The ECB’s communication maintains a ... - BNP Paribas

The ECB communication is an increasingly challenging exercise. On one side the central bank is more and more confident about the solidity of the recovery: it has recently upgraded its GDP projections as well as its risk assessment on the growth outlook. But, on the other side, the central bank remains very cautious when it comes to inflation developments, still subdued despite the improving cyclical outlook.

The speech pronounced this week by Mario Draghi at the ECB forum on Central Banking perfectly illustrates this balancing act and the difficulties it entails. The President of the ECB has shown strong confidence about the monetary policy efficiency: the decline in interest rates has triggered a solid economic growth, deflationary pressures have been replaced by reflationary forces. In this context, the ECB stands ready to accompany the recovery that is to say to increase interest rates in line with the pick-up in inflation in order to maintain a constant policy stance.

The confidence expressed by Draghi in his speech has been interpreted by the markets as a sign of an imminent monetary tightening. The euro surged against the dollar. Yet, the speech also underlined the need for the ECB to be persistent and prudent given, in particular, the uncertainties surrounding the real extent of labour market underutilization. In other words, inflation should gradually pick up but it could take more time than currently forecast.

Such a communication maintains a certain ambiguity over the direction of monetary policy. Still, this stance comes with an advantage: the positive effect of avoiding too abrupt a transition from a resolutely accommodating ECB (as has been the case since mid-2014) and an ECB equally resolutely committed to the path to normalisation (which would seem premature).

■The ECB’s communication maintains a certain ambiguity over the direction of monetary policy ■This

permits to avoid too abrupt a transition from easing to normalisation

EUROZONE, GDP AND CORE INFLATION

-- GDP y/y -- inflation y/y (RHS)

Source: Eurostat

Recommended reading

Markets Overview

Indicators

Economic scenario

Economic Forecasts

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Ecoweek 17-26 // 30 June 2017 economic-research.bnpparibas.com

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■ Monetary policy normalisation is a balancing act: tighten too early could trigger a recession, hike too late could mean an inflation overshoot and a need to raise rates more aggressively ■ The reaction of financial markets adds to the complexity of the balancing act ■ Different factors have made the job of central banks more difficult in recent years Monetary policy normalisation, which in the current environment consists of adopting a less expansionary policy stance, confronts central banks with challenging questions: when to start, what should be the pace, which guidance should be provided?

The answers are important for households, companies and in particular for financial markets, all the more so because the reaction of the latter can weaken or, more likely, reinforce a given impulse coming from the central bank. Weakening would occur if e.g. equity markets would rally because they see a monetary tightening as a signal that according to the central bank the economy is in good shape or because the central bank tightens policy less than expected. Reinforcement would occur if equities would drop and/or credit spreads widen because the required risk premium rises as investors become more risk averse because of increased concern about the economic outlook.

Wage dynamics have changed

These reactions could in turn impact the real economy via spending, hiring and corporate investment decisions. The different outcomes lead to the obvious conclusion that it’s important to do the right thing. This also applies when looking at it from the perspective of the real economy. Too slow a pace of tightening would mean that the central bank ends up “being behind the curve”: rates are too low considering the output gap and the amount of slack in the labour market. Hike rates too fast and one runs the risk of killing the upswing.

On this matter, the past two weeks have seen two important contributions to a debate which has become very intense. Chapter 4 of the 87th annual report of the Bank for International Settlements1 discusses how monetary policy is “inching towards normalisation”. Wage dynamics play a key role: labour market bottlenecks should eventually cause wages to grow faster than productivity forcing companies to increase their prices (unless their competitive positioning would force them to accept a decline in profit margins). However, despite the decline in the unemployment rate in e.g. the US or the UK, wage growth has been more subdued than in previous cycles. According to the BIS this reflects a long-term trend of “labour’s declining pricing power” due to the huge expansion of the global labour force

1 BIS, 87th annual report 2016-2017, Building, https://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2017e.htm

(increased globalisation, changes in global value chains) and industrial automation.

