implies that their detection, disruption, andelimination can succeed fully only if done globally.2That said, no oneshould surmise that international intelligence cooperation did not existpr ior to 11 Sept embe r (her eaf t e r 9=11) . I n f ac t , We s t e rn s e cur i ty andintelligence agencies have long cooperated (and sometimes simultaneouslycompeted), either bilaterally—the preferred way—or multilaterally. Theircooperation is sometimes difficult, uneven, and haphazard, but when livesare believed to be at stake due to terrorists’ active targeting, efforts tomake it work are certainly redoubled.With 9=11 and the initiation of military operations against al-Qaeda inA f g h a n i s t a n , t h e s e e s t a b l i s h e d l i a i s o n r e l a t i o n s h i p s h a d t o b ecompl ement ed wi th vigorous new one s i nvolving Middl e Eas t e rn andCent r al A s i an count ri e s , of t en making for s t range a l l ianc e s .3Whi l e avariety of intelligence liaison relationships with countries in these regionsmay have existed previously they took an enhanced—more operational—turn. Tactical intelligence must be shared to ensure military success, andhuman intelligence gathered to better understand and counterterroristorganizations, as Arabs can more easily infiltrate Islamist terrorist groupsthan can non-Arabs . For t he s e enhanc ed r e lat ion ship s t o work w e l l ,confidence and trust are essential ingredients, as are the perceived benefitsto both sides in the liaison. Although intelligence liaison activities arerarely discussed, their importance needs to be recognized.

THE IMPACT OF 9=11After the 11 September attacks, the United States made full use of its foreignintelligence liaison relationships, for both defensive and offensive purposes,in its ‘‘extensive, shadowy struggle against al-Qa’ida.’’

Included wereeffo r t s to b e n e fit f rom th e knowl edge and e xpe r i enc e o f the Ru s s ian ,Chinese, Pakistani, and even Libyan intelligence services. The director ofSpain’ s Nat ional Int e l l igenc e C ent er ( CNI ) , J or ge De z cal lar , publ i c lyconfirmed the enhanced levels of cooperation among intelligence agenciessince 9=11.5Even this cooperation between the United States and its alliesagainst al-Qaeda was not entirely new. When al-Qaeda emerged, severalyears ago, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) quickly recognized thev a l u e o f c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h f o r e i g n i n t e l l i g e n c e s e r v i c e s i n f a c i n g t h echallenges of knowing more about the organization and penetrating it. Thecooperation, recognized as fruitful by all parties, led to the dismantling ofseveral al-Qaeda cells worldwide.6Just as the CIA expanded its foreign liaison activities to address theincreasing threat posed by al-Qaeda, the Federal Bureau of Investigation(FBI), under the leadership of Louis J. Freeh, director from 1993 to 2001,increased the number of its overseas legal attache´ offices from 16 in 1992to 44 by September 2001. The new offices were concentrated in countriesfacing a terrorist problem, and where cooperation and coordination withthe FBI would be most mutually beneficial.7After 9=11, thirty of theselegal attache´ offices were reinforced by 300 Special Agents and 85 supportstaff ‘‘to assist in pursuing leads and coordinating the investigation withour international colleagues.’’8B u t t h e F i n a l Re p o r t o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s S e n a t e ’ s a n d H o u s e o fRepresentatives’ Joint Inquiry Staff, which investigated the events leadingt o t h e a t t a c k s o f 1 1 S e p t emb e r , co n c luded t hat the U . S . i nt e l l i genc ecommunity had relied too much on the cooperation of foreign intelligenceagen c i e s ins t ead o f r e c rui t ing and d eve lop ing i t s own human sou r c e sa b r oa d . In th e o p i n i o n o f th e J o i n t I nq u i r y S t a ff , th e r e s u l t s o f th i scooperation in terms of productive intelligence were mixed because variousforeign services were not able or willing to really go after the al-Qaedanetwork and its leadership. Compounding this problem was the failure of

U.S. intelligence agencies ‘‘to coordinate their relationships with foreignservices adequately, either within the Intelligence Community or withbroader U.S. Government liaison and foreign policy efforts.’’9While the Joint Inquiry Staff assessment might be correct, it seems tounderestimate the time necessary to infiltrate terrorist organizations orrecruit agents knowledgeable enough about them to be useful. Given itshuman intelligence weaknesses in regions such as the Middle East andCentral Asia,10the United States has no choice but to work with friendlyindigenous intelligence agencies. While intelligence liaison arrangements ofa b i l a t e r a l n a t u r e a r e u s u a l l y t h e m o s t p r o d u c t i v e , m u l t i l a t e r a larrangements, especially in the context of a coalition fighting terrorism,h a v e b e e n c o n s i d e r e d . W h i l e n o n ew mu l t i l a t e r a l a r r a n g eme n t s h a v esurfaced publicly, the assumption must be that multilateral liaison is beingdone on at least an ad hoc basis, given the needs of the moment. AlthoughAustralian intelligence specialist Desmond Ball has argued that ‘‘the fewmul t i lat e ral a r rangement s of the Cold War offe r no mode l s ’ ’ for thecurrent situation,11many of those arrangements survived the fall of theBerlin Wall and have been applied to 9=11.

