The Doctrine of DoubleShort

8/12/2019 The Doctrine of DoubleShort

1/25

Alternative Formulation of the Duty Not to Harm People might doubt whether the doing/allowing distinction

can be made in a non-question begging way, whether it is

morally relevant, or both.

However, many of them still think that it is wrong to chop up

Chuck to save five patients in the Organ Transplant Case.

These people might well doubt what I said last time: Isnt

there a distinction alternative to the doing/allowing

distinction, which can explain why chopping up Chuck iswrong? And they are right: there are possible alternatives.

Today, we are going to examine one possible alternative: the

intending/merely foreseeing distinction.


2/25

The Principle of Double Effect

Copyright 2005 Makoto Suzuki


3/25

Aims for Day 6

Understand the Principle of Double Effect, its motivations

and Problems

Understand A General Puzzleabout Ordinary

Injunctions


4/25

The Principle of Double Effect (PDE)

(Timmons, 78) Roman Catholic moral theologians, such as Thomas Aquinas,

have held a principle called the Principle of Double Effect(PDE). Many non-Catholics also have held this principle.

Many contemporary philosophers have examined whethersome version of PDE is correct.

The core of PDE is the distinction between the intended effectand the merely foreseen effect.

PDE takes (1) an action with an intended harm to require moreto justify than (2) an action with the same amount of harmmerely foreseen. That is, according to PDE, (1) is moredifficult to justify.


5/25

The Classical Formulation of PDE

(Timmons, 78-9)

Whenever an action would produce at least one good and onebad effect, then one is permitted to perform the act if and only if

all of the following are met:

1. The act, apart from its effect, is not wrong;

2. The bad effect is not intended by the agent. There are twoprincipal ways in which an effect might be intended:

a. Any effect that is a chosen end of action is intended.

b. Any effect that is a means for bringing about some intendedend is also intended.3. The bad effect is not out of proportion to the good effect.

(That is, the badness is muchsmaller than the goodness. How much?

Well, nobody has specified the ratio.)


6/25

Ends, Means and Side Effects Ex.: I might aim at earning a skydiving certificate. This is one of my

ends. The achievement of this end is helped by several things: e.g.,

accumulating certain hours of instruction and passing a writtentest. When I try to accomplish these things for this reason, they arecalled the means to the end.

In this situation, if I earn the skydiving certificate by accumulatingthe hours of instruction and passing the written test, these (earningthe certificate, accumulating the hours, and passing the test) arecalled intended effects.

I expect many things happen as I try to earn the skydivingcertificate. For example, I expect that I will get acquainted withother people interested in earning the certificate, that I will losesome time for hanging out with my friends, studying or listening tomusic, and so on. They are not the parts of my plan, so if theyhappen, they are called (expected) side effects.


7/25

The Alleged Categories of Effects

Expected Effects

Merely

Foreseen

Effects

IntendedEffects

Intended

as Ends

Intended as

Means

Unexpected

Effects

Q1: Side effects include merely foreseen effects andunexpectedeffects i.e., all effects exce t intended effects .


8/25

Notes on the Classical Formulation

The Classical Formulation makes PDE an

absolute principle: no exception is permitted.

That is, if an action fails to satisfy any of theconditions, it is necessarily wrong.

But some may want to mitigate it so that it allows

certain exceptions.

These people can still keep the basic feature of

PDE: an action with an intended harm to

require more to justify than an action with the

same amount of harm merely foreseen.


9/25

The Application of PDE:

Bomber Examples Both Bomber T and Bomber S have the goal of

weakening a really evil but super-powerful enemy.

Each intends to pursue this goal by dropping bombs.

Bomber Ts plan is to bomb the school in the enemysterritory, thereby killing children of the enemy and

terrorizing the enemys population.

Bomber Ss plan is to bomb the enemys munitions

plant, thereby undermining the enemys war effort.However, he also knows that next to the munitions

plant is a school, and that when he bombs the plant, he

will also destroy the school, killing the children inside.


10/25

PDE: Bomber Examples

Suppose that both bombings have the good effect, i.e.,weakening the really evil but super-powerful enemy,

which in proportion to the harm of killing children etc.

If so, PDE apparently tells that Bomber Ts action iswrong while Bomber Ss action is permissible.

Why? Bomber T intends to kill the children while

(apparently) Bomber S merely foresees his bombing willkill the children: for Bomber S, killing children is a merely

foreseen side-effect. (Chart 1)

What do you think about this judgment?


11/25

Chart 1: Bomber ExamplesBomber T

Action: Bombing

Bomber S

Action: Bombing

Means:

Killing the children

in school and

terrorizing the

enemys population

End:

Weakening the

evil but super-

powerful enemy

Means:

Destroying the

enemys

munitions plant

End:

Weakening the

evil but super-

powerful enemy

Impermissible!

Permissible!


12/25

The Difference between Intending/Merely

Foreseeing Distinction and and the

Doing/Allowing DistinctionThese two distinctions are distinct: dont confuse

them!

The cases of doing harm is not always the cases ofintending harm.