Wage growth and inflation should eventually accelerate

In addition, the relationship between unit labour costs and inflation has become weaker. However, even a weak relationship would still imply that reduced slack would eventually lead to a pick-up in inflation, possibly in a non-linear way. Central banks are faced with a balancing act: tighten early under the belief that inflation will rise could, via higher real rates of interest, act as a big headwind for growth if inflation does not pick up. Financial markets would also suffer, which in turn could have second-round effects on the real economy. Acting late implies low rates for longer which could lead to higher asset prices and an abrupt correction when it turns out that the central bank should have hiked rates earlier. This in turn would weigh on economic growth.

The BIS eloquently discusses the issues but does not provide a policy recommendation in terms of hiking rates or not, probably because this is out of its remit. At most it emphasizes the need of enhanced central bank cooperation, which is a valid point considering the international spillover effects of monetary policy conducted by the major central banks. Kristin Forbes, external member of the monetary policy committee of the Bank of England, on the other hand, does at least for the UK express a clear opinion. In her recent, particularly rich speech2 on “Failure to launch” she starts from the observation that although global growth has been above 3% for seven years in a row and that global inflation is picking up, no central bank of an advanced economy3, except the US, has tightened policy since 2011.

What explains the reluctance to tighten?

Several explanations are provided for this reluctance to tighten. Lingering concern about the fundamental weakness of the economy is one but in her view this argument has lost much of its power. A second explanation concerns the role of central banks. Their toolkit has broadened and now also includes using the balance sheet (QE) and applying forward guidance in addition to setting interest rates. Many central banks also have a macroprudential policy role. The

2 Kristin Forbes, Failure to launch, Bank of England, 22 June 2017, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/2017/985.aspx 3 The sample excludes Denmark, Hong Kong, Singapore and Iceland.

https://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2017e.htm



http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/2017/985.aspx

http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/2017/985.aspx


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simultaneous use of several tools would allow for fewer or at least a slower pace of rate hikes. In addition, central bank action has also become much more visible and subject to public scrutiny, which may influence the policy stance, e.g. by paying more attention to the short rather than the longer horizon. A third explanation is about constraints on central bank policy. With still very low interest rates, the case can be made that the cost of tightening too much is bigger than ending up behind the curve. The former would mean a significant growth slowdown or even a recession, which would be hard to address given the limited leeway, if any, to cut rates.

Forbes doesn’t buy this “out of ammunition” argument because the balance sheet could always be increased. A more important constraint is the exchange rate: currency appreciation on the back on rate hikes expectations would imply a tightening of financial and monetary conditions, weigh on the growth outlook via exports, and reduce the need for traditional rate hikes. Against this background and focusing on the fundamentals of the British economy, she argues that “the lift-off of UK interest rates should not be delayed any longer”, all the more considering that sterling weakness will have a persistent upward influence on inflation.

4 Rudiger Dornbusch, Expectations and exchange rate dynamics, Journal of Political Economy, 1976, vol. 84 nr 6, http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdfplus/10.1086/260506

Monetary policy and different adjustment speeds of the real economy

vs asset prices Back in 1976, Rudiger Dornbusch published his seminal article on exchange rate overshooting4. A monetary easing weakens the currency in the long run but because of different adjustment speeds between foreign exchange markets and the real economy, the exchange rate overshoots: an excessive depreciation in the short run is followed by a gradual appreciation. The bigger the monetary easing, the bigger the depreciation of the exchange rate in the long run and the bigger the overshooting in the short run.

It is tempting to transpose this framework to the relationship between monetary policy, asset markets and the real economy when analysing central bank policy. Asset prices are a key variable in the conduct of monetary policy. Not only do they reflect expectations about the economy as well as the risk appetite of market participants thereby providing useful information to the central bank (signalling role) but they also are a key transmission channel for monetary policy. Interest rate cuts and QE can support asset prices via higher growth expectations and a lower required risk premium.

If the adjustment speed of the real economy is very slow, i.e. if it takes considerable time for inflation to pick up, a central bank which is following an inflation-targeting policy may very well decide to keep rates low for longer and to continue with QE. Quite likely this could squeeze risk premia further to levels well below historical reference points. The longer the expansionary stance would be maintained, the bigger the squeeze on risk premia.