MULTILATERAL ARRANGEMENTSClose allies routinely exchange intelligence through various bilateral andmultilateral means. But the depth and breadth of these exchanges verymuch depend on their sharing a common perception of a threat or sets ofi n t e r e s t s .1 2The c o m m o n t h r e a t p o s e d t o N o r t h A t l a n t i c T r e a t yOrganization (NATO) members by the Soviet Union during the Cold Warwas thus conducive to allied services sharing large amounts of intelligenceon Soviet intentions and capabilities. The advent and spread of terrorismin the 1970s forced exchanges and cooperation on this issue among closeallies, although this collaboration materialized rather slowly.13Yet, common threat perceptions and shared interests necessary to fruitfulrelationships among intelligence agencies are not sufficient, as other factorsmay indeed complicate these relationships. For instance, a nation or aspecific agency’s intelligence culture may play a role. To wit, as the ColdWar progressed, the United States came to rely increasingly on nationaltechnical means of gathering intelligence, to the detriment of human source

i n t e l l i g en c e , i n c l u d i n g t h a t p r o v i d e d t h r o u g h l i a i s o n r e l a t i o n s h i p s .1 4Further more , the not ion o f t rus t in, and r e spe c t for , othe r agenc i e s i sfor emos t when the t ime c ome s to de c ide on the e xt ent o f i nt e l l igenc esharing arrangements. That is why, for instance, the United States has builtits most productive relationships around key allies, such as the membernations of NATO, Japan, and South Korea.15During the Cold War, thesea l l i e s e s t a b l i s h e d s e v e r a l mu l t i l a t e r a l f o r ums f o r i n t e l l i g e n c e l i a i s o npurposes, to which a few mechanisms were added in the 1990s.

The UKUSA AgreementThe UKUSA Agreement, signed in June 1948 between the First Party (theUnited States) and Second Parties (the United Kingdom (UK), Australia,Canada, and New Zealand), divided signals collection efforts among itssignatories.16Historian Stephen Dorril correctly qualifies it as ‘‘the mostimportant and resilient part of British intelligence’s ‘special relationship’with the United States,’’17which, incidentally, has gone far beyond theworld of signals intelligence. For instance, the British Joint IntelligenceCommi t t e e ( J IC) , whi ch p roduc e s int e l l igenc e as s e s smen t s for s eniorpolicymakers, has long involved the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) ini t s work, and v i c e -ve r sa.1 8Coope rat ion among t he five par t i e s to theagreement is believed to be close, but not necessarily mutually beneficial,given the disproportionate resources at the disposal of the United Statesand the United Kingdom, and those of the relatively small intelligencecommunities of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.19The relationshipsfostered by the UKUSA Agreement are a key to the United States’s effortto secure its homeland, and necessary to its fight against terrorism.

The Club of BerneThe Club of Berne, a forum for the heads of the separate national EuropeanUnion security services, has met annually since 1971, and has its owndedicated communications system. According to the 1999 annual report ofthe Dutch National Security Service (Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst—BVD,now the Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst—AIVD, or General

Intelligence and Security Service), that year’s meeting agenda for the BerneClub inc l ude d s u c h i t e ms as t e r ror i s m , c ommuni ca t ions int e r c ept i on,encryption, and cyberterrorism. In 2000, the Club focused on the positionor rol e of int e l l igenc e s e rvi c e s wi th r e spe c t to European int egrat ion.Informal contacts also take place among smaller groups. The Club worksin relative secrecy, amidst doubts about its efficiency and very shaky legalfooting. The situation reports drawn up by the heads of the participatings e rvi c e s me r e ly provide i nformat i on to membe r s tat e s , s inc e they ar eaddr e s s ed t o no pa r t i cular Europ ean pol i t i cal au thor i ty , such as theEuropean Union’s High Representative for the Common Foreign andSecurity Policy.20The European UnionOn 20 September, 2001, the Justice and Home Affairs Council realized thatenhanced cooperation among the member countries’ intelligence serviceswas required. It decided to establish, within Europol,21for an initial sixmonth period, a Counter-Terrorism Task Force for which the memberstates were invited ‘‘to appoint liaison officers from police and intelligence530 STE¤PHANE LEFEBVREINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCEDownloaded At: 20:38 17 February 2011services specialising in the fight against terrorism.’’22The Club ofBe rne , mandat ed t o p rovide guidanc e to Europol ’ s count e r t e r ror i smexperts, formed a consultation group of directors of counterterrorismdepartments, which meets four times a year, to that effect.23On 14 March,2003, the European Union and NATO signed an agreement on the securityof information, a prerequisite for the exchange of intelligence between thetwo organizations.24The Kilowatt GroupCreated in 1977, upon an Israeli suggestion following the attack by BlackSeptember at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games, was the Kilowatt Group.Believed to have changed its name since then, it is comprised of twentyfour membe r s e rvi c e s : EU m embe r sta t e s , Canada , Nor way, Swede n ,Switzerland, the United States (CIA and FBI), Israel (MOSSAD and ShinB e t h ) , a n d S o u t h A f r i c a . T h e y e x c h a n g e , o n a n o n - r e c i p r o c a l b a s i s ,information on terrorists and terrorist organizations. According to anAssembly of the Western European Union report, however, ‘‘the ‘group’ islittle more than a telex network.’’