One can do harm unintendedly.

Ex.: Bomber SThe cases of allowing harm is not always the cases of

merely foreseeing harm.One can allow harm intendedly.

Ex.: Passive Euthanasia


13/25

n epen ence o t e st nct ons:Ex : Euthanasia PDE holds the distinction between intending harm and merely

foreseeing harm.

According to PDE, not only active euthanasia but also

passive euthanasia are wrong because in both cases, doctors

intends the death of the patients for their own sake.In contrast, if we hold the distinction between doing harm

and allowing harm, only active euthanasia is wrong.

According to PDE, injecting a pain-taking but life-shorteningdrug might be permissible because the doctor merely

foresees the patients death.(Chart 2)

In contrast, if we hold the distinction between doing harm

and allowing harm, this is wrong because it is doing harm.


14/25

Chart 2: Euthanasia Passive Euthanasia

Stopping treatment etc.(Action)

Impermissible!

Active EuthanasiaGiving poison etc.

(Action)

Impermissible!

Life-Shortening Drug

Giving anodyne etc.

(Action)

Permissible!

Means:

The death of the

patient

End:

Saving the

patient fromsuffering or the

loss of dignity

Means:

The death of the

patient

End:

Saving the

patient from

suffering or the

loss of dignity

End: Easing the

patients suffering

Side Effect: Shortening

the patients life


15/25

Independence of the

Distinctions: Ex.: EuthanasiaIntending Merely

Foreseeing

Doing Active(Intended)Euthanasia

Actively butUnintendedlyAccelerated

Death

Allowing Passive(Intended)Euthanasia

Passively andUnintendedlyAccelerated

Death


16/25

Motivations for PDE


17/25

How does PDE deal with the Organ

Transplant Case and the Trolley Example?

We started the investigation of the

fundamental obligation not to harm

individuals with these two examples. If PDE vindicates our respective views on

each case, the principle is plausible to some

extent.Thus, lets consider what judgments PDE

give about each case.


18/25

Organ Transplant Case Imagine that there are five patients, each of

whom will soon die unless they receive anappropriate transplanted organ: one needs aheart, two need kidneys, one needs a liver, and

the fifth needs new lungs. Unfortunately, due totissue incompatibilities, none of the five can act asdonor for the others. But here is Chuck, who is inthe hospital for some fairly routine tests. The

hospital computer reveals that his tissue iscompletely compatible with the five patients. Youare a surgeon, and it now occurs to you that youcould chop up Chuck and use his organs to savethe five others.


19/25

PDE and The Organ Transplant Case

In this case, the surgeon intends to chop up

Chuck (in order to save the five patients).

According to PDE, intendedly harming anindividual is wrong, so the surgeons

chopping up Chuck is wrong.

This vindicates ordinary views on thisexample.


20/25

The TrolleyExample

Frank is the only passenger on a trolley whose driver hasjust shouted that the trolleys brakes have failed, and whothen died of the shock. On the track ahead of him are five

people; the banks are so steep that they will not be able toget off the track in time. The track has a spur leading off tothe right, and Frank can turn the trolley onto it.Unfortunately there is one person on the right-hand track.Frank can turn the trolley, killing the one; or he can refrainfrom turning the trolley, letting the five die.


21/25

The Trolley Example

Frank


22/25

PDE and the Trolley Example In this case, in changing the course of the trolley, Frank

does not intend the harm or death of any person. Thus,the action will be permissible (only) as far as the

proportionality condition is satisfied: the bad consequence

the death of one person

is not out of proportion to thegood consequence the survival of five people.

Then, PDE might vindicate ordinary peoples view.

On this point, PDE might do better than the doing/allowingview. Since changing the course of the trolley does harm

to one person, the doing/allowing view will take it to be

wrong.


23/25

Criticisms of PDE

1. Counterintuitive Results

2. Existence of Alternative Descriptions

3. Doubts about the Relevance of the

Distinction between Intended harm andMerely Foreseen harm


24/25

Problem 1. Counterintuitive ResultsConsider Foots Gas example.

Suppose that if a doctor operates to save the livesof five patients, this will inevitably release somepoisonous gas so that he will end up killing a sixthperson who cannot be moved out of harms way.

Suppose there are other ways to save the fivepatients. We will then think that the operation iswrong.

However, the doctor does not intend the harm to thesixth person. The act of operation itself seems allright. Thus, the operation is prohibited by PDE only ifthe harm to the patient is out of proportion.


25/25

Can the Proportionality Condition Help? However, remember what PDE says about the trolley

example. PDE says it is permissible to change the course ofthe trolley only as far as the bad consequence one

persons death is not out of proportion to the good

consequencethe survival of five people.

Consistency seems to require that if this is not out ofproportion, one persons death is not out of proportion to the

survival of five people in Foots Gas example.

That is, if it is permissible to change the course in the

trolley example, the operation is also permissible in the

Gas example; and if the operation is not permissible,

changing the course is neither permissible. Either way, PDE

diverges from ordinary views somewhere

Documents

The Doctrine of DoubleShort