There is concern that this gradual overshooting would eventually be followed by a market correction: when the real economy at long last reacts to years of expansionary policy, the increase in wage growth and inflation would force the central bank to react more strongly, which would increase the required risk premium and weigh on asset prices. Via wealth and confidence effects this could turn into a headwind for the real economy.

http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdfplus/10.1086/260506

http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdfplus/10.1086/260506


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Markets overview

The essentials

10 y bond yield, OAT vs Bund Euro-dollar CAC 40

Money & Bond Markets

10y bond yield & spreads

Commodities

Oil (Brent, $) Gold (Ounce, $) CRB Foods

Exchange Rates Equity indices

* MSCI index

Week 23-6 17 > 29-6-17

CAC 40 5 266 } 5 154 -2.1 %

S&P 500 2 438 } 2 420 -0.8 %

Volatility (VIX) 10.0 } 11.4 +1.4 %

Euribor 3M (%) -0.33 } -0.33 +0.0 bp

Libor $ 3M (%) 1.29 } 1.30 +0.3 bp

OAT 10y (%) 0.60 } 0.80 +20.0 bp

Bund 10y (%) 0.26 } 0.45 +19.5 bp

US Tr. 10y (%) 2.14 } 2.27 +12.3 bp

Euro vs dollar 1.12 } 1.14 +2.0 %

Gold (ounce, $) 1 256 } 1 244 -1.0 %

Oil (Brent, $) 45.7 } 47.7 +4.6 %

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2015 2016 201729 Jun

1.14

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2015 2016 201729 Jun 3 800

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4 600

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5 154

2015 2016 201729 Jun

Interest Rates

€ ECB 0.00 0.00 at 02/01 0.00 at 02/01

Eonia -0.36 -0.33 at 02/06 -0.37 at 05/06

Euribor 3M -0.33 -0.32 at 02/01 -0.33 at 10/04

Euribor 12M -0.16 -0.08 at 02/01 -0.16 at 23/06

$ FED 1.25 1.25 at 15/06 0.75 at 02/01

Libor 3M 1.30 1.30 at 28/06 1.00 at 02/01

Libor 12M 1.74 1.83 at 15/03 1.68 at 06/01

£ BoE 0.25 0.25 at 02/01 0.25 at 02/01

Libor 3M 0.30 0.37 at 05/01 0.29 at 21/06

Libor 12M 0.66 0.78 at 09/01 0.61 at 14/06

At 29-6-17

highest' 17 lowest' 17 Yield (%)

€ AVG 5-7y 0.31 0.68 at 17/03 0.18 at 21/06

Bund 2y -0.61 -0.60 at 27/06 -0.96 at 24/02

Bund 10y 0.45 0.49 at 10/03 0.09 at 02/01

OAT 10y 0.80 1.14 at 06/02 0.59 at 14/06

Corp. BBB 1.43 1.65 at 01/02 1.29 at 26/06

$ Treas. 2y 1.36 1.38 at 14/03 1.14 at 24/02

Treas. 10y 2.27 2.61 at 13/03 2.14 at 26/06

Corp. BBB 3.53 3.90 at 14/03 3.46 at 14/06

£ Treas. 2y 0.33 0.33 at 29/06 0.01 at 28/02

Treas. 10y 1.18 1.51 at 26/01 0.87 at 14/06

At 29-6-17

highest' 17 lowest' 17

5.43% Greece 498 pb

3.03% Portugal 257 pb

2.15% Italy 170 pb

1.53% Spain 107 pb

0.86% Ireland 40 pb

0.80% France 35 pb

0.78% Belgium 32 pb

0.64% Netherlands18 pb

0.61% Austria 15 pb

0.50% Finland 4 pb

0.45% Germany

Spot price in dollars 2017(€)