25The NATO Special CommitteeThe NATO Special Committee, known in NATO parlance as AC=46, is oneof the oldest intelligence exchange mechanisms among allies. Established bythe North Atlantic Council (NAC) on 3 December 1952, it is comprised ofthe heads of security intelligence services of NATO member countries, eachof whom speaks for his country’s intelligence community. AC=46 advisesthe NAC on espionage, terrorist, and other nonmilitary related threats thatm i g h t a ff e c t t h e a l l i a n c e a n d i t s m e m b e r s t a t e s . T h e w o r k o f t h eCommittee, whose chairmanship rotates annually among heads of service,is supported by the NATO Office of Security. In the wake of 9=11, theB e l g i a n c h a i r o f t h e S p e c i a l C o m mi t t e e e s t a b l i s h e d , w i t h i n N A T OHeadquarters, an analytical unit to compile and analyze intelligence onterrorism obtained from security services, disseminate this intelligence tothe Council and the Secretary General, and closely cooperate with NATOmilitary intelligence bodies. The Committee also explored the possibility ofincreasing its cooperation in the field of counterterrorism with Russianintelligence agencies.’’26As part of the NATO Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council’s (EAPC) ActionPlan 2000–2002, meetings of the EAPC forty-six countries’ intelligenceagencies were held within the framework of the NATO Special Committee.These meetings focused on the identification of threats from, and responsesto, international terrorism.27An EAPC meeting touching upon intelligence,but outside the framework of the NATO Special Committee, was also heldpost-9=11. Hosted by Poland, it was attended by a representative of theINTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION 531AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME 16, NUMBER 4Downloaded At: 20:38 17 February 2011Canadian chair of the NATO Special Committee, who chaired WorkingTable 1 on the exchange of information, education, and training.28In April 2002, Romanian authorities organized a symposium for NATOmembers and candidate countries to discuss ‘‘The Intelligence and SecurityServices and the Security Agenda of the XXIst Century.’’ According to aNATO official who attended the meeting, ‘‘the event was also meant todispel lingering suspicions among intelligence services, which in the pastworked against each other.’’29The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence UnitsThe Egmont Group was established in 1995 to provide an internationalforum for cooperation and the exchange of intelligence among national

financial intelligence units. Initially focused on the fight against moneyl a u n d e r i n g , i t s wo r k n ow i n c l u d e s e ff o r t s t o t hwa r t t h e fi n a n c i n g o ft e r r o r i s m . M a n y o f i t s m e m b e r s a r e a c t i v e l y s u p p o r t i n g t h e i r U . S .colleagues in the war on terrorism.30In June 2002, 11 financial intelligenceunits, including the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre ofCanada (FINTRAC) , we r e adde d t o t he organi zat i on’ s 58 m embe r s ,raising its membership to 69.31‘‘Uni¢cation’’ of ServicesIn Mar ch 2001, Rus s ian int e l l igenc e agenc i e s hos t ed a m e e t ing in St .Petersburg, bringing together the heads of intelligence agencies, or theirrepresentatives, from no fewer than 39 states. This ‘‘International Forumof Secret Services’’ had, as its ultimate objective the bringing about of an e w l e v e l o f i n t e l l i g e n c e c o o p e r a t i o n t h r o u g h t h e ‘ ‘ u n i fi c a t i o n ’ ’ o fespionage agencies.32The Forum was certainly among the largest gatheringof intelligence agencies ever, outside of NATO’s Euro-Atlantic PartnershipCouncil in AC=46 format.While useful for bringing together the intelligence services of severalcountries for some lofty purposes, and building confidence and trust over along period of time, these multilateral arrangements are, overall, far frombeing privileged platforms for intelligence cooperation. The key reason hasto do with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, according tothe principle that ‘‘the wider the dissemination of information, the greaterthe chance of its unauthorized disclosure.’’33Bilateral liaison arrangementsare thus the preferred means of international intelligence cooperation.Most, if not all, bilateral exchanges are subject to the third-party rule,which means that intelligence supplied by a party to another cannot beshared with a third one without the originator’s consent. Without such arule, intelligence shared with an ally could end up in the hands of a thirdparty friendly to the original recipient but an adversary of the originator.34532 STE¤PHANE LEFEBVREINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCEDownloaded At: 20:38 17 February 2011BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTSBilateral liaison arrangements are a defining characteristic of the intelligencewo r l d . S e t u p f o rma l l y ( i . e . , wi t h t h e s i g n i n g o f a M emo r a n d um o fUnderstanding) or informally (on the basis of an unwritten, gentlemanly

agreement), they pay particular attention to the participants’ protection oftheir intelligence. They usually cover a wide range of issues, including thesharing of assessments, raw data, or training facilities and the conduct ofjoint operations, some of which could lay dormant at any given time.While traces and discussions of particular bilateral relationships can befound in the historical literature, key questions such as ‘‘How does suchcoope ra t ion ar i s e ? How f r equ ent ly and wha t form do e s i t take ? Whoauthorizes it and arranges it?’’ are not always easily answered.35Most intelligence agencies recognize that the gaps in their coverage, access,or expertise to do certain things, periodically compel them to rely on alliedintelligence services to fill the void. As an example of lack of expertise, int h e m i d - 1 9 8 0 s t h e D i r e c t i o n d e l a su r v e i l l a n c e d u t e r r i t o i r e ( F r a n c e ’ sinternal security service—DST) asked the CIA and Germany’s FederalIntelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst—BND) for assistance inexploiting documents provided by Colonel Vetrov (codenamed Farewell) ofthe Soviet State Security Committee (KGB), who in 1980 had offered hisservices to the DST. Yves Bonnet, the head of the DST at the time, hadsimply concluded that his service did not have the necessary expertise todo the job.36The liaison relationships of the United States have perhaps been discussedmore than those of any other country, largely because of the greater opennessof U.S. society with regard to intelligence matters. For example, the UnitedStates and Germany have built a solid cooperative partnership dating back tothe end of World War II.37They shared responsibilities against commont a r g e t s , s p e c i fi c a l l y t h e S o v i e t Un i o n a n d t h e G e r m a n D e m o c r a t i cRepublic, throughout the Cold War and at least until the end of the SovietUnion in 1991. With the advent of terrorism in Germany in the 1960s and1970s, intelligence cooperation between the two countries extended to thisarea as well.38Israel, which faces constant threats from terrorism, has also developed aseries of intelligence relationships with its closest allies. Additionally, theforeign intelligence service, the Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks(ha-Mossad le-Modiin ule-Tafkidim Meyuhadim—MOSSAD), has builtunlikely ties with certain Muslim and Arab intelligence agencies, includingthat of Jordan.39Others, such as the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO)and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), have hundreds of