Oil, Brent 48 46 at 26/06 -22.3%

Gold (ounce) 1 244 1 156 at 03/01 -0.8%

Metals, LMEX 2 853 2 639 at 03/01 -1.0%

Copper (ton) 5 931 5 462 at 08/05 -0.9%

CRB Foods 368 325 at 24/04 +0.3%

w heat (ton) 180 146 at 24/04 +13.9%

Corn (ton) 133 130 at 23/03 -7.4%

At 29-6-17 Variations

lowest' 17

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36

42

48

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66 72

48

2015 2016 201729 Jun 1 050

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2015 2016 201729 Jun

1€ = 2017

USD 1.14 1.14 at 29/06 1.04 at 03/01 +8.3%

GBP 0.88 0.88 at 12/06 0.84 at 19/04 +3.0%

CHF 1.09 1.10 at 10/05 1.06 at 08/02 +2.0%

JPY 128.65 128.65 at 29/06 115.57 at 17/04 +4.6%

AUD 1.49 1.52 at 01/06 1.37 at 23/02 +2.2%

CNY 7.75 7.75 at 22/05 7.22 at 03/01 +5.7%

BRL 3.77 3.77 at 29/06 3.24 at 15/02 +9.7%

RUB 67.47 67.48 at 28/06 59.66 at 17/04 +4.8%

INR 73.80 73.80 at 29/06 68.18 at 07/04 +3.1%


highest' 17 lowest' 17 Index 2017 2017(€)

CAC 40 5 154 5 432 at 05/05 4 749 at 31/01 +6.0% +6.0%

S&P500 2 420 2 453 at 19/06 2 239 at 02/01 +8.1% -0.2%

DAX 12 416 12 889 at 19/06 11 510 at 06/02 +8.1% +8.1%

Nikkei 20 220 20 230 at 20/06 18 336 at 14/04 +5.8% +1.2%

China* 73 74 at 08/06 59 at 02/01 +25.0% +14.8%

India* 533 546 at 05/06 445 at 03/01 +13.6% +10.2%

Brazil* 1 692 2 001 at 22/02 1 639 at 21/06 +2.5% -6.6%

Russia* 511 622 at 03/01 497 at 22/06 -17.4% -21.7%


highest' 17 lowest' 17


6

Indicators France

Friday 7 July – Production index (May, m/m)

April May Over 3-m The improvement in business

confidence signals a production

rebound. -0.5% 0.6%

Eurozone

Monday 3 – Unemployment rate (May)

April May Over 3-m The unemployment rate should

continue to decline. 9.3% 9.2%

Wednesday 5 – Composite PMI Final Estimate (June)

May June Over 3-m The final estimate should confirm the

decline of the composite PMI.

56.8 55.7

Wednesday 5 – Retail sales (May)

April June Over 3-m Continued growth in retail sales

expected 0.1% 0.3%

United States

Monday 3 – Manufacturing ISM (June)

May June Over 3-m The manufacturing sentiment is not

deteriorating : it is only back to more

normal strength. 54.9 55.1

Thursday 6 – Non-manufacturing ISM (June)

May June Over 3-m Meanwhile, business confidence keeps

on historical highs in the non-

manufacturing sector. 56.9 56.5

Friday 7 – Labour market report (June)

May June Over 3-m

Non-farm payrolls have been

expending for 80 months in a row… 138k 180k

4.3% 4.3% … driving the unemployment rate well

below the estimated NAIRU…

+2.5% +2.6% … which is still not mirrored in strong.

wage growth

France: Production and business confidence

▬ Manufacturing production [ y-o-y, %, rhs] ▬ Manufacturing PMI [adv. 2-months, lhs]

Sources: INSEE, Markit

Eurozone: Unemployment rate

Source: Eurostat

United States: Labour prospects

▬ M&N employment component ; ▬ Job creations (m/m, 3-m m.a., 000s, r.h.s.)

Sources: BNP Paribas Economic Research, BLS, ISM

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34

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2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

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1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017

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1997 2002 2007 2012 2017


7

Economic scenario

UNITED STATES Annual growth, % 2016 2017 e 2018 e

GDP 1.6 2.2 2.6

Priv ate consumption 2.7 2.8 2.8

Gross Fix ed Capital Formation -0.5 5.0 5.5

Ex ports 0.4 3.0 2.6

Consumer Price Index (CPI) 1.3 2.0 2.5

CPI ex food and energy 2.2 2.1 2.7

Unemploy ment rate 4.9 4.6 4.2

Current account balance -2.6 -2.8 -3.1

Fed. Gov t. Budget Balance (% of GDP) -3.1 -2.9 -3.5

Gross Fed. Gov t. Debt (% GDP) 75.9 76.2 76.8

GDP growth keeps on a decent 2% pace and may have picked-up in Q2.

However the fiscal outlook remains uncertain. A fiscal stimulus still is

possible, but it would not be implemented before end-2017. Potential effects

are thus uncertain.

The labour market is buoyant than ever. Still, the support to households’

disposable income is not as strong as it looks as wage inflation remains

limited.

With inflation relatively muted at this stage of the cycle, the Fed is in no

rush to increase rates.. We forecast the Fed Funds target rates to come at

1.25/1.50% by year-end, 2/2.5% by mid 2018.

CHINA

After a period of stabilisation since Q2 2016, growth is expected to slow down moderately in the short term.

Exports should continue to rebound and infrastructure projects will continue to drive investment. However the downside risks are high due to the reduction in industrial production capacity, risks of a downturn in the real estate market and greater financial instability, and slow growth of household revenues.

The authorities are expected to maintain an expansionist fiscal policy, while the central bank continues to tighten monetary conditions very cautiously.

EUROZONE Annual growth, % 2016 2017 e 2018 e

GDP 1.7 1.9 1.6


Gross Fix ed Capital Formation 3.5 1.9 2.6

Ex ports 2.9 4.5 3.9




Current account balance 3.3 3.6 3.5

Gen. Gov t. Balance (% of GDP) -1.5 -1.4 -1.3

Public Debt (% GDP) 91.3 90.3 89.0

The recovery is getting stronger and broader: the dispersion of economic

performances among member states is receding.

Despite the cyclical recovery, core inflation still shows no sign of a

convincing upward trend. For the recovery to enter its inflationary phase the

economy has to improve further, until the point at which wages will tend to

increase.

The level of slack remains uncertain though. Broader measures of labor

underutilization reach 18%, double the level of the current unemployment

rate. The ECB is expected to remain cautious.

FRANCE Annual growth, % 2016 2017 e 2018 e

GDP 1.1 1.6 1.6


Gross Fix ed Capital Formation 2.7 2.4 3.1

Ex ports 1.2 2.9 3.7

Consumer Price Index (HCPI) 0.3 1.3 1.0



Current account balance -0.9 -1.1 -0.9


Public Debt (% GDP) 96.3 96.3 96.2

A clear growth acceleration is underway. Higher rates of growth should

resume. Households’ consumption is supported by the jobs recovery but

restrained by the upturn in inflation. Investment and exports dynamics are

favourable. Risks lie slightly on the upside.

We expect the output gap to slowly narrow and the unemployment rate

to progressively decline, containing the rise in inflation.

Fiscal policy should continue to combine growth supportive measures

and consolidation ones. The fiscal deficit should not be a lot more reduced

but it should remain below the 3% threshold.

Sources: BNP Paribas Group Economic Research, European Commission ;e: Estimates and forecasts

Annual growth, % 2016 2017 e 2018 e

GDP 6.7 6.6 6.4

Industrial output 6.0 6.5 6.0

Gross Fix ed Capital Formation (nominal) 8.1 8.5 8.0

Ex ports (nominal) -7.7 6.0 5.0


Producer Price Index (PPI) 6.0 6.5 6.0

Current account (% GDP) 1.8 1.4 1.1


Foreign reserv es ($bn) FXRES$3 011 3 024 3 072


8

Economic forecasts

Financial forecasts

Interest rates, % 2017 2018 ######## ######## ########

End of period Q1 Q2e Q3e Q4e Q1e Q2e Q3e Q4e 2016 2017e 2018e

US Fed Funds 1.00 1.25 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00 2.25 2.50 0.75 1.50 2.50