l i a i s o n a r r a n g eme n t s i n p l a c e wi t h f o r e i g n s e c u r i t y a n d i n t e l l i g e n c eINTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION 533AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME 16, NUMBER 4Downloaded At: 20:38 17 February 2011agencies. As of 2003, ASIO had 233 liaison partners, distributed across 104count ri e s ,4 0and, as of 2002, CSIS had 230 liaison arrangements withagencies from 130 countries. Like other Canadian organizations with anintelligence mandate—the Department of National Defence, the RoyalCanadian Mounted Police, the Communications Security Establishment,the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the PrivyCouncil Office—CSIS also has full-time Security Liaison Officers (SLOs)pos t ed abroad.4 1Given the i r la rg e numbe r , th e l ia i son ar rang emen t smanaged by intelligence agencies are quite likely to differ tremendously inscope, breadth, and depth.REASONS FOR COOPERATIONIntelligence agencies cooperate for many reasons. No one agency can do andknow everything. But, they act primarily in support of their nation’s foreignpolicy objectives and in their self-interest. They may even get better in theprocess,42that being one of the objectives behind many of the overturesoffered by multilateral arrangements for the sharing of intelligence, such asNATO’s EAPC meetings in the framework of the Special Committee.The United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom areparticularly attractive partners for less fortunate services that can tradehuman intelligence for the more sophisticated and expensive technicalproducts to which they would not otherwise have access. As Paul Taillonnotes, ‘‘[O]n occasion, some smaller nations can have access to importanthuman intelligence sources, and therefore these states can be attractivep a r t n e r s i n i n t e l l i g e n c e - g a t h e r i n g a c t i v i t i e s a b r o a d . ’ ’4 3U l t i m a t e l y ,intelligence cooperation occurs when the potential benefits are evident, andthe costs or risks of that cooperation well understood.44Filling identifiedgaps, reducing operational costs, and replacing nonexistent diplomaticrelations are among the major benefits of intelligence cooperation. Othersmay include some ability to influence, where applicable, the policies ofother countries, or ‘‘affect the course of a military conflict,’’ as happenedin 1984 after Iraq received U.S. intelligence useful in its war against Iran.

45RESTRAINTS ON COOPERATIONThe nature and extent of intelligence liaison relationships can be affected byseveral factors:(1) Differences in perceptions of a threat and the foreign policy objectives of theservices’ respective nations, which may prevent a coordinated, effective, andforceful approach in, perhaps, the fight against terrorism;46(2) Differences in the distribution of power, which may be conducive to unequalrelationships with the consequent impact, for example, on domestic affairs forthe dominant partner, such as complaints about unfair burden-sharing;47534 STE¤PHANE LEFEBVREINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCEDownloaded At: 20:38 17 February 2011(3) The poor human rights records of a liaison partner, which may lead to a setbackin the relationship.48This is a tricky issue for Western governments, which haveto carefully balance the requirement to protect their citizens with that of notassisting human rights violations through cooperation with a liaison partner.49(4) Legal issues. For example, the CSIS can enter into a liaison arrangement with aforeign agency only with the approval of the Solicitor General of Canada, afterconsultation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. TheSolicitor General may impose conditions on any arrangements, and must ensurethat the human rights record of a prospective partner be assessed and weighed inany decision, that all applicable laws of Canada be respected, and that thearrangement be compatible with Canada’s foreign policy.50The impact that judicial practice may have on a liaison arrangement mustbe taken into account by both parties. A recent Canadian case is instructive.In 2002, Nicholas Ribic, charged under Canada’s international hostagetaking law , was g ran t ed ac c e s s t o CS I S and Depar tment of Nat ionalDe f ence document s , s ome o f whi ch contained i nt e l l igenc e r e c e ived i nconfidence from foreign intelligence agencies. While recognizing this fact,the trial judge took the position that a fair trial took precedence over theprot e c t ion o f thi rd par t i e s ’ int e l l igenc e data. The f ede ral gove rnmentlawyers lost the argument that a release of the documents would damageCanada’s ability to obtain intelligence from foreign governments andother third parties. ‘We promised, before we received the information,that we would keep the information confidential,’ Alain Pre´fontaine, aJustice Department lawyer, said in an interview. ‘The source would bemore reluctant to divulge information in future . . . knowing that thethird-party might disclose it to the Canadian government, who mightthen make it public.’