Libor 3m $ 1.15 1.20 1.50 1.75 1.90 2.05 2.25 2.45 1.00 1.75 2.45

T-Notes 10y 2.40 2.20 2.60 3.00 3.10 3.25 3.25 3.25 2.45 3.00 3.25

Ezone Taux "refi" BCE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.25

Euribor 3 mois -0.33 -0.33 -0.36 -0.36 -0.36 -0.36 -0.16 0.05 -0.32 -0.36 0.05

Bund 10y 0.33 0.29 0.60 0.80 1.00 1.20 1.40 1.50 0.11 0.80 1.50

OAT 10y 0.97 0.74 1.05 1.25 1.45 1.65 1.80 1.90 0.69 1.25 1.90

UK Base rate 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.50

Gilts 10y 1.07 1.00 1.10 1.25 1.40 1.55 1.80 2.00 1.24 1.25 2.00

Japan BoJ Rate -0.06 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.06 -0.10 -0.10

JGB 10y 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.08

Exchange Rates 2017 2018

End of period Q1 Q2e Q3e Q4e Q1e Q2e Q3e Q4e 2016 2017e 2018e

USD EUR / USD 1.07 1.10 1.07 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.08 1.10 1.05 1.04 1.10

USD / JPY 111 115 117 120 118 116 114 112 117 120 112

GBP / USD 1.25 1.31 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.29 1.29 1.29 1.24 1.30 1.29

USD / CHF 1.00 1.00 1.05 1.08 1.07 1.06 1.04 1.05 1.02 1.08 1.05

EUR EUR / GBP 0.86 0.84 0.82 0.80 0.81 0.82 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.80 0.85

EUR / CHF 1.07 1.10 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.15 1.07 1.12 1.15

EUR / JPY 119 127 125 125 124 123 123 123 123 125 123

Source : BNP Paribas Group Economic Research / GlobalMarkets (e: Estimates & forecasts)

% 2016 2017 e 2018 e 2019 e 2016 2017 e 2018 e 2019 e

Advanced 1.7 2.0 1.9 1.2 0.8 1.7 1.9 2.0

United-States 1.6 2.2 2.6 1.3 1.3 2.0 2.5 2.8

Japan 1.0 1.4 1.0 0.2 -0.1 0.6 0.7 0.5

United-Kingdom 1.8 1.8 1.1 2.0 0.6 2.6 2.6 2.3

Euro Area 1.7 1.9 1.6 1.3 0.2 1.6 1.4 1.6

Germany 1.8 2.0 1.9 1.4 0.4 1.8 1.7 1.7

France 1.1 1.6 1.6 1.4 0.3 1.3 1.0 1.1

Italy 1.0 1.2 0.6 0.5 -0.1 1.6 1.2 1.3

Spain 3.2 2.8 2.2 1.8 -0.3 2.1 1.6 1.8

Emerging 4.1 4.6 4.9 4.8 4.4 3.2 3.5 3.7

China 6.7 6.6 6.4 6.5 2.0 1.8 2.3 2.5

India 7.1 7.5 7.9 8.0 4.5 4.6 4.9 5.1

Brazil -3.6 0.5 3.0 2.5 8.8 4.0 4.4 3.8

Russia -0.2 1.4 1.6 1.5 7.1 4.5 4.5 4.8

World 3.1 3.5 3.7 3.3 2.8 2.6 2.8 3.0

Source : BNP Paribas Group Economic Research, European Commision (e: Estimates & forecasts,)

GDP Growth Inflation

© BNP Paribas (2015). All rights reserved. Prepared by Economic Research – BNP PARIBAS

Registered Office: 16 boulevard des Italiens – 75009 PARIS

Tel: +33 (0) 1.42.98.12.34 – Internet :

www.group.bnpparibas.com

Publisher: Jean Lemierre. Editor: William De Vijlder

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The ECB’s communication maintains a ... - BNP Paribas