51(5) Related to the above is the fear that the intelligence exchanged, or knowledgeacquired, through the relationship will be compromised or passed on to athird party without the originator’s consent is a major constraining factor onany liaison arrangement.52Numerous historical cases are available to illustratethis point.Certainly, one of the most damaging cases was Harold Adrian Russell(Kim) Philby’s. A British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) officer workingfor the KGB, he served as a liaison officer to the CIA from 1949 untilrecalled to London in 1951. His time in Washington, D.C., was marked byunprecedented access from the highest to the CIA’s lowest-ranked officials,its planning, and what the Agency knew about Soviet operations. Withoutcompunction, he used this knowledge to derail a joint SIS-CIA infiltrationo p e r a t i o n i n A l b a n i a , t h e r e b y l e a d i n g t o t h e d e a t h o f a t l e a s t 3 0 0individuals.53Also, during his time in Washington, he hosted at his homea fellow KGB spy, Guy Burgess, working for the British Foreign Ministry,INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION 535AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME 16, NUMBER 4Downloaded At: 20:38 17 February 2011a security risk if any. This infuriated the CIA, which, along with the SIS, wasstill unaware that Philby was working for the Soviets. According to MilesCopeland, who was with the Agency at the time, CIA Director WalterBedell Smith ‘‘sent an ultimatum of the greatest bluntness to the British.‘Fire Philby,’ he said, ‘or we break off the intelligence relationship’’’54( P h i l by d e f e c t e d to t h e S o v i e t U n i o n a f ew y e a r s l a t e r ) . Du r i ng t h i sdelicate period, the United States severed its cooperation with Britain ona t o m i c w e a p o n s a m i d s t f e a r s t h a t i t s n u c l e a r s e c r e t s w o u l d b ecompromised.55A more recent case is the leak of a National Security Agency (NSA)memorandum on signals intelligence collection against members of theUni t ed Nat ions S e cur i ty Counc i l (UNSC) . A f emal e employe e of th eNSA’s cousin in the United Kingdom, the Government CommunicationsHeadquarters (GCHQ), was arrested in March 2003 and charged under theOfficial Secrets Act. According to a news report, the memo was leakedbecause of the arrested employee’s disagreement with the policy on Iraqbeing pursued by her government and that of the United States.56

The leakwas excessively embarrassing to the United States, which became subject toa UN investigation into the matter at the time when it was fighting hard atthe UNSC to see its views on Iraq prevail. Ian Davis and David Isenbergof the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) argued thatthe leak was ‘‘driving a further wedge between Western nations at a crucialtime,’’ and speculated that the damage caused to transatlantic relationswould take a while to repair.57(6) The intelligence exchanged through a liaison relationship could potentiallybe used for unintended purposes, as it was by Israel in June 1981 when itstruck Iraq’s Osirak reactor, thanks to satellite imagery obtained from theC I A . I n r e s p o n s e , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a m e n d e d i t s i n t e l l i g e n c e - s h a r i n gagreement with Israel to ensure that it would use U.S. intelligence for onlydefensive purposes.58This list, while not exhaustive,59illustrates the variables to be weighed byin t e l l i ge nc e age nc i e s whe n c on s i de r i ng en t r y i n t o a pa r t i c ul ar l i a i sonarrangement with a foreign intelligence agency. These variables lead to theas sumpt ion that int el l igen c e agenci e s l ike ly p re f er formal r at he r t haninformal agreements, since they offer more protection and lay the base fora more equitable quid pro quo.FINDING THE RIGHT QUID PRO QUOAlthough the literature on international intelligence cooperation is sparseand l ar g e ly hi s t or i c a l6 0the r e i s hardly any doubt that al l int e l l igenc es e r v i c e s p e r f o r m s o m e k i n d o f l i a i s o n f u n c t i o n . N o n e h a s a l l t h eresources—financial, human, and technical—to be entirely self-sufficient in536 STE¤PHANE LEFEBVREINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCEDownloaded At: 20:38 17 February 2011all areas. Furthermore, the transnational nature of security threats makesisolation an impossible option. While international cooperation has to beentertained, its benefits must be weighed against the costs and risks. Post9=11, once implausible relationships are now apparently working out, atleast for the narrow purpose of combating al-Qaeda.Multilateral arrangements, though they exist, are mostly neglected byi n t e l l i g e n c e a g e n c i e s , w h i c h p la c e m o r e i m p o r t a n c e o n b i l a t e r a lrelationships, primarily for security reasons. Fulfilling other objectives,

such as influencing policies and outcomes, is usually easier bilaterally,rather than through a forum comprised of dozen of intelligence agencies,each having a different mandate and objective. What is shared and donem u l t i l a t e r a l l y i s u s u a l l y n o t o f a s e n s i t i v e n a t u r e . M u l t i l a t e r a larrangements, such as NATO and the Club of Berne, could be useful,however, to establish relations based upon trust and confidence with neworganizational members or outside partners. Their purpose is, therefore,more political, and their activities conducted in support of national oragreed-upon policy objectives. While some multilateral arrangements havecontributed to the ongoing global war on terrorism, their impact, as far ascan be openly discerned, has been minimal.In all likelihood, bilateral liaison arrangements and certain specialf u n c t i o n m u l t i l a t e r a l i n t e l l i g e n c e a r r a n g e m e n t s w i l l c h a r a c t e r i z einternational intelligence cooperation in the war against al-Qaeda andother terrorist groups. The Joint Inquiry Staff’s conclusion that UnitedStates intelligence must develop its own human intelligence sources is wellintended. But foreign intelligence agencies, because of their geographicallocation and the composition and ability of their personnel, will continue,in many cases, to have a clear comparative advantage which will not beovercome by the U.S. putting more money into intelligence while isolatingitself in so doing. The key for U.S. intelligence agencies, as well as forother agencies involved in the worldwide fight against terrorism, will be tofind the right quid pro quo with their liaison partners, while protectingt h e i r o wn s o u r c e s , me t h o d s , an d i n f o rma t i o n i n r e a c h i n g b o t h t h e i rcommon and separate objectives.REFERENCES1This article focuses upon the international intelligence cooperation betweencivilian security and intelligence agencies responsible for fighting terrorism andtherefore makes no attempt to characterize the nature and extent of militaryintelligence relationships.2See, inter alia, Paul Taillon, Hijacking and Hostages: Government Responses toTerrorism (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), p. 163.INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION 537AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME 16, NUMBER 4Downloaded At: 20:38 17 February 20113For instance, Libyan intelligence agencies assisted the West in the fight againstterrorism post-9=11. Richard J. Aldrich, ‘‘Dangerous Liaison: Post-September11 Intelligence Alliances,’’ Harvard International Review, Vol. XXIV, No. 3,Fall 2002, p. 51.4Eleanor Hill, Staff Director, Joint Inquiry Staff, Statement before the JointIntelligence Committee of the U.S. Senate and U.S. House of Representatives

I n v e s t i g a t i n g t h e E v e n t s L e a d i n g t o t h e At t a c k s o f S e p t emb e r 1 1 , 2 0 0 1(Washington, DC: 18 September 2002), p. 14; see also pp. 7–8.5El Pais, Spain, 28 April 2002.6Eleanor Hill, Staff Director, Joint Inquiry Staff, Statement before the JointIntelligence Committee of the U.S. Senate and U.S. House of RepresentativesI n v e s t i g a t i n g t h e E v e n t s L e a d i n g t o t h e At t a c k s o f S e p t emb e r 1 1 , 2 0 0 1(Washington, DC: 8 October 2002). This was confirmed by the Director ofCe nt ral I n t e l l i ge nc e ( DC I ) on 17 O c tobe r 2002. George J . Tene t , Wr i t t enStatement for the Record of the Director of Central Intelligence before theJ o i n t I n t e l l i g e n c e C o m m i t t e e o f t h e U . S . S e n a t e a n d U . S . H o u s e o fRepresentatives Investigating the Events Leading to the Attacks of September11, 2001 (Washington, DC: 17 October 2002), pp. 11–12.7Eleanor Hill, Statement of 8 October 2002.8Robert S. Mueller III, Testimony before the Joint Intelligence Committee of theU.S. Senate and U.S. House of Representatives Investigating the Events Leadingto the Attacks of September 11, 2001 (Washington, DC: 17 October 2002), p. 3.9Joint Inquiry Staff, Report: The Context. Part I: Findings and Conclusions(Washington, DC: 10 December 2002), p. 9.10See, inter alia, Robert Baer, See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in theCIA’s War on Terrorism (New York: Crown Publishers, 2002).11Desmond Ball, ‘‘Desperately Seeking Bin Laden: The Intelligence Dimension ofthe War Against Terrorism,’’ in Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future ofGlobal Order, Ken Booth and Tim Dunne, eds. (Houndmills, United Kingdom:Palgrave, 2002), p. 71.12Paul Taillon, Hijacking and Hostages, pp. 174–175.1 3J e a n - F r a n c o i s G a y r a u d a n d D a v i d S e´ n a t , L e t e r r o r i s m e ( P a r i s : P r e s s e sUniversitaires de France, Que sais-je? No. 1768, 2002), pp. 61–62.14Ri cha rd R e and Kr i s t e n E i chens eh r , ‘ ‘A Conve r sat ion wi th Bob Graham.S e a r c h i n g f o r An swe r s : U. S . I nt e l l i g e n c e Af t e r Se p t emb e r 1 1 , ’ ’ Ha r v a r dInternational Review, Vol. XXIV, No. 3, Fall 2002, p. 40.

15Ibid., p. 41.16Peter Hennessy, The Secret State: Whitehall and the Cold War (London: TheP e n g u i n P r e s s , 2 0 0 2 ) , p . 2 6 . T h e k e y w o r k o n t h i s s u b j e c t i s J e ff r e y T .Richelson and Desmond Ball, The Ties That Bind: Intelligence CooperationBetween the UKUSA Countries (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985).17Stephen Dorril, MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty’s Secret IntelligenceService (New York: The Free Press, 2000), p. 56.538 STE¤PHANE LEFEBVREINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCEDownloaded At: 20:38 17 February 201118See Percy Cradock, Know Your Enemy: How the Joint Intelligence Committee Sawthe World (London: John Murray, 2002), pp. 271–280.19Christopher O. Spencer, ‘‘Intelligence Analysis Under Pressure of Rapid Change:The Canadian Challenge,’’ The Journal of Conflict Studies, Vol. XVI, No. 1,Spring 1996, p. 63.20See, inter alia, Sylvain Besson, ‘‘Un ve´ ´ teran des renseignements franc ais oppose le secret-de´fense `a l’enqueˆte sur ses comptes suisses’’ (6 December 2002), ath t t p : ==w w w . m a r c o s b i l l i o n s . c o m=m a r c o s =Y 2 0 0 2 =D e c e m b e r =0 6 % 2 0French%20intelligence%20veteran%20opposes% 20secrecy%20defence.htm;M r . L e m o i n e , R a p p o r t e u r , ‘ ‘T h e N e w C h a l l e n g e s F a c i n g E u r o p e a nIntelligence—Reply to the Annual Report of the Council,’’ Report submitted onbehalf of the Defence Committee, Document A=1775 (Brussels: Assembly oft h e W e s t e r n E u r o p e a n U n i o n , 4 J u n e 2 0 0 2 ) , a t h t t p :==w w w . a s s e m b l y -weu.org=en=documents=sessions_ordinaires=rpt=2002=1775.html#P179_22707;and Intelligence Forum e-mail at http:==lists.his.com=intelforum=msg04402.html21Europol was set up to deal with criminal intelligence. See its booklet entitledEuropol Intelligence Management (The Hague, n.d.).22European Union, ‘‘Conclusions Adopted by the Council (Justice and HomeAff a i r s ) , B r u s s e l s , 2 0 S e p t emb e r 2 0 0 1 , ’ ’ d o c ume n t SN 3 9 2 6=6=0 1 R E V 6(Brussels, 20 September 2001).23Frank Gregory, ‘‘The EU’s Role in the War on Terror,’’ Jane’s Terrorism &Insurgency (January 2003); Annual Report 2001 of the National Security Service(AIVD) (The Hague: AIVD, 2002), p. 55. Accessed at http:==www.aivd.nl= on

12 March 2003.24The text of the draft agreement is available as an attachment to the ForwardingNo t e f rom the Counc i l of th e European Union, ‘ ‘Agr e ement b e twe en th eEuropean Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on the Securityo f I n f o rma t i o n , ’ ’ P E SC 5 9 9 , CO SDP 4 6 3 ( B r u s s e l s : 1 8 D e c emb e r 2 0 0 2 ) .Ac c e s s e d a t h t t p :==f a c u l t y .ma xwe l l . s y r . e d u=a s r o b e r t s=f o i=l i b r a r y=g s o i a=n a t o_ eu _2 00 2_d r f t . pd f o n 1 2 M a r c h 2 00 3 . S e e a l s o NATO P r e s s R e l e a s ePR=CP(2003)022 (14 March 2003). Accessed at http:==www.nato.int on 14March 2003.25‘‘Swiss Citizen Abducted by Western Secret Service?’’, ‘‘Fortress Europe?’’ -Circular Letter (FECL) No. 46, August 1996; Lemoine, The New ChallengesFacing European Intelligence.26Annual Report 2001 of the Czech Security Information Service (BIS) (Prague: BIS,2002). Accessed at http:==www.bis.cz=eng=vz2001=vz2001.html on 10 March2003; Annual Report 2001 of the National Security Service (AIVD) (The Hague:AIVD, 2002) , p . 55 . Ac c e s s ed a t h t tp:==www.aivd.nl= on 12 Ma r ch 2003;NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001),p. 298; Lemoine, The New Challenges Facing European Intelligence.2 7E A P C A c t i o n P l a n s c a n b e f o u n d o n t h e N A T O W e b s i t e a thttp:==www.nato.int=pfp=eapc-blue.htm#work.2 8T h e a g e n d a a n d s p e e c h e s d e l i v e r e d a t t h i s m e e t i n g a r e p o s t e d a thttp:==www.nato.int=docu=conf=2002=c020222b.htm.INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION 539AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME 16, NUMBER 4Downloaded At: 20:38 17 February 201129Agence France Presse, as quoted in Southeast European Times, 11 April 2002.‘‘President Ion Iliescu Meets Participants in Symposium on Role of IntelligenceServices in XXIst Century,’’ Romanian News Agency, 12 April 2002. Accessedat http:==www.romania.fi=news_archive= on 12 March 2003.30Alan Larson, ‘‘The International Dimension of Combating the Financing ofT e r r o r i s m , ’ ’ S t a t e m e n t b e f o r e t h e U . S . S e n a t e C o m m i t t e e o n F i n a n c e(Washington, DC: 9 October 2002). In his Executive Order of 24 September2001, U.S. President George W. Bush requested that the Secretary of State, theSecretary of the Treasury, and other appropriate agencies make all efforts tocooperate and coordinate with other countries, including with respect to the

sharing of intelligence about funding activities in support of terrorism. ‘‘BushE x e c u t i v e O r d e r o n F r e e z i n g T e r r o ri s t A s s e t s ’ ’ (W a s h i n g t o n , D C : U . S .Department of State, International Information Programs, 24 September 2001).Accessed at http:==usinfo.state.gov= on 25 September 2001.31Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada, PerformanceRepo r t fo r the Pe r iod Ending Ma r ch 31, 2002 (O t tawa: M ini s t e r of Publ i cWorks and Gove rnment Se rv i c e s Canada, 2002) , pp. 1–2, 58; and J immyGurule´, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance (Washington,DC: 9 Oc tobe r 2002) , p. 14. Se e a l so Stat e me n t o f Pu r pos e o f t h e EgmontGroup of Financial Intelligence Units (The Hague, 13 June 2001).32Oleg A. Kalugin, ‘‘Window of Opportunity: Russia’s Role in the CoalitionAgainst Terror,’’ Harvard International Review, Vol. XXIV, No. 3, Fall 2002,p. 60.33Jeffrey T. Richelson, ‘‘The Calculus of Intelligence Cooperation,’’ InternationalJournal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 4, No. 3, Fall 1990, p. 315.34Ibid., pp. 315–316.35Lemoine, The New Challenges Facing European Intelligence.36See Yves Bonnet, Contre-espionnage: Me´moires d’un patron de la DST (Paris:Calmann-Le´vy, 2000).37CIA historian Kevin Conley Ruffner compiled a rich collection of documents onthis relationship, Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins of theBND, 1945–49, that was recently declassified. Thi s was not ed in Ruffne r ’ sbiographic details in the Journal of Intelligence History, Vol. 2, No. 2, Winter2002=2003 (accessed at http:==www.intelligence-history. org=jih=contributors-2-2.html on 6 March 2003); and discussed in Vincent Jauvert, ‘‘Gehlen, l’hommedu Reichet de la Maison-Blanche,’’ Le Nouvel Observateur, 11 July 2002.38Loch K. Johnson and Annette Freyberg, ‘‘Ambivalent Bedfellows: GermanA m e r i c a n I n t e l l i g e n c e R e l a t i o n s , 1 9 6 9 – 1 9 9 1 , ’ ’ I n t e r n a t i o n a l J o u r n a l o fIntelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 10, No. 2, Summer 1997, pp. 165–179.39Yigal Sheffy, ‘‘Israeli Intelligence and Counterterrorism,’’ paper presented at theannual conference of the Canadian Association for Security and IntelligenceStudies (CASIS) (Ottawa: 26–28 September 2002), p. 9.40ASIO Director General Dennis Richardson, Address to Australian IndustryGroup (Sydney, Melbourne, and Brisbane, 17, 19, and 21 February 2003).

Accessed at http:==www.asio.gov.au=Media= comp.htm on 10 March 2003.41Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Public Report 2001 (Ottawa: CSIS,2002). Accessed at http:==www.csis-scrs-gc.ca on 10 March 2003); Government ofCanada, The Canadian Security and Intelligence Community (Ottawa: PrivyCouncil Office, 2001), pp. 17–18. Accessed at http:==www.pco-bcp.gc.ca on 10March 2003.42As Paul Taillon argues, ‘‘more experience in working with foreign security,intelligence agencies and military forces may assist in an overall improvementof national intelligence services.’’ Hijacking and Hostages, p. 166.43Ibid. , p. 166; Se e a l so J effr ey T. R i chel son, ‘ ‘The Cal culus of Int e l l igenc eCooperation,’’ p. 312.44Jeffrey T. Richelson, ‘‘The Calculus of Intelligence Cooperation,’’ pp. 307–323.45Ibid., p. 314.46Paul Taillon, Hijacking and Hostages, p. 172.47Ibid., p. 172; Jeffrey T. Richelson, ‘‘The Calculus of Intelligence Cooperation,’’p. 309.48Paul Taillon, Hijacking and Hostages, p. 174.49This is a particularly sensitive issue in Canada. The Security Intelligence ReviewCommi t t e e ( SIRC) r egular ly audi t s CSIS on thi s mat t e r , whi l e be ing f ul lyconscious of the balance to be maintained between protecting Canadians andpreventing further abuses as a result of intelligence exchanges. See SecurityIntelligence Review Committee, SIRC Report 2000–2001: An Operational Audito f t h e C a n a d i a n S e c u r i t y I n t e l l i g e n c e S e r v i c e (Ot tawa : P u b l i c Wo r k s an dGovernment Services Canada, 2001), p. 7.50Security Intelligence Review Committee, SIRC Report 2001–2002: An OperationalAudit of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (Ottawa: Public Works andGovernment Services Canada, 2002), p. 19.51Tom Blackwell, ‘‘Kidnapping Ruling May Pose Security Threat,’’ The NationalPost, Canada, 14 September 2002.52Paul Taillon, Hijacking and Hostages, p. 175.53Bruce Page, David Leitch, and Philip Knightley, with an introduction by John leCarre´, The Philby Conspiracy (Toronto: Fontana Books, 1968), pp. 2, 187–188;

John Prados, President’s Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operationsf rom Wo r ld Wa r I I th rough the Pe r s ian Gu l f, r ev i s ed and updat ed edi t ion(Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996 [1986]), pp. 48, 50.54Bruce Page, et al., The Philby Conspiracy, pp. 234–235.55This led Britain to build the Blue Danube atomic bomb. Michael Smith, ‘‘MoDShows Terrorists How to Make an A-Bomb,’’ The Daily Telegraph, 15 April2002, p. 1. Coope rat ion was r e s tor ed i n 1958. Pe t e r H enne s sy , Th e S e c r e tState: Whitehall and the Cold War, p. 59.56Martin Bright, ‘‘GCHQ Arrest over Observer Spying Report,’’ The Observer, 9Mar ch 2003. Thi s was compounded by s tor i e s that the Uni t ed Stat e s wasclearly reluctant to share intelligence with UN inspectors in Iraq for fears ‘‘thats ens i t ive i nformat ion might be l eaked to th e I raqi s and that int e l l igenc e -gathering sources could be compromised.’’ Rajiv Chandrasekaran and ColumLynch. ‘‘U.N. Officials Say Intelligence to Prove US Claims Is Lacking,’’ TheWashington Post, 27 January 2003, p. 12.57Ian Davis and David Isenberg, ‘‘The Long History of UN Espionage,’’ TheObserver, 9 March 2003.58Jeffrey T. Richelson, ‘‘The Calculus of Intelligence Cooperation,’’ p. 316; BobWoodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981–1987 (New York: Simonand Schuster, 1987), pp. 160–161.59Other factors include: a) ‘‘nations that provide key intelligence may seek to extortpolitical or other benefits from a partner, or to avoid sanctions;’’ b) ‘‘participationin international intelligence arrangements may also cause a nation to conductintelligence operations of little or no direct use to its own security;’’ and c)‘‘Finally, nations may risk, or so believe, serious embarrassment when detailsof intelligence sharing become public.’’ Jeffrey T. Richelson, ‘‘The Calculus ofIntelligence Cooperation,’’ pp. 317–318. For a general discussion, see alsoMichael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1996), pp. 200–220.60For a short overview, see Arthur S. Hulnick, ‘‘Intelligence Cooperation in thePost-Cold War Era: A New Game Plan?’’ International Journal of Intelligenceand CounterIntelligence, Vol. 5, No. 4, Winter 1991–1992, pp. 455–